THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 2, 1966
• Content Type: IM

'F(')P SECRET 1
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T0082qAQ01 100010011 -1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
information as of 1600
2 August 1966
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
?25X1
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'P SECRET
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010011-1
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 Apprc
2 August 1966
North Vietnamese politburo member Nguyen Chi
Thanh, who reportedly has been in South Vietnam di-
recting the war effort since early 1965, has writ-
ten an article criticizing those who had lost heart
after the introduction of US troops into South Viet-
nam in mid-1965.
US
torces tought several scattered skirmises with the
enemy in the central highlands during the conduct of
Operation PAUL REVERE.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: US
forces clash with Communists in several areas south-
west of Pleiku (Para. 1). A South Vietnamese Army
convoy was ambushed yesterday south of Saigon (Para.
2). Operation SPRINGFIELD II ended yesterday in
Binh Duong Province, and Operation CHEYENNE began in
the same area (Paras. 3-4).
i
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Premier Ky reportedly announced today that he would
not be initially available as a candidate for the
position of chief executive for the government to be
elected some time next year (Para. 1). Viet Cong
armed units and sabotage squads in the Saigon area
are being instructed. to support Communist political
efforts directed against the government's forthcom-
ing elections (Para. 2).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments: US
Navy aircraft have struck the HaiphongJPOL facility
for the third time since 29 June (Paras. 1-2).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
Appro\
 Approved
V. Communist Political Developments: North
Vietnamese politburo member Nguyen Chi Thanh, who
reportedly has been in South Vietnam directing the
war effort since early 1965, has authored what ap-
pears to be a defense of his stewardship against
critics in Hanoi (Paras. 1-7).
anoi is attempting to strike a
threatening note in its protests of US bombings in
the Demilitarized Zone (Para. 11).
VI. Other Major Aspects: 'oad construc-
tion is proceeding in northwestern North Vietnam
(Paras. 1-3).
2 August 1966
Approved
 A ft- -Aft
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\ NORTH ?D4ng Hot
VIETNAM
DEMA'(1; (t)P LIM
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5?pone
$Savannakhet
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Bien
Hoa
Xuan Coo
SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
0 25 5U /5 1OOMiles
:1 25 5(1 75 160 K~ior eters
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Ban Me
Thuat
 Appro
1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Elements of the US 25th Infantry Division,
participating in Operation PAUL REVERE in the cen-
tral highlands of Kontum and Pleiku provinces,
clashed with Communist forces in several scattered
skirmishes today. One battalion of the US 1st
Cavalry Division was helilifted into an area
about 20 miles southwest of Pleiku and immediately
was attacked by an estimated battalion-size enemy
force. With support from tactical air strikes and
coordinated artillery fire, the US troops repulsed
the attack. In another encounter, a company of the
25th Infantry Division reported heavy contact with
an enemy force in an area approximately 30 miles
southwest of Pleiku near the Cambodian border. Amer-
ican casualties in today's action total ten killed
and 80 wounded. Initial reports of enemy casual-
ties indicate four killed. Operation PAUL REVERE
is a long-term border surveillance operation which
began on 9 May. Some 650 Viet Cong have been killed
to date.
2. A South Vietnamese Army convoy was ambushed
yesterday by a Viet Cong force approximately 25
miles south of Saigon. A reaction force was sent
to the area and was supported by tactical air strikes,
armed helicopters, and artillery fire. During the
hour-long engagement, 32 South Vietnamese soldiers
were killed, 14 wounded, and ten allied trucks dam-
aged. One Viet Cong was reported killed in the ac-
tion.
3. Operation SPRINGFIELD II, a US search-and-
destroy operation in Binh Duong Province, ended
yesterday. This operation was conducted in an area
approximately 30 miles north of Saigon by five bat-
talions of the US 1st Infantry Division. American
casualties included two killed and five wounded.
A total of ten Viet Cong were killed and two cap-
tured. The 1st Infantry Division began a six-bat-
talion route security operation--CHEYENNE--yester-
day in the same area. Estimated Viet Cong strength
in the area of these operations totals 2,380.
2 August 1966
Appro
 App
5. The three-battalion South Vietnamese
search-and-destroy Operation LAM SON 292 ended yes-
terday following three days of operation in an area
southeast of Hue in Thua Thien Province. Cumulative
results were three South Vietnamese killed and eight
wounded with 15 Viet Cong killed and two captured.
2 August 1966
Appro4'
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. According to the press, Premier Ky today
formally announced that he "would leave politics"
and return to the air force when an elected govern-
ment assumes office some time next year. Various
wire services have reported that Ky's statement
today took the form of a communique from the ire-
mier's office, following remarks by Ky along this
same line to some newsmen on 31 July. Ky previously
has expressed a desire to return to military duties,
and today's remarks apparently put him officially
on record as being initially unavailable as a chief
executive for an elected government. Premier Ky has
also been quoted recently as stating that Chief of
State Nguyen Van Thieu might be a candidate for
president or chief executive under the projected
constitution.
25X1 2.
II the Viet Cong have assigned some o eir
25X1 armed units and sabotage squads in the Saigon area
to support Communist political efforts against the
government's forthcoming constitutional assembly
elections. These forces are to increase terrorism
in the capital through assassinations and sabotage
in an effort to cut down on the total vote.
2 August 1966
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 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00826
Hai
Duong
POL Facility
,Thai Binh
Mong Cat
~'.,~V knt'k Lirt
DEMARCATION LINE
Y""~ ~ Ong Fla
Bo i SU uang Tit
SOUTH
VIETNAM
Mtrang Nong ..-^~
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. US Navy aircraft attacked the Haiphong
POL facility for the third time on 2 August. Ini-
tial pilot reports indicate that all bombs were in
the target area. One large explosion, three
smaller secondary explosions, and a fire were re-
ported. No US aircraft were lost. There were no
tankers noted moored in the vicinity of the target.
2. Haiphong had been struck previously on
29 June and 7 July. Photographic analysis of these
strikes indicated that slightly over 80 percent of
this target had been destroyed. Today's strike was
targeted against the remaining facilities including
the pumping station, drumming and packaging facil-
ity, and the bunkering piers.
2 August 1966
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 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010~11-1
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
2 August 1966
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 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001100p10011-1
V. COMMUNIST PQLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Politburo member Nguyen Chi Thanh, who re-
portedly has been in South Vietnam directing the
war effort since early 1965,has authored what ap-
pears to be a defense of his stewardship against
critics in Hanoi. The article was contained in the
July issue of the North Vietnamese party journal,
Hoc Ta p,and carries unusually forthright and explicit
criticism of those who differ with Thanh's views.
2. In essence, Thanh criticized those who
had lost heart after the introduction of US combat
troops into South Vietnam in mid=1'965. Judging
from the specific policies he defends and from
the particular attitudes he attacks, Thanh was aim-
ing his remarks at high-level Vietnamese Communists
rather than the middle or lower level ranks who gen-
erally come in for the bulk of criticism. He par-
ticularly singled out those who base their analysis
of the current situation in South Vietnam on past
experience and ignore present "realities." Thanh
asserted that "to repeat exactly what has belonged
to history in a new reality is an adventurous act."
3. This barb is an obvious challenge to those
who still rely primarily on the 1947 analysis by
Truong Chinh of the war against France. Vo Nguyen Giap,
the hero of Dien Bien Phu and the defense minister
in Hanoi, is the most famous pupil of Truong Chinh
and an old personal adversary of Nguyen Chi'Thanh.
4. If Thanh and others in the Vietnamese
Com-
munist hierarchy have had some differences over
how
the war should be fought, the appearance of his
ar-
ticle
in the authoritative party journal suggests
that
the dispute has been resolved, at least for the
time
being, in Thanh's favor. There is no indication
that
any heads have rolled as a result of the argu-
meht.
