WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIMISTIAN SCITARrigArteSr Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0
8'.'y 1968 ? 7 -.0
?
unit . seen as
Vietnam peace
to Saigon rule
By Beverly Deepe
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Saigon
Announcement of 10 national-level corn-
.
mittee members of a new peace group is
considered here as a significant step towards
an all-out Communist drive to topple the
government of President Thieu.
?
Reliable Vietnamese sources here believe
.the announcement of the peace group's
leadership marks a crucial turning point
for the United States-backed anti-Commu-
nist here.
It is not considered a clear-cut political.
defeat for the Thieu government, but it,
does represent an acceleration in the ero-
sion of political strength in the govern-
ment-controlled areas. ?
. Observers say formation of the 10-merh-
'ber alliance publicly stresses the continued
state of crisis and the unsolved problems
ef President Thieu's elected government.
Use of name indicated
The annoucement 4:4 the leadership for
'the alliance of National, Democratic, and.
Peace Forces also is considered,likely here
to offer .the pretext for the Communists to
use the name of the movement to perpette
ate their so-called "general uprising" in:t.he
. cities and towns.
. They also are expected to simultaneously?,
launch a concerted diplomatic offensive to;
win over leftists in America and the world;
while Washington-Hanoi peace talks pre-
liminaries are getting underway.
"The Communists are interested in the
substance rather than in the semantics of
, words .like front and alliance;" one Viet-
namese political source explained.
"During the French Indochina war, the
Viet Minh was technically known as an
alliance, while today the Viet Cong are
' called a front. During the Indochina war,
. Ho Chi Minh organized a front within a
front; Now the Viet Cong have organized'
the new alliance as an appendage of the'?
National Liberation Front, or a satellite to
it.
"In general, the Communists want bigger
and bigger concepts to attract an ever
widening base of mass support. If the Amer-
ican government wants to negotiate with
the new alliance to dump the Thieu govern-
. ment, fine -- but Wahington rejected that
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idea, so now they'll try to destroy the Thieu
government by themselves."
Just what methods the Communists will
:use in their attempts to overthrow the Thieu
i government are sill unknown here. Some
!believe their political offensive will be made
'in conjunction with either ground assaults
and /or rocket attacks on the cities and
towns. Saigon is currently in a high state
,cf tension and uneasiness as developments
,e7 this kind have been predicted by both:
.ihe Vietnamese and American military corn-
tUands here.
Other sources believe the Communists will
Tim more and more toward political agi-
1 ition, subversion, attracting urban dissi-
RGents, propaganda, and terroristic activi-
v
11,es as the spearhead to destroy:the Thieu?-
1, overnment, with ?military forces playing a
istinctly supporting role. -
significance outlined
' The short-range, immediate significance
of am )uncing the national-level committee
niemters of the alliance is considered by
Vietna nese political sources to be:
1. T:is is the 4rst known migration of as
many s 10 persons of what amounts to the
upper- rust, snob-set Vietnamese to the pro-
Comm ;nist side since 1960, when the Na-
tional . beration Front was established.
This not considered an outright defec-
tion of no-American, anti-Communists to
the pr.( -..lommunist camp. The important
-membc - of the announced alliance are not
known ere as anti-Communists; several
have 11 tories of pro-French leanings or
prosoci st and proleftist peace leanings or
activiti in the past.-/
Yet, ese committee members are not
specific ly known to Saigonese as Corn-
munists either, nor is there immediate,
specific evidence of Communist back-
grounds informed sources report.
, While iumerically insignificant in politi-
cal tents, these 10 personages?intel-
lectuals 'ather than politicians?arc never-
theless onsidered as psychologically im-
portant i softening the attitudes of other
urbanit toward the Communists. Commu-'
mist ra broadcasts indicate more than
the 10 Live been officially named to the
commi't ?e. But other names have not been
release.
Ploy c I led clever
Since .364, allied counterinsurgency ex-
perts he e have predicted with trepidation
this spc fic moment when, as one said at
the tim "the Communists will eventually
attract % ry respectable non-Communists
to front '? - them, but behind the scenes the
Commui ts will hold power. This will be
a very ed -er ploy by?the Communists?and
a very 1 icult one for the allies to coun-
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era
CPYRGHT
2. In terms of guerrilla optics, t
Com munists APPEOVRAIE ftqcha39 /08/17
into the cities at a time when militarily
they are attempting to encircle some urban
centers from the outskirts and when eco-
nomically they are trying to strangle these
populated centers from the agricultural
produce of the countryside.
The Communist radio broadcasts during
the Tet offensive in late January first men-
tioned the Alliance for National, Democrat-
ic, and Peace Forces, under a variety of
names, as representing a return of the "gov-
ernment to the people" in Hue. Later the
committee members were named for the
chapter in Hue and the two northernmost
provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien.
Le Van Hao, a professor of ethnology at
the Universities of Saigon and Hue was
rimed chairman. He was the son-in-law of
a businessman closely identified with man-
aging the economic interests of Mrs. Ngo,
Dinh Nhu, the sister-in-law of the late Pres-
ident Diem; the businessman also was a,
relat ve by marriage to the Diem family.
Named deputy chairman was a woman,:
Mrs. Thong Vy, a former director of an
important girl's school in Hue and the
mother-in-law of a Vietnamese general,
currently head of the political warfare de-
partment, as well as the mother-in-law of
a rich pharmacist who is currently acting
as an assistant to President Thieu.
Buddhist monk named
Also named deputy chairman was a. Bud-
dhist Monk, the Venerable Thich Don Rau;
his student leader protege, Hoang Phu Ngoe
Tuong, was narned secretary-general. The
Venerable Thich Don Hau a Buddhist
spiritual leader who .was heir apparent to
Thich Tri Quang in Hue, also is listed on
the newly announced committee list for Said
gon. Some Buddhist sources believe he was.
captured by the Communists during the bat-
tle of Hue and his name was involuntarily
entered on the committee roster.
Also during the Tet offensive, Communist
radio broadcasts said a Saigon chapter
had been established, but no names were
listed. Last weekend, both Liberation radio
and Hanoi radio mentioned that the Saigon
committee?expanded to mean the national,.
level committee?had met on April 20-2A
outside Saigon.
