AMENDMENT NO. 1378

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030058-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: June 4, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved
For R~ 1 3~ 1 C i 5 . 9 0700030058-3 J u n e 4, 194
9 9614
The motion to lay on the table was
agred to.
AMENPMENT? NO, 1378
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the
previous order, the Senate will now pro-
ceed to the consideration of amendment
No. 1378, by the distinguished Senator
from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), which
the clerk will report.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to read the amendment.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered; and, without
objection, the amendment will be printed
in the RECORD.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 17, between lines 20 and 21, insert
a new section as follows:
Svc. 703. Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law, no funds appropriated pursuant
to this or any other Act may be used for the
purpose of carrying out research, testing,
and/or evaluation of poisonous gases, radio-
active materials, poisonous chemicals, bio-
logical, or chemical warfare agents upon dogs.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time for
debate on this amendment shall be lim-
ited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided
between and controlled by the mover of
the amendment and the manager of
Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield myself such
time as I may need.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order. Senators will take
their seats or retire to the cloakroom for
their conversations. The Senator will not
proceed until the Senate is in order.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
discussed this amendment yesterday. I
want .to be sure that the Department of
Defense and its related departments or
agencies do not engage in the use of dogs
for carrying out research, testing, and
evaluation of poisonous gases, radioac-
tive materials, poisonous chemicals, bio-
logical or chemical warfare agents. That
is the whole purpose of this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate is not in order. The Senator from
_.Minnesota is entitled to be heard. The
Chair asks the indulgence of Senators.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, be-
cause I want to make sure that this
amendment is specific and is directed to-
ward the Department of Defense, as it
relates to the use of dogs in the testing
of poisonous gases, radioactive materials,
poisonous chemicals, and biological or
germ warfare agents. I want to change
my amendment very simply, by making
sure that it applies directly to this act.
Therefore, on line 2 I would say:
No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act
may be used for the purpose of carrying out
research, testing .. .
I so modify the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair advises the Senator that inasmuch
as the yeas and nays have been ordered,
Unanimous consent is required.
W. HUMP IIIREY. I ask unanimous
consent.
_ OFFICER. Is there
The PP
objection? Thebhair'hears none, and it
is so ordered.
The modified amendment is as follows:
-On page 17, between lines 20 and 21, insert mentation program. My amendment
a new section as follows: gives it that direction. It prohibits the
SEC. 703. Notwithstanding any other pro- use of dogs in all such deadly and Cruel
vision of law, no funds appropriated pursuant experimentation.
to this Act may be used for the purpose of Mr. President, I find the poison gas
carrying out research, testing, and/or evalua-
tion of poisonous gases, radioactive materials, experiments by the DOD on dogs-on
poisonous chemicals, biological, or chemical man's best friend-reprehensible.
warfare agents upon dogs. It is one thing to do legitimate medi-
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the cal research on rats and rabbits, but it
purpose of that is for clarity. We are is quite another thing to use dogs, to
not trying in this proposal to move in use beagle puppies, in the tasting of
on the National Science Foundation, in poisonous nerve gas and radioactive ma-
its normal research work, or the Depart- terial and other deadly agents of war-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare. fare.
I wonder what the arguments are I want to remind my colleagues in the
against this particular proposal. The ar- Senate of the moving words of Senator
-
In the Sen
guments are, of course, that if the Hum- George ate in Gthe. late Vest, 1800' who s to served 1903:
phrey_amendment, known as the beagle The one absolutely unselashfriend that
amendment, passes, it will restrict re- man can have in this selfish world, the one
search, and it'will complicate the prob- that never deserts him, the one that never
lems of the Department of Defense on proves ungrateful or treacherous, is his
ascertaining how much, for example, an dog ... He will kiss the hand that has no
individual or man can take in a sub- food to offer.... When all other friends
marine; how much bad air; how much desert, he remains.
polluted air. I Introduce this amendment not only
Mr. President, I say all of that is not to protect our dogs, which are so close
relevant because if the Department of to our hearts, but also with earnest con-
Defense wants to make tests as to the cern for the provisions of the Geneva
effect of poisonous gases, radioactive ma- Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the
terials, poisonous chemicals, biological, use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other
or germ warfare agents, there are plenty gases, in war, and the use of bacteriolog-
of other animals.they could use such as ical methods of warfare.
rates and mice. I am the author of Senate Resolution
I do not believe any Member of this 48 which calls for the Senate to support
body wants to see the Department of a broad interpretation of the Geneva
Defense advertise, as it has recently, for protocol. In so doing my resolution rec-
450 beagle puppies for the purpose of ommends that the United States be will-
testing poisonous gases, radioactive ma- ing, on the basis of reciprocity, to re-
terials, poisonous chemicals, biological frain from the use in war of all toxic
or germ warfare agents. chemical weapons whether directed
I, for one, am trying to save the De- against man, animals, or plants.
partment of Defense from a little more The amendment which we are consid-
bad publicity. I hope they were mistaken ering today is in the context of my con-
in that original advertisement. This cern that we prohibit the development
amendment really is the result of con- and use of all chemical and biological
versations I have had with the distin- weapons whether directed against man
guished Senator from Washington (Mr. or man's best friend.
MAGNUSON), who long has been interested The DOD currently is testing poisonous
in this kind of legislation. The Senator gases on beagles and it will continue to
from Washington was not on the floor do so unless we prohibit such a heartless
yesterday when I proposed this amend- practice.
ment, so I ask unanimous consent that Senators have been calling the Depart-
his name be added as a principal co- meat of Defense, editors have been writ-
sponsor of the amendment, along with ing editorials, doctors have been pro-
the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), testing, but the Department of Defense
nd the Senator from West Virginia (Ml`.
a
just goes willy-nilly on its way with its
RANDOLPH). deadly research on dogs.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without As I indicated earlier, the U.S. Army's
objection, it is so ordered. Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland currently
Mr. HUMPHREY. These Senators all is advertising for 450 beagle puppies to
have given serious consideration to this be used to test poisonous chemicals and
proposal. gases. We must stop the appalling suf-
Mr. President, the amendment before fering' which the dogs must experience
us addresses the question of the cruel in these DOD experiments.
testing by the Department of Defense if my colleagues were able to read
of poisonous gases, germ warfare agents, the scientific description of some of these
nerve gas, biological warfare agents, experiments from the American Hygiene
poisonous chemicals, and radioactive ma- Journal, which appeared in the RECORD
terials on dogs.
As I pointed out to my colleagues late yesterday, I am sure they will want to
yesterday afternoon upon introduction of stop these devastatingly cruel experi-
this amendment, the military branches ments by supporting my amendment. I
have. been insensitive to the hue and urge its adoption.
cry In this country against their con- Mr. President, before anything further
tinued use of dogs in test gas programs. Is said about it, there is not one bit of
The DOD has used dogs extensively and necessary research that would be in-
currently is using dogs in the evaluation hibited by this amendment. Not one bit
of the toxicity and disabling nature of of research has to be done on dogs in
poisonous gas. The DOD needs some di- connection with poisonous gases, radio-
rection in its use of dogs in an expert- active materials, poisonous chemicals,
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 ne 4, .1974' Approved For CONGRESSIONALORECORD P SENATE 8000700030058-3 S 9n/~
.- S VI.ei
In summary our -foreign intelligence Our problem with the removing of the Mr. President, I am prepared to yield
service arises out of an act of Congress Russian missiles. from Cuba posed a real back the remainder of my time, if the
and all of its activities are clorly ecru- Critical situation. What was not gen- opposition is prepared to yield back its
tinized by a number of 1=epr6entative rally known at that time was that a time.
members of both the Senate and the high ranking Russian G.R.U. intelligence Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am
House of Representatives. This is how agent named Oleg Penkovsk:, had turned glad to yield . back the remainder of my
we have resolved the *balarice._between against the Communists, and he was time.
the needs of an open society= and the supplying information, quite accurate as Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield back the re.-
needs for a secret foreign intelligence it turned out, as to how far the Russians mainder of my time.
service. I certainly do not t k that would go. If anyone wants to read some- The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
this is the time to unbalance the situa- thing interesting on intelligence opera- HASKELL). All remaining time having;
tion as I am confident enactment of the dons. The,Penkovsky Paper:, is the most been yielded back, the question is on
proposed amendment would do. interesting book on the subject I have agreeing to the amendment -(No. 1369;
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank ever read. of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr.
the Senator. I am sorry I do pot have I know there is great interest in the PROXMIRE).
more time, but I am glad to yield a min-
ute to the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. Presi-
dent, I merely want to Join with my col-
leagues on the Armed Services Commit
tee in opposing this amendment We are
all proud of the open society of Which we
are a part, but there Is a time ,when we
must keep some of our, intelligence se-
cret, and I would urge my colleagues, in
the interest of the country, to defeat this
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how
much time does the opposition have
remaining? I might have misunderstood
the Chair.,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The op-
position has 9 minutes. The proponents
have 54.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
3 minutes to the Senator from North
Dakota.
Mr. YOt7NG. 11r. President, I rise to
oppose the amendment.
I see no objection to every Member of
the Senate kno ing exactly how much
money is spent for intelligence, and Sen-
ators can -get that information- now if
they want-It. It cannot be made public
though, But as one who has served for
many years on this five-memlr Sub-
committee on Intelligence Appropria,
tions and Oversight I can see great dan-
ger in, having to -publicize the an3ount of
money that can be spent forinteiligence
purposes.
Let me give a good example- During
World War II, President Roosevelt spent
some $4.5 billion, as nearly as I m able
to ascertain, to develop the atomic bomb.
That was probably the best kept secret
this country ever had. It was a good thing
It was, because'; the Germans had the
know-how._ and if they had knpwa we
were developing. an atomic bomb
,
they
.
could probably have developed pne be- I just cannot understand how Mem-
fore us. I understand only five or six bests of the Senate could be afraid of a
Members of Congress knew of that de- little knowledge of a little information on
velopment, Even Vice President Truman the basis of which inquiry could priv-
did not ,know it -until he became Presi- ately be made, so we could see whether
dent. If the bomb had not worked, Presi- or not these enormous slims are being
dent Roosevelt might have been subject spent wisely. Now we do not know wheth-
to impeachment for spending so much er it is $1 billion, $5 billion, $10 billion,
money without being authorized to do or what it Is. We do not knew whether
80. the amount is .going up or down. It has
Also, during World War II, a German been indicated by the chairman of the
named Richard Sorge ,became a Russian Appropriations Committee that the
Communist spy.{ He found out from amount has been fairly stable, and per-
Japan that they had no Intention of hags' has declined in the last year or
attacking Russia, but were going to move so. This is very useful to know. It seems
south, and as a result, the Russians were to-me, that we have a right to know
able to remove their crack troops from how much !is involved and a duty to
the Far East and win the war against know, and a duty to act on the infor-
Germany. mation.
public knowing . everything possible, but On this question, the Yeah and nays
I.think there are some thing; that should have been ordered, and the clerk will
be kept secret for our own security. call the roll.
Mr. STENNIS. That is a fine state- The assistant legislative clerk called
ment. the roll.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, since Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
this is my amendment, I prefer that the that the Senator from California (Mr.
apposition make whatever statements CRANSTON), the Senator from Arkansas:
they want to make. I intend to speak only (Mr. FULERIGHT), the Senator from
another minute or so, and then I shall Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from
yield back the remainder of my time, Kentucky (Mr. HunnLEeTON) the Sell--
which is 54 minutes. ator from Hawaii (Mr. INouYE), the
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, If the Senator from Massachusetts Mr. KEN--
Senator will conclude in 1 minute, I will NEDY), the Senator from Utah (Mr.
yield back the rest of my time right now, Moss), the Senator from Alabama (Mr
and that will conclude the debate. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Cali-
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, with fornia (Mr. TunrrEY) are fecessarily
all deference to, my colleagues, I think absent.
this amendment has been very badly mis- I also announce that the Senator from
interpreted. It would not give away any Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) is absent be-
secrete or expose any of the i;ecret work- cause of illness.
hies of the CIA. All it would do Is provide Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
one overall figure, of what our irltelli- Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON)
ggnce operations in total cost, and the Senator from Oregon (Mr.
There has been not one example dur- PACKWOOD) are necessarily absent.
ing the debate of how this figure could The result was announced-yeas 33,
do us any damage; not one. Flow it would nays 55, as follows:
help the Russians is beyond me. If they [No. 224 Leg.]
inquire as to what the figure means, ob- YNAS-s3
l
y
s
th
u
vi
e
no
y g
t
n
a
swer.
o
e
B
u
t
M
em-
bers of the Senate or the House of Rep-
resentatives, on the basis of this figure,
cguld inquire if the total is increasing or
decreasing, or determine whether they
think it is too big or too small. I point out
that it might very well be too .small.
.Finally, Mr. President, this proposal
is not based on something that came
from my mind, by any means. This is
based on the recommendation of a bi-
partisan committee of Democrats and
Republicans, headed by the majority
leader and the minority leader, who rec-
ommended that the release of this lim-
ited information will be useful to the
Senate in maintaining the necessary
support of our intelligence operations
Abourezk
Hatfield
Muskie
Baker
Hathaway
Nelson
Bayh
Hughes
Pell
Case
Javits
Pro Xoire
Church
Magnuson
Randolph
Clark
Mansfield
Ribteoff
Cook
Mathias
Schweiker
Eagleton
McGovern
Stafford
Gravel
Metcalf
Stevenson
Hart
Metaenbaum
Weleker
Haskell
Mondale
Williams
NAYS-55
Aiken
Dole
McClure
Allen
Domenici
McGee
Bartlett
Dominick
McIntyre
Beall
Eastland
Montoya
Bennett
Ervin
Nunn
Bentsen
Fannin
Pastore
Bible
Fong
Pearson
Biden
'Goldwater
Percy
Brock
Griffis
Roth
Brooke
Gurney
Scott, Hugh
Buckley
Hansen
Scott,
William L.
Byrd,
Hollings
Stennis
Harry F.. Jr.
Hruska
Stevens
By, Robert C. Humphrey
Taft
Cannon Jackson
Talmadge
Chiles Johnston
Thurmond
Curtis McClellan
Young
NOT VOTING-12
Bellmon Huddieston
Packwood
Cranston Inouye
Sparkman
Fuibright Kennedy
Symington
Hartke Moss
Tunney
So Mr. PROXMIRE'S amendi nt (No..
1369) was rejected.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was rejected.
Mr. McINTYRE. I move to lay that
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Approved L%M1LJ@?MM :gd"75QWp00700030058-3EJune 4, 19
ices Committee of the Senate, the Appro-
priations Committee of the Senate, the
Armed Services Committee of the House,
the Appropriations Committee of the
House. So there is nothing hidden. It is
disclosed. It just not disclosed to any-
body. If any particular Senator wants
this information, he can get it from these
committees on a classified basis.
It,should be classified. This information
should not be made, public. Those who
passed a law of Congress in 1949, I think,
were very far-sighted when they pro-
vided that such information would not
be made public.
I do not know of any objection that
has been made to-the way these four
committees have handled this informa-
tion. So far as I know, the four commit-
tees in, Congress have done a good job
handling this information.
If we reveal this information to the
public generally it will simply aid our
enemies. We cannot get around that.
There is no doubt about it. It will reveal
the size of our activities that the CIA
is engaged in. It will reveal not only the
size but also the trends, because some
year it may go up, some year it may go
down. Then, that wile indicate to our
enemies what we are doing. It will indi-
cate whether we are increasing our in-
telligence activiiies; whether we are re-
ducing our intelligence activities. 'Men
the effort will be made to know where, In
what country.
Another thing : In dealing with foreign
nations this could be a sensitive matter.
Our relations could be affected because if
we make this information available then
there is going to be the desire on the part
of somebody to know how much of it is
being spent in this country, how much
is being spent in that country. This is a
sensitive question that might bring about
some ill will in our foreign relations.
No country in the world reveals this
information to the public. Why should we
do it in the United States? Why should
we tell our enemies the size of our ex-
penditures in collecting information
which we need to preserve this form of
government and protect the people of
the United States.
This would be an opening wedge for
intelligence details. Once . the total
amount is revealed there will be the
strenuous effort to collect the details.
There will be a strenuous effort to col-
lect the sources of information, the
methods of collecting information, who
is engaged in this, and how they go about
it.
Further, I know of no clamor from the
public. If the Senator from Wisconsin
knows of any clamor from the public to
divulge 'figures here that will hurt our
country and help the enemy, I do not
know about it.
Mr. President, I may say, further, that
it has been referred to here that Dr.
Schlesinger does not seem to object to
the amendment, and that Mr. Colby does
not object to, it.1 believe the Senator
from Wisconsin made some such state-
ment. At any rate, during the course of
the hearing on his nomination to be Sec-
retary of Defense, Dr. Schlesinger did
make the ilti~tement, but the Senator
from Wisconsin did not give the entire
statement. I want to give some of the
rest of it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has expired.
Mr. THURMOND. These are his
words.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am
virtually out of time, but I yield 1 min-
ute to the Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger
stated:
I would lean against it. But I think that it
could be done. The problem that you get
into, you see, as you well know, Senator, is
that it would be just a free floating figure,
unsupported and unsupportable in public,
with nobody except the members of the
Oversight Committees or members of the
Armed Services Committee and Appropria-
tion Committees who would know the de-
tails. Those are circumstances which under
certain conditions would elicit the strong
tendency for a flat 10 percent, 20 percent, 60
percent, 100 percent, cut in intelligence ac-
tivities because there is an identifiable tar-
get with no broad understanding of what
the components are and it is that aspect
that I think concerns me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has expired.
Mr. THURMOND. I may say in clos-
ing that we do have an open,society.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield one-half minute
to the Senator to conclude.
Mr. THURMOND. We do have an open
society, but there are some things that
have to be kept secret, and this is one
of those things.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield to
the Senator from Arizona for 2 minutes.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the Sena-
tor.
I want to express my deep concern
about this amendment. I think it is ex-
tremely dangerous, and it should be de-
feated.
It is dangerous because it starts a
precedent. It is a precedent that I do not
know exists any place else in the world,
and I do not know that it even exists in
this country.
If this amendment is voted on fav-
orably today, we can rest assured that
within a year or two, the demand will
be made to break the figures down so
that we will know where every cent is
going.
In military operations there is noth-
ing that approaches intelligence. The
estimate of the situation that is made by
every man in any battle he has ever en-
gaged in is headed by intelligence of the
enemy forces. If the enemy knows what
we know about their forces, then this in-
telligence becomes valueless.
Mr. President, I see no need for this
amendment. Any Senator can attend
briefings by the CIA if he is cleared for
top secret. Any Senator can get the fig-
ures that we are talking about by ask-
ing for them. If we make them public
I think we are asking for trouble.
We have had imposed an us an almost
impossible task of espionage with respect
to the Soviet Union, while they have a
very easy time of it in the United States.
I do not want to make that any easier.
I hope that the Senate will say "no"
to this very ill-advised amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3
minutes to the Senator from Nevada.
Mr. CANNON. I thank the chairman
for yielding to me.
I must say that I am in complete ac-
cord with the statement just made by
Senator GOLDWATER. I cannot think of
anything more unwise or anything that
could possibly be more harmful to our
Government than to let this amendment
be agreed to, providing for full and free
information to people from whom we
would like to keep that information.
I certainly am in favor of full dis-
closure on matters that ought to be of
public interest and ought to be disclosed
to the public. I have supported that con-
cept continuously over the years. But I
think that disclosure of the intelligence
budget would, over the years, by virtue of
the trends that were discovered, and
which that would disclose, would cer-
tainly provide valuable assistance to our
adversaries.
I think that if we were to provide
that type of information, then we might
just as well discontinue the type of ac-
tivities that we are trying to continue to
keep this country informed of for the
benefit of the people who reside here.
I hope that the Senate will defeat this
amendment overwhelmingly.
I thank the distinguished Senator for
yielding.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 4
minutes to the Senator from Washing-
ton.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I do not
feel that this proposal really meets our
national interest. It is true that a for-
eign intelligence service like the CIA
must operate more openly in our society
than any other similar service in any
other democracy in the world. Let us look
at the facts:
Last year the new Director of Central
Intelligence, William Colby, appeared
before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee and gave extensive testimony in
public. I know of no other democratic
society in which this would occur.
It has been mentioned here earlier, Mr.
President, that the head of MI-6, which
is British Intelligence, is known only to
the Prime Minister of Great Britain.
That is how close they keep that in-
formation.
The functions and responsibilities of
the Central Intelligence Agency are fully
prescribed in statute. I know of no other
democratic society in which this has been
done.
Finally, the appropriations for CIA are
subject to a process which intimately in-
volves four committees of the Congress
who are aware of and approve the de-
tails of its programs.
The proposal before us is designed to
contribute to a more informed public.
But how can the public be really in-
formed unless the details of CIA's pro-
grams are also spelled out? Yet, if we did
so, I can guarantee that we will be pro-
viding what is necessary for our potential
adversaries to neutralize the methods
which we must use in order to obtain
information about closed societies.
The paradox of the situation is re-
flected in the fact that recently some
journalists were jailed in Sweden-cer-
tainly not a closed society-for merely
mentioning that Sweden has an intelli-
gence service.
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ness of much of our most impprtant work ties of the agency designated to perform familiar, and of- which it had been fully ap-
in the field ofirit~elligence. its foreign intelligence mission. In the prised during this and previous sessions.
