BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 19, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#57
Principal Developments:
Commentary 23 June-6 July 1965
1. Polemical warfare in the ICM suddenly marks time, as the major
parties try to adjust to the new situation created by the overthrow of
Algerian strong man Ben Bella on the eve of the Second Afro-Asian Confer-
ence, which had loomed so important in the policies of them all. The
eventual decision by the preparatory committee to postpone the Conference
to 5 November, in the face of an intense Chinese campaign to push it
through on its original schedule, is seen by practically all non-Communist
observers as a blow to Chinese policy and prestige and to Chou En-lai per-
sonally -- though the Chinese make a great show of being first to recognize
the new Algerian regime and emphasize the decision not to move the Confer-
ence from Algiers as a victory! Public reaction from the Soviet side is
slow in coming and reserved: some Soviet-aligned parties are so critical
-- especially the French -- as to draw hostile reaction from the new re-
gime. (Clandestine reporting indicates that at least one Soviet-leaning
party tried vainly to get guidance on the Algerian developments from the
CPSU.)
2. After Castro publicly denounces the Ben Bella overthrow as a be-
trayal of the Algerian "socialist revolution," the new regime closes the
Algerian office of Castro's Prensa Latina for "subversion." And from an-
other corner, the Yugoslavs bitterly denounce Castro's erstwhile right-
hand man, Che Guevara (missing from public view since late March), for
the Chinese-type line of an interview he gave to the Egyptian monthly At-
Taliya.
3. Further deterioration of Sino-Soviet state relations seems to be
indicated by a Peking announcement that the 47 Chinese scientists at the
Dubna Joint Institute for Nuclear Research near Moscow have returned home.
The Chinese had contributed 20% of the cost of building the Institute in
1956 and have consistently maintained a larger group of scientists there
than any country other than the USSR.
4+. The warm Soviet welcome to Tito continued throughout his exten-
sive two-week visit. In their joint communique, they characterize them-
selves as "two socialist countries" with "identity and closeness of views"
on the main international problems: the watery section on problems of the
ICM is limited largely to a mutual pledge to try to strengthen the move-
ment.
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(Commentary Cont.)
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5. The Rumanians march further along the road to independence by
publishing a new draft constitution which strikes out all reference to
the USSR, by announcing competition for a new national anthem (the old
contains a phrase about Soviet liberators), and by censoring out a Soviet-
written, Soviet-line article on the 20th anniversary of the liberation of
East Europe from the May issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism (World
Marxist Review), as they resume publication of a Rumanian edition which
had. lapsed since last summer.
Ski `ificance:
The unexpected overthrow of Ben Bella and the intense political strug-
gle over postponing the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference have clearly shaken the
ICM, the "anti-imperialist camp," and the Afro-Asian world. The present
lull in polemics indicates how severely both Peking and and Moscow have
been rocked. The major parties are now engaged in a feverish effort to
sift the wreckage, construct a valid picture of the new situation, and ad-
just policies and plans accordingly.
Although the course which the new Algerian regime will follow -- or
even its survival prospects -- cannot be confidently forecast, its pro-
nouncements, particularly on independence and true non-alignment, and its
rough treatment of Castro and the French CP for their criticism seem to
indicate that Algeria will renounce the role it had increasingly played
under BB as a sort of advance base in Africa for the Communist "anti-
imperialists" of both camps.
A further crumbling of the old monolith is seen in the new Rumanian
independence measures, the Guevara-Yugoslav feud and the Chinese with-
drawal from Dubna.
As we go to press, an announcement is expected from the International
Preparatory Committee, now meeting in Helsinki, to the effect that the
Ninth World Youth Festival which had been scheduled for 28 July in Algiers
has been cancelled -- or at least postponed for an uncertain future. (Even
before the Algiers coup, it had been rumored that this would be the last of
these gargantuan, extremely costly spectacles because of increasing obsta-
cles to Soviet manipulation and exploitation, due to the breakdown of dis-
cipline in the Soviet camp and opposition from the Chinese camp within the
ICM as well as anti-Communist elements in the world youth movement.)
25X1 C1 OB
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" (Commentary Cont.)
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 Approved For Release 2005/06/ ~DP78-03061A00030004O602'44-y 1965
923. WILL THERE BE A NEW BERLIN CRISIS?
25X1 C10B
SITUATION: (For an outline of recent incidents in the Berlin area,
see unclassified attachment.)
Recent months, and especially the month of June, witnessed a number
of incidents in the Berlin area, giving rise to fears that a new Berlin
crisis may develop. Aside from the events described in attachment, other
considerations helped to focus attention on Berlin. The twelfth anniver-
sary of the 17 June 1953 East German revolt was observed in West Germany
and West Berlin with public speeches and bonfires. The West German Bun-
destag debated (but did not pass) a constitutional amendment permitting
a series of laws to go into effect in case of a national emergency, in-
cluding bans on strikes, controls on publications, and civil defense and
protective measures; the East German official paper Neues Deutschland
compared this proposal with Hitler's ErmachtigLungsgesetz Enabling Act)
of March 1933, and used such headlines as 'Emergency Laws Increase Danger
of War" and "Bundestag Discusses War Laws." (Actually the laws would only
go into effect after a special vote in a possible war-time emergency, and
are not -- as Hitler's law was -- for immediate use. Also, stricter con-
trols are even now in effect in East Germanys) West German elections are
due on 19 September, and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and others apparently
believe that the leading government party, the Christian Democratic Union,
lost votes in the 1961 election because Chancellor Adenauer did not react
more strongly to the erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August of that
year. On 23 June 1965, an official West German spokesman denounced the
East German actions as a "danger to peace," and on 24+ June Erhard made a
display of activity, conferring with the heads of other parties and with
representatives of France, Britain and the United States.*
Even while provoking alarm, the East German authorities in Berlin-
Pankow tried to make such alarm appear a fabrication of the Bonn govern-
ment. On 25 June the East German news agency ADN ridiculed the "West
German war scare," and East German officials have coolly lied, denying
(26 June) that helicopter overflights over West Berlin proper had taken
place, or (27 June) that government-to-government negotiation had been
an issue in the rail tariff negotiations. (FYI only, a classified re-
port states that a Soviet diplomat from the Embassy in East Berlin also
told a French diplomat that "nobody" intended to modify the situation,
and that rumors of a crisis were baseless. End FYI.)
Certainly a real crisis had not arisen as of the end of June. The
Soviets have begun repairs on the building of the U.S. Military Liaison
These unflattering references are not intended for use, esp. to the bloc.
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SJ66LUM (923 Cont.)
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Mission (USMIM) in Potsdam, East Germany (the counterpart of the Soviet
Military Mission located in West Germany), some visitors arrested at
Easter have been released, rail and barge service has not been inter-
rupted, and East German helicopter flights did stop, at least temporar-
ily, after the 21st of June. West Berlin's exposed position lends itself
to Soviet exploitation at any time, and other conditions are now favorable
for Communist action. East Germany has recently improved its status with
the Arab states due to their annoyance over Bonn's relations with Israel
(though there has so far been no formal diplomatic recognition or exchange
of ambassadors between Pankow and these countries), Tito recently swal-
lowed past resentments and visited East Germany, West German politicians
are preoccupied with elections, and De Gaulle's activities, including
attempts at rapprochement with Moscow, are weakening Western unity. The
Soviets may wish to remind the US that they can raise difficulties in
Germany, eveh if they can do little in -- or about--- Vietnam. It is up
to Moscow to decide whether the situation is to become'more critical.
The East German leaders are always ready to press for improved in-
ternational standing and are probably encouraged by the Arab attitude
and Tito's visit. (Also, FYI only, East Germany extended over $200
million in aid to five key developing countries in the fifteen months
ending March 1965, almost four times the total of East German aid to less
developed countries over the previous nine years. $100 million of this
went to the UAR, $t.2 million apiece to Ceylon and Indonesia, $14+ million
to Yemen, and $7 million to Tanzania. End FYI.) But while Pankow may
sometimes take small initiatives without encouragement from Moscow, the
East German leaders undertake no significant provocation to which the
Soviets -- with 20 divisions in East Germany -- have not precisely agreed.
