THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010040-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: March 10, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
State Department review completed
Top-Secret
110
10 March 1967
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Information as 1600
10 March 1967
North Vietnamese air defense units gave stiff
resistance to a US air attack on the Thai Nguyen
Iron and Steel Plant. At :Least one DRV MIG was
shot down. The Viet Cong may have acquired a 175-
mm. rocket.
The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
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arge--posse y
175-mm.--rocket may be in the possession of the
NVA 84A Artillery Regiment, according to a recent
rallier (Paras. 5-8). A Viet Cong district in
Darlac Province has formulated plans for increased
military, political, and economic activity in the
coming months (Paras. 9-11). Captured Communists
have reported differences between northerners and
southerners in Viet Cong ranks (Paras. 12-14).
II. Political Develoments in South Vietnam:
The Vietnamese Veterans Legion, a potential grass
roots political organization for the military, is
currently experiencing some friction among its
leaders (Paras. 4-6). No official details are
available concerning the most recent Constituent
Assembly sessions in which the final chapter of
the constitution was reportedly completed (Para. 7).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Preliminary pilot reports indicate that the air
attack on Thai Nguyen was successful (Para. 1).
North Vietnamese air defense units offered stiff
resistance and lost one MIG in this attack (Paras.
2-4). Pilots also report success in an air attack
on a thermal power plant and an explosives storage
site near Hon Gai (Para. 5).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. Communist Political Developments: Un-
confirmed press reports allege that a change has
been effected in the leadership of the Viet Conq's
National Liberation Front in order to smooth the
way for peace talks with the US (Paras. 1-3). The
Liberation Front representative in Hanoi in an in-
terview with AFP has discussed. Communist demands
for US troop withdrawal, a postwar coalition gov-
ernment in the South, and possible areas of North-
South cooperation prior to reunification (Paras.
4-8).
VI. Other Major Aspects: North Vietnam is
using small ightwefit. railroad equipment south
of Thanh Hoa (Paras. 1-2).
Approve
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THAILAND
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Possible Communist 175-mm. Rocket in South Vietnam
5. Recent interrogation of a North Vietnamese
rallier suggests that Communist forces in South Viet-
nam may possess a rocket larger than the 140-mm.
type which was used in the attack against the Da
Nang Air Base on 28 February. The rallier claimed
that he had been trained in North Vietnam in the
use of a 175-mm. fin-stabilized rocket designated
"DKZ-66."
6. A Soviet-made fuse, larger than any known
Soviet artillery shell or recoilless rifle fuse, was
recently discovered in South Vietnam, packed in a
container marked "DKZ-66." Its physical character-
istics resemble the 140-mm. Soviet-designed rocket
fuse, but it is much larger.
7. According to the source, the 175-mm. rocket
is the principal armament of the North Vietnamese
Army's 84A Artillery Regiment which left the North
last March and arrived in South Vietnam's III Corps
in August. Although such a weapon has not been
identified in the Soviet military inventory, the
existence of the recently discovered fuse lends
credence to the report. It is doubtful, however,
that such a rocket would be the "principal" weapon
of an entire regiment.
8. A rocket of this size could be used against
static allied installations with a limited degree of
success. Rockets are considered an area weapon and
cannot be directed against specific targets as can
mortars and recoilless rifles. Nevertheless, the
psychological impact of a large-scale rocket attack
against a major American installation cannot be dis-
counted.
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Future Viet Cong Plans in Darlac Province
9. A description of the military, political,
and economic plans of a Viet Cong district in Darlac
Province was provided in early March
These plans, which
seem genuine, place increased emphasis on the sup-
port of a Viet Cong main force independent battalion
located in the province. In addition, four guer-
rilla companies were scheduled to be formed and,
upon completion of their training, were to be as-
signed to villages to organize defenses, destroy
roads, and reconnoiter. allied movements and posi-
tions. In late March,
these guerrilla units, together with a 400-man Viet
Cong main force battalion, are to attack GVN out-
posts and New Life hamlets.
10. Other plans of this three-pronged--mili-
tary, political, and economic--concept include the
collection and storage of rice by the district's
task teams. Attempts will also be made to persuade
pro-GVN families to resume cooperation with the
Viet Cong revolution and to motivate the people to
stage "struggle" movements.
11. The major part of Darlac Province is cur-
rently insecure and subject to Communist control
except for the key towns and other isolated pockets
of government control. These Viet Cong efforts are
designed to maintain tight control over the people
in the province and to provide maximum support to
enemy military operations.