The PRESIDING OFP'IC The Sen-. process of working out legislation for * *
ator's 2 minutes have expire CIA, it, was necessary to somewhat The appropriation and the activity had
Mr. STENNIS. I yield mys f 1 minute change ,the procedures foliowect in the been approved and recommended by the
more. case of the more normal Federal agency. Bureau of the Budget and, like all military
I -oppose the amendmentbecause it This wag particularly true in connection aegendituthe and oparaterns, was under the
the
would give our adversary, nor and in the with provisions concerning the author:,- Armed Fore Co the United States, for wi;o
m
future, the working tools, a ueprint, to zation and appropriation of funds. all members of the subcommittee have the
a degree, of our activities that have. al- Public revelation in these areas would highest regard and in whose military capaity
ready proved to be so valu le and are alert potential adversaries to programs, they have the utmost confidence.
proving themselves more v able, in a needs, and accomplishments. This know::- The question immediately arises as to the
way, as each year comes and jioes. edge could be used against our Nation's authority of the subcommittee to recomm.nd
So I hope the Senate will t only de- interest to offset the value of intelligence P
for u e purposes, a
a pr pri
e
failure
feat this amendment but, tth all due collected or to-neutralize the sources and
deference my friend divulge to the House and the country the
to
to
do sby a la
e
th
d
d
,
rg
me
o
s use
. Justifications warranting the expenditure ,find
vote. I will be glad to be relijved of my The 1949 CIA Act permits the alloca,- all details connected with the item at the
responsibilities in this field it-the Senate tion of sums for the CIA to carry out time it was under consideration on the floor.
wants to adopt a new system. its activities without publicly revealing The answer of the subcommittee Is-ab-
I yield to the Senator from Youth Caro- the secret purpose to which such funds solute and unavoidable military necessity,
ling. may be Put. fundamental nationial defense.
Mr. President, how many Minutes do Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
we have left? sent that section 6 of that act be printed This appropriation, and its purpose, is jus.
The PRESIDING OFFER. The at this point in my remarks. tified by honored and established precedecnt.
Senator has 30 minutes left. There, being no objection, the sectia:n This subcommittee, including the same per-sonnel with of Mr. STENNIS. I yield 12 minutes to the was ordered to be printed in the RECORID, who have si the exception the two commit-
Senator m -
from South Carolina as follOWS: tee ho have which for re something like s 3 same
years rc~s Pre-
-
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. Pretent, I rise Sec. 6. In the interests of the security of vided in the annual appropriation bills a sure
In opposition to the amendnent by the the foreign intelligence activities of the which finally totaled more than $2 billion
senior Senator from Wisconsif. The pro- United States and in order further to imple- for the original atomic bomb. Session alter
posal has the lure of simplict , but con- ment the proviso of section 403(d) (3) cif session the money was provided, and the sub-
sequences that run deep, and ggainst our this titie'that the Director of Central Intel- committee visited Oak Ridge where the work
Nation's fundamental interes. It Con- ligence shall be responsible for protecting was in progress without any Member of he
tains the promise of fundamental inters the public intelligence sources and methods from un- House with the exception of the Speaker
authorized disclosure, the Agency shall be Of the House being aware of this tremendous
while preserving the essentlalecurity of exempted. from the provisions of section 654 project or the expenditure of the money. .ic.
our foreign intelligence Cap ilities. In of Title to and the provisions of any other cording to the testimony of all military eu-,
fact, I believe it would serve oth inter- law whichh require the publication or die- thorities that bomb ended the War and sa,red
ests poorly. closure of, the organization, functions, names, the lives of not less than half a million men
ploy--- -- -- t-e Agency: --vid
employe-- nations - s to possess int
the
That the intentions and capabilities of adver- rector in of furtherance the Bureau of of this the e section, Budget et shall Di-
saries. General Washington Wrote one make no reports to the Congress in connec-
of his intelligence chiefs, 7Col. Elias tion with the Agency under section 947 (b 1
Dayton: of Title 5.
The necessity of procuring good intelli- Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as a
gence is apparent and need not-be further -matter of fact, the arrangements worked
urged-all that remains for meeto add, is, out are completely responsive to the ma-
that you keep the whole matter ps secret as
possible. For upon Secrecy, Sucggss depends jor elements of the Federal budgetary
In most Enterprizes of the kind, Bald for want systems. Changes from the norm are de.-
of it, they are generally defeats .1, however signed to provide a reasonably controlled
well planned and promising a fav ?rable issue. environment so as to protect and Preserve
That was the statement t our first the sources and methods which neces.
Commander in Chief, the first,,President. sarily must be resorted to in collecting
The tragic experience of Peal Harbor foreign intelligence.
taught us a number of paint lessons. As a matter of fact, I know that the
In the 1947 National Security Act the budget of CIA is scrutinized with great
Congress took a giant step toward as- care.
suring that executive action dr inaction Similar procedures have been used
in the international field would be based .over the years to fund other governmen..
upon the best information. avajlable. In- tal activities of an extremely sensitive
sofar as it is possible for the Congress to nature when the public interest would no
duct of essentially an executive responsi-
bility the National Security Ut of 1947
provided the authority needed for an
effective foreign intelligence ,establish-
ment.
The CIA Act of 1949 provided addi-
tional administrative authorsf for CIA
and provided for its funding.2'lie fund-
ing of CIA was particularly ,important
from the point of view of Congress since
it establishes the second of the two prin-
cipal relationships between arexecutive
branch agency and the Congress-legis-
lation and appropriations.
I believe that our Nation is unique in
the attention Its legislature has given to
specifying and circumscribing the activi-
be served through the use of more com??
mon explicit procedures. Examples of this
include the Manhattap project for the
development of the atomic bomb and the
development of the U-2 airplane.
On May 10, 1960, following the loss of
the U-2 over the Soviet Union, the chair-
man of tale House Appropriations Com-
mittee, Clarence Cannon, explained that:
The plane was on an espionage mission
authorized and supported by money provided.
under an appropriation recommended by the
House Committee on Appropriations and
passed by the Congress.
Although the Members of the House have
not generally been informed on the subject,
the mission was one of a series and part of
an established program with which the sub.
committee in charge of the appropriation was
that the subcommittee was not justified in
expending an amount that eventually aggre.
gated more than the assessed valuation of
some of the States of the Union for that pur.
posse.
And now the most gratifying feature of the
entire incident.
The world has always recognized the re-
markable success of our form of government.
It has been the wonder and admiration of
mankind. But they have said that it was at a
great disadvantage in a war with an authori??
tartan dictatorship.
We have here demonstrated. conclusively
that free men confronted by the most ruth-
less and criminal despotism can under the
Constitution of the United States protect this
Nation and preserve world civilization.
The CIA Is held tightly accountable
within the executive and legislative
bodies. There maybe disagreement as to
whom the Members should be or mere
particularly what committee they should
be from In the Congress, but I think su'h
disagreements can only be resolved ors
the basis of giving priority to the special
constitutional roles of the Congress-Lie
appropriation of funds-the enactment:
of legislation-and the oversight of leg-
islation already enacted. It Is difficult to
perceive how enlarging a somewhat small
group into a somewhat large group would
assure that these congressional respon-
sibilities are being fulfilled. Clearly ,in-
formation on the activities of the C9:A.
should not be displayed in a public arena.
To do so would defeat our national
interest.
Mr. President, I simply want to say
that four committees of Congress now r.-
ceive this information-the Armed Seri-
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This argument today is' not prompted
by the CIA. I have not mentioned this
matter to the CIA. I do not have one
scintilla of line about them, or a tele-
phone call, a meeting, or anything else.
Those of us who have been in touch with
the problem have a feeling about it. As
the Senator from Arkansas said, we are
not speaking for a committee, or a de-
partment, a director, an employee, or
anything else. This is a problem concern-
ing our national security that has
jammed us right to the question of na-
tional survival. That is why we stand
here year after year standing firm on
this position. It may sound apologetic,
but it is not apologetic. It goes as far
as it can to explain to the membership
and to the American people the problem
we are up against, and how this problem
is handled; and, as much as we can, the
reason for handling it that way-at the
same time showing the proper respect
for every Member of this body and for
tinguished Senators who have yet to briefings by the CIA direct to our full
speak in opposition to the amendment- committee.
I have not heard one, single, solitary, real, But going back over the years, every
hypothetical, or imaginary example of year this matter has been scrupulously
how any damage is going to be done to the gone into because. of the special nature
United States of America. How is this in- and because we had this extraordinary
formation going to be used against us? I responsibility. I remember asking Dep-
have heard nothing on that score. I have uty Secretary of Defense Packard when
heard generalizations as to what might he was here 3 years ago to look into this
happen if we were to release informa- matter from his viewpoint, and he did
tion not called for by this amendment. that.
That does not make any sense. Because Now, we are talking about a good many
we provide the overall total figure for in- different groups that are connected with
telligence does not mean we are going to the intelligence effort. The Senator from
tell anything about the CIA. Wisconsin asked for something specific.
My point is that if this amendment is To start with, the Soviets know almost
wrong, the burden of proof certainly is on everything about everything we are
those'who would say it is wrong; because doing by merely going to the bookstore
what we are doing is simply providing or to the newsstand. They get all of that
the taxpayer what they are entitled to laid out before them, almost everything;
know, information on where their money and we get nothing. Wo do not know any-
goes. If we are not going to disclose this, thing much about what they are doing.
the burden of proof certainly should be That is what makes it necessary for us to
on the side of those who say we should have such a vast intelligence-gathering
insist on secrecy and not provide dis- activity which is worldwide. We have to
closure. carry a great deal of the load, the major-
So I say that proof has been lacking ity of the load for the free world. I am
and I see no examples at all of any dam- talking about.the money load. But we do
age this could do. not have anything to start with. The
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder Soviets have everything, almost.
of my time. If they are given this new information
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how then certain deductions could be made
much time remains in opposition to the about how much. of the budget is going
amendment? for these different activities and the first
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The op- things we know calculations are made
position has 45 minutes remaining. and they come pretty close to being cor-
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield rect as to how much is spent by the mili-
myself 10 minutes. , tary, how much is spent in the civilian
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- area how much is spent on satellites, and
ator from Mississippi is recognized. how much is spent by the CIA itself and
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have where. Following a series of deductions
said in this Chamber before and I repeat and inferences based on all the informa-
now that it is not fun being on this com- tion they already have from us, from the
mittee that looks into the money that newspapers, and from the newsstands,
goes into intelligence. I say that after they will be able to make fairly good cal-
years of service on the Committee on culations.
Armed Services and the last 5 years as Specifically I wish to point out one
chairman of that committee matter. Senators remember the incident
This idea of not having had any sur- of the U-2 having been shot down. Re-
veillance and Congress having failed to member that landing that was made. We
go into it, those statements are just un- later had that gentleman before our
founded because they are made on facts committee. President Eisenhower was
that have been told to some Senators that President then. He said:
are not correct. I am to blame if any blame is to be
t attached.
ma
b
u
tter
I do not like to go into this
In the formative days men like former
Senator Russell of Georgia, former Sen-
ator Ellender of Louisiana, and former
Senator Smith of Maine were Members
of this body, and they were some of the
personalities involved. I have served with
them, as has the Senator from North
Dakota (Mr. YOUNG), who is still serving.
Also the Senator from Arkansas (Mr.
MCCLELLAN) is here. He already has
spoken.
It is a mistake to say that the Com-
mittee on Armed Services in the year
1970-71 held no meetings on this mat-
ter. Every Item in the CIA budget in
those years was gone over by members
of the committee and the capable staff
members, and checked in and checked
out.
I remember that in January of 1973
we' had a full briefing before the full
coniinittee by the CIA, and the budget
committee on the CIA had meetings, and
went had d meetings this year, in 1974,
we that have
over the budget; and we had
the taxpayer who contributes as much
as one thin dime to the cause involved.
Now, what, about the CIA itself. The
Senator from Wisconsin has offered a
valuable amendment with respect to the
basic CIA law, and it has been accepted.
I commend him highly for the amend-
ment. We had a bill I had introduced in
my committee. We have not yet had a
chance to have hearings on that bill.
There are some of its provisions that I
am delighted to see added as a part of
this bill. They are relevant and will be
helpful.
For many years I, along with other
Senators, have gone over every single
major item in the'CIA budget.
On my responsibility to my colleagues,
they in CIA keep a clean house. They
have had a conservative operation dollar-
wise and have accounted for the money
in a splendid way. That has been true
without exception. There has been no
great spillage of money or great extrava-
gances, and not one bit of scandal or
odor of any kind.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's 10 minutes have expired.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 2 more
minutes.
In connection with the expenditure of
that intelligence money. There are other
agencies involved, as we all know. The
military services have already been men-
tioned. The Defense Department itself
has a certain intelligence agency at-
tached to it.
So when I say these matters have been
gone over, I mean all of it, but our Armed
Services Committee is the so-called par-
ent committee of this direct CIA money.
I am not here to praise anyone, but I
tell you, Mr. President, that moneywise
for years and years the CIA has been
conservatively operated and has had a
firm hand and a clean house and a clean
record with reference to the handling of
the taxpayers' money.
I hope that in a moment of frustra-
tion-and I do not blame any Senator
That U-2 venture saved our Treasury
billions and billions of dollars, in my
judgment, and I am familiar with the
facts. If we had not been carrying on
an activity such as that we would have
been totally in the dark with respect to
what we knew about the extensive missile
work, the silos that they had, and a great
many other -things that could be named.
There is a specific illustration.
Some might say, "Go on and develop
what is happening now." I cannot do
that; I cannot go on. That is one of the
things that can be brought out. I have
talked to Senators in the cloakroom and
largely have satisfied them with respect
to the matters we have talked about,
with respect to these programs, and this
money, and how we hold back the actual
ounts for reasons I have already
ll
d
ar am
o
given, and other reasons that could be tern is not overturned here on the floor
given. I know this has been a good debate of the Senate on an amendment which,
and I have never seen a debate where I if it becomes- law and is carried out,
was so certain no single speaker was would, as its practical effect, virtually
speaking for any agency. destroy 80 to 90 percent of the effective-
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House Appropriations: Mahon, Whitten, Mr. STENNIS. I the Senator
es> lylnshall, and cederbez yield i right for me to do that. But I wish it
House Arme services: Nedai, H6bert, Price, additional minute. were possible and consistent with the
Fisher, r!n eArends, ansi d BQb Wtleon. Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President, this best interests of our country to disclose
Mr has been a burden to me. I have had these figures on the front pages of the
President, as Ihave pointed out, Senators in good conscience, in good press, on television and radio, s3 that
we are servants of this bQay and of the faith-dedicated, loyal., patriotic Amerl- everybody would know. I believe, how-
House. If it Is desired that,his matter be cans--come to me and seek this informa- ever, that the Senator agrees with me
not handled this way, the enate should tion. I Would like to give it to them. But that that would be a bad mistake. I think:
recommend a change in a law and a I am torn between the personal desire it is a mistake to start the public dis-
joint supervisory committi be created. I to make them acquainted with every- closing of these matters. If you do not
will support it. I will w elco rie it. I do npt thing, I know-everything I have seen like the setup, change the setup, but we
care. and heard in these hearings-and the must protect our national security.
But, let us bear in mind that if we are duty to help maintain and preserve our Mr. PROXMIRE. I say to the Senator
to have a security intelligence agency, we national security. A security that wi,l be from Arkansas that I wholeheartedly
cannot have it with national publicity effective and can be useful and can serve agree that the Senator is absolutely right
on what it does, how It dogs it, and how to protect the welfare of our country. to come and ask for the Senate's decision
much It spends here, or how much It I have to make that cholce. on this.
spetids there. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will As I understand the Senator's re-
1 was Intrigued by the .;.statement of the Senator yield? sponse, at one time he thought that he
the Senator from Wisconsin when he Mr. McCLELLAN. I will yield, but :first could release this if the Senate would
said, "Let us end this ignorance." I should like to make one other corn- approve; but he has had second thoughts
All right. How much is Ignorance? ment., on it, and now he feels that it might not
Pirst, the total amount. You want to I think I can go this far. For the past serve the interests of the country to dis-
end that ignorance? That is when you 5 years, we have held extensive hearings close this information at the present
intend to put the camel's nose under the on these requests for appropriations. It time.
tent. That Is the beginning. That is the has ben more than adequatesupervision Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will
wedge. You say you do notyant to know with respect to expenditures; I can say the Senator yield?
all the details on how the npney is spent. that. It has been on the conservative Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.
But if you get the ovarall.,figures of $1 side, I may say to the Senator, without Mr. McCLELLAN. We had Mr. Colby
billion or half a billion dolle,rs or $5 bil- any reservation whatever. in and discussed this matter. I asked Mr.
lion, or whatever, then howiire you going The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Colby to come down, and I asked the
to know, how can you evaluate, how can ator's additional time has expired. Senator from Wisconsin and the Seaator
you judge or make an intelligent judg- Mr.STENNIS. I yield the Senator 1 from California to come In and interro??
meat on whether that is too much or too additional minute. gate him and visit with him about these
little, whether it is being expended wise- Mr. McCLELLAN. We cut the national things. I have done everything I possibly
ly or unwisely, except when you can get defense budget. We cut this more her- can to try to find an answer to this iirob-
the details? centagewise, fem. But I do not know the answer. We
How? You cannot know,.. And if you The issue can simply be stated. Do we either have to do it or not do it.
receive these figures and if_ you end this want to publicly disclose these figures? Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator.
Ignorance as to the total mount, next. Or do we want some other change, some Mr. President. I should like to :rake
you will want to end the ignorance as other committee to try i;o perform these one other statement.
to the different agencies adid bow it is functions? I am willing to abide by the The Senator from Arkansas hags as -
spent, and through whom, it is spent. decision of the Senate. gued, as do other Senators, that the re-
Next, you will want to end the ignorance. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will lease of this information, the os erall
on what it is spent for. Negt, you want the Senator yield on my time? total information, is going to be of some
to end the ignorance of how that intel- Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield. value to the Soviet Union, but of no
ligence is procured. There 1s no end to Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield myself 2 min- value to us. That does not make any s ense
It. We take, a choice. If you vote this utes, Mr. President, to ask the dist:in- at all to me. It may or may not be of any
way, the Senate takes the responsibility. guished Senator from Arkansas a ques- value to the Soviet Union. Frankly, :I
It is no embarrassment to ieie or to any tion. think it will be of none. There is no way
other member of this committee. If this On November 15, the majority and the Soviet Union can interpret whether
is the way the Senate wants to do it, that minority leaders wrote the Senator from our overall figure indicates what we are
Is its responsibility. Arkansas, asking that he release all over- doing within our intelligence committee.
The national security of this country all intelligence information of the kind Suppose we decrease the amount we are
also is the Senate's responsibility. If this called for in the amendment. The re- spending. That may mean. that our satel-
is the way the Senate wants to do it, very sponse of the distinguished Senator from lites are more effective. That may mean
well. But let me say this: By ending the Arkansas, on November 20, is as follows: we have found methods that are more
ignorance that the Senator speaks of. I have your letter of November 15 and efficient in gathering intelligence than
that can be pursued logically to the point want you to know that I Intend to comply, relying on manpower. If we increase the
as fully as possible, with the recommendation
that this will not be the end,.of it. It will of the Senate Select Committee on Secret amount we are spending, it may mean the
go on from here. and Coufdentiai Documents to provide the reverse. It may not mean that we are
"Ignorance" is a harsh word. We have Senate with the over-an sums requested for making a greater intelligence effort.
to be ignorant of many thilags in Gov- each of the various intelligence agencies, What this does is to alert the Senate
ernment. If Government is going to What was the intention of the Senator of the United States-it alerts Members
function in the area of national security, from Arkansas? Is his intention the sarae of Congress-so that they, in turn, can
we cannot be informed at all..times about now, or has he changed his mind? get the information they should have if
everything that is going on. We often in- Mr. McCLELLAN.,It was my intention they feel that a disproportionate amount
form our enemiesof too much-and they and it would be my intention now, to Is being devoted to the intelligence com-
can take advantage of it. release those figures If it would not munity-as to whether they feel it is too
If you are going to end all their alleged jeopardize. our national security. I do much or too little.
Ignorance, you are going to vjid national not want to withhold them. I would like As the letter from Senator HUGH Scorn
security. Where do we stop? It you do not to give the Senator everything I know. and Senator MArrsFrar.n pointed out, the
like the ad hoc committees, do what the But this is not my responsibility. I am purpose of this is to maintain the nec-
distinguished Senator from. Minnesota not the committee. I would have no right essary support for our intelligence opera-
has suggested: Create another commit- to come here and spread these matters tions, not to tear them down. Not to
tees which you will have confidence. on the floor of the Senate without the diminish our effort, but so that we can
Crete.another committee;. name the approvtl of the committee. reinforce it and do so wisely and Intelli-
Peoliile you w311'trust to oversee. Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is abso- gently.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The lutely right. One more point. With all the deb;ate
Senator's 8 minutes have expired. Mr. McCLELLAN. It would not be we have heard-and I challenge the dis-
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ate: The greatest threat to the security
of this Nation is the secrecy that we our-
selves place on these events. It will be
from the inside, not from the outside.
We talk about the numbers of missiles,
we talk about the numbers of warheads,
we talk about the numbers of subma-
rines, we talk about the numbers of air-
planes, and all of these things; but when
each can destroy the Earth, then how
much is enough?
The threat will come from losing con-
trol on the inside. If maintaining that
control requires an ounce of risk, then I
think we should be prepared to take that
ounce of risk in at least letting us see
publicly and the people see publicly
whether we are spending $3 billion, $7
billion, or $90 billion, and how we are
concealing it and hiding it, and if we are
protecting ourselves from the inside as
well as from the outside.
I think that ounce of risk, if it exists,
is worth taking, and I thank the dis-
tinguished Senator from Wisconsin for
yielding.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. HUGHES. I yield.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I re-
spect this good man the Senator from
Iowa, who is one of the great men of the
Senate, a great spirit and a great in-
spiration to me, and I really regret that
on occasions like this one has to dis-
agree with a friend so dear and precious,
but I want to say to the Senator that
while this argument is moving and I
think. filled with much truth, we can
control any possibility of secrecy or of
coverup by establishing within the in-
struments of the Congress the necessary
machinery for the supervision of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
We have executive sessions in this
Congress. We have them in the Foreign
Relations Committee and we have them
in the Armed Services Committee, and
we do not permit those executive ses-
sions to become public. Maybe that is
a mistake. But I, over long years of serv-
ice here, have felt that some of these
sessions are necessary.
I feel there is a tendency to try to
make too much secret and too much ex-
ecutive. This is why I have proposed that
we have a joint committee on national
security of the House of Representatives
and the Senate. We have an ad hoc com-
mittee on this matter of the intelligence
operations of our Government, and on
that ad hoc committe serve some of the
finest Members of this body. I know
what good men they are. I am confident
that they are as concerned about the
security of this country inside and out-
side as any of us. I find them philo-
sophically the kind of Senators who
would be able to cross-examine anyone.
