DISPOSITION OF CIA COVERT U-2 RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP75B00159R000200070002-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 21, 2006
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 29, 1969
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP75B00159R000200070002-1.pdf | 106.34 KB |
Body:
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SUBJECT: Disposition-of CIA Covert U-2 Reconnaissance Program
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
I am informed that in a meeting with Budget Director Mayo on
17 December 1969 you expressed your intention of terminating the CIA
covert U-2 reconnaissance program.
The continuation or termination of the CIA U-2 program was a question
I had intended to raise in the 303 Committee before it unexpectedly
arose in your meeting with Mr. Mayo.
The CIA forwarded a memorandum dated 18 December to the 303 Committee
recommending retention of this activity for the following reasons.
This memorandum i, attached at Tab A.
1. The program provides a flexible overhead reconnaissance
system with unique capabilities for high r>_solution photography,
ELINT collect io It ?2an react rapidly to
worldwide crisis situations cheaply, ef_fec_:ively and at little
political riEk to the U.S. Government.
3. This new U--2R capability can be utilized with a reaction
time of approximately 50 hours anywhere in the world and has a
very high degree of survivability if attacked by either MIG-21's
or SAM's.
4. This program provides the U.S. Col-ernment with a low
cost option for meeting future crisis situa.tions in areas other
than the more heavily defended areas of the USSR. The vulnerability
of satellites makes this option especially desirable, particularly
when it is recognized that neutralization of satellites would deny
the U.S. a hiii percentage of its strategic intelligence.
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5. During noncrisis perio set- is, used to collect
intellieence on Communist Chinalttt~
6. The SAC U-2's do not now have adequate sensors for all
types of missions, lack the defensive equipment to operate in a
hostile environment and of course do not afford the U.S. Govern-
ment the option of nonattributability.
On 20 December the members of the 303 Committee, with the exception of
Mr. Packard, who was out of the city, discussed this activity in depth.
It was the strong view of those present that.. the U.S. should retain this
covert reconnaissance capability for contingency use in possible future
crisis situations. Should future events dictate the necessity for
resumption of covert overflights of the Chinese Communist mainland, this
mechanism would be available.
DISAPPROVE
The combined NRO a,.-id CIA budget which enables the CIA to operate and
maintain fbiq covert reconnaissance capability is on the order of
The Committee believes that savings resulting from
termination or tra.asfer of this activity would he slip-ht compared to
the loss of the covert capability
resulting therefrom. The Committee would like to study and
review further the feasibilities of continuing or terminating or trans-
ferring this activity and make appropriate recommendations to you before
the next budget submission.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve retention of the CIA covert U-2 reconnaissance program
with a budget on the order of for FY 1971, with the under-
standing that the 303 Committee will study this activity further and
make appropriate r=commendations to you prior to the FY 1972 budget
submission.
Attachment
Tab A
(" I321.1
OTHER
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