DISPOSITION OF CIA COVERT U-2 RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75B00159R000200070002-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 21, 2006
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 29, 1969
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75B00159R000200070002-1.pdf106.34 KB
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Approved For Release 2006/08/21: CIA-RDP75BOO159R000200070002-1 Approved For Release 2006/08/21: CIA-RDP75BOO159R000200070002-1 Approved Forase 2006/08/21 :CIA-RDP75BOpC0_ -1 25X1' TOP SECRET 25X1 SUBJECT: Disposition-of CIA Covert U-2 Reconnaissance Program MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: Henry A. Kissinger I am informed that in a meeting with Budget Director Mayo on 17 December 1969 you expressed your intention of terminating the CIA covert U-2 reconnaissance program. The continuation or termination of the CIA U-2 program was a question I had intended to raise in the 303 Committee before it unexpectedly arose in your meeting with Mr. Mayo. The CIA forwarded a memorandum dated 18 December to the 303 Committee recommending retention of this activity for the following reasons. This memorandum i, attached at Tab A. 1. The program provides a flexible overhead reconnaissance system with unique capabilities for high r>_solution photography, ELINT collect io It ?2an react rapidly to worldwide crisis situations cheaply, ef_fec_:ively and at little political riEk to the U.S. Government. 3. This new U--2R capability can be utilized with a reaction time of approximately 50 hours anywhere in the world and has a very high degree of survivability if attacked by either MIG-21's or SAM's. 4. This program provides the U.S. Col-ernment with a low cost option for meeting future crisis situa.tions in areas other than the more heavily defended areas of the USSR. The vulnerability of satellites makes this option especially desirable, particularly when it is recognized that neutralization of satellites would deny the U.S. a hiii percentage of its strategic intelligence. Top SEC1-"E'-1 69 1.32 25X1 Approved For Rase 2006/08/21 : CIA-RDP75B00159 00200070002-1 TOP SECRET -2- 5. During noncrisis perio set- is, used to collect intellieence on Communist Chinalttt~ 6. The SAC U-2's do not now have adequate sensors for all types of missions, lack the defensive equipment to operate in a hostile environment and of course do not afford the U.S. Govern- ment the option of nonattributability. On 20 December the members of the 303 Committee, with the exception of Mr. Packard, who was out of the city, discussed this activity in depth. It was the strong view of those present that.. the U.S. should retain this covert reconnaissance capability for contingency use in possible future crisis situations. Should future events dictate the necessity for resumption of covert overflights of the Chinese Communist mainland, this mechanism would be available. DISAPPROVE The combined NRO a,.-id CIA budget which enables the CIA to operate and maintain fbiq covert reconnaissance capability is on the order of The Committee believes that savings resulting from termination or tra.asfer of this activity would he slip-ht compared to the loss of the covert capability resulting therefrom. The Committee would like to study and review further the feasibilities of continuing or terminating or trans- ferring this activity and make appropriate recommendations to you before the next budget submission. RECOMMENDATION: That you approve retention of the CIA covert U-2 reconnaissance program with a budget on the order of for FY 1971, with the under- standing that the 303 Committee will study this activity further and make appropriate r=commendations to you prior to the FY 1972 budget submission. Attachment Tab A (" I321.1 OTHER TOP SECRET Annrny d Fnr Ralaaca 20OAlflR/21 ? ('.I Clfll F,ARflflfl7flflfl7flflfl7-1