NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031300180001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 21, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Briefs and Comments
1 :1
Iran: Oil Program Cutbacks . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR-Syria: Military Deliveries. . . . . . . . 2
USSR-Mexico: Naval Visit . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Nigeria: Presidential Candidates Not
Disqualified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Yugoslavia: Earthquake Damage. . . . . . . . . 4
East Germany: Restrictions on Writers. . . . . 4
Special Analysis
Zaire: Mobutu Under Fire . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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IRAN: Oil Program Cutbacks
//Iran has canceled or suspended a number of oil and
gas projects involving foreign companies, indicating that
there are no present plans to rebuild the country's long-
term oil production capacity to the prerevolution level
of 6.6 million barrels per day. Efforts by the National
Iranian Oil Company to arrange the return of a limited
number of expatriates have encountered opposition from
Iranian oil workers' groups.//
//The cancellations include a contract with a Brit-
ish firm heavily involved in gas injection and secondary
oil recovery projects. Work has also been halted at a
gasfield in the Persian Gulf, which was to be a major
source of gas for injection into oilfields. The gas in-
jection program was a vital part of the old regime's
plans to maintain a high level of oil capacity in the
1980s.//
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//Iran has also canceled contracts with a Canadian
and two US drilling companies and withdrawn numerous
orders for new drilling equipment, especially offshore
rigs. A request to a third US drilling operator to re-
turn some non-American expatriates has reportedly been
approved by a revolutionary committee monitoring oil
operations. Efforts by the National Oil Company to ar-
range the return of some foreign workers employed by the 25X1
Oil Service Company of Iran--the operating arm of the
foreign consortium that formerly produced most of Iran's
oil--have apparently made no progress.//
The government has not yet authorized construction
to be resumed on a second gas pipeline to the USSR. Ex-
ports via the existing pipeline have been restored to
about 60 percent of former levels. The state gas com-
pany, however, has been authorized to proceed with con-
struction on a large domestic gas distribution system.
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USSR-SYRIA: Military Deliveries
//New Soviet air defense equipment was seen this
week in Syria, reinforcing previous indications that the
Soviets are shipping arms to Syria under existing con-
tracts despite problems in reaching a major new arms
agreement. Arms talks became strained Zast fall, and
although the visit to Syria by Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko Zate last month reportedly may have paved the
way for a new arms agreement in principle, we still
cannot confirm that a final accord has been signed.//
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severa new SA-2 surface-to-air
oving south from Tartus, andi
1 1 30 new self-propelled antiaircraft ar-
i ery guns being unloaded at a storage area north of
Damascus. This equipment, along with several new Soviet
fighter aircraft the Syrians received earlier this year,
probably constitutes much of what remained to be deliv-
ered under two large contracts signed by the two
in 1977.//
Soviet deliveries to Syria declined in the second
half of last year, and this year the pace of shipments
does not appear to have increased. Recent deliveries,
nevertheless, indicate that the Soviets have not inter-
rupted the flow of material, is have al-
leged.
//The new air defense equipment apparently is in-
tended for the Golan Heights, where older SA-2 systems
are being replaced.
an SA-2 a ery that probably came from
the Golan Heights being set up in Aleppo. The Syrians
have been building up the air defenses around their
major ports and northern cities for __t e past several
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USSR-MEXICO: Naval Visit
//The Soviet naval oceanographic ship Bashkiriya
and an F-class submarine also probably involved in
oceanographic work left Acapulco, Mexico, on Tuesday
after a brief port call. This was the first known visit
to Acapulco by Soviet naval or naval-associated vessels.
Th
e ships had previously been to ports in
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NIGERIA: Presidential Candidates Not Disqualified
The Nigerian military government issued a statement
yesterday that stopped short of disqualifying Nnamdi
Azikiwe and Amino Kano, two presidential candidates.
The move was intended to defuse a delicate issue that
threatened to spark considerable political violence.
The regime probably hopes the candidates will volun-
tarily step aside. They have been publicly told to pro-
vide "better evidence" that they complied with electoral
law requirements and paid their income tax. The govern-
ment's decision apparently reflects last-minute divi-
sions in the ruling military council over disqualifying
the two candidates. Both have been badly discredited, 25X1
and their followers are likely to attribute this to
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partisan motives on the mil tary's part.
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YUGOSLAVIA: Earthquake Damage
The earthquake that hit Montenegro last Sunday
caused damage estimated variously at $450 million to
$900 million--50 to 100 percent of its annual income.
According to preliminary reports, the quake severely
damaged major harbors, half the tourist accommodations,
4,000 public buildings, and 23,000 homes. An estimated
15 to 25 percent of Montenegro's industrial goods and
facilities was destroyed. A ball bearing plant vital
to Yugoslavia's automobile industry was damaged. Mon-
tenegro accounts for only 5 percent of Yugoslavia's for-
eign trade and 8 percent of its earnings from tourism.
The damage to ports, hotels, and industries, however,
will halt the development of Montenegro, whose growth
rate has been the most rapid of Yugoslavia's backward
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EAST GERMANY: Restrictions on Writers
In another move to curtail inner-German contacts,
East Germany is restricting many of its prominent writers
from traveling to the West. The East Germans recently
refused to allow Stefan Heym, the country's most promi-
nent author, to give a lecture in West Germany. Accord-
ing to a Reuter report of Heym's statement, three other
dissident authors, Rolf Schneider, Erich Loest, and
Klaus Pocher, also have been denied exit visas. The re-
jection of their applications is in keeping with recently
adopted controls on activities of foreign journalists in
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ZAIRE: Mobutu Under Fire
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In the year since the second "Katangan" invasion of
Shaba, President Mobutu has done little to resolve the
region's severe social, political, and economic in-
equities. Most of Shaba's problems are not unique; they
apply to most of the country, and Mobutu is facing the
most difficult challenge of his 14 years in power.
Serious disruptions are probable, as the steady deteriora-
tion of social and economic conditions is creating an
atmosphere ripe for disorder. Mobutu could soon face
eruptions from disgruntled students, disaffected sol-
diers, Katangan guerrillas, or hungry and exploited ur-
ban dwellers. Such outbreaks could spread rapidly and
return the country to the chaos th t reigned a decade
ago.
Zairians view Mobutu as the only leader capable of
holding the country together. He is given this standing
only grudgingly because he has exploited the country's
problems to perpetuate his rule instead of seeking to
resolve them. He has done little to promote economic
development and political and social integration. Cor-
ruption and ethnicity have been the most salient features
of Mobutu's rule, and his attempts to mold a personality
cult and construct, even a fragile nation 1 unity have
foundered.
Mobutu's inability to deal effectively with worsen-
ing economic problems forms the basis of growing popular
discontent with his government. Ethnic divisions remain
a serious social problem, and because of the severity of
the country's economic hardships, class cleavages also
are widening. Periodic shortages of basic food staples
are common in the capital and other regions, and hunger,
malnutrition, and disease are widespread. Rampant in-
flation and the recent devaluations of the Zairian cur-
rency add further hardship.
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The central government's role in Zaire's diverse
regions, tenuous at best since independence, has deteri-
orated still further in recent years. Poor roads, fuel
shortages, and limited contact with the capital contrib-
ute to general isolation and social malaise. Moreover,
Zaire's local and regional governments are largely inef-
fective and many regional officials are corrupt and in-
competent. Such officials also are often outsiders who
do not speak local dialects or have an interest in local
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Despite widespread grumbling, the population is more
demoralized than rebellious. Kinshasa and Shaba region,
however, are potential local flashpoints that could pose
a serious threat to Mobutu. Mobutu is aware of the high
level of popular discontent in both areas; recent student
demonstrations in the capital and Shaba to protest poor
living conditions brought a quick response from the Presi-
dent to the student's grievances.
The Military
Mobutu's Army is at once the basis of his power and
the chief potential threat to his rule. Ethnic and re-
gional tensions are at least as prevalent in the military
as in the society at large, and most military personnel
think of themselves in tribal, rather than national terms.
A change of government or a general breakdown of law and
order could spark fighting between military units, possi-
bly along ethnic lines.
The Army is beset with problems of recruitment,
leadership, and organization, and low morale and indis-
cipline are endemic largely because the government has
failed to provide basic necessities. Desertions and cor-
ruption are also prevalent.
r_ u
recently as attempted to ensure military oya ty by
lifting the freeze on promotions, by making more and
cheaper foodstuffs available to military families, and
by granting pay raises. Rather than reducing ethnic
strains in the military, however, Mobutu has worsened
them through discriminatory recruitment practices and by
assigning officers and deploying military units on the
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Kinshasa's unwillingness to keep spending in check
is reflected in a deficit this year that will likely
reach $600-700 million. A large portion of these exces-
sive expenditures will go for government workers' salaries
basis of ethnicity. This practice is largely responsible
for the tensions between the military and civilians in
Shaba and other areas.//
Zaire's poorly trained and ill-disciplined military
units probably could not contain a large-scale disturbance
in one of the country's major urban areas. In an armed
clash with organized anti-Mobutu forces, the loyalty of
the Army would be doubtful. Many Zairian troo s mi ht
either desert or defect. 25X1
Mobutu currently is receiving aid from military
forces of 10 countries. The Army will not evolve into
a capable professional force soon, and an external threat
will require outside help for Mobutu to retain control.
F7
With the expected departure from Shaba this summer
of the Inter-African Force, a new attack by insurgents of
the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo could
threaten Mobutu. Such an attack, accompanied by a break-
down in law and order, could trigger disorders in Kin-
shasa or other regions. 25X1
Economic Problems
Zaire's economy has almost no prospects for meaning-
ful improvement soon. Foreign exchange remains tight,
and the country's foreign debt exceeds $3 billion. Lead-
ing Western creditors have not provided substantial finan-
cial support because of Mobutu's reluctance to institute
austerity measures. 25X1
and for Mobutu's sizable personal slush fund.
The mines in Shaba--Zaire's most important economic 25X1
asset--have performed remarkably well in view of dis-
astrous economic effects on the area by the rebel inva-
sions of Kolwezi and the subsequent exodus of 450 expatri-
ates last year. Copper output last year apparently was
almost identical to the 1977 total of 435,000 tons, while
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cobalt production jumped to 13,200 tons, compared with
10,000 tons the year before. This recovery is unlikely
to continue, however, unless more expatriates return and
the flow of spare parts for the mining facilities is
expedited. Output during the first two months of 1979
was about 20 percent below the 1978 average. The eco-
nomic outlook is also clouded by dependence on politi-
cally unreliable or inefficient routes for exporting
minerals. Security along the Benguela Railroad through
Angola, the best route abroad, cannot, now be guaranteed.
Prospects
Internal conditions will continue to deteriorate for
some time. Mobutu is unlikely to regain the authority or
respect he once commanded. Without substantial external
economic and military support his rule would disintegrate
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If Mobutu's position does deteriorate further, he
probably will search for scapegoats inside Zaire and ac-
cuse traditional foreign supporters of "abandoning" him.
He probably is already suspicious of US intentions and
may believe that Washington supports some of his oppo-
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If Mobutu does not survive, an even more rapid de-
cline would probably occur. A sudden change in leader-
ship would be likely to trigger widespread disorders be-
fore a new regime could consolidate power. Key military
leaders probably would play an important role in deter-
mining the shape of a new government. A peaceful transi-
tion of power is unlikely, and any new government would
be hard pressed to unify Zaire or halt the social and
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