Numbers of unnamed persons reportedly
drew up the alliance's program and sp.
lected the 10 leaders. The program is "de;
scribed here as a carbon copy of the 14-
point National Liberation Front program
issued last September, in. the terms of the
main objectives, of fighting the common
enemies. of the Thieu7Ey government and
the Americans.
The tone is less Strident and he words
are less biased: "The Americans" replaces
'the Communist language of "the American
imperialists," for example.
Mixture
The 10 members listed as heading the'
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represented
PeliSaW/tItittinekiMOW60i53643454) a
'mixture of t e three regional divisions of
Vietnam?northern, central and southern?
of various religious groupings, and of various professions. It is heavily weighted to-
ward lawyers, doctors, professors, and stu-
dents which are considered the best-educat-
ed layer of Vietnamese society.
The chairman was listed as Trinh Dinh
Thao, a semiretired Saigon lawyer. He was
born in North Vietnam, but moved to the
South at middle age. His law degree was
earned from his studies in France. His son,
also a lawyer, is married to the daughter
of one of the richest jewelers in Saigon.;
Mr. Thao was considered years ago by
informed Saigonese to be close to Nguyen
Huu Tho, head of the National Liberation
Front; the two lawyers reportedly worked
together in peace movements at the end of
the French Indochina war.
Vice-chairman Lam Van Tet is a south-
ern-born Cao-Daist, a religious sect. Tet was
prominent in Saigon as the chairman of
the All-Religions Citizens Front established
in 1964 with the Rev. Hoang Quynh repre-
senting the Catholics, and others represent-
ing the Hoa Hao and Buddhists and Cao-
Deists.
He is' reportedly rather elderly. While
listed as an engineer, a more accurate
'translation ? would be a land surveyor. He
-also is a large landowner, which Viet Cong
land Hanoi radio broadcasts conveniently
'failed to mention. He unsuccessfully ran for
the upper house of the Legislature that is
now in session.
Reported in hiding
A second vice-chairman is the Buddhist
monk Thich Don Hau, who is also vice-
chairman of the chapter for Hue. He, like
the chairman of. the Hue grouping, is
;thought to be in hiding outside of Hue,
,where heavy fighting has taken place in
the past few days between U.S. Army 1st
?Air Cavalry 101st airborne troops and
North Vietnamese Army units.
Secretary-General Duong Ky was ar-
rested for his anti-government actions in
1965. He was one of three peace advocates
sent over the Ben Hai Bridge to North Viet-
nam in that year. He went'to Paris and re-
turned to Saigon in 1967, informed sources
report. Active in the past Buddhist-inspired
crises and demonstrations against a suc-
cession of governments following the fall
of Ngo Dinh Diem, he was for a time a
professor at Saigon and Hue Universities.
Listed as assistant secretary-general is a
rather well-known, wealthy woman doctor in
Saigon, Duong Quynh Hoa. She received
her doctor's degree in France, and reliable
sources said she was once engaged to a
Frenchman who was a member of the Com-
munist Party. He passed on before they
were married and she never 'wed anyone
else.
She was bitter for sometime, these sources
7ITIXe-ktiFige-631ffelbAff05405botiele
CPYRGH
resort city of Dalat, was murdered and
robbeApprovatilFbr Rostleass,213 G8f137
1960's. But she suspected that government
agents during the Diem regime committed
the crime.
A second assistant secretary-general was
listed as Le Hieu Dang, who was well known
as deputy chairman of the Saigon student
union, with headquarters on the main street
of Saigon, in 1966 and,1967. He was known to
have participated in the American-aided
summer student programs which helped
rebuild and clean up some of Saigon's slum
districts.
A third assistant secretary-general, Thanh
Nghi, is known as the author of a French.
Vietnamese ,dictionary. He holds the equi-
valent of a master of. arts. degree from
:France.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR i
29 August 1968
1
r?
Three others re
$acom_ France, corn-
a_ :
; A CIA-RDR7810300A9 0 ranee,
?Nguyen Van Kiet has held government po-
sitions dealing with primary and middle.
level education, as well as good teaching
jobs in the Mekong Delta and at the Uni-
versity of Saigon.
Tran Trieu Luat was graduated from the
University of Saigon in 1067, was vice-chair-
man of the Saigon Student Union, partici-
pated in antigovernment demonstrations,
and then became a professor at the Univer-
sity of Saigon.' ? ?
Little information is available, even from
official sources, about Huynh Van Nghi,.who
-was not further identified.by the Commun-
ists.
Front fo
?
Whatever, the Communists or their
agents do in Vietnam these days is mani-
festly connected with both the talks in
Paris and the presidential election cam-
paign in the United States. Hanoi has
things impressively organized ? even if it
occasionally fails or misreads the signs.
And so it is presuniably no coincidence
that there have come together in recent
days both a brief resumption of the rock-
eting of Saigon?as well as stepped-up
military activity elsewhere ? and a re-
gumption of political activity by one of
the newest and most significant Commu- ?
nist-front organizations in the South, the
Vietnam Alliance of National; Democratic
and Peace Forces (VANDPF).
The VANDPF is in fact a front for a
front -7 for the National Liberation Front
(NLF) which has had s,ome non-Commu-
nist components all along but is now ex-
posed as on a tight rein to Hanoi. Even
Hanoi at last recognizes apparently that
it is asking too much of the other side to
accept the NLF as the sole legitimate
spokesman for the South and to insist on
the NLF's program as the only one ac-
ceptable for a resolution of the country's
long agony. So the VANDPF has been set
up in Viet Cong-held territory in South
Vietnam, with possibly only one known -
Communist on its 10-man central commit,
tee. (That one, paradoxically, is a woman
who may either have been a member in
her youth of the French Communist Party
or was once betrothed to a member of It.)
r a front
Hanoi's intention would seem to be to
get the VAN131410 recognized as the non-
Communist component in an eventual
coalition government in Saigon. And to
achieve this, it has first to bring about an
undermining of the legality of and confi-
dence in the present government in South
Vietnam ? the Thieu-Huong tandem
which the United States supports. In ef-,
fect, then, the plan is first to substitute
a VANDPF team for the Thieu-Huong
team, to be immediately followed by the
VANDPF's seeking a coalition with the
NLF. To discredit these efforts, the Thieu-
Huong tandem has recently pronounced
capital sentences in abstentia on the 10
members of the VANDPF's central com-
mittee.
