THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010034-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: November 8, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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'Top Secret
MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
State Department review completed
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Information as of 1600
8 November 1966
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Deliveries of rice from the delta region of South
Vietnam to Saigon during the first nine months of 1966
were 30 percent below deliveries during the correspond-
ing period in 1965.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Re-
newed fighting broke out today in Tay Ninh Province
between US and Communist forces as Operation ATTLEBORO
continued to sweep the area near War Zone "C" (Paras.
1-3). US forces participating in Operation THAYER II
in coastal Binh Dinh Province engaged a Communist
force for five hours early today (Paras. 4-5). Accord-.
ing to press reports, the Viet Cong kidnaped an entire
village in the Mekong Delta province of Vinh Binh
(Para."6).
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II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Premier Ky plans to act soon on the resignations of
the six cabinet ministers that have been pending since
-early'-'October (Paras, 1-2). During its 8 November ses-
sion, the Constituent Assembly appeared fairly united
in its opposition to the government's controversial
veto power, but the US Embassy is inclined to believe
that a compromise solution will be worked out (Paras.
3-4). The prospects for land reform as a part of
Revolutionary Development appear dim (Paras. 5-6).
The Viet Cong defector rate is again increasing
(Paras. 7-8).
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: There is
nothing of significance to report.
VI. Other Major Aspects: Rice deliveries to Saigon
from the delta are down almost 30 percent (Paras. 1-2).
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0,Savannakhet
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OPERATION
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C A M B O D I A
SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Heavy fighting flared up today between Amer-
ican and Communist forces north of Tay Ninh city as
the multibattalion US Operation ATTLEBORO continued
to sweep Tay Ninh Province near Communist War Zone
"C." The Viet Cong force--estimated to number more
than 1,000 men--moved from jungle hideouts to at-
tack a battalion-size force of the US 1st Infantry
Division. US artillery units pounded the Viet Cong
with nearly 2,000 shells while tactical aircraft
dropped high-explosive and napalm bombs in advance
of the US positions.
2. Following the four-hour battle, enemy cas-
ualties in the operation now stand at 758 killed,
nine captured, and 54 suspects apprehended. American
losses now total 81 killed, 332 wounded, and five
missing. Enemy losses also include three rocket
launchers, seven machine guns, 19 submachine guns and
pistols, 3,000 fragmentation grenades, and 1,000
rifle grenades that were captured and an 80-bed Viet
Cong hospital that was destroyed.
3. The fighting in Tay Ninh Province during
the past five days--some of the heaviest of the
war--may be indicative of.a Communist desire to de-
fend and protect various installations and storage
areas near their War Zone "C" stronghold.
4. A company of the US 1st Air Cavalry Divi-
sion clashed early today with a Communist force of
unknown size in coastal Binh Dinh Province. The ac-
tion occurred near the coast several miles south-
east of Bong Son, the scene of several battles in
past months. US artillery, rocket-firing heli-
copters, and tactical air strikes against the en-
emy positions supported the American troops that
are a part of the six-battalion operation THAYER II.
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5. The Communist force--believed to be part
of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese 3rd Division
(formerly the 610th)--withdrew after five hours
of heavy fighting. Casualties for this action
currently stand at one American killed and two
wounded as compared with enemy losses of 34
killed. This brings to 218 the number of Communist
troops killed since the initiation of this opera-
tion on 24 October. Cumulative American losses
presently total 26 killed and 111 wounded.
6. The Viet Cong, in an unprecedented act of
terrorism, kidnaped an entire village of 100 per-
sons in the Mekong Delta province of Vinh Binh,
according to press reports. The inhabitants of the
village, which is 60 miles south of Saigon and iden-
tified by US authorities as Long Vinh, were routed
out during the night and forced at gunpoint to march
off into the jungle. South Vietnamese troops entered
the village at dawn on 8 November and found it empty.
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1. With both the Manila Conference and US elections
now out of the way, Premier Ky. plans to act on the re-
signations of six cabinet ministers pending since early
October. In addition. to.Economy Minister Than who was
replaced on 27 October, Youth Minister Trieu and Educa-
tion Minister Truong will be leaving the cabinet. Dep-
uty Premier Nguyen Lu.u Vien., Labor Minister Hung, and
Transport Minister Thuan have agreed to remain. There
are conflicting reports on Social Affairs Minister Lieng,
and his status has apparently not yet been settled.