And while I cannot help but agree with
the Senator from Iowa that one of our
great threats is from within, particularly
from the moral erosion that is taking
place in our society, not only now but
over the years, I do not underestimate
the threat from without.
Furthermore, good intelligence permits
us to do a better fob in terms of our
national security expenditures and op-
erations, not necessarily increasing them
but reducing them, and I believe I heard
today from the chairman of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations that the funds
for intelligence operations have been
reduced.
I happen to believe that we have the
power in Congress to set up whatever
kind of method or supervisory system
we need so that we do not let the execu-
tive branch run rampant. But, under our
system, we put a great deal of trust and
faith in the President. I know that this
is a difficult time to discuss that, because
of the events of recent months, but I
do say to you, Mr. President, that we
have a man in that high office, the
President of the United States, who has
the prime responsibility for these re-
quirements of intelligence and national
security and if we do not have the right
man there, then it our fault, because we
elected him.
We can establish all kinds of systems,
elections, and campaign reform, and say
that we do a better job, but I happen to
believe that we should proceed with
great caution when it comes to this busi-
ness of, really, opening up and exposing,
because I think of what would be the
inevitable result of our intelligence op-
erations.
Mr. President, I regret to have to say
this, because I would like very much
from my own political point of view to
say to the contrary, but from the point of
view of my conscience, I speak as did the
Senator from Iowa. Is it not a wonderful
thing in this body that two of us can be-
lieve so differently and can be as sincere
in our point of view?
I greatly respect the Senator from
Iowa, and if his point of view prevails,
I think it will prevail in large measure,
because of our great respect for him.
Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from Minnesota. I am
ready, willing, and I hope able to join
him, and I hope the chairman of all of
the committees, to find out what they
are doing. This would be the appropriate
moment, the time, and the day to find
out. Let us make sure, instead of an ad
hoc oversight or a minimum oversight,
that there is some. sort of bearing and
adequate responsibility on that oversight
and in carrying it out. Although we do
not have enough time, I agree that an
occasional session here is useful so that
the youngest and the newest Members
can get available information in relation
to- these activities so that they would
know something about them.
Again, I say that this is no risk com-
pared to the risk of darkness. A little bit
of light at this moment might help us
all in the years to follow.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I want to commend
the distinguished Senator from Iowa
(Mr. HUGHES). He has hit the target
exacly on this issue. The greatest danger
we face is from within, I agree. We have
seen what-has happened to the intelli-
gence community. But I want to tell the
Senator from Iowa that I tried to get the
most practical and limiting amendment
that I could get. I discussed the amend-
ment recommended by the majority and
minority leaders, written to the chair-
man of the Appropriations Committee,
and it was agreed, after a study by the
1974
Senate Select Committee on Secret and
Confidential Documents, that the Senate
should be provided with all of the infor-
mation requested for intelligence. They
believed that the release of this limited
information would be useful to the Sen-
ate in maintaining the necessary support
for intelligence operations. All I do is
provide the overall figures. The commit-
tee consists of Senators MANSFIELD, PAS-
TORE, HUGHES, CLARK, GRAVEL, JAVITS,
HATFIELD, GURNEY, and COOK. Their re-
port recommended this procedure. That
is all. It certainly does not go so far as
breaking it down as. to what the CIA and
the DIA spend. The leaders concluded
that if we get this overall information,
we will be in a better position to dis-
charge our duties and responsibilities to
the people.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder
of my time and I yield the floor.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
8 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas
(Mr. MCCLELLAN).
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HAS-
KELL). The Senator from Arkansas is
recognized for 8 minutes.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I am
reluctant to speak on this issue, because
of the position I occupy as chairman of
the Appropriations Subcommittee on In-
telligence Operations. By reason of that
position as chairman of that subcommit-
tee, I have the duty of oversight over the
CIA.
I am reluctant to speak on these mat-
ters because-I do not relish nor do I
cherish nor do I take pride in the fact-
that I may have access to information
that I cannot share with my colleagues.
I would wish it were practical. I wish it
were a proper thing to do-to disclose
every bit of information that I have been
able to obtain from time to time respect-
ing the activities of the CIA, what it does,
its methods of procuring information,
how it spends its money, and the results
that it achieves. I would prefer to do
that. The subcommittees who have this
responsibility are ad hoc committees of
the Appropriations Committee and the
Armed Services Committee of both the
Senate and House. We are instrumentali-
ties of the Senate, of the Congress, and
so created where we are serving as your
agent, as your tool, to achieve the super-
vision that is possible and necessary. We
are charged with the responsibility to see
that this work is carried on, and to rec-
ommend the proper appropriations
therefor.
If these subcommittees-and there are
22 members on them. Ten are from the
Senate-five are from the Appropriations
Committee and five are from the Armed
Services Committee, who are privy to this
information that is withheld for security
reasons from the public. The committee
members are:
INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEES
Senate Appropriations: McClellan, Stennis,
Pastore, Young, and Hruska.
Senate Armed Services: Stennis, Syming-
ton, Jackson, Thurmond, and Dominick.
Mr. President, there are 12 members
of the Armed 'Services Committee and
the Appropriations Committee of the.
House of Representatives. The House
Committee members are:
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JIcne 4, 197 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
if yod really want to`iindout' what is
Rung in America, you don't have to do re-
se th; just ask anybody an& he will give
you a full hour's dissertation.
lllr. PROXMIRE. We have a pretty
g system.
1 r. HUMPHREY. Do ngt misutnder-
stalid me.
.Mr_ PROXMIRE. It worn well. It is'
open and free.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I thin this open-
nets is our strength. I think a society has
to have that openness. But I think there-
are some things in family life that are
private, that do not aid a good family 1!
one starts exposing it all.
L think there are some t ings, may I
say, in public life called national security,
particularly when it comes to intelli-
gence-gathering: It is a nasty business,
and the Senator knows It a'id I know it,
and, of course, it makes good headlines,
it makes, good stories it mes good fic-
tion; it makes good TV. Bit there is a
point, I think, where we have to ask our-
selves, "]Jo I dare go this fair," and that
is all the Senatorfrom_Minnesota is do
ing
I really do not intend to get so in-
volved in tits debate, but t feel a very
deep obligation, about this. I think that 1
owt it to this body to at lelst tell what
my- experience has been, even though f
had no direct responsibility. 1 only served
as Vice President, but l
ha-ppen to be-
lieve that this agency is 96 important
that we ought to make sure within the
confines of Congress that wg know what
it is doing, and set up the Instruments
ail men we can trust.
We trust one another in this body on
the basis of censorship o each other.,
One 'thing I plead for in the Senate is
more trust other than our running to
get the heaines. More loves more aifec-
tion in this body; that is what this coun
try really needs today.
What I worry about is that somehow
or other we feel we tar trust each
other here. I happen to nink-and I
useone Senator, the Senatot,from Rhode
Island-who is as much igiterested in
cutting the defense budget the Sena-
tor rdim Mi nesota. I wan to see that
budget reasonable, and I want to see it
trimmed. By the way, the committee did
cut it, It cut it so much tha some of us
who thought we were going to cut it feel
that they beat us to it.
It is my j4dgment that we have got to
trust somebody. I think what we are
doing here is trusting somebody.
Ir. McCLELLAN. I might say that at-
the same tingle we cut the defense budg-
et, we also out this budget more than we
did the defense budget. I will just say
that much for the record.
Mr. HUMPHREY. There we are. I be-
lieve -we have to have some place in this
body where there are some of most deli-
cate things involved where we can put
our trust. When we find that trust has
been violated, we can remove people
from those iositions.
-i do not believe I have any more to
add. and be redundant. I' save partic-
ipated in this debate becalue I feel we.
have got tobe very, very careful. I wel-
come the initiative of the Senator from
Wisconsin, because it gives us a chance
to really explore what we are doing.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield
the Senator from Iowa such time as he
may require.
Mr. STENNIS. Before he does that,
will the Senator yield to me to ask how
much time we have remaining, those in
opposition to the amendment?
Mr. ?ROI IIRE.1',yield.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Those in
opposition have 54 minutes remaining.
Mr. STENNIS. Fifty-four minutes;
what about the` proponents?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pro-
ponents of the amendment have 72 min-
utes r mg.
Mr. ; ROXtvIIRE. Mr. President, I yield
the Senator from Iowa such time as he
may require.
Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distin-
guisheo Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. president, the distinguished Sen-
ator from Minnesota has six guests wait-
ing in the dining room. He has assured
me he is not walking out on my disser-
tation here today. I assure him that he
is free to go. I value his friendship and
integrity beyond anything he could pos-
sibly know.
The debate I have listened to so far
seems to carry an implieation that this
amendment is a threat to the internal
workings of the CIA and the intelligence
gathering community of America around
the world, and thereby a threat to 1 he
security of the United States of America.
The .amendment is very simple, Mr.
President. It would list publicly the ceil-
ing or the total amounts of money spent
in the Intelligence gathering community.
One of the greatest threats to any
country, and particularly a country that
has great military strength, is not from
the outside or from its foreign enemies,
it Is from the inside, from secrecy and
interior deterioration. The greatest
threat of all is when we begin to lose
control and not know what is happening,
and when we begin to give large sums of
money to mechanizations and machines
that have no bureaucratic control over
them.
The Senator says, trust. Yes, we trust
and we love. But we know from reading
history that governments have destroyed
themselves when they no longer had
knowledge of what was happening, and
when the interior started breaking down.
I am not half as concerned, in today's
world, about the future of America based
on exterior threat as I am about what is
happening Inside this country and what
can happen inside this country unless we
are completely open, with every ounce
of communications we can have with the
people of this country. If thereby there
is some little risk to the, world, with
the risks we are already living with, I
say it is not too high a price to pay.
What is the role of the CIA? As far as
I know, I know nothing. I am a member
of the Armed Services Committee, and I
know Nothing. I could get suchinforma-
tion, as the Senator from Minnesota has
said, given to me privately. It would
be given. But as far as 1: know, there is
no Member of the Senate, no Member of
Congre,ps, and no member of the ad-
S 9607
ministration, including the President of
the United States, who knows precisely
and exactly what the CIA is doing in
every incident.
We do know they are involved, as the
Senator from Minnesota has said, in a
nasty business. They are involved in a
nasty business in a lot of areas of the
world, and that nasty business is sup-
posedly directed at proteing the free-
dom of the people of the country and.
our friends in "the free world. But no one
has the certainty to know precisely what
everyone is doing, or even where they are
doing It from= time to time.
But that is not what we are asking for
today. Not at all. All of this debate that
I have been listening to, though relevant
to the overall intelligence community,
which is certainly involvedln the security
and freedom of the people of the free
world, not just in ous country but that of
the people of other countries, has no re-
lationship to the risk involved in giving
the people of this country a glimpse of
light in telling them what the total cost.
is involved in the intelligence activities
of this country throughouthe world. We
doo not know that amount, but we do
know it is in the billions of dollars.
I listened to the chairman of the Sen-
ate Appropriations "Committee say did
not even want to know, because he was
afraid he might talk in his sleep some-
time and thereby disclose it to someone.
He made that statement on the floor of
the Senate.
Mr. President, we are asking just for
a thread of light into what may be not
only our greatest source c#f security, but
has the potential to be our greatest
threat, without the dbservation `and light
and without the security that we our-
selves as publicly elected officials can
place upon those who have the capacity
together with the reStrainb--and if goers
is any evidence that we have applied, as
elected officials, the responsibility of re-
straint I am unaware of it. I am not say-
ing there are misdeeds or there are
wrongs. I am saying none of us know
whether we are right or wrong. If we
know, I would like toknow it is and how
much he knows, even an individual Sen-
ator, if he Is asked for enough ahead, to
know what geundwork is--being laic: for
the capacity to draw the threads of the
armaments of this country into entangle-
ments.
We have wrestled for years with the
problem of the CIA. We do not know.
We are uninformed. The oversight that
is done apparently is not carried out
either mechanically or intelligently. We
have not had the capacity or responsi-
bility to know even when we were given
information whether it was right, or
wrong, or what was happening.
.Mr. President, one of the great
Senators of our time has :been the dis-
tinguished Senator from Minnesota. He
is, as he called himself, o, liberal, who
has said, "Let us show the public every-
thing, let us give them all the informa-
tion."
I respect his debate today in saying
the public should not have this infor-
mation, that It is a threat to our se-
curity. But, Mr. Preside, I leave this
thought with the Members of the Sen-
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would not get up on the floor of the Sen-
ate and ask how much higher or lower
the figures are for this year as compared
to last year? Knowing the Senator from
Wisconsin, he would be the first in the
Senate to do so.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Would that not be
good? What would be wrong with that?
Mr. PASTORE. The Senator can re-
veal what he knows.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I do not have to re-
veal it. I can ask about it.
Mr. PASTORE. What am I supposed to
do? I cannot tell the Senator; so the Sen-
ator goes out and says, "Senator PASTORE
would not tell me."
Mr. PROXMIRE. No. But the Senator
from Rhode Island and other Senators
know about it.
Mr. PASTORE. The Senator can find
it out privately, but he does not want to
find it out privately. He wants to tell the
world about it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I think the world
ought to know the overall figures.
Mr. PASTORE. Does the Senator mean
Russia should know?
Mr. PROXMIRE. Right.
Mr. PASTORE. My goodness, I quit.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator
say that it would have been in our na-
tional interest in World War II if Frank-
lin Delano Roosevelt had published how
much money was invested in the atomic
bomb?
Mr. PROXMIRE. Of course not. My
amendment would not require it.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I realize whenever
we get into any element that is called
secrecy here it is suspect. We are deal-
ing with national security, and one has
got to trust somebody. We have a way at
least of checking here a little bit, and
that check is with the ad hoc committee.
If that committee does not meet often
enough, I suggest we submit an amend-
ment requiring the committee to meet
monthly or to meet quarterly for what-
ever time is necessary. That is what we
need to do.
I happen to believe that we need a
Joint Committee on National Security in
Congress, that is going to have general
supervision of the CIA, consisting of the
top people of Congress, just as we have
a National Security Council.
I proposed it repeatedly. I proposed a
Joint Committee on National Security,
in which the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives would have
particular responsibility in the field of
national security.
But my point is, and I think the Sena-
tor from Rhode Island is so right, the
minute we publicize all these intelligence
figures, the inevitable followthrough is a
debate in this body as to what it is for,
it will be in every journal and every
tabloid. It will be all over. It will not
serve the public interest.
If we could get the Soviet Union and
the Chinese to walk to the altar with the
rest of us, confess our sins, live a pure
life, and pledge ourselves to peace and
love, then I would let them know every-
thing about what was going on. But,
frankly, they will not do it.
I believe in detente. No Senator has
worked harder for arms control; no
Senator has worked for more open com-
mittees. But there is a point where we
have to stop, at least in my judgment.
I know the Senator can make a bril-
liant argument and a moving, emotional
argument, that we ought to have all these
figures right out in the open, and if we
can-have assurance that is all we are go-
ing to do, that is all it would lead to.
Even that would be a risk, but perhaps
one that we could take.
But just as surely as we are in this
body today debating whether or not we
ought to have a release of the figure,
next year it will be whether it is too big
or too little, and then it will be what is
in it. Then when we start to say what is
'in-it, we are going to have to expose ex-
actly what we have been doing in order
to gain information; for example, years
ago as to where the Soviet Union was
building its nuclear subs and the kind
of nuclear subs they were. I saw that ma-
terial in 1965-how far they were along,
what their scientific progress was. I do
not think it would serve the public in-
terest for all of that information to have
.been laid out. It would have destroyed
our intelligence gathering completely.
I wonder how many Senators realize
the unbelievable torture that a number
of our Central Intelligence agents go
through in order to get information that
is vital to the Nation's national security.
It is because I feel this strongly that I
make this statement, although it runs
counter to much of my so-called ideolog-
ical philosophy. One advantage I have
had-and I am not going to be a parti-
san around the Senate when it comes to
national security-is to sit on the other
end of the line. I am here to tell the Sen-
ate, that if we start to tinker with the
intelligence services of this country, we
do it at our peril.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes, Iyield.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Could not the same
argument the Senator is making be made
with much more force with respect to our
Defense budget? We debate on the floor
of the Senate, we have open public hear-
ings, we publish a great deal about our
missiles, about our submarines, about our
most advanced and complex planes. This
does give great information to the Soviet
Union. I am not asking about anything
of that nature with respect to intelli-
gence. This would not even reveal how
much we provide for the CIA.
All I am saying is that the taxpayer is
entitled to know how much of the bil-
lions of dollars he contributes in taxes
goes for intelligence operations overall.
Then he can, through his Representa-
tives, determine to some extent whether
we spend any kind of effort and interest
and concern with whether or not that
money is wisely spent.' That is all the
amendment does.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I think I understand
fully the Senator's honorable, legitimate
purpose. I really am not opposed to that
legitimate purpose. The problem is it is
sort of like loose string on a ball of twine,
so to speak, that starts to unravel. Now,
indeed, we tell the whole world about
practically everything we are doing. As
Gunnar Myrdal, the great Swedish soei---1
ologist, once said about the United
States:
try. Other than that, I do not relish the
job; I am not trying to keep this away
from the American people. I am con-
cerned and interested because that is the
only way we can behave in a crazy world,
and it is a crazy world.
Mr. HUMPHREY. And it is going to
continue that way for some time, regret-
tably.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
Mr. JACKSON. And what if the fol-
lowing year the CIA found it necessary
to ask for more money? Then we would
have the same problem. They would
want to know what they are engaged in
now that they were not engaged in in the
past. We could not allow the publication
of the figures without that sticking out
like a sore thumb,
Mr. PASTORE. You cannot win.
Mr. JACKSON. You cannot win either
way.
Mr. HUMPHREY. It is a no-win prop-
osition.
Mr. JACKSON. I commend the Sen-
ator from Minnesota and the Senator
from Rhode Island.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, as
long as the Senator from Rhode Island
and the Senator from Minnesota have
the floor, I would like to ask them some
questions.
Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I ask the Senator if
it is not true that the amendment does
not require, the revealing of information
or any figure about the CIA, but simply
the total national intelligence overall
figure, including the CIA, the DIA, the
Army and Navy Intelligence, all together.
It is not an anti-CIA amendment. What
this amendment would do is tell us
whether we are spending $1 billion, $5
billion, $10 billion. It would give us some
-notion of how important this is in terms
of resources and would mean we could
have some attention given to these agen-
cies, attention we do not have now.
The fact is, as the Senator frim Mis-
souri (Mr. SYMINGTON) said, that in 1970
the CIA oversight committee of the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee met
twice. In 1971 there were no meetings.
In 1972' it met once. When it does meet,
what does it accomplish? It does not
keep a record. No staff is present. Only
Senators are present. We know that
without a staff or a transcript, a hear-
ing like that cannot be very useful.
When we have some knowledge of
what this amount is, whether it is $6
billion, $7 billion, or $10 billion, we have
some interest or pressure on this. Not be-
' ing on the oversight committee, one
would be entitled to ask about it, so one
would be inclined to be better informed.
It seems to me we will function far bet-
ter. That is all the amendment is in-
tended to do.
Mr. PASTORS. When the Senator says
there is no record kept, that is true, but
there is an obvious reason for that. The
staff is there. The Senators are there. We
sit there for hours, listening, and we have
a very eme Lute scrutiny of the items that
are
Is the Senator telling me that if the
entire figure is revealed, at some time he
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Ju w 4, 1.9 `. G NGRESSIONAL RECORD - -- SENATE
Energy, the Committee Appropri
tions, and on the ad hoc committee
which I referred-where ey show ys
the evidence they have. Bjthey do not
disclose how they spend r4oney to pro-
vide this information. Oncee'the Russians,
or even the Chinese Comm istS find olt
our national security cane damaged.
And it is just to satisfy a *ttle bit of oar
emotional rebellion that t justified on
the grounds that an ages y has made
some mistakes. Can we th"ow away the
security of the country? That is what it
means to me.
I have sat down with thej?enator from
Wisconsin (Mr. PROxnnRE)_ the Senator
from California (Mr. CRAN@TON), to find
a solution, and I have sat dawn with My.
Colby, who is a great American. He said,
"Please do not do this. If, you want to
make my job easier, please do not do
this." I cannot sit there ter that ad-
monition and exhortati r and turn
around and say, "Mr. Copy, I do net
believe what you have to ,nay." If I be-
lieVed that for 1 minute,-1 would say,
"You ought to give up your job."
I know the CIA got mixed up in Viet-
nam. Many got mixed up in Vietnam.
I condemned it.
Do not forget, I was G(%4 error of my
State when the bomb fell ,9n Hiroshima,
on August 6, 1945. A few days after that
a second atomic bomb fell,on Nagasaki.
Frankly, I have not slept-so well since
then thinking about the horror that can
be visited upon mankind f this thing
ever lets go. I would lope that the CIA
is not a provocative agency but a pro-
tective agency; that it is there to pro-
tect American security anff the Amerj,-
can people. The minute we disbelieve
that we should do away wth it entirely.
I repeat again that as kQug as we live
in this kind of a world, where tomorrow
we do not know where we will be, where
the Russians now are try tg to achieve
parity with us; where we live been told
categorically; without any question of
doubt, that what they are; doing is be-
cause they do not want to duffer the hu-
miliation of Cuba again-that is what
this is all about, and that is why they
are coming along, hell,ber for election,
augmenting their military; strength.
Look at the deal we made on SALT 1.
They can have over 60 missile firing
nuclear subs; we have one a little more
tharr40 of this type of sulgnarine. They
have about 1,700 land-based missiles; we
have slightly over 1,000.
When anyone stands u2 and says to
me, "Oh, they are not going so fast,"
that person is not going to the briefings.
One does not find that inaormation on
the floor of the Senate. He has to go to
the secret briefings. There_ one sees the
statistics, the facts. I can.tell Senators
that after they have done so they will
be frightened as to what ouid happen
to this world if one act of-madness lets
this thing go off .
And so I say to my _distipguished col-
le am from Wisconsin, ancjrall those who
ag 'ee with him, I sympathize with his
feed. I realize the fact ,that the CIA
h' done some things wrong---perhaps
toe maw things wrong-b rt let us cor-
reet it. Let us put the brakes on. Let us
admonish the committee that Is fa
charge to do its Job. But in the narn3 of
truth, in the name of protecting this
Nation against an assault, in the name of
protecting the American people and their
future, let us rely on the special com-
mittees that do their job, and if any
Member of the Senate really wants to
find out what the total amount is, I think
in private he should be told.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr.'PASPORE. I yield..
