SITUATION ROOM REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000300070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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THAILAND
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V. Communist Political Developments: There
is nothing orirgilificance to report.
Approved For
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SOUTH VItTlilMV FOAFfettte ffilifintt4-RDPW00827A000300070001-7
WEEKLY REPORTta ?25 JUNE 1966
Total Personnel Losses
3,500
(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)
[7
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
- GVN /US/other Free World
? Viet Cong/PAVN
US only
4,0001
4,500
3,000 r
2,500 I-
2,000
,00o
500
UNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN EB MARAPR. MAY
I I
US Combat Casualties in Vietnam
(including North Vietnam)
Fatalities Non-fatal Wounds Captured Missing
Cumulative, 1961-1964 255 15 24 10 12
Cumulative, 1965 1365 6110 15 136
Cumulative, 1966 to date 2394 14 670 12 103
TOTAL 4014 22304 37 251
SEPT 1 OCT NOV 1 DEC 1 JAM
Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
(US/GYM/Other Free World)
11 Missing or Captured in action Wounded in action
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62794
Killed in action
SOUTH VIETNAINgfilvarer: CIA-RDUOT00827A000300070001-7
WEEKLY REPORT 18-25 JUNE 1966
1.2 Antiaircraft Fire
Propaganda
Sabotage
Terrorism
Attacks
Viet Cong Incidents
1,900
LIMO
62793
JUNE
Viet Cong Attacks
Company and battalion sized attacks
Battalion sized (and larger) attacks only
ULY
AUG
Weapons Losses
Government
Viet Cong
2685
JUNE
JULY
AUG
SEPT OCT
NOV DEC I JAN FEB MAR APR
MAY I JUNE
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USAID, State rev ew(s)
completed.
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27 June 1966
No., 0379/66
Copy No. 1
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Approved For Release 200
0007
GROUPI
otftit
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declassification
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WARNING
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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No. 0379/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(16 June - 26 June 1966)
CONTENTS
Page
I. POLITICAL SITUATION 1
Developments in I Corps; Saigon Bud-
dhist Institute raided; Policy differ-
ences within Buddhist leadership; Ky
government buoyed by success.
II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT 4
Cadres; Status of National Priority
Areas during May; Viet Cong Defectors
(Chieu Hol).
III. ECONOMIC SITUATION 8
GVN economic reforms; Rationale for
the reforms; Prices; Currency and gold;
Rice; Port Operations.
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
South Vietnam Economic Indicators (graphs):
-Foreign Exchange Reserves
-Commercial and Military Discharge: Saigon
-Cost of Living Index
-Money Supply
-Rice Stocks: Saigon and Delta
-Rice Deliveries: Delta to Saigon
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I. POLITICAL SITUATION
The Buddhist capability for street
agitation was nearly eliminated last week
as the Ky government completed its sweep
of Hue and other northern towns, moved
dissident leaders to Saigon, and cleared
the Buddhist Institute in the capital.
Scattered Buddhist protests continue, how-
ever, despite both a major reduction in
Buddhist political assets in central Viet-
nam and a serious policy split within the
Buddhist leadership in Saigon. Government
leaders, while celebrating their first an-
niversary in office, are playing down their
difficulties with the Buddhists and turning
their attention to other matters.
Developments in I Corps
1. Most overt manifestations of the "struggle"
movement have now been eliminated in Hue. However,
following a government "reoccupation'? of the city
which began on 16 June, US observers have reported
that many political, psychological, and administrative
actions need to be taken there before government
authority can be consolidated. Among other things,
the government is planning to keep police field forces
in the city for several months while local police
are reorganized. Several persons under arrest may
be tried and sentenced to death for their antigovern-
ment activities. Some of the government's regional
offices now in Hue may be shifted to Da Nang in the
near future.
2. Militant bonze Tri Quang was transported
from Hue to Saigon during the week by government
police. He was installed in a clinic where he was
reportedly continuing his hunger strike as of 26 June.
Police maintained that Quang was not under arrest,
but did screen his visitors. After conferring with
several institute imonks including Tam Chau, Quang
reportedly announced that he would maintain his op-
position to the government. However, the courses of
action immediately available to him appear rather
limited.
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3. In a roundup of military dissidents, generals
Dinh and Nhuan were moved from Hue to Saigon by the
government. Former I Corps commander General Thi was
also expected to arrive voluntarily in the capital
soon. Although the futures of these and possibly
two other generals--Chuan and Cao--are not yet clear,
a high-ranking Vietnamese officer maintained that
they will either be retired or more severely punished.
4. In addition to the arrests and transfers of
civilian and military officials involved in the "struggle"
movement, the government further reduced Buddhist po-
litical assets in central Vietnam by moving forces
into the capitals of Quang Tri and Binh Dinh provinces
last week to quell antigovernment elements. Neverthe-
less, sporadic hunger strikes, demonstrations, and
one additional suicide occurred in various towns
throughout I and II Corps.
Saigon Buddhist Institutes Raided
5. After the suspected killer of a policeman
took refuge in the Buddhist Institute on 18 June,
police blockaded the premises, and finally on 23 June
raided the institute. Most of the 500 persons taken
into custody were released later in the day after
identification checks; some youths were held for in-
duction into the armed forces or for later trials
for antigovernment activities. The suspect was ap-
prehended and reportedly confessed to the killing.
6. Although the government had apparently planned
to return control of the institute to chairman Tam
Chau after its clearing operation was completed, Chau
in a public communique condemned the government raid.
He suggested that the sanctity of the pagoda had
been destroyed and that the government would hence-
forth be held responsible for maintaining the buildings
and the grounds of the institute.
7. On 26 June, a second Buddhist pagoda was
raided by government police and ARVN rangers, and one
weapon was captured and 15 draft-age youths were ar-
rested. No monks were reported to have been mistreated
and no reaction has been forthcoming from Buddhist
leaders.