There is however, a hint in Thanh's article
2 August 1966
Approv
 Approved
that there has been some footdragging in the ranks
because of discouragement over the results of the
past year's fighting against the US.
5. Thanh lashed out in unusually harsh lan-
guage at those who offer suggestions on fighting
the war but who are not familiar with the battle-
field situation. He charged that in the situation
such as existed in mid-1965 when US combat forces
increased abruptly, "erroneous tendencies" appeared
as well as "correct ideas." The erroneous tenden-
cies result in the performance of work according to
"old customs," according to Thanh.
6. Thanh singled out the question of the re-
lation between the Communist effort in the delta
and that in the highlands as one in which there is
a particular difference of opinion. Although Thanh
did not go into details, he did claim that some
people tended to look at this problem "in an old-
fashioned manner." The implication was that some-
one, presumably on a policy planning level in the
military, had proposed that the Communists in South
Vietnam concentrate their military efforts in the
highlands, even at the expense of their position in
the lowlands and delta area.
7. A recent article in the North Vietnamese
Army journal, written in South Vietnam, addressed
itself to this same problem and asserted that the
1965 Communist offensive in South Vietnam had suc-
ceeded in launching attacks in both the highlands
and the delta, something which had never before been
accomplished. The article claimed that this was the
proper strategy and that it must be continued this
year.
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 Approve
Hanoi Protests Bombing of DMZ
11. Hanoi is attempting to strike a threatening
note in its protests of the B-52 Stratofortress bomb-
ings of the DMZ without admitting that its own troops
have recently transited this area en route to South
Vietnam. In a party daily commentary on 2 August,
Hanoi warned that "up to now" the DRV armed forces
had always respected the 1954 Geneva agreements
and the status of the DMZ, but that the US must now
"bear all the consequences of destroying the buffer
character of this area." This kind of veiled threat
has been used before and has become fairly typical
of Vietnamese propaganda reaction to US military
2 August 1966
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 Approved
initiatives in Vietnam, particularly with respect
to the Geneva agreements and the question of for-
eign volunteers. This kind of a threat is prob-
ably as close as the Vietnamese wish to come to
the more inflammatory Chinese propaganda stand
that in "tearing up" the Geneva agreements the
US justifies the Communists` ignoring these agree-
ments.
2 August 1966
Approved
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 Approv
VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Road work which has been under way north-
west of Yen Bai since mid-1965 is continuing at a
slow pace, and two roads in the area now appear to
be in late stages of construction. Completion of
the work will provide the first direct road connec-
tion between Yen Bai and Lao Cai on the Chinese
border, and generally improve the road transport
network in the northwest border area.
2. Photography Ishows a road from
Yen Bai to Lao Cai to be in the final stages of
grading with portions of it already raved G.nd
usa..le. Several bridges still appear to be in
early stages of construction, however. When fin-
ally completed, the road will run roughly northeast
of _nc' parallel to the Hanoi - Lao Cai railroad,
connecting existing Routes 4 and 157 in the Lao Cai
area with Route 13A at Yen Bai.
n existing road running
north from Yen Bai in the direction of Lao Cai also
has been extended for about 12 kilometers and may
eventually provide a second road connection between
Yen Bai and Lao Cai. West of Lao Cai work is near-
ing completion on another road that will link Lai
Chou, on Route 6, with Lao Cai and with the Hanoi -
Lao Cai railroad. Sections of this road also ap-
pear to be serviceable, but numerous bridges remain
to be completed.
3. The pace of construction observed on these
roads suggests that they are part of a general plan
to improve road transport in the area and that the
major part of the work is being carried out by the
North Vietnamese. There is no indication that Chi-
nese Communist military engineers in the area are
involved in this construction, although it is pos-
sible that they may provide occasional assistance.
2 August 1966
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