2. Settlement of the resignation problem, expected
within the next day or two, should serve to stabilize
the cabinet somewhat and remove it as a focal point of
north-south regional tensions. However, it is not at
all certain that the solution will satisfy various south-
ern political elements which continue to be concerned
about the concentration of real government power in the
hands of a few northerners. Premier Ky may yet appoint
a southerner to one of the two positions currently held
by General Loan, who recently appeared resigned to such
a loss. At any rate, the long-term north-south re-
gional problem will remain, and will undoubtedly influ-
ence the formation of broad, national groupings contend-
ing for control of next year's. constitutional govern-
ment.
Constituent Assembly Debates Government Veto Power
3. The Constituent Assembly has now begun for-
mal discussion of Article 20--the government's con-
troversial veto power over legislation lacking a two-
thirds majority vote. The US Embassy has reported that
the assembly appears fairly united in its opposition to
the provision as it now stands. However, the degree of
such opposition in terms of a desire to provoke or con-
front the government varies widely, and the embassy be-
lieves that the assembly at present is inclined to seek
a compromise solution.
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4. Dr. Phan Quang Dan, a northerner and a well-
known political independent, played a prominent part
in criticizing the veto provision. Arguing that the
originial rationalization for the provision was the
government's desire to guard against pro-Communist
or neutralist action, Dan urged that the veto be used
only on such issues. Many other delegates, including
representatives of every bloc except for the Hoa Hao dom-
inated Alliance Bloc, also spoke against Article 20,
demanding that it be abolished or amended. There was
no vote taken during today's session, however, and the
discussion will resume on 9 November.
Political Obstacles to Revolutionary Development
5. The prospects for land reform uhder the aegis
of the Revolutionary Development (RD) program are poor,
according to Colonel Vo Dai Khoi, an assistant to Gen-
eral Nguyen Duc Thang, minister of revolutionary develop-
ment. The basic problem, in Khoi's view, is that any ef-
fort toward land reform would be subject to high-level
political pressures. The reason for this is that many of
the-large landholdings that would have to be broken up for
redistribution to individuals belong either to the family
or friends of the IV Corps commander, Lieutenant General
Dang Van Quang.
6. Khoi believes that the Revolutionary Develop-
ment Cadres (RDCs) could not start land-reform programs
at this time, or even in 1967. His reasoning is that
the' over-all RDC program must be consolidated throughout
the country before any attempt is made to implement a
land reform program. Piecemeal or premature efforts to
start such programs in other parts of the country would,
in Khoi's opinion, only serve to alert Quang and his
associates.
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Viet Cong Defectors (Chien Hoi)
7. A total of 501 Viet Cong returned to gov-
ernment control between 27 October and 2 November.
This is the largest: number of defectors since early
April when the defection rate was also very high.
The actual count last week was probably even higher
since reports were not received from 12 provinces
and the reporting period was cut off at the end of
five days due to the celebration of South Vietnam's
National Day. A breakdown of defectors by corps
follows:
I Corps 48
II Corps 271
III Corps 68
IV Corps 114
TOTAL 501 (271 military)
8. Since the first week in September, defec-
tions have been averaging about 294 per week. Among
the reasons advanced for the great upsurge in de-
fectors are stepped up GVN/US military operations,
especially in II Corps, and augmented psychological
warfare operations since late September and through-
out October. From January 1966 to 2 November there
has been a total of 15,221 defectors. This number
exceeds by 4,097 the number of defectors who re-
turned to the government during 1965.
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port.
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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Rice Deliveries from Delta to Saigon
THOUSANDS OF
METRIC TONS
I(}
Co
SEPT
EMBER
14,8
Q
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing.of significance to report.
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
Rice Deliveries to Saigon Fall sharply
1. Deliveries of rice from the delta to Saigon
during the first nine months of 1966 amounted to only
256,100 metric tons, or roughly 30 percent below de-
liveries during the corresponding period of 1965 and
almost 5O percent below the January-September average
during 1961-64. Moreover-1 according to embassy es-
timates, total deliveries for 1966 will amount to
only 312,200 metric tons--compared with 449,300 tons
in 1965 and an average of 591,700 tons during 1961-64
(see chart). As previously reported, this decline
in deliveries stems from several factors, the most
important of which include: a decline in production,
flood damage, VC taxation and interference with rice
movements, hoarding by both merchants and peasants,
and illegal shipments to Cambodia.
2. Because of the shortfall in deliveries from
the delta, South Vietnam--traditionally a rice ex-
porter--has become a large-scale importer of rice.
Imports of rice in 1.965 amounted to 130,000 metric
tons, and in 1966 these imports will probably rise
to 485,000 metric tons. Moreover, according to em-
bassy estimates,. imports of rice in 1967 may total
600,000 metric tons as deliveries from the delta fall
below the 1966 low.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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