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Policy Differences Within Buddhist Leadership
8. Tam Chauts strong criticism followed several
days during which he had been attempting to end once
and for all the confrontation between the Buddhists
and the government by securing an amnesty pledge
from the government for all those involved in Bud-
dhist agitation. His criticism, however, may only
be a move designed to strengthen his support among
other monks in the institute. Chau had lost con-
trol over institute policy to the militant wing dur-
ing the previous week, and he does not appear to have
regained it.
9. Despite the current policy split among Bud-
dhist leaders and the quelling of the "struggle"
movement, it is rather doubtful that Buddhist politi-
cal influence will remain at its current low level
as long as leaders of the caliber of Tri Quang, Tam
Chau, and Thien Minh remain active. In addition,
lingering resentment of the Ky government in the
northern towns and a general lack of positive sup-
port for the Saigon government may provide opportu-
nities for future Buddhist maneuvering.
Ky Government Buoyed by Success
10. Generally declaring that the antigovern-
ment problem had been "solved," Premier Ky and other
government leaders turned their attentions to a
celebration of the government's first anniversary
on 19 June. Buoyed by its success in overcoming
the "struggle" movement, the government appears
relatively unified at present, even though the im-
petus for its forceful move against the dissidents
came from a relatively small hard-line faction with-
in the armed forces. A relaxation over a continuing
period of time, however, could reopen splits between
previously well-defined military cliques.
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THAILAND
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National priority area for
revolutionary development
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itary Region
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CORPS
SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
100 Mlles
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II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
The second cadre group training
class began on 13 June for approximately
5,200 personnel. Progress during the
month of May in the four National Pri-
ority Areas ranged from a complete stand-
still in I Corps to projects ahead of
schedule in An Giang Province. The de-
fector rate, which is slowly rising,
should receive a boost in response to in-
creased military contact S and a largely
resolved political situation.
Cadres
1. The second training class for revolution-
ary development cadre groups began on 13 June at the
Vung Tau National Cadre Training Center. Approxi-
mately 5,200 trainees will participate in the 13-
week course. This class is heavily weighted toward
the training of the census-grievance, civil affairs,
and new life hamlet specialist groups to augment the
numerous Peoples Action Teams (PAT) already in the
provinces. Nearly half of the new trainees were
drawn from pacification cadres who were working
under the old GVN provincial programs. The re-
mainder of the trainees are new recruits.
2. One of the improvised revolutionary devel-
opment teams working in a hamlet in Bien Hoa Prov-
ince in early May utilized an interesting ploy to
confuse a Viet Cong platoon that was attempting to
enter the hamlet at night. The team members, dressed
similar to and living among the hamlet inhabitants,
could not be identified as a group by the Viet Cong.
When the team members directed harassing fire at the
enemy unit, it became confused and withdrew. The
Viet Cong later attempted to obtain the names and
locations of the cadre members living in the hamlet,
but the hamlet inhabitants refused to provide the
information.- By repulSing the enemy and living in
the hamlet, the pacification cadre had gained the
confidence of the people who, in turn, rejected at-
tempted Viet Cong overtures.
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Status of National Priority Areas During May
3. National Priority Area I. The pacification
effort in the National Priority Area (NPA) around Da
Nang in Quang Nam Province unfortunately paralleled
the general lack of progress in the rest of I Corps.
Morale in a five-village special project area was re-
ported at an all-time low because of the removal of
US and ARVN units that had been providing security
for the villagers. Consequently, the Viet Cong were
able to terrorize and proselytize among the villagers,
reminding them that the government had promised to
defend the community against enemy infiltration and
terrorism. The over-all program in NPA I is con-
sidered to be at least five months behind schedule.
4. National Priority Area II. Revolutionary
development projects in the NPA in Binh Dinh Prov-
ince are on schedule, and it appears at this junc-
ture that the 1966 goals may be accomplished. Dur-
ing May, 14 hamlets were considered to have met the
criteria for being "secured," and the cadre teams
that had been working in them were deployed to 14
new hamlets within the NPA. In addition to the regu-
lar government military forces now in the area,
three Regional Force companies and ten Popular Force
platoons have been undergoing training to enable them
to provide continuing village and: hamlet sedurity.
The prospect for the recruitment of additional se-
curity forces is considered good.
5. In the meantime, ARVN, :US, and Korean troops
are conducting clearing operations with the aim of
providing adequate security for the various groups
carrying out the specialized functions of pacifica-
tion. Adequate supplies and movement of consumer
goods in the NPA are indicative of an excellent over-
all economic situation in the II Corps NPA.
6. National priority Area III. In general,
revolutionary development programs in the Saigon and
Gia Dinh Province area as well as in portions of four
surrounding provinces progressed satisfactorily ex-
cept for the construction and consolidation of ham-
lets. Three of the five provinces in the NPA re-
ported improvements in the morale and effectiveness
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of the Regional and Popular Force security units.
Security for pacification cadres was also improved
through an increase in GVN and free world military
operations. The number and intensity of Viet Cong
incidents reportedly decreased.
7. National Priority Area IV. Pacification
projects TY) An Giang Province continued on or ahead
of schedule. Two Regional Force companies, drawn
from the boa Hao religious sect that predominates
in the province, were formed. The initial goals for
school construction and selfhelp projects were met or,
in some cases, exceeded. Assistance to An Giang's
ambitious agricultural program was augmented by the
arrival of seven Chinese technicians. The prospect
at the end of May for the achievement of the prov-
ince's 1966 revolutionary development goals continued
to be excellent.
Viet Cong Defectors (Chieu Hoi)
8. The Communist defector total for the week
ending 17 June was up slightly to 373, with I Corps
reporting its totals for the second straight week.