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
rise to commend the Senator from Rhode
Island and to associate myself fully with
his comments. The Ser.ator pointed out
very properly that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency has in the past engaged in
activities that have been looked upon by
certain Members of the Congress as un-
desirable; but I want to make it clear
that every one of those activities had
been ordered by a President. The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency does not just
engage in activities for the love of work.
I know that the Central Intelligence
Agency, during the Kennedy years and
the Johnson years, was engaged in ac-
tivities in Laos-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator from Rhode Island has
expired.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
yield such time as the Senator may re-
quire.
Mr. PASTORE. Five more minutes.
Mr. HUMPHREY. There were Mem-
bers of Congress who knew full well what
we were doing, but at the time we
thought we were doing the right thing.
Hindsight is so marvelous, is it not? We
see so much better after the fact.
Mr. President, the Central Intelligence
Agency is possibly the most important
agency in this Government. By and large,
it is made up of people who are com-
petent, able, and who have served this
country well and faithfully. To be sure,
there 'are times when it has engaged in
activities, as we have said, that are
looked upon with suspicion; but I think
it would be folly for us ?,o publicize all of
its activities, to publicize the amounts it
receives, particularly when there are
ways and means within this body and
within the other body of Congress to
supervise it and to keep a check rein
upon it.
The Soviet Union does not tell us what
they spend in intelligence, or even in
subversion, and they are not about ready
to. The only way we have any chance of
knowing what they are doing Is through
agencies like the Central Intelligence
Agency-not alone, but that agency is,
without a doubt, the prime instrurr..ent
of this Government for the gathering of
intelligence.
I was visiting earlier, here with our
distinguished friend and colleague from
Washington-and I know this to be a
fact, of course-and discussed, the ::act
that there is only one person in the Brit-
ish Government who knows who the di-
rector of intelligence is and to whom that
director reports-just one, and that is
the Prime Minister. In most countries
that Is the case. In the Republic of
France and in the. Federal Republic of
Germany it is the case.
S 9605
Presently we are on a binge in. h::,;
country about every aspect of govern-
ment. Everything is suspect. Well, Mr.
President, you have got to call a halt to,
something. You cannot just start to dis-
mantle the structure because of the
transgressions, or alleged transgres3ionb,
of a few.
I think that the Senator from 1hode
Island stated it so succinctly and ,.o of-
fectively that all I can do is just add my
amen to it; but I had the privilege of
serving on the National Security Co ancil,
and I want to tell my colleagues that the
Central Intelligence Agency was the most
accurate and effective instrument of
Government for that council. Its reports
were most accurate, and bad we for. owed
the advice of the Central Intelligence
Agency in many areas, we would have
been better off, but at least it was there.
I know the Senator from Wisconsin is
going to say he is not going to-lnterfere
with them, and that is true, but the
figure will be out there, and right away
there will be some of my political per-?
suasion, who are labeled "liberals," who
are going to say, "Well, look at how :much
money they are spending on spying. Look
at how much money they are spending
on gathering information which is un-
necessary. Look at what they are going
to do on counterfore activities or clan-
destine military activities."
If the Congress does not want it, to
engage in clandestine activities, all : t has
to do is legislate it-they will obey the
law. But the trouble around here is that
we like to put the blame on a lot of other
people when we do not have the guts to
legislate what we ought to be legislating.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. HIIMPHREY. I yield
Mr. PASTORE. Talking about the
amendment, It sounds so harmless to say,
"All we want is the overall figure."
When we discussed this with Mr. Colby
and asked him, "What is wrong with the
overall figure?" he told us, "There is a, lot
wrong with it, because if ypu choose to
cut the figure down at some time, pri-
vately and secretly, and I have to live
with-it, nobody knows what is done, but
if you do It publicly, then the Russians
and the Chinese Communist will know
we are doing less, and that might let
them become more audacious. They
might think we are letting our guard
down. It will have repercussions."
This came from the lips of an expert.
in the area, and it makes sense.
If I thought giving the overall .igure
would be the answer to our problems. I
would go along with it,, because, after all,
it could be argued, "Well, we arc not
giving the details," but, as the expert
said, if we give the, overall figure, what
does it mean? If anybody thinks we are
spending too much,_he will want to know
where we are spending it. If we are
spending too little, he wlM want to know
what we are doing. These are not rnat-?
ters that we can discuss before the pub-
lic for the public.
It does not make any difference to me
personally. I am interested in my family.
I am interested in my grandchildren, I
want them,to live is a safe country. I do
not want them to live in on unsafe coun.-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENA E June 4, 1974
gence in order to assure that this sensitive
information might not be made available to
any foreign government. Nevertheless, the Of-
fice of Management and Budget exercises
its responsibility to review CIA funding in the
same detail that it reviews the budget re-
quests of any other executive branch agency.
The specific amounts of the agency's ap-
proved appropriation request and the identi-
fication of the appropriation estimates in
the President's annual Budget, within which
these amounts are included, are formally _
provided by the Director of OMB to the
Chairmen of the Senate and House Appro-
priations Committees; similarly, the Director
is informed'by them of the determination of
the CIA budget, and OMB approval of the
transfer of funds to CIA is based upon this
decision.
Within the limits of this arrangement
made necessary by security requirements, I
wish to respond fully to the questions raised
in your letter.
1. The authority under which OMB ap-
proves the transfer of funds to CIA for its
approved budget is Section 5 of the CIA Act
of 1949 (50 USC 403f). To our knowledge, no
other authority isnow or ever has been used
by OMB for this purpose. As in the case of
other executive agencies, CIA receives other
funds under provisions of the so-called Econ-
omy Act (31 USC 686), which permits the
purchase of supplies or services by one agency
from another when it is more economical to
do so. The magnitude of these transactions Is
reported to the appropriate committees and
to OMB, but no formal OMB approval is re-
quired.
2. Except for possible Economy Act trans-
actions, no funds have been transferred to
the CIA from any of the agencies falling
under the jurisdiction of the HUD, Space,
Science, Veterans and Independent Agencies
Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee.
3: The transfer of funds to CIA under
Section 5 of the CIA Act is accomplished by
the issuance of Treasury documents rou-
tinely used for the transfer of funds from
one government agency to another. The
amount and timing of these transfers, pur-
suant to that Act, are approved by OMB.
4. Information concerning the transfer of
these funds to CIA is available to members of
the Senate and House Armed Services and
Appropriations Subcommittees concerned
with CIA matters.
5. Under established procedures, funds
approved by OMB for transfer to CIA are
limited to amounts notified to OMB by the
Chairmen of the- Senate and House Appro-
priations Committees. The specific appro-
priation accounts from which the funds will
be transferred are also determined by this
process. Obligations by CIA, subsequent to
the transfer, are further controlled by OMB
through the apportionment process.
6. The funding of CIA through a single
publicly. identifiable appropriation could re-
sult in the disclosure of information detri-
mental to the agency's sensitive foreign in-
telligence operations, as I understand the
Director of Central Intelligence has indicated
to members of the Congress on several oc-
casions.
I trust that the above information is re-
sponsive to, your needs.
Roy L. Asa,
Director.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without ,
objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield me 5 or -10 minutes?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 10 minutes to the
Senator.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, what I
have to say will not take 10 minutes.
I must recognize the sincerity and the
motive-I might say the noble motive-
on the part of the sponsors of this
amendment and what they are trying to
accomplish. As a matter of fact, I do not
think any matter has disturbed Members
who are charged with this responsibility
more than this matter, with respect to
the ramifications and the complexities
that are involved in this kind of situa-
tion.
I would pray for the day in this world
when nations could live as neighbors,
when people could live as brothers, when
we would not have to have an atomic
bomb or a missile or a nuclear submarine,
that we could live in peace and tranquil-
ity, and that we would not even need a
Central Intelligence Agency.
But the world is not made that way.
The history within my lifetime has
proved pretty much that unless a nation
is on its guard, as we had to be in 1962
at" the time of the Cuban crisis, it could
lose its birthright.
Now, what are we talking about here?
We are talking about the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. I have been connected
with the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy almost as long as I have been in
the Senate. Day in and day out we sit be-
hind closed doors in a room that has
been debugged because of what is told,
what is given to the committee, and what
is listened to. Only the members of that
committee are privy to what goes on, ex-
cept, of course, that the courtesy is ren-
dered on a need-to-know basis to Mem-
bers of Congress if they make a request
that they need to know. The same goes
for the Central Intelligence Agency. I
daresay if any Senator really wants to
know how much we spend for intelli-
gence, he could find out. But then they
would have to reveal what they spend it
for. They might not be able to publish the
information, and why should they? What
would it accomplish?
I do not know the men and women up
in that Press Gallery. For all I know,
there may be a newspaperman there from
Moscow. We live in a free society, and
what we say on the floor of the Senate
goes all over the world. It is a public
record. That is the way we live. We are
an open society. If we tell the Russians
what they have to know, will they tell
us what they have? I will eat anyone's
hat on the Capitol steps if that happens.
Do Senators know what Khrushchev
said when he came here and met with Mr.
Dulles, of the Central Intelligence` Agen-
cy, for the first time? He said, "You know,
your country and my country could save
a lot of money if we could get together."
Do Senators know what he meant by
that? He meant by that that they are
spying on us and we have to spy on them.
That can be said publicly, because that
is what this is all about. We have to know
what they are doing, so we can know
what we have to do in order to guarantee
the security of our own country.
So we cannot come out here and tell
the whole world, "We spent $1 billion or
$2 billion for the Central Intelligence
Agency." What does that mean to any-
one else, except that perhaps some people
think they are spending too much. And
the minute the question is asked where
they are spending it we are in serious
trouble.
So what happens to your children and
my children, Mr President? What hap-
pens to you when you go home tonight?
What happens tomorrow? What hap-
pens to the security of our country?
Can we afford to tell them? Oh yes, I
would like to tell the public everything it
is possible to tell them. I believe in that.
I have been in public life continually for
40 years. I believe in the right of the "
public to know. But I certainly would
not come to the floor of the Senate and
tell you, Mr. President, how to put to-
gether an atom bomb. I would not tell
you that. I would not tell you how far
our nuclear subs are able to travel; I
would not tell you how we can detect an
enemy sub; and I would not tell you how
they might detect ours.' I would not- tell
you that. Why would I not tell-you that?
I would not tell you that because the
minute I told you that I would jeopardize
the future of your children.
I do not relish the responsibility on
this ad hoc committee. I happen to be
on it. We sit there for hours and hours,
day in and day out. It is not a pleasant
job, but it is a job that was assigned to
me and I have to do it. If anyone wants
my job on that particular committee
I will give it to him tomorrow. But it
has been assigned to me and I have to
do it.
I repeat again that I realize the mo-
tive behind this measure. I think a lot of
people are a little disturbed over some
things that CIA has done. That needs to
be investigated, and that is our job, and
we are doing it every day.
But as the Senator from Minnesota
has said on this floor a hundred times :
Please do not throw out the, baby with
the bath water. That is the point. In our
attempt to catch that one mouse, are we
going to burn down the barn? We can-
not an d must not burn down the barn.
So we come out here and say, "This is
the amount of money we are spending."
Very well; after it has been said, then
what? Someone else says, "You are
spending too much." In order to prove
that too much is not being spent, state-
ments have to be made as to where it is
being spent, what we are doing. The big
question is, can we afford to tell them
what we are doing?
I have been in many committee meet-
ings-the Joint Committee on Atomic
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose
time?
Mr. THURMOND. The time to be
equally divided between both sides.
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June 4, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 9603
But we go much further than that.
We lay out that budget in great detail.
We break It down by component and by
unction. We then talk about each indi-
tidual weapon. When will it be ready?
low much will it cost? What does it look
in a technical sense?
of course, this detailed information is
,tillable to the U.S.S.R. But long ago, a
alecision was made that in our open so-
?=dety it was better to know the facts and
ride herd on the Defense Department
than to accept the intangible fear of
cunemy knowledge.
in fact, many American strategists
naive argued that the size of the U.S.
tniiitary budget and the characteristics
is f our overwhelming nuclear force should
he made public in order to reinforce the
psychology of deterence. The enemy will
not be deterred unless he truly believes
the United States has these weapons.
The same goes for the intelligence
budget. It is a form of deterrence for the
potential adversary to know that we will
z:ontinue to spend sizeable funds for in-
telligence. They will be less inclined to
tring some surprise.
Of course it should be quickly said that
ft;e only figure we would be releasing is
the single number representing the com-
t-fined intelligence budget. Not a break-
town. Just the overall figure.
Now just what would this tell our ad-
scrsaries? They would not know if it all
'aunt to the CIA, or DIA. Whether the
:t:SA. spent most of the money, or the Air
three.
flow about yearly fluctuations? Say for
cxampie, that the budget went up 10
ercent in 1 year. What what they con-
dude? That manpower was more expen-
we? That the CIA was spending more
'irr Laos? That the DIA had bought a
::yew computer division? That NSA was
liming more people? They would know
;nothing.
Listen to what former CIA Director
James R. Schlesinger told Senator HARRY
BYRD, JR., during his confirmation
hearings for Secretary of Defense:
think it (speaking of releasing selected
intelligence budget data) might be an ac-
niptable procedure, Senator, to indicate the
total figure of the national intelligence pro-
;;rams. I would not personally advocate it, but
1L may be an acceptable procedure ... There
iF the feeling that it might be wise to give
the gross figure. I have come to share that
feeling at least in this time frame, but that
Ales not say that is not a possibility.
;Senator BYRD specifically asked:
There would be no security reasons why it
iiouid not be done?
Dr. Schlesinger replied:
"or the gross figure, I think that; the secur-
ity concerns are minimal. The component
1i Aires, I would be more concerned about but
for the gross national intelligence program
fi:!Ires I think we could live with that on a
security basis, yes.
Remember that this was the Director
t: Central Intelligence testifying, the
Irian who then was the CIA Director. He
is now the Secretary of Defense. This is
exactly what the amendment before the
Senate provides.
When the same question was put to
William E. Colby during his confirmation
hearings to be Director of Central In-
telligence, he replied:
I would propose to leave '.that question, Mr.
Chairman, in the hands of the Congressa to
decide . . . We are not going to run the kind
of intelligence service that other countries
run. We are going to run one in the Ameri-
can society, and the American constitutional
structure, and I can see that there may be a
requirement to expose to the American peo-
ple a great deal more than might be con-
venient from the narrow Intelligence point
of view.
Mr. Colby's two points should be kept
in mind. First, he left it up to Congress.
Second, he said we have to run our in-
telligence agencies in a democratic en-
vironment. Both of these points argue
for supporting this amendment.
After he was confirmed, Mr. Cclby
started having a change of heart. It is
interesting to note how opinions change
during and after confirmation hearings.
Now Mr. Colby argues against releas-
ing even the aggregate total of the in-
telligence community budget.
nuring the confirmation, he said,
I would favor a greater degree of exposure
of what we are doing (p. 18).
Now he says he does not think it would be
a good idea.
Mr. Colby further explained why he
opposes such a course of action. Quoting
from a February 22, letter, Mr. Colby
says:
I am still concerned that public disclosure
of total intelligence figures on an annual
basis would lead to pressures for further
public explanation of the programs for which
monies were appropriated.
that is the real reason for not
releasing the budget. It will allow Con-
f,ress to start doing it,, job. Questions
will be asked. There will be pressure on
the oversight committees to very closely
review that budget and justify it thor-
oughly, so that they in -urn could come
back to Congress and say we are getting
our money's worth.
There is something very healthy about
responding to public pressure---even :for
the intelligence community.
The question must be asked of every
person who says that the release of this
total budget will endanger national
security. How will it do so? Why (lid
Secretary Schlesinger say it would not?
Give some examples, hypothetical if
desired of how such disclosure would
work against us. How is the total intel-
ligence budget figure different from the
total military budget? Is it more im-
raortant than a $100 billion defense
budget? Are the Armed Services Coln-
inittees violating security by reviewing
the Defense budget in public?
These questions need answering by
those that support continued secrecy of
the intelligence budget.
I hope answers are forthcoming.
Mr. President, this amendment is the
most restrained attempt to introduce
fiscal integrity to the intelligence com-
munity. It is written to take into co:a-
sideration the possibility of security
problems. It only calls for the release of
the total figure.
It is time we found out just how large
that budget Is. It will not impinge on
'icurity considerations.
It is a long overdue step toward re-
asserting the right of Congress to inquire
into the money it appropriates. We have
operated in the dark too long.
T invite attention, Mr. President. Lo
the fact that the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Secret and Confidential Docu-
ments, the cochairmen of which were the
majority leader and theminority leader..
Senators MANSFIELD and HUGH SCOTT?
made the recommendation which it em-
bodied in the amendment I am nresenn;-
ing to the Senate today and on whic:l1
we will vote a little later.
I hope that the Members; of the Senate
will recognize that this is a matter that
has been studied by the select comniii.-
tee; that they did make this recom-
mendation; that the present Secr.ftarv
of Defense, who was formerly Dir??ctor,
and the present CIA Director, whe.a his
nomination was being confirmed--bolli
at the time of the confirmation of their
nominations-indicated that the dam-
age, if any, would be minimal and tl' i t
they saw strong arguments in favor of
releasing the total. figure. They could
live with that, provided there was rio
breakdown of the components.
Mr. President, I reserve the remaind? i'
of my time, and I yield the floor.
EXHIRrT 1
US. SE;vATE,
COMMITi.'EE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, D.C., April 8, if'74
Hon. Roy M. Asia,
Director, Office of Management and l?sdnr',
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Ma. Asn Under the authority cf tie
1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act, th,, CIA
is authorized to transfer funds to and re cei'. L~.
funds from other Government agencies sut -
ject to the approval of your office. Thin -?
thority is granted without regard to ocher
provisions of law.
Would you please provide answers to Ljw
following questions dealing with this era, -
tice,
1. Is there any other authority for iiai
transfer or receipt of funds otter than 11 0,,-
1949 CIA Act, Section 6? If so, where ?
2. As Chairman of the HUD, Space, Scie=:,ce,
Veterans and Independent Agencies Stibeorn -
mittee of the Senate Appropriations Con;-
mittee, I request you to make known to Inc
if any of the funds appropriated under ni
jurisdiction have been transferred to or ex--
pended by or on behalf of the CIA?
3. Will you please describe the
which funds are transferred from one appro-
priation account to use by the CIA?
4. What members of Congress are made
aware of this practice in terms of the a
flow of funds?
5. What restrictions are placed on It;
transfer or expenditure of funds?
6. Why cannot the CIA budget be fu:iic ;
in a single appropriation.. bill?
I would appreciate an early answer to I-hn-
questions since hearings axe currently fir.
progress.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM POOXMIRE.
U S. Senator-
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESS-. _ _ _ .
DENT, OFFICE OF MANS CEMENT
AND BUDGET,
Washington, D.C., April 29, 19'4
Hon, WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Se;Iatc,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR PRoxMIRE: This responc s to
your letter of April 8, 1974, in which you pose
several questions regarding the fundin o;'
the Central Intelligence Agency.
As you know, extraordinary measures have
been taken by both the Congress and the
executive branch to protect the Sens:.tive
foreign intelligence operations in which the
CIA engages. With respect to the budget, 'it-=
formation relating to CIA's funding has been
classified by the Director of Central Intalll-
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House conferees, even if it did not sur-
vive the conference, we would be at least
pinpointing something that needs to be
emphasized in this day and age, because
one day we will have to convert from
war to peace, prayerfully and hopefully.
The big question is, How do we do it?
Do we just sit back and say, "Well, we
will just wait and see what the Govern-
ment is going to do about it"?
With reference to the Rhode Island
situation, we tried to go down and see
the President for a long time and we
could not do it. We were told the day
before the order came out cutting our
installations. Only the day before did
we know it. I tried to find out from Mr.
Kissinger. I tried to find out from Mel-
vin Laird. I tried to find out from Ad-
miral Zumwalt. I tried to find out from
the President. None of them told us what
was going to happen to Rhode Island.
We never knew of it until the axe came
down and chopped off our economic
head. I say that is disgraceful. I repeat,
we are not over the agony yet.
Mr. President, I am very amenable to
this amendment. for the reasons I have
stated. I realize this is not the complete
answer. I realize it may not survive the
conference. But surely the Senate ought
to express its sentiment.
It is not going to affect my State a
great deal. It may affect one or two
plants. Perhaps we can reconvert them
without Federal help. But the time has
come when we have to think about these
things in advance, and not, after the
fact, get up on the floor and propose to
extend unemployment compensation,
and have a silly retraining-for-jobs pro-
gram, without knowing what jobs they
are going to give these people after they
are trained. This is something that has
to be done in advance.
I would hope such a proposal would
receive serious consideration. I can say
this as one who has depended on the
Pentagon and the Defense Department.
I am one who has. not always agreed
with the Senator from South Dakota
(Mr. MCGOVERN) with reference to some
of the cuts he wanted to make in de-
fense. I have been on the side of the Sen-
ator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) and
the Senator from South Carolina (Mr.
THURMOND) more than I have been on
the side of the Senator from South Da-
kota, but this proposal ought to be given
serious consideration, and I am going to
vote for it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
myself 1 minute.
I appreciate very much the problem
Rhode -Island had at a time when I was
not active. Iread about it in the news-
papers, and it had my interest, and I
remember the vigor with which the
Senator from Rhode Island and his col-
league opposed it. They did everything
anyone could do to try to alleviate that
situation. But with all deference to my
friends, I do not believe such an amend-
ment on this bill is a solution to the
problem. I think, legislative-wise, it
would be better to take the route that all
far-reaching legislation should take. I
think, a full development of all the facts
to give the Congress a choice among
alternatives, if it has alternatives before
it, is the best way to do it.
I hope we can keep this bill a military
authorization bill, as I explained before,
and get it into law as soon as we can,
and pave the way for appropriations. I
know that if the authorization commit-
tees do not meet those time demands,
our work is going to be brushed aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The, time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 1 addi-
tional minute.
