SUMMARY-I BACKGROUND 1946-1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01034R000200010002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 23, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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This doCunt ha$ been
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S UM4IARY
T Background 1946-1950
This study traces the organizational development of the
Central Intelligence Agency, using as a chronological guide the
period covered by the administration of General falter Bedell Smith
(October 7, 1950 - February 26, 1953.) It is concerned only
incidentally with the Agency's clandestine activities.
When General Smith became Director
Central Intelligence (as
Group and Agency) was almost five years old. The principal
developments during that time had been as follows:
(1) The Central Intelligence Group (CI G) was established as
coordinating agent for the Secretaries of State, 'Jar, and Navy plus
a personal representative of the President designated as the National
Intelligence Authority (NIA), by a presidential letter of January 22,
19L6. GIG was to consist of a Director a_pointed by the President,
assisted by persons and financed by funds to be supplied by the NIA.
The Director was to (a) advise the NIA concerning needed modifications
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in the existing intelligence structure of their departments; (b)
"correlate and Evaluate intelligence", and (c) establish "services
of common concern" wherever there were "related to the national security".
Under this directive, the first director, Sidney d. Souers
(January 22, 1946 - June 10, 1946) formed two staffs: one for
coordination, and the other for correlation and evaluation of
intelligence. On February 8, 1946, the NIA, at the request of the
President, added to CIE's duties by requiring a daily summary of
current intelligence. Since CI G was dependent on the NU for funds
and personnel, there was no real staff for personnel and administration
under Souers.
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (June 10, 1946 - May 1, 1947)
proceeded on the assumption that, as the President's appointee, he
must take full responsibility for his acts as Director; he therefore
sought commensurate authority and was empowered by the NIA to (a) hire
and pay his own personnel; (b) receive and disburse independent funds,
and (c) act as the "executive agent" of NIA members in dealings
with their departmental subordinates. He was also empowered. to'
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collect foreign intelligence apart from the regular departmental
collection services, and to do independent research in intelligence
under certain limitations. To assist him in coordination of
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intelligence activities, Vandenberg established the Interdepartmental
Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICA.PS) consisting of representatives
from all PNIP. intelligence organizations plus a chairman appointed
by the Department of State. To discharge his functions with respect
to correlation and evaluation of intelligence related to the national
security, Vandenberg built up a full scale research organization
called the Office of Deports and Estimates (0itE), which took charge
of national current intelligence, intelligence estimates, basic
intelligence, and interagency coordination of all three, plus a
variety of other services including production of scientific, technical,
and economic intelligence. In view of the independent authority now
vested in the jirector, staffs for personnel, administration, and
security were formed under the itrector's 1'Executive".
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Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter (May 1, 1947 - October 7, 1950)
retained all authority acquired by General Vandenberg with the
exception of his position as 'executive agent' which Hillenkoetter
renounced on June 26, 1947.
On July 26, 1947, the National Security Act made the Group
an Agency (CIA) and substituted the National 5ecur.ty Council (NSC)
for the National Intelligence Authority. Between the passage of the
Act and January 13, 1948, National Security Council Intelligence
Directives (NSCIDt"s) issued in pursuance of the new law, defined
relationships and allocated responsibilities among CIA and other
intelligence organizations but not in such a way as to necessitate
important changes in the existing CIA organization.
This organization, as of January 1, 1949, consisted of (1) The
Director advised by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (established
under NSCID-1); (2) certain advisory groups; and (3) six offices:
Collection and irissemination 03D), Scientific Intelligence (OSI);
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Reports and Estimates (ORE), Operations (00), Special Operations (050),
and olicy Coordination (OPC).
During iIillenkoetter's administration, difficulties arose with
respect to all of the principal CIA functions; Surveys undertaken
during 197-1950 resulted in numerous recommendations, many of which
were still pending when General Smith took office on October 7, 1950.
II Organizational Revisions 1950-1953
In spite of many internal.and external changes (an increase
of major organizational components in Washington; new leadership
in key positions; jurisdictional realignments among CIA's operating
units; reallocations of budgetary assets and personnel; changes in
operating programs, priorities and the like; and a variety of
modifications affecting CIA's relationships with other intelligence
organizations)A t e administration of General Smith was characterized
by important elements of stability in that basic legislation underlying
the Central Intelligence system did not change; and the system remained
decentralized among seven intelligence and numerous non-intelligence
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agencies of the government. The Smith administration was, nevertheless,
motivated toward change when it took office, partly because of
recommended changes already approved by the NSC and partly as a
result of the Korean Jar.