First Secretary Walter Ulbricht is apparently happy with the new Brezhnev-
Kosygin leadership, which has given no cause (as Khrushchev sometimes did)
for supposing that it might deal with Bonn over Ulbricht's head. Regard-
less of the desires of the German people, East and West, the Soviet and
East German leaders want a permanent division between East and West Ger-
many, permanent, at least, so long as Germany cannot be reunited on Com-
munist terms. Political recognition of East Germany promotes this divi-
sion and strengthens the position of Soviet puppets like Ulbricht and
Winzer.
Observers have sometimes speculated that the Communists follow a
deliberate policy of alternate hardness and friendliness to confuse and
disorient the democracies. This may be doubted as far as it concerns
over-all East-West relations, since there are too many factors which
Moscow cannot control, especially now with the rise of Chinese Communist
hostility and the decline in Bloc solidarity. Many tension-provoking
periodical switches are only to be understood in the context of the zig-
zagging general Communist party line, and are not "planned." But Commu-
nists do deliberately use ambiguous or alternating hard and soft tactics
in appropriate limited situations, in order to bait the democracies and
split Free World alliances. These tactics appear in such contexts as
the United Nations and disarmament, and current maneuvering in Berlin is
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25X1 C1 OB
a good example. The East Germans make moves which appear innocuous to
the uninformed, or for which various pretexts are offered (e.g., military
maneuvers, West German "revanchist" speeches and demonstrations). If
the West Germans or the Western allies, esp. the U.S. don't react, this
omission encourages additional probes. If they do react, the original
move is presented as unimportant or even denied altogether, and an attempt
is made to make the western reaction seem alarmist or aggressive. Later,
if a more serious situation arises, the advocates of Western firmness may
be regarded as alarmists in the West itself, and their advice may be dis-
regarded. Whether or not a real crisis develops, it is desirable that
East German and Soviet provocation be recognized for what it is.
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(923 Cont.)
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924.
25X1 C1OB
APPEASEMENT IN VIETNAM?
THE CERTAIN ROAD TO ESCALATION
25X1 C1OB
SITUATION: There are quite a few groups and individuals in far-flung
parts of the free world, some of them influential, who advocate policies
that are dangerously similar to those of people who felt in 1938 that
Hitler could be appeased; they believed, or hoped, that by meeting his
demands he would be convinced that it was in his interest to accept the
friendship of the democracies. The term appeasement has been so suffi-
ciently disgraced that even those who would in fact "appease" the Commu-
nists in the Far East would vehemently deny that this is their policy.
In spite of the contempt that the term implies, the conceptions of ap-
peasement still imperil U.S..interests and those of the entire Free World:
Those who advocate any version of appeasement in Southeast Asia, particu-
larly Vietnam, designed to show the Chinese Communists that non-Communists
bear them no ill-will represent a clear and present threat to the firmness
and resolution that are vital to the position of the Free World in that
area. (See unclassified attachment for details on attempts to appease
Hitler and for relevant background on more recent events in the Far East.)
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(924 Cont.)
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925.
25X1 C10B
SITUATION: On June 22, 1965, the Governments of Japan and the
Republic of Korea (ROK) signed a treaty and twenty related documents in
Tokyo to restore (after a lapse of 55 years) full diplomatic relations
between the two countries and to settle outstanding issues. The parlia-
ments of both countries have yet to ratify the agreements -- Korea prob-
ably in July and the Japanese Diet probably in late August or early Sep-
tember.
This action, especially important for the political and economic
well-being of both countries in the face of the growing threat from Com-
munist China, brings to a climax fourteen years of intermittent, diffi-
cult and conflict-ridden negotiations. All Korean governments have faced
organized resistance against establishing normal relations with Japan
(who annexed all of Korea in 1910 and ruled the peninsula as a colony un-
til.it was liberated at the close of World War II). Similarly, Japanese
Governments have struggled against internal pressures over submitting to
sometimes irrational Korean claims and demands, one of which required an
apology for past transgressions.
Negotiations had dragged along during the regime of President
Syngman Rhee, but have been seriously pressed by President Chung Hee
Park since his inauguration for a four year term on October 15, 1963.
The conclusive steps leading to the Treaty and its expected ratification
(which may coincide in Korea with the twelfth anniversary of the Korean
Armistice, 27 July 1953) were the
Basic Relations Treaty, initialed on the last of three days of dis-
cussions with Japan's Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina in Seoul
on February 20, 1965;
Claims and Economic Cooperation, Fisheries, and the Status of Korean
Residents in Japan agreements outlining the last major issues be-
tween the countries), initialed after 10-days of discussion in Tokyo
on April 3, 1965 by Korea's Foreign Minister Tong Won Lee and Japan's
Foreign Minister Shiina.
Every official meeting and discussion, each proposal for a solution
to one of the many problems at issue, has met with demonstrations and
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sometimes violence on the part of the organized Opposition in Korea and
the communist-led students and trade unionists in Japan. In Korea, 200
Opposition political leaders (superficially merged in the new Minjung
(Popular) party in June) and organized students from the University lead
the resistance. The Opposition's Struggle Committee Against Humiliating
Agreements with Japan said, when the Treaty was being signed, that it was
scheduling "forceful action" to make known its disapproval of the accords
normalizing relations with Japan. It has used the latent and open hos-
tility against Japan to focus all. of the public's frustrations over in-
ternal economic and political problems against the Government. While it
is believed that the National Assembly will ratify the Treaty and Agree-
ments, all of the Government's resources will have to be used to educate
the population and its political leaders to the fact that these are rea-
sonable, and sometimes generous accords which are favorable to Korea and
in the best interests of the country. Japan has agreed to help South
Korea with reparations and loans of $800 million; fishing grounds, for
countries with an overriding need for this natural resource and industry,
have been reasonably demarcated for use between the two. Koreans who
lived in Japan prior to World. War II may claim permanent residence rights
and equal status with Japanese in important respects. Japan may now open
a diplomatic mission in Seoul; Korea established a mission in Tokyo short-
ly after the end of World War II.
While communist-led opposition causes his Government difficulty, the
almost two to one majority held by Premier Eisaku Sato's Liberal-Democratic
Party was not changed significantly in the July elections (his Party lost
5 seats in the upper house elections). Successive governments in Tokyo
have shown restraint and understanding in dealing with Seoul to help over-
come past antipathies and to remove a major source of Far Eastern tension.
But Communist agitation in Japan is effective on one subject in particular:
they call attention to ROK troops supporting South Vietnam. and claim that
Japan will be drawn into this war as a result of the Treaty. Less impor-
tant for Government stability, the Communists take umbrage at the clause
in which Japan recognizes the ROK as the "only legal government" in Korea. AMA
Communist capitals in Pyongyang, Peking and Hanoi have established
clear lines of attack aimed at reviving old fears of Japan throughout south-
east Asia: their principal theme hammers on the return of Japanese mili-
tarism and the renewal of Japan's dreams of the Greater Eastern Coprosper-
ity Sphere (absent from Peking propaganda since 1959 until last November
when it reappeared in Peoples Da m and was echoed in the DPRK press).
On the legal, side, the three capitals (often echoed by the USSR) call the
treaty null and void, and recall a 1962 Pyongyang foreign ministry state-
ment that any unilateral treaty on. diplomatic or consular relations, rep-
arations, fishing boundaries, status of Koreans in Japan, would be illegal;
"such questions," it said, "should be solved after Korea is unified."
Additional fears in Korea stemming from the Treaty are that Japan
will again extend its influence throughout Korean society, and that the
U.S. will withdraw its extensive support [besides the sizeable amounts of
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moo
money poured in for direct economic development, the U.S. 8th Army of
some 50,000 men provides substantial purchasing power in addition to
supplying the bulk of the U.N. Conmand patrolling the 151-mile demarca-
tion line in Korea, alongside of the R0K?s own 600,000 man army].