? A good case can be made that this
central committee while playing Han-
oi's game ? is less pro-Communist than
neutralist, anti-American and more at
ease with French than any other outside
' culture. Among intellectual and some reli-
gious and business circles in Saigon, there
are signs of a patchy growth of these
trends perhaps an incipient hedging of
bets against an imagined American sell-
out or walkout.
' It would be na? .not to see the
VANDPF for what it is. Yet at this stage
in the game, could it not be short-sighted
to make its non-Communist central com-
mittee members martyrs, albeit in abl
sentia? Could not these people under cer-
tain circumstances be used against as
? much as .by the communists?
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Principal Developments World Communist Affairs
(20 August-19 September 1968)
1. World Communist Conference
In the light of the deep divisions in the Communist world which the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has caused, questions have been raised
in many quarters in and outside the Communist world whether the Soviets
could effectively proceed with the World Communist Conference, a convo-
cation planned to demonstrate the unity and harmony binding the world
Communist movement together (it is scheduled for 25 November 1968). As
we go to press all indications are that they do indeed plan to go ahead
with it. Pravda on 13 September published an article by the war horse
of Stalinist Communism, Jacques Duclos, former head of the French Commu-
nist Party, urging the importance of the Conference. The desperation of
the Soviets to find a prestigious figure to call for proceeding with the
Conference is illustrated by the fact that this call was actually origin-
ally published by Duclos in Fi'anc on 15 May (!), long before the invasion.
Since the invasion, it is doubtful the Soviets would be able to find any
major Communist leader in the free world willing to support such a move.
In fact, Italian Communist leader Luigi Longo wrote in the Party journal
Rinascita in mid-September that it would be "neither useful nor opportune,
nor perhaps even possible" to go ahead with the Conference unless the
Soviets withdraw their troops from Czechoslovakia in the interim --an
unlikely development. (Correspondent Alvin Shuster's article in the New
York Times, datelined Budapest 17 September, says that another prepara-
tory meeting for the Conference will convene in Budapest during the week
of 23 September, but that no official announcement has been made. The
last such preparatory meeting was held last June.)
2, Polycentrism Revived?
Even if the Soviets succeed in ramming through their demand for a
meeting of many Communist parties next November, it is doubtful they could
gain assent for formalizing world Communist unity in some sort of organi-
zation or in the unanimous underwriting of some bold new Manifesto.
Much more hope of success could be expected from an idea that is
hinted at by Maurice Duverger, a leftist French professor of political
science writing in Le Monde on 5 September 1968, that is, "A Western
Communism" ("Un Communisme Occidental") (See attachment). He points
out that the invasion merely highlights the inapplicability of the So-
viet model of Communism for Western Europe, and argues that it can only
become viable by seeking its own path. In this vein, the veteran Austrian
Communist ideologist Ernst Fischer asserted that all European Communists
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have the moral duty of severing relations with the CPSU as a result of the
invasion, and it is but a step beyond this to suggest that West European
Communist parties should get together -- without the Soviets to discuss
the development of a more relevant form of Communism (an application of
deceased Italian CP leader Togliatti's "polycentric Communise).
3. The Soviet Dread of Freedom
On the night of 20-21 August 1968, the Soviet Union by invading
Czechoslovakia with four Bloc partners: East Germany, Poland, Hungary,
and Bulgaria, again demonstrated its disregard of solemn agreements, in
this case those reached with the Czechs at Cierna nad Tisou and Bratislava
a scant three weeks earlier, and of its solemnly and oft repeated "prin
ciple" of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. The
desperate proliferation of excuses for the intervention proferred after-
wards in Bloc propaganda betrays the lack not only of a reason that is
acceptable to the world at large, but even of one that would be convincing
to anyone in the Bloc itself. The main justification offered -- that
"counterrevolutionaries" were on the verge of toppling the Czechoslovak
regime -- is patently absurd, and it seems impossible for the Soviets to
have believed it true.
The true reason was and remains the Soviet fear that its system of
Communism, wherever practiced, cannot survive free and critical self-
examination such as that which Czech intellecti]Als were conducting and
airing in public information media and which the Czech leadership refused
to suppress. This Soviet fear may well be justified, and it is a telling
commentary on the ideological poverty of Soviet Communism that it cannot
exist under conditions where even some of the basic human freedoms are
permitted to flourish.
There was some early hope among both friends and enemies of the Soviet
Union that the invasion would be recognized as a mistake with an accompany-
ing disposition to make amends, but that hope is fading in the light of
the single-minded and persistent determination of the occupiers to require
complete fulfillment of their demands, which they choose to call "normal-
ization." Itis still not clear how tar these demands will extend, but there
is reason to believe that a liberalized, or even humanized, Czech Communism
will not be permitted, and that the Czech leadership will not be permitted
to rum the country without direct Soviet supervision (for example, via a
system of Soviet "advisors" in all key sectors).
4. HIELlIghts of Events in Czechoslovakia
The occupation of Czechoslovakia was achieved smoothly and effi-
ciently, in its military aspects, as if it had been planned far in
advance. It seems most likely that it was the execution of a contingency
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plan made long before, though it is less certain when the decision was
taken to put such a contingency plan into effect. Presumably it was
some time after the agreements reached at Cierna and Bratislava, at
which the Czech leaders believed they had received assurances that they
would be permitted to meet minimum Soviet requirements in their own way.