Organizational planning and advice were available to the new
Director internally from: (1) the "Management Staff"; (2) the
Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff (late ICAPS); (3) the
Inspections and Security Staff; (4) the Budget Staff; (5) the Personnel
Staff; (6) the Legal Staff; (7) the "Project Review Committee"; and
externally from: (1) the Iti'berstadt" Committee's Report to the Hoover
Commission (in 1948); (2) the "Dulles Committees" report to the
National Security Council (1949); (3) the results of studies made
by the State and Defense Departments in 1949 and 1950, and (4) studies
promoted by the Bureau of the Budget.
Of all these, the most important and compelling was the "Dulles
Report", in that it was at the same time the most detailed, comprehensive,
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and objective, and a plan to whose implementation General Smith
was committed.
The principal changes indicated by the Lilles Report were as
follows:
(1) Creation of an "Estimates Division" to be small and
carefully seleeted and to have charge of constructing "national"
intelligence estimates in close cooperation with the other intelligence
agencies.
(2) Creation of a "Research and Reports .Division" to (a)
produce whatever "departmental" intelligence CIA might need, (b) take
charge of "basic" intelligence, (c) take charge of research in economic,
scientific, and technological (including map) intelligence as well as
any other type that might in the future be authorized as a "service of
common concern", and (d) take over certain support services, chiefly
the library, indexing, reference, and collation activities.
k3) 1J merger of collection services and clandestine activities
(OSO, 00, OPC) under a single Division, and with "covert" administration
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compartmented from "overt" administration9
(Li) Creation of a "Coordination Division", as a staff to
the hirector, concerned with interagency coordination, and to supervise
the duties currently undertaken by the "Liaison Division" of OCD.
Other important features of the wiles Report were:
(1) Suggestions that CIA should relinquish activities in
conflict with those of other agencies;
(2) apecial criticism directed at ORE for having become a
competitive producer of intelligence not properly classed as "national";
(3) Special criticism with respect to scientific intelligence;
communications intelligence; and "domestic intelligence including
counterintelligence and the points at which domestic and foreign
intelligence overlappwd."
Some but not all of the recommendations in the Tulles Report
were adopted by the Smith Administration in complete or modified form.
Another important influence on General Smith's planning for
the Agency seems to have been a "Staff Study" issued jointly by the
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State and Defense Departments on May 1, 1950. The plan here suggested
would have involved a "'tional Intelligence Group" within CIA to
produce both estimative and current intelligence (unlike the Dulles
Report Plan in which current intelligence might well have been dropped
from CIA activities).
General Smith reorganized the Director's staff to include two
members of the "Dulles Committee", Mr. William H. Jackson as Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. Allen Dulles h 'f as
Deputy Director for Operations. The former took the lead in
reorganizing the Agency and inter-agency apparatus for production of
intelligence; while the latter took general charge of collection and
clandestine operations. Smith also appointed a Deputy Director for
Administration (i'Ir. Murray McConnel soon replaced by Mr. Walter R.
Wolf) to supervise the administrative activities of the Agency minus
the new office of Training which was given independent status. It was
not until January 2, 1952, that the third deputy (for Intelligence)
was added to superintend the work of the "overt" offices which eventually
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included national estimates, Current Intelligence, Research and Reports,
Scientific Intelligence, Intelligence Coordination, Collection and
Dissemination, and Operations. In the interim, Mr. Jackson took general
charge of the overt components.
While the Agency executive structure was being thus altered,
Jackson and Smith gave immediate attention to the problem of
re-asserting CIA's leadership in governmental intelligence. They
proceeded conservatively, however, seeking to withdraw the Agency
from fields where its "dominant interest" was not clear, rather than
attempt to take on new functions. Jackson spent much of his time
during his first weeks as Director in negotiating an agreement with
the Department of State under which State nonce#ded a dominant interest
in economic intelligence to CIA while CIA withdrew from the field of
research in political intelligence . (Later, CIA also withdrew from
certain fields of scientific and technological intelligence.) After
the first interagency agreements were negotiated, Jackson made use of
the Office of Intelligence Coordination (OIC) for study of interagency problems.