25X1 C1 OB
3
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25X1C10B
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 Approved For Release 2005/ P78-03061A000300040QS Daly 19o5
926 AF, FE, ITi , ,^iIU .
25X1 C1 OB
TH FOPULL T IOH EXPLO 'ION
SITUATION: It took all of Moan history until 1640 for the world
population to reach one billion. During the intervening century-and-a-
quarter until the present, it increased by another two billion. And
now, according to the best of recent statistics, a fourth billion will
be added in just the next 13 or 14 years. The "population explosion"
has thus become, in the opinion of many, the central problem of our time,
overshadowing other proble..,s and. demanding massive action toward an early
solution.
Nature has programmed all of its creatures to produce a i rasteful
surplus of progeny so that a sufficient number might survive and perpet-
uate the species. In the case of min, this surplus population has been
removed by war, famine, disease, and other hazards of the violent world
in which he has usually lived. Toward the end of the loth century, the
industrial revolution began to bring increased productivity to the land
and a greater measure of general prosperity. Fewer people died of star-
vation or neglect, and the population of the more advanced countries be-
gan to rise sharply. In 1793, Thomas Malthus advanced the theory that
population increases faster than the food supply and that, unless births
are controlled, war and famine will step in and limit the increase.
Malthus was right in principle but somewhat wrong in his timing.
It was the advent of modern medicine that has created a truly alarming
imbalance between births and deaths. Although the birth rate has re-
mained about the same, the death rate has dropped sharply, so that a
higher percentage of people survive to live a normal span. According to
the latest (1963) United Nations Demographic Yearbook, the population of
the world, now something over 3 billion, is increasing at a rate of approx-
imately 2% per annum. At this rate, it will double by the end of the cen-
tury. In just 35 years, there will be over 6 billion people in the world!
But the rate varies from region to region, and only the more advanced
and enlightened countries are experiencing what might be considered a man-
ageable increase. The rest -- those in which a large proportion of the
population are on the borderline between a substandard living and sheer
starvation -- are accounting for most of the increase. The following ta-
ble will. show the unhappy contrast between a selected group of prosperous
countries that are experiencing a small increase and a group in the under-
developed world where the population will inevitably outrun the food sup-
ply, if the present rate continues.
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(926 Cont.)
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Annual Rate of Population Increase
for Selected Countries
Country
Percent
Increase
Country
Percent
Increase
Australia
2.1
Costa Rica
4.14
United States
1.6
El Salvador
3.8
'J'apan
0.9
Nicaragua
3.5
Switzerland
0.9
Brazil
3.4
Austria
0.6
Mexico
3.1
Sweden
0.47
Egypt
2.6
Belgium
o.44
India
2.3
What will some key countries look like by 1980? That date is chosen
arbitrarily for selected projections because it is unlikely that much can
be done to control natality in the next fifteen years. Actually the birth
rate is increasing in some countries, and even the rate of increase in the
world as a whole has been rising. That is, not only is the population in-
creasing, but it is increasing at a faster rate each year.
Estimated
_--Po12ulation-------------- 1965---------------19800---
Brazil
Mexico
United States
Communist China
But: Belgium
United Kingdom
West Germany
80 million 14+0 million
1+0 11
195
71.9 11
71 it
252 it
9.3 million 10.1 million
54 6o
56 it 64
The FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN) reported that
for the fifth consecutive year the rate of growth in agricultural produc-
tion was less than the rate of growth of the world's population. The im-
plications of this are ominous: already two thirds of the world are
food-deficit areas. Even if we could arrest the trend, so that the pro-
duction of food could keep pace with the production of people,'most areas
would still be badly off. To reverse the trend -- to start raising the
living standards substantially -- seems hopeless when all factors are con-
sidered without unjustified optimism. Indeed, it is quite possible that
even substantial progress toward birth control could be nullified by im-
proved medical care, particularly in very backward and primitive areas.
Thus a decrease in births could easily be offset by an increase in sur-
vival. All responsible opinion thus converges on the urgent need to act
without delay. According to an article in U.S. News and World Report,
forwarded as attachment, the world has a choice: "limit population or
face famine."
2
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Encouraging developments have recently come to mitigate the forego-
ing somber statistics and projections. For the first tine in American
history a President has taken cognizance of efforts to deal with the pop-
ulation explosion. In his State of the Union Message, President Johnson
said on 5 January 1965: "1 will seek new ways to use our knowledge to
help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity
in world resources." Following this pronouncement, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, on 4 March 1965, sent an airgram to all missions
stating that AID was prepared to entertain requests, approved by foreign
governments, for technical assistance in family planning. Equally encour-
aging is the fact that the Ecumenical Council is concerned, and a number
of important prelates have voiced their concern, over the population prob-
lem and the attitude of the Catholic Church toward birth control. Richard
Cardinal Cushing voiced hope that the fourth session of Second Vatican
Council, which opens 14 September, will settle the problem: "My sympathy
and love goes out to those people who are having problems with large fam-
ilies, and who are worried sick about the.Church's teaching. I'm hoping
and praying that all these problems will be settled by the commission's
report." Lee Joseph Cardinal Suenens, Primate of Belgium stated last
October that the Church's outlook has been too one-sided with too much
emphasis on the command "to increase and multiply." Maximus Saigh, the
Patriarch of Antioch, called for "new thinking on certain official pos-
itions," adding that ... "the future of the Church's mission in the world
is at stake."
25X1 C10B
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 Approved For Release 2005/0 -03061A000300040 92t4ly 1965
927. SOVIET SCIENTISTS CELEBRATE MENDEL'S ANNIVERSARY
25X1
SITUATION: (For a fuller account of Lysenkoism and its recent down-
fall, see unclassified attachment.)
Although occasionally challenged after the death of Stalin, the
teachings of Trofim Lysenko -- often called "Michurinist biology" dominated Soviet biology until the fall ~f Khrushchev. Lysenko's doctrines
owed their status, not to scientific validity (which they lacked), but to
the fact that they seemed more in harmony with Marxism-Leninism than the
genetics of Gregor Mendel and his Western successors. Lysenko himself was
also a skillful politician who knew how to flatter personalities like Stalin
and Khrushchev, and how to make his own opponents appear to be opposed to
the Soviet regime. When honest scientists had doubts about Stalin's plans
to transform nature or Khrushchev's program to develop the semi-arid Virgin
Lands, Lysenko was ready to furnish the desired intellectual justification.
Lysenko, however, made many academic enemies on both scientific and person-
al grounds, and was bound to share some of the onus for the failures of
Soviet agriculture after 1958. It now appears that the influence of the
Lysenkoists was only sustained in recent years by Khrushchev's personal
support, for their position collapsed with Khrushchev's fall from power.
Vladimir Dudintscv, the novelist, published an article on 23 October
1964, describing the way the official (Lysenkoist) scientific establishment
in biology was inhibiting research, and many other attacks followed, in-
eluding some that debunked Lysenko's claims that he had produced practical
results. Lysenko himself was in any case in semi-retirement, but his lead-
ing lieutenant, Mikhail Olshansky, lost his post as head of the All-Union
Lenin Agricultural Academy on 10 February 1965. At the March plenum of
the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev pronounced Lysenko's work a failure. The problem
remains, however, of rooting out Lysenkoist doctrine in Soviet schools and
institutes, and breaking old habits of thought. Perhaps partly to give
Soviet biology a shock treatment, leading Soviet biologists recently held
a meeting in Moscow, commemorating the centennial of Mendel's work on plant
hybrids. Also, Pravda printed a commemorative article (with picture), hail-
ing Mendel's work and saying,
"After the October plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1964,
every opportunity was created for the extensive and comprehensive de-
velopment of biology, and for the emergence of our scientists into
the front rank of this important science."
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Only a year ago, it would have been unthinkable that Gregor Mendel
should be honored in a Moscow ceremony. Even now, old Soviet habits and
fears persist. Bykhovskiy's article describes Mendel as a Czech, or "an
outstanding son of the Czechoslovak people," and makes no mention of Mendel's
clerical position; even the picture of him is somewhat fuzzed, obscuring,
his clerical collar. In contrast, the Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya
-- in this respect correctly -- describes him as "of German-Slavic ancestry"
(1938 ed.) or as Austrian (1951- ed.), and clearly identifies him as a monk.
(Mendel was born Johann Mendel in Austrian Silesia, studied in Vienna, and
taught at Br'vnn (now Brno, CSR). It would be more correct to describe him
as an Austrian than as a Czech ....) Even today, then,. Soviet biologists
do not openly speak of Mendel's origins. They are right, on the other
hand, in noting that Soviet biology has to make up for lost time. Official
rehabilitation is only the beginning, since a whole generation of students
has been taught Lysenkoist doctrines and kept in ignorance of Mendelian
genetics. Old textbooks must be discarded, and teachers must be re-educated.
Moreover, the idea that science is a matter of political-ideological doc-
trine dies hard. Some of the attacks on Lysenkoists, while understandable,
are unpleasantly reminiscent of past attacks on deviationists of various
kinds; to some Soviet citizens, raised in the dogmatic tradition, anti-
Lysenkoism is simply the new dogma. The practice of open scientific dis-
cussion and debate, without descent into personalities, will take time to
master.
25X1 C10B
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(927.)
 CPYRGH
Fact Sheet 19 July 1965
The My Russian
by
Victor Lasky
Trident Press
630 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10020
$1+.95 313 Pages 1965
This book documents many failures in Communist Bloc (particularly
Soviet) technical assistance projects throughout the world and reports
cases of racial bias on the part of Soviet technicians and diplomats
abroad. The unhappiness, largely caused by racial discrimination, of
students from Africa and Asia in Soviet and other Communist Bloc univers-
ities and technical schools, also receives extensive treatment.
Much of the material in Lasky's book has appeared previously, notably
in Dan Kurzman's, "Subversion of the Innocents"and.om House: New York
1963. 570 pages. $6.95), but Lasky has contributed much from his own
travels and his conversations with both leaders and ordinary citizens in
several of the world's principal non-aligned countries. A few of the
cases reported by Mr. Lasky follow.
In 196+ Indians made a determined attempt to break down the color
barrier at the Calcutta Swimming Club, where membership was restricted
to Europeans. In marked contrast to the Americans, whose ambassador
forbade members of his staff to join the club, and requested those who
were already members to resign (because of the exclusion of Indians from
membership), the Soviets did nothing to discourage their diplomats from
remaining members, and the Indian left wing noted with disappointment
that a number of Soviets continued to use the club's pool regularly.
Attractive Svetlana Ushakova was sent to Guinea with a group of
Soviet teachers to help the Guinean Ministry of Education train local
teachers. Soon accepted by the Guineans, she was invited to some of
their parties. This angered her Soviet superiors who called her in and
ordered her not to have any social contacts with the Guineans. She ignored
this warning, and continued to include Guineans in her social activities.
This flagrant disregard for authority enraged her superiors, who deter-
mined to send her home. The Soviets found that Svetlana refused to go,
but they twice sent her to the airport under escort to force her to board
a plane for home. Each time, however, the Guinean police had been
alerted, and they refused to allow Svetlana to board the plane. The
Soviets did not give up easily. On their third attempt, they drugged
the unfortunate girl, bandaged her head, and carried her to the aircraft
on a stretcher. But again the Guinean authorities intervened, and freed
her. After considering her case, the Guinean Government granted her po-
litical asylum, and hired her to continue her teaching.
(Cont.)
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The Soviets try to discourage their citizens from marrying for-
eigners. Nevertheless, they have not absolutely forbidden this, and
during the past ten years there have been numerous cases of intermarriage
between Soviets and foreigners who were students or trainees in the USSR.
Lasky learned that quite a number of Indians, in particular, had married
Soviet girls while studying or training in the Soviet Union, but that it
was next to impossible for the wives to obtain Soviet permission to ac-
company their husbands to India when their training ended. This cruel
practice has caused so much discontent on the part of the husbands that
within the past two or three years the Soviets have relented slightly,
and allowed a token number of Soviet wives to rejoin their husbands.
CPYRGH
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The Soviets have failed miserably in some of their projects in Guinea,
the small West African country which broke with France in 1958 rather than
Join the French African Community as other former French African territor-
ies did upon gaining independence. Sekou Toure, the Marxist President of
Guinea, invited the Soviets and other Co=,mist countries to help his
country. Guinea soon had second thoughts about the "aid" it received from
the Communists. One noteworthy example of Soviet bungling was exposed
when two huge pieces of machinery turned out to be snow plows and had to
be left for many months in the port area of Conakry. Nearby were nearly
100 Soviet tractors which the Guineans also found unsuitable for the trop-
ical climate. Then there was Hungary which furnished Conakry with 103
city buses in 1962; poor quality, unsuitability and lack of spare parts
reduced them within two years to a point where only a handful were still
operable. Soviet prestige in Guinea received a damaging blow with the
discovery that Soviet technicians, supposedly teaching the Guineans more
efficient methods of mining diamonds (a principal Guinean export under
the French), were also helping themselves to some of the diamonds and
smuggling them out of the country. Guinea arrested and expelled eighteen
of the Soviet technicians.
When the Guinean security forces (trained themselves by the Commu-
nist countries) found documents proving Soviet involvement in attempts to
overthrow the government, Sekou Toure decided to call a halt. He declared
the Soviet Ambassador, Danil S. Solod, persona non grata, and immediately
arrestel.mar.y local Communists implicated in the plot. Since then (1961),
Guinea has been more interested in genuine neutrality between the Commu-
nist Bloc and the West, and has encouraged Western capital to invest in
the country, which it has done.
Soviet o erations in other parts of Africa, notably the Congo
(Leopoldville, have been anything but successful. The Soviets first
supported Patrice Lumumba, and later Antoine Gizenga, both of whom proved
erratic and totally unreliable. The Soviets tried first to foment a re-
bellion in the Congo in 1960, shortly after Belgium granted independence.
However, there was more anti-Communist feeling among the Congolese than
the Soviets had counted on: the rebellion was put down and Lumumba was
2 (Cont.)
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CPYRGH
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deposed, arrested and later killed. Despite proof positive of Soviet
involvement in the 1960 attempts to overthrow the Congolese Government,
the USSR was allowed to re-open its embassy in December, 1961. The
Soviets rapidly increased the size of their staff until it numbered about
100, and housed it in a ten-story apartment building. But Congolese po-
lice were alert this time. Counselor Boris Voronin and Press Attache
Yuri Myakotnykh, both known to be members of Soviet security services,
were kept under surveillance. In November, 1963 they were caught with
documents which proved that the Soviets were plotting with left-wing
exiles to overthrow the legitimate goverment of the Congo. Vie entire
staff of the Soviet Embassy was declared persona non grata and forced to
leave the country.
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U.S. NEWS & MRID REPORT
1!4 June 1965
CPYRGH
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WORLD CHOICE:
LIMIT POPULATION OR FACE FAMINE
What Latest Study Shows
Death by- starvation is the prospect facing millions of people in Asia, Africa and
parts of Latin America. By 1980, those areas will have 1 billion more mouths to
feed. Yet, food production. in many countries already falls behind needs.
This warning is being sounded for the world's underde-
veloped nations-
Either find ways to limit population growth and add to
food output or face large-scale famine. .
These other alarms are added:
? One billion more people in underdeveloped, food-short
countries will have to be fed by 1980.
? Even America, with its vast capacity for food output,
cannot fill that need while meeting demands of its own ex-
panding population and those of its paying food customers.
? Threat of famine on a broad scale in Asia, Africa and
parts of Latin America is becoming an immediate-not just
a remote-prospect.
A losing race. As population explodes in nations that
already teem with people, many of those nations even now
are skirting the borderline of famine.