The invaders were received by the Czech people with uniform hostil-
ity though with little violence (this latter at the behest of the Czech
leadership). While the main Czech leaders, with the exception of Presi-
dent Ludvik Svoboda, were seized and held incommunicado, the Soviets
were surprised at not being able to find enough Czech Quislings to set
up an amenable yet viable government. Hence they had to resort to the
unexpected alternative of re-installing the original key leaders: Party
Chief Alexander Dubcek, Premier Oldrich Cernik, and National Assembly
head Josef Smrkovsky, after dictating to them the conditions that would
have to be met. These conditions are known as the "Moscow Agreement,"
reached between 23-27 August. While the authorities have not revealed
the content of the agreement, a version acquired by the New York Times
(attached) is probably a fair approximation. Judging by this and by
events following the Moscow meeting, the most important provisions
are clear: (a) restoration of the formal, organized censorship of news
and information, especially to prevent criticism of the Soviet Union, its
allies, or Communism (b) elimination of any kind of political or quasi-
political grouping not sanctioned by the occupying authority (c) removal
from office of certain officials repugnant to the Soviet Union. The
first two provisions have been fulfilled, though full conformity of the
Czech news media with Soviet requirements has not yet been achieved
and the Soviet regularly note this fact in their propaganda. Full con-
formity is probably simply a matter of time. Some Czech liberal leaders
long under personal attack in Soviet and Bloc media have been purged,
others will undoubtedly be removed in due time. Among the more promin-
ent liberal figures relieved of their main responsibilities (some have
taken less sensitive jobs) are Central Committee Secretary Cestmir Cisar,
National Front head Frantiszek Kriegel, Minister of Interior Josef Pavel,
and Deputy Premier Ota Sik, prime architect of Czechoslovakia's new eco-
nomic model. Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek resigned on 19 September. A
number of well known Communist conservatives also resigned their posts.
Another provision of the agreement is that the Soviets will decide
when the situation is "normalized" sufficiently to warrant the with-
drawal of troops. Most observers believe this will be a long time com-
ing, and that even when most troops are withdrawn some units will remain
along the Czech-German border.
Lesser provisions seem to include the requirement that the Czech
leadership make public its disapproval or take a public stand on cer-
tain issues such as, disavowing the anti-Soviet deposition made by
Foreign Minister Hajek in the United Nations and declaring null and void
the clandestine 14th Party Congress which was held just after the invasion
and which elected an overwhelmingly liberal Central Committee (the regular
3
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Party Congress scheduled for 9 September has not yet been rescheduled).
Whether the Czechs will indeed be forced to discard all elements of Sik's
economic program, as Soviet propaganda suggests, is not yet certain.
There is some reason to believe that Dubcek's days as Party Chief
may be numbered. He was the only one of the present top leaders named
in a Pravda editorial of 22 August (hence the day after the invasion
and before he joined the talks in Moscow) as a "right-wing opportunist."
He was also said to be one of a minority at the Cierna meetings that
refused to abide by the Bratislava agreement. However, that has been
the only adverse mention of Dubcek in Soviet media. A straw in the wind
may be that an "independent" Polish newspaper, Zycie Warszawy ("Warsaw
Life"), on 4 September printed him as gullible, moral, and sincere, but
expressing "certain reservations as to his political acumen and ability
to engage in resolute action when necessary."
5. Communist Reaction
The ultimate impact of the Soviet invasion of the World Communist
Movement (WCM) still remains to be seen. The reaction of certain key
Communist parties is still evolving. The Communist governments behaved
for the most part as was to be expected. The four Bloc partners, of
course, defended it. Rumania and Yugoslavia denounced the invasion
immediately, unequivocally, and vehemently. In succeeding days, the
Rumanians softened their tones, whether under pressure by the Soviets,
or voluntarily in order not to add gratuitously to the disruption of the
Communist world, is not clear. The Chinese Communists and Albanians de-
nounced the invasion in vitriolic terms (% monstrous crime," "utterly
shameless"). Among Chinese objectives in condemning the invasion may
well be the hope of sabotaging the World Communist Conference. And of
more than passing interest is the fact that the North Vietnamese chose
clearly to support the Soviet position even though it flatly contradicted
the Chinese Communist line. The Cubans approved it as "necessary" while
simultaneously asserting that of course it was illegal.
All the legal European Communist parties condemned the Soviet inva-
sion, some more vigorously than others. Among the strongest condemnations
was that of the Austrian Communist Party. Central Committee member Ernst
Fischer persohally proposed that Communist parties cut all ties to the
CPSU and form another leftist movement. The powerful Italian and French
parties condemned the invasion, but not -going so far as to suggest a break
with the Soviet Party.
Parties of countries in the Near and Middle East receiving Bloc
military and economic aid supported the Soviets; perhaps for analogous
reasons, so did most Latin American parties. In the rest of the free
world, condemnation of the Soviet action by Communist parties was virtu-
ally unanimous.
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5 September 1968
A Western Communism?
CPYRGH
by Maurice Duverger
' The 'action of the USSR in Czechoslovakia raises the problem of a third pole in
the development of communism. It has not brought together the two which already exist,
the Russian and the Chinese. That Mr. Dubcek might be more "revisionist" than
Mssrs. Brehnev and Kosygin, that the latter might employ Stalinist methods to
eliminate them, these do not sufftce to give them grace in the eyes of Mao Tse-tung.
He has understood perfectly well one of the essential meanings of the Soviet decision:
the affirmation by one of the two great powers of its freedom of action within its
zone of influence, which obliges it to accord the same prerogatives to the other.
The new coup de Prague could justify a new coup de Santo.Domingo. It strengthens
the.imperialism of the United States in Latin America. Nothing is more removed
from the Chinese concept of world revolution.
The two present forms of communism still correspond to fundamentally different
situations. That of Peking embodies the hope of the poor, ,of the under developed,
of those who have nothing to lose and everything to gain in employing violence.
That of Moscow relates to the more advanced countries, which naturally tend toward
prudence and realism. But, since 21 August 1968, it has shown itself incapable of
embodying, the future of the more modern industrial nations. To tell the truth,
it never truly embodied it. As early as 1917, Lenin hoped that the revolution in
Germany and in the rest of Western Europe would relay the Russian revolution and take
the lead in the movement. Since then, the progress of the .communist parties in
France, in Italy and in the other countries having a pluralist democracy has always
been held back by certain aspects of Soviet practice.
, This phemonenon remained a secondary one as long as these parties were far re-
moved from power. Moreover, the evolution of the USSR and of the popular democracies,
in recent years, gave reason to think that the gap between the structure of their
communism and the technical; political, and cultural needs of the western nations
was going to be progressively filled in. Thus one could think that the liberaliza-
tion of Eastern Europe Would develop more rapidly -- or as rapidly -- as would the
possibility of the communists accede to the government in Paris or in Rome, so that
they would not have been too weakened by the sequels of Stalinism.