The increase apparently reflected heavier military
CP arme. 926 military defectors
9. According to US Mission officials, the over-
all reduction in the rate of Viet Cong defections to
the GVN since mid-April of this year is due to several
factors. The primary cause is probably the unstable
political situation, especially in I Corps. However,
with the reassertion of GVN control in Hue during the
weekend of 18-19 June, this problem seems to be largely
resolved for the time being. Another major influence
on the defection rate is the number and intensity of
military contacts between Viet Cong and friendly
forces. Such contacts declined during the period
from mid-January through mid-April. It appears that
numerous and intensive military engagements not only
provide potential ralliers with opportunities to de-
fect, but also intensify the fears that often motivate
defections. It has also been determined through de-
briefings that potential ralliers tend to Avoid com-
mitting themselves until they feel assured' the gov-
ernment will fulfill its promises of' safety and good
treatment.
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10. During the: period of diminished military
contacts and political turbulence, the Viet Cong
political cadre were themselves attempting to cut
down their losses from defections. Captured docu-
ments and rallier debriefings have revealed that the
penalties for an unsuccessful defection attempt, and
even for reading air-dropped Chieu Hoi leaflets, are
now more severe than in the past. Surveillance of
Viet Cong troops by politically reliable cadres has
also apparently been increased.
11. A more subtle factor influencing the Chieu
Hoi program, according to the US Mission, has been
the attitude of the minister of information and Chieu
Hoi, Dinh Trinh Chinh. A conflict between Chinh and
his assistant for Chieu Hoi affairs has apparently
had a deleterious effect on lower-level working
cadres in the districts. Chinh's performance has
also been affected by persistent reports that he may
be removed from office. He is, apparently now marked
for early replacement by Premier Ky in a general
cabinet reshuffle.
12. To cope with the problems affecting the de-
fector. rate, government planners are instituting
several measures. An additional 45 advisory posi-
tions to be filled by third-country personnel have
been allocated, primarily for work in the provinces.
An intensified information, campaign is being planned
for the week preceding the anniversary of the Geneva
accords on 20 July. Psychological exploitation of
the Chieu Hoi program will be the subject of increas-
ing attention from GVN and US agencies. Finally,
planners are forging ahead with the construction of
a regional Chieu Hoi center in each of the four corps
areas.
13. If the political situation continues to
stabilize, and if military engagements remain at
the intensified level of the past week, the number
of defectors should continue to rise.
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III. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION:
The week was highlighted by the an-
nouncement on 18 June of a 50-percent
devaluation of the piaster, an increase
in government salaries, stabilization of
rice prices, liberalization of economic
regulations, and the free sale of gold.
These major economic reforms were recom-
mended by the International Monetary Fund
to combat the inflationary spiral. Fol-
lowing the announcement, the price of gold
and dollars declined, but the prices of
both domestic and imported commodities rose.
It is reported that the decline in
deliveries of rice from the delta to Sai-
gon stems from a decrease in production,
VC taxation of and interference with rice
movements, hoarding by merchants and
peasants, and illegal shipments to Cam-
bodia. The movement of cargo through
transit warehouses at the port of Saigon
accelerated during the first half of June.
GVN Economic Reforms
1. On 18 June, Minister of Economy Thanh an-
nounced a 50-percent devaluation of the piaster, an
increase in government salaries, stabilization of
rice prices, the free sale of gold, and liberaliza-
tion of economic regulations. These major economic
reforms were recommended by the International Mone-
tary Fund in order to combat the inflationary spiral
in South Vietnam. Thanh noted that without such
measures, prices would continue to rise to a point
where the piaster would become worthless.
2. The Exchange Rate. Effective 18 June, the
exchange rate was raised from 60 to 118 piasters to
US $1, and the former multiple rate system was
abolished. The new exchange consists of a basic
rate of 80 piasters plus a surtax of 38 piasters.
Imports for which license applications were issued
by the National Bank prior to 18 June, but which
have not yet been cleared through customs, will be
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subject to an exchange rate equalization tax of 58
piasters to US $1 to be added to the former rate of
60 piasters to US $1. In order to get'iMporters to
clear their goods through customs rapidly, the goods
withdrawn from customs by 4 July will be subject to
an exchange rate equalization, tax of only 30 piasters
to US $1, i.e., these goods will receive a 23-percent
discount. Customs duties still will be calculated at
the old rate of 35 plasters to US $1, but the tariff
schedule will be revised to maintain present collec-
tion levels. Transfers for students abroad will be
exempt from the surtax, permitting a rate for such
transactions of 80 piasters to US $1.
3. Pay Raises. All government employees--both
military and civilian--will receive wage increases
ranging from 20 to 30 percent to be effective from
1 June. These increases are 30 percent for those
earning less than 5,000 piasters monthly, 25 percent
for those earning 5,000 to 10,000 piasters monthly,
and 20 percent for those earning more than 10,000
piasters monthly. These pay raises are intended to
restore to a more equitable income position the
country's fixed salary employees who have suffered
most from the inflation.
4. Rice. The GVN will subsidize rice imports
to assure-W-gtable low price for this basic commodity.
Thanh also noted that the prices of beer, soft drinks,
and gasoline would be affected only slightly by the
devaluation, and that a "stabilization fund" would
be established to permit intervention in the market
in cases of sharp price increases for basic commodi-
ties. Details on this particular aspect of the eco-
nomic reform are not yet available, The GVN, how-
ever, evidently did agree at the last: minute to exempt
all PL 480 commodities from the surtax of 38 piasters
in order to hold down price increases for these
commodities.