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General amith was quick to call upon the Intelligence Advisory
Committee to aid him directly in problems of coordination of both
activities and estimates. Luring the next two years, the IAG was
convened almost one hundred times, occupying itself chiefly with
detailed discussion of intelligence estimates prepared by all agencies
under the leadership of CIA for presentation to the National Security
Counfil. The IAC also reached agreement on a wide variety of inter-
agency problems.
Other coordinating boards which figured importantly during
the Smith administration were;
(1) the US Communications Intelligence Board of which the
DCI became chairman in the fall of 1952;
(2) the Operations Coordinating Board (formerly the
Psychological Strategy Board) directly under the NSC, on which CIA was
represented, the DCI acting for a time as chairman;
(3) various primarily military intelligence coordinating
committees in which CIA gained influence: the Joint Intelligence
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Indications Committee (which became the Watch Committee of the IAC);
and the joint military organizations for exploitation of prisoners
of war; enemy materials, and enemy documents.
In the particular matter of inter-agency coordination overseas,
General Smith gradually gained agreements in which the influence of
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I The covert services
continued to maintain their own arrangements for coordination abroad.
Perhaps the most striking changes introduced into the intelligence
system by the Smith administration were those related to the production
of "national" intelligence as defined in NSCID-3. The following
division of responsibilities was gradually evolved for production
of intelligence in this category:
(1) Estimates by the newly formed Office of National
Intelligence which relied primarily upon the IAC organization for
the material underlying these.
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(2) Basic Intelligence (the National Intelligence Survey)
by a division under the Office of Research and Reports, acting
as coordinating agent for research carried on by the 1.!C.
(3) Current intelligence publications by the Office of
Current intelligence (but national "indications" intelligence by
an inter-agency group).
This new division of responsibilities, which involved the
abrupt abandonment of the Office of Reports and Estimates, was made
necessary by the pressing international situation and the demands
created by the National Security Council's endorsement of the Dalles
Report.
III The Inter-agency Coordination Problem
It appeared essential to all CIA directors through General Smith
to organize a personal staff for interdepartmental coordination of
intelligence activities, to aid him in formation of decisions ultimately
to be considered by the Intelligence Advisory Board (January 22, 191t6-
July 26, 1947) and the Intelligence Advisory Committee (after December 12, 1947).
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Admiral Souers organized such a staff (Central Planning Staff)
which, during the four months of its existence (February - June 1946)
conducted numerous studies of the points at which the existing intelligence
organization of the government might be strengthened with reference
to the national security. This staff was not primarily representative
of the agencies from which the members came, but rather consisted of
advisers responsible to the Y.I.
General Vandenberg dissolved Souers' staff and organized an
"Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff" (ICAPS) in its
place. This consisted of representatives of all IAB members with a
representative from the State Department as chairman. It was in part
responsible to the DCI and in part to the IA.C chiefs. According to
the functional description issued for ICAPS, it was to "ensure"
cooperative activity by each agency as well as CIG.
Admiral Hillenkoetter retained ICAPS after GIG had become CIA
with much the same theoretical responsibilities as it had had before,
adding to it a second staff celled the "Standing Committee". This
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committee differed from IC.P,PS primarily in terms of seniority. The
ICi'S-Standing Committee system did not work well, primarily because
the staffs lacked the confidence of the IAC. Admiral Hillenkoetter
was not inclined to make regular use of the LAC itself in the
process of coordination.
In 1948 the Dulles Committee found the system for and results
of coordination unsatisfactory on several counts. The Committee,
however, emphasized what it considered to be failures in coordination
of national intelligence estimates, for which the main responsibility
in CIA lay in the Office of Reports and Estimates. According to the
Dulles Group, rather than bring about the harmony of operation called
for by the requirements of coordination, ORE had tended to create
friction with respect to the type of material presented in intelligence
reports and estimates; the manner of coordinating their substance; and
in the field of intelligence research where ORE's activities impinged
on the dominant interests of other departments. As to Hillenkoetter's
immediate staff system for coordination of activities, the committee
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found it inadequate as constituted at the time of reporting. In place
of ORE, the jteport proposed a small staff for estimating and a larger
one for research and reports. In place of ICAPS, the Committee
recommended a "Coordination Division" with somewhat broader responsibilities
than those accorded to ICAPS.
Although the National Security Council endorsed these recommendations,
the only changes made in accordance with them up to ?ctober 7, 1950,
entailed little more than a token internal reorganization of ORE, and
a change in the name of I UPS to the Coordinating, Operations and Policy
Staff (CORPS).