Yet, in most of those countries, actual production of food
is showing a tendency to decline, not to rise.
In Asia, food available for each person has fallen by 4
per cent since 1961. In Latin America, the dropoff 'since
1958 has been even greater-6 per cent. In Africa, up to
now, food output has kept pace with the increase in popu ,
lation, but a downward shift in this trend is indicated.
This is a disturbing reversal of conditions. While food
production in these areas dropped sharply during World
War II, the decline was temporary and, with peace, output
returned to prewar levels. Around 1960, however, a leveling
off occurred and since then the situation has been getting
more serious year by year.-
The seriousness of the food crisis -is 'dramatically brought
out in a special report on world food problems just prepared
by the U. S. Department of Agriculture.
In famine belt, unless-. In the years just ahead, this
Agriculture Department report says, areas of the globe
where two thirds of the, world's 'people= live will be in the
famine belt unless dramatic changes occur..
A plan to spend 4 billion dollars a year on food from the
U. S. to eliminate hunger in countries outside Communist
China has been suggested.
But Lester R Brown, staff economist of the ,Department
of Agriculture and author of the new study on the world
;food outlook, says:
"Food shipments from developed countries can help, but
they. cannot account for more than a very small fraction of
the projected increases in food needs over the next several
years."
So, either population growth must be limited or food out-
put increased greatly in the underdeveloped nations.
1 i The problem is: Today, in many densely populated areas
of Asia and Latin America, almost all available land already
is being used for food production. At the same time, efforts
so far to lower birth rates through family planning and other
programs have met with negligible success.
Alternative-bigger yields. One other suggested solu-
I tion for the impending crisis is to grow more food on the
same acreage now under cultivation.
In the U. S., startling advances in farm technology have
resulted in great increases in food production even though
the. amount of land under cultivation has been reduced by
federal crop controls. Farmers sometimes are paid . not to
produce foodstuffs.
But raising yields per acre is not so easy elsewhere in
the world. Only a handful of countries-Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Japan and a few West European countries-
have had yield increases anything like those in the U. S.
Over the last 25 years, the U. S. and Canada had a 109 per
cent rise in farm yields. For all underdeveloped countries
combined, the increase for the same period was only 8 per
cent. When you look closely at the underdeveloped countries, .
you find these handicaps to sustained rises in farm output:
? Widespread illiteracy hampers the introduction of new
ideas and techniques to farmers.
? Low per capita income prevents the farmers from buy- ;
ing the machinery, fertilizers, pesticides and other products
they need. No country with a per capita income of less than
$200 a year has been able to raise yields appreciably.
? Incentives are lacking. If farm income goes to wealthy
landlords, as in some Latin-American countries, or to the
government, as in Communist lands, farm output is poor.
~?vFarmers do not get cash prices for their produce suf
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 CPYRGHT
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ficient to buy the yield-increasing machinery and chemicals Rather, the Department of Agriculture study shows, they
they need. Often, they raise just what they can eat. are in many ways similar to those of China, Pakistan and
0 Needed farm services, 'such as' research, credit and Indonesia. Together, these four countries. contain 1.4 billion
transportation, usually are lacking. people, nearly half of the world total."
Story of India. Consider the case of India, where many Egypt depends on imports of wheat for about half of its
kinds of grain are raised-rice, corn; wheat, barley and mil- supply. Nearly all of this grain. has come through the U. S.
let. India has 350 million acres under cultivation-about the foreign-aid program. ?Now, with U. S.-Egyptian relations de
same as in the United States. But it has 60 million farmers, teriorating, this source may be cut off. If it does,. the outlook
compared with fewer than 4 million in the`U. S. for Egypt's soaring population could be widespread hunger.
Nearly three fourths of the Indian people are illiterate, Communist China's per capita food resources have been
and the rate is even higher among the farm .population. falling since 1958. It has been buying 5 to 6 million tons
The people speak hundreds of different languages and, of wheat a year in world markets. Nearly 40 per cent of its
dialects. The job of teaching modern. agricultural methods foreign-exchange earnings go for food and fertilizer. And
to farmers under these conditions is formidable, if not still its population is climbing toward the billion mark.
im
s
ibl
po
s
e What lieshd Lki td th fhd
. aea.oongowareuture, te uner
Per capita income in India is $60 a year. Farmers are developed countries-India, Communist China, Iraq, Pakis-
hard pressed to buy seed, a primitive plow and.an animal tan, Indonesia, Egypt, Brazil and others-can expect yearly
to pull it. Few have ever used fertilizers or other agricultur- increases in farm yields of less than 1 per cent. These coun-
al chemicals vital to increased farm output: tries now hold 2.2 billion of the world's 3.1 billion people.
Rainfall is a problem. Most rains in India fall during the To make .matters worse, these same countries expect the
period from June to September; there is inmost no rain for biggest population booms In future years. Underdeveloped
five to seven mouths of the year. nations will add more than 1 billion people between 1960
As a result of all these problems, grain yields are low, and 1980. All other countries are expected to add 216 mil-
averaging less than one fourth of those in the. U. S. and lion people in that period. See chart on this page.
Japan. During a period of . nearly 60' years, yield. per acre In some underdeveloped countries, such as Mexico, Brazil;:
in India rose by only 3 per cent. Iraq, the Philippines and Guatemala, population growth is
India is trying to bring more laud under cultivation, and exceeding 3 per cent a year. In these nations, as in India,
hopes to add 6 million acres in the next 15 years-an in- Communist China and Indonesia, time is running out,
crease of about 0.2 per. cent a year: But, with its popula- An "immediate and dramatic" effort to raise farm yields,
tion growing by over 2 per cent a year-10 times as fast is needed, the Department of Agriculture study concludes.
the situation is explosive. The danger of a world food crisis lies close at hand, not in
Food riots raged in the streets of New Delhi, Calcutta, the distant future.
Madras and Bombay in recent months. Behind the protests It is between now and 1980, when the fastest population
were these developments: While food production remains growth in history is anticipated, that the threat of famine
constant, per capita income has been slowly rising. The re- -in villages and cities throughout large areas of the world-
sult has been higher food prices and shorter rations for low- will be greatest.
er-income Indians. Even massive help from the U. S. and other developed
Another problem is distribution. Last month, 27 ships con- nations maybe too little, and too late.
taming grain were lined up outside Bombay harbor awaiting The signs of trouble to come are everywhere apparent in
unloading. Meanwhile, many ,people were going hungry. the food-short countries. What has finally come to be
recognized as the world's gravest problem 'appears to be
Many in some ii ht. India's .troubles ,are not unique.
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7 s f 4. i,ti , h ;fl_
W,rduclapcga;atioas of Asia, A `ca and t ih Asmdp
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CPYRGH
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NY TIMES
22 June 1965
U.S. Cffer'ingBirth ControlHelp
To the Underdeveloped Nations
By JOHN FINNEY
WASHINGTON, June i21 Was realized that In most of
Cautiously and as unobstrusive- ecoonomunderdeveloped ic development could not
ly as possible, the Administra- hope to keep pace with popula-
tion is going ahead in' helping tion growth brought about by
underdeveloped nations curb high birth rates and declining
their growing populations, death rates.
9'ormal and informal requests Within an `agency that was
for American assistance in de, already unpopular on Capitol
veloping and implementing birth Hill, however, there was a relucl,
control programs have been re- tance to add, to its difficulties
eeived from India, Pakistan and by embarking upon a program`
Turkey. The expectation is that 'of birth-control assitance to for-
[Agency for International De-
elopment.
Approval of the requests will
mark another significant step
'In the Government's, evolving
policy toward a more positive.
position on population control.'
This policy will come under
what is expected to be sympa-
thetic Congressional examina-
,tion tomorrow when a Senate
Government Operations subcom-
mittee opens hearings on Gov-
ernment population control pro-
grams.
The hearings will mark tht
first time that a legislative com-
mittee has dared to look pub-
licly into the politically sensi-
tive question of the Govern-
ment's role in birth control.
The subcomn3ittee is headed
by Senator Ernest Gruening,
Democrat of Alaska, an out-
spoken advocate of population
control ever since his gradua
tion - from Harvard Medical
The door to a more active pro-
gram was opened in January
when President Johnson de-
clared In his State of the Union
Message that "I will seek new
ways to use our knowledge "t
help deal with the explosion of
the world, population and the
growing scarcity of world re-
sources."
In an "aerogramme" on Marc!
4 to all its missions, the Agency!
for International Development
laid down a policy with the
following provisions: .
91t was prepared to enter-l
tain requests, approved by for-
eign governments, for technical
assistance in family planning,
Where appropriate, the requests
will continue to be referred to
private agencies.
eWhatever family planning
program is proposed should pro-
vide freedom of choice to the
individual on what type of birth
control, if any, is to be ued.
qThe agency was:/ not pre-
School in' 1912. To provide a'; pared to entertain requests for:
springboard for public hearings j' contraceptive devices of the`
on the issue, he has introduced
legislation proposing that an as-
sistant secretary for population
be establisheA In the State De-
partment and in the Health,
Education and Welfare Depart-
ment.
Changing Policy
Until recently It has been the
policy of the Agency for Inter-
national Development to refer
all foreign requests for infor-
mation and assistance in birth
;control to private agencies. The
most the agency was willing
to do was provide _ funds for
demographic studies. of. popula-
tion growth and sociological
studies of attitudes about fam=
ily planning.
But their cost was viewed as:
too small to present a stumbling;
block to an effective program. !
cThe agency was, however,;
prepared to,provide other 'as-
sistance, such as administrators,
doctors and nurses to help es
tablish a program; "commodity
aid," such as vehicles and educa-
tion equipment, and training op-;
portunities in this country. It
also was prepared to make avail-
able local I "counterpart" funds
held by Zhe United States to
help' finance family planning
programs.
Turkey Seeks Vehicles
It. was under this policy that
requests were received recently
from Turkey, Pakistan, and
der critical review within the India.
agency about e yetLr ago,, as,1 ,'key?which , only ,recently
CPYRGH
r
THE "POPULATION EXPLOSION"
6000000000
5,000,000,000
1
1
4,000'000'000
%
3,000,000,000
2,000,000,000
Q
1,000,000,000
*
1Z
1
1500 1600 1700 1800 -1900 2000
Source: Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.
:repealed a ban on contracep-'
tives, Is asking for several, hun-
dred jeeps to carry family plan-
ning groups,into rural areas.
India has asked for technical
and financial assistance, but its
not clear yet specifically what
it needs. .
Pakistan which has a better
defined program, has requested
administrative assistance as
well as counterpart funds to
help pay doctors and midwives.
There Is a possibility that a
request for aid will be received
soon from Honduras.
.One of the potential problems
in`implementing the new policy,
the agency,has discovered, Is' a
shortage,?even in this country,
of medical personnel and techni-
cians trained in carrying out
birth-control programs.
As a result the agency has
given contracts to the Univer-
sity of California, Notre Dame,
Johns' Hopkins University and
the University of North Carolina
to develop training programs In
population control for foreign
and American students. Train-
ing will be made available to
foreing students starting this
fall.
In the coming fiscal year,
which begins July 1, the agency
'expects to spend more than $3
million in carrying out the new
_,,
1
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NY TIME
14 lpril 1965
RISING POPULATION AND BIRTH CONTROL ISSUE
Pope Paul VI has urged a special church commission to
recommend soon a Roman Catholic policy.on birth control.
In a recent speech to the 'committee the Pope alluded to
the population explosion, which is expected to almost
double the world's population by the year 2000 .(above).
The commission has been secretly reviewing the church's
traditional ban (discussed in publications such as those shown
at right) on any chemical or mechanical means of birth control.
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July 1965
Recent Events in Berlin
After a period of relative quiet, the second quarter of 1965 was
marked by a series of incidents in the Berlin area. The most striking
of these were the East German helicopter flights over West Berlin borders
and sometimes over West Berlin itself, which began on March 23 and became
much more frequent after the first week in June, culminating in the
flight of an armed East German army helicopter over American barracks
on June 18. (21 flights occurred up to 21 June.) According to post-war
inter-allied agreements, all air activity within 20 miles of the center
of Berlin should have clearance from the four-power Berlin Air Safety
Center. But on June 17, a spokesman of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) -- as East Germany calls itself -- claimed the right to overfly
all of Berlin because it is "within GDR territory." This claim was
moderated three days later to a statement in effect extending only to
East Berlin and East Germany. Flights ceased for a time after June 21.
But on June 30, the East German press announced that a "demonstration"
of helicopter "life-saving activity" would be given in the center of
East Berlin on July 3 and 4. More important than the legal question,
the helicopter flights represent a sort of "war of nerves" against the
public of West Berlin. Mayor Willy Brandt expressed the feeling of many
West Berliners on July 1 when he expressed the hope that any future East
Gentian helicopter flights over West Berlin would be forced down by the
Western allies.
Other Developments:
April 5-9: The Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn was closed on the
official pretext that maneuvers were being conducted in the
area. (Actually the closure was intended as a threat in
connection with the meeting of the West German Bundestag in
West Berlin; the Bundestag had last met in Berlin in 195$.)
US military convoys were permitted to pass after some delays.
Kay 30: The Berlin wall was opened to West Berliners for the
fourth in a series of holiday periods since the fall of 1964
(in this case for the German Pentecost holiday), but the East
German press alleged that the pass agreements had been abused
by West German intelligence services and others, and indicated
that this might be the last visiting period. (Some West
German visitors were arrested during this and the previous,
Easter, visiting periods.)
June 2: East German rioters attacked the headquarters of the
United States Military Liaison Mission (USi ) in Potsdam for
an hour, protesting US involvement in Vietnam. Three floors
of the building were ransacked, windows were broken, and paint
was spattered; two US flags were desecrated and vehicles were
turned over.
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June 2: With West Germany refusing to substitute government-to-
government negotiations for the long-standing agreements of the
occupying powers, the GDR declared that existing permits for
inter-zonal water traffic would be invalid as of July 1. A
decree of June 25 stated that barge owners would need an East
German permit, and that crews would need personal travel permits.
June 15: An outboard motorboat, occupied by West Berliner
Hermann Doebler and his financee, strayed toward the East Berlin
bank of a canal. Immediately after firing three warning shots,
and while Doebler was turning his boat, East German border
guards fired 30 more rounds, killing Doebler and seriously wound-
ing his companion.
June 16: The GDR put aside a recently worked-out agreement on
rail tariffs, and when the Bonn government refused to replace
this with a new GDR government-to-government draft, announced
that they will apply their own freight rates to inter-zonal
traffic. (Note: These measures do not apply to Allied military
traffic. The rail tariff arrangements should not be confused
with rail traffic arrangements, which were worked out in
September 19 and approved by the Western Allies on 28 May 1965.)
June 20: The official East German newspaper, Neues Deutschland,
compared the current situation with that in the summer of 1961
when "August 13" (i.e., the erection of the Berlin Wall) "put
an end" to West German plans for a "revanchist war."
June 21: The East Germans refused to deal with the West Berlin
representative in negotiations over further holiday passes,
stating that he must have "better credentials" -- i.e., his
signature on passes must be noted formally as representing
the West Berlin Senate, which would confirm the East German
thesis that there are three "Germanies," West Germany, East
Germany, and West Berlin.
June 24: Travellers reported seeing Soviet and GDR troops along
the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the Hamburg-Berlin highway,
which would be a reminder of Communist ability to close these
arteries.
June 24: Otto Winzer, known as a ruthless Stalinist, replaced
the ailing Lothar Bolz as GDR Foreign Minister.
June 25: Winzer stated in a speech at a Central Committee plenum
that the Berlin Air Safety Center "has no power of decision over
East Germany or its capital Berlin." Another speech by Transport
Minister Erwin Kramer indicated that East Germany will continue
to press for formal government-to-government talks on transport
questions. First Secretary Walter Ulbricht called for the
bridling of "the Bonn revanchists," direct talks between East
and West Germany, and the conclusion of a peace treaty for all
Germany.
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July 19 5
Recent Events in Berlin
After a period of relative quiet, the second quarter of 1965 was
marked by a series of incidents in the Berlin area. The most striking
of these were the East German helicopter flights over West Berlin borders
and sometimes over West Berlin itself, which began on March 23 and became
much more frequent after the first week in June, culminating in the
flight of an armed East German army helicopter over American barracks
on June 18. (21 flights occurred up to 21 June.) According to post-war
inter-allied agreements, all air activity within 20 miles of the center
of Berlin should have clearance from the four-power Berlin Air Safety
Center. But on June 17, a spokesman of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) -- as East Germany calls itself -- claimed the right to overfly
all of Berlin because it is "within GDR territory." This claim was
moderated three days later to a statement in effect extending only to
East Berlin and East Germany. Flights ceased for a time after June 21.
But on June 30, the East German press announced that a "demonstration"
of helicopter "life-saving activity" would be given in the center of
East Berlin on July 3 and 4. More important than the legal question,
the helicopter flights represent a sort of "war of nerves" against the
public of West Berlin. Mayor Willy Brandt expressed the feeling of many
West Berliners on July 1 when he expressed the hope that any future East
Geriian helicopter flights over West Berlin would be forced down by the
Western allies.
Other Developments:
April 5-9: The Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn was closed on the
official pretext that maneuvers were being conducted in the
area. (Actually the closure was intended as a threat in
connection with the meeting of the West German Bundestag in
West Berlin; the Bundestag had last met in Berlin in 1958.)
US military convoys were permitted to pass after some delays.
May 30: The Berlin wall was opened to West Berliners for the
fourth in a series of holiday periods since the fall of 1964
(in this case for the German Pentecost holiday), but the East
German press alleged that the pass agreements had been abused
by West German intelligence services and others, and indicated
that this might be the last visiting period. (Some West
German visitors were arrested during this and the previous,
Easter, visiting periods.)
June 2: East German rioters attacked the headquarters of the
United States Military Liaison Mission (u 4IM) in Potsdam for
an hour, protesting US involvement in Vietnam. Three floors
of the building were ransacked, windows were broken, and paint
was spattered; two US flags were desecrated and vehicles were
turned over. [[
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Jam: With West Germany refusing to substitute government-to-
government negotiations for the long-standing agreements of the
occupying powers, the GDR declared that existing permits for
inter-zonal water traffic would be invalid as of July 1. A
decree of June 25 stated that barge owners would need an East
German permit, and that crews would need personal travel permits.
June 15: An outboard motorboat, occupied by West Berliner
Hermann Doebler and his financee, strayed toward the East Berlin
bank of a canal. Immediately after firing three warning shots,
and while Doebler was turning his boat, East Genaan border
guards fired 30 more rounds, stilling Doebler and seriously wound-
ing his companion.
June 16: The GDR put aside a recently worked-out agreement on
rail tariffs, and when the Bonn government refused to replace
this with a new GDR government-to-government draft, announced
that they will apply their own freight rates to inter-zonal
traffic. (Note: These measures do not apply to Allied military
traffic. The rail tariff arrangements should not be confused
with rail traffic arrangements, which were worked out in
September 1967 and approved by the Western Allies on 28 May 1965.)
June 20: The official East German newspaper, Neues Deutschland,
compared the current situation with that in the summer of 1961
when "August 13" (i.e., the erection of the Berlin Wall) "put
an end" to West German plans for a "revanchist war."
June 21: The East Germans refused to deal with the West Berlin
representative in negotiations over further holiday passes,
stating that he must have "better credentials" -- i.e., his
signature on passes must be noted formally as representing
the West Berlin Senate, which would confirm the East German
thesis that there are three "Germanies," West Germany, East
Germany, and West Berlin.
June 24: Travellers reported seeing Soviet and GDR troops along
the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the Hamburg-Berlin highway,
which would be a reminder of Communist ability to close these
arteries.
June 24: Otto Winzer, known as a ruthless Stalinist, replaced
the ailing Lothar Bolz as GDR Foreign Minister.
June 2 : Winzer stated in a speech at a Central Committee plenum
that the Berlin Air Safety Center "has no power of decision over
East Germany or its capital Berlin." Another speech by Transport
Minister Erwin Kramer indicated that East Germany will continue
to press for formal government-to-government talks on transport
questions. First Secretary Walter Ulbricht called for the
bridling of "the Bonn revanchists," direct talks between East
and West Germany, and the conclusion of a peace treaty for all
Germany.
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25X1 C1 OB
Appeasement ----The Road to War
In March 1935 Hitler repudiated the Versailles Treaty restrictions
on German armaments and one year later flouted the democracies by march-
ing German troops into the Rhineland provinces, again in specific contra-
vention of the Versailles Treaty. These moves met with no opposition on
the part of either France or Great Britain, and it is the consensus among
students of the period that in either case, Hitler could have been stopped
without causing a war. When German troops were marched into the Rhineland,
they had been given orders to withdraw if they encountered opposition.
The democracies could not understand or believe the nature of Hitler's
ambitions and could therefore not find the strength to unite behind a
policy of resisting Hitler's threats and demands. W the time Hitler
made his next aggressive move -- the marching of troops into Austria on
12 March 1938 -- he was no longer bluffing and his troops were not given
orders to withdraw in the face of resistance.
As always happens with unresisted aggression, arrogance increases
with each new success. Hitler's next step was to press the Czechoslovak
government on the German population in the Czech Sudetanland. His de-
mands became increasingly unreasonable in spite of the fact that he knew
that both Great Britain and France were committed by treaty to the de-
fense of Czechoslovakia and that only in dishonor could they break those
treaties. Yet Chamberlain and Daladier, the British and French leaders,
were convinced that they could appease Hitler and cause him to modify or
even relinquish his territorial ambitions. They acquiesed in the muti-
lation of Czechoslovakia by letting it be known that they would not sup-
port Czechoslovakia if Czech resistance led to war. A series of crises
ensued that culminated in the Munich Conference of 30 September 1938 --
attended by Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini -- at which the
fate of Czechoslovakia was decided. Chamberlain was firmly convinced
that he had succeeded in averting war and returned to London to emerge
from his aircraft waving "the bit of paper" which, he proclaimed, meant
"peace in our time." He was believed by many people who, in the face
of repeated evidence that Hitler's word was worth nothing, seemed unable
to comprehend that by giving Hitler one country they only expedited the
day he would ask for another one, and that this process would continue
until he finally demanded their own country.
Within six months Hitler had marched his troops into Prague without
firing a shot and he had already made it known that Poland was to be his
next victim. The weakness and vacillation of the democracies led to the
signing of the infamous Nazi-Soviet Pact wherein Hitler and. Stalin, inter
alia, agreed to divide Poland between them. Hitler's subsequent attack
on Poland made it impossible to believe any longer that "appeasement"
could succeed and Great Britain and France honored their committment to
defend Poland. The decision to stop Hitler was so late in coming because
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(Cont.)
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the insidiousness of wishful thinking had created such a pervasive mood
of craven fear, despair and defeatism that otherwise intelligent people
were able to convince themselves that an arrogant, militaristic dictator
could be dissuaded from tomorrow's aggression by giving in to him today.
After World War II, the Communists took up where Hitler left off
and they too immediately found allies -- some witting, some unwitting --
who came to their assistance with demands that the Free World accede to
Stalin's demands to show him that he was wrong about capitalism, that he
had nothing to fear from his neighbors. And so, without much protest,
he was allowed to communize the semi-circle of East European states on
his western borders, in a cordon sanitaire.