Hereafter one can no longer believe that. The military occupation of Czecho-
slovakia. shows that the USSR is absolutely determined to prevent a profound liberali-
zation. Although it remains less brutal than in Hungary, because popular resist-
ance has taken different forms, the action of the Soviet tanks is more grave for
the future of communism. Twelve years ago it aimed above all to prevent the disso-
lution of the Warsaw Pact; Imre Nagy had been imprudent in this respect. Today its
essential aim is to paralyze the internal democracy of a country otherwise determined
to remain faithful to the socialism camp and to the Russian alliance. It is moti-
vatpd by fear of the contagion of liberty more than by the necessity of protecting
outward appearances.
Let us not deceive ourselves on the other hand. The conflict which last month
was able to divide the Soviet leaders did not really pit the liberals against the
"hard liners." Rather it pitted the advocates of military intervention against
those of political pressure, to reach the same goal: to conserve the monolith.
There are no real liberals in the apparatus of the Soviet party and state. As always
in Russia, liberty remains above all the idea of the intelligentsia. The formidable
weight of the traditions of an authoritarian empire is added to that of a dictator- NI,
ship of the proletariat to brake evolution towards socialism, pushed moreover by
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1
CPYRGH
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economic and technological developments. Yesterday tie examp popular de-
mocracies, and particularly that of Prague, acted in the opposite sense; it is now
suppressed.
Certainly, as in Hungary after 1956, liberalization will undoubtedly begin again,
little by little, in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. But so slowly and so weakly that
it will remain for a very long time (if not forever) short of the degree of liberty
necessary to render communism assimilatable by the nations of the West. The gap '
becomes more serious as the communist parties are no longer totally beyond the hope
of coming to power. The communists have participated in the government of Finland
since 1966; their participation in France is no longer entirely unimaginable; even
in Italy they have moved a little towards it. Facing a Social Democratic movement
that is more and more bureaucratic, could not a liberal communism restore its chances
for, achieving socialism in the advanced countries? But Moscow now appears as
incapable of resolving these parties' problems as those of the under developed
countries. Its responsibilities as a great atomic power, its (valid) efforts to es-
tablish a, modis vivendi with the United States, its economic growth, the remoteness
of revolutionary methods: these lend justification to Chinese communism. Its rejec-
tion of an authentic liberalization, its attachment to dictatorial control over
information, its allergy to political democracy, its estrangement from the needs of
industrial nations: these would justify the birth and development of an original
western communism.
Soviet communism remains very important. Without the revolution of 1917, the
development of socialism in the world.would be less important. Without the present
strength of the USSR, which confronts that of the. United. States, capitalism would
be more widespread and more dominant. In misunderstanding this aspect of the problem,
and in considering the Russians as enemies, the Chinese are probably wrong in rela-
tion to their own revolutionary objectives. In refusing to break completely with
Moscow, the communist parties of the West show themselves more realistic. But they
would not be so, on the other hand, if they content themselves with protesting the
military occupation of Czechoslovakia in the name of the right of each country to
determine its own road to socialism.
Stalin transformed the USSR from a power which exports ideasinto a simple
conservator of a system. It became a place of security, a citadel, and nothing more.
It is even loco able to ,spread its doctrine in the industrialized countries than in
the under developed countries; rt. ntill has something to teach to the Chinese com?
munists. It has nothing to teach to the western communist, since it refuses the
liberalization which alone would permit the Soviet model to correspond to the level of
Aft ;
tecnological and political evolution of Western Europe. On the contrary, the latter
could teach it a lot in defining a model of liberal communism which world raise
Eastern Europe from the stagnation 'in which it is progressively engulfed.
In saying "no" Moscow over the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the communist parties
of the West have opened the way for such an evolution. They do not seem determined
to go further in this direction after this enormous first step However, on their
ability to do so depends not Only their own future, but perhaps that of international
communism. There is no reason to think that the under developed countries will be
the prime movers of history in the coming decades; without doubt this role will
belong for a long time yet to the most technically advanced countries, as Marx
thought moreover, and except at the end of his life, Lenin. The future of socialism
in the latter countries depends less on Moscow now than on the capacity of the
Italian CP and, to a lesser degree, the French CP to take the-leadership of a western
communism.
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CPYRGH
LE MONDE parig3proved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0
5 Septeraber 1968
UN CO
L'action do l'11.11.S.S. on Tchecoa-
, :ovaqulo poso le problem() d'un trot-
"gem) pilo do developpoment du
:ommuniamo. Ello n'a pas rapproche
lea .deux qui existent deg:, le rusao
at In chinols. Quo M. Dubcak soft.
)lus ,? revialormisto ? quo MM.' Broj-
say et Kossyguine, quo coux-ci ern-
3loiont des methocies ataliniennes
our recraaar, cola no suffit pas a
our fair() trouver graco aux yeux do
Mao Ise-toung. 11 a parfaltement
:ompria uno dos signification? ?seen-
tollos do la decision sovietiquo :
!affirmation par l'un dos deux
Grancbr do aa liparte d'action a rin-
teriour 'do act zone d'influonco, qui
;oblige a roconnaitre los memos pre.
ogativaa a l'autre. Lo nouveau coup.
io Plitt() justifiorait un nouveau
7004 dw' Saint-D=111qm 11 renforce
'imp14r ism? dos Etata-Unis on
Amer"
4 e latine. Rion. n'ost plua
Sloig; du concept chinois do la
:Ovolon mondial();
Leir'4,doux communismes actuola
:orrospondont toujoura it dos situa-
Ions l'endamontakoment . differentes.
''..lolui do Pekin incarno l'espoir des
muvres, dos sous-devolopp6s, de
:aux q41 Wont non a pordro et tout
gagr S' on omployant la violonco.
:....,u,,,. Moacou corroapond a des
Days '' lk s avanc6a, qui tondont natu-.
!allorniftnt vans la prudonco at le
'Mori-Siam?. Mats, dopuis lo 21 aoilt
1968, 0 s'avero incapablo d'incarner
!avonfi des nations industriolloa les
plus Midornea. A vrai diro. II no l'a
;amancarne vralmont. Des 1917,
Lenin? epaperalt quo la revolution en
Alloingono ot dana to resto do l'Eu-
ropo citOidentala viondrait rolayor la
76voluty3ni mono at prondro la tato
iu mogitemont. Depuis lora, la pro-.
emer;roasiori dos partici communistes on
Fran .:on Italia et dans los attires,
sayte :di) democratio plurallater a
oujotif? 616 freineo par contains
1apo9f du sovietism?.