Reported Friction Between Northerners and Southerners
In VC Units
12. Continuing reports of friction in Viet Cong
ranks between native southerners and infiltrated
northerners indicate that there probably is an un-
dercurrent of tension within the Viet Cong organiza-
tion. Although party discipline apparently keeps
any frictions under control, two recent reports
from captured prisoners indicate that differences
are real and may be comparatively widespread within
those units which have both northerners and southerners.
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13. These latest reports maintain that the
frictions are based on traditional regional dif-
ferences, on differences in military experience,
and on the fact that northerners are often placed
in positions of command over southerners.I
Bot characterize
the problems between the North Vietnamese and the
Viet Cong in much the same way although in somewhat
different detail.
14. According to both sources, much of the
reported friction stems from traditional Vietnamese
regional antagonisms. The southerners were de-
scribed as more casual and outgoing people who look
with dismay on the more formal, reserved, and dis-
ciplined northerners. The northerners in turn were
characterized as tending to be domineering and crit-
ical of the southerners4
15. Another important problem, however, in-
volved differences of age and military experience
and their effect on career development. Most of
the southern Communists who were not regrouped to
North Vietnam in 1954-55 are younger men whose mili-
tary experience is confined to the present Viet
Cong movement, usually ranging from five to seven
years. Many native northerners and regrouped south-
erners are professional military men with more than
20 years experience dating back into the Viet Minh
conflict with the French. Most of them are regular
North Vietnamese Army men with formal military train-
ing, and high standards of organization and discipline.
When they are sent to South Vietnam to take over com-
mand positions, they often generate southern resent-
ment, particularly when they consistently receive
better assignments, better allowances and privileges,
and better opportunities for career advancement.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Problems Within Vietnamese Veterans Legion
1. Lieutenant Colonel Pham Do Thanh, secretary
general of the Vietnamese Veterans Legion, told a US
Embassy officer on 6 March that the legion hopes to
enter more than 30 candidates; in the election of the
future government's lower house. Thanh declared,
however, that the legion has not done any serious
planning, and blamed the inattention of the legion's
president, General Pham Xuan Chieu, for~this condi-
tion.
2. Thanh claimed that General Chieu is still
absorbed in a recent unsuccessful attempt to open
gambling stalls under legion auspices on the grounds
of the Saigon Zoo, an attempt which Thanh said re-
sulted in some bad publicity and created some problems
for Chieu with other members of. the ruling military
Directorate. Thanh, who is a strong backer of Premier
Ky, further declared that General Chieu supports
Chief of State Thieu, and then emphasized his own
feeling that Premier Ky would be the best presidential
candidate by far.
3. Although the legion is still weak and in an
early stage of organization, it does have some 152 paid
district workers throughout Vietnam, strong Hoa Hao
and Cao Dai subsidiaries, and a small, full-time
headquarters in Saigon. Although top legion officers
differ on their preference for presidential candidates,
there have been some previous indications that the
military leaders view the legion as a.key organization
to be involved in any effort by the military to build
a grass roots political party.
Constituent Assembly Developments
4. No official reporting has been received as
yet on the Constituent Assembly sessions of the past
two days, during which the assembly is said to have
completed work on the final chapter of the constitution.
This chapter deals with the role of the assembly and
the incumbent regime during the period of transition
to elected government.
10 March 1967
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Iron and
steel plant
x
Xieng Khouang ?
L A O S Samneua?
i
VIENTIANEr, Nong Khai
JVlnh
Destroyed bridges
l Lin
`. Cal
? Ha Tinh
sfo'ruge site
g Yen. Hon Gal
Muang Nakhon Phanom
?\?Khammouane
NORTH VIETNAM
Light-weight ~?~
rolling stock observed
Muang Sakon Nakhbn s
Ching-hsi
Thai Nguyen/ TL I IV,..-,-..--.. `
Small-Light.. ight cars
in railroo0ard -
SEpon . eq r+O "
SOUTH
\ VIETNAM
MuongNong~`?
LAOS `..,.:;
erma
power plant
BacNinh 'Explosives
Line inoperative
Dong Ho/
?Saravane
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1. North Vietnamese air defense units gave
stiff resistance to the strike on 10 March by US Air
Force planes against the iron and steel complex at
Thai Nguyen. Preliminary field reports indicate
that the attack was successful, but photographs
taken after the strike have not yet been analyzed.
2. Communist 85-mm, artillery shot down one
F-105 flying a SAM suppression mission in support of
the Thai Nguyen attack. Two F4Cs received extensive
battle damage in the target area and went down in
Laos as the pilots, later rescued, attempted to
return to base. Pilots described encountering a
layered barrage of heavy, accurate 37-, 57-, 85-,
and 100-mm. AAA fire within six miles of Thai Nguyen,
but reported that much of the ground fire was suppressed
when cluster bomb units hit the target area.