And the appropriations will be made
whether there is an?authorization or not,
and we will be helpless to do anything
about it.
I think we do render a service-I am
sure my colleagues agree-through these
authorization bills.
So let us keep it what it is to begin
with-an authorization bill for military
hardware and manpower for the en-
suing year.
Mr. President, I yield the floor. I will
yield anytime any Senator wishes.
Otherwise I am willing to yield back the
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Mississippi has 12 minutes re-
maining. The Senator from South
Dakota has 5 minutes remaining.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, so
far as we are concerned on this side, we
are willing to yield back our time if the
Senator from South Dakota is so willing.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, under
those circumstances, I am willing to
yield back the remainder of.my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time
having been yielded back, the question
is on agreeing to the amendments num-
bered 1347 by the Senator from South
Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN). The yeas and
nays have been ordered, and the clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from California (Mr.
CRANSTON), the Senator from Arkansas
(Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from
Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from
Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from
Maine (Mr. HATHAWAY), the Senator
from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON), the
Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KEN-
NEDY), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr.
MCGEE), the Senator from Utah (Mr.
Moss), the Senator from Alabama (Mr.
SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Cali-
fornia (Mr. TUNNEY) are necessarily ab-
sent.
I also announce that the Senator from
Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) Is absent be-
cause of illness.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON),
the Senator from Tennessee (Mr: BROOK) ,
the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS),
the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACK-
wooD), and the Senator from Delaware
(Mr. ROTH) are necessarily absent.
The result was announced-yeas 27,
nays 55, as follows:
S 9601
[No. 223 Leg.]
YEAS-27
Aboure2k
Humphrey
Mondale
Bayh
Jackson
Montoya
Biden
Long
Muskie
Brooke
Magnuson
Nelson
Church
Mansfield
Pastore
Clark
Mathias
Pell
Gravel
McGovern
Ribicoff
Hatfield
McIntyre
Schweiker
Hughes
Metcalf
Williams
NAYS-55
Aiken
Dole
Metzenbaum
Allen
Domenici
Nunn
Baker
Dominick
Pearson
Bartlett
Eagleton
Percy
Beall
Eastland
Proxmire
Bennett
Ervin
Randolph
Bentsen
Fannin
Scott, Hugh
Bible
Fong
Scott,
Buckley
Goldwater
William L.
Burdick
Griffin
Stafford
Byrd,
Gurney
Stennis
Harry IF., Jr.
Hansen
Stevens
Byrd, Robert C. Haskell
Stevenson
Cannon
Helms
Taft
Case
Hollings
Talmadge
Chiles
Hruska
Thurmond
Cook
Johnston
Tower
Cotton
McClellan
Weicker
Curtis
McClure
Young
NOT VOTING-18
Belimon
Hathaway
Moss
Brock
Huddleston
Packwood
Cranston
Inouye
Roth
Fulbright
Javits
Sparkman
Hart
Kennedy
Symington
Hartke
McGee
Tunney
So Mr. MCGOVERN's amendment (No.
1347) was rejected.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was rejected.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
AMENDMENT NO. 1369
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
ABOUREZK). Under the previous order,
the Senate will now proceed to the con-
sideration of the amendment (No. 1369)
offered by the Senator from Wisconsin
(Mr. PROXMIRE), which the clerk will
state.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill in-
sert a new section as follows:
SEC. -. On or before March 1 each year
the Director of Central Intelligence 'shall
submit an unclassified written report to the
Congress disclosing the total amount of
funds requested in the budget, transmitted
to the Congress pursuant to section 201 of
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (31
V.S.C. 11), for the national intelligence pro-
gram for the next succeeding fiscal year.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
for debate on this amendment shall be
limited to 3 hours, to be equally divided
between and controlled by the mover of
the amendment and the manager of the
bill, with 30 minutes on any amendment
in the second degree.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, be-
fore I yield to the distinguished Senator
from Mississippi, which I shall do in a
moment, I would like to call the atten-
tion of the Senate, while some Senators
are still on the floor, to the fact that
what this amendment does is provide a
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE Iu: i? I, :11 :m
part of what has been requested by Sen-
ators SCOTT and MANSFIELD of Senator
MCCLELLAN when they wrote him last
November, and what, in my judgment,
Senator MCCLELLAN said then he would
like to do if he can. I shall just read that
letter, and then leave the matter in the
hands of the Senator from Mississippi.
This is the letter dated November 15,
1973, signed by the majority and minor-
i.y leaders:
A- q'o-chairmen of the Senate Select Com-
rnittee on Secret and Confidential Docu-
rucnts, we wish to call your attention to one
of the major recommendation.; which our
Committee made with respect to the opera-
l ons of the various intelligence agency.
specifically, it was agreed that the Senate
should be provided with the over-all sums
requested for each agency. We believe that
the release of this limited Information will
be useful to the Senate in maintaining the
necessary support for our intelligence Oper-
ations.
We do wish to reiterate that the Commit-
;ooe did not recommend the disclosure of any
particular intelligence activity or any other
such detailed matters, which continue to re-
uiain. and properly so, under your jurisdic-
i,,on.
1. have talked with the majority leader
this morning, and he said it was his con-
struction that that would mean the over-
all figure would be made available pub-
licly. The response of Senator MCCLELLAN
dated November 20, was as follows:
DEAR SENATOR: I have your letter of Novem-
i;er 15 and want you to know that I intend
to comply, as fully as possible, with the rec-
ommendation of the Senate Select Commit-
l.ee on Secret and Confidential Documents to
provide the Senate with the over-ail sums
3fequested for each of the various intelligence
a gencies.
Mr. President, the purpose of the
amendment which I am offering now is
to provide that the overall figure for the
intelligence community as a whole, not
broken down but the overall figure,
would be made available, so that the tax-
nayers of this country would have some
idea of how much, how many billions of
dollars-and it is billions of dollars-
are going for intelligence efforts by our
Government.
Now, Mr. President, I yield to the Sen-
,tor from Mississippi-
Mr. STENNIS. On my time.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes. I yield to the
Senator from Mississippi.
Mr, STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
V take 2 minutes of my time first to em-
phasize to Senators present the over-
whelming importance of this amend-
rai.ent and the far-reaching effect it
would have if passed and enacted into
law.
When we disclose-and I speak as one
who, for years, has had to take care of
a lot of keeping up with this problem-
and it is no fun-if we disclose the
amount of money spent on this effort,
which includes the CIA, then we give
to our adversaries all over the world,
present and future, a true index as to
what our activities are. There are de-
ductions that can be made from our fig-
iares which could lead them along the
oath of information which would be
priceless to them to know.
Tue, we are an open society and, so
jar, we have been able to carry on an
intelligence pre ;ram effectively which
has been worth to us billions and billions
and billions of dollars in savings. But, if
we are going to abandon the idea of
keeping these figures from being dis-
closed, then, in my humble opinion, we
might as well abolish the agency. It
would be like saying, in effect, that we
do not want this secret intelligence a.:?ter
all, that we do not need it, and that we
will abandon it.
We will pay an awfti price for that.
I am familiar with the CIA budget.
I can satisfy most any Senator in the
cloakroom, talking to him some about
this, but I will publicly say that it is a
clean budget and they have justified
many times over the expenditure of the
money.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished Senator from
Mississippi.
Mr. President, how much does the
United States spend each year on the
intelligence budget? Except for a small
handful of Senators and Congressmen,
nobody knows, at least in this country.
My amendment would end this ignor-
ance and allow the Congress to reassert
its fiscal control over the largest budget
currently unavailable to public or con-
gressional scrutiny.
The amendment requires that on or
before March 1 each year the Director of
Central Intelligence shall submit an un-
classified written report to the Congress
disclosing the total amount of funds re-
quested in the budget for the national
intelligence program for the next suc-
ceeding fiscal year.
It is as simple as that. Each year the
Director of Central Intelligence adds up
the combined budgets Cf the intelligence
community and supplies that figure to
Congress in an unclassified form.
No longer would we be operating in
darkness. For the firs'; time we would
have hard budgetary facts. Granted, it
would only be one figure each year, but
that is enough to tell us the relative size
of that budget.
At present, we do nos know if the na-
tional intelligence program budget is $1
billion of $10 billion. We do not know if
it went up 200 percent ,his year, or vient
down 10 percent. We simply do not know
and the consequence of our ignorance is
twofold.
First, the intelligence community es-
capes effective congressional control.
Second, Congress is systematically de-
ceived as to the size of other civilian
'budgets.
How does that come about?
It comes about because the intelli-
gence budgets, particularly the CIA, are
hidden in other budgets that pass
through the legislative process. There
is intelligence money in this bill before
us today.
I don't know how much. Only the
Oversight Committee members know
that. There are funds in other budgets.
It is quite possible that even some of the
chairmen of these subcommittees do not
know that their budgets contain intelli-
gence funds.
The authority for thLs sleight of rand
resides in the Central Intelligence Act of
1949, section 6 (50 USC 403f).
Section 6 states that the CIA if. au-
thorized to transfer to and receive from
other Government agencies any money
approved by the Bureau of the Budget
authorized under the National Security
Act of 1947.
According to the Office of Management
and Budget, the transfer of funds to
CIA under section 6 of the CIA Act is
accomplished by the issuance of Treas.-.
ury documents routinely used fo-- the
transfer of funds from one Government
agency to another. The amount and
timing of these transfers are approved
by OMB.
The funds approved for transfer to
CIA by OMB are limited to amounts
notified to OIUMB by the chairmen of the
Senate and House Appropriations Com -
mittees. The specific appropriations ac-
counts from which the funds will be
transferred are also determined by to is
process. Obligations after the transfer
are further controlled by OMB through
the apportionment process.
In other words, only two men il the
entire Congress of the United state:;
control the process by which the CIA is
funded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that my correspondence with Roy
L. Ash, Director of OMB be printed in
the RECORD. There is an error in Mr.
Ash's reply that should be noted. Where
the letter refers to section 5, it should
read section 6.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit. 2.)
Mr. PROXMIRE. As chairman of the
HOD, Space, Science, Veterans Appro-
priations Subcommittee, I became in-
terested in whether or not there were in-
telligence funds in my $21 billion budget.
I checked with OMB and was tole that
except for possible Economy Act transac-
tions, no funds have been transferred
to the CIA from any of the agencies fall-
ing under the jurisdiction of the HUD,
Space, Science, Veterans and Independ-
ent Agencies Subcommittee. I urge other
subcommittee and committee cha.rine'n
to make the same inquiries.
THE SECURITY ISSUE
This sleight of hand aside, the major
question each of us has to answer before
voting on this amendment is "Will the
public release of this aggregate budget
in any way compromise our national se-
curity?" If it can be shown that it will
not, then this amendment should be
passed.
I intend to show that it will not c:orri-
promise our security, in any w iy.
First, let its apply a little common
sense to the problem of security. Would
anyone charge that the Senate Armed
Services Committee is endangering ou r
national security by publishing the total
amount of the Defense budget? Would
anyone claim that the Secretary cf De-
fense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
violated security when they testify be-
fore Congress in open session and when
they peak across the country and ue the
total amount of the defense budget in
public?
Of course not. That would be utterly
ridiculous. The total amount of the budg-
et is not a security problem.
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CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -HOUSE May 20', 1974
passed, and a motion to reconsider was
laid on the table.
A similar House bill (H.R. 13685) - was
laid on the table.
CALL OF THE HOUSE
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I
make the point of order that a quorum Is
not present.
The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is
not present.
Without objection, a call of the House
was ordered.
There was no objection.
The can was taken by electronic de-
vice, and the following Members failed
to respond:
[Roll No. 2291
Anderson, Calif.Ford,
Moorhead, Calif.
Andrews, NO.
William D.
Moorhead, Pa.
Ashbrook
Fountain
Morgan
Badillo
Gaydos
Moss
Bafalis
Gettys
Murphy, Ill.
Barrett
Giaimo
Murphy, N.Y.
Bell
Gibbons
Nedzi
Biaggi
Goldwater
Nelsen
Biester
Goodling
Nix
Blatnik
Grasso
Parris
Boland
Gray
Peyser
Bolling
Green, Oreg.
Podell
Brademas
Green, Pa.
Pritchard
Branco
Griffiths
@ule
Broomfield
Gunter
Rangel
Brotzman
Hanna
Reid
Buchanan
Hansen, Idaho
Rinaldo
Burke, Calif.
Harrington
Roncalio, Wyo.
Burke, Fla.
Hays
Rooney, N.Y.
Butler
Heckler, Mass.
Rooney, Pa.
Byron
Heinz
Roy
Carey, N.Y.
ifeletoski
Ruppe
Carney, Ohio
Hogan
Satterfield
Chisholm
Ifolifield
Scherle
Clancy
Huber
Schneebeli
Clark
Hudnut
Schroeder
Clausen.
Hunt
Sebelius
Don H.
Ichord
Shipley
Clawson, Del
Jarman
Shoup
Clay
Johnson, Pa.
Shuster
Conyers
Jones, Okla.
Skubltz
Corman
Kluczynskt
Smith, Iowa
Cotter
Kyros
Staggers
Culver
Landgrebe
Stanton,
Daniels,
Landrum
J. William
Dominick V.
Lehman
Steed
Danielson
Litton
Steele
Davis, Ga.
Long. La.
Steiger, Wis.
Davis, S.C.
Long, Md.
Stubblefield
Delaney
Luken
Teague
Dennis
McCloskey
'Udall
Dent
McCormack
Vander Jagt
Diggs
McKinney
Veysey
Dingell
McSpadden
Vigorito
Donohue
Macdonald
Waldie
Dorn
Madigan
Ware
Dulski
Mann
Widnall
Eckhardt
Maraziti
Williams
Eilberg
Matsunaga
Wyatt
Eshleman
Mayne
Wydler
Findley'
Milford
Wyman
Fish
Mink
Yatron
Fisher
Mitchell, Md.
Young, Ga.
Flood
Mollohan
Young, S.C.
Flowers
The SPEAKER. On this roilcall 274
Members have recorded their presence
by electronic device, a quorum.
By unanimous consent, further pro-
ceedings under the call were dispensed
with.
USDA DELAYS FLEMING KEY ANI-
MAL IMPORT CENTER PLANNING
(Mr. MELCHER asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute, and to revise and extend his re-
marks and Include extraneous matter.)
Mr. MELCHER. Mr. Speaker, although
directed by action of the 92d Congress to
build an Import quarantine center to im-
port European breeds of cattle and other
livestock at Fleming Key off the coast of
Florida, the Department of Agriculture
has failed to start the plans and design
of the facilities.
Congress appropriated $300,000 for de-
sign and planning in fiscal year 1973. The
Department advises me:
The design criteria have been completed.
Architectural-engineering firms have been
evaluated and ranked in order of prefer9nce
by a review board.
But-the Department then equivocates
by saying that they do not intend to ex-
pand the $300,000 appropriation for de-
sign and planning until construction
funds are available.
For the current fiscal year appropria-
tions the conference committee of the
Agriculture Appropriations Committee
asked that the request.for funds for the
Fleming Key Animal Import Center be
made in the routine way through the
President's budget rather than asking for
the funds outside the normal budgetary
process. That was not done. Now the De-
partment position is that this quarantine
center should be financed through pri-
vate sources.
Whether it Is private or Government
funds that pay the bill for this needed fa-
cility I would strongly urge the Depart-
ment to get right on the Job of design
and planning the installation, which
usually takes a year, so that when the
funds are available construction can
start. Further delay only stalls what is
an obvious need for the U.S. livestock in-
dustry. Also the stall defies the will of
Congress in directing that the $300,000
appropriated be used for the purpose of
planning and it's obvious that the De-
partment has wasted a year or more in
defiance of the directive of Congress.
(Mr. WOLFF asked and was given
permission to address the House for I
minute, to revise and extend his remarks
and include extraneous matter.)
.[Mr. WOLFF addressed the House. His
remarks will appear hereafter in the Ex-
tensions of Remarks.]
(Mr. VANIK asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his remarks
and include extraneous matter.)
-[Mr. VANIK addressed the House. His
remarks will appear hereafter in the Ex-
tensions of Rem-arks.]
MILITARY PROCUREMENT
AUTHORIZATION, 1975
Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, by direc-
tion of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 1112 and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution as
follows:
H. RES. 1112
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this
resolution it shall be in order to move that
the House resolve itself into the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the
Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R.
14592) to authorize appropriations during
the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of air-
craft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat
vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and
research, development, test and evaluation
for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the
authorized personnel strength for each active
duty component and of the Selected Reserve
of each Reserve component of the Armed
Forces and of civilian personnel of the De-
partment of Defense, and to authorize the
military training student loads and for other
purposes. After general debate, which shall
be confined to the bill and shall continue
not to exceed four hours, to be equally di-
vided and controlled by the chairman and
ranking minority member of the Committee
on Armed Services, the bill shall be read for
amendment under the five-minute rule by
titles instead of by sections. At the conclu-
sion of the consideration of the bill for
amendment, the Committee shall rise and
report the bill to the House with such
amendments as may have been adopted, and
the previous question shall be considered
as ordered on the bill, and amendments
thereto to final passage without intervening
motion except one motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. MADDEN) is recognized for
1 hour.
(Mr. MADDEN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30
minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska
(Mr. MARTIN) pending which I yield my-
self such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, last week the House Rules
Committee held hearings on the 1975
military authorization legislation and re-
ported out an open rule with 4 hours of
general debate-House Resolution 1112
Chairman HEBERT and other members
of the Armed Services Committee testi-
fied at.length regarding the important
features of this legislation, after months
of extended hearings of recorded testi-
mony from the heads of the various
armed services, Members of Congress,
et cetera.
This legislation reported by the Armed
Services Committee provides for appro-
priation authorization of $22,642,963,000.
The total authorization includes $13,-
641,000 for procurement of aircraft, mis-
siles, naval vessels, tracked combat ve-
hicles, torpedoes, and other weapons..
The sum of $9,001,663,000 is authorized
for research, development, testing, and
evaluation.
After the hearings were completed, the
Armed Services Committee reduced the
total amount of this authorization by
$487 million. The total amount of the
authorization is $1.2 billion above the
1974 authorization.
The total authorization also includes
$1,400,000,000 for the military assistance
service funded program, providing for
military assistance to South Vietnam.
The Armed Services committee re-
duced the requested airborns warning
and control system authorization from
$515.4 million to $257.7 million, This re-
duction included authorizing 6 instead of
12 aircraft.
The committee denied the request of
$50 million for the stretched version of
the C-141 aircraft.
The request of $132.9 million for the
civilian reserve air fleet program was re-
duced to $25 million.
The procurement authorization re-
quest for $14.3 million for two patrol
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`U~, ? 'v a . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE
i; n''t a party to the subcontract. The
xecutive communication points out that
he propoi amendments would afford
s ?ol,ection t , those subcontractors, espe-
,ially when tl ley are small businessmen
wfin might oti rwise suffer from un-
-cessary finanefiiei losses when perform-
Srlg as subcontracts and material
sun-s on Governnii it contracts.. The
_Ienerai Services AftinistrFa,tion also
l aced that it does not b"'eve that the bill
aaouid result in any incre ed cost to the
ovcrnment. The only possible cost
d; ould be an indirect one iced on the
i"35sibility that private surety ftnipames
crr,uid increase their bond prei ums to
reflect the added exposure to thIllo pay-
ai,ut of interest and attorneys' in
oie event a subcontractor enforce is
a:rime contractor's bid would reflect t
!~ =greased premiums, if any.
'i;~ frolic y of protecting subcontractors as
,;ribodied in the Miller Act. It, is recom-
'ionded that the bill be considered
i,vorably.
(Mr. MOORHEAD of California, asked
;and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
tVlr. MOORHEAD of California. Mr.
pecker, when Congress first passed the
iialler Act in 1935. its primary objective
a.ct was perforn d, within 1 year
?.'ter the labor was: erformed or the ma-
terials supplied. Il`enacting this law, the
Congress embrd a public policy of
?- rotecting sul )retractors working on
z;overnment otihstruction contracts.
But. whilthe intent of the original
i 311er Act 1clear, as a practical matter
i:lie remed+ provided has all too often
h"en illu iy, Frequently, the cost of liti-
=,ation isrProhibitively high, when com-
i~ aced vAth the amount which may be re-
eoveredf. So. in many instances. there
e istsva basic economic disincentive for
bi?ingiing such suits. Also, either through
a lsfik of legal advice or pressure from
l;ltsf prime contractor, a subcontractor
-i'ten enters into an arrangement where-
-()1 I
N.C., and the Cross Cimh N,:tionai
Grasslands in Texas in of fo-mart
President Lyndon B..30 n.
There being no objWnnt the Clerk
read the bill, as follo
in, H. 885
Pc it enacted b , o e Senat,' and Mci - c
Representatives. th r: Un tf d Statf e c
onservation Corps (i nter,
rrowood Civilian Conserva:-
hnson Civilian Conservation t;orr _-
and the Cross Timbers Nation:.'.
sties, Texas, is redesignated as the 'Lys:.
B. Johnson National Grassland
or record of the United Staites in whici. re_
erence is made to the Arrowood Civilian Conn -
servation Corps Center or to the Cross Tim
ber:, National Grasslands shall be held and
considered to be a reference to the Lyadoi
B. Johnson Civilian Conservations Corps Cex7-
ter and the Lyndon B. John-on Net,onri;
(,a..:-, ssl ands, respectively.
The bill was ordered to be engressin
and lead a third time, was read the thirc
time, and passed, and a motion to re^s,. and other re-
Sorurces
AWACS has also degionstrated a ca-
pability to detect and track surface ships
mod to provide real tinge information to
ski see er commanders n making timely
decisions concerning force deployment
and employment. 'f'hrt3bgh use of "IFT,
AWACS can monitor the location and
status of friendly ships.-Non-l" targets
>s uld easily be identtted as unknown
or hostile. This infor~.i ation could be
made available to seror commanders,
thereby enhancing t:ie capability to vec-
tor friendly naval and air forces for re-
connaissance, and for attack enemy
vessels.