The disposition made of the ORE problem by the Smith administration
is outlined elsewhere in this study. COAPS remained in existence until
December 1, 1950, when it was abolished in favor of the Office of
Intelligence Coordination (OIC). (The "Standing Committee"" was retained
until April 2, 1951 when it also was abolished.) No direct effort seems
to have been made to establish a T1Coordination Division" in accordance
with the Dulles Report specifications.
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CIC was established as a small staff, with Office status, to
serve as an advisory, fact-finding, and management-consultant group
on various kinds of inter-agency problems of an organizational,
administrative, or procedural character. Though this staff was
responsible to the Director, it worked primarily with the Deputy
Director during its early development.
On January 19, 1951, OIC was instructed to furnish a Secretary
for IAC. In this capacity, the Assistant Drirectorfor Intelligence
Coordination prepared studies and agendas for the IAC and was enabled
to keep in touch with policies being formulated there.
On this same date, the Assistant Director described OIC as an
Office which (1) furnished aid where needed to other CIA offices, which,
however, themselves carried on inter-agency ccordinationas it affected
their own special fields; (2) assisted in making the IAC effective;
(3) worked also with and through the regular meetings of the DCI..with
his Assistant Directors; (14) developed an intimate knowlddge of the
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functions and activities of the IAC agencies as well as CIA; and
(5) foresaw future problems in the course of planning in relation
to coordination.
The principal achievements of the Office of Intelligence
Coordination to 1953 were described as: (1) Regularization of certain
IAC practices and the IAC structure; (2) intelligence publications;
(3) advice on and the negotiation of NSCID's and DCID's; resolution
of jurisdictional problems among agencies regarding intelligence
activities and stimulating cooperative action to meet urgent
intelligence needs; (5) relation of services of common concern to
the rest of the community and provision of uidance to those services;
(6) support for DD/P and psychological warfare.
After January 1952, OIL; was administratively responsible to
the Office of the DDI but was not absorbed into that office during
the Smith administration.
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Iv The Conduct of Overt Collection
The Office of Operations (00), an amalgamation of four
organizations for collecting intelligence 1 from foreign broadcasts,
foreign documents, domestic sources
was originally formed as part of CI G on October 17, 19L46. The oldest
of its constituent parts, the Foreign Broadcast Information Division
came into being in 1940 and was transferred, as an entity,
to CIJ on June 29, 1946. The next, the Foreign Documents Livision
(FDD) originated as a military agency in 1944, and it was transferred
to CIG on December 1, 1946. The third, the Contacts Division (00/C)
originated within CI q
for the Office of Gpecial
Operations (OSO) in July 1946. It was transferred from OSO to 00
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By NSCID-6 of December 12, 1947, CO's monitorin, activity was
designated a "service of common concern" to "conduct all Federal
monitoring of Foreign propaganda and press broadcasts required for
the collection of intelligence information to meet the needs of all
Departments and agencies in connection with the National Security".
The work of 00/C received similar authorization by NSCID-7
o' February 1948. included were agreements with the FBI, which at
first feared CIA interference with its domestic security responsibilities.
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The .Dulles Report corLnended the work of 00 in General but
objected to its organization as a separate office. Instead, the
Committee recommended that the Contact Division be made part of a
proposed "operations Division" in which 030 and the Office of Policy
Coordination should be the other two elements; that the Foreign Documents
Division should be made part of the Committee's proposed Research and
Reports Division; and that the Foreign Broadcast Information Division
"should probably" be administered under the same. Admiral 1iillenkoetter
rejected these proposals on the advice of the Assistant Director for 00.
General Sr"ith at first seemed to agree with Admiral Hillenkoetter's
position in that he told the NSC on October 12, 1550, that heopposed
the OSO-OPC-00 merger. In November 1950, however, Smith changed his
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views to the extent of appointing Mr. Allen Dulles as Deputy Director
for Operations (DDO), to superintend the work of 00, OPC, and OSO.
This reversal of general Smith's views seems to have been
motivated primarily by (1)
r2) the need for coordination between overt
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and covert collection problems; and (3) Mr. Dulles' special qualifications
for collection work.
In spite of this new dispensation for intelligence collection
(published in chart form January 19, 1951) 00 remained intact as an
office without important change in its functional assignments.
Nevertheless, those in charge of the Office of Operations were
not convinced of the wisdom of the merger. The 00 Assistant Director
,nade representations to the DCI and others to this effect during 1951
and 1952.
The principal arguments against the merger were (1)
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This proposal was adopted in February 1952,
In spite of the above-described changes in 00's status, the
Office continued to operato productively during 1950-1953 with
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respect to all its various functions
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Statistics for the period 1950-1953 show that: STAT
(2) The Foreign Broadcast Information Division continued to
represent a problem of both mass and quantity, as the Division increased
its daily output, derived from monitoring an estimated oreign
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broadcasting stations.
(3) The Foreign Documents Division continued to furnish
a variety of translation, abstracting, and research services both
for CIA and the IAC agencies. It also served as a coordination center
to reduce duplication and confusion in the translation field. During
the period it increased both its volume of service and the number of
languages it could handle.
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VI Problems of Scientific and Technical Intelligence
The exceptional importance of establishing an efficient post-war
apparatus to deal with scientific intelligence from the point of view
of national security was recognized from 1946 on, but a long series
of difficulties arose as attempts were made to deise an appropriate
system.
The first agreement of importance in this field established a
Scientific Intelligence "Branch" within the Office of Reports and
Estimates of CIG. This organization (which was severely criticized
by the Dulles Committee on the basis of its 1948 survey) proved to
be a failure for numerous reasons and was supplanted as of January 1,
1949, by an Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) in CIA.
In September 1949, after the unexpected Soviet explosion of
an atomic bomb, this Office complained that its mission was impossible
of accomplishment under current circumstances. The principal reasons
given were, first, that the Office of Special Operations did not furnish
adequate scientific intelligence from the field; and second, that the
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intelligence system under the IAC did not cooperate for scientific
intelligence purposes. OSI proposed, in effect, that it be given a
greater control Over OSO with respect to scientific intelligence and
that the Director should assert complete authority over the IAC.
Neither of these recommendations was carried out, but in the course
of an ensuing controversy involving the Assistant :directors for
Scientific Intelligence and Special Operations, the former resigned.
As a result, a new Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
took office seven months before the coming of the Smith administration
under circumstances of some delicacy with respect to the internal
organization of CIA. These special circumstances, along with general
difficulties attending the 0:i7L-ONE-ORR reorganization in 1951, may have
had a part in the tendency shown by the Smith administration at this
time to concentrate on other problems than that of scientific
intelligence. No attempt seems to have been made in 1950-1951 to
transfer scientific and technical intelligence to ORR, as had been
proposed by the Dulles Committee, or until 1952 to modify the arrangements
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for inter-agency coordination that had been begun under the previous
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In origin it seems to have resulted from a compromise adopted by the
IAC in preference to a. method of coordinating medical intelligence
proposed by jecretary of Defense Forrestal in March 19249. Its
principal mission was to produce coordinated estimates, for which
purpose it relied on sub-committees specializing in various fields
considered to be of scientific and technical importance.
The Office of Scientific Intelligence itself, when General Smith
became Director, was almost two years old but still largely in a
formative stage of organization.
Largely because it had been unable as yet to
recruit a large enough and competent enough staff, its achievements
to October 1950 had been limited. The Office had expressed
dissatisfaction on numerous occasions with the quantity and quality
of material collected by the field and made available to OSI. Under
regulations promulgated by the amith Administration early in 1951,
the emphasis with respect of 03I's functional responsibilities was
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shifted in the direction of furnishing national scientific intelligence
for use in estimates to be produced by ONE.
At the end of fifteen months, the Scientific Intelligence
Committee began to show signs of fundamental disagreement. This came
to a head in April 1951 with a divided vote on a motion to abolish
certain sub-committees considered to be engaged in work belonging
exclusively to the military establishment. As a result of this and
other disagreements, the matter of departmentl jurisdiction in various
fields of scientific and technical intelligence came before the
Intelligence Advisory Committee on August 2, 1951.
No action was taken by the IAC at this ar'later meetings during
1951. The Scientific Intelligence Committee continued to function
as usual, though its actions were under study by OIC. In Jaruary 1952,
xna~ve , it was announced to the Committee that the Joint Intelligence
Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had established a technical
subcommittee whose work would obviously duplicate that of the SIC.
Closely following this new development came two new surveys of the
scientific intelligence situation.
Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP83-01034R0002010002-7
 Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP83-01034R000200010002-7
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DCID 3/3 and the .IC were to be retained5
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