The example of the Greek "civil war" is instructive. Maly people
in the Free World insisted that the U.S. should get out of Greece, aban-
don the government it was committed in honor to defend, and "let the
Greeks settle their internal (;) problems among themselves." The U.S.,
however, stood firm and when the combination of that firmness, coupled
with internal problems in the Communist bloc, made the price of taking
over Greece too high, international Communist support of the Greek rebels
ended and the "rebellion" soon collapsed.
Then the Communists turned their attention to the Far East. In
June 1950 they launched their aggression against South Korea. Again they
met firmness and resolution from the Free World and when they became con-
vinced that they were not to be allowed to take over South Korea, they
called off their aggression and returned to the status quo.
Again in the autumn of 1958 the Chinese Communists decided to test
the mettle of the non-Communist world. They began artillery bombardment
of the Quemoy Islands off the southeast coast of China, threatened inva-
sion and declared their intent to "liberate" Taiwan. Predictably the
voices of appeasement began to cry that these "minor islands" should be
evacuated and abandoned to the Red Chinese. But the U.S. stood firm and
the firmness was clearly understood by the Chinese Communists. They
abandoned their aggressive project.
The Chinese Communists chose India for their next testing ground and
attacked the very neighbor who had been their most ardent advocate and
supporter in all the controversial questions concerning Communist China.
Had they not sat side by side at Bandung in 1955 and both declared their
respect for the sovereignty of others and pledged non-aggression? India
turned to the non-Communist world for help and was immediately assured
that such help would be made available in whatever quantity required to
repell the invasion. The Chinese again saw and understood that the Free
World was united in determination to defend itself and another Chicom
aggression project was terminated.
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And now in Vietnam, the Free World is facing its most serious test
since Hitler, abetted by both Stalin and Western appeasers plunged the
world into war in 1939. As the seriousness of the challenge mounts, so
does the hysteria of the voices of appeasement who say that Vietnam is
not important to the interests of the Free World., that the Vietnamese
should be allowed to settle their own "internal" problems, that it is
hopeless to try to prevent Chinese domination of Southeast Asia, and that
the Free World has chosen the wrong time and the wrong place to draw the
line against Communist aggression, These are the same arguments that
appeasers have always used; only the names and dates have been changed.
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25X1 C1OB
19 July 1965
Soviets Discard Lysenko, Hail Mendel
From the 1930's until the fall of 1964, there was a rigid party line
in Soviet biology. The CPSU endorsed the doctrine of I. V. Michurin (1855-
1935) and Trofim Lysenko (b. 1898) that acquired characteristics can be
inherited, and rejected the genetic discoveries of the Austrian Augustinian
monk; Gregor Mendel (1822.,1884), according to which heredity is transmitted
by discrete living particles (or genes), and cannot be affected by any ad-
aptation of a living organism to its external environment. Although
Mendel's findings had been accepted by virtually all non-Communist biolo-
gists, Soviet ideologists regarded these findings as reactionary, `idealist,
and contrary to Marx and Darwin. Since Mendelian genetics suggest that man
cannot be transformed overnight, the ideologists argued that Mendel had pro-
vided a rationalization for the s_tatu_sguo; the fact that Mendel belonged
to .a religious order seemed to lend color to this supposition.
Lysenko, who was politically astute and unscrupulous, succeeded under
Stalin in getting the authority of the CPSU for his views (unofficially in
the 1930's, officially in 1948), and his opponents were dismissed from their
posts, in some cases dying in the slave labor camps. There was some decline
in Lysenko's status in the early poste-Stalin period,but Lysenko soon gained
Khrushchev's support--probably because he came out strongly in support of
Khrushchev's efforts to turn the semi-arid Virgin Lands into a new source
of wheat. While more reputable biologists sometimes were able quietly to
do sound scientific work, the Lysenkoists, anxious to preserve their privi-
leged position, tried to suppress all public criticism, and maintained that
they alone were ideologically right and their critics ideologically wrong.
Lysenkoist hacks received comfortable appointments, while non-Lysenkoists
had to be content with poorer positions, or even to carry on their work at
home. Lysenko himself became less active with advancing age, but his chief
disciple and successor as President of the powerful All--Union Lenin Agri-
cultural Academy, Mikhail Olshansky, defended the faith. Olshansky forced
an editorial retraction and shake-up after a literary journal (Neva) pub-
lished an exposition of modern genetics in 1963, and in August 196+ he
printed an article in Selskaya Zhizn (RuralLife) in which he tried to pin
the label of `dogmatist` on the critics of Lysenko, and suggested that they
be tried for libel and slander. On 2 October 1964, in the same periodical,
P. Shelest expressed horror that school botany programs had been criticized
for devoting too much space to Michurin and Lysenko, and argued that the
anti-Lysenkoists at a Leningrad institute contributed nothing to the na-?
tional economy, implying that they should be dismissed.
With the fall of Ehrushchev, things changed almost within a few days.
Vladimir Dmitriyevich Dudintsev, the author of Not by Bread Alone, led the
attack of the liberals with an article (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 23 October
1964) entitled No, The Truth is Inviolable,`' describing the work of Nina
Alexandrovna Lebedeva in the genetics of potatoes, which she had carried
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on despite her inability to obtain an official position. All the leading
Soviet periodicals now began publishing exposures of Lysenkoism and some
writers went on to call for free scientific inquiry and debate, implying
that this had been endorsed by the CPSU plenum which overthrew Khrushchev.
On 2 December, Komsomolskaya Pravda revealed to Soviet readers that
during the Stalin era, Lysenko's leading opponent, V.I. Vavilov, was ar-
rested and died "in exile` (i.e., in the camps); G.D. Karpechenko, G.A.
Levitsky, K.A. Flyaksberg and L.I. Govorov suffered similar fates. Now
the shoe was on the other foot, and on 27 January 1965 Lysenko lost his
position as Director of the Institute of Genetics of the Academy of Sci-
ences. The President of the Academy of Sciences, M.V. Keldysh, spoke
authoritatively on 1 February 1965, indicating that the Lysenko cult was
a spent force and noting the damage which had done to Soviet biology by
Lysenko's influence. Olshansky was replaced early in February, and at
the March plenum of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev declared that Lysenko's sci-
entific and organizational work had been a failure, because of
"fallacious theories and dogmas that came into being with-
out sufficient scientific support and that were encouraged
by administrative means" (Izvestia, 27 March 1965).
In retrospect, it appears that Lysenko's doctrinal approach had long been
unpopular in scientific-intellectual circles, and had only been sustained
in recent years by Khrushchev's support, voiced in public as recently as
December 1963.
The revolution in Soviet biology was symbolized on 25 June 1965 by
a meeting in Moscow, commemorating the centennial of Mendel's first public
report of his research on plant hybrids (1865). Boris L. Astaurov, a bi-
ologist, declared,
"We are not only marking today the memory of an out-
standing scientist, but we are rehabilitating an entire
science that he founded,'
and another speaker stated that Soviet biologists would have to redouble
their efforts to catch up with world research. Pravda published on 2I
June an article by Academician Boris Bykhovskiy, honoring Mendel and noting
that defective theories and dogmas in biology" had delayed the progress of
Soviet genetics. Soviet announcements of forthcoming publications indicate
that Mendel's own writings and Soviet comment on them will shortly appear
in the USSR. Other hitherto--unavailable -zvlumes are also scheduled, in-
cluding the complete works of Albert Einstein (in four volumes) and a book
of writings by H. Ya. Marr, whose theories on Marxism and linguistics were
rejected by Stalin in 1950 as "anti-Marxist and unscientific.''
2 (cont.)
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Background Materials:
Conway Zirkle, Evolution., Narxian Biology and the Social Scene
(Philadelphia, 1959).
D. Joravsky, "Lysenko Affair,'' Scientific American 207:41_9
(November, 1962).
D.S. Greenberg, "Lysenko: Soviet Science Writes Finis to
Geneticist's Domination of Nation's Biological Research," Science
147:716-17 (12 February 1965).
'Final Defeat for Comrade Lysenko," Time 85:51 (12 February 1965).
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