TESTIMONY OF GEORGE KARLIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000500140003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 88
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 10, 1969
• Content Type: OPEN

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TESTIMONY OF GEORGE MARLIN
HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
45-158 WASHINGTON : 1970
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JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
SAM J; ERVIN JR., North Carolina
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota
JOSEPH D. TYDINGS, Maryland
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, In., Maryland
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAws
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., NorthCarolina STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
BIRCH BAYII, Indiana MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
J. G. SouRwiNE, Chief Counsel
Jon,r R. NORPEL, Director of Research
AssoNSo L. TARASOCHIA, Chief Investigator
RESOLUTION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
Resolved, That the testimony given by Mr. Yuri Krotkov (under
the name of George Karlin) before the Subcommittee in Executive
Session on November 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 13, 18, 24, 1969 and March 9,
1970, is de-classified and released from the injunction of executive
secrecy and shall be printed and made public.
JAMES 0. EASTLAND,
Chairman.
Approved: November 19, 1970.
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CONTENTS
Testimony of George Karlin:
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TESTIMONY OF GEORGE MARLIN
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE TIIE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF TIIE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at - in room 154,
Old Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond presiding.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel.
Senator THURMOND. The hearing will come to order.
I remind the witness he has been sworn.
Mr. SOURWINE. Yesterday, we were discussing the operations
against the French Ambassador. Do you want to pick that up and go
on with it?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
We finished with this party in the restaurant Prague in Moscow
when the Ambassador and his wife invited all our company to a dinner
in the French Embassy.
That dinner was organized in a private way. There were 'only the
Ambassador with his wife and the cultural attache, Gerard, with his
wife. And we Soviets, who have been in restaurant Prague.
Mr. SOURWINE. Whom you named yesterday?
Mr. KARLIN. Right. Do you want me to name them again?
Mr. SOURWINE. No, I do not think it will be necessary to name
them.
IVIr. KARLIN. That dinner which we had in the French Embassy
was the next step on the way to becoming closer to the Ambassador
and his wife, particularly my way to be closer to the Ambassador.
After this dinner, we had other parties in restaurants. There were
some invitations from my side, there were some invitations from the
Ambassador's side. But to come closer to the operation itself, I must
admit this: Once, when his wife, the Ambassador's wife, went some-
where outside of Moscow-maybe that was her trip to Leningrad, or
I do not remember exactly, maybe that was her trip to Volga River
with Major Andreev-but at that time, the Ambassador was in
Moscow alone without his wife. I invited him to visit an exhibition
of famous, very talented, and known Georgian artist Gudiachvily. I
invited him and his cultural attache to observe that exhibition. I
invited also Kchovanskiy, as my friend and good interpreter.
After visiting that exhibition when French people went out to the
street, Kehovanskiy went out with the Ambassador and asked him
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whether he would pick her up acid bring her to her flat. Of course, he
very gently said yes. And they went to her place.
From Kunavin and from Kchovanskiy herself later, I have known
that she invited him to visit her flat, to have a cup of tea, and that
was their first meeting, which ended-well, how to put it-they had
love relation there. That was the first meeting, which then was
repeated. So what General Gribanov wanted, happened.
But later, I was allowed to know from Kunavin that the general
qualified success as unsuccess: It was impossible to use that lady
because of her past, because of her husband. It would be risky, said
Gribanov, to compromise the Ambassador using her.
Well, of course, he should think about this before starting all that.
It was his second mistake. Still, the order was to try now to organize
other parties and to involve other ladies-two of them.
This second lady and the last, I guess, was Kronberg. It happened
probably in two months' time, but still in the same year, 1958.
The Ambassador's wife went to her vacation, to Europe, she went
to Belgium, it was longer than 2 or 3 weeks vacation, and the Ambas-
sador was alone.
When the wife left Moscow, she jokingly asked me to entertain the
Ambassador, to spend time with him and so on. I have (lone it by the
order of KGB.
I invited him to organize some picnics outside of Moscow and I
came with Kronberg, and another girl, Golubeva. It was of course the
KGB swallow-girl and the idea. was this: To give the Ambassador
to decide what girl would be better for him, to have two of them to be
ready to please him.
I would say, he stuck his eyes on the first one, Kronberg. We had
been outside of Moscow. Then we visited one Soviet writer, Brynzev,
who was previously the KGB man, but then he left KGB and he
started to write novels. He died later, but he is known as author of
many detective stories.
We visited him because lie had a nice dacha outside of Moscow.
Then the Ambassador invited us to have hunch in the embassy.
There were four of us, these two girls, the Ambassador and me.
Then the basic operation was prepared.
Then Kronberg invited once the Ambassador to visit her place. She
had a special flat, KGB flat, in Ananevskiy lane. That was a one-flat
apartment, modestly furnished, with telephone, with bath, kitchen,
on the first floor. He came and they made love there. That means
that the Ambassador knew that flat a little hit. Kronberg told him
by the way that her husband is a geologist, Mikhael, but she told him
that usually, lie is outside of Moscow somewhere in some south part
of the U.S.S.R. doing his geologist work.
I invited the Ambassador again to go to a picnic and again, two
girls were with me. I heard from Kunavin, that before that Kronberg
was invited to the Hotel Metropole, where in the special cabinet there
was a meeting with General Gribanov, and his assistant Melkumov,
(Melkumian).
Melkumov, who was involved in this operation and whom I met
many times, and Kunavin himself presented at this meeting, the
KGB Captain Mischa was there too. He came from town Kazan-the
capital of the Tatar Republic. He was a KGB man, but I remember
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that Kunavin told me he had a rather unusual profession. He was
used in the whole operations when it was necessary to compromise
and to beat foreigners, because he was a very strong man, very rough
man, and that was in some way his specialty.
They discussed the whole operation which was planned in this way:
After the picnic, going back to Moscow in the Ambassador's car,
sitting with him Kronberg would ask the Ambassador to bring her
to her place and to invite him for the "cup of coffee."
Then there was a special cable prepared by the KGB, with such
words: "Coming Monday, kiss, Mischa."
When the Ambassador would come to the room, it was necessary
for Kronberg, by the way, to say: "Oh my husband will come to-
morrow, hell . . ." and so on.
Then they chose a password, which she would pronounce, partic-
ularly when they would be in a bed. The password was "Kiev", the
capital of the Ukraine, K-i-c-v.
There was a microphone in her room. But in the next separate flat,
beside "hers" . . at the same floor, there was the KGB operative
place where there was a loudspeaker and the short wave transistor.
When Gribanov from operative place would hear a word "Kiev",
Kunavin and Mischa worn in geologist's dresses, rather specific in the
U.S.S.R., with their rucksacks, with their staffs would enter Kron-
berg's flat. Mischa as her husband, according to the fable, then would
find the Ambassador with the wife of a Soviet geologist it's to say his
wife and they both, he and Kunavin, as his friend would beat the
Ambassador. It was necessary for Kronberg to cry that he is the
Ambassador, the French Ambassador and so on.
I have not been there, but I have heard all that from Kunavin,
who, I repeat, was very friendly with me. One day when he was
drunk, he told me, all that, being proud about his activity.
So, we went to the picnic, then we came back to Moscow and
Kronberg invited the Ambassador to visit her. I must admit that in
the second flat, there were General Gribanov himself and Colonel
Melkumov. All our trip from Moscow to the suburb we were followed
by two KGB cars. One was an old Pobeda car. Another was, we
called it in Russian, "GAS-64." The second car, and probably the
first, too, was equipped with short wave transmitters. They have
contact with KGB operative flat where Gribanov and Melkumov,
with other two KGB men were (Kunavin and Misha) presented. They
knew each move of our cars and everything what was during our
picnic.
Coming back to Moscow, we separated. I went with Ala Golubeva
"my girl", and the Ambassador took Kronberg in his car.
She went to her place and invited the Ambassador to have a cup
of coffee. I was ordered to come to my place and wait the call from
KGB.
There was a special reason for this which I would mention later.
Well, the Ambassador entered her room and all happened, how
KGB planned.
He was beaten there, although as I know from Kunavin, he was
beaten accurately, without face damages, but still pretty strong,
because idea was to show him that it is not a joke, that it could be
very harmful for him, and that these people are strong and tough.
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Kronberg cried. Mikhael mentioned that he would sue the Ambas-
sador, that he would go to the Soviet court, that he would make a
big scandal to show foreigners that in the Soviet Union there is no
place to do such a thing, to seduce somebody's wife, and so on.
Of course they frightened him, and I guess deeply, because when he
dressed in some way-I can imagine what a tragic and comical episode
that was, he went out and he told Boris, his driver, "Home, please,
home." Then he closed his face and Boris heard a deep breath, behind
himself. It is what Boris told later the KGB people and I heard this
from them.
I mentioned before that General Gribanov had his own private
relation with the Ambassador under the name Gorbunov, as the top-
ranked Soviet official. And the Ambassador, as I said, many times
visited his bid and luxurious dacha (KGB's). Two or three days
before our picnic Gribanov invited the Ambassador to visit his
dacha, I do not know, really, I do not remember, at 8 or 9 o'clock.
We estimated time in such a way that after scandal the Ambassador
would go home, probably to take a bath and be able to rest and
mediate what happened with him, before going to see Gribanov-
Gorbunov.
That's why lie wanted me to stay home. He thought about different
Ambassadors' reactions. Well, it could be, of course, an absolutely
different reaction. The Ambassador could even take his luggage and go
to the airport, I do not know, or call directly to the French President,
or he could call me, because I introduced him to Kronberg, and of
course, that would be natural if he would call me and say, please come
quick to the Embassy, I want to tell you something, and probably he
would ask my advice, what to do and so on .
He didn't call me. No. At 9 o'clock or earlier Colonel Melkumov
telephoned me and said: "OK, everything is OK, you can go to the
restaurant and to drink."
General Gribanov, after operation in two apartments ended, after
the Ambassador was compromised, immediately went to the KGB's
dacha-I do not know whether he changed his suit and took a bath,
but still, he waited there when the Ambassador would come.
I know from Colonel Kunavin and partly from Major Andreev, who
was the "wife" of Gribanov, that he invited some other people who
were usually among his "guests." I mentioned them yesterday,
Michalkov, this Sumzov, and some others.
The Ambassador came to this party after this beating, according to
Kunavin, he behaved normally, as a great actor, because he did not
start to talk about his trouble from the beginning. Even Gribanov
was afraid that he would talk nothing about it.
But at the end of this party, the Ambassador, calling Gorbunov,
Alec, because his real name was Oleo, Mihalovich, asked him to go to
the billiard room for a private talk and when they went there, there
happened a conversation which Gorbunov-Gribanov expected.
Well, according to Kunavin, the Ambassador asked Gribanov to
help him.
I must admit that the real result of all this pretty big and important
operation-I want to emphasize it-is not known to me, I would say
officially. All what I know, again came from someone else and is the
result of my own meditations and some additional operations which
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were done by me after the Ambassador's compromization, when lie
was more or less in Gribanov's hands.
I remember, for example, such an episode. Well, after the beating
of the Ambassador, we "related" still in a "normal" way. Only Kron-
berg disappeared from our "company" and KGB ordered me to say at
the Ambassadors presence by the way that she went to Kiev to be
filmed there in a movie. I remember I told this to the Ambassador and
he behaved absolutely beautifully, showing no emotions.
We had many other parties, and once I invited the Ambassador
and his wife to the flat of Cherednichenko, it happened particularly
when the Algeria crisis was at the stake. The KGB gave me disinfor-
mation-that means it was necessary for me to tell the Ambassador
something which was not correct and to see what would be his reaction.
They typed on such a little piece of paper what was necessary for me
to tell the Ambassador and to tell him that I have heard it somewhere
in the very top sphere, being at a Kremlin party and talking to VIP's.
This information was about the possibility of the Soviet Govern-
ment to recognize the Algerian Government at that time, which was
totally crucial, of course, for DeGaulle.
I remember that the Ambassador reacted absolutely angrily and
said, that would be wrong, that would be awfully wrong, that would be
catastrophic if the Soviet Government would do that.
Thinking about all what happened at that time I came to this
general point of view: I think that the Ambassador was compromised,
but I cannot say that he did become a traitor. I guess Gribanov had
a very difficult and complicated dealing with him. The Ambassador,
by my opinion was not totally in KGB's hands. If he would it wouldn't
be necessary for KGB to use me as I said above.
I think until the day when he was called back to France after my do-
fection, he still-based on my meditations, on my experience and the
facts which I put all together-it was a very tough, very difficult bar-
gaining between him and Gribanov. I can add that General Gribanov
and Major Andreev, later on behaved differently, they differently
talked about the Ambassador and his wife.
Sometimes they talked about them unpleasantly saying that they
are greedy, awful, they collect food which rested after the party,
they saved it, that the Ambassador is a terrible man because he gave
his wife only 50 rubles pocket money monthly and so on.
But there was a period when they talked, that the Ambassador and
his wife are pretty nice people, that they invited them to go to Sochi
to their dacha and they had such private relation that even some
friends of the Ambassador came to Moscow and Gribanov gave
them his dacha.
I think in that period, there was much better relation between
two parts. I think it reflected bargaining between Gribanov and the
Ambassador.
I must say that from my conversation with Andreev and Kuvanin,
I realized that General Gribanov wanted to use the Ambassador not
so much in Moscow, but to use him as much as possible when he would
go back to France.
I did not tell you that before in this report, but the Ambassador
came to Moscow when French President was Coty. But later, DeGaulle
took cower. I have learned from Kunavin that the Ambassador was in
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close private relation with DeGaulle, in the past. They have been to-
gether in London in the first DeGaulle emigration, during the war.
During that time, Dejean was DeGaulle's foreign commissar. Of
course, General Gribanov wanted to use all that. I have learned from
Andreev that DeGaulle wanted to replace Couve do Murville by
Dejean. There was even such a rumor that Couve de Murville said
somewhere that the French Ambassador behaves very strangely, that
the whole information that he was receiving from Lin is one-sided
information and very pro-Soviet and so on, which indicates that
probably still the Ambassador did something in a way to help General
Gribanov.
Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon, but how (lid you learn of what
Mr. Couve de Murville said to General DeGaulle?
Mr. KARLIN. In my conversation with Andreev, she mentioned
Alexey. It was a big hunting of MI-5 and the French Secret Service,
and even your people from CIA, to recognize who was that man, but
I knew only, and I know only his name-Alexey. She mentioned this
not Soviet gentlemen who sometimes visited Moscow-from Paris-
to meet General Gribanov privately, the gentleman who, by the way,
told Gribanov: "Do not worry about the west, do worry about the
East."
At the same time, that gentleman told Gribanov something which
he knew. That is my personal guess. I think there was some special
channel by which KGB could know this story.
Mr. SOURwINE. All right, go ahead.
Mr. KARLIN. Once, it was an order for all of us, for all our "Russia-
France" company, to stop any relation with the Ambassador and his
wife.
Why? Because this was such-again, that is a question, how it
was known, who told this to KGB-that someone from the French
Embassy reported to Paris about "friendship" between the Ambas-
sador and his wife and sonic strange Russians. All of us, including
Michalkov, stopped to relate with French people for a while, because
KGB suspected that probably the special commission would come from
Paris to investigate it.
I remember Kunavin told me that he does not know exactly
who made that report. Even they thought about the doorman, an
old gentleman. Kunavin told me that he worked in the French police
before, but he was a rather, I would say, primitive man. He was a
doorman, a servant in some way. Of course, he could be an informer,
too. But still, there was a moment when we stopped our relation
with French people. But that was probably for 2 or 3 weeks only.
Sure, it could be that KGB knew all that directly from Paris, or
that the French Ambassador, told it himself to Gribanov. All that
depended on the relation which was between them. This, I repeat, I
do not know. I must underline and emphasize strongly, that I do
not know of the nature of the bargaining which was after the com-
promising of the Ambassador.
If you would ask me what, I think about it, I would say that I
do not think that he became the 100 percent agent of the KGB. I do
not think so, because, well, still he was not so stupid. Be had one
weak point-sexual instability. Then, if you would compare him with
the Indian Ambassador, of course, the last one was stronger and
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"uneditible" for the KGB, but the Frenchman was more acceptable
for it.
Mr. SouRwINE. Do you know whether any films or recordings
were made in connection with the compromise of the Ambassador?
Mr. KARL IN. No. What I know is that there was a microphone in
one apartment and in another there were transmitters. Of course,
there could be this transmitter, a tape recorder, too, but I do not know
anything about it.
Mr. SouRwINE. You had nothing to do with any negotiations with
the French Ambassador after he had been compromised?
Mr. KARLIN. Nothing, but what I mentioned above.
Mr. SouRwINE. He never said anything to you about pressure
from the KGB or anything of that sort?