Lo hello:nen? roatalt secondaire
ant 0 CO4 partia domouraiont fres
iloig a du pouvoir. D'autro part,
,'6voiLtion do 1.11,11.S.S. at dos demo-
:nadirs populairoa, cos dernieres
nimioa, faisait ponsor quo recant
Illait atm progressivomont comble
mtro la atructuro do lout commit-
limo ot los bosoms tochniquoa,
polItiqueu ot culturals des nations
occidentales. On pouvalt crolre ainsi
quo la liberalisation de l'Europe
orientate so devolopporalt plus rapt-
doment ? ou mast rapidoment ?
quo las possibititea de vole les,cont-
munistes aco6der au gouvernement
a Paris ou a Rome. do sorte qu'elles
n'auralent pas 616 trop affaiblies,par
lea soquelles du stalinisme.
On no pout plus le croire desor-
mats. L'occupation militaire do la
Tchecosiovaquie montre quo ru.R.s.s.
Approved
MtNISME OCCIDENTA .?
capacita a be fairo clOpond capon-
, dant. non soulomont lour propre
Po r MAURICE DUVERGER .avonir, main( pout-Otro colui du com
est absolumont decide? 4 empechor? puissance atomique, son efforts (vo- Inunismo international. Rion no por?
tine liberalisation profonde. Bien
qu'elle resto moms brutal') qu'en
Hongrie, parte quo la resistance
populcdre a pets d'autres formes, rac-
tion des chars sovietiques est plus
grave pour ravenir du communisme.
11 y a douse ans, elle tendait surtout
a empecher la disaolution du pacte
de Vamovie : Imre Nagy avait ete
Imprudent, a scat egard. Aujourd'hul,
elle' a pour but essential de para.
lyse; la democratiaation interieure
d'un pays decide par ailleurs a res-
ter tidal? au camp socialist? et a
ralliance rusae. Ella est motives par
la pour d'uno contagion de la liborte
phial quo par la necessite de pro-
tiirr le glacia. ?
4*
lablea) pour etablir un modus vIvendi mat do ponser quo los pays noun.
avec lea Etats-Unis, sa croisaanco developpes soront lo motour print!.
economique, reloignent des meth?. pal de l'histoiro dans lea prochainas
'des revolutionnaires: ils opponent decades : co robe appartiondra long-
' des justifications au communism? ?
encore sans douto aux pays
' chinois. Son refus d'uno liberalisation lamps
authentique. son attachement a la les plus avances tochnlquoment.
dictature do l'information, son alter- commo lo ponsaiont d'ailleurs Marx
: gie a la democratio politique, reloi- et, sauf a la fin do sa vie.'Lenine.
gnent des besoins des nations indus-Lo sort du socialism? dans coux-la
Welles : ila justifieraiont la naissanca dopond moins do Mosso% main.
'ot la progression d'un communism? ,.
tenant, quo do la capacito du P.C.
; occidental original,,
Italian ot, dans uno molndro MOSLITO,
**4 du P.C. ironical() a prendre la tete
I ,d'un communism. occidental. "
Le communism? sovietiquo con-
Rory? one grand? importance. Sans
la revolution do 1917, le developpo-
mont du socialisme dans le mond?
Benoit beautoup motels grand. Sans
Ou'on no s'Y trompe pas d'autre la puissance ?stiletto do l'U.R.S.S.,
part. Le conflit qui a pu divisor le qui fait face a.celle des Etats-Unis,
miff dernter les dirigsants soviet". le capitalism? aorait plus repandu
quits n'opposait pas reellement des at plus dominateur. 'En meconnais-
liberaux a des ? duns .. Il opposail sant cot aspect du problem? et on
pita& les partisans d'une interven- considerant les Russet) comma dos
tion militate? at unix d'uno prosalon ennemis. les Chinois ont probablo-
politique. pour atteindre le memo '
but 1. conserver le monolithisme. Il Merit tort par rapport a lours pro?
nifpros objoctifs revolutionnairos. En
a pas do veritables liberaux
claim rcippareil du part! at de rEtat rofuoant do rompro totalement avec
Moscou, les partis communiates de
soietiques. Comma toujours on
l'Ouest se montront plus thalistes. '
Aussie la ,liberte reste surtout uno Main ilo no le seraient pas, d'un'au.
'dee do rintelligentala. Le poida for. tro cOtti. s'ils se contentaient de
midable des 'traditions d'un empire protester. contra roccupatIon mill-
autOritaire s'y ajoute a celui do la take de la Tchecosiovaqule au nom
dictpture du proletariat pour .frainer du droit de chaque pays a deter.
sreVoluilon vers le socialiame, pous- miner sa pxopre vole vans le aria.
see pourtant par le developpement lime. ,
economique et technique. H I e r, ,
roxemple des democraties . populai-
Stalin? a transform; ru.n.s.s. do
res at singulierement de
Prague,' puissance exportatrico d'idecul on
,
agiasait en eons contraire : 11 est uno simple consorvairice d'un sys-
maintonant supprime.. tame. Elle doviont une place do
Cortes, comma on Honcjrie ?pees 8C;r?t6' uno citadello, 'at lien do
1956, la liberalisation reprondra sans Plus' Ella pout encore motets re.
doute pea a peu en Tch6coslovaquie pandre la doctrine dans los pays
ot ?Moues. Main al lentemont at al industrialises quo dans les pays
faiblement qu'alle restera trent long- sous-developpea. Elle ' a quelquo
temps (sinon toujours) on deg& du chose encore a apprendro aux
dogrel do Merle necessaire pour communistes chinois. Ello n'a plus
rondre le communism? . assimtlablo
aux nations d'Occident. Le decalage
doviont d'autcrnt plus grave quo les
partia communistes n'y sont plus
abaolumont ecartes do resperance
do pouvoir. Los communiates partici-
pont au gouvernemont de la Fin-
land? dopuis 1966 lour participation
en Franco West plus tout a fait MI-
maginable: en Italie memo, ha eon
rapprochont un pm. En face d'une
social-democratic) do plus en plus
rien a approndre crux communistes
occidentaux, puisqu'elle ref uso la
liberalisation qui permettrait soul?
au modele sovietiquo do correspon-
dre au niveau d'evolution techniquo
et politique do l'Europo do l'Ouest.
Au contrairo, its pourraient but ap-
prondre beaucoup en definissant un
model? de communism? liberal qul
tirerait l'Europe do l'Est de la sta.
gnation oz elle s'enlise progressi?
vement.
gestionnaire, on communism? liberal En disant n non ? Zs Moscou lora
, no pourrait-il restituor sea chances au de 'Invasion do la Tchecoslovaquio,
socialisme dans los pays avances ? las penis communiatos d'Occidont
Maia Moscou parait maintenant Quasi oat ouvert la veto d'uno belle evo.
Incapable de resoudre leura pet:thief- lution. Ifs no aomblont pas decides
mos quo ceux doe paVa sous-devs- a s'y engager plus avant, apnea
loppea. Sea responsabilites de grand. cot ?norm? Drernler lass De tour
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CPYRGH
Nai yom ',Lived For
8 Sr,ptpmber 1968
MOSCOW'S ENVOY
D NEE TALK
ON CZECH COURSE
Kulnetsov Sees Party Chief
in an Effort to Reconcile
ConfliCting Viewpoints
DEMANDS MADE KNOWN
Text of 14 Points Suggests
Prague Has Been Balking
at Some Conditions
By TAD SZULC
sNonii L Tb. New York 'Times
PRAGUE, Sept. 7?Vasily V.
Kuznetsov, the Soviet First
Deputy Foreign Minister, con-
ferred today with Alexander
Dubcek, the Czechoslovak par-
ty leader, in his second day of
negotiations aimed at resolving
conflicting interpretations of
a Soviet-Czechoslovak accord
reached in Moscow two weeks
ago.
The agreement, concluded
Aug. 26, contained Soviet con-
ditions for tlie withdrawal of
the 600,000 troops of the
Soviet Union and four , of its
Warsaw Pact, allies that in-
vaded Czechoslovakia on the
night of Aug. 20-21.
A list of 14 points of the
Moscow agreement, which has
now become available here,
suggests that while the Czecho-.
slovak leadership has fulfilled,
some of the conditions de-'
manded by the Soviet Union,:
others have been met only:
partly and still others not at
all.
The conditions were pre-
seated earlier this week at
closed briefings of regional and
district party leaders through-
out Czechoslovakia.
Mr. KUZI1CtS0V, who arrived.
here yesterday with what ap-i
pears to be full negotiating!
powers, conferred later in the
day with President Ludvik
Approved For
svobocla.
Releaebnp5/44/117 i?Pb4,TRIDP784:0061A000400esoat54
limited interest in the Middle
East. reported that the Soviet
delegate, Yakov A. Malik, had
said that "the responsibility for
the tense situation in the Mid-
dle East lies with those who
occupy the Arab lands."
"With Ow occupation of Arab
territory, Israel brought on it-
self the hate and bitterness of
the local people." Male Pravo
quoted Mr. Malik as having
said. "The occupation has called
to life a fight for freedom that
,cannot be suppressed by the
Security Council or anyone
else."
choslovakia broke diplo-
matic relations with Israel fol-
lowing the 1967 war ? before
Mr. Dubcek's advent to power?
but the Czechoslovak press has1
not occupied itself with attacks
on Israel.
Despite the wide use of such
double entendre, Soviet troops
evacuated last night all but
one of the newspaper offices
they had been occupying since
the Invasion. Still under guard
was the youth newspaper
Mlada Fronta, but the People's
party's daily Lidova Demok-
rade appeared today and the
Socialist newspaper Svohodne
Slovo is expected to come out
tomorrow.
However, the showing of a
newsreel on the first days of
the occupation was stopped
earlier this week, apparently
on orders from the Soviet
command. ?
Mr. Kuznetsov called on Mr.
Dubcek early this afternoon
at the latter's offices at the
Ceneral Committee of the Com-
munist party. He was accom-
panied by Ambassador Stepan
V. Chervonenko and one un-
identified person.
Authoritative informants in-
dicated later in the day that
Mr. Kuznetsov might remain in
Prague indefinitely. The view
In foreign Communist quarters
was thant his presence, was "n
positive event" that might lead
to a settlement.
East European diplomats alsol
believe that Mr. Kuznetsov's
talks may be followed late next(
week by another visit to Mos-
cow by a delegation headed by
Mr. Dubcek.
Yesterday, the Presidium ofi
the Czechoslovak party called'
for "open and direct negoti-
ations" to remove obstacles
"from any side" to the fulfill-
ment of the Mosco(A, agreement.'
This was taken to mean that
the Czechoslovak leadership
was preparing for a new round
.of negotiations on the highest
'level to clarify the terms and
the United Nation g Security the implications of the agree-
Reigko,i4worui;,:iegg.P781-ra4d440C1040.008001:51.01
merit by the Prague radio
seemed 14 indicate that the,
Soviet 414- Czechoslovak offi-I
dials renNined at odds.
Last night, the talk with Mr.
Svoboda was described as an
"open and comradely" ex-
change. On the meeting today
with Mr. Dubcek, the Prague
radio said that the two men
"informed each other and pre-
isented opinions about current
questions concerning relations
between the two countries and
parties."
A comparison between the
14 points and the present situ-
ation shows that, for example.
Czechoslovakia has not yet
issued a required statement
that her border with West
Germany was not properly
prepared for defense and must,
therefore,
he secured by War-
saw Pact forces.
It has been reported that at
least two divisions are to be
stationed on the West German
border after withdrawal of the
other occupation forces.
The Prague government has
removed Deputy Premier Ota
Shik, the chief economic plan-
ner, and Interior Minister Josef
Pavel as demanded, in the 7th
and points, but it has not "re-
leased from his functions," as
requesteed, Foreign Minister
Jiri Hajek. In fact, Mr. Majek
returned to Czechoslovakia
today despite an attack on him
in the Soviet press in recent
days. ?
, While Point 2 demanded a
declaration that the 14th con-
gress of the Czeechoslovak
Community party, which met
clandestinely in a Prague In-
dustrial plant while Mr. Dub-
cek and his assoclatees were
In Soviet interment, was illegal,
no such statement has yet been
made.
According to the Czecho-
slovak party briefings insist
that such a declaration be de-
layed until the withdrawal has
been completd.