5. Gold. The GVN will now sell gold through
commercial banks to South Vietnam's 763 authorized
jewelers, 281 of whom are in Saigon. Any jeweler may
go to any commercial bank and buy three gold bars (of
12 to 13 kilograms each) at a time. Upon presentation
of sales documents for the jewelry, they will be able
to replenish their stock. The price will be fixed each
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day. The free sale of gold is expected to absorb
excess piasters for the GVN and lower the price of gold.
The GVN has assured the US that these sales will be made
from the GVN's own gold holdings.
6. Liberalization of Regulations. In order to
promote competition, the GVN announced the liberaliza-
tion of many economic regulations that had obstructed
economic activity. The prohibition on increasing the
number of commercial importers, which had discouraged
competition, has been removed and the GVN has now de-
cided to authorize new import firms if they are able to
meet certain requirements. In addition, the allocation
of foreign exchange by quota points has been ended. Con-
trols in the industrial sector will be relaxed by simpli-
fying administrative regulations and by giving early
authorization to industrial project applications. Imports
of machinery and raw materials will be facilitated, and
the Ministry of Economy will shortly approve ten new
industrial projects. The Ministry of Economy and the
National Bank will advance a 400 million piaster credit
for medium term loans to industry through the Industrial
Development Center, a government agency established in
1957 to provide technical and finanCial assistance to
Vietnamese industry.
Rationale For The Reforms
7. Since January 1965, Saigon prices have risen
more than 50 percent, and the money supply has expanded
by roughly 90 percent. In spite of large-scale US fi-
nancing of imports, the amount of goods could not keep
pace with the money chasing these goods. The immediate
effect of the new economic reforms will be to double the
amount of piasters and take them out of circulation, re-
sulting in a decline in the money supply. While retail
prices of all goods will rise in the short run, these
price rises will be partially alleviated by government
subsidization of rice and the use of a stabilization
fund for other basic commodities.
S. It would appear that the group to be most af-
fected by the new economic measures is the urban middle
class, which constitutes the principle market for imported
goods. The rural peasant, who buys few imported goods,
probably will be least affected. It is hoped that after
a period of adjustment of perhaps three months dura'
tiOn,, prices Will Stabilize at a higher level. The
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US will provide full support to the GVN during the
implementation of these new economic measures through
a continued program of large-scale commercial import
financing.
Prices
9. Retail prices in Saigon rose significantly
in the week ending 13 June. The prices of almost all
foodstuffs except vegetables increased, as did the
prices of imported commodities. Although the reason
for the rise in prices of domestically produced goods
was unclear, the increase in prices of imported com-
modities apparently stemmed from a depletion of inven-
tories. In view of the rumors of devaluation, it also
is possible that importers were withholding goods from
the market in anticipation of higher prices. Over-all,
the USAID retail price index was nine percent above a
month ago. (A table of retail prices in Saigon is in-
cluded in the annex.)
10. Following the announcement of the new economic
reforms, prices of both domestic and imported commodi-
ties rose. On 21 June, the median increase in the price
of US-financed imports was 20 percent above the previous
week. The imposition of a higher rate of customs assess-
ment on 4 July reportedly is causing imporAers to clear
their goods through customs rapidly, but they appear to
be holding off sales until after 4 July in the hope of
realizing higher prices.
11, Exchange rates on the Saigon free market rose
sharply just before devaluation was announced, after
having declined slightly the previous week. On 13 June,
the price per dollar of $10 dollar bills was 191 piasters,
up five piasters from the previous week. The price of
$10 MPC (scrip) rose one piaster to 124 piasters per
dollar. Gold jumped to 308 piasters per dollar compared
with 289 the previous week. By 16 June, however, the
prices of $10 bills, $10 MPC, and gold had skyrocketed
to 260, 150, and 450 piasters per dollar, respectively.
This sharp increase reportedly was triggered by an an-
nouncement of the introduction on 27 June of a new 500-
piaster note. The announcement gave rise to fears that
the present 500-piaster note, many of which are said to
be held abroad, would be canceled. In addition, gold
supplies apparently were limited by stricter controls.
-11-
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Approlya For Releascipreirper-RDPNX0827A000300070001-7
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The mounting inflation, rumors of devaluation, and
continuing political uncertainties undoubtedly also
contributed to the sharp increases.
12. Following the announcement of the economic
reforms, the price of gold and dollars declined. On
21 June, the prices per dollar of $10 bills, gold, and
MPC were 210, 332, and 121 piasters, respectively.
13. As previously reported, rice deliveries from
the delta to Saigon during the first four months of 1966
have been lower than during the comparable period of
any previous year. The US Mission recently estimated
that total deliveries for the year would amount to
only 265,000 tons compared with 425,000 tons in 1965
and 505,000 tons in 1964. At the end of April, Saigon
and delta rice stocks totaled 154,100 tons, well below
April levels of the past few years. Moreover, three
fourths of the Saigon stock at the end of April con-
sisted of imported rice. The stock in the delta, which
accounted for two fifths of combined delta and Saigon
stocks, consists of Vietnamese rice. (Graphics on
rice deliveries and rice stocks are included in the
annex.)
14. On 12 June, the Ministry of Economy began
selling stocks of US rice in Saigon in an effort to
stabilize rice prices. This rice is being sold both to
retailers and directly to the public from trucks in
various districts of the city. The results of the first
few days' operation were gratifying from the point of
view of both sales and public impact. During the course
of the week, rice prices on the open market were stable
or declined slightly, depending on the grade. The US
Mission reports that, given the present economic at-
mosphere with the alarming leaps in black market cur-
rency and gold rates, the stability of rice prices was
encouraging.
15. Two US Mission officers recently visited
several provinces in the delta to re-examine the rice
situation. In spite of continued low shipments to
Saigon, they found substantial amounts of paddy in the
provincial mills. Based on extensive interviews and
personal observation, the reporting officers concluded
that the decline in deliveries to Saigon stems from five
major factors: a decline in production, VC taxation and
-12-
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3.E. C.4 itt.r.