3. At least three MIG encounters were reported
by pilots involved in the raid. The first occurred as
four F-105s headed for the target about 13 miles north
of Yen Bai. One of two MIG-21s sighted fired an air-
to-air missile which burned out before reaching the
US flight. A second incident occurred as four F4C
pilots were leaving the target and sighted a MIG-21
firing an AAM at an F-105. The Communist missile
missed the F-105 and a Sparrow AAM launched by one
of the F4Cs missed the MIG--2l.
4. In the third MIG encounter reported, two
F-105s engaged four Communist aircraft, thought to
have been MIG-17s, about ten miles west of Thai
Nguyen. In the air battle that followed, one Commu-
nist aircraft was shot down and two others were
damaged.
The area in which the Communist air-
were encountered on 10 March is within the
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normal defensive patrol area of Phuc Yen. Pilot
reports indicate that the F-105s initiated the attack
in this engagement
5. US Navy planes conducted coordinated
attacks on a thermal power plant and an explosives
storage site near Hon Gai on the North Vietnamese
coast. Initial pilot reports indicate extensive
damage to both targets and no loss of US aircraft.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Alleged Change of Leadership of National Liberation
Front
1. According to unconfirmed press reports
from Saigon, Nguyen Huu Tho has been replaced as
chairman of the Viet Cong's National Liberation
Front by Huynh Tan Phat, the Front's secretary gen-
eral. This change allegedly was made to smooth
the way for peace talks between the Front and the
US which would bypass the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment.
2. The press accounts do not make clear why
the change in leadership would make negotiations
more feasible. One theory offered was that Phat
would be more acceptable to the US as a negotiator;
another was that Phat could be a scapegoat if the
talks broke down, and that Tho could then resume
his position without being tainted by failure.
Neither theory seems particularly valid.
3. There have been no prior indications of
any impending change in the Front's leadership,
and no official reports from Saigon on this press
account have been received. The South Vietnamese
Government, however, is conducting a vigorous public
campaign against any peace talks which would lead
to a coalition government. It may be that the
press accounts linking a purported switch in Front
leadership with impending peace talks--which ex-
clude the Vietnamese Government--may be more of
the government's campaign.
Front Plans for Postwar Government
4. A French news account of an AFP interview
with Nguyen Van Tien, the Liberation Front repre-
sentative in Hanoi, provided Tien's views on US
troop withdrawal and the political structure en-
visaged for postwar South Vietnam.
5. Tien emphasized that the Front did not
expect the US to pull out its troops immediately
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or within a month after a settlement, but that the
Front was willing to see the withdrawal take place
"within a reasonable period of time." Such a with-
drawal has always been a primary element in the
Vietnamese Communist's demands for settling the
war, but they have avoided spelling out any precise
timetable.
6. On the question of the Vietnamese political
structure following peace, Tien stated that an un-
determined "transitional period" would precede re-
unification and that each part of Vietnam would have
a separate government. In the South there would be
a "neutral national coalition of the broadest base
representing the most diverse tendencies, but with
one common objective--getting rid of the US aggres-
sors." Tien, however, reiterated that the Front is
the "only authentic representative organ of the
South Vietnamese people and that its role must be
decisive in the settlement of the conflict." In
this regard, Tien also claimed that in 1967 the
Front would increase its political activity as a
step toward the creation of a coalition government
in the South.
7. During the transitional period between the
advent of peace and the reunification of the two
zones of Vietnam, Tien pointed out that there would
be many such joint problems to settle as the free
circulation of population and trade. He stated his
personal opinion that these problems could be set-
tled by "an all-Vietnamese Assembly with an equal
number of representatives from the North and South."
The Communists have not pushed the idea of setting
up such North-South cooperation in years. This was
a fairly common theme, with some variations, in the
late 1950s.
8. Tien's remarks on a possible North-South
group to handle interim problems prior to reunifica-
tion were undoubtedly offered with the aim of fur-
thering the Hanoi-inspired charge that the Vietnamese
could settle their own problems if only they were
left alone by the US.
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1, photography
of the an oa Railroad Yard indicates that material
arriving from the northern provinces is being trans-
loaded to small "lightweight cars at Thanh Hoa for
further transport into Military Region IV.
2. Photography I I showed
meter-gauge cars in the northern portion and small,
lightweight cars in the southern portion of the
yard. Stockpiles of material were observed along
a track connecting the two portions of the yard.
3. The region south of Thanh Hoa has been more
frequently attacked than any other part of North
Vietnam. By using light cars, and locomotives con-
verted from trucks, the North Vietnamese can build
lighter replacement bridges on the line between
Thanh Hoa and Vinh, camouflage cars more effec-
tively, and replace losses of cars and locomotives
at less cost.
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