DRAFT WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: BRIEF

25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
 Approved For lease 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T008214000900030001-5
25X1
Following draft, dissemed 5-DD1, 5-DOCJ, 2
25X1
War in Vietnam
Chinese Attitude
Hong Kong
Middle East
6:15 minutes
2:45
1:00
4qF45
15 minutes+/-
25X1
25X1
Only limited surgery was performed on draft con-
tributions
ana in any event it is i icu at is point, wit
the way things are moving, to determine which phase
should give up its pound of flesh.
Hopefully, pieces are organized so that the
bulk of the detailed current reporting can be
inserted at the breaks on pages 2 and 11, x avoiding
major rewrite and total reproduction of the remainder.
I
State Department review(s) completed.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
will handle further processing for you)
 Approved For, le+se 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T0p82 00900030001-5
23 May 1967
DRAFT WHIT, HOUSE
BRIEFING FOR DCI
1. The increasing Communist commitment to a major
confrontation along the D.M.Z. in Vietnam
appears to me to be the keystone of a new
Communist strategy designed to cope with our
present military posture in South Vietnam.
A. When the major search-and-destroy operations
began reaching new peaks of effectiveness,
you will recall that there were indications
that the enemy was considering a reversion to
classic guerrilla warfare, avoiding contact
with major troop units as much as possible.
B. As of this morning, however, we know of
elements of five North Vietnamese divisions
in and around the DMZ--and they do not appear
to be evading contact at the expense of important
positions.
1. The incoming rocket, mortar, and artillery
fire is increasing in frequency, intensity,
and weight, coming from larger weapons not
used by the enemy before this year.
1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
 Approved For ReWso
FAW900030001-5
2. At the same time that we have a major
operation in progress in the Demilitarized
Zone, the enemy is continuing his efforts to
build up the pressure against the Marine
base at Con Thien.
NB: Intent of this arrangement is to
facilitate putting fresh and updating
material into the foregoing paragraphs,
in hopes that the basic argument which
follows will stand.
25X1
Approved For Rele - 0827A000900030001-5
 25X1
Approved For Rey@,ase
27AQ P900030001-5
II. This apparent paradox in enemy strategy, we believe,
reflects a Communist attempt to play for a stalemate.
A. The new DMZ "front," according to captured enemy
documents, is intended to draw in enough allied
reaction forces so that the Communists will be
able to regain some initiative in the highlands,
the central coastal lowlands, and in the III
Corps area, where they have suffered a number
of substantial defeats since U.S. forces were
introduced.
B. There is plentiful evidence of every type that
the enemy plans major offensives in each of
these areas during the summer months. These
will have a number of objectives:
1. They will try to re-establish control or
influence over areas they have lost. This
will make a particular target of pacification
efforts.
2. They will be looking for psychological
victories which might shake public faith,
both in Vietnam and the United States, in
the allied ability to win.
3. And above all, the Communists will be trying
to inflict heavy casualties, even at heavy
cost to themselves, in anticipation of an
erosive effect on domestic resolve in the
United States.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
-3-
 Approved ForjOlase 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T~082W00900030001-5
III. As we analyze the enemy idea of a stalemate, it is
a situation in which allied military and civil
efforts at present levels can no longer make
clearcut or significant progress.
A. In such a situation, the United States would
either have to go all out in Vietnam, or
drastically modify its policies on the war.
1. We think that Hanoi probably believes
it would be very difficult for us to
decide on going all out, because we could
not be sure that even the increased effort
would produce victory.
IV. It thus looks like a long, hot summer in the
ground war in South Vietnam, with the Communists
standing a good chance of gaining at least some
8.f their objectives,and recovering some of their
lost momentum.
A. We see no signs that enemy manpower. morale,
or supply problems in South Vietnam are
serious enough to make the Communists
abandon the war if their upcoming summer
offensive fails.
B. They are using their augmented firepower
throughout South Vietnam to try to force
some friendly units from offense to defense.
C. They are also using a better mix of conventional
and guerrilla tactics.
Approved For Release 2005/06/094_CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
 Approved For Rgas
270900030001-5
1. Small main force elements frequently
operate with the guerrillas in the
growing number of attacks against
pacification teams and installations.
V. We believe that the Communists in their current
strategy draw considerabl- comfort from their
demonstrated ability to fort the war in the
South despite the air attacks on North Vietnam.
A. In the past few months, the stepped-up raids
on the North have made life considerably more
grim for the populace, but
25X1
25X1
25X1
that morale--in terms of discipline, confidence,
and willingness to endure hardship--is still
sound,both among the leaders and among the people.
B. According to our present information, damage to
recent targets in the Hanoi area has not yet
knocked any of them out permanently.
1. The Hanoi thermal power plant was apparently
off line briefly after the attack on May 21st,
but now seems to be operating again at
reduced capacity. Some lights are in the
southern part of Hanoi.
C. Recent attacks on Hanoi have run into the stiffest
anti-aircraft defense yet, and the North Vietnamese
appear to have ample supplies of armament and
ammunition, including SAMs.
Approved For Release 2005/06/0 ;:!CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
 25X1
2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00g
D. This reinforces other indications that the
supply of material from the Bloc countries
has increased. It seems to be flowing smoothly
to North Vietnam through China.
1. We have no reason to expect any decrease
in Bloc aid, and we believe that the
Communist countries can adequately replace
bomb losses in. everything from food to war
materiel.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Re se
VI. On the other hand, we have no firm indications that
Hanoi's allies have sent or plan to send more
sophisticated new weapons systems to North Vietnam.
Ap'
proved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
 Approved For jl~ase 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T0082 900900030001-5
Chinese Attitude
VII. As for Peking's attitude, we believe that the
Chinese Communists consider things are going
reasonably well in Vietnam from their point of view.