ApprovqickFor Releasb?1Q5,1qiNt-RDP79.109827A000300070001-7
cs v.1 rt
interference with rice movements, hoarding by merchants,
hoarding by peasants, and illegal shipments to Cambodia.
As an additional factor, they cited the difficulty and
expense involved in transporting the rice to Saigon, but
concluded that this was of less importance.
16. The decline in production during the 1965/66
crop year was caused mainly by the lateness of last
summer's rains and a lower level of flooding on the
Mekong. VC activity to push up prices and frustrate
the movement of rice, while not entirely new, appears
to be more significant than it was last year. More-
over, illegal shipments to Cambodia apparently are
higher than in previous years.
17. Although most of these factors apply generally
throughout the delta, it was observed that their rela-
tive importance varied from place to place. The decline
in shipments from Chau Doc and An Giang provinces still
is attributed officially to a decline in production.
However, merchants in Long Xuyen, capital of An Giang
Province, mentioned shipments to Cambodia and the rising
cost of transportation of the rice Co Saigon. In Kien
Giang Province, it appears that outsiders are buying
rice at high prices, possibly for sale to Cambodia.
Merchants and officials in the province also complained
about rising transportation costs and VC activities,
especially VC taxation. Impediments to deliveries of
rice to Saigon from Ba Xuyen Province include hoarding
in anticipation of higher prices, VC harassment, and
transportation problems. As in Kien Giang Province,
bankers and merchants complained of outside buyers pur-
chasing rice at prices well above the market rate.
Port Operations
18. During the period 8-14 June, 24 deep-draft
ships, 14 of which were military, completed discharge
and departed from Saigon. Commercial importers are
making a greater effort to claim imports and, as a
result, the movement of cargo through transit ware-
houses has accelerated. During the first half of June,
an average of 1,293 metric tons of cargo per day passed
through the port's transit warehouses, compared with
only 931 metric tons daily during the last half of May.
-13-
Ap
proved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000
kN.E C.4'KP, 1
00070001-7
25X1
Nor,
ApproviWor Release STIM:prDP7910827A000300070001-7
ANNEX
Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon 2/
(In Piasters)
3 Jan
1966
16 May
1966
23 May
1966
31 May
1966
6 June
1966
Percent
Change
from
Mo. Ago
Percent
Change
from
Yr. Ago
Index for All Items 12/
160
158
161
164
162
+14.
+14.6
Index for Food Items 1?,/
169
166
171
174
171
+11.
+55
Of which:
Rice/SOC Nau (loo kg.)
800
11100
1,150
1,150
1,120
+ 2
+ 18
Pork Bellies (1 kg.)
70
70
70
70
70
0
+
Fish/Ca Tre (1 kg.)
110
110
105
110
115
+ 5
+130
Nuoc Mam (jar)
50
70
70
70
70
+ 8
+ 56
Index for Non-Food Items 12/
124
126
126
129
130
+ 4
+ 46
Of which:
Charcoal (60 kg.)
440
45o
450
480
490
+9
+ 9
Cigarettes (pack)
10
lo
lo
lo
lo
o
+25
White Calico (meter)
27
27
26
26
26
-14.
+ 5
Laundry Soap (1 kg.)
30
32
32
32
33
+3
+ 25
2/ Data are from MAID sources.
12/ For all indexes, 1 January 1965 = 100.
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0070001-7
ApprovWor Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79827A000300070001-7
SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Foreign Exchange Reserves
JANUARY 1963 ? APRIL 1966
MILDONS OF US DOLLARS
I L111 II
964
JJ A S ON A MJ JA S ON
965 1966
Commercial and Military Discharge, Port of Saigon.
AUGUST 1965 ? APRIL1966
T HO US ANDS OF METRIC TONS
Total
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MARAPR MAY JUN JUL AUG 5FT
966
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Appromag For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP7W0827A000300070001-7
SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMIC INDICATORS
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Approur) For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP70)0827A000300070001-7
SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMIC INDICATORS
,
te StockSaigon and 'Upelt
JANUARY 1963 ?APRIL 1966
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
AT END OF MONTH
Total
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
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Approved FQr,,,Release EVEGREWA-RDP79TONAVA000300070001-7
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25X1
\we
Appcsod For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDRZOT00827A000300070001-7
LS'ECRET
South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 May 1966
1. General Statistical Data:
Viet Killed Wounded
Cong in in Captured
Time Inci- Action Action or Missing
Period dents GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC
1962 1825 299 1294 475 212 116 390
Jan 1963 927 453 1754 908 318 102 379
1964 1770 343 1223 913 - 555 240
1965 2206 904 2203 1938 - 471 565
1966 3914 747 2648 1557 - 450 588
1962 1460 244 1205 300 316 124
Feb 1963 788 379 1082 656 303 82
1964 2078 374 1055 916 303
1965 1982 880 1564 1840 - 1394
1966 3100 1015 4727 2095 - 477
353
292
289
309
508
1962 1961 523 1456 737 551 140 523
Mar 1963 1282 410 1443 851 368 66 222
1964 2160 439 1456 1249 - 345 531
1965 2056 751 2022 1633 - 720 394
?1101 1966 3670 938 5685 1961 - 466 604
1962 1933 387 1596 532 292 151 415
Apr 1963 1331 506 1660 878 256 96 388
1964 2284 594 1671 1584 - 398 245
1965 1860 591 1909 1650 - 232 529
1966 3235 573 2818 1522 - 121 483
1962 1825
May 1963 1208
1964 2143
1965 2263
1966 3566
390
435
458
1049
661
1756
1895
1135
1975
4239
509
889
987
2143
1454
352
295
94 524
94 695
202 242
873 548
196 652
1962 1477 325 1666 613 413 77 441
Jun 1963 1311 389 1863 772 310 90 437
1964 2062 494 1005 1145 - 313 230
1965 2597 1211 2208 1920 - 1260 189
1962 1564 384 1544 686 424 212 542
Jul 1963 1368 529 1918 1071 372 306 387
1964 3045 900 1427 1812 510 219
1965 2520 1160 2980 1591 540 580
25X1
S-1
SECTRE1'
Total
Casualties
GVN VC
890 1896
Weapons
Losses
GVN VC
1463
2451
457
683
1611
1463
917
532
3313
2768
1700
711
2754
3236
935
979
668
1874
1117
1677
253
399
1593
1344
708
471
4114
1873
2454
620
3587
5235
1076
1219
1400
2530
1327
2033
467
367
2033
1987
814
532
3104
2416
1442
698
3365
6289
1393
1632
1070
2303
1440
2304
797
468
2576
1916
990
424
2473
2438
757
973
2216
3301
594
829
993
2632
1418
2885
463
564
1647
1377
723
281
4065
2523
1701
831
2311
4891
493
1087
1015
2520
1251
2609
580
394
1952
1235
718
387
4391
2397
2387
793
1282
2510
1906
2677
663
374
3222
1646
1889
447
3425
3560
1375
882
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25X1
Time
Period
Aug
Sep
Oct
NOV
Dec
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SECRET
Viet
Killed
Wounded
Cong
in
in
Captured
Total
Weapons
Inci-
Action
Action
or Missing
Casualties
Losses
dents
GVN VC
GVN VC
GVN VC
GVN VC
GVN VC
1962
1642
377
2271
626
367
63
669
1066
3307
1963
1349
411
1685
804
237
352
482
1567
2404
637
428
1964
2580
721
1449
1612
-
478
282
2811
1731
1106
619
1965
2498
808
3624
1945
-
287
606
3040
4230
705
1074
1962
1375
419
2218
646
365
59
446
1124
3029
1963
1763
672
1982
1155
234
566
347
2393
2563
878
389
1964
3091
819
1187
1759
-
737
230
3315
1417
1465
525
1965
2473
655
3485
1724
-
266
838
2645
4323
778
838
1962
1357
365
1967
619
286
64
373
1048
2626
1963
1422
428
1520
989
244
398
236
1815
2000
753
330
1964
2827
739
1617
1583
-
693
576
3015
2193
1510
482
1965
3330
961
3874
2416
-
225
660
3602
4534
762
1013
1962
1311
410
1982
834
368
92
561
1336
2911
1963
3182
664
2333
1554
373
665
252
2883
2958
1595
455
1964
1982
574
1747
1404
-
410
570
2388
2317
1104
515
1965
3638
1034
5516
2056
-
520
592
3610
6108
1126
2164
1962
1346
294
2203
618
289
78
463
990
2955
1963
1921
389
1440
961
191
320
190
1670
1821
724
546
1964
2504
1002
1813
2053
-
1092
503
4147
2316
2111
666
1965
4106
1239
4076
2262
-
926
516
4427
4592
1728
1158
VC
Time Inci- KIA
Period dents GVN VC
. 1962
1963
1964
1965
**1966
25X1
Composite Annual Totals
WIA
GVN VC
Captured
or Missing
GVN VC
Total
Casualties
GVN VC
Weapons
Losses
GVN VC
19076
4417
21158
7195
4235
1270
5700
12882
31093
5195
4049*
17852
5665
20575
11488
3501
3137
4307
20290
28383
8267
5397
28526
7457
16785
17017
6036
4157
30510
20942
14055
5881
31529
11243
35436
23118
7848
6326
42209
41762
16915
11755
17485
3934
20117
8589
1710
2835
14233
22952
4491
5746
*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.
**Through 31 May 1966
S-2
SECRE'I'
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Approved ForRelease20U5/060'? Ctib9TOO827A000300070001.7 25X1
2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 31 May
1966
Time
Period
Viet Cong
Incidents
ATTACKS
Terrorism
Sabotage
Propa-
ganda
Anti-
Aircraft
Small-
Scale
Co. Size
BN. Size
Total
1962
1825
528
21
0
549
839
180
257
Jan 1963
927
242
8
2
252
447
49
179
1964
1770
218
2
3
223
1244
129
174
1965
2206
57
1
63
1489
272
170
212
1966
3914
42
23
5
70
2490
312
299
743
1962
1460
480
20
0
500
613
137
210
Feb 1963
788
181
13
1
195
433
69
91
1964
2078
211
3
3
217
1389
210
271
1965
1982
73
6
3
82
1411
267
91
131
1966
3100
50
10
9
69
1829
201
172
829
1962
1961
561
27
588
660
290
423
Mar 1963
1282
333
11
344
653
131
154
1964
2160
198
4
1
203
1632
158
167
1965
2056
80
3
3
86
1476
240
90
164
1966
3670
32
10
10
52
2332
212
154
920
1962
1933
470
27
0
497
1024
220
192
Apr 1963
1331
371
9
3
383
688
105
155
1964
2284
211
6
3
220
1738
169
157
1965
1860
38
1
4
43
1407
149
96
165
1966
3235
61
7
9
77
2238
252
110
513
1962
1825
490
28
0
528
892
154
251
May 1963
1208
344
13
0
357
608
93
150
1964
2143
170
3
2
175
418
217
140
193
1965
2263
40
7
11
58
1558
365
115
170
*1966
3566
37
9
7
53
2552
295
106
560
1962
1477
339
23
0
362
736
157
222
Jun 1963
1311
398
11
1
410
652
107
142
1964
2062
128
10
2
140
1390
176
162
194
1965
2597
62
1
6
69
1784
469
103
172
S-3
SECRET
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25X1
Approved For Release' 2004i : P79T00827A000300070001-7
25X1
Time
Period
Viet Cong
Incidents
ATTACKS
Terrorism
Sabotage
Propa-
ganda
Anti-
Aircraft
Small-
Scale
Co. Size
BN. Size
Total
1962
1564
437
10
1
448
735
158
223
Jul 1963
1368
398
8
1
407
698
80
183
1964
3045
166
12
7
185
2132
286
224
218
1965
2520
42
0
6
48
1706
400
154
212
1962
1642
368
10
0
378
885
146
233
Aug 1963
1349
356
11
1
368
647
113
221
1964
2580
107
3
3
113
1775
315
173
204
1965
2498
38
9
5
52
1597
349
200
300
1962
1375
382
9
0
391
624
178
182
Sep 1963
1763
483
17
3
503
889
164
207
1964
3091
110
4
4
118
1938
482
178
375
1965
2473
19
7
5
31
1530
278
185
449
1962
1357
406
12
1
419
583
189
166
Oct 1963
1422
359
6
0
365
802
105
150
1964
2827
75
2
6
83
1790
480
197
277
1965
3330
24
8
12
44
1969
415
198
704
1962
1311
411
7
3
421
614
144
132
Nov 1963
3182
631
11
3
645
1990
269
278
1964
1982
57
2
1
60
1391
247
109
175
1965
3638
26
16
10
52
2234
486
255
611
1962
1346
375
8
1
384
670
107
185
Dec 1963
1921
258
3
0
261
1298
111
251
1964
2504
81
9
6
96
1719
318
128
243
1965
4106
32
18
7
57
2572
442
317
718
Composite Annual Totals
1962
19076
5247
6
212
5465
8875
2060
2676
No Data
1963
17852
4354
15
121
4490
9805
1396
2161
No Data
1964
28526
1732
41
60
1833
19556
3178
2080
1879
1965
31529
531
73
81
685
20730
4132
1974
4008
*1966
17485
222
59
40
321
11486
1272
841
3565
*Through 31 May 1966
S-4
25X1
SEURE 1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000300070001-7
Approved For Releastrnr-RDW00827A000300070001-7
*ow'
CASUALTIES (KIA)
Year
VC
GVN
US
1961
--
--
1
1962
21,158
4,417
255
1963
20,575
5,665
I
1964
16,785
7,457
1965
35,436
11,243
1,365
1966
(Thru 31 May)
(Thru 31 May
(Thru 4 June)
20,117
3,934
2,042
TOTAL
114,071
32,716
3,662
_
CASUALTY- COMBAT OPERATIONS
(Weekly Averages)
Last
1964
1965
Half
1966
1965
Enemy Combat Deaths
322
680
906
(Thru 31 May) 958
RVN Combat Deaths
143
216
221
(Thru 31 May) 187
US Combat Deaths
3
26
44
(Thru 4 June) 93
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SECRET
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APRIL 1966
1470
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Reguiar PQrces
11,203
9,666
21,441
47,297
23,133
GVN fati rz -,7t dj
remail AWOL, oh tlefe.zt,
draftees who co*PPV1
Totals
29,924
36,441
73 010
1
113' 168 62676
45,500 THRU 30 APRIL
ffe-,Ienriate between deserters who eventual iv ,4,.41:soxittropozriipspalera9p7moR -7
eftfimeitsbs 2005/06/09.1
al ?he reVrai.tc?rce strength,
Approwl For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP7W0827A000300070001-7
?
MAY 1966
..400
1237
Annual Totals
Military Totals
? Monthly Totals
1964
1,903
14,465
1965
9 472
42,52
J966
4,631
8166
ni Military
'Mihtary on ly *au 30 April
Totals thru Sl May
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Approver Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79TV.927A000300070001-7
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Approved POAelease 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00
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25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000300070001-7
BEST COPY
Available
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Approwl For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP7W0827A000300070001-7
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ApprokFor Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP7W0827A000300070001-7
CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
4W''eN1
Rt. 9
THUA TH
?I ?I-- Section of operable railroad
-- Section of inoperable road
Note: Routes are inoperable primarily
because of Viet Cong sabotage/
interdiction efforts.
Rt. 14 6:MANG
NGAI
K NT U M
Kontum
it
PLEI U
DARL
ANG DLIC
LAM DON
DOC
KIEN
PHONG
TAY
provin
Rt. 1A
BINH
, ANH
NMI UY
NOMA ,X Lob,
KEN BIN
T 0 G 1? r UOC
N
TUY
o cONG
GIA
VINH
BINH
AN
XUYEN
Rt. 17A
(Loca on
Approx mat)
Information as of 12 June
1966
62681
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
raJhtL
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
28 June 1966
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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HIGHLIGHTS
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28 June 1966
The Ky government reportedly hopes to announce
cabinet changes and the membership of its new
civilian-military advisory council by 1 July. In
addition, the government is planning to brief local
officials in the near future on the September elec-
tions.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Only light contact was reported today between US
and Communist forces (Paras. 1-2). Three South
Vietnamese Army battalions, participating in a
one-day search-and-destroy operation, reported kill-
ing 80 Viet Cong in An Xuyen Province (Para. 3).
II. Political Develo ments in South Vietnam:
The government opes to announce ca inet c anges
and the membership of its new civilian-military ad-
visory council by 1 July (Paras. 1-2). The gov-
ernment is planning to brief local officials in
the near future on the September election law
(Para. 3). Some political groups have begun or-
ganizing for the elections (Para. 4). Vietnamese
construction workers who have been on strike in
the Saigon area for the past week reportedly
agreed to return to work tomorrow while wage ne-
gotiations continue (Para. 5). The unofficial
piaster prices of gold and US dollars rose today,
with no satisfactory explanation yet available
(Para. 6). Buddhist Institute leaders apparently
have not yet settled their differences (Para. 7).
Premier Ky appears to be trying to conciliate In-
stitute Chairman Tam Chau following the govern-
ment's raid on the Institute last week (Para. 8).
There is
IV.
There is
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Military Developments in North Vietnam:
nothing of significance to report.
Other Communist Military Developments:
nothing of significance to report.
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. In northern Thua Thien Province, US Marine
patrols encountered light sniper fire today while
searching the marshy flatlands between Route 1 and
the coast 12 miles north of Hue in Operation JAY.
Dog teams were used by the marines in an effort to
track down the enemy, many of whom are reported to
have moved underground into a vast network of tunnels.
Communist casualties currently stand at 88 killed.
US casualties remain unchanged at 23 killed and 58
wounded.
2. Operation NATHAN HALE, the large search-and-
destroy operation being conducted in the jungled
coastal hills of Phu Yen Province, continued today
with only light contact reported. A total of 60 Amer-
icans have been killed and 232 wounded in this oper-
ation which began on 18 June. Communist losses stand
at 411 killed and 20 captured, with over 150 weapons
seized.
3. Three South Vietnamese Army battalions,
participating in a one-day search-and-destroy opet-
ation DAN CHI 239 in southernmost An Xuyen Province,
established contact with an estimated company-size
enemy force today. In the ensuing engagement, three
South Vietnamese were killed and 11 wounded. A total
of 80 Viet Cong were reported killed, Many weapons,
including several machine guns. and 70 field packs,,
were seized.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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GVN Hopes to Announce New Cabinet and Military-Civilian
Council on 1 July
1. According to civilian Directorate member Nguyen
Luu Vien, the government will probably announce its new
cabinet on 1 July. Vien told a US Embassy official that
Premier Ky had asked him to become a deputy premier in
charge of health, education, welfare, and labor, and
that he had tentatively accepted Ky's proposal. Within
his new area of responsibility, Vien stated that the
ministers for labor and education would be replaced.
The present minister of education, Tran Ngoc Ninh, has
been noted for his ties with the Buddhist Institute.
Other major cabinet changes mentioned by Vien include
the elevation of General Thang to a "super minister" for
revolutionary development, and new ministers for justice,
interior, and information/Chieu Hoi.
2. Meanwhile, the government is also attempting
to line up members for its military-civilian advisory
council. The selection of council members originally
to consist of 60 civilians in a total of 80 members, has
apparently run into some difficulties during the past
week, and may only amount-to some 40 in all.
'Directorate secretary
general Chieu nas been given Lnu L6spon5ib1lity for the
selection of the civilian members, but has balked at
carrying out this duty without receiving some sort of
approval from Premier Ky prior to announcing the new mem-
bers. One tentative list of members was leaked to the
press earlier, but at least one whose name appeared on
the list declared that he had not been formally invited
by the government. Thus far, provincial councilmen who
were members of the election law drafting committee have
been invited to become members of the new advisory coun-
cil, but are apparently planning to withhold their ac-
ceptances unless the government allows them to hold
their provincial council seats as well.
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Election Progress
3. The government is planning to send teams consist-
ing of former election law committee members into the
provinces in the near future to brief local officials on
the application of the electoral law.
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pect the Buddhist Institute and some Catholic groups to
participate in the -elections, but do believe that other
Buddhist, Catholic, and minority groups will take part.
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4. Thus far, the Catholic archbishop of Saigon report-
edly has designated the leadership of the Catholic Citizens
Bloc--which staged an impressive Catholic parade in Saigon
in early June--to organize Catholic participation in the
September elections. Dr. Pham Quang Dan, a well-known in-
dependent politician in the Saigon area, is also attempting
to unite provincial council chairmen throughout the country
to run for the constituent assembly under a common symbol.
One small Hoa Hao faction also recently announced its in-
tention to participate in any September elections.
Vietnamese Construction Workers Reportedly to Resume Work
5. According to the preEs, labor representatives today
agreed to call a temporary halt to a strike by some 12,000
construction workers in the general Saigon area. Workers
reportedly will return to work tomorrow while wage negoti-
ations continue, with the apparent stipulation that a set-
tlement be reached by 15 July.
Disturbing Rise in Gold and Dollar Exchange Rates
6. The US Embassy reported today that the unofficial
piaster prices of gold and US dollars are now rising, with
no satisfactory explanation yet available for this trend.
The exchange rates had generally been dropping since the
goverAment announced its devaluation and other economic
reform measures on 18 June. The embassy also noted that
among domestic products pork is presently unobtainable in
Saigon markets, while the most serious price rise among
imported commodities is that of wheat flour, which has
risen' some 57 percent since 14 June.
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Buddhist Institute Troubles Remain Unresolved
7. Press reports today stated that members
of the Buddhist Institute Council met yesterday
at Tri Quang's bedside, but that no decisions were
announced. A spokesman for Tri Quang reportedly
announced that Quang was still "considering" a
letter from patriarch Tinh Khiet ordering him to
end his hunger strike. Khiet's communique' from
Hue, which was made public yesterday, also ordered
Tam Chau to take charge of efforts to reach an
accord with the government. Khiet, who is over
80 and rarely takes part in secular affairs, evi-
dently signed the communique, although it is'not
yet clear who drafted the document.
8. Meanwhile, Premier Ky is apparently attempt-
ing to conciliate moderate Institute Chairman Tam Chau after
Chau's criticism of the government raid on the In-
stitute on 23 June. According to a partial transla-
tion of Vietnamese language newspaper in Saigon to-
day, Premier Ky expressed regret to Tam Chau for
the government's action, and personally ordered a
halt in the search of the Institute after learning
of the raid. Ky also offered reparations for any
damage that might have been inflicted by the govern-
ment and ordered the release of any genuine members
of the Buddhist clergy.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
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1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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