Prss censorship has been for-
mally instituted, as the third
point of the Moscow agreement
spcifid, but the Russians are
known to b unhappy over its
laxity.
A Pointed U.N. Report.,
Czechoslovak methods of
handling their press in the face
of restrictions were evident in
the prominent front-page dis-
play this morning in the Com-
munist party's official organ,
Rude Pravo, of a report from
New York on the meeting of
CPYRGH
.ApRroved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0
-Wine e economic discussions
on a whole range of problems
;ranging from long.range trade
'questions covering the period
beyond 1970 to immediate eco-
nomic aid to Czechoslovakia
,and to compensation for darn,'.
iages caused by the invading
!armies.
Under the circumstances,
?sources here said, the planned
meeting in Dresden, East Ger-
:many, between the Czechoslo-
yak lraders1,in and the leaders
of the I Ivo .War;aw Pact' cOun-
Jule!: to le.Toilate a gradual
.withdral,vay ()I' the occupation
:forces is certain to be pOst.-1
Toned pervlin g the .nutcorne'. of
the expected new round of con-
versations in Moscow.
The Dresden conference had
ibeen tentatively scheduled for
'Sept. 10 or 11.
There was no visible warmth
between' the Soviet and Czech-.
oslovak officials as Mr. liuznet-
sov made his rounds, but the
relationships were coolly con."
rect even though Soviet tanks
still sat in Prague's streets and
parks and armor and artillery
forces ringed this capital.
: A new note In the Soye,..
;occupation 1was the appearance
of Soviet marine detachments
In red berets, sailor blouses
and khaki uniforms guarding
the embassies of the five War-
NEW YORK TIMES,
.8 September 1968
,
saw Pact occupiers.
According to Rude Pravo,
three East German deputy
defense ministers, including
and admiral, visited last week
their country's occupation
units in Czechoslovakia. It was
believed that they met with
liaison staff and the token
units that remain in north-
western Czechoslovakia after
most of the East German forces
were evacurtled for political
reasons a week after the inva-
sion.
Meanwhile the afternoon
newspaper Vccerni Praha re-
ported this evening the return
to. Prague of Foreign Minister
Jiri Hajek who came under
attack by rthe Soviet press
earlier this 'week.
There appeared to be no im-
mediate disposition on Prague's
part to dismiss Mr. Hajelc, one
of those on the Soviet black
list.
The now Inier!or Minis'-r
Jan Pelnar ?a little known .
moderate who last week re-
placed Gen. Josef Pavel, an
:outspoken liberal *has, taken
1 personal control of the security
forces, including the secret
?police, and has offered public
assurances that Czechoslovak
laws would be respected.
- Mr. Pelnar also turned over
to the Justice Ministry the disl
position of rehabilitations in,
volving former political pri-
soners in a step that had been
planned before the invasion. ?i
?-?-- ?
New Soviet Phase Seen
:;reciai to The New Yorit Timri
MOSCOW, Sept. 7?The visit
of Vasily V. I< utznetsov
:Prague was viewed by East
European observers today as
possible opening step in a!
?new phase of Soviet policy;
toward Czechoslovakia.
Although nothing has be-
.come known of Mr. Kuznelsov's
-conversations today with Alex-
ander Dubcek, the Czecho-
slovak party leader, and yes-
terday with President Ludvik
Svoboda, the observers
that such a visit at this timel
is of more than routine impor-
tance.
In the light of public soviet'
statements since the Moscow
agreement of Aug. 26, the oh-
servers .feel that a HMV phase
of Soviet policy would be .
marked by a more draconic
attitude toward the occupied
country.
Czechoslovak Party Briefing M9scoW. Accord
,PeelAl to The New York Tiffin
PRAGUE. Sept. 7?Follow-
ing, in unofficial translation,
are stenographic notes taken
by Czechoslovak Communists
who were briefed at closed
meetings earlier this week on
the 11 points of the Aug. 26
Moscow' agreement between
Czechoslovakia and the So-
viet Union.
Information for 'the work-
ers of the regional and dis-
trict party committees on the,
basic 14 points of the Mos-.
cow agreement:
1. The chacteristics of the
political devel.pment here. It
was agreed that the course
will be changed in accord-
ance with the Soviet type of
socialism.
, 2. The declarations of the
.revolution" was left out and
it Was not repeated again in
the declaration [published
Aug. 27 at the end of the
Soviet-Czechoslovak talks.1
, 5. The mass communica-
tions media may not speak
'or write against the allies.
6. We submitted a request
that together with the with-
drawal of the troops, the
Soviet security organs also
he removed. The Soviet Union
did agree and changed the
declaration so that together
with the withdrawal of troops
the other groups will also be
removed.
7. The Minister of Interior,
Gen. Josef Pavel, asked to be
relieved from his functions
because he was not ready to
cooperate with the Soviet
security organs.
14th party congress are not 8. Our request for repara-
valid. tions for damages caused by
3. The strengthening of so- the invasion was finally
cialism through press censor- couched in such a way that
ship. ' ? a commission will probably
4. The Soviet side request. be formed consisting of re-,
t
ed our side to declare that Iwesenatives of the five
there was a counterrevolu- states and us to decide What.
tion. As the result of our can be approved as repara-
protest,
9. The international situa--
tion must be adjusted in ac-;
corel?N"P with the agreement'
In 1.,atislava.
10. The issuing of a dec-
laration that our government
did not request the United
Nations and will not request
the United Nations to discuss
our subject.
11. The questions of min- ?
isters. The release from their
functions of Ota Sik and of
Prof. Jiri Hayek.
12. A declaration that our
border with West Germany
is not prepared for defense
and must, therefore, be se-
cured by the allies.
. 13. The results of the
Moscow negotiations are
strictly secret and will not
be published.
14. The further st?rc-ngth-
ening of friendship and
alliance with the Soviet
Union and., with the states
of the socialst_c.amp.
. The following' additional
points were discussed:
(A) The Soviet Union re-
quested a declaration that
the persons who worked for
,the Soviet Union [in connec-
tion With Paragraph 41 will
not be persecuted,
? (B) Our side requested an/
extra provision in the decla-
ration that the statement
that the 14th congress is not
valid will be made when the
foreign troops .have left the
?,..
Country..? -?????
- - ?
the Apt/ t194141deFOPRe lettfiSeltgleilteetkl : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0