A. As they see it, Hanoi remains steadfast, and
Communists forces in South Vietnam continue
fighting, at a comparatively modest cost to
China.
B. The Chinese have repeatedly asserted, and
probably still believe, that time is on the
Communist side.
C. Their idea is that if the war can be kept
going long enough, the political pressures
in the United States and on the United States
will become insupportable.
VII. With this estimate of the situation, Peking also
would agree on the immediate objective of a
military stalemate, costly to the United States
and to the Vietnamese but not to the Chinese.
A. To achieve this, the Chinese will continue to
give the Vietnamese Communists war material,
food, and "technical assistance"
25X1
1. We think they would increase the level
of such support if Hanoi asks for it.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06Lq2: CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
 25X1
25X1
Approved For?We
IX. Peking would take another long, hard look at the
cards, however, if a change in the overall situation
required a more direct Chinese involvement and greater
risk of war to keep the Vietnamese fighting.
A. The Chinese all along have tried to hold down
the danger of a military confrontation with the
United States, for all their uncompromising public
stance and periodic pledges of support for Hanoi.
1. If anything, they are now less disposed to
intervene directly than they were in 1965.
B. Peking's caution has increased in direct
proportion to the level of the U.S. effort
Chinese propaganda has decreased
steadily in volume and vehemence since the
spring of 1966.
C. Chinese Communist spokesmen have indicated
privately for two years that China would come
into the war if U.S. aircraft attacked targets
in China, or if there were a major U.S. invasion
of North Vietnam.
1. These conditions probably still hold in
general today, although it is unlikely that
Peking's response to either situation
would be automatic.
2. The Chinese might also move to establish
a buffer zone outside the Chinese frontier if
North Vietnamese collapse looked imminent.
Approved For Release 2005/06/eg -CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
 Approved For'le
D. There are no indications, however, that Peking
thinks any of these contingencies are likely
in the near future--as a result of either
U.S. or Chinese initiative.
25X1
25X1
X. To take a brief look at Hong Kong, the Chinese
Communists are clearly out to undercut the position
of the British government in the colony, and at
the same time expand their own base of public support.
A. The success Peking had last winter in humiliating
the Portuguese in Macao may have encouraged the
Chinese to challenge the British when labor
troubles in Hong Kong created the opportunity
early in May.
B. The firm stand taken by London and the tough
tactics of the Hong Kong police appear to
have given Peking second thoughts.
C. I doubt that the Chinese are ready to jeopardize the
$550 million in foreign exchange which they obtained
through Hong Kong last year.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
25X1
 Approved For-aV4ase 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79Tg082i?G000900030001-5
1. There is, of course, room for misjudgment,
and the Chinese may feel they can still put
considerably more pressure on the British
without serious risk to Peking's economic
stake in a British Hong Kong.
Approved For Release 2005/06/00 CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
 Approved For e
I. The situation in the Middle East took a very
serious turn last night, although there is no
evidence that either Israel or the Arab nations
really want a war.
A. The trouble is that--except for the smaller
nations like Jordan and Lebanon--neither do
they want peace very badly.
B. Now Nasir, who is not prepared for war with
.Israel, has announced that he is closing
the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and
he must know that to the Israelis, this ranks
as a casus belli.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
-11-
 25X1
Approved For Rya
0827A 0900030001-5
II. The crisis has arisen from the persistent raids
by Palestinian terrorists,
into Israel.
A. The Israelis trounced the Syrians in an
air battle on April 7. There have been 14
terrorist incidents since then. The Israelis,
concerned because the raids are showing growing
capabilities, have renewed their standard
warnings of retaliation.
25X6
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
-12-
 25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For RO
08274W0900030001-5
III. Now the Egyptians have about 50,000 men, 71 aircraft,
and 500 tanks in Sinai on or near the Israeli border.
[twice as many tanks, three times -the
air strength, and 20,000 more men than Egypt has
normally had there.
IV. The Israelis in turn are convinced that they are
facing a new situation, with UAR forces beefed up
and the UNEF safety mechanism withdrawn. They have
carried out at least 30 to 40 percent mobilization
as a protective measure, and are re-assessing
their security requirements.
A. As I remarked earlier, we have considered that
the Israelis probably rate any attempt to
interfere with shipping to their southern port
of Eilat as a cause for war.
B. They have also been quite firm in the warning
that any new terrorism involving Israeli loss
of life will bring some form of retaliation
against the Arabs.
C. We believe Tel Aviv will not accept any
attempt to impose a U.N. presence or controls
on Israel.
IV. The Soviet attitude is of the utmost importance
to the Arabs at present
25X1
25X1
 ~ pproved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
B. The Soviets face real difficulties; they
don't want a full-blown war, particularly one
which could well bring U.S. commitments into
play, and yet they would rather stay "on the
side of the Arabs" than come down unequivocally
on the side of peace. Unrest and tension are
and have been exceptionally useful to the
Soviets in their attempt to erode Western
influence in the Middle East.
C. The private Soviet line was probably given
to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow last Friday
when Thompson told Dobrynin he hoped that the
Soviets were exerting as much pressure in Syria
as we were in Israel. Dobrynin answered:
"I think we can match you."
V. Even with restraining Soviet pressures, the danger
lies in the fact that the leaders on each side are
being moved by the chain of events, rather than
controling those events at this point.
A. The Israelis, for example, feel that they
must now patrol by land and air into Sinai,
and there is a hint of fatalism in the Arab
Approved For Release 2005/06/QlaCIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
25X1
25X1
 Approved For R ase 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00 27900030001-5 25X1
moves which is clearly expressed in Nasir's
aggressive announcement about the Gulf of
Aqaba.
B. Under the circumstances, war can now come
from accident, incident, or miscalculation.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030001-5