Mr. KARLIN. Openly?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; he never asked you for help, in other words?
Mr. KARLIN. He?
Mr. SouRwINE. The Ambassador?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, no. We played a game as if nothing happened.
Only I mentioned that Kronberg went to Kiev to make a movie there,
and I remember two other points.
Point No. 1 is this: Later, in summertime I was told by the KGB
be'ng with the Ambassador, to mention once more that Kronberg
still is filmed and that I heard that her husband is an awful man,
very jealous, and so on.
Well, I realized at that time that still Gribanov used this argument
as the pressure to the Ambassador. And knowing General Gribanov
personally, I can. say with a 100 percent guarantee, that he used all
possibilities which existed in his hands, in the best way, because he
was a very talented man. It was an ominous talent.
The second point is this: Later on, mush., much later, I do not
know-in 2 or 3 years time I told Major Andreev that in my last
conversation with. the Ambassador and his wife, I mentioned that
Kronberg married. She really married. That was something which
happened in reality and that, well, probably I forget that it would be
better not to tell the Ambassador about this, but still I told that and
I thought it was better for me to report about that to Andreev.
She was rather frightened, you see. She said : "But he knew that
she was married to the geologist?"
Then she said: "OK, 2 or 3 years passed and such a movie star
could marry two or three tunes during that period." Still Andreev
was worried about it. That means that still the "scandal" was
KGB's cornerstone, still that was the basis of the game. That means
that Gribanov still was Gorbunov.
Mr. SouRwINE. The Ambassador, speaking now of Dejean, as I
understand your story, did not have it real love affair with this girl,
it was simply a passing sexual connection?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwINE. Of a kind of which lie had had several with people
you had provided and you do not know how many with people that
he found for himself?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. SouRwINE. Now, what makes you think that this particular
incident constituted it serious threat to the Ambassador, that lie was
moved by it to betray his country in any way?
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1\MIr. KARLIN. I think it was a way to become a traitor. I repeat
again: I don't know whether the French. Ambassador went to that
way or not. I would probably add, in my testimony here, some purely
psychological evidences.
Being involved in the collaboration with KGB many years, still I
did not lose, I hope, my human nature and I could see what was
going on with other men psychologically.
I remember exactly that one day, when according to KGB's time-
table, one party was arranged, and when it accidentally happened
that the rest of the people did not come, I had been with the French
Ambassador face to face in the restaurant, "Udzni". We were two of
us there, only two. I wanted to see a little bit his real nature, because
usually he behaved along the diplomatic cliche, making jokes, some
pretty sexy ones, well, to eat nicely, to drink, to find some girls
he could look at and so on. And we have been there man and man.
And I wanted to talk to him a bit about life and death, about, well,
I can say-philosophy. I realized that he did not want to talk about
that.
I remember that if he would be a little bit different probably I
would give him a hint. I could not tell him anything openly, but prob-
ably, I would try to give him a hint to be careful.
Then, I realized that lie was inwardly a Philistine.
That was his tragedy, I am sorry to say that, but many, many
foreigners have not real knowledge of the scale of the KGB operations
against them. I am sorry to say to you Western people, this primitive
thing, this axiom: when you are coming to the U.S.S.R. you must
control each of your moves, each of your actions.
The French Ambassador didn't want to try to see in me a human
being in spite of the fact that I gave hiin such opportunity, he wanted
to see in me only a person who will bring him another girl who will
make his life enjoyable, who will organize picnics and so on-after
that, I even came to the idea, that it is OK, it is all right, lie must
be teached in such a way.
Mr. SouRWINE. What do you mean when you use the word
"Philistine"?
Mr. KARLIN. Philistine is the man who thinks life is only money,
you know, or his car, or his career. Nothing wrong would be if all
that would be at the second place, particularly if the man works for
the government, if lie is the top government official or diplomat, I
think the real man must be devoted to some big idea. If he would be
integrated person he would .not be in trouble, specially when he fights
Communists.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone ever tell you that the operation with
Ambassador Dejean had been a success?
Mr. KARLIN. You mean KGB?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, yes, they were proud of that operation.
Let me tell you this: After "scandal" later-I am sorry, but I got a
gift. Here I have an American gift, but I have another one very same
gold watch.
Kunavin told me that he wants to invite me to a restaurant and I
realized that it would be something pleasant for me. In the Aragvi
restaurant, I met Kunavin and Colonel Melkumov. We had good
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dinner, then Melkiunov officially pronounced a patriotic speech. He
mentioned about my long-term, very "devoted," very "talented" work
for the KGB and he said: "We want to make a present to you." He
said, "I am sorry we cannot make any"-usually, you know, the
government gives in the U.S.S.R.-I do not know how they do it
here-in the U.S.S.R. they put some sign-some inscription. But
he said: "We cannot do that, you understand tivhy".
He gave me golden Swiss-made watch "Doxa."
Then he said: "Our operation with the French Ambassador, was
one of the greatest in the history of KGB's inside operations." He
said that it would be good if I would try to write all that operation
from the beginning. He called me the first violin. He said: "Probably
you will write all this for our KGB high school students to study it."
Well, later on, I guess they consulted with someone at the top
and they came to the idea not to do it. It is my personal guess. I
think still they knew that many of the students later could defect
and that would not be so good, probably, to bring such lesson
to the West.
Off the record.
Mr. SOURWINE. Off the record.
Senator TIIURMOND. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Senator TIIIIRMOND. Back on the record.
Mr. SOURWINE. Why do you want that off the record?
Mr. KARLIN. I do not know, because I do not know until now
what is secret and what is not secret. I am so tired for this 6 years
to be in secrecy.
You know that I had a lot of trouble being under the British. Secret
Service. You know, what sort of agreements I signed. Until now, I
do not know whether I atn doing correctly, because still I have an
agreement nowhere, never mentioned all that,, you see, with the
red stamp on that agreement.
It is answer to your question, sir.
AMIr. SOURWINE. Have you told us all you know about the com-
promising of Ambassador Dejean?
Mr. KARLIN. Sir?
Mr. SOURWINE. Have you told us all the important facts?
Mr. KARLIN. I guess so. There were many details, but the carcass,
the skeleton I hope were depicted to you.
Mr. SOUR-WINE. What it boils down to is that you know that the
Ambassador was something of a philanderer, that he had sexual
relations with a number of Russian women, that in one instance,
they pulled the old badger game on him-that is, pretended to be a
husband and he was physically beaten.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. Soun-wiNE. But you do not know whether he over agreed to
work for the KGB or ever gave anything of a secret or confidential
nature, even, to the KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct, sir. That is absolutely correct.
Mr. SOURwINE. All right.
You mentioned Gibeau. Do you want to take a little break and
talk about Gibeau?
Mr. KARLIN. I have mentioned yesterday about Jeannette Gibeau,.
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his wife. You correctly said at that time that Orlov, after he fails
with his attempt to seduce the Ambassador's wife, was shifted by
the KGB to do the same thing with Jeannette Gibeau.
So Orlov tried in every possible way-well, there were many,
many meetings, you know. Even one day, Jeannette and Marie Claire
invited us, me and Orlov, to Gibeau's flat, the address of which I
mentioned yesterday. We had drinking and everything was very
intimate. Even, I must admit, there was a moment when I thought
it could be some sex relation between me and the Ambassador's
wife, too. They were drunk in a good way, and the situation was, I
repeat, very intimate. Still there was nothing between me and the
Ambassador's wife.
Then, Colonel Kunavin told me that Orlov is an idiot, that KGB
decided to switch him off from the operation, and he told me why.
The Russian, the teacher of Jeannette-she studied Russian, I mean
they were in friendly relation, Jeannette and her Russian teacher
who was, of course, the KGB lady.
She told Kunavin that Jeannette asked her about the Russian men,
their characters, how they behave, what sort of sexual interests
they have, and so on. Of course, all that was because of her "game"
with Orlov. I really think that she was infatuated by him and one
day, she invited him to her flat and she was alone there. I have heard
from Kunavin what later on, Orlov himself told me in rather funny way.
He came to Gibeau's place and he wanted to be, how to say, brave
before his "attack," and he drank two or three glasses of cognac.
In a decisive moment, suddenly, lie collapsed, you know, another
word he could not do anything. Therefore, she was absolutely shocked
by this and, of course, that is what I can imagine, General Gribanov
was shocked most of all.
Mr. SourtwINE. Are you saying in your own hyperbolic way that
Orlov was successful in seducing Madame Gibeau to the point of
achieving her consent, but at that point he was physically unable to
perform the sexual act?
Mr. KARLIN. That is correct.
And after that, of course, General Gribanov decided to switch him
off.
What I know about Orlov, that he worked before I met him, with
another department or section of the KGB, particularly against Amer-
icans. But I do not know anything he had done concretely. He did
something, because he was awarded by-that is a big, great award in
Russia-by an apartment. He got a separate one-room flat, and he
got it for something that he did before. That is what I know.
From time, when he "collapsed" he practically disappeared from
our company. Well., the Ambassador's wife many times asked me about
him. Actually two men disappeared, Cherkaschin first-and then
Orlov. But later, it so happended, it is a coincidence, it happened that
Orlov played hero's part in my movie, "Captain of the First Rank"
you see, which I showed the French Ambassador and his wife. That
was specially organized. She had. seen him on the screen and she
laughed and asked me where he is and so on.
So Orlov disappeared. Gibeau and his wife went back to France.
I guess 2 or 3 years passed after that. Then they came back again.
I knew about their coming from the Ambassador once, he mentioned:
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"Well, you know the Gibeaus are coming to Moscow again, and he is
coming as a general, military attache".
I have seen firstly Jeannette. She came to Moscow with her two
children-one son and a daughter, the son about, I guess, 15 or 16
years. They were good, educated, nice children. Then I met Gibeau
himself during the parties, you know. I met them only once and I
didn't know much about their life.
Only once, Marie Claire told me that the Gibeaus bought a new
flat in Paris, pretty expensive one and they must pay for it monthly
and so on. There was nothing special.
One day, I met one swallow-that is to say a co-opted KGB eirl-
Rita Prokofiev, whom I mentoned yesterday. She told me: "well, I
want to drink, I stay here in this house, I rent a room there with
another girl. Let's drink, let's drink." I bought some liquors and we
went to her place. Then I met another girl, Avakov, she worked in-
previously it was named the Bureau-of serving diplomats in Moscow.
It is a Soviet organization. Well, practically, of course, it is a KGB
organization, but officially it is under the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the U.S.S.R. It serves foreigners their apartments, their cars, vaca-
tions, and so on. She worked there. And of course, there were only
KGB girls.
We conversed, and she said, "You know what an interesting news
we have today?"
I said: "What about?"
She said: "You know, the French military attache committed
suicide."
I asked, "What is his name?"
She said: "Gibeau."
Prokofiov knew that I worked for KGB even against French, and
she looked at me inquisitively, she wanted me to say something,
you know.
I did not. When I came home, I could not call the KGB. It was
night time. Next day, I called Andreev. She said: "It is true, how
did you know it?"
I explained to her that I have heard it from Avakov.
She said: "I telephoned you all day yesterday and could not catch
you. You must call firstly to the embassy, call to the ambassador's
wife and tell her that you heard about this bad news and that you
want to see her immediately."
She told me that, "Of course, she will invite you to come to the
embassy, I will guarantee you, and please go and try to understand
what's going on in the embassy, how they react to the suicide."
Andreev was very nervous. I realized that something important
happened for KGB too.
I called Marie Claire and it happened actually like Andreev
predicted. Marie Claire invited me immediately to the embassy and
when I came I remember, like today, we went to the garden. There
is a big garden in the embassy. Partly it is a yard, partly it is a garden,
English style garden, where, by the way, there was a grave, of their
beautiful dog-what is the name of this dog? I have forgotten.
Mr. SoURwINE. I do not think that is important.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes; that is not important. I remember while we
walked across that garden, she told Inc all what she thought about
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tragedy. I realized from that conversation that her feeling and of
course, his feeling, because she mentioned the Ambassador, that was
their collective feeling, that what happened with Gibeau was private
thing. She told me: "There is no matter of any politics, you know.
Gibeau himself was a strange man for a long, long time, because he
was in the Algerian war, which was awful." She wanted even to say
that he was not absolutely normal, that he was a little bit abnormal.
I would say, he could produce such an impression. He was closed,
with grim eyes, you know. It was possible to say about him something
like that.
But I. realized that she wanted to underline it, very strongly under-
line it. Now, how Gibeau committed suicide?
Well, Marie Claire, mentioned before that the relation between
wife and husband, between Gibeau and his wife, was not good, never
was good, that they often quarreled. She told me about this a long
time ago.
According to Marie Claire, in the early morning, the Gibeauus
quarreled strongly and he took a car and went to his attache office.
He entered the room, there was a secretary, he went to his room, and
then in 2 or 3-in 5 minutes, I do not know exactly, but in a limited
time--it was a shot. When the secretary entered the room, he was
down, you know. He died immediately.
Marie Claire told me that his wife, after they quarreled, in 10 or 15
minutes time, went out and took a taxi and drove to his place, but
she came too late. Marie Claire told me that Gibeau's wife is totally
upset and shocked and that now she will follow the coffin with her
husband to Paris and that he will be probably graved, I guess in
Marseilles, because it was his birthplace, as far as I remember.
What I can say is this: the KGB, Andreev, Gribanov-and the
Ambassador with his wife, two sides tried in every possible way to
quiet that story, not to mention too much about it, to underline that
it happened accidentally you know, like something happened on the
street. Nothing special.
Colonel Kunavin was not terribly strong drunkard, but he liked to
drink and when he was drunk he talked too much. He told me many
stories, real interesting stories, for example, how the KGB man-
Kravchenko-became a general. He was the colonel and lie was respon-
sible for all security measures during the Teheran Conference when
Roosevelt met Churchill and Stalin.
Kunavin told inc that Kravchenko "prevented" assassination of
Mr. Roosevelt. Then Roosevelt told Stalin that, he wanted to see a
gentleman who worked so well aril to ask him how lie did his job.
Stalin. introduced to Roosevelt Kravchenko, and your President
said "Thank you, General". After that Stalin immediately ordered to
give Kravchenko the general's rank.
Well, Kunavin very often told me many details which was not
necessary for him to tell me.
We came to the Gibeau case too and he told me that once Jeannette
Gibeau was ill. I do not remember what sort of illness she had. So,
she went to see Russian doctors, Soviet doctors. Of course, again, I am
sorry, the KGB interferes here too of course,that was a special doctor,
that was organized in such a way, that he recommended her to go to
relax, to rest to Sochi.
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Sochi is a very known Soviet resort, like your Miami Beach, for
instance. And she went alone to this place. Colonel Kunavin told me
this: "We sent there now not Orlov but another one, very strong,
brave fellow, who seduced her there." He told me even that it hap-
pened outdoors. There are beautiful shores with the beaches there.
He told me that exactly, he told me that she was seduced.
Mr. SOURWINE. Not by Orlov, by someone else?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Orlov was unsuccessful?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. He never got another chance to try?
Mr. KARLIN. Who? Orlov? He was switched off.
Mr. SouRwINE. You told us yesterday or the day before that
Orlov's first effort to seduce Jeannette Gibeau had been unsuccessful,
he did not gain her permission.
Mr. KARLIN. That was the Ambassador's wife.
Mr. SOURwINE. You are saving now that the only time Orlov ever
sought to seduce Jeannette Gibeau, he was successful as far as gaining
her consent, but unsuccessful because he could not perform the act?
Mr. KARLIN. That is correct.
Mr. SOURwINE. All right, go ahead.
Mr. KARLIN. Now, if you permit me, I would like to meditate a
little bit because that is the only way to explain something.
Logically, if the KGB started an operation with the idea to seduce
Jeannette Gibeau, they of course wanted to compromise her and
through her to find a key to Gibeau himself. Jeannette herself was
not so interesting for the KGB, really. Fortunately KGB didn't
succeed with Orlov, but KGB sure didn't illuminate its idea.
When the Gibeau's came back and he at that time was in the more
important position as a general, of course, it is logical, absolutely
clear that the KGB tried to do something again.
Again logically, one can come to the idea that the KGB repeated
its attempt, which was ended by suicide of General Gibeau. From
my point of view, it's rather difficult not to put a tie between the
success in Sochi and the suicide.
Mr. SOURWINE. You are saying you are drawing that line, not
that you were told?
Mr. KARLIN. No, no, I am drawing it. That is my proposition based
on my meditations.
Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether this particular seduction
was witnessed or recorded on film or tape or any other way?
Mr. KARLIN. No, sir, I do not know it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Or whether it was used as a basis for an attempt
to blackmail the husband?
Mr. KARLIN. No, sir; I don't know it.
Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know for a fact that the husband over
learned of that or heard of it?
Mr. KARLIN. I do not know that.
Mr. SOURwINE. You do not know whether it was in any way
connected with his suicide?
Mr. KARLIN. I do not know that. Officially I do not know it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Unofficially, do you know it?
45-158-70-pt. 2--3
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Mr. KARLIN. Unofficially, I mentioned that I only have heard
from Colonel Kunavin that she was compromised and after that, I
have heard unofficially from the KGB. I would not say that I have
heard, but I felt how the Gibeau's suicide trembled them. It was
something unusual for them at that time, I repeat it was really
important fact. It put together a logic, all my 17 years' experience,
its possible to say that the KGB provoked Gibeau's shot. The
KGB killed him.
Mr. SouRwINE. You do not think, in other words-you do not
think-that the KGB got compromising pictures or tape or both of
his wife, and attempted to use it to blackmail him and that he com-
mitted suicide because of that?
Mr. KARLIN. It is particularly what I think.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is what you think?
Mr. KARLIN. That is what I think.
Mr. SOURWINE. But you are calling that murder?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir. I can add that Kunavin told me on ano ther
occasion another story which again was a point of search in London,
because Kunavin did not say who was, particularly, that diplomat.
He mentioned one diplomat for Benelux, the charge d'affaires. He
told me that he was with a KGB girl in a compromised position and
the picture was taken.
It is another evidence. If KGB could take that picture, why it
didn't take a picture in the Sochi, on the beach. I do not think that
would be a problem.
Mr. SOUR\WINE. You are speculating that they could have taken
such pictures?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, that is true.
Mr. KARLIN. They could do that.
Mr. SoURwINE. You do not know whether they did or no one ever
told you?
Mr. KARLIN. That is correct.
Mr. SouRwINE. It would not have made sense from the standpoint
of the KGB to have ordered Gibeau killed, would it?
Mr. KARLIN. No, I do not think they would order Gibeau killed.
I think it was his response to the KGB. He was a brave man, I guess.
Mr. SOURWINE. The KGB did not gain anything and could not
have stood to gain anything from his death?
Mr. KARLIN. I think so, sir. The KGB thought he would be like
Dejean but Gibcau was a strong man.
Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean they thought he would be like
Dejean?
Mr. KARLIN. It is the psychological matter, which is very im-
portant. They thought that Gibeau would choose, you know
Mr. SOURWINE. To receive them?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWINE. But you told us that you do not know whether
Dejean chose to receive them.
Mr. KARLIN. It's correct, but still he was in the KGB's trap.
Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether Dejean received them
or not.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, I don't know it.
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Mr. SouRWINE. But still you say they thought Gibeau would be
like Dejean.
Mr. KARLIN. I will explain it in this way.
I guess, if Dejean would be like Gibeau, after what they have done,
his reaction would be different. It would be either diplomatic break or
he would leave his place, or something else. Another word he wouldn't
continue that sort of game, as I see it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. How long was it after the seduction of Madame
Gibeau before the suicide of her husband?
Mr. KARLIN. Unfortunately I cannot tell you exactly, but I think
it was-let me try to remember when he came again to Moscow. I
guess it all happened in 1963. He came maybe in the end of 1962 or
the beginning of 1963. He was in Moscow second time a short period,
not a long period.
Mr. SouRwINE. You do not know whether it was weeks or months?
Mr. KARLIN. Lot me try to remember.
Oh, yes, we walked in the garden. That was beautiful around, you
know. That must be the summertime-summertime, yes.
No, I think that was the summer of 1963-yes--because I think that
was after I make a trip to Japan., when I came back. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. When did this seduction take place, the same
summer?
Mr. KARLIN. Sir, I do not know that really, because I heard it from
Kunavin and he did not mention when.
. Mr. SouRwINE. Did he tell you about the seduction before the
suicide or after the suicide?
Mr. KARLIN. I guess he told me that before-yes, before.
Mr. SOURWINE. When did he tell you about the seduction?
Mr. KARLIN.YOU mean the date?
Mr. SOuRwINE. Approximately. When was it when he told you
about the seduction?
Mr. KARLIN. It was all in the end of an operation. I mean my
active participation in it. Kunavin was dismissed later. The accident,
happened with him, too. He had an automobile accident and General
Gribanov sent him to another job, not a direct KGB job, to Riga. He
went to Riga. He is now, I guess, there in Riga still. I think that was.
particularly when he left his place and he was very unhappy, I think
that was one of those days when he was drunk or something like that..
Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been in what year?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, I do not know, it could be 1961. I am not sure of
this.
Mr. SoTRWINE. You did not see him. after 1961? He went away?
Mr. KARLIN. No; I have seen him many, many times later. I have
even been in Riga. He became the director of the Intourist Hotel
there, which was under the KGB observation. He was like the KGB
man there. Once he gave me a room, it was a problem to get a room. and.
he helped me.
Then he came two or three times to Moscow for some investigationsi
of the KGB. There were several unpleasant things for him. I do not,
know what cases were, but the KGB called him to make explanations..
Well, I guess when I defected, he was called, too:
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, I imagine.
Mr. KARLIN. No question about it.
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Mr. SOURWINE. Your best memory is that he told you in 1961 about
the seduction of Madame Gibeau?
Mr. KARLIN. I repeat, it's approximately.
Mr. SOURWINE. And General Gibeau committed suicide in the
summer of 1963?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. There was more than 2 years, then, at the least,
between the seduction and the suicide?
Mr. KARLIN. Could be.
Mr. SouRwINE. Well, if you were told about the seduction in
1961
Mr. KARLIN. Could be.
Mr. SOURWINE (continuing). That would have been 2 years before
the summer of 1963.
Mr. KARLIN. If you take the first date as an exact date, but I
repeat, that is not exact. Probably I was told by Kunavin even in
1963. I don't remember it. One year and a half the French team, the
British team, and even the American team, tried to check all that. It
was a scrupulous and very difficult work, you see, and then they did it.
In their reports everything is absolutely correct. But you know, still
many years passed after that and my memory is not so strong.
Mr. SOURWINE. These teams you are mentioning, you are talking
about the security teams which debriefed you?
Mr. KARLIN. Five Frenchmen worked particularly with that
operation, which we unofficially called "Operation Maurice," and three
men from British MI-5, too.
Mr. SOURWINE. What were they especially interested in?
Mr. KARLIN. British intelligence men were interested in every-
thing. They were my masters and they wanted to "sell" me in a good
way to the French, to show them how nice they are doing for them.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you say you were in this country. When
was that?
Mr. KARLIN. That was in 1964, August, until 1965, January-6
months.
Mr. SOURWINE. That was from 1964 until 1965?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes; that was August 1964.
Mr. SOURWINE. Until January 1965?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct.
Mr. SOURWINE. But all the questions about the operations of the
KGB were-whether it was against the Americans, against the Cana-
dians, against the French, against anybody?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir.
Well, to clarify my story, I would say this: When I decided to
defect-I decided this many times, but the last time when I decided,
and I wanted to refuse my way back, being in Moscow in a very
.special and very dangerous situation, I typed 175 pages, one line after
another, the whole operation of KGB, with real names.
I would say it was sort of justification for me. Actually, I put my
life on the stake.
Mr. SOURWINE. This was a recital of all the work you had done for
the KGB in 17 years?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. With names and dates and places?
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Mr. KARLIN. With everything. If I would be checked on the Soviet
border, in the airport, I would be shot. I wrote it. Then I filmed
whole pages. Mr. Kuznetzov followed my way.
Mr. SOURWINE. You typed it and then microfilmed it?
Mr. KARLIN. Firstly I typed it on the normal pages; with one
line intervals, a full page. hen I microfilmed it. When I explained
this job to the CIA because they wanted to know my whole tech-
nology, they said : "George, you are a genius."
Sorry, it is a joke.
Mr. SouRwINE. No; it is not a joke, because if you did not have
special microfilming equipment, it was a great achievement to got a
microfilm with an ordinary camera.
Mr. KARLIN. 1 got a special lens for my "Kiev" camera. I got it
from another co-opted nian, one from our company whom I did not
mention because of no importance. He was a cameraman and I asked
him to give me lenses.
He asked, "Why do you need them?"
I said, "Listen, I have some pornography, I want to reprint them."
He gave me three of them to use. And I have done it in my private
room, and the Soviet neighbors are pretty. inquisitive.
Mr. SouRwINE. You did this in your flat with 21 people?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. I had a room there. If there was a light between
my door and a floor, they would think, what he is doing there,
you know? They were not thinking about political thing of course.
But still, they thought, of course, why he is not sleeping there?
Mr. SOURWINE. Twenty-one people might figure out 21 different
things for you do do.
Mr. KARLIN. Well, still I brought it here. British MI-5 printed it.
Then they translated my manuscript.
I am afraid-well, I think that was done by Americans because
there were many American expressions, I would say, and the British,
service are rather poor, they have not enough money for it.
Then we discussed all details. French team told me when they
visited me three times in London that whole facts are correct, but
there were some differences in dates.
. Why I mentioned all that. You tried to clairfy the dates and I
repeat, that is all approximately, because in that time, you know,
there was a long time for us and we have many, many resources, how
to check by some association, well, to remember another thing, to
come to this to try to find the real date. And still there was some
shifts. But I guess in the end, they came to the real dates.
Mr. SouRwINE. And found it to be accurate?
Mr. KARLIN. I think they have done it and they have been happy
and I think it was some little thing for them to check in an American
area, because about my relation to Americans, I have only couple
things to say, because basically there were British, French, Indian,
Pakistani, Latin Americans, cases in my "past" but with Americans,
only some very few little things.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It is a quarter to 12. Before we open up another
case, I have it few general questions, little questions that have arisen
on what you have already told us.
We might take the time from now to noon on that and then break
for lunch.
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Mr. KARLIN. OK, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned KGB girls; what ages do they run
usually?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, that is usually from student ages. I would say
in 19 years, 20, 22, and probably there is no limit, because even it
could be 30, 35, you know. There is a big scale for it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now, from what groups do they recruit these
girls? From all walks of life?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes; that depends on what sort of jobs they collect
them for, because they have many, many different jobs.
For example, in one operation, I met a girl who probably I will
mention later. They sent her as a servant in the kitchen in the British
Embassy. But of course, she was a rather, I would say, simple girl,
without high education, even with rather poor language. This was one
channel.
Well, then, they used very, very often-I would say that is the
most typical kind of girls-the students from the Institute of Foreign
Languages, because they often need girls with some foreign languages.
It is very important.
But sometimes, they used, if they know that particular foreigner
speaks a little Russian, a girl without foreign language.
It is more natural and there it is good fun, where the people do not
really know language, they sometimes like one another more. It is
some sort of entertainment.
Mr. SouRwINE. Did the KGB make a practice of keeping a group
or corps or company of these girls working for the KGB or did they
most usually go out and seek particular girls for particular jobs on an
ad hoc basis and co-opt them on that particular work?
Mr. KARLIN. That could be this or that, because sometimes it is
urgently necessary to have some specific and gifted girl, you know, but
of course, they cannot use them without checking them before. Some-
times it takes time. I gave them girls' names and some biographical
details. Usually, they asked me to write all that I knew about girls,
even my psychological guesses-how they are inwardly and so on.
But after that, they need some weeks to clarify all that, to realize who
their parents are, to check all that, and then to get permission from
the KGB bosses, because they have, even in the KGB, a very bureau-
cratic system.
Once Colonel Kunavin told me this: We are totally without hands.
What happened? I have a Canadian diplomat, his car, with his lug-
gage. I could open this suitcase to look what is in, because I knew that
he went out for 2 hours. Two hours I could work. But I needed to get
permission for this. I called a general, he called another general, a
third general, and 2 hours passed and I could not open that suitcase.
If you think they are brilliant, sir, it is wrong. But if you think they
are idiots, it is wrong, too.
Well, usually they need 2 weeks to clarify everything, but if there is
some urgent need, they could cut it to 1 week.
At the same time they of course have a supply stock. They collect
them gradually, for example, Kunavin, each day when we met, said
to me: "Do you know anyone new?" He would "eat" them by the
hundreds. He asked me to give him every interesting girl from my
point of view. He trusted my girls. Whether later KGB accepted all
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of them or not I didn't know. It was their job and of course absolutely
secret job.
There is a colossal institute of co-opted Soviet girls. There were
many, many co-opted Soviet girls with different appearance, different
talents. If you permit me to say this, that was again a Kunavin joke,
very typical KGB joke:
One American diplomat, the young one, came to Moscow, and he
called to another American diplomat, an old one who has been in
Moscow 3, 4, 5 years. This young one asked him, listen, how about
the sexual life here in Moscow?
The answer was, "Oh, brilliant. You know, the KGB supplies us each
week with another blonde girl, like they change the sheets, in the hotel
each week."
Why girls do that? Because, that is what I know, because I met
them and I worked with them -they want to do it. They are happy
to do it. They are looking for this. Because, I repeat-I guess I said it
yesterday-that that is a chance for them. That is a chance to meet
some man. Maybe this man will be so brave and so honest, so good,
that he would marry her and would take her abroad-well, if not,
maybe he will help her to have a good dress, you see, or some money or
some little presents. So they are ready to work with KGB. They are
not thinking about what they are doing, whether it's good or bad, for
example, maybe later, some of them would regret it.
Mr. SOURwINE. How young would the KGB take a girl if they
wanted to get one?
Mr. KARLIN. How young-the girl?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. It could be done according to the Soviet Constitution,
after she became mature. That is after 17.
Mr. SoURwINE. It would have to be after 17?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes; because usually, they could think of sexual
relationships and therefore, it must be lawful, according to the law.
Mr. SOURWINE. You were in Moscow in 1057?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. We have heard a story about a Russian girl, a
member of the household, presumably of a KGB colonel.
Mr. KARLIN. KGB colonel?
Mr. SOURWINE. Who was reportedly, according to her story, raped
in the room of a Moscow hotel by a foreign diplomat in 1957 at a time
when she was 16 years old.
From your experience, does this sound like something that happened
the way she described it, or is it more likely that this was a KGB
operation and she had been co-opted for the period?
Mr. KARLIN. One must have more details.
Mr. SonRwiNE. I understand.
Would a member of the household of a KGB colonel be necessarily
exempt from such work, particularly if--
Mr. KARLIN. Let me tell you this: when we have been, for example,
with French people in our party in the Prague restaurant, I know
that a servant was a KGB major, it could be everything in U.S.S.R.
All depends on what KGB wants to do, practically.
They are flexible, sir. And therefore, it could be this and that, you
see. But I never have heard about a case, which you just mentioned.
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Mr. SouRWINE. What are the laws in Russia, and especially in
Moscow, with respect to such crimes as rape?
Is it a much greater crime with a young girl or a girl under a certain
age?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes; under the law, one would get 8 years, I guess.
Because in the Pakistanian case, there was such a case and KGB used
it in a different way. If they wanted to make a political scandal, that
is one thing. Among the Soviet people, it would be different, but it is
a law against rape.
Mr. SOURWINE. Is it there as it is here, that if the girl is under a
certain age, even though she consents, it is still considered to be rape?
Mr. KARLIN. As far as I know in the Soviet law, there are many
evidences. There must be some expertise, which was her position,
which was his position, and so on. I think there is something about age,
but I am not very familiar with this. I can only tell you that the
KGB can use this thing, too.
Mr. SOURWINE. It might be entirely possible, then, might it not, for
the KGB to set up a situation in which a diplomat might share a
hotel room with a young lady whom he found entirely willing--
Mr. KARLIN. Sure, absolutely.
Mr. SOURWINE. It is about noon. Suppose we break until about 2.
Senator THURMOND. We will recess until 2 p.m.
(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee was recessed to reconvene
at 2 p.m., the same clay.)
Senator THURMOND. The hearing will come to order.
Mr. Sourwine?
Mr. SOURWINE. We were talking this morning about KGB girls.
I think we finished that subject.
There is something I meant to ask you when you were discussing
the suicide of General Gibeau. Did you hear anything from your KGB
associates or superiors that would lead you to believe the KGB was
worried because of what the French might find out about Gibeau and
his relationships with the KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. I have heard from Andreev that the KGB was worried
how the French people would react to Iibeau's suicide, how they
would qualify all that in the first moment, because it would show, for
example, what the Ambassador thought about it. You see, I think
they were-that happened spontaneously, unexpectedly, and it was so
important for the KGB, that they wanted to know how French people
would react, I repeat.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider it possible that he had in fact been
recruited, that he was operating as an agent with the KGB, and that
the KGB was concerned lest the French take the attitude that he
might have been an agent and start checking up on what he had had.
access to and what plans might need to be changed and what codes
might need to be altered?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, theoretically, it could be, too. I personally think
that the story was different. I think that KGB tried to show him
probably some compromising pictures to recruit him.
Mr. SOURwINE. What picture was this?
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Mr. KARLIN. Well, I think there could be pictures of seduction of
his wife.
Mr. SouRwINE. You do not know that there was a picture?
Mr. KARLIN. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Who was it who seduced his wife?
Mr. KARLIN. That was another KGB man. It could have been a
co-opted man or the officer of the KGB.
Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know who that was?
1VIr. KARLIN. No. The question is: before he commitod suicide, there
was a quarrel between him and his wife. Why? You see, if he was
recruited before, he was afraid or the KGB was afraid that the French
Secret Service would know all that. It wouldn't have any relation to
his wife. I guess they met him, they said yes or no, of course, he was
shocked, when he came home he could of course quarrel with his wife.
That is logical. But it happened in a morning. I personally think, I
repeat, the shot was the result of the attempt of the KGB to recruit
General Gibeau. That is my personal thinking.
Mr. SoURwINE. Wouldn't they have made this attempt fairly soon
after they got the evidence?
Mr. KARLIN. It must be so but it depended on the situation.
Mr. SOURwINE. It was a long time after they got the evidence
before he actually committed suicide.
Mr. KARLIN. She went to the resort and when she came back, they
could do it-well, you see, that again, I cannot say the particular
date, because what I know about the seduction, I know that from
Kunavin and I don't remember when he told me that. I do not remem-
ber how long that was. And even lie didn't tell me, of course, which
time it happened. Nevertheless, I think you are right, theoretically
they do not need a long period between seduction and recruitment.
Mr. SouRWINE. I am wondering if it would not be more logical that
within a matter of weeks, at least, after the actual seduction, not 6
months later, they would have brought their weapons to bear on M.
Gibeau.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, possible.
Mr. SOURWINE. With whatever result, and if he had repudiated
them, their fear about the French attitude would have been at that
time, not later. But if he had begun to work for them, then they might
have been much concerned about the suicide because of the possi-
bility that it might lead the French to uncover the fact that he had
furnished them information and that might lead to various changes
that would obsolete the information. Do you follow me?
Mr. KARLIN. Theoretically, yes. It could be so. But again, I think,
knowing a little bit of Gibeau's character, I think he was a very strong
man with a rather patient reaction, and I think if he told KGB yes
the first time, I do not think he would shoot himself after that. Again,
I regard his character-it is my own guess, of course. Again, I repeat,
I do not know particularly how
Mr. SOURWINE. Well, nobody told you whether he had given in or
not? That is, you were not told whether the operation against Gibeau
was successful?
Mr. KARLIN. No, I do not know that.
Mr. SouRwINE. So you are only giving-which is important--
Mr. KARLIN. My guesses.
45-158-70-pt. 2-4
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Mr. SouRwINE (continuing). Your opinion based on your knowledge
of. Gibeau?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, that is true.
Mr. SOURWINE. Still, now, the kind of man you knew him to be, a
man who might not have given in because of a threat to himself, but
might perhaps have done it for the sake of his wife
Mr. KARLIN. Of his honor, I would say.
Mr. SOURWINE. Would not the fact that he had given in, if he did,
weigh heavily on the mind of a man like that until perhaps
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, I think so. He was the man like that. He could
have shot himself or he could say yes and he would work later, and so
on, because he was a strong man and if he decided to do that, he
would do that.
Mr. SOURWINE. When was it that Orlov got his magnificent flat
as a reward for the unknown seduction?
Mr. KARLIN. Orlov?
Mr. SouRwINE. You did not know who, but he had been successful
against some American, you indicated.
Mr. KARLIN. I am sorry. Could you repeat that again?
Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you tell us that Orlov had been used in an
operation against an American and had been so successful that he
got a flat as a reward?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, yes, I said that.
Mr. SOURWINE. When was it that he got that flat?
Mr. KARLIN. The flat?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, that I can tell you because I remember. That
was approximately in 1957, yes, because he invited me, even, to this
flat.
I know that because it is on the Avenue Frunzeskay. That is
opposite the Central Moscow Park.
I understand, I follow your idea, but there is one detail. But you
know the point is that it could be a long time ago even 1 year, until
they would be able to give him a flat, even if they wanted to reward
him earlier, because that was not so easy.
Mr. SouRwINE. In other words, he might have had his success a
year before, or perhaps even in 1955?
Mr. KARLIN. Could be.
Mr. SOURWINE. And didn't get the flat until 1957?
Mr. KARLIN. They promised him, but that is not so easy, because
still they must write the letter to the Soviet Government because
KGB (lid not want to give him a flat in its house, in KGB house.
Mr. SOURWINE. Although when you came back to Moscow and
found somebody in your quarters, they got them out and cleared
them for you almost overnight?
Mr. KARLIN. It was different situation. It was in 1943. Then KGB
helped me to get back my own room. I underline-Room.
Mr. SouRWINE. I think you told us about all you know-you have
indicated you have, in any event-about the operation against
Ambassador Dejean.
Mr. KARLIN. I remembered two other points which I would like
to report, because I think they are important.
Mr. SOURwINE. All right, would you tell us, please?
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Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
First is this: It was a time when in Paris it was announced' the
meeting between the Big Four. Between Eisenhower, De Gaulle;,
between Khrushchev and-who was at that time in England? I ami
sorry-McMillan.
In that time or a little bit earlier particularly, I know it from,
Kunavin and again, from Andreev, even from Melkumian he men-
tioned it once, it accidently happened that the French Ambassador,,
well, they mentioned that with irony, you know, that after some
party in the French Embassy, he wanted to take remnants of dishes
and hold them in his apartment; in other words to lock them in a
cupboard. But he slipped, you see, and his hand was broken.
Mr. SoURwINE. He slipped and fell?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. And broke his hand?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is too bad.
Mr. KARLIN. It was very important for the KGB, because they
wanted-that is what I heard from them-they wanted him to be
Do Gaulle's consultant on the meeting with Khrushchev and then at
the Big Four. It was better for the KGB if he would be on the right
hand of De Gaulle than another man, you see. And they tried to do
all what was possible to do. having shortage of time. I do not know
exactly-maybe 2 weeks, 3 weeks-to treat him, you know, to become
good enough to go to Paris.
Andreev told me that they put him in Botkinskaya Hospital, in
the special section which was only for the VIP, and they called the
best specialists, and they succeeded. The French Ambassador went
to Paris and was there at the beginning of important meeting.
Well, you know, the conference of Big Four was broken. But still,
it is one of the crucial evidences because I think if the KGB had not
had a good relation with the French Ambassador-I do not know why
they wanted him to be in Paris.
That was point No. 1.
Now, point No. 2: If you remember, probably, Khrushchev sud-
denly by his private initiative, declared that he recognized the new
Algerian Government. I remember next day or 2 days later I met
Andreev and she was angry, furious-it was very interesting, because
it indicated that inside KGB it was some sort of opposition to Khrush-
chev's power at that time. She told me something like that: "We
worked many years and such a difficult job was done. We came to the
great victory, we make the French people here in the Embassy with
the Ambassador, you see, our friends, people whom we can ask to do
something for us, but this one man has broken all that by his idiotic
gestures."
Mr. SOURWINE. That would seem to indicate that the KGB's hold
over Ambassador Dejean was not one of fear or blackmail but only
one of friendship?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, you know, in the language of KGB, friend means
much, much more.
Mr. SoIXRwiNE. I know it does. But such friends you do not lose
just because policy goes against them.
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Mr. KARLIN. Of course. But why to create some difficulty. It is all
not simple and mechanical process.
Mr. SOURwINE. If they had blackmail over the French Ambassador,
,it would not make any difference what Khrushchev did, he would
not like it, but lie would still have to respond to the blackmail.
Mr. KARLIN. But do you remember, sir, what was the result of
Khrushchev's action? The French Ambassador went to Paris and the
Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov stayed in Paris as a tourist. It was
an absolutely great scandal. It was very close to a diplomatic break.
By the way, Vinogradov, was in very, very close relation with De
Gaulle, he was the President's favorite.
So it was really a bad time for the KGB. The boss of KGB was
Shelepin. Of course, Andreev could not say those words by her own
initiative, you know. Of course that was said before by General
Gribanov and he heard it from Shelepin, no question about it. It means
that in that time, there were some differences, some contradictions
between Khrushchev and other people, you see, which was very
complicated, of course.
Now I want to point out that Andreev practically said that the
French Ambassador was "ours."
Mr. SOuRwINE. At that time, Shelepin was moving like a young
man of destiny, headed for the highest seats.
Mr. KARLIN. Well, something like that, Shelepin was young,
strong, and with support of Khrushchev himself, because Khrushchev
put him there, you see.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.
Mr. KARLIN. He came to that organization with the great support
of KOMSOMOL too. He took with himself to the KGB many young
people. I guess he is strong man among up-to-date Soviet Government.
But he is now a little bit out of the real power.
Mr. SounwINE. It is a question, of course, we are getting into poli-
tics now, what is in store for him. But for a time, at least. he seemed
to be headed for the very highest things.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, and at the same time, he was the Central Com-
mittee boss and held the minister of control, you see.
Mr. SOURWINE. And he has not been downgraded or shoved aside
to such an extent that one may say yet that he is completely out of
the picture?
Mr. KARLIN. I think he will come back to power one day. And I
don't think it would be a good thing for my people.
Mr. SouRwINE. Did you have anything else about that?
Mr. KARLIN. It is all that I wanted to indicate in regard to the
French case.
Mr. SOURWINE. It might be well to let the record show something
with regard to the background of Ambassador Maurice Dejean.
Incidentally, how old would you think he is?
Mr. KARLIN. Now?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. I think over 60.
Mr. SOURWINE. 70 this year.
Mr. KARLIN. 70 this year?
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Mr. SOURWINE. He was born September 30, 1899. He was chief of
the press service at the French Embassy in Berlin, 1930-39. So he
came up in the diplomatic service as a newspaperman and public
relations man.
Mr. KARLIN. I did not know that.
Mr. SouRwINE. I am surprised that you and he never talked about
that. That would have been an interesting comment.
Mr. KARLIN. No, they did not tell me about this.
Mr. SouRwINE. He was joint chief and chief of cabinet of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, 1939-40. He was director of political opera-
tions of Free France, February to September of 1941.
Mr. KARLIN. This I knew, he was in the movement.
Mr. SouRwINE. He was a member of the National Commission on
Foreign Affairs in London, September 1941, to October 1942. He
was diplomatic counselor of the French Committee on National Libera-
tion, January to August of. 1943, became Minister Plenipotentiary to
Allied Governments in London, 1943-44, director of general political
affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1944-45, became France's
Ambassador to Czechoslovakia in 1945, and served in that post until
1949.
He was a joint delegate to the United Nations in October, Novem-
ber, and December of 1946, was French delegate to the international
control of the Ruhr in 1949, became chief of the French Liaison Mis-
sion to the Supreme Allied Command to the Far East in 1950 and
served there until 1952, and became the French Ambassador to Tokyo
in 1952.
Mr. KARLIN. He met his wife there.
Mr. SouRwINE. He was also appointed and served as Consul Gen-
eral of France to Indochina, 1953-1954. He was made diplomatic
counselor of government in November, 1954, and became Ambassador
to the U.S.S.R. in December of 1955. He held that post until January
of 1964. He was given the personal rank of Ambassador of France in
1964, which is the highest diplomatic rank
Mr. KARLIN. After he came back?
Mr. SouRwINE. Yes.
He was given that personal rank and retired at that personal rank.
As I understand it, that is a rank like the rank of a four-or five-
star general. Once you have it, you retain. it for the rest of your life.
In 1965, he was made administrator of the French. Shell Oil Co.
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, that is a commercial job.
Mr. SouRwINE. It is a very large commercial job, a.semigovern-
mental, which is the position he still held in-at the end of 1967.
I have nothing further than that.
He was president of the Franco-Soviet Society for Industrial Coop-
eration beginning in 1965 and still held that job at the end of 1967.
He was administrator of the Society of Seashores, beginning 1966 and
still held that job, and beginning 1966; was president of the Circle of
Foreigners in Monaco.
Mr. KARLIN. That is a Government post?
Mr. SouRwINE. Well, you will have to tell me what the Circle of
Foreigners in Monaco is.
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It has some kind of a governmental connotation, apparently, since
it found its way into this biography, but I do not know exactly what
the duties entail.
In any event, he was still alive and well at the end of 1967 and at
that time, holding the personal rank of Ambassador of France and the
positions of administrator of French Shell, president of the Franco-
Soviet Society for Industrial Cooperation, president of the Society of
Seashores, and president of the Circle of Foreigners in Monaco.
The most interesting one there, is the Franco-Soviet Society for
Industrial Cooperation. That is a little bit like an American belonging
to one of the various Communist Fronts in this country, is it not?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. Well probably, I guess you read this book,
"Topaz."
Mr. SOURWINE. I read the book.
Mr. KARLIN. I can add to this something which I heard from the
British. They told me that he was called back from Moscow in a
special way and that that was organized in the short period. So,
not one-they called back not only the French, but some other
Ambassadors also at the same time, to show that there wasn't any-
thing special that happened with him.
I have no other comment, sir.
Mr. SOURwINE. Now, you spoke of Americans and Canadians.
Can we get to that subject before we move to any other?
What do you know of any KB G operations or what operations did
you, yourself, participate in which involved Americans or Canadians?
Let's take them one by one.
Mr. KARLIN. All right, the Americans first.
Mr. SOURWINE. Please.
Mr. KARLIN. There were three American correspondents, Jack
Raymond, Marguerite Higgins, and Bill Jordan.
The two men were from the New York Times and Marguerite
Higgins from the New York Herald Tribune. I guess the most im-
portant is the operation against Bill Jordan.
I was, as I mentioned once, I was not used to relate with Americans.
It was something special. First of all because of Peter Burchette
Mr. SOURwINE. Wilfred Burchette.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. Wilfred Peter Burchette. Being in Moscow, he
mentioned that one American would come to Moscow to be New
York Time's correspondent, in place of Jack Raymond.
He said he knew him pretty well because he was in Japan with him,
or in Korea, and he gave a hint that, well, he is an interesting person,
and therefore, KGB decided to use this possibility and asked me with
the help of Burchette to be introduced to Bill Jordan.
I met him and we had a very good and long, I would say, relation,
because I would say he was really interesting for me as a human being
too.
He was intellectually highly developed and deep human being, a
clever man, good correspondent, but I would say he was rather, a
little bit a person with, how should I say, rather in a good sense of the
word romantical nature, lyrical nature.
Mr. SouRWINE. This is Bill Jordan you are talking about?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, a rather soft man in the best sense of this word.
I met him many times in the Press Club in Moscow, then he invited
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me to his flat, then once he introduced me to his wife, with a kid-
one or two, I do not remember exactly.
Then I visited him when he was alone. I told him that I am now on
the way to write a play about Abe Lincoln and the Russian sailors
who came to America during the Civil War.
It was a very interesting story and I wanted to write the play and
then even to produce a movie. He immediately gave me a valuable
book, "Lincoln and Russia," and he wanted to help me in any possible
way.
I repeat we had a really good relation, because the KGB wanted
first of all to understand what sort of person he is, to understand what
lie likes, what he does not like, and so on.
Mr. SouRwINE. Were he and Jack Raymond both in Moscow at
the same time?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, no. When I met Bill, in that time, Jack was not
there. Maybe physically, he came in the same time, maybe they met.
But when I met Bill, Jack was out.
Mr. SOURWINE. He succeeded Raymond, then, as New York Times
correspondent in Moscow?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, I think-I guess so, but maybe there was some-
one between them.
Mr. SOURWINE. All right.
Mr. KARLIN. And practically, the KGB did not give me any idea
what to do with Bill.
Mr. SouRwINE. You were just told to develop a friendly rela-
tionship?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURIWNE. And you were successful in that?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, I guess I realized what sort of man he was and
I reported, of course, all that.
Mr. SOURWINE. What sort of man was he?
Mr. KARLIN. I mentioned that he was intellectually highly devel-
oped, with a good education and very human, very. I would say, a
man who can go deep into things.
We met many times, as I said, without any particular purpose
from my side.
Later on, absolutely accidentally, I have known something about
KGB and Bill Jordan. Once I met a former very top rank KGB man,
with the agent's name Karev. Victor. He was a Greek by nationality.
Kunavin told me that during the Stalin time, he was a pretty big man,
highly decorated, he worked abroad with his reliable but terrible
French language-not English. Then he was dismissed during the
Khrushchev "thaw". Then KGB used him as, how do you call it, a
part-time worker. He worked in close association with his former
subordinates, you know.
I met him in the Hotel Moscow. I guess it was the time when KGB
wanted me to be free-lance correspondent of some Canadian newspaper
in Moscow, later on he was a man who organized all that story with
Burchette, you know. The first part was mine and then I "gave"
Burchette to Karev.
Mr. SouRwINE. How did you come to meet Burchette?
Mr. KARLIN. The first day, in Moscow?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
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Mr. KARLIN. Well, he called me absolutely unexpectedly from the
Hotel Savoy. That is now the Berlin Hotel. And he in that time passed
Moscow, flying from Hanoi [Vietnam] to Bulgaria, and he telephoned
me. I, of course, telephoned immediately to the KGB officer and he
told me, well, all right, go and see what he wants.
Mr. SoURwINE. Why did Burchette telephone you?
Mr. KARLIN. I guess he realized even when we met in Germany
that, I am a special man from the elite, maybe he even could suspect
that I had something with the Soviet Intelligence, because he was
very open with me, when we met.
Mr. SOURWINE. I opened up the Burchette thing, but let's leave it
for a moment and come back to that.
Mr. KARLIN. Fine.
Mr. SOURWINE. I mentioned it because I have anote here that Bill
Jordan had introduced you to Burchette.
Mr. KARLIN. Who-Bill introduced me to Burchette?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. It is impossible, because I met Burchette in 1947 in
Germany.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I thought.
Mr. KARLIN. It was opposite. It is only an error, grammatical,
probably.
Mr. SounwINE. Who introduced you? Burchette introduced you to
Jordan?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, that is what I just said, I was introduced to Bill
Jordan by Burchette.
Mr. SOURWINE. Were he and Jordan good friends?
Mr. KARLIN. I would say they had friendly relations. I don't know
whether they were good friends.
Burchette told me he met Bill Jordan in Japan and Korea, and he
gave me a hint that it would be all right to cultivate him.
Mr. SouRwINE. You mean Jordan was telling you it would be all
right to work withBurchette?
Mr. KARLIN. No, no.
Mr. SOURwINE. You mean Burchette was telling you it was all
right to work with Jordan?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. This was after you knew that Burchette had been
an agent?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, you know, I could suspect that Burchette was
an agent, even in Germany, because
Mr. SOURWINE. I understand. But at the time Burchette told you
it was all right to work with Jordan, were you and Burchette openly,
talking to each other as Communists?
Mr. KARLIN. As Communists? I have never been a Communist.
Mr. SOURWINE. All right, as agents for the Soviet Union?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
The point is that when Burchette came to Moscow first, when he
called me, the next day, we went to the restaurant, at river place in
Moscow, and he showed me his papers and he openly told me that he
worked with the Chinese Communist Party, he opened all his cards
and put them on the table.
Mr. SouRwINE. At an early time?
Mr. KARLIN. What?
Mr. SOURWINE. At an early time?
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Mr. KARLIN. Yes, from the first day.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you said that he knew of your connection,
that is why he came to you?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. When he was telling you that Bill Jordan was all
right to deal with, that meant something, didn't it?
Mr. KARLIN. It could only mean that Burchette advised today
to use Jordan's good and human nature, it does not mean that Jordan
was pro-communist or something like that.
Mr. SOURWINE. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SOURWINE. Back on the record. I understand that you feel
that the individual you identified as Karev may actually have been
one Kartzev?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Will you spell that name for us?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, K-a-r-no, K-a-r-t-s-c-h-oh, how to spell
it-K-a-r-t-z-e-v.
Mr. SOURWINE. What was his first name?
Mr. KARLIN. Victor Alexandrevich.
When I met him, we had been in the Hotel Moscow, and I do
not remember what we discussed. Suddenly, a telephone rang. He
took the receiver and he talked to someone, and I realized, hearing
this conversation, that that was a girl who told him what happened
with her during her meeting with some foreigner the previous evening;
By that conversation, I realized also that the foreigner with whom
she was in some relation but I cannot tell exactly it was a sexual
relation, suddenly started to talk in rather too human way, about
life, about some unhappiness around people, you see, about tragedies,
death, war, and even he cried.
Mr. SOURWINE. Who cried?
Mr. KARLIN. This foreigner who met this girl. They talked, this
girl from somewhere talked to this Kartzev and by their conversation,
I realized what happened-she met some foreigner and there was
conversation between them. It was so unexpected for her to hear
those sort of things, Kartzev laughed.
Then from Kartzev telephone conversation, I realized that the
foreigner in 2 days' time wants to fly to Stockholm for a few days.
When Kartzev put the receiver down-well, I did not like him,
he was an awful man, really, Probably that is why I said it:
"Listen, do you want me to tell who was this foreigner?"
He said, "Well, who?"
I said, "That was an American correspondent, Bill Jordan."
He said, "Well, how do you know that?"
I said, "Well listen, that is a very simple thing. I heard your
conversation and I visited this gentleman a week ago and he told
me that he plans to fly to Stockholm for a couple of days."
And he said, "No, no, that was not him."
But I am personally sure it was him.
Well, I do not want you to misunderstand me. That is again what
I think, because, actually, he said no, no, it was not him.
Mr. SOURWINE. Well, did he say how did you know, or did he say
"No; that was not him"?
Mr. KARLIN. No, no; it was his reaction, he was surprised greatly.
It gave me a point why I thought it was him.
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Mr. SOURWINE. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SouRwrNE. Back on the record.
Mr. KARLIN. From that little conversation which I have heard
accidentally, I came to the idea that KGB tried to do something against
Bill Jordan, aside of me, but I do riot know what was later, whether
they tried to do something more after he came back from Stockholm
or not, that is what I do not know.
When Bill decided to go back to the U.S.A., we met again, and we
said to one another "Goodbye," and separated nicely. Fortunately,
I didn't hunt him.
Mr. SouRwrNE. You gave your information about Jordan when
you were discussing this?
NIr. KARLIN. It was written in my manuscript which I brought
with me from Moscow. Therefore, that was read by everybody-I am
not sure whether they gave this whole to the French people. I think
probably they only gave them the chapter of the "Operation Maurice."
I think someone- I do not remember exactly---told me that KGB
made some attempt against Bill Jordan, but that he reported all to
the Embassy.
Mr. SOURWINE. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SouRwrNE. Back on the record.
Mr. KARLIN. She said that they really tried to blackmail Bill, but
that he reported immediately to the Embassy and he was not in the
KGB's trap.
Now about Marguerite Higgins.
She came to Moscow, when U Nu, the Burman Prime Minister
officially visited the U.S.S.R. Which year it was-1 am not sure about
it. Somewhere in 1955. She came to Moscow as a correspondent and
she stayed not long. The KGB knew that I met Higgins in Berlin
and had some relation with her there, I mean a normal relation, that
I was introduced to her by Burchette. Therefore, the KGB decided
to renew our relation. The KGB organized my meeting with her at
a very big official party. Yes, that was in 1955, because I remember
Malenkov was at that party too, and Molotov. It was rather difficult
for me to meet her there, because there were about a thousand people.
Still I met her and she did not recognize me, firstly.
It was necessary for me to remind her: "Remember, I had been
in your house in Berlin with Mr. Burchette and you had at that
time a Pontiac, blue." She said: "Yes, now I remember you."
She invited me to come to her place, to the Hotel Metropole, to
have lunch with her, but the KGB decided not to do it, I don't know
why.
I remember that KGB sent me to the Exhibition of the Modern
French Artists, it was organized in Moscow and Higgins had been
there and I again met her. I remember we discussed the Lincoln
problem. I asked her whether she would be able to help me to get
some of Carl Sandburg's volumes. She promised and she told me at
that time that very soon, she would go back to the U.S.A. Practically,
there were two meetings, between us, and not any actions.
I don't know whether it's good place to mention about relation
between Marguerite Higgins and Burchette.
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Mr. SouRwiNE. Go ahead if you know anything about that.
Mr. KARLIN. Once in Moscow Burchette told me that, it is a
rather important thing-I know she died, but it is still rather im-
portant, even historically-
Recently being in Vienna, Austria I met there the British corre-
spondent Eric Bourne, whom I mentioned before, who went with us
to Pennemunde. He told me in Vienna that Marguerite Higgins met
in Berlin first Panton, the first correspondent of the Daily Express.
He was very knowledgeable person. He knew everything and it was
necessary for her job to have this sort of friend.
Then there was some intrigue and his wife was rather jealous. As a
result she became friendly with Burchette. Later even she wanted to
marry him.
Well, Eric Bourne called it a possible business-like marriage, because
two of these correspondents would be able to help one another in
their job. He undorlined this point. But they didn't marry, of course.
In Moscow when Burchette wanted to show how valuable he could
be for the KGB, he mentioned among other possibilities one which had
a connection with Marguerite Higgins.
He said that he was in close intimate relation with her and she liked
him and that later she married some very important American
general, the Air Force general. He gave a hint that probably, this
situation could be used for KGB, his relation with her in the past
and her new marriage to this military general.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was he saying that she had been his mistress?
Mr. KAMAN. Whose Inis1ress?
Mr. SOURWINE. Burchette?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, he said.
Mr. SOURWINE. And suggesting that that might be used against
her now that she was married to a general?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct, sir-not against, but-well, yes.
Mr. SoURwINE. Yes, used in. an operation to
Mr. KARLIN. Yes; correct. I don't know, unfortunately, whether
later when Burchette became KGB's agent they made any attempt
to use the situation which I described above. I remember at that time
Burchette mentioned that he would not be able to got an access to
the United States, that if he would come here, he would be arrested.
Mr. SoURwINE. We will got back to Burchette in just a moment.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. Any other Americans?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. Jack Raymond, whom I met first in Berlin,
with whom I had a friendly relation, and whom suddenly, absolutely
unexpectedly, I met at a party in Moscow. What was that party?
I guess, if I am not wrong, it was during the official visit of Guy
Mollet who was the French Prime Minister. It was a big party in
Moscow club of newspapermen and I went to that party because I had
a special task to meet English Reuters correspondent, John Rettie.
I came there, by the way, with Colonel Barsegov, who was the chief
of the KGB's special department; I do not know whether it exists
now-a department which controlled only foreign correspondents.
This Barsegov planned the operation against the British corre-
spondent and we went there, both, because Barsogov worked himself
under the code name, Borodin. When I conversed with Rettie I
suddenly had seen Jack Raymond.
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He recognized me immediately, and invited me to his apartment
which was the same that Bill Jordan had later.
I visited Jack many times. He wanted to see all his Soviet friends,
whom he met in Berlin-well, there were many persons-and he invited
all of them and no one come, except me. I was the only one who got
permission from the KGB to go there, because the KGB again had the
same idea, to try to understand what is now Jack Raymond's political
position. The KGB knew something about him before in Berlin, but
time passed and he came as a correspondent of the New York Times
to Moscow, which was rather important.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is why you were assigned to him?
Mr. KARLIN.Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you were instructed, were you not?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, but firstly, I met him accidentally. Then I
reported and they said, OK, go, and look.
Mr. SOURwINE. Was this a compromising operation of
Mr. KARLIN. No.
Mr. SOuRWINE (continuing). Or just an operation to learn what you
could about him?
Mr. KARLIN. To learn something about him.
Mr. SOURWINE. His habits, his traits, his activities?
Mr. KARLIN. That is correct, sir, his character, his political views.
At that time, Jack Raymond had really some friendly ideas of the
possibility to have a good relation with the Soviet Union, because that
was particularly after the Khrushchev speech-well, that was the time
of Khrushchev's speech. He produced it before, but it was not pub-
lished, you see.
I remember one day he invited me saying: "Come, George, I will
show you something interesting." When I entered his apartment he
opened on the table the newspaper and said, "Look at that." I have
seen the Khrushchev speech published in English, with pictures of
some revolutionaries.
I said, "What is that, how could that be?"
Be said, "That is the New York Times publication."
I said, "How did you get it?"
He said, "I do not know exactly."
Later on we went with Jack and one of my girls to the restaurant.
He was with an English model girl.
We enjoyed, really. My relation with Jack was without any opera-
tive purpose from KGB. He was very friendly with me.
Then this happened: He wanted to cross the Soviet Union on his
way back to the States. He even thought that probably he could
be able to get the visa to visit China and to be almost the first Amer-
ican correspondent who visited Red China at that time. He tried to
use-he was a very good correspondent, clever, flexible, even crafty in
the way which is necessary for correspondents to be, and he wanted to
obtain the Chinese visa and the permission from the Soviet Govern-
ment to cross Siberia, the Far East-in other words parts of the
U.S.S.R., which wasn't seen before by any foreign correspondent
actually.
The point is that the press department of the Soviet Foreign
Minister promised him to give such a permission. Of course, his
attempt to get a Chinese visa failed, but still he had a hope to
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visit unknown Soviet land. He wanted to write about this and at the
last moment, the press department said no.
I remember he telephoned me. I came to the hotel "Nazional," and
he told me, "Look, George, I have been here as your friend. Now I am
thinking differently. I was loyal, but look what your officials have
done with me. I am a correspondent and I want to see your places, I
want to write and so on, but what are they doing?"
He said, "I will come to America and I will tell all that to my
people even I will lecture and I will explain how they deceived me."
He asked me whether I would be able to help him. Well, I have done
something to show him that I am trying to do something, I called
Bespalov-that was the gentleman whom I mentioned, and I told him,
"Remember we met in Berlin Jack Raymond?" He said, "Of course,
I know, he was in Moscow," I asked him whether he would be able
to help him.
He said, well, he could not do anything. He knew I was the KGB
man. He understood that our conversation was false because, I said
on the phone, that I am calling now from the hotel being with Mr.
Raymond.
Practically, Jack went back to the States without permission to go
to visit Soviet places. It means almost that there was not any KGB
operation against him done.
The KGB did not tell me to do anything, they wanted only to know
what he said, what was his
Mr. SOURWINE. You were to strike up a friendship with him, gain
his confidence, judge him, and report about it?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct.
Mr. SouRwINE. And this you were able to do?
Mr. KARLIN. In some way.
Mr. SOURWINE. He know, did he, that you were working for the
KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. He couldn't. He could only suspect it, especially
of ter--
Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me. I did not mean to ask did he know
that you had been assigned to him. We assume he did not know this.
But did he know that you had been co-opted by the KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. He could know it if I would tell him.
Mr. SOURWINE. You never told him?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, no.
Mr. SOURWINE. That he may have suspected?
Mr. KARLIN. He could suspect, particularly when he invited all
these Soviets, his friends.
Mr. SouRINE. And you are the only one who came?
Mr. KARLIN. He was clever enough to understand it.
Mr. SOURWINE. But he never mentioned it to you?
Mr. KARLIN. No. He didn't do it.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you never mentioned it to him?
Mr. KARLIN. No. I didn't.
Mr. SOURWINE. As far as you know, he did not know and still
doesn't know that you were assigned to develop a friendship and
report on him?
Mr. KARLIN. You mean now?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, now.
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Mr. KARLIN. I think he knows now because my manuscript with-
out names, "Diplomats in Moscow," was in the hands of Don Levine.
I guess Jack was among others who wanted to help me, to get per-
mission to come to the States, because I got a letter from Jack
Raymond, where lie mentioned that he must tell me honestly that
with my "background," it would not be so easy to come to this
country. Well, I think the word "background," indicated his know-
ledge about my relation with the KGB.
Mr. SOURWINE. Does that conclude the story with Raymond?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, it concludes the story with Raymond.
Now, I can only say something very, very little-two little things-
something about Thompson, the American Ambassador.
Mr. SOURWINE. Llewellyn Thompson?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, the American Ambassador.
Well., actually, not about him, but about his wife. Firstly, still,
I repeat that last time I was in the particular KGB channel, which
"controlled" the French Embassy but had nothing to do to the
American Embassy. Nevertheless* Marie Claire Dejcan, the French
Ambassador's wife, was in very close relation, she told me that, with
the wife of Thompson. Once she wanted to visit the studio of well
known Soviet sculptor Kun, who was a mother of that gentleman, the
camera-man, who was in "our" group. She was co-opted by the KGB
too, of course, but she did not do anything herself. She was the sculptor
with a big house, studio, and she did very good sculptures, you know,
statues, busts, little things, and so on. Marie Claire visited her many,
many times because that lady made her bust.
Once she told her that she would come tomorrow with Mrs.
Thompson.
Of course, the KGB knew that immediately and Kunavin called me
and asked ine to go there and be introduced to Urs. Thompson. But
she did not come.
Secondly, once Iii, the French Embassy, I have been at a big recep-
tion with many foreigners. By the way, I was iniroduced there to the
Italian Ambassadora.nd the Japanese Ambassador with the beautiful
daughter, known there. And then I have seen in the window-there
is a big window, you know, with this, how do you call it -
Mr. SouRwiNE. Drape?
Vlr. KARLIN. Yes, curtains, two big curtains. I have seen there
one or two persons. I have looked and I have seen a very attractive
woman, oh, about 40 years, maybe-well, a rather American type of
woman. I can recognize them because 1. like that type of woman.
With her there was a man, tall, young, and they joked in a rather
intimate way. But they'still were two of them, and I remember that.
'WVhen I told that, I do not know whether I mentioned that in the
report-well, probably yes. Kunavin told me, "You know who was
that lady, and who was that man?"
'
1 said, "No, I do not know."
Ile said, "That was the wife of the American Ambassador and
the man was the employee of the Finnish Embassy Staff." He men-
tioned first or third secretary, I do not remember exactly which one,
but one of the secretaries. And Kunavin told me that it was a sort of
love affair between them, and he smiled.
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Well, you see, it was typical for the KGB staff. Every time they
like to mention that there were some sort of love relations among
people in the diplomatic corps, that they sleep one with another,
pretty simply. The KGB wanted to show me that the diplomatic
corps actually was an ugly place. The KGB accused many foreigners
of hom.osexualism and adultery, treachery, and so on.
I do not want to be misunderstood. I don't know myself anything
about Mrs. Thompson. I told you what I have heard from Colonel
Kunavin.. I cannot guarantee it was really so. And at the same time,
I must say that Colonel Kunavin almost never told me something
wrong.
Mr. SOURWINE. You know nothing about any other Americans?
Mr. KARLIN. No, sir; I think that is all. I met many of them,
but I did not relate with them.
Oh, I am sorry. There is a. little point about the wife of an American
correspondent named Stevens. You know, she wanted to meet me
and she invited me many, many times, and the KGB said no. Why?
She had a daughter-I guess now she is a professional ballerina,
because she was in the Bolshoi Theater Ballet School.. But even there
was a rumor among the Soviets, I would say, intellectuals, who
visited embassies, that, Stevens and his wife is rather-you know,
strange people and even maybe they work for both sides, you see;
the same rumor existed about Shapiros, the Associated Press corre-
spondent in Moscow and his Russian wife. But I don't know anything
about these people but rumors.
Mr. SOURWINE. What Stevens are you talking about?
1-1r. KARLIN. The Americaii correspondent in Moscow. What he
represented there, which newspaper, I do not remember.
Mr. SOUR\VINE. At what time was he there?
IVIr. KARLIN. It was (luring the French operation, because I
remember such an episode. Once we went to the restaurant in Khimki.
There was a big restaurant. The KGB wanted to organize our meeting
in the place where there could not be foreigners. But that was no so
easy to do. When we came to this restaurant, unfortunately-who
told me that? I guess they told me-yes, Maurice Dejean and Marie
Claire, told me: "Look, there is Mrs. Stevenson with some Americans,
here."
Mr. SouRwrNE. Is it Stevenson or Stevens?
Mr. KARLIN. Stevens, I'm sorry.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was it "v" or "ph"?
Mr. KARLIN. This I do not know.
Mr. Sou- RwINE. What paper did he represent?
Mr. KARLIN. I think he represents not the paper but the agency,
maybe AP or UP or something like that.
Mr. SouRwrNE. You said you placed the time. What year was it in
in terms of the year?
MMlr. KARLIN. It was in 1958.
But I repeat that by some reason, KGB did not want me to meet
that lady, Mrs. Stevens, you know. Usually, if there was some opportu-
nity to get a natural good acquaintance with foreigners the KGB
try to use it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Why did she want to meet you, do you know?
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Mr. KARLIN. I do not know. I think her interest probably came
particularly when she had seen me in the company with the French
Ambassador and his wife in that restaurant.
Mr. SOURwINE. I See.
Mr. KARLIN. Then, you see, there was the Soviet composer
Bogoslovsky, who visited many diplomatic receptions. He was known.
He spoke very good French. I remember once I met him, and he said,
"Listen, Mrs. Stevens wants you to come to her place, she wants to
talk to you."
I was introduced to her once at the reception. But we talked only
2 or 3 minutes, you see. Therefore---well, I do not know what was her
purpose to see me, but it happened like that.
Mr. SOURWINE. Since you did not see her -
Mr. KARLIN. Well,the order from the KGB was opposite.
And I guess that is all about Americans.
Mr. SouRwINE. Did you know Annabel Bucar?
Mr. KARLIN. No, I never met her, but I know her story, from KGB
people, because one similar story happened with another British man
whose book I partly wrote in Moscow.
Mr. SouRwINE. Was this part of an operation. against her by the
KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. This one?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. Lapschin seduced her.
Mr. SouRwINE. He had been co-opted to work and she was an
assignment, right?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, she was--no, firstly, she was in love with this
man. Then she left the Embassy and she wrote the book. Of course,
that was-and I know they told me that Lapschin was a co-opted
man, like me, like---
Mr. SouRwINE. That is what I mean.
Mr. KARLIN. It is correct, yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. She was a clerk in the U.S. Embassy?
Mr. KARLIN. I guess she was a cipherer girl, yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. She was seduced by Lapschin who
was a KGB agent?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes but then
Mr. SOURwINE. What happened? Did she defect to the U.S.S.R.?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, yes, she defected, and later on her rather noisy
book, "From the Window of the Embassy." was published in Moscow.
Mr. SOURwINE. What is she doing now?
Mr. KARLIN. Working in Moscow radio as an announcer.
Mr. SOURwINE. Is she still married to Lapschin?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, they have two kids one a big one, and she was
accompanied with bodyguards for the first few years. I have heard
from her good friend that she is now very unhappy and she wanted
probably to come back to the U.S.A., but it is not so easy for her to do.
But she calls, sometimes, her parents in the States and talks to them
by telephone.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any information about a Canadian
or Canadians?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, there was one operation at which the KGB
spent a lot of money, and energy. It was against two young Canadian
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cipher girls. I am not sure I remember their names. One was Brown
I guess, another-I do not remember the name of the second one.
The purpose of that operation was this: The KGB rented for ine a
dacha in the vicinity of Moscow, in a place called Cheluskensy.
The KGB rented one dacha for me and then I realized-they did not
tell me this-they rented at an opposite side of the street, in the
country-there are country streets-another dacha. Firstly I did not
know it, but then the KGB told me it. And they had in the Canadian
Embassy, a Russiam woman whose name I do not remember, too,
because I never met her. I only have seen her and I knew something
about her. She was a tall, gray lady, very Russian; but Soviet. She
worked in the Canadian Embassy as a technical secretary. Of course
she was co-opted by the KGB.
She was ordered to press the Canadian Ambassador, the First
Secretary and the staff to rent for their vacations, for their weekend,
the dacha somewhere around Moscow. But they did not do that.
They said they do not need it.
Later the KGB ordered her to tell them that she rented the dacha
for herself, and that was particularly this one which was located oppo-
site my dacha, and it could give her a chance to invite some of them to
"her" dacha to spend their weekend. Idea was this: when two Cana-
than girls, among others, would be there, when they would play
probably ball or walked, to find a way to get acquainted with them.
Then I realized that they put another KGB man there, too. Again.,
they did not tell me this firstly, but then it was impossible not to tell
me it. The second man was Schvartz, they put him in the back of her
dacha. There was one room there and he introduced himself as a
student of the third course who is now trying to prepare himself
for the exams. It was very difficult for that lady to bring Canadians
to her dacha. They did not come for it long, long time.
We prepared everything. Even one musician-what was his name--
Igor, probably. The musician with the accordion came, you know,
with an idea probably if Canadians would come and sit here, to
entertain them and to become "friends".
Well, still, one day they came. They had lunch, in her dacha. Then
they came out and I have seen another young follow, absolutely
Soviet, and I thought who could he be? Then I realized-they told
me that too-It was Schvartz, who went with them, you know, to
play ball. They played ball, then they came back, then they go back
to Moscow, and they then disappeared.
In a month's time, they came again and we could not do anything,
really. Then by one KGB's order the Russian lady pretend to be ill
and someone called to the Canadian Embassy. We hoped that they
would come to visit her, and even we prepared a table, with wines
in front of her dacha.
But only the First Secretary came. He came alone and he went
through us. He spent half an hour with the lady and then he came
back and even he didn't look at us and he went to Moscow.
All that operation failed and nothing was approached. It was an
attempt with a great idea, but nothing happened.
Mr. SouuwiNE. All because of good security, would you say?
Mr. KARLIN. I would say they were all right, these Canadians.
They were human, good, but they were well instructed, I guess.
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Mr. SouRwrNE. If we started the Burchette story, we could not
finish tonight.
1MIr. KARLIN. Yes, it is a long story.
Mr. SoumvTNE. I still want to talk about the man Koreshi, the
Pakistani.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, there were two of them, Koreshi and Murad.
Mr. SouRwrNE. This was in 1948?
Mr. KARLIN. No, I guess it had to be in 1949, next, after the
Kaul case.
The KGB officer who was responsible for that operation, it was
his operation, he was the "author" of it, was an absolutely stupid
man, you know, absolutely primitive, the old Chekist type. His name
was Kovalev, Major Kovalev.
Egorov introduced me to him--because Egorov was his chief.
Kovalev was under Egorov. He said, to me: "Now, probably you
will help us to make something with the Pakistanians." Kovalev
explained the general situation in the Pakistani Embassy, and
pointed out two diplomats named, one, Koreshi----his first name was
Sahmi, another was Murad, Enver Murad. They were newcomers
in some way, and KGB was interested to "work" with both of them,
but Kovalev told me that from. his point of view, from his knowledge,
and information, Murad would be better to start to work with,
because Murad is not very stable and &o on.
Mr. SOURWINE. Murad was third secretary of the Pakistani Embassy,
right?
Mr KARLIN. Yes, I think so.
Mr. SouRwrNE. Korheshi was the first secretary?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwrNE. How come you skipped the second secretary?
Mr. KARLIN. I'm not sure that I remember correctly their ranks.
Mr. SouRwrNE. I understand. How come the KGB skipped the
second secretary? They went after the first and the third.
Mr. KARLIN. They wanted to work with all of them.
Mr. SOURWINE. The two you were working on were Koreshi and
Murad?
Mr. KARLIN. They are fishing, you see they are looking which
fish would be fat and more profitable. And sometimes, they prefer even
to work with cook in the Foreign Embassy, then with the first
secretary.
How KGB organized my meeting with the two Pakistanians, and
how I was introduced to them-there was the Soviet diplomat
Volkov-the first name, I guess, was Boris. Boris Volkov. I would like
to say that I am not sure, but I heard that he became even the Am-
bassador of one of the coun tries in the East, later. But in that time, he
worked in Moscow in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He met those
two gentlemen in Moscow or abroad.
I remember that I was told that Volkov worked in the Soviet
Embassy in Afghanistan.
Kovalev composed a very complicated, I would say an idiotic plan
how to organize our meeting. I don't know why, we waited somewhere
on a square in Moscow with Volkov and then some KGB boys came to
us and say, look, there are two gentlemen. Kovalev probably thought
that Volkov would not recognize them immediately.
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127
Then Pakistanians went into the underground and we took a KGB
car and crossed the center of Moscow, having the special horn. Then
we stopped at another underground station, waiting when Paki-
stanians would come out of it. And of course, all that was so compli-
cated that we could not meet them, as it result.
Next day, we stayed close to the Embassy, we talked, and when
those two boys passed Volkov stopped. them, he said: "Oh_, hello, Mr.
Koreshi, Mr. Murad."
He introduced me to them.
I would like to say that it is rather important for you to understand
this-the relation between KGB and the Minister of the Foreign
Affairs is rather specific. In my first meeting with Volkov in the
Moscow Hotel, the KGB introduced me to him, and they told me
something about him. But I would say Volkov felt himself not all
right, because, well still, practically, they have absolute, total contact
between these two offices, two machines.. But they are trying to do that
as safe as possible and never to open it, never to mention anything
about it. Even they like to say that they don't like one another.
At the first meeting, I remember, Volkov showed that it is a corn-
promise for him., that he is doing something that is not really neces-
sary for him to do.
Well, he was probably it little bit afraid, of me because they intro-
duced me as a writer, but not an officer of KGB, and he thought what
e-ould happen, who knows?
Alas, it has happened.
Volkov introduced me to those two gentlemen and Ave fixed the
date of our dinner. It was it big dinner, organized, in the restaurant
"Aurora"-one of the best Moscow restaurants. We have been four
of us there. We talked about everything. But the idea was,. why we
went to this restaurant, the idea was to give me the opportunity to
create the friendship with those people and to get their telephones.
And, of course, it was a very simple task and I succeeded. Even
probably-I am. not sure of this---maybe even there I fixed our next
meeting.
Then I related with there it long time. We visited many restaurants
together, we went to skating rink. Then they-no, sir, that was 1949,
because they came to see my play. They had been in my theater.
They had seen "John, Soldier of Peace". It means that the operation.
started somewhere in 1949 and. then. continued in 1950.
My opinion was totally opposite the Kovalevs, I told him and
litter other people, at KGB, that the Koreshi is much better to be
provoked. It so happened that another Pakistanian=Murad--
suddenly told me that he is on the way out of the country. I do not
know why. I think something happened, but I guess in no connection
with KGB.
So Koreshi was alone and we related with him, I repeat long time.
Once he told me that he does not know what to do, because one
Russian girl telephoned him to his Hotel NIetropole and that he could
not reject her and she said, I would come to see you, and she asked
the number of his room.
Well, usually the number of the telephone is the number of the
rooms, you see, in Moscow. I do not know how it is here in your
hotels.
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128
When she came, there was only conversation, according to Koreshi.
But the second time, they went together to a bed, and he asked inc
something about what is the custom in the U.S.S.R., you know, how
to relate with girls, you know, whether she needs money or something
like that. But I guess after that, she tried to provoke him, to ask him
to marry her, to bring her money and to go abroad and to bring
dresses and so on.
But I must say it was not a KGB girl. That is one of the variations,
you see, when there are volunteers, girls with their own initiatives. This
girl was a very strong and really independent character. Kovalev, and
even the man I mentioned yesterday, Schubnikov, was involved in
this, he invited me cud lie talked to me and lie said, "Liston, you
know, the girl is very tough and we cannot do anything. We talked
to her mother, because we want to use her, but she said, "go to hell, I
do not want to have any relation with KGB, I am doing my own
;job", and it was impossible to do anything with her.
She was arrested later.
It's interesting that particularly at that time, it was organized by
KGB, of course in Soviet newspapers, there were publications about
the court procedure against another Pakistanian, whose nano was
Munir. He was a servant-he was not in an important position-lie
met a Russian girl and then she went to the court and she said, lie
raped her.
It created a rather nervous situation among diplomats in Moscow
and particularly for Koreshi. He was afraid of all this.
Then. Schubnikov asked me whether I think it is possible to recruit
Pakistanian. I told him that probably, it is possible to do, but it is
necessary to do in a very delicate way, because he was a young,
rather, I repeat, naive and roinantical man. He was not good in-
structed, he was not educated special how to behave in the U.S.S.R.
Ile was very friendly and he wanted to learn Russian language and
he said many good words about Stalin at that time, being not a
Communist, of course, but he was very pro-Soviet at that time.
Without my knowledge the KGB tried to recruit him in a very
rough way. I was told about it by Egorov. Kovalev met Koreshi
somewhere and told him that if he would not sign the agreement with
the KGB, the whole sexual story would be opened, you see, and he
would have many troubles. Even Egorov, smiling, told me that
Kovalev tried to recruit the Pakistanian under a muzzle of a pistol.
Well, I do not know whether it was figurative words or real things,
but still, the result was that Koreshitelephoned me and said: "I
want to see you because I. am leaving your country in a couple of
days time and please come for the last meeting."
I telephoned the KGB. They told me that I could go and bring
him it present. I brought him, because of his interest in the Russian
language, such a very heavy, big packet of the records of the "his-
torical" Stalin's speech, when lie "produced" the Constitution of the
U.S.S.R. Koreshi was happy to get this speech.
And you know, Stalin's' Russian language yv as awful, with the
Georgian accent. Still he got these records, and he took them to his
country. And he, I guess, went to Pakistan without being really
harmed. He was saved. Another KGB operation failed.
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Mr. SOURwINE. Are you saying that Koreshi was not blackmailed,
was not recruited?
Mr. KARLIN. No, he was not recruited, but he was blackmailed.
The KGB did it, Kovalev tried to do it. I knew it from Egorov.
Mr. SOURWINE. Let's go off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SOURWINE. Back on the record.
Mr. KARLIN. By the way, Schubnikov is now a very important man
in Moscow. He is responsible for holding all secrets in the Academy
of Science, being the left-hand man of the academician, Keldisch.
That is what I knew before I left Moscow. It was still 6 years ago.
Mr. SOURWINE. All right.
Now, you are telling us that in the case of Koreshi, the KGB did
not fix him up with a girl?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, that is correct, sir.
Mr. SOURwINE. They did not?
Mr. KARLIN. No, she "worked" independently.
Mr. SOURWINE. Were any photographs taken of him with this
girl?
Mr. KARLIN. I doubt it, because it was not the KGB operation.
She did it herself.
Mr. SouR.wINE. She was an independent?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, she was. They wanted to use her initiative,
private initiative.
Mr. SOURWINE. All right.
Off the record.
(Discussion off the record..)
Mr. SOURwINE. I think that is about enough for today.
Monday, if it is not inconvenient, shall we say 10 o'clock? You
might come to my office, because I do not know what room we will
be holding the hearing in. If we know the room number before then,
we will advise you.
Senator TI3URM0ND. We will stand ui recess until 10 a.m. Monday,
subject to the call of the Chair as to the place for reconvening.
(Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene
Monday, Nov. 1.0, 1969, at 10 a.m.)
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TESTIMONY OF GEORGE MARLIN
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1969
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room
2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond presiding.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel, and Alphonso Tara-
bochia, chief investigator.
Senator THURMOND. The hearing will come to order.
I remind the witness he is still under oath.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, before we start where we left off,
I have a couple of individuals who we are seeking information on.
It just may be that the witness has some. We have a photograph of
this man, and on the back of the photograph an indication of the
names he has used, Vadim Kotchergin. There are two different
spellings, K-o-c-h-c-r-g-i-n, also Vadim Listov, also the name of
Vadin. This photograph was taken in 1956. Do you know him?
Mr. KARLIN. No sir, I don't know him.
Mr. SOURWINE. Would you look at the names on the back and see
if you recognize any of those as names of anyone you knew? Supposedly
he was a Soviet writer and newspaperman.
Mr. KARLIN. No, sorry; I don't know those names.
NIr. SOURwINE. This man we are interested in is on the left in this
picture, which is a 1966 picture from a Miami newspaper.
The name is Vladimir Bagachev.
Mr. KARLIN. On the left?
Mr. SOURWINE. Is he known to you?
Mr. KARLIN. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. It has been suggested that the record as it stands
is not very full with respect to your family life. You are a married man?
Mr. KARLIN. You know, sometimes it is very difficult to say yes
or no, because formally, officially yes, I am, but can I explain?
Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, anything you wish to say.
Mr. KARLIN. As you remember, when I mentioned how I was
co-opted by KGB, at that- time I mentioned about lady named
Berta Nemlicher. I met her, during the war, and I told you about her
travel in 1945 immediately after the end of the war, when she was
searched by the criminal police, and came to Moscow. In that time
it was necessary for me to help her to change her name, and I have
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done it. Then, or probably in the same time there was love relation
between us. In that time we went to the Soviet office to fix our mar-
riage. So I became married. But later on
Mr. SOURWINE. That was the first time you were married?
Mr. KARLIN. It was the first and the last time in my life when I was
officially married. It was in 1945, yes, 1945. After that, I would say
in a year or maybe a year and a half period practically in the real life
we separated because she had a husband and child.
Mr. SOURWINE. Had you known this at the time you married her?
Mr. KARLIN. Of course I knew that, and even her husband asked
me to help him "marry" his wife, because, I repeat, it was it situation
when there was only one way for her to change her name and to be
saved from prison. Her husband was in some way my friend. It was a
rather complicated psychological collision. I tried to help her, but at
the same time it was love between her and me.
Mr. SOURWINE. You seem to have gotten into a very complicated
situation with a fairly simple question, I'm sorry.
Mr. KARLIN. In the Soviet reality, every thing is pretty complicated,
sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. But I think now that we are in it, we will have to
explain it enough so that the record will be clear.
Mr. KARLIN Good.
Mr. SOURWINE. You have given the lady's name?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. I gave her my name.
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, but you have told us what her name was. Was
that her married name?
Mr. KARLIN. It was her maiden name.
Mr. SOURWINE. What was her married name? -
Mr. KARLIN. M'akushkov.
Mr. SOURWINE. And her husband's name?
Mr. KARLIN. The same one.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you say she has a child, or children?
Mr. KARLIN. The child named Yuriy.
Mr. SoURwINE. That is, she had it child by her husband?
Mr. KARLIN. It is correct, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. And how old was the child at the time?
Mr. KARLIN. At that time he was about 6.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was this lady older than you?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, 3 years older.
Mr. SOURWINE. How old were you?
Mr. KARLIN. I?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. Well, 29, I guess. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. You were born in 1919?
Mr. KARLIN. No, 1917.
Mr. SOURWINE. You were born in 1917?
Mr. KARLIN. All that happened in 1945.
Mr. SOURWINE. I thought you said 1948.
Mr. KARLIN. No, 1945.
Mr. SouRwINE. 1945?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what had this lady done. that caused the
police to be after her?
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Mr. KARLIN. I told you this, but I can repeat it, of course. She.
worked in Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine. She worked at a milk
factory, producing milk and all milk production. She was an engineer-
technologist, and as far as I know the director of the factory, and his
assistant, they were crooks. That is very typical for the Soviet life.
They used some milk to sell it privately in the markets, not in the
government way, but privately, and they put money in their own
pockets. She was, as far as I know, involuntarily involved in their
activities.
It could be so, but still it could be, of course, that she had a finger
in their pie. She worked with them together. At the same time, if she
wouldn't be involved, and if she would not run away, still she would
be accused to be in their group, you see, with the director and his
assistant, making some illegal job with milk.
Mr. SouRwINE. So her problem was what? To conceal herself
from the police?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, because when her husband came to Moscow,.
after she came-she stayed in my flat-when he came, he told us, her,
me as a friend of them, that there was declared in Kiev such a special
whole Soviet Union search order which cost a lot of money and the
Soviets are doing that not so often, because it is a very complicated
procedure. That means in each police department, or the passport
department which exists in the U.S.S.R., there would be a list with
her name.
Mr. SOURWINE. This search had been extended from Kiev through-
out the Soviet Union?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct, sir.
Mr. SouRwINE. So she came to Moscow to seek your help?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRWINE. Had you known her before?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, I met her.
I met her and her husband in the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi in
1943-44 when I had been there 1 year, and then I came back to Mos-
cow and started to work in TASS.
At that time I met them there and we had a friendly relation there.
Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you and the lady?
Mr. KARLIN. I would say firstly, I and her husabnd, and then there
was a good relation between me and her, but without the sexual
contact at that time.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you feel that by changing her name you could
help to conceal her?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh yes, it is what I felt.
Mr. SoURwINE. Are the Russian police so inefficient that a more
change of name is going to conceal an individual from them?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, it is very important.
But, you know, it was done in some special way by her husband,
because he brought some temporary document, because to change her,
which she had was rather risky, and he brought, he bought it in Kiev,
a temporary one, not a permanent, temporary to change during the
marriage procedure for another one, which would be a really good one.
Mr. SoURwINE. He brought false papers?
Mr. KARLIN. It is correct, it was false.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you married her under this false name?
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Mr. KARLIN. Name?
Mr. SOURWINE. Well, through the use of the false papers?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. What name did she have on the false paper?
Mfr. KARLIN. It was the same name, but you know, without the
registered address,-.
A Ir. SouRwrNE. Z"ou mean she used her own name oil the false
paper?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, only to change for the--
Mr. SouRwINE. With everybody in the Soviet Union looking for
someone by that name, she used that name?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. It is a rather complicated procedure.
Mr. SouRwINE. Yes, I am sure it is.
Mr. KARLIN. Because at that time the marriage department was
separate from the police department, and that red card was in the
police department and not in the marriage department, but later I
guess after many such cases took part, they understood that the two
offices must be anuler the same control. And now if you are going to
marry, you must bring-they wouldn't marry you immediately. At
that time when we came they have done it immediately, you know,
only we needed two witnesses.
But now if you are going to marry, you need to wait for 2 or 3 weeks
when they will check your previous addresses, where you have been,
who are. you, and so on. Now it would not be possible to do what we
have done, but in 1945 it was done.
Mr. SouRwINE. So where were you married, in Moscow?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, in Moscow, in my district.
Mr. SouRwINE. And under the laws of the Soviet Union, can a
woman who already has it husband and child be married?
Mr. KARLIN. No. Therefore, it was illegal marriage., of course.
\=1r. SOURWINE. The marriage was unlawful, not only illegal, it was
unlawful.
\1r. KARLIN. Unlawful is correct.
Mr. SouRwINE. And it was no legal marriage.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. Now, you and this lady went ahead and lived
together, did you?
Mr. KARLIN. I repeat, we started with the idea to save her, and the
husband participated in all that story, but then it went in a. different
way, because we had a sexual relation too, and he knew that, and
there was a tragedy, you see, but, all that lasted about a year and a half.
Mr. SouRwINE. She only lived with you for a year and a half?
Mr. KARLIN. If you mean physically in my room, it was not so,
because she partly lived in my place and partly in her relatives' place.
Then she wanted to see child, and for this the dacha was rented outside
of Moscow and the husband brought her child there.
\I r. SouRwINE. S-, actually the year and a ha!!' was the time during
licit this purported marriage lasted?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
.Jr. SouRwINE. Was this marriage ever legally dissolved?
~Ir. KARLIN. What do you mean? I almost divorced her.
Mr. SouRwINE. You (lid divorce her?
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Mr. KARLIN. I attempted once, and it was done in it half necessary
way because there was another woman I wanted to marry, and I called
her, my official wife, and I said, "I need to be divorced." She said,
"OK., do what is necessary." According to the Soviet procedure first
of all one must publish in newspaper about your divorce with names
and so on. I have done it, it was iu the newspaper, Eveiung Moscow.
It is only one newspaper ivhieh publishes such : dve~tisiug, There
we went to the court, but you see, iii the Soviet procedure the decisive
point is town court, but you must start from the district court.
We went to the district court, and district court usually does not
in, ke real decision. The district court wants to help parties to
Mr. SOUR-WINE. Reconcile its parties?
NIr. I1IRLIN. Yes. Well, the judge did not succeed. We had a way
to go to the town, city, Moscow court, but we did not at that time
because my situation changed. I did not need it at that time seri-
ously, and all that suspended ... until now.
Mr. SOURWINE. So there had been no divorce proceeding?
Mr. KARLIN. No, Sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. But you and she, I take it, have not lived together
since when, 1949 sometime?
.N/Ir. KARLIN. Oh, no, I think since 1947.
NMIr. SoURwINE. 1947 sometime?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, until I went to Germany, it is correct, until the
middle of 1947, because in that time everything was over in my rela-
tion with her. Well, we were friends later, you see, and even, when I
defected. She went to the British Embassy in Moscow. Of course,
she did not do that by her initiative. She wanted to come to see me in
London, but, of course, it was the KGB's operation, General
Gribanov's one.
Vlr. SouRwiNE. Did she work for the KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, no, as far as I know she didn't. I cannot guar-
antee it, but I guess she didn't.
Mr. SouRwINE. Was your attempt to save her successful? Did she
in fact escape arrest?
Mr. KARLIN. Of course. She was alive until now, only because of
this.
Mr. SouRwINE. Did she go back and live with her husband?
Mr. KARLIN. It happened, but then they separated too, because
he become a real criminal because he was the. man who made false
documents-how you call this profession?
1-'Ir. SouRwINE. Forger.
Mr. KARLIN. Forger, yes. Ile was really the forger. He spent I
don't know how many years, maybe 5 years in prison, but she
divorced him before this, I guess, and then they again wanted to live
together because of their son. It is a story for the novel, with many,
many interesting situations.
Mr. SOURwINE. She divorced him after she had married you?
Mr. KARLIN. No, she didn't if you mean the formality. It was not
necessary, they lived together, actually some time, then they separated.
Mr. SouRwINE. They had been married, had they not? And she
divorced him?
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Mr. KARLIN. No, she did not. When she married me she did not
divorce him.
Mr. SouRwINE. No, but afterwards?
Mr. KARLIN. After?
Mr.SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. It wasn't necessary for her because she needed my
name, not his name, you see, and she is until now under my name.
Mr. SouRwINE. Under Soviet law, their divorce after you and she
had married did not make the marriage between you and her a legal
one, (lid it?
Mr. KARLIN. Excuse me. Probably you will tell me once again.
Mr. SoURWINE. Yes, I will start again. That is a little complicated.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes it is.
Mr. SOURWINE. At the time you married this lady, the marriage
was void. It was not valid. It was not a good marriage because she
already had a husband.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, correct.
Mr. SOURWINE. Afterward, at a later time, she divorced that
husband?
Mr. KARLIN. No, she didn't.
Mr. SouRwINE. She never--
Mr. KARLIN. She never did it.
Mr. SouRwINE. She never did divorce her husband?
Mr. KARLIN. No. Simply because she needed my name.
Mr. SouRwINE. I thought you said she did.
Mr. KARLIN. One time, after we separated, she lived with him,
then they separated, too. All it factually, not formally.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I was trying to get at.
Mr. KARLIN. Until now formally she is my wife, formally you see,
if not going into the history of how all this happened.
Mr. SouRwINE. Yes, I understand.
Mr. KARLIN. How they lived together when they were together,
it is another point. He visited Moscow. Later with great difficulty
he got a permission to stay in Moscow, but still they had different
names, you see, practically they called one another wife and husband,
but officially they were not. I was the husband officially.
Mr. SouRwINE. All right. Then there never was a legal divorce
between them so far as you know?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, you see, the point is that he told me that he
did-she was Jewish originally, and he told me, this gentleman with
this rather special ability to make false documents that during
the war when they left Kiev, he-you see on the document, he spoiled
the document, because on nationality there was Jewish and he wanted
to change this document, and when he changed they put there Ukrain-
ian, you see, and when there was Ukrainian at that time by some
reason he decided not to repeat to put the stamp of marriage, you see.
Mr. SoURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. Therefore her document which she had before was
without the indication of marriage, you see. She used it only when
it was profitable for her to use it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the document she used when she married
you?
Mr. KARLIN. No, he changed this document because there was an
address of Kiev, on it.
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Why he bought this temporary one? Because if was without the
Kiev's address, and Kiev's registration, He was afraid of this, you see.
Mr. SOURWINE. That registration, that paper, however would not
change the fact that he and she had been married, and I understand
from you they were married?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, yes. If someone would make an investigation, of
course.
Mr. SOURWINE. They were married, and they were never divorced.
Mr. KARLIN. It is correct, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. And the fact that she went through a marriage
ceremony with you did not invalidate her prior marriage.
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, no. That all was done against the law.
Mr. SOURWINE. If the man is still alive, she is still married to him
today, even though she uses your name.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. And the identity is your wife?
Mr. KARLIN. Sure.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where she is living?
Mr. KARLIN. The last time when I got a letter from her through
the British authorities they told me she was in Moscow. She worked
in Moscow at that time. Where she works now? In the Moscow
Department of Water Supply, I guess.
Mr. SouRwINE. Is her husband still living?
Mr. KARLIN. He is in Moscow, I guess.
Is he living?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, he is alive, yes; it was 6 years ago, but they
separated, and he worked in some Soviet publishing house.
Mr. SOURWINE. What became of the child?
Mr. KARLIN. It is what I know: He joined the Institute of Cinema-
tography, which is unique in the Soviet Union, Movie Institute, to be a
director. He was in very good hands of Soviet producer Michail Rome.
He was his student, you known, and now he must be somewhere in
the movie studio. But he has his father's name, M'akuschkov.
I am sorry, sir, it was a very complicated and not clear enough
explanation and one day if I would have time I would write a novel
about all those, because all those are pretty specific and typical for
the Soviet reality.
Mr. SOURWINE. The boy's name being Yuriy is just a coincidence.
He was not named after you?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, no. He was born before I met them, you see.
Therefore, that was a coincidence.
Mr. SOURWINE. You never had a wife at any other time or went
through a marriage ceremony with any other woman?
Mr. KARLIN. With other woman?
Mr. SoURwiNE. Yes. Did you ever go through a marriage
ceremony--
Mr. KARLIN. No.
Mr. SOURwiNE (continuing). With any other woman?
Mr. KARLIN. No. I mentioned it was once in my life.
Mr. SOURWINE. You never lived with any other woman as your
common law wife?
Mr. KARLIN. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any children?
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Mr. KARLIN. No, sir. If I would have probably I wouldn't be here.
Mr. SouRwINE. Your point being that your defection did not hurt
anybody in the Soviet Union.
Mr. KARLIN. I guess so, sir.
Mr. SouRwINE. At the last session I think you had completed the
discussion of one particular incident; is that correct?
Mr. KARLIN. You. mean Pakistannian?
Mr. SouRwINIe. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. OK.
Mr. SOURwINE. That was Koreshi and Murad.
You told us at an earlier session about the incident involving a Miss
Brown, the cipher girl at the Canadian Embassy. I think you had told
us all you knew about that; is that correct?
Mr. KARLIN. It is correct, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. You have indicated that you have some knowledge
of an incident involving the then head of the Indonesian Government,
Mr. Sukarno.
Would you tell us about this?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes; I can tell you about this.
Mr. SOURWINE. How he came into your life and what you know?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. And what you had to do with it?
Mr. KARLIN. I told you before that my bosses from KGB, they
asked me any possible time to give them names and candidates for
co-opted workers, especially girls, whom we called, as I told. you be-
fore, swallows, girls, and this girl whoni I will mention now was named
Valentina Reschetnyk--
Mr. SOURWINE. Nicknamed "Valva"?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, that is the nickname for Valentina. She was one
of them, those swallows, whom I recommended to the KGB. I met her
in a little party. She was at that time the student of the Institute of
Foreign Languages in Moscow, and she worked at that time as a
stewardess, but in the domestic aviation service.
She was really a beautiful girl, blonde with very good English lan-
guage, a capable girl, and when I gave her name to Colonel Kunavin,
after 2 or 3 weeks he asked me to invite her to the restaurant and to
talk, to realize whether she would accept his offer, and even to prepare
her for this sort of job in a friendly way without any specification.
He gave me the telephone of Filippov. There was a man from UPDK,
as I said before the department which serves the Diplomatic Corps in
Moscow of course, under the KGB control. Formally it is the Minister
of Foreign Affairs' office. Filippov worked there. Kunavin told me to
give her his telephone and to name Filippov as my personal friend.
I invited Valya to the restaurant. I talked to her.
Firstly, she thought that I simply wanted to sleep with her, but
then she realized there is a different job, and she was very happy, and
she said that she is ready to do every job, to relate with foreigners.
I gave her Filippov's telephone number, and later Kunavin told me
that he met her there, that she is OK and that they are going to give her
some job. As far as I knew from Kunavin, and later from her, because
she was rather open with me, I talked to her in such a way she realized
that I am a man to whom it is possible to talk openly, and she told me
how that meeting happened, how she entered the private room of
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Filippov's, how she met there a big man (it was Kunavin), and how
he co-opted her.
Firstly, they gave her some normal job. They wanted to train her.
She was the teacher of Russian. I do not know which Embassy she
visited and with whom personally she met. But later on I knew that
from Kunavin and she told me what happened.
President Sukarno came to Moscow. That was his first official visit.
If I am not mistaken, it was in 1956. At that time Voroshilov was
President of the U.S.S.R. It is what I remember because there was
some relation between Sukarno and Voroshilov. At that time Kunavin
told me that, General Gribanov decided to use Reschetnyk under
the code name Lena. She was introduced to President Sukarno under
this name, and she was officially his interpreter almost the whole
period of his being in the U.S.S.R. She had been with him almost at
all the receptions in Moscow. Then they went to Leningrad. Then
they made a long trip in Soviet Asia. She was almost, everywhere
with him.
One day in the Pravda newspaper on the first page there was a very
big picture where one can see President Sukarno with his national
hat, and the face of a blonde "movie star," a beautiful Valya Res-
chetnyk. I remember Prokofiev called me and said; "Look, Valya is
a great girl because she is in Pravda on the first page."
What happened then, this, again, I know from Kunavin and from
her, too, because I repeat, she talked to me openly.
Well, she had a sexual relation with Sukarno. He was in love with
her, and he wanted even to take her to his country and make her to,
I guess, his third, if I am not mistaken, third wife. Valya went to see
her parents to consult with them, and the collective decision, I would
say, was no. Sukarno went to see Voroshilov for this case, to get his
presidential permission to marry Russian girl and to take her to
Indonesia.
Still when he went back, before he went back, he sent his people to
Vienna to buy some gifts for her, you know what a woman needs
really, and I do not know exactly, in a half year or a year period he
invited the whole team of the plane which served him during his trip
in the U.S.S.R. to come to Indonesia. Of course, it was done only with
a purpose to see Valya. I heard it from the KGB people and from her,,
too. She was included in this team, you see, as the interpreter, and the
picture of all of them was even published in the magazine Ogonek.
She visited him. In other words, she went to Indonesia. She told me
again that he made an attempt to marry her there. But then when
she refused, he gave her money and she alone went though Europe
back to the Soviet Union, but through Europe because she had been
in Stockholm and bought something to wear.
When she came back to Moscow, the KGB gave her a special apart-
ment in Izmailovsky Boulevard, in a new house. It was one-room
flat, and the KGB helped her to furnish it, to make it cosy. I have
been there, because she invited her "friends," you see, the first time.
The idea was to have a place to meet, if President Sukarno would
come again to Moscow.
He visited Moscow-I don't know-maybe once or twice, but as
far as I know, they never met in that flat, because each time he had a
special government place, and particularly in the Crimea. She went
there to see him, and they met in a luxurius house.
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Mr. SOURwINE. What you are telling us adds up to the fact that
this girl, whom you had selected and who had then been co-opted to
work with the KGB was made acquainted with Sukarno, was made
available to him, and became in effect his mistress over a period of
years.
Mr. KARLIN. Correct, sir.
Mr. SOURwINE. All right. How.long did that continue?
Mr. KARLIN. I guess the whole period.
I don't know anything about the end.
Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether it ended or when?
Mr. KARLIN. I do not know whether it ended. Right.
Mr. SOURWINE. All of this time, so far as you know, this Valya
Reschetnyk was a KGB girl?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, sure.
Mr. SOURwINE. We must presume she was exerting influence on
Sukarno when she could.
Mr. KARLIN. No question about it.
Mr. SOURWINE. And that she obtained information from him if the
KGB wanted it, she would try to get whatever they wanted.
Mr. KARLIN. Logically, yes. But I do not know whether she did it
or not. No one told me what sort of information she obtained
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you learn from her or from the KGB or other-
wise whether any effort was made to use her in order to compromise
him with pictures or otherwise or whether she was used simply as a
contact?
Mr. KARLIN. No, sir; I do not know anything about an idea to
compromise him, using pictures and so on.
Mr. SOURWINE. It may very well have not been done. She may
have been more valuable as a contact and influence.
Mr. KARLIN. I can only guess and think logically having my
experience that the KGB never would do anything without a target,
sometimes a long distance target. It meant if it was not necessary for
them to compromise him right now, it could be done in a 4- or 5-year
period.
Mr. So_URwINE. Have you told us all you know about that incident
with regard to Sukarno?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, I guess SO.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any other knowledge with regard to
Mr. Sukarno?
Mr. KARLIN. No, Sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge of significance with
regard to Valya Reschetnyk?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. I know that after this job when Sukarno went to
his country, she was used in other different cases, even with some
Americans, because she told me that she met some Americans and then
the KGB put her in the Int.urist Agency. She worked there. She told
me that she met some American tourists and she went with them some-
where outside of Moscow.
She was, I would say, to) level girl, because she was extremely
beautiful and intelligent and attractive. Therefore, they put her in
such a level as President Suka.rilo's, and I doubt whether they would
use her after that in a little case. However it could be done too.
Mr. SOURWINE. You told us about it, Canadian cipher girl.
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Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SoURwINE. Have you testified with regard to the Canadian
man who was first secretary of their Embassy in Moscow in 1962?
Mr. KARLIN. You mean Williams?
Mr. SOURWINE. Apparently you do know something about an inci-
dent. Tell us eve`rthing you know about it.
Mr. KARLIN. We talked before about the attempt which was done
outside of Moscow when the Russian lady secretary, who worked in
the Canadian Embassy, rented the dacha. At that time I mentioned
about the first secretary. Do you want to know something about that
particular man?
Mr. SouRwINE. Not necessarily.
If there were two first secretaries, differentiate them and tell what
you know about each.
Mr. KARLIN. I told you how he visited her dacha.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I have the impression that this was not 1963.
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, 1963, no.
Mr. SOURWINE. This first secretary you ar6 talking about now, and
that there is nothing compromising about him at all?
Mr. KARLIN. Nothing compromising.
Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about an incident that you have
mentioned.
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Which involved again the girl Rita Prokofiev.
Mr. KARLIN. Now I understand what you want to know.
I met Rita Prokofiev in 1963. She also used the code-name Zoya.
When I met her we had a private conversation generally about
love and so on and I asked her what you are doing now? She said,
"Well, I have had some operation." She mentioned "love affair"
with a Canadian gentleman. I do not know, really, whether she said
first secretary, but one of the secretaries of the Canadian Embassy.
I guess the Canadian Secret Service, when I defected, tried to under-
stand who he was.
He wanted to meet her and not to be recognized. Therefore, he
bought a Soviet car, Volga, because if one has a foreign car it is
easier to be controlled in Moscow. According to Rita they were in
love, and the KGB wanted to do something but she told me at that
time that they are all stupid, these people from the KGB, that they
did not give her carte-blanche. She said that they did not trust her
absolutely, and therefore, they wanted to control everything. The
result was that the operation failed and Canadian diplomat went
back to Canada. He was married in the time she mentioned.
Mr. SouRwINE. You are telling us that there were no compromising
pictures taken, that in this respect the operation was unsuccessful,
is that right?
Mr. KARLIN. I do not know anything about it. I know only what
she told me. It wasn't this sort of indication; but probably she didn't
tell me everything.
Mr. SoURwINE. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SOURWINE. Back on the record.
So that to sum up, all you know about this is in the first instance
through hearsay, from what Rita Prokofiev told you?
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Mr. KARLIN. It is correct.
Mr. SouRwINE. Second, the substance of what she told you was as
part of the KGB operation she had had a love affair with the secre-
tary of the Canadian Embassy in 1963?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct, sir.
Mr. SouRwINE. He was first, second, or third secretary, you don't
know?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwINE. And the only way you have of identifying him is
that he owned a Volga automobile?
lMIr. KARLIN. It is correct.
Mr. SouRwINE. Is that a rather rare thing for a diplomat in Moscow?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, yes, it is a pretty rare thing. There are some of
them with Volga car, but very few. Usually there are diplomats of
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland, but not persons---
Mr. SOURWINE. If we should find that there were two secretaries in
the Canadian Embassy who owned Volga automobiles in 1963--
Mr. KARLIN. I would doubt it.
Mr. SOURWINE (continuing). We would be unable to determine
which one it was.
Mr. KARLIN. I doubt very, very much that you would be able to
find two Canadian officers with Volga cars.
Mr. SOURWINE. And according to what Rita Prokofiev told you
the owner of a Volga car who was on the diplomatic staff of the
Canadian Embassy in 1963 had a love affair with her and there may
or may not have been a compromising situation as a result of KGB
activities?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. Did you ever tell the Canadians about that?
Mr. KARLIN. I met the British. Of course they contacted with the
Canadians.
Mr. SouRwINE. You told the British and Americans?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. You were debriefed by several teams. I thought
maybe the Canadians had a team in there somewhere, too.
Mr. KARLIN. No. There were the French, five of them, three British
and one American.
It was a long time procedure therefore, I knew all of them.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now, apparently you talked off and on over a
period of years with Zoya, or Rita Prokofiev.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did she tell you any details of any other operations?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, she mentioned some love story, with one French-
man. She did mention his name, it seems to me-John, a young
handsome French cipher worker. She told me that everything was
OK. That the start was successful. They nicely slept together and
she was rather infatuated with him. Then he jumped out. He was
afraid to continue their relation. It was the end.
Mr. SouRwINE. What year was this?
Mr. KARLIN. I think it was again when we discussed her private
life and her work and so on, and she mentioned what she had
done all together. That means it was in 1963. But she didn't mention
how long ago it happened.
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Mr. SOURWINE. She would not have been carrying on two operations
at the same time, would she?
Mr. KARLIN. No, I do not think so. They never do that. With
some exceptions.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You had no name for this Frenchman?
Mr. KARLIN. No.
Another name which she mentioned, which the French team tried
to find, was Miller.
He was a Frenchman with a rather German or English name. He
was a tourist who came to Moscow for a while and the operation was
organized, I guess by Kunavin; she was introduced to this gentleman
and she had some relation with him, but I do not know anything
about the result and the purpose of the operation.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Miller's first name?
Mr. KARLIN. No, I do not.
Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know what year it was?
Mr. KARLIN. Somewhere in 1960.
As far as I remember she told me that she visited a new house for
foreigners in Moscow. Before I left the country there was I guess
about five new houses, specially built for Western diplomats, and
one of them was opposite the Hotel Ukraine. She told me: "Well, I
am very familiar with this house. I visited many people there," but
without any specification with whom she met and for what purposes.
It means she was still in action, but she was unhappy at that time,
I repeat. She told me: "They do not trust me. They want to control
each of my steps and therefor it is impossible to do anything."
It was some little conflict which would be very big one day between
her and the KGB.
Mr. SOURWINE. There is nothing further that you recall that you
can tell us about her or her activity?
Mr. KARLIN. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. You have told us before on another occasion that
you were under the department which dealt with subjects of English-
speaking countries other than the United States.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Principally Great Britain, Canada, India, Pakistan,
and the other British Commonwealth countries.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And that for that reason you were never ordered
to start anything with Americans except for one or two rare instances?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct.
Mr. SouRwINE. Have you told us about all of the rare instances
when you were instructed or ordered to start something with an
American?
Mr. KARLIN. Yesterday I remembered one thing which probably
has some little interest, but I was not under the KGB order at that
time. It happened spontaneously. It's in regard to the American Am-
bassador Galbraith, in India.
In 1962-the Cuban crisis was in 1962-when I was in Japan with
the Soviet tourist group, we came back through
Mr. SOURWINE. What year was that?
Mr. KARLIN. That was in 1962, the Cuban crisis, 1962, I am sorry,
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November. That is why I asked, because it has a connection with the
Cuban crisis.
I went to Japan with the Soviet tourist group without any specific
order from the KGB, simply as a tourist, but of course the watch dog
knew that I am a devoted man and he asked me to help him to observe
the situation among the Soviets.
His service was to control the Soviet tourists. We came back through
Manila, and then we stopped in New Delhi, and that was particularly
the beginning of November. We had been there I guess 4 days; and
one of them was the 7th of November. That was the October revolu-
tion celebration. In the Soviet Embassy I met one Lubomudrov.
She was the top level woman. She worked before in Moscow in the
Soviet Society for Friendly Relations with foreign countries. She was
the assistant to the chairman of this society, who is known as Nina
Popov.
I knew her before and I knew that she has to be in India, because
she went there to be the culture adviser and the manager of the House
of Friendship between India and the U.S.S.R.
When I came to New Delhi, I called her and she was very happy
because we met many times before in Moscow. Even we traveled
together, I mentioned this, I guess, shortly. It was the first Soviet
tourists with their cars who went to Germany, Poland, and Czecho-
slovakia, I think in 1959, and we have been together there.
Therefore, we had friendly relation, and she was in the top position
in the Soviet Embassy. She invited me to the reception. I had been
there and she introduced me to the Soviet Ambassador who was
then Benediktov. He is a very well known man, even in the Stalin
period he was on the hill. Once he was the Minister of Agriculture,
then be became diplomat. Probably he is in India, because Svetlana
mentioned him in her book, Svetlana Stalin-Benediktov was with
his wife.
We sat around the table. There were many tables, space for dancing
and there were other people and she introduced me and we sat and
talked about 15 or 20 minutes about many things. He mentioned
of course, about situation in India.
Now it is up to you to interpret this phrase which he spelled, but
my duty is to say it. He said, that the majority of embassies in New
Delhi are located in one district, and that the Soviet Embassy is very
close to the American Embassy. Then he said, "Well, we have a very
good, very friendly relation . . ." It was particularly during the
Cuban crisis, because this Benediktov said that we had been almost
5 minutes before a start of the big war. Then he said: "We have a
very good relation with American diplomats here, particularly with
American Ambassador" and he said: "He is a nice chap. He is our
man."
I do not know precisely what he thought mentioning this "our
man."
Mr. SOURwINE. Just a moment.
This was the Soviet Ambassador to India speaking?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Talking about the then U.S. Ambassador to India?
Mr. KARLIN. It is correct, sir.
Mr. SoURwINE. Who was a man named Galbraith?
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Mr. KARLIN. It is correct, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. He was talking during a party?
This was at his table?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. This Soviet woman that you had spoken of was
there?
Mr. KARLIN. And his wife.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you were there?
Mr. KARLIN. I was there.
Mr. SOURWINE. The Soviet Ambassador's wife?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anyone else there?
Mr. KARLIN. I think there were one or two other people.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who they were?
Mr. KARLIN. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Were they Embassy people?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. Soviet People.
Mr. SOURWINE. Were they speaking Russian?
Mr. KARLