NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029100010014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 9, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Friday July 9, 1976 CI NIDC 76-160C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday July 9, 1976.
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior o icials.
Lebanese Christians with Syrian support have apparently
stalled the Palestinian and leftist offensive against Christian
villages in northern Lebanon. The Christians reportedly have re-
taken Amyun--they regained Chekka on Wednesday--and were able
yesterday to take control of the principal access route to the
larger town of Zagharta.
I I The victory in the north has been costly for the Chris-
tians in terms of both casualties and troops captured by the Pal-
estinians. Palestinian forces continue to put up stiff resistance
to the Christian drive toward Qalamun.
I I Heavy clashes continued yesterday in central Beirut
an in the suburbs surrounding Tall Zatar refugee camp. Street
fighting has spread to most of the traditional lines of con-
frontation between the eastern and western sectors of the city,
and heavy artillery shelling has apparently caused another major
fire in the port area.
Yasir Arafat charged yesterday that Syria is planning
an imminent attack on Beirut itself. Although Syrian troops and
artillery have supported the Christian attack on Tall Zatar,
there is no direct evidence that would corroborate Arafat's al-
legation.
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I IPresident Asad did meet with top military and political
lea ers in Syria's National Progressive Front on Wednesday, pos-
sibly seeking endorsement for a new move in Lebanon. Asad has
generally sought the front's approval of important shifts in his
Lebanon policy.
I I A contingent of Syria's elite Defense Companies left
amascus yesterday, moving north toward Al Qutayfah. The unit,
the equivalent of a mechanized battalion supported by armor, had
122-mm. multiple rocket launchers. This weapon is not known to
have been used previously in Lebanon.
The Syrian contingent could be on its way to strengthen
the torce Damascus has been assembling near the Iraqi border, or
it could be moving into Lebanon. Syrian troop strength in Lebanon
has remained relatively constant for the past month.
The Israelis apparently continue to believe that events
in Lebanon pose no immediate threat to their security and to give
tacit endorsement to Syria's role there.
During a recent conversation with Ambassador Toon, Is-
raeli Defense Minister Peres, a hardline conservative usually
considered to be deeply suspicious of Syria's aims, cautiously
indicated that Israel could tolerate a consolidation of Syrian
control in Lebanon. He said this would be relatively less dam-
aging to Israel's security interests than a leftist - Palestine
Liberation Organization takeover of the country.
I I Peres discounted recurring speculation that Syrian
President Asad wants to transform Lebanon into an anti-Israeli
confrontation state. He cited Syria's continuing support for the
Lebanese Christians as evidence of Asad's determination to steer
a more moderate course.
Peres believes that a united and independent Lebanon
remains possible if Lebanese Christian leaders can effectively
reorganize and coordinate their military forces.
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I I The Israeli government has long hoped that the Chris-
tians will be able to maintain a strong political position in
Lebanon to offset--at least partially--the growth in Palestinian
strength and also to help prevent development of a hostile, left-
ist-dominated state threatening Israel's northern border.
I I Peres' apparent endorsement of a continuing Syrian
ro e pro ably should be interpreted more as a reflection of Is-
raeli satisfaction that the Syrians are actively working in sup-
port of Christian goals rather than an indication. that the Is-
raelis have abandoned their suspicion that Syria's military pres-
ence in Lebanon could ultimately work to Israel's disadvantage.
I I Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Allon have 25X1
repeatedly expressed concern that Asad could ultimately be forced
by Arab and domestic pressure to reverse his course and seek some
kind of accommodation with the Palestinians and Lebanese leftists
that would leave the Christians isolated and free the Palestinians
to resume operations against Israel.
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//Our early July estimate of the Soviet grain crop
is 195 million metric tons, unchanged from the mid-June esti-
mate. Later today the US Department of Agriculture will publicly
release a crop estimate of the same size.//
//The forecast assumes normal weather; the actual
CLOP UOUI(I urn out to be substantially higher or lower depend-
ing on the weather in the next month.//
//Conditions in most of European Russia remain un-
usua y avorable for the growth and development of winter
grains. Greater-than-normal losses last fall and winter, how-
ever, have restricted the winter grain crop to an estimated 45
million tons.//
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The De azLment of Agriculture's winter wheat
team I Irecently traveled through the heart
of the winter grain area and reported generally good conditions,
dispelling concern of abnormal plant disease problems.//
//Harvesting of winter grain will soon be in full
swing. Continuation of wetter-than-normal weather in the north-
ern European USSR, however, could cause delays and above-average
losses.//
//Overall, prospects for spring grains continue to
be good. Spring grain production is presently estimated at 150
million tons., some 59 million tons more than last year's disas-
trous spring grain harvest and second only to the record 1973
spring grain production of 159 million tons.//
Conditions west of the Urals that favored winter
grains have also fostered development of spring grains. In con-
trast to the rather uniform crop development in this area, crop
conditions east of the Urals are uneven in the main spring grain
areas. Since mid-June, a series of weak weather fronts have
passed over the Urals and northern Kazakhstan, resulting in nu-
merous localized showers. As a result, areas with above-average
yeild potential are interspersed with areas which have suffered
irreparable damage due to low soil moisture.
I I Soviet grain requirements are especially difficult to
estimate this year because of the effects of last year's disas-
trous harvest. They will depend on the rate of rebuilding poul-
try and hog inventories, which fell 15 and 20 percent respec-
tively last year; on how rapidly meat production, down roughly
15 percent this year, is intended to recover; and on the extent
of grain stocks replenishment. Additional claims on Soviet grain
supplies may come from Eastern Europe, especially Poland, where
shortfalls in livestock production have caused political prob-
lems of concern to Moscow.
I IWith a grain crop of 195 million tons, and few grain
imports yond those already contracted for or committed by
agreement, the Soviets would have a grain supply of about 210
million tons in the 1977 cropyear. This would enable them to
restore the quality of bread and other grain products to normal
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levels, increase meat producticn by about 800,000 tons during
the last half of calendar 1976, and slowly increase livestock
inventories.
Large increases in grain exports to Eastern Europe
an in grain reserves as well as a rapid buildup in livestock
herds would require substantial additional grain imports.
I I Large Soviet import contracts for grain and soybeans
in recen months despite favorable crop prospects indicate that
Moscow is giving a high priority to rebuilding its livestock
sector. So far, the Soviets have bought an estimated 13.6 mil-
lion tons of grain for delivery beginning this month. This in-
cludes 6.5 million tons from the US, 1.6 million tons of which
was purchased during the past week.
Purchases from the US include 3.8 million tons under
the US-Soviet grain agreement, leaving a minimum Soviet commit-
ment of 2.2 million tons. In addition, the Soviets have bought
2 million tons of soybeans, of which 1.5 million tons probably
will come from the US.
I I Soybean meal, a high protein feed, can be used to re-
ur livestock herds, while the soybean oil can be used to
cover any shortfalls in Soviet edible oil output--largely sun-
flower and cottonseed oil. The Soviets also have made recent
overtures for the purchase of 140,000 tons of beef and mutton
from Argentina and Australia. Earlier this year, they bought
almost 50,000 tons of mutton, beef, and poultry from Western
suppliers, including the US. These purchases of soybeans and
meat could reduce somewhat the need for grain imports.
I I There is no reliable information on the likely scale
0 Soviet grain imports for the balance of the cropyear. Bal-
ance of payments considerations may be critical. Outlays on
grain and soybean purchases to date have reached nearly $3 bil-
lion. Moscow has demonstrated a willingness to continue spend-
ing heavily for grain imports despite its hard-currency deficit
and growing indebtedness, but is probably becoming increasingly
concerned about these problems.
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Morocco's King Hassan, who marks his 47th birthday to-
day, enjoys a strong domestic position as a result of the acqui-
sition of Western Sahara last winter by Morocco and Mauritania.
His success in annexing the territory despite Algerian diplomatic
opposition and harassment by Polisario Front guerrillas has, at
least in the short run, enhanced his government's security and
popularity.
So far the military, traditionally the major prop of
the regime, has supported the government's campaign against the
Polisario guerrillas. Morale has probably improved somewhat as
a result of promotions awarded to lower- and middle-grade offi-
cers this spring.
I I Frustration over continuing hit-and-run guerrilla at-
ac s in Western Sahara and southern Morocco, however, could
again produce serious disaffection within the armed forces. The
military's commitment to Hassan is uncertain despite his efforts
to improve relations with the armed forces since military coup
attempts in 1971 and 1972.
I In his annual birthday speech today, Hassan is expected
to announce a new timetable for local and national elections. The
polling for local councils may be extended to Morocco's portion
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of Western Sahara in an effort to undercut Algeria's argument
that the wishes of the Saharan people were not taken into account
when Morocco and Mauritania partitioned the territory.
According to the US embassy in Rabat, the King is con-
sidering holding the local elections this fall and an election
for a national parliament in December or January. The latter
election would fulfill a promise he made in March 1972, when the
current constitution was promulgated.
The opposition parties have long sought a mandate from
Hassan to organize elections. They have also demanded a general
amnesty for political prisoners.
I I Hassan, who has quietly released some prisoners in re-
cent mon s, may be willing to consider at least a partial am-
nesty, both to entice the parties to participate in elections
and to undercut exiled Moroccans who are seeking or receiving
assistance from foreign governments to overthrow the monarchy.
I The King and his supporters would enter elections in
a strong position. In his campaign to acquire Western Sahara,
Hassan successfully played on the strong irredentist sentiment
of many Moroccans and created an atmosphere of national unity.
I None of the several opposition parties, which have been
out of power for more than a decade, is strong enough to win a
parliamentary majority.
I I Election-year worries in Japan's Liberal Democratic
Party have increased with the resignation of six conservative
Diet members to form a second conservative party.
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Although party leaders do not expect the group to
attract other defectors, the secession--the first in the party's
20-year history--troubles the conservatives, who are already
embroiled in the Lockheed affair and in efforts to replace Prime
Minister Miki.
The leader of the secessionists is Yohei Kono, the 39-
year-old son of one of the party's founders and a self-styled
spokesman for young and middle-ranking conservatives.
Kona justifies the resignations on the grounds that
the leadership has failed to restore public confidence in the
Liberal Democrats by carrying out promised internal party reforms.
The rationale is calculated to appeal to other conservatives who
are disenchanted with the party's recent election performance
and its prospects this year.
//Kono's reformist theme is popular among the
rank-and-file. Still, many party members see more personal and
immediate motives in his secession, including his concern that
Deputy Prime Minister Fukuda may soon replace Miki as prime
minis ter.//
//Kono is ambitious, and his differences over
policy issues with Fukuda have included very personal attacks
in the past. This makes it highly unlikely that Kono will play
a significant role in any Fukuda government.//
//Kono and his followers also believe that dis-
associating themselves from the party will boost their own re-
election prospects this year. Most of the group represents urban
and suburban constituencies where their election depends on
winning a major share of the independent vote. For them, any
swing in public opinion is critical, and they apparently calcu-
late that their vulnerability is increased by the party's
Lockheed difficulties.//
//Kono's group has acknowledged that it needs
20 to 25 followers to form a viable political party. That pros-
pect seems unlikely, however, and Kono is leaving the door open
for an eventual reconciliation. He continues to support the
Liberal Democratic Party's general policy goals and disavows
any intention to cooperate with the moderate opposition parties.//
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I I The increase in the prices of meat products, imposed
by the Hungarian government on Monday, has apparently provoked
no adverse reaction from the population. This will compound Po-
land's embarrassment over its mishandling of proposed price hikes.
I I Over the past several years, Budapest has periodically
raised prices on a number of food items without incident. There
have been signs of some shortages and increased grumbling, but
the Hungarian leadership apparently has been adroit in assessing
and molding the public mood.
1 -1 Budapest's job may have been somewhat easier because
Hungarians have not had the taste of political influence that
Polish workers experienced in 1970.
In addition, the recent Hungarian price increases, averag-
ing 30 percent, were less drastic and covered fewer foods than
those proposed in Poland last month. The Hungarian price hikes
also were preceded by an open discussion of the country's eco-
nomic problems.
Party chief Kadar's evident success on the price front
is a symbolic triumph that enhances his credentials as an effec-
tive national leader and could provide him with added levera e
in defending his domestic policies. F77
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