$li short, the inherent mobility and
flexibility of the AWACS would offer the
capability to perform a number of im-
portant functions in any future con-
tiogency, and, thereby, could greatly en-
hance the overall effectiveness of U.S.
forces in future co:nfllcts-not only in
air battles but also in combined arms
battles. This increase in effectiveness
would help to offset expected future
growth in the capabilities of enerrT gen-
eral purpose forces. Moreover, P.WACS
could function in support of friendly in-
digenous forces. This could enable friend-
ly nations to make greater `contributions
to'their own defense by increasing the
effectiveness of their aid` and surface
forces.
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield
4 minutes to the gentleman from Cali-
fornia (Mr. LEGGETT).
(Mr. LEGGETT F.sked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairmary I in-
tend to offer amendments tomorrow in
a. number of subject areas. First, per-
haps, I should point out that it large
part of this bill, as in previous years. I
concur with. A large number of the cuts
that were made by the committee 1like-
wise concur with, particularly the reduc-
tions that were recommended by the
committee on the AWAC system on the
order of $250 million. I think that was
well thought out. I think that program
can well afford to be slowed down and we
should know where we are going with it.
Obviously, it is a tactical program, as
the committee report wisely points out,
that particular aspect of AWACS should
be better thought out.
The C-141 stretch out program and
the- CRAF program likewise have been
either abated or slowed down. It :is a lit-
tie difficult to figure out exactly where
we are in these programs, since they were
also Included in the authorization sup-
plemental and the supplemental appro-
priation bills. We do not have the re-
sults of either of those conferences to
date, but hopefully we can take eonsid-
erable testimony on both of thesle two
bjeet matters.
On the CRAP program modi,ication
we are talking about making a nose
May 20,
loader out of the Boeing 747's and the
Lockheed 1011's and the DC-10's; rip-
ping out all of the interiors ant. putting
in a new hinge in the front section. I;iv-
ing them a tank ramp.
Obviously, spending $7 million per ve -
hicle and perhaps $800 million or $1
billion on these programs-requ;ses con-
siderable thought and should not comie
up in a supplemental. It requi_,es more
testimony than we have before our com-
mittee, so I think we were wise in slow-
ing that program down.
The other program that I will talk
about in the couple of minutes I have
remaining is the MASF program, the
military assistance service funded pro-
gram for Vietnam. I do intend:, with a
number of my colleagues from a. num-
ber of committees, to offer an amend-
ment tomorrow to reduce that program
from the $1.6 billion recommended by
the Pentagon, the $1.4 billion. recom-
mended by the House committ3e, down
to a $900 million level. The $90) million
level, I think, Is reasonable. It does not
pull the rug out from under the allies
that we have in Southeast Asia. It Jr
$900 million for military assistaance and
will be combined with about $900 milliear
of economic assistance and will provide a
total program of about $1.8 billion for
the 1975 fiscal year, which compares to
about $1.8 billion for the current ilsca.1
year.
So. we are sot escalating that pro-
gram at all. It allows for a one--half" bil-
lion dollar reduction in the Vietnam
program for the 1975 fiscal year. We will
have some reasons In addition to these I
have o-.itllned.
Mr. Chairman, I also intend to offer
an amendment with regard to the 'Iii-
dent submarine system. I have already
complimented my colleague from Flor-
ida, Mr. BENNETT, on the method by
which the Sea Power Subcommittee has
made its recommendations. How ever, the
last time we had appropriations ap-
proved by conterence on the Trident
program, we agreed to a one ship pro-
gram for fiscal year 1975, and awe should
keep with that schedule.
Mr. Chairman, today we begin con-
sideration of the military proc:u.rennent
authorization bill for fiscal 1975. As the
action an the fiscal 1974 supplemental
bill indicates, not all committee,; dealing
with the defense budget view it in the
same light:
-COMPARATIVE ACTION ON FISCAL YEAR 1974 DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL A{D APPROPRIATIONS BILLS
Defense
request
House
A.S.
Senate
6S
A.
uau~
ayprn-
Rri>Aions
&ma
appro-
griafeons
Defense
request
A.S.
AS.
priations
:;eraale
priations
1. Procurement:
Amny'ACFT
22
0
22
0
3.
l
16
0
Army
-------- r --------
8.2
8.t
8.2
8.0
to
.
y Made.ACFT __ 219:2
.
214.2
101 1
. 7
IS
3
.
Total-----------------
1007.1
999.3
1458.5
658.1
532.7
445.0
445.0
15{.8
294.0
244.4
Anny misuses -_
84.4
7%.6
6
?.3
76.6
76.6
n_ssftes
28.6
28.6
1
Raises
--------.-
08-1
1
108:9
108.9
54.4
IQ&,
Corps miss ff45
me
22.3
22.3
22.3
22
3
3
22
1
5
0
F
owee missiles
39.0
.0
22.9
.
39.0
.
27.0
111. MILCON----
_. --_------
29.0
29.1
0
29.1
-
0
NAVY SCN
--
--
-
24.9
3.
24
8
IV
MASF
aO
a-
Q0
0
55
---
-----
-
-
AEfny TCV
113
6
113
6
50
9
63
1
.
50
6
.
------- ------------- ---?-
-
-------- -_ -----
.
.
.
.
.
:112.8
74L 7
6IL&
t155 809,000 to be transferred from $2,200,000,000 far Israel.
$MAS' oequest required no apprgi iabon.
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 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3
May 20, 1,974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE H 4029
If the country had unlimited money, Lest we believe that every cent in the
no agency would need to be limited in defense budget is vital to national secu-
spending. Since we don't have the money,, rity, we should consider this testimony
we have therefore restricted poverty, ed- given by the Secretary of Defense to the
ucation, health, housing and manpower Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on
training funds. Defense expenditures February 17, 1974, in response to allega-
should be no exception. tions that the budget contained $5 billion
The following chart shows the escala- worth of padding:
tion of the U.S. national debt over the It was recognized late in calendar year
past 7 years, the annual service charge 1974 that there may be an easing of the
on the debt that must be paid, adminis- economy and some growth in unemploy-
trative income and the percentage of ad- ment and that as a consequence of that,
ministrative income allocated to this the total figure for the budget outlays
item: would be relaxed. . . . If there had not
JDollar amounts in billionsl been this perception of an easing eco-
Year
National
debt
Service
charge
U.S.
adminis-
trative
income
Per-
centage
service
charge
$367 X
$15.8
$143
11.0
1970----------?
382
18.3
143
12.7
1971____________
410
19.6
134
14.6
-------
437
20.6
149
13.8
1973------------
468
22.8
161
14:1
1974 ------------
486
27.8
185
15.0
1975____________
508
29.1
202
14.4
Obviously, our escalating debt, esca-
lating service charge, and escalating
service charge as a percentage of income
dictates and demaiids moderation.
Since we spend 95 percent of all mili-
tary funds spent in this hemisphere,
and 60 percent of all military funds ex-
pended in the world, we need constantly
to review our posture in this regard.
The short chart that follows, prepared
by committee counsel, shows the action
of our House Armed Services Commit-
tee in various subject areas of the pend-
ing bill:
H.R. 12564
[In thousands of dptlarsi
nomio environment I believe our outlays
might have been a billion dollars or a
billion and a half dollars less in 1975.
In short, the Secretary had admitted to
a billion or a billion and a half WPA dol-
lars intermixed with the national secu-
rity budget.
We had further evidence of Pentagon
padding in the fiscal year 1974 supple-
mental request, which included $108.6
million for research and development.
The committee decided the request was
not sufficiently urgent to warrant sup-
plemental action, and suggested the De-
fense Department make a strong appeal
for these funds in the fiscal year 1975
regular budget if it so desired. Now we
find not one word about these programs
in the 1975 request; the previously vital
programs are no longer vital. To me it
seems the DOD sometimes means what
it says and sometimes does not.
TITLE I. PROCUREMENT
A. TRIDENT SUBMARINE
The submarine-launched ballistic mis-
sale system is probably as important as
the rest of the military establishment
combined. It is secure from detection and
is expected to remain so in the foresee-
able future. Of all our weapons systems,
Requested Recommended it makes the greatest contribution to
by DOD by committee national security, and at the same time
Procurement:
Aircraft:
Army__________________ 339,500
335, 000
Navy and Marine Corps- 2,960,600
2,964,100
AirForce -------------- 3,496,600
3,391,400
Missiles:
459
200
Army
400
439
__________________
,
Navy------------------ 620,600
,
620, 600
Marine Corps ----------- 76,000
76, 000
AirForce. __.--------- _ 1,610,800
1,610,800
Naval vessels: Navy-_____-_ 3, 562,600
3, 539,100
Tracked combat vehicles:
Army__________________ 331,900
321, 200
Marine Corps ----------- 80,100
74,200
Torpedoes: Navy ----- _---__ 187,700
187, 700
Other weapons:
Army__________________ 53,400
55,700
Navy------------------ 25,600
25,600
Marine Corps ----------- 500
500
Total procurement.--- 13,805,100
13, 641, 300
Research, development, test and
evaiuation;
Army ---------------------- 1,985,976
1,878,397
Navy______________________ 13,264,503
13, 153,006
Air Force__________________ 3,518,860
3,459,760
Defense agencies------- -- 555, 700
510, 500
SUMMARY
Net change in procurement (title
I)-
- - - ---
-163,800
U in R.D.T.&E. (titleil)-------------
-323,376
is not provocative. By increasing the
range of the missile, the Trident I and
Trident II systems will provide a prudent
hedge against the possibility of unfore-
seen breakthroughs in Soviet anti-
submarine technique.
In short, I favor the Trident concept.
However, the very high rate at which
the Navy plans to build the 10 ships is,
in my view, unwise.
It is not sufficient for a system to be
sound in concept; it must be reliable in
operation. The Polaris submarine-
launched missile system, which had the
benefit of a thorough and careful R. and
D. program, was perhaps the most re-
liable missile system ever built. The Po-
seidon, which was not developed as care-
fully, has been somewhat less reliable
but still creditable. It would be disastrous
if this trend were to continue and we
pendent upon an aquatic C-5A.
The surest way to induce unreliability,
as well as cost overruns, is to rush the
program. The worst aspect of a rushed
program is what is called "concurrency":
placing the system full into production
while a substantial amount of R.D.T. & E.
remains to be done.
The arguments for accelerated devel-
opment are not persuasive.
First. There is no need to rush Trident
into the water to meet a Soviet threat
to Polaris-Poseidon ships, since the
threat does not exist. On the contrary,
at this point we cannot even speculate
on the nature of the threat which might
develop. Thus, the sooner we construct
the ships the more we increase the pos-
sibility that they may be inappropriate
to the threat they may eventually face.
I believe the House Appropriations Com-
mittee was entirely correct in its rejec-
tion of the Trident acceleration in the
fiscal year 1974 supplemental. Its report
stated:
The Committee recommends that the $24,-
800,000 requested to accelerate Trident sub-
marine construction from one per year, as
recommended by the Congress in fiscal year
1974, to two per year not be appropriated.
It is the considered judgment of the Com-
mittee that with new Navy initiatives, such
as the strategic cruise submarine-launched
missile, the available options to backfit the
Trident I missile into our 10 Polaris, and 31
Poseidon submarines, and the proposed
NARWHAL submarine as a low cost option
to the Trident submarine, an acceleration of
the Trident submarine construction effort
cannot be justified. The Committee is also
mindful of the backlog of new construction
and conversion of ships and submarines at
the two large nuclear-oapable shipyards
which are involved in the Trident subma-
rine program, and the problems they and
many shipyards are having in obtaining
skilled labor.
All of these factors seem to mandate a
prudent and cautious, but deliberate course
in the construction of Trident submarines.
There must be a reasonable limit or plateau
that should be achieved in spending merely
for the sake of "bargaining chips." The Tri-
dent submarine construction rate of one per
year as directed by Congress appears to be a
sufficient demonstration that this country
has the national resolve to modernize and
maintain our sea-based missile deterrent and
a current status technologically, without
risking an escalation or renewal of the arms
race.
Second. While submarines do wear
out, there is no indication that a 1-per-
year Trident program will leave Polaris
boats In operation longer than would be
justified by safety considerations. On the
other hand, it is undeniable that the
sooner we launch the Tridents the
sooner thay will wear out and the sooner
we will need the next generation SSBN.
Moreover, if we buy Tridents in rapid
succession they will wear out in rapid
succession, thus forcing us into excessive
concurrency on the next generation and
more block obsolescence.
It is claimed that faster procurement
is cheaper. This is only true if the accel-
eration does not produce difficulties. In
my views, it is probable that problems,
and therefore increased costs, will arise
from the accelerated schedule proposed
by the Navy.
Therefore, I will propose an amend-
ment to reduce the procurement sched-
ule to one ship per year from the Navy's
proposed two.
I propose to reduce the $1,166.8 million
two-ship program to $700 million, which
would consist of last year's $627.8
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114030 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --HOUSE May 2', 197-4-
million one-step progral# plus a reason- we more realistically assume work at base Minuteman ICBM's against a yea-
able inflation allowance.' two=thirds of the planned pace, we find sonable vigorous threat
I do not propose to reduce research and ourselves facing a 3-year slippage. And However, site defense operate; u:n(ier
development. Neither F I propose to this is only the first of the 30 ships. two handicaps:
reduce procurement of" the Trident I Second. Cost: Program unit cost has so The ` Strategic Arms Limitation
missile, which can a ad should be far ' kept .reasonably consistent wl,h the Treaty-SALT-sets a limit of 100 inter-
retrofitted into the existing Poseidon general inflation. However- ceptors whereas many hundred:; would
submarines. Delays inevitably require the contract be required before Site Defense cc+uld add
In additional views i pended to' the to be performed in an inflated economy, significantly to our deterrent.
fiscal year 1974 report, described the which increases the cost to the con- Site defense is incompatible N4?i th the
landing heavy assault -LHA-program tractor. administration's-headlong rush for maxi-
as "one of the worst disinters in the his- Litton Is now asking for an addtional mum ICBM accuracy. As I point out un-
tory of American miita procurement." $7 1nillioif per ship. der "Dangerous Nuclear Programs" later
While this rhetoric mayDave been softie- With Only 2 of the 30 ships in the in these additional views, if we fund the
what overdramatic, subsequent events water, the Navy has already tole! us it development of high accuracy, there will
have not impugned the :accuracy of the expects the cost to go to ceiling-130 be no way to negotiate the Sovie -s out of
assertion. At the time o8 last year's re- percent of target price. also deploying high accuracy warheads.
number of expensive subsystems- They will thus be able to use very small
port, thesefive ships were 2 years behind A
schedule. Today they ale 21y2 years be totaling perhaps 20 percent of the cost yields as silo-killers which means they
hind; the cost is sittirigon the contract of the ship-are to be installed after de- will be able to use large numbers of war-
ceiling and we can a )ect, before we livery. Thus, they are not included in the heads on each BM at low cost. Thus,
have the ships in handle to find the con- systems acquisition costs. Instead, they they will-be able to exhaust site defense
tractor rewarded for his delays by pay- are funded by the other procurement, fax more cheaply than we could expand
ments well above the oiling. Navy-OPN-and operations and main- it. It is important to note that the same
The same contractor i the same ship- tenance-O. & M.-budgets, which :receive unlikely and tragic egrcumstances that
yard-Litton Industries in Pascagoula., relatively light scrutiny and are there- would permit deploynnt of site defense
Miss.-is building another series of fore prime breeding grounds for what is abrogation of SALT I-would almost
ships: the 30 large arisubmarine de- known in the trade as "contract nour- certainly be accompanied by the failure
stroyers of the DD-963 class. This pro- ishment" of SALT II and the consequent t+echno-
gram is clearly headed for similar or 't'hird. Performance: We are not yet logical developments that would neutral-
worse problems. capable "bf judging the performance of ize any ADM.
The new "assembly-Ihhe" method used the system. However, our experience has Therefore, we shall move to amend the
in this shipyard has received much pub- been thatlate delivery and cost overruns site defense authorization, reducing the
licity, but it is not the source of the do. not usually go hand in hand with $160 million prototype demor~stratiop
problem. satisfactory performance. program to a $110 Million technology
The difficulty stems from the Inability I believe it to be a real mistake to au- program.
of the contractor, to 4ttract suff.c ent thorize the last of the 30 ships, thus ef- B. SAX-n
quantity and quality of-labor to the site festively giving up the Armed cervices Secretary of Defense Schies iger has
of the shipyard. Total labor force on the Committee's control over this program. has wisely pointed out that, since the
DD-963 program ispreeently 29 percent A sine lar mistake was made on the LHA United States has no technological choice
below program. The problem is increas- program, in which we finished author- but to remain vulnerable to Soviet mis-
ing rather than decreasi.g, with 10.6 per- }zing the last of the five ships last year, siles, there is no sense spending money to
cent attrition but onlym 9.9 percent ac- yet the Navy has still to see its first LHA. defend against bombers.
cession between Sept ,nber 1972, and I do not propose to reduce or cancel Thus, the only function of the SAM-D,
September 1973. The shipyard today is the program. At this point, I mere ly em- anti-aircraft system will be to defend our
4,000 men short and is enable to acceler- pliasize that the reasons for the diffi- allies. This $6 billion program makes a
ate employment. culty-difficult location and inadequate very expensive charity item in these day.--
The quality of the work force, accord- m nagernent-were entirely subject to of precarious economic security.
lug to the General Accounting Office, is the control of the contractor. at the time Therefore, it would be desirab:ie for the
as substandard as the quantity. The he made his bid. It is he, and not the tax- Secretary of Defense to seek conxmit-
journeymen;apprentice'` ratio has been palyera, who should bear the burden of his ments from our allies to pay is cash a
about 1.4-1, where 2-1 7 is considered de- inability to live up to the contract. minimum of one-half the total program
sirable. While' this ratio has remained According to the recent report to the cost of the system, and to include the
relatively stable, the quality of the ap- Congress by the General Accounting of- result of his efforts In his annual report
prentice force has declined markedly, fide, the Navy and its contracting officer for fiscal year 1976.-If these commit-
with the percentage hiving less than 1 have made sincere and vigorous efforts ments are not In hand at the time o
' adhere to the terms of the contract. I the report, it is my view that the pro-
year's experience soar* from 18 percent to
in October 1972, to 41 percent in August commend them for It. it would be my in- gram should be abandoned.
.1973. The contractors Silo prospects for teztion to see that the full 30 ships will c. DANGEROVO NUCLEAR FROCdAus
improvement. be delivered with satisfactory perform- It is natural to assume that id ,markedly in., will look back on the action they have
size for over the last 10 years,The World recommended as an important turning
War II ships, destroyers in particular, point in the naval history of the United
that were the mainstay of off~~rr Navy for, States. ,
so many years have readbep-the enc. of Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield
their useful life. To replace them with 6 minutes to the gentleman from New
large, multipurpose, "abe to fight any- York (Mr. PIKE).
where" destroyers in the glimbers re- (Mr. PIKE asked and was given per-
quired to adequately coversthe thou- mission to revise and extend his r(-
sands upon thousands of m+es of vital marks.)
sealanes in time of war wo$d be pro- Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
hibitively expensive. support of H.R. 14592, but, I-do not wart
Th
N
k
s t
h
l
f
e
avy
` a
a
en cogni nce o
t
e to give the ixs ression that I rise in sup-
fact that, when combined, with the newer
port of everything contained -14-4
11
1"
escort ships that we nov live or will
have during the next 10 25 years,
relatively small, less eapesve ships
could be designed and -coxtructed to
adequately defend our sealanes in all but
the most hostile of the i orl potential
war Zones where our cagier 4ask forces
and other highly sophisticate ships are
designed to il,~ht. And mist i>pportantly,
the Patrol Frigate can be co tructed in
the numbers that we require can afford-
able price.
The Navy has devoted alias st 3 years
of concentrated study. analy is and de-
sign effort to determine es ac the right
combination of weapons and,-sensors to
provide the required force eectiveness
at a minimum cost. Taking v advantage
of modern computers . they evaluated
ever 300 combinations of h, propul-
sion, weapons; and sensors b ore deckl-
g
am.
w
not
ing on the patrol frigate as tl a most ef- . go into that in detail at the present
fective in meeting our rated It is an time. The minority views on this sub-
austere ship design to provid iaximum it are on liege 97 of the committee
required capability at least cpst. It is a report. I was_. encouraged. to hear the
ship which will 811 a major Portion of the chairman of the Research and Develop.
void brought bout by the re ement of ment Subcommittee, the gentleman from
our World War II destroyers., Illinois (Mr. PRICE) did concede in his
It should be noted, also, the the Navy own remarks today that it is in fact a
has been equally diligent in ,,,developing seek program.
a shipbuilding program designed to pre- Mr. Chairman, I would like to address
vent gross cost overruns.The lips "de- myself bgriefly today to the larger prob-?
signed to cost" and the "Aesi~n to cost" lem of getting facts out of the Pentagon,
principles will be adhd to in Its I have not brought my lunch here
planned production. koday in this package, but I have brought
In summary, the patrol frig t,e is a well an altimeter. This particular altimeter
conceived program, carefully tailored to costs $1,000, and that Is not. a bad buy
provide capabilities vital to the protec- for an altimeter, except that thispartic-
tion of the sea lanes of the wgr rii _essen- ular altimeter does not work. It wt .wily
tial to the United States itp puce and In does not work, but it cannot be repaironed,
war. it is a ". nonsense"
shig designed It has on it a red tag which says
,
,
to provide nias3mum et act eness at "W for Ground 'Use Only. Not Te
least cost. It is a ship, we catt build in 'Be Instal ed on Aircraft."
the numbers that we need. It is a ship we I would submit that an altimeter which
connot afford not to build? cannot tae thst2iied on an aircraft is not
Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, Field such Inuc h of a bargain. Not only did It cost
time as be may consume to the gentle- 41MO sitting
, of ontthe there are shelves at shat ands throe
man from C radfl on an Air Force
( Mr
A>i]pcsxaoNG)
.
every
facility, and they just cannot be installed as important as those we faced at this
A NA'' I thank the gem- on aircraft, because they do not work. time last year. Last year we bad what we
tdemaai fpr y` The Air Force investigated this
I rise to congratulate procalled the Peyser amendment. It was
the ci irman of curenient What did they find? They added to an amendment which made an
the Seapower Subcommittee and the found that the manufacturer was sneak- attempt to reduce our commitments ,;o
ranking member for their leadership In into the factory at night during the 33ATO. Tice Peywer amendment called for
bringing before the committee and be- testing process and adjusting the alum- a study of our forces in Europe, and with
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n
.
..
14502.
I think we have done some very useful
things in this bill. I am particularly im-
Pressed with the work of the Subcom-
mittee on Manpower. Any time we can
increase the proportion of enlisted mesa
to officers, that is real progress toward
a more effective fighting military. Any
time we can decrease the proportion of
generals and admirals to combat troops,
that, too, is real progress.
I would like to say at this time I think
among the members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff that General Abrams in particu-
lar is committed to the goal of making
a fighting Army rather than a parade
Army. I think he is doing everything he
can. in this regard and should be com-
mended,and encouraged.
Tomoyrow I will offer an amendment
to out out the B--1 pro
r
I
ill
May 20', 1974
titers while they were being tested. Did
they cancel the contract? Oh, no, they
did not cancel the contract. The Govern-
ment inspector found that, In the testing
facility there was a tube running off from
the vacuum and pressure testing mech-
anism, right into the wall of the facility,
so that no matter whether the altimeter
really worked or not, it Would indicate
that the altimeter worked.
So, did theycancel the procurement,?
No, they did not cancel the procurement.
There was just unadulterated fraud in
this procurement of these altimeters, and
finally the Air Force, because they did
not work, canceled It for nondelivery.
But they continue to buy other altimeters
from the same corporation.
Now, can we Set the investigation re-
ports? No. We . cannot, because, for in-
stance, I have tried to et the OS1 report.
They have let me look at it, but I could
not keep it. I pointed out to them the
Freedom of Information Act which we
passed, and the Freedom of Information
Act says that when an investigation is
completed we can get the facts.
Well, what do they-say? Although he
investigations say on the face of them
that they are completed, the case is
closed, they say, "We have not com-
pleted the investigation."
I say, "Why have you not completed
the investigation?" They say, "We have
not completed the investigation because
you, Congressman PnCE, asked a question
If I had not asked for the information.,
in other words, I could have it. 'But, in
view of the fact that I have asked :'or
the information, they are still investi-
gating it, and, accordingly, we eamtc t
Set it.
Now, this is true throughout this whole
procurement business.
The B-1 program increased in cost; by
0 million a month every month in
the last year-increased. And we can-
amt get the uli-to-date selected acqui;i--
tici reports not only on the 13--1 progra;n,
but on any program. We have not gotten
a selected acquisition -report in the sub..
committee dated more recently than last
December 3L We do not know what the
B-1 costs today. They know over in tat
Pentagons. They are cot taming tree
truth. They know that they are acccl-
crating the price at an estimated infla-
tion rate of only 3.3 percent a year.
This is fantasy, and we ought to at
least insist on the truth from the Pesa-
tagon. -
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gan-
tleman has expired.
Mr. WHITETIGRST. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. RANDALL).
(Mr. RANDALL asl d and was given
permission to revise and extend his rie-
marks.)
Mr. RANIDAL. Mr. Chairman, to-
morrow this committee will be faced with
some amendments that will be
bit
 May 20, 19 74
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the mandate that the Committee on
Armed Services make a report effective
April 1 on its study. But there have been
some important intervening events. I
wish there were more Members on the
floor who were not members of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services who could lis-
ten to this brief discussion.
Following the Peyser amendment came
the Jacks on-Nunn amendment. That
said that in the period ending in 18
months-12 months from last November
and an additional 6 months, which would
expire next May-that if there is a defi-
cit In our balance of payments because
of deployment of air troops and our al-
lies do not make up that deficit, then
there should be a withdrawal of forces
by the percentage which fell short of full
offset by air allies. Thus Jackson-Nunn
is one difference this year. As one who
was privileged to serve as chairman of
the ad hoc committee, that we have a
very excellent chance of meeting Jack-
_.son-Nunn on time. There is no indica-
tion that we will fail.
There has been another event which
has already, been alluded to. That is the
MBFR. The subcommittee visited Vienna,
arid we found there something that we
had never seen before. There was com-
plete unity among our allies in agreeing
on what forces we should reduce and, on
the contrary there was _no footdragging
and no delays at all by the Russians.
The committee reports to you here to-
day that there is a good chance that that
conference can succeed. We are not cer-
tain of the reasons for it. Maybe it is be-
cause the Russians are anxious to have
our credits and our technology. Maybe
they think more of the concept of detente
than we realize, but they have indicated
a willingness to move forward.
How does this apply to the debate and
the amendments which will be offered
tomorrow? There will be two amend-
mejits offered tomorrow, and maybe
more. One will be simply to the effect
that there are going to be 200,000 troops
brought home from overseas. We do not
know yet whether they are to be brought
home or discharged. The other one would
be a little bit different. It will say about
100,000 troops phased out, apparently
brought home.
Of course, at the appropriate time the
Armed Services Committee will attempt
to show there will really be no saving.
in any other field besides military hard-
ware or to any renewed dedication to
working out real problems.
At home, we see this in the fact that
while every other Government agency
and program is scraped to the bone, es-
pecially the human needs programs, and
forced to show "efficiency dividends" at
the expense of significant accomplish-
ment only the military maintains its rate
of growth without any substantial sav-
ings, in fact with a growth rate that out-
strips the overall rate of inflation.
We must realize this: In an era of
tightened resources and hard choices, we
must choose either tax reform and de-
fense cuts on the one hand, or a help-
less Government facing multiplying so-
cial problems on the other. If the De-
fense budget is untouchable, the rest
of the Government must wither away.
Abroad, we see this when we notice
that detente does not mean an end,
first, to our worldwide military presence;
second, to our ability to fight any way at
any time; third, to our dedication to
keeping dictators in power though any
means necessary; and fourth, to the same
perception of political and strategic
realities that dominated foreign policy
thinking 20 years ago.
So we are forced to ask ourselves, "Is
detente any different from the cold
war? Does it make any difference at all?
What is the use of it then?"
OVERSEA TROOP LEVELS
Manpower costs comprise 55 percent
of the military budget. This figure does
not include the increasingly heavy bur-
den of veterans' benefits, which the ad-
ministration never includes in its mili-
tary spending figures, but which this
year will be $13.6 billion. We will un-
doubtedly save some money if we end
some of the unneeded and costly weap-
ons systems such as the atomic aircraft
carrier, the B-1 bomber, the Trident
submarine or the destabilizing land-
based missiles-but we will never touch
the bulk of the huge military budget
until we revise our assumptions about
the use of manpower. It is here that the
Pentagon's refusal to come up with any
real "efficiency dividend" Is most
flagrant.
For these reasons, I shall offer an
amendment that will substantially cut
end-strength, and mandate that the cuts.
be taken overseas. Exact location of the
oversea cuts will be left to the Pentagon.
We now have 492,000 troops scattered
all over the world. My amendment will
charged. But for those who are brought dream of any nondefense agency admin- cut 198,100 from this total. This decrease
home and try to find a place to house istrator. Only the military budget is sig- could easily be accomodated without any
them, there will be no saving. In fact, it nificant enough itself to set limits to reduction in real commitment, because
will cost more to keep them in this coun- what the whole Government can do or of the inefficient structure of the over-
try than if they remain in the NATO hope to do. In fact, the size of the mill- sea troops as reflected in crowded head-
area in the Federal Republic of Ger- tart' budget is the central issue deter- quarters, wasteful support-to-combat
many. ming domestic reform. ratios, and disruptive rotation policies.
But let me get back on the track in the As Secretary Schlesinger has clearly These are the key questions we want to
limited time I have remaining and say told us, this first completely post-Indo- ask:
to the Members that the real seriousness china budget shows what to expect for Is it possible to have a real peacetime
of, this whole thing is that if we approve the indefinite future unless some basic budget? Can the Government get its job
any amendment to call home our troops assumptions are changed. done without raising taxes?
then ourNation,can very well become a It is the first indication of what can be Do we need to maintained a worldwide
spectacle in the eyes of the world for expected from a supposedly peacetime military manpower presence?
acting capriciously. We will allow our- Government. Unfortunately, the answer Can we really end the arms race by
selves to be held up to the justified crit- is: "Not much." Whatever else "peace" the method proposed by the 'Pentagon,
icism of all the world. In effect we will means for this administration, it does that is, new technological leaps in
have sale yes we passed the Jackson- not mean any commitment to creativity weaponry?
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Nunn amendment. Our allies are meet-
ing Jackson-Nunn but we are bringing
our troops home anyhow. The Federal
Republic of Germany made the best
offset agreement that has ever been
made in all of the years there has been
an agreement. At the moment just about
everything is going our way.
In spite of their problems this year,
the oil crisis, and all of the other prob-
lems, our allies have, nevertheless, come
up with the best offset agreement of any
year. So if we do a turnaround here
tomorrow and happen to adopt one of
these amendments for withdrawal, or
any variation of them, then we are say-
ing to our allies and to the world in ef-
fect: We did not mean what we said by
Jackson-Nunn, and we do not mean any-
thing we are saying or doing in Vienna
at MBFR.
We have Secretary Resor, former
Secretary of the Army, heading the nego-
tiations over at Vienna. He came over
here to make a report 2 or 3 weeks ago.
We had a chance to visit with him. There
was no diminution in his optimism.
It is unexpected and unanticipated the
cooperation we are getting from the War-
saw Pact at this time in Vienna. Sure,
we have a long, tedious time ahead at
MBFR. It Is going to be a lot of work
yet, but the prize or the objective is the
important thing, and that is to get a
reduction-a balanced reduction of
forces without diminishing our security.
For the first time we appear to have a
breakthrough. Think how foolhardy,
how almost stupid it would be if we ap-
prove any of these amendments tomor-
row. It simply would mean we will
have pulled the rug out from under our
people. We might as well say to them:
"Just pack your bags and come on
home."
So I suggest to the Members they
should think long and hard before they
support either of these amendments
which will be offered tomorrow.
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield
6 minutes to the gentleman from Cali-
fornia (Mr. DELLUMS).
(Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, ob-
viously this is one of the most important
bills considered by Congress. The size of
the military bureaucracy and the
amount of money needed to supply it
with hardware far exceeds the wildest
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Finally, does this budge] really serve
the Interests and the segurity of the
The answer to the. fl question a
"no." In simple terms, this ill continues
the disastrous trend ofs bl d faith miii,
tarism and adventurislr( which has
dominated policymakilig IV this Nati(M
and which, over the past decade, has de-
stroyed and distorted the A,erican econ;
omy, shattered the politigi and social
framework upon which or democracy
was created, and killed #nd maned
hundreds of thousands of rsons. There
is ;a massive difference ltween what
reason, I am strongly oppod to the bill
in its present form.
MILITARY AID TO SA,.ON
This Nation is a signator to the Paris
agreements and yet we aae in serious
violation of that true. Our, client, Gen-
eras Thieu, has made a mQckery of the
Pttrfs agreefnents; there is;probably not
cONGR~SSIQNAL RECORD - ]SOUSE
tragic nation. What honor for us can
therebe when Thrieu's biggest friend
also lxappens to be the American Ambas-
sadorbb I do not think this is :the fo>.'um
to deal with all of Ambassador Martin's
follies but'I would like to bring atten-
tion to the fact that Martin himself has
admitted that he is permitting outright
American violation of the Paris agree-
ment. Despite legislative malidate and
terms' of the Paris agreement, In a mem-
orandum printed in the April 4, 1974,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on page E2117,
Ambassador Martin notes that-
A certain number of people in the Defense
Attache Office were retained, engaged solely
on logistics assistance to the military forces
of South Vietnam.
To me, that appears to be a flagrant
violation of both congressional intent
and ti~{{e Pars agreement.
Fin9,lly, let me indicate what I see oc-
curring if huge flows of American mili-
tary assistance continue to Thieu-as the
general and the administration desire.
As long as America picks up the tab for
his military operations and for his re-
violated. peated violations of the Palls agree-
xpayers are menu; Thieu will continue the war. I do
liievertlieless, American 1I
t
virtually the sole financial, support for not think the Provisional Revolutionary
Thieu, Estimates indicate that our tax Government will allow that to happen
dollars account for 85 perc it of Thleu',s for any prolonged period-and up to now,
national budget, and I would like to call the PRG has concentrated
based the
attention once again to the gores noted Paris is agreements a saand d upon the
by our cone nd has undertaken
ague from Net York (MI'. only limited military operations. But I
PIKE) in the floor debate on thesup-
do not think it realistic for us to assume
pie mental aid to Vietnam when he that the PRG and its allies would re-
po1lzted out that the Sout Vietnamese main so passive, if It becomes apparent
defense budget dropped frogs $1.3 billion that Thieu will never agree to any of
in 1971 to only $474 mlllion rudgeted for the political components of the Paris
thi$ year.
accords and that America will continu-
Americandollars allow ieu to con ously fund, Thieu's aggression. When-
tinlie a way, that took applximately 60 ever that point is reached, I think that
thousand lives,last year; American dot- massive fighting will break out again.
lars pay for a police state in-which thou- and we will be back to the situation of a
sands of Vietnamese are held political decade ago.
prisoner without benefit of al; Ameri- Given that chance, It is conceiva':ale
Can dollars pay for the secuy of a petty that, based upon the implicit commit-
dictator who refuses to all ow -distribution inept Secretary Kissinger has made,
of the Paris agreements ip his areas, large-scale American forces could be re-
who holds Illegal elections, 2orbids neu- introduced in Vietnam.
tredism, and employs systengtic torture,,. Have we not learned from the past
It is a sham to say them is peace in decade, in Vietnam? How long Is this
Vietnam, and a lie to cl there is tragedy to continue? As long as Con-
"honor- in American policy ward that gress allows_Thieu to mock the Paris
May .2 0, 19 74
agreements by his repeated offensives, by
his refusing basic human rights gulran?
teed by the agreements, and by gestapo
tactics which pervert the legal systoni in
Vietnam, it is we who must take the re-
sponsibility for war in Vietnam.
I do not oppose the concept of human-
itarian assistance to the people of Viet-
nam. But this bill provides nothing of
that sort. Instead, the American tax-
payer once again assumes the burden of
Thieu's military budget. As long as we
do so-and no matter what level ceiling
we may impose-there will be continuing
war in Vietnam.
If instead, our Nation is to abide by
the Paris agreements--something, we
have not done up to now-Congress must
insist that Thieu live up to the terms set
in Paris. I intend to_offeran amendment
on the floor proposing that all military
aid be suspended until we are asi,ured.
that Thieu is in accord with the Paris
agreements and I urge my colleagues to
support that motion.
This is a serious issue, but not one ap-
parently critical enough though for the
Armed Services Committee to devote ma-
jor analysis and attention. Proper legis-
lative oversight of Executive activities
is, of course, the very key to our system
of government-particularly now in an
era of gross Executive misuse of power.
It is thus with considerable dismay that
I found that the committee report's lan-
guage justifying military aid to Sr,igon
contains outright plagiarism of unsub-
stantiated and thoroughly inaccurate
Executive testimony.
I have discovered that the committee's
justification is not only misleading,
loaded with inaccuracies, and in many
cases totally untrue, but it is, in fact,
copied almost word-for-word from testi-
mony given by a Pentagon spokesman to
the committee on March 26, 1974. The
following comparison of testimony given
by Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell, Direc-
tor, Security Assistance Plans and Policy
Formulation, to the committee on pages
893-895 of its hearings with the language
of the committee report shows that the
committee has simply copied the pre-
pared statement of General Caldwell
and then presented it as a summary of
committee findings:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN Hou4 ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON 11ISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY
SPOIR.ESMAN
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMTFVE REPORT ON TESTIMONNT BY MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM CALDWELL,
MnrrARY PROCUREMENT AUTE1 IZATIONS FOR, DEPARr'MENT.OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR, SECURITY
FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF FOR SCI 'TH VIETNAM, ASSISTANCE PLANS POLICY, MARCH 26, 1974,
MAY 10, 1974, PAGES 85-90 PAGES.893-895
The objectives of our militay assistance
to South Vietnam are limited, but absolutely
essential. [The Government cL the United_
States wishes] to help the GQvernmellt of_
South Vietnam to maintain ofifective mll-
itary, deterrent in the face of" he consider
able threat posed by the North Vietnamese
forces within the Republic of,Vietnam. At-
tainment of this limited objective is the key
to the maintenance of stable balanced condi-
tions necessary to ensure pelyce in Indo-
chilia and'Soutleast Asia. However, attp;in-
meat of this objective has a vital and stra-
tegic importance far beyond Idochina. In-
volved are the fundamental goals of our
nation's foreign policy.
General CALDWELL. Mr. Chairman, and dis-
tenguislied members of this committee:
The objectives of our military assistance to
South Vietnam are limited but absolutely
essential. We seek to help the GVN to main-
tain an effective military deterrent in the
face of the considerable threat posed by the
North Vietnamese forces within the Republic
of Vietnam. Attainment of this limited ob-
jective is key to the maintenance of stable,
balanced conditions necessary to Insure
peace In, Indochina and Southeast Asia. How-
ever, attainment of this objective has a vital
and strategic Importance far beyond Indo-
china. Involved are the fundamental goals of
our foreign policy.
PENTi-GON
COMMENTS
Paragraphs I-2-The available evidence
does not indicate that our military assistance
is helping to "ensure peace". There were well
over 1,000,000 war victims in South Vietnam
alone last year-perhaps more than in the
rest of the world combined for 1973. (50,152
military dead and over 100,000 military
wounded, according to GVN official statistics;
15,000 civilian dead, 70,000 civilian wounded,
and 818,000 refugees, according to the U S.
Senate Subcommitteeon Refugees.)
Not only does our military assistance fuel
this continuing war, but it shows no hope of
stabilizing. Thus last year $1.009 billion in
MASF funds was allocated to the GVN; In
FY 75, however, the Administration req.lest
was set at $1.8 billion, an Increase of 42%.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
H 4041
A COMPARISON BETWEEN HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON
SPOKESMAN-Continued
Events in Vietnam over the past year
have taught us that a lasting peace is possi-
ble only if there is a stable balance of power
between the opposing sides. It is the view
of the Committee on +rmed Services that a
military equilibrium in that area of the
world will deter new offensives and gradually
induce a (general) shift in priorities (by the
contending forces) away from war.
"The post agreement period in Vietnam has
recorded substantial progress toward this
goal. (Although) some fighting has contin-
ued, on the basis of testimony received by
the Committee, it is the conviction of the
Committee that the cease fire has indeed
served to significantly dampen combat ac-
tivity.. Thus, the hopes of the Executive
Branch, which are shared by the members
of the Committee on Armed Services, for a
stable peace in South Vietnam, are largely
dependent upon the continued ability of the
South Vietnamese to defend themselves.
The cease fire already has witnessed the
following:
-"A rough but tenuous balance of forces
thus far prevails in Vietnam;
. Territorial and population control have
changed little .over the past year (what
change has been made has been in favor of
the Government forces);
In the area of military operations, Hanoi's
land grab offensive on the eve of the Paris
agreement set a pattern of NVA attacks and,
Government reactions which still character-
izes the cease-fire.. Major Conunu.fiist Initia-
tives in the past year have included:
Another land .grab attack prior to the June
communique;
The capture of strategic posts (e.g., Le
Minh border Camp) in the western highlands
last fall;
An offensive in Quang Due province which
seized a district capital;
The shelling of Bien Hoa airbase;
The destruction of a major civilian fuel
depot near Saigon;
Continuing attacks against all forms of
transportation and; .
Terrorism against civilians.
A new North Vietnamese full-scale offen-
sive, however, is It inevitable, Hanoi is
keeping its option open but, is encountering
serious problems both at home and in the
south. These problems, together with a strong
GVN deterrent and the international con-
text of detente give us hope that an offen-
sive can be avoided. A shift in Hanoi's prior-
ities, would then make possible a serious
accommodation within the spirit of the Viet-
nom agreement.
Events in Vietnam over the past year have
taught us that a lasting peace is possible
only if there is a stable balance of power
between the opposing sides. A military
equilibrium will, we believe, deter new offen-
sives and gradually induce a shift in priori-
ties away from war.
The post-agreement period in Vietnam has
recorded substantial progress toward this
goal. While fighting has continued, we believe
that the cease-fire has served to dampen.
combat activity. Our hopes for a more stable
peace are dependent on the continued ability
of the South Vietnamese to defend them-
selves.
Nor does it offer any hope of deterring pos-
sible offensives by the other side, which was
neither deterred from a'1968 offensive by
550,000 U.S. ground troops or a 1972 offensive
by a massive U.S. bornbing campaign.
Clearly, the only way of achieving our ob-
jective of "lasting peace" is implementation
of the Paris Agreement; there are numerous
indications, however, that the GVN still re-
fuses to recognize the PRG (See the N.Y.
Times, Feb. 10, 1973; The Economist, Feb. 16,
1974) and test its offer to engage in politi-
cal settlement.
Under these circumstances, the Adminis-
tration's present MASF program offers little
hope of encouraging peace and seems only to
be leading to more war.
Paragraph 3-All evidence indicates that it
is not our arming the GVN that has served
to. "dampen combat activity", but rather a
Communist decision in 1973 tl at it is in
their interests to try for a political solution
to the conflict and emphasize reconstruction.
(See U.S. Embassy analysis of Document No.
113, Vietnam-Documents and Research
Notes; N.Y. Times, January 23, 1973; "Hanoi
Puts Rebuilding Ahead of Victory"; Balti-
more Sun, April 16, 1974.)
Paragraph 4-This shocking admission
that "what change has been made has been
The cease-fire already has witnessed the in favor of Government forces" indicates
following: that the GVN may well be using our military
A rough but tenuous balance of forces assistance to take land from the other side.
thus far prevails in Vietnam; This has been also suggested by numerous
Territorial and population control have newspaper reports, for example one which
changed little over the past year-what reported that "In the past month, military
change has been made has been in favor of officials say, almost 20 square miles of for-
the Government forces; merly Communist-held territory have been
In the area of military operations, Hanoi's seized by South Vietnamese troops driving
land grab offensive on the eve of the Paris westward from Highway 1.. . ." (Wash. Post,
agreement set a pattern of NVA attacks and September 30, 1973.)
government reactions which still character- This fact indicates that while the com-
izes the cease-fire. Major Communist initia- munist attacks listed did occur, the GVN is
tives in the past year have included: another not entirely blameless.
land grab attack prior to the June communi-' Indeed, the consensus of opinion indicates
que; the capture of strategic posts, for ex- that at the very least both sides have en-
ample, Le Minh Border Camp in the western gaged in violations of the military ceasefire,
Highlands last fall; an offensive in Quang thus making it difficult to attribute primary
Due Province which seized a district capital; blame to either side for a specific military
the shelling of Bien Hoa Airbase; the destruc- incident.
tion of a major civilian fuel depot near Senate Foreign Relations Committee in-
Saigon; continuing attacks against all forms vestigators, for example, have reported that
of transportation; and terrorism against Saigon forces "have encroached on territory
civilians. considered predominately under Communist
A new North Vietnamese full-scale offen-
sive, however, is not inevitable. Hanoi is
keeping its option open but, is encountering
serious problems both at home and in the
South, These problems, together with a
strong GVN deterrent and the international
context of detente give us hope that an
offensive can be avoided. A shift in Hanoi's
priorities would then make possible a serious
accommodation within the spirit of the Viet-
namagreement.
control, and in MR III they have been even
more aggressive in military operations.
("Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam,"
April 1923, p. 35)
And, until the GVN at least tests the other
side's offer to compete for power politically
by recognizing the PRG and allowing demo-
cratic liberties guaranteed by Article 11 of
the Paris Agreement, the GVN may have to
take the political responsibility for the mili-
tary breakdown.
Paragraph 5-As long as the PRG is out-
lawed from the political arena, another of-
fensive is unlikely in the, short-term but
inevitable in the long-term. The notion that
the Communists are encountering more
problems now than five years ago when fac-
ing 550,000 American ground troops or 11/2
years ago when facing hundreds of U.S.
bombing raids daily does not make sense.
"International detente" did not stop an
offensive in 1972, nor is -likely to preclude
a future one. There is every reason to be-
lieve that build up the GVN's army can only
increase its capacity to provoke attacks, while
doing nothing to prevent defeat. The GVN
Is offering the other side no choice at this
point but surrender, and the experience of
the past 25 years indicates that this simply
will not happen.
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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL . YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON
While the North VietnamesVhave increased
the conventional capability of the mai'n
forces, the cost has been great, and the
Government of Vietnam has thus far man-
aged to turn back all their challenges In
the past year.
Combat deaths, while substantial on both
sides, have declined to the lowest level erode
1965 and are down 75% compared with the
rate in 1972. Some 500,000 refugees have been
resettled. Virtually all pre-cease-fire civilian
detainees and POW's-at least on the GVN
side-have been released.
The balance of power which underlies the
chances for peace is under heavy pressure
from North Vietnam. Hanoiis conducting a
massive military buildup ins the south and
repeatedly violates the cease-fire. These ac-
tivities threaten the equilibftum and confge-
quently the whole framework of the peace we
so laboriously negotiated in Paris, for ex-
ample: in total violation of the Paris Agree-
ment, since the cease-fire, Hanoi has infil-
trated over 70,000 replacement troops, some
400 tanks, 150 long-range heavy artillery
pieces, 1,000 AAA guns and 150,000-200,000
tons of ammunition and supplies. Since the
cease-fire, North Vietnnannase capabilities
have increased 20% in combat manpower,
200% in tanks, 75% in hefty artillery and
75% in AAA. Some of this additional equip-
ment includes new items such as SAM-2
missiles with 18 to 20 lai$chers of which
most, if not all, were introduced into the
south after the cease-fire. The Communists
are also working on 12 airfields in the south
and are completing a massive new logistics
system of all-weather three lane roads and
pop pipelines.
While the North Vietnamese have Increased
the conventional capability of the retain
forces, the cost has been great, and the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam has thus far managed
to turn back all their challenges in the past
year.
Combat deaths, while substantial on both
sides, have declined to the lowest level since
1965 and are down 75 percent compared with
the rate in 1972, Some 500,000 refugees have
been resettled. Virtually all pre-cease.-fire
civilian detainees and POW's-at least on
the GVN side-have been released.
The balance of power which underlies the
chances for peace is under heavy pressure
from North Vietnam. Hanoi is conducting a
r)iassive military buildup in the South and
repeatedly violates the cease-fire. These ac-
tivities threaten the equilibrium and conse-
quently the whole framework' of the peace
we so laboriously negotiated in Paris.
For example: In total violation of the
Paris agreement, since the cease-fire, Hanoi
has infiltrated over 70,000 replacement
troops, some 400-plus tanks, 150-plus long-
range heavy artillery pieces, 1,000 AAA guns,
and 150,000-200,000 tons of ammunition and
supplies. Since the cease-fire, North Viet-
namese capabilities have increased 20 per-
cent in combat manpower, 200 percent in
combat manpower, 200 percent In tan:csa, 75
percent In heavy artillery, and 75 percent in
AAA. Some of this additional equipment in-
cludes new items such as SAM-2 missiles
with 16 or 20 launchers of which most, it not
all, were introduced into the South after the
cease-fire. The Communists are also working
on 12 airfields in the South and are complet-
ing a massive new logistics system of all-
weather, two lane roads and POL pipelines.
Paragraph 6-Since the "enemy offensives"
long predicted by U.S. and GVN officials
have simply not materialized since the cease-
fire, it is fundamentally inaccurate to claim
that the GVN has "turned back all their
challenges."
Paragraph 7-The Pentagon neglects, to
note that the 818,000 new refugees reported
by the U.S. Senate Refugee Subcommittee
are more than in any year of the war except
1966 (906,000) and 1972 (1,320,000). The
Refugee Subcommittee also notes that many
of those "resettled" have actually been sim-
ply shifted to economically unviable land
so the GVNcan claim new territory. in viola-
tion of Article 11 of the Paris Agreement
which permits "freedom of movement'. The
Senate Appropriations Committee repoorted
on December 19, 1973, that "reliable and
objective sources suggest that there are be-
tween 40,000 and 60,000 political prisoners
being held." Since the ceasefire, however, the
GVN has - only released, by its own official
count, 5,081 "civilian detainees" to the: other
side, leaving tens of_thousands still in jail.
The U.S. Embassy in Saigon, moreover, has
admitted not visiting the prisons since the
ceasefire. (Gong. Record, April 29, 1974,
86421.) Thus American officials do nct have
sufficient evidence to make the svueeping
generalization that the GVN has released
all pre-ceasefire civilian detainees.
Paragraph 8-The evidence suggests that
there has been no shift in the military bal-
ance of power in South Vietnam since the
Parts Agreement in favor of Hanoi. Al ;hough.
there is no way of knowing the real figure of
replacement troops, the 70,000 figure '.s more
than offset by the 40-50,000 troops reported
to have left South Vietnam to returr. North
during this period. (Los Angeles Times, Feb-
ruary 13, 1974), and the 50,000 op more
"NVN/PRG" reported killed.
Moreover, Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee Staff reported the CIA estimate to be
142,000 North Veitnamese troops in South
Vietnam as of April 15, 1973. (See "Tt,ailland,
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam: April 1973", p.
36.) Since then there has been virtv.ally no
change. Official U.S. sources put the figure at
138,000 In December, 1973. U.S. News and
World Report, December 17, 1973; Chicago
Daily News, December 19, 1973.) More re-
cently the estimate was put at between
140,000 and 150,000 (N.Y. Times, May 6,
1974).
Moreover, USSAG headquarters reported
that nearly all 400 tanks referred to actually
came into South Vietnam before the cease-
fire deadline. (See "Thailand, Lao;., Cam-
bodia and Vietnam," pp. 36-37.) The argu-
ment can also be made that the relatively
small number since South since then may
well fit the "one for one" provision of the
Agreement, as may also be true for the artil-
lery pieces. [As for AAA and SAME, the build-
up since the ceasefire could well lie a re-
sponse to the heavy bombing of PRO zones
which has been going on Since the beginning
of the ceasefire. Such defensive mewmres, In
any event, hardly "threaten the equil ibrium"
as much as the refusal of the GVN to com-
pete for power politically with it; adver-
saries.]
Paragraph 9-The record shows 7rectsely
the contrary. An American official has been
quoted as saying that "after we cut down
the ammo suply, we found that the South
Vietnamese were still outshooting the enemy
by 20 to 1, but the overall total was tb at much
lower." (Washington Post, June 4, 1973) . Vir-
tually every western newsman to have visited
PRO zones since the ceasefire has reported
random shelling of villages by ARVIN forces
(See, for example, New York Times, Feb. 18
and 19, 1914; CBS News, Nov. 14, and I.S.
1973). Returning staff aides from a GVN.
sponsored trip In April, 1974, have reported
that American officials say the GVN is vast-
The record of GVN's and'North Vietnam's
cease-fire implementation itimply does not
support the argument that our assistance will
only facilitate new "violations" by the GVN
and thus undermine the cee-fire. Through
out the cease-fire period, Saigon has exercised
restraint compared with the Communists'
excesses. It has observed he agreement to
the extent of any prudent state faced with
North Vietnam's current policy and activities
in the South. Despite Hanol's record of vio-
lations, the GVN has limited itself to justi-
fiable acts of self-defense. With few excep-
tions, Saigon has limited its military opera-
tions to responding to communist land grab
The record of GVN's and North Vietnam's
cease-fire implementation simply does not
support the argument that our assistance will
only facilitate new "violations" by the GVN
and'thus undermine the cease-fire. Through-
out the cease-fire period, Saigon has exercised
restraint compared with the. Communists'
excesses. It has observed the 'agreement to
the extent of any prudent state faced with
North Vietnam's current policy and activities
in the South.
Despite Hanoi's record of violations, the
GVN has limited Itself to justifiable acts of
self-defense. With few exceptions, Saigon has
'limited Its military,, to responding
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SPOKESMAN-Continued -
activities and to consolidating where its to Communist land grabs activities and to
forces were present at the time of the cease- consolidating where its forces were present
fire. at the time of the cease-fire.
The foregoing suggests that far from excit-
ing GVN violation of the cease-fire, our mili-
tary assistance is tailored to enable Saigon
to defend itself against Communist pressure
while deterring a major offensive. South Viet-
nam's need for substantial U.S. assistance,
both military and economic, is not open-
ended. The next 18-24 months is an espe-
cially critical period which will determine
whether Saigon becomes economically viable
and whether a North Vietnamese attack can
be deterred.
Provided the requisite amount of U.S. as-
sistance is forthcoming in the near term, the
executive branch foresees a signflcant eco-
nomic revival in the South and the chance
that Hanoi will shift its energies to more
peaceful pursuits. Hopefully, these develop-
ments will reduce the need in subsequent
years for heavy American assistance.
The Departmental budget for military
assistance to South Vietnam in fiscal year
1975 contemplates a program involving $1.45
billion. Departmental representatives have
assured the. Committee on Armed Services
that the proposed program in no way vio-
lates the cease fire agreement.
The printed Committee hearings on both
the Department's fiscal year 1974 Supple-
mental Request and for the Department's
fiscal year 1975 Authorization Request con-
tain extensive data on the administration of
the MASF program. The Committee urges
that these hearings be read by all Members
of Congress since such a reading will elimi-
nate much of the confusion and misinfor-
mation which often occurs during debate on
the justification for the continuation of this
military assistance program to South Viet-
nam For example, one of the more pertinent
questions which is, continually raised con-
cerning the military assistance program to
South Vietnam is the possible alleged conflict
with Article VII of the Cease Fire Agreement,
which provides for a one-for-one replace-
The foregoing suggests that far from exist-
ing new GVN "violations" of the cease-fire,
our military assistance is tailored to enable
Saigon to defend itself against Communist
pressure while deterring a major offensive.
South Vietnam's need for substantial U.S.
assistance, both military and economic, is not
open ended.
The next 18-24 months is an especially
critical period which will determine whether
Saigon becomes economically viable and
and whether a North Vietnamese attack can
be deterred.
Provided the requisite amount of U.S. as-
sistance is forthcoming in the near term, we
forsee a significant economic revival in the
South and the chance that Hanoi will shift
its energies to more peaceful pursuits. Hope-
fully, these developments will reduce the
need in subsequent years for heavy American
assistance.
It is an honor and privilege to appear be-
fore you today in support of the request for
a $1.6 billion overall authorization and re-
lated program of $1.45 million in fiscal year
1975 for the military forces of South Viet-
nam. The proposed program in no way vio-
lates the cease-fire agreement.
Ing considerable ammunition and could get
by on fax less of what they are now consum-
ing. U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin recently
reported in a cable that it was only after
"U.S. Imposed constraints" that the use of
American-supplied ammunition dropped at
a rate of 20 to 50 percent.
The most striking indication of lavish
ARVN use of ammunition is the fact that
despite the Congressional refusal of $474
million in a supplemental ammunition re-
quest, the Pentagon recently reported that
the ARVN has survived and is not in the
"dire straits" that Assistant Secretary Clem-
ents predicted it would be if the supple-
mental ammunition request was refused.
Paragraphs 10-11-All available evidence
directly contradicts the notion that there is'
the slightest possiblity that Saigon can be-
come either economically or military viable
in the next 18-24 months.
An official World Bank Study Mission
recently reported that ". .'net aid required
in 1980 will still be on the order of $770 mil-
lion a year.... it seems probable that Viet-
nam is at least a medium 'long haul' case as
far as foreign aid is concerned. . as a
purely arithmetical exercise . by 1990 the
external resources gap would close by about
$300 million to about $450 million." (Current
Economic Position and Prospects of the Re-
public of Vietnam", January 28, 1974, p. 34.)
As long as the GVN continues to refuse to
allow refugees to return to their villages, even
if in PRG zones-thus maintaining un-
productive islands of millions of people, as
long as it does not reduce its 1.1 million man
army, 120,000 man police force, and 350,000
civil servants,. moreover, there is little reason
to believe that the GVN can become economi-
cally viable.
In 1973, for example, the GVN exported
only $56 million, while importing $795 mil-
lion. There is no foreseeable way this huge
balance of payments deficit can be altered
until there is peace.
Indeed, the reverse is likely to be true,
as the cost of maintaining the GVN's war
machine rises for the U.S. taxpayer due to
inflation. Thus, although ARVN casualities
were down from 39,587 in 1972 to 11,093 in
1973, the costs of maintaining the ARVN for
the U.S. taxpayer did not decrease at all. Ac-
cording to official AID statistics supplied
Congresswoman Bella Abzug on February 20,
1974, U.S. Military aid in CY 1972 was $2.382
billion and in CY 1973 was $2.270 billion.
Secretary Kissinger himself as much as
acknowledged that our commitment to the
GVN is open-ended, when he stated in a
March 25 letter to Senator Kennedy that "we
believe it is important that we continue our
support as long as it is needed."
Paragraphs 12-14-If Committee members
actually do read the hearings for the FY 74
supplemental and FY 75 authorization they
will discover that the DOD not only provides
no evidence for any of its major assertions,
but even admits this on page 900: "The de-
termination of a ceasefire violation is ex-
ceedingly difficult. . . . As a result, we do
not have truly independent sources for in-
formation of this kind." Indeed, this fact
makes the numerous newspaper reports of
GVN ceasefire violations by western .corre-
spondents all the more credible
The question of whether the Administra-
tion is violating the "one for one" clause is
not at all answered by the insertion from
page 51 of the hearings, which in fact states
that no one, not even the ICCS, is aware of
what the Administration has channeled into
South Vietnam.
Given the fact that the Administration
has admitted. replacing the F5A with the
F5E, an entirely different aircraft, the weight
of the evidence would seem to indicate that
the Administration is not honoring the "one
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 20, 19 744
merit of weapons of the same taracteristics
and properties. The anew to this question
appears on page 51 of RASC Document 93-
40, and because of its pertinency, is set out
bela" in its entirety:
Question. Is the International Control.
Commission in Vietnam super?tsing the de-
livery of weapons and amn unition for either
side under article 7 of the ceeace-fire agree-
ment which provides for a one-for-one re-
placement of weapons of the same character-
istics and properties?
Answer. Article 7 of the ICCS Protocol spe-
cifies that the International Commission of
Control and supervision (ICCSI and the-Two
Party Joint Military Commission jointly in-
spect the entry into South Vietnam of re-
placements of war materiel permitted trader
Article 7 of the Paris Agreerxsent, The Viet
Cong has refused to perfltt the TPJMC to
carry out this function, and the ICCS has
taken the position that inspections by it
alone would not be official. The United States
and the RVN have kept records of replace-
ment shipments to South Vietnam and have
stated their readiness to provide a full ae-
counting to the ICCS and to the TPJMC
whenever- those bodies begin to carry out
their duties with respect to Inspection sari
replacement materials for the two sides.
Hanoi on the other hand has introduced
illegally into South Vietnam vast quantities
of armaments. No offer to allow' IOC$ inspec-
tion of this material has ever been made.
That the committee would just copy
word for word Executive testimony and
present ft as the recommendations of
Congress Is shocking enough, in and of
itself. It also represents a surprising de-
gree-of slovenliness and shoddiness. And
it raises the question of the very need
for a staff. Why should taxpayers fund
hearings, hire a staff, pay for the print-
ing of public reports if the committee is
going to merely mindlessly and slavishly
reproduce Executive testimony?
The real issues raised by the report,
however, go far deeper.
Is our only function to rubber-stamp
Executive actions? Are We to avoid tak-
ing Public witnesses more seriously, do-
ing some of our own investigative work,
integrating testimony by executive offi-
cials with that of other observers in an
attempt to come up with the truth? What
do we need the Congress for, if it is sim-
ply to endorse Executive pronounce-
ments, no matter how untrue or tenden-
tious.
The fact that the committee would
plagiarize Executive testimony, falsely
presenting it as independent conclusions
based on an impartial and thorough
analysis of the subject goes to the very
heart of our democratic system. It rep-
resents an unconstitutional erosion of
congressional powers, arid is symbolic of
our headlong progress toward an execu-
tive dictatorship in this country.
For, at the heart of the matter, there
is not only plagiarism, but more impor-
tantly, indifference to the truth and to
for one" portion of the Agreer nt. The c wa-
mittee report, moreover, also fails to rote
that the Administration is now proposing an
even more blatant violation of the Paris
Agreement for FY 75; introduction of 28
new F5Fs.
Most importantly, however, is the failure
of the Pentagon to provide a rationale for its
provision of $521.6 million in FY 74 and
$574 million in FY 75 for Operations and
Maintenance, and $42.4 million in FY 74 and
$24 million in FY 75 for personnel.
It seems clear that neither of these cate-
gories fit the provision of Article VII of the
Paris Agreement permitting only "one for
one" replacement, and Article IV by which
the U.S. agreed-not to "continue its military
involvement or intervene in the intirnal
affairs of South Vietnam."
Most shockingly, the Committee also fails
to note that the DOD's own definition of
what is allowed under Article VII also pre-
cludes Operation and Maintenance and Per-
sonnel. "The Executive r)rauch would be lim-
ited to furnishing only armaments, Muni-
tions, and war materials. . Those words
(were) defined by the DOD for the purpose
of complying with the peace agreeaaent,"
DOD lawyer Forman has testified (Senate
Armed Services Committee, FY 74 Aix hori-
zation hearings, Part 8, p. 5906).
Given such massive violations o' the
Agreement, the Administration Would be
better-advised to observe Article VII :'ether
than making empty offers to allow iaispec..
tion of records, particularly when res?onsi-
bility for the failure`of the Two-Party JN1C
may lie as much with the GVN as its
opponent.
our responsibility. The Caldwell testi-
mony is replete with factual errors, and is
indeed little more than blatant propa-
ganda misrepresented as serious analysis.
I believe that there are few more criti-
cal matters facing our Nation than ex-
posing the kind of congressional indif-
ference to responsibility represented by
this report. I further believe that the
House has an obligation to reject entirely
both the suggestion oi' giving $1.4 billion
to the Thieu regime this year and the
half-baked rationale presented for it.
Despite what the Pentagon and its
friends in Saigon would want us to hear
and to read, there is quite another side
of the situation in Vietnam. Because the
committee has not allowed us a full range
of material before we vote on this criti-
cal issue, I would now like to insert in
the REcoRo important testimony given
to the committee and other materials
available to it which present a broad
perspective on the existing situation.
The materials follow:
TOWARD PEaPETVAL WAR OR A POSETBLE
PEACE
(Testimony of Guy Gran)
The Military Assistance Service ;Funded
(MASF) program is the principal overt and
legislated channel through which the United
States sends military aid to the Republic of
South Vietnam (RVN) and to the Royal Lao-
tian government. For FY 74 this program
now has a ceiling of $1.126 billion of which
$1.022.1 billion for the RVNN. In the sup-
plemental bill under cxiisideration the Nixon
ceiling by $474 million, using pipeline funds,
to restore precisely the amount cut by Con-
gress from the original request.
It would be well at the onset to consider
that the MASF monies are only a part of the
direct and indirect military aid to the govern-
ment in Saigon. Additional military Support
results from all of the plasters generated by
$295 million of commodities under tl^ a Food
for Peace. program and some if not most of
the piasters from the c.$200m. Commodity
Import Program. Additional aid iF being
channeled through excess defense articles,
piaster purchases, and military service
money.' There is no reason to believe that
three decades of covert CIA activities in
Indochina, squandering both their own and
DOD resources, with and without legal au-
thority or, Congressional knowledge, has
come to a halt in FY 74. Finally, the RVN
benefits from the American military pres-
ence elsewhere in Southeast Asia. An early
FY 74 estimate of such costs was $1.1 billion.
A recent UPI report contained a DOD esti-
mate that the sum of- DOD activities in
Southeast Asia would cost $3.4 billion this
fiscal year?
The investment of another $474 million re-
quires judgments about political, military
and legal realities in Indochina. It also neces-
sitates judgments about the integrity of in-
formaton concerning such issues released by
the Executive branch. I shall argue that the
basic political and military arguments ad-
vanced on behalf of this level of aid are. not
supported by empirical evidence. A major
portion of the MASF program is not in keep-
ing with the legal provisions of ,he Paris
Agreement. The relevant informatiorr re-
leased by the Executive is deliberately dis-
torted and incomplete. In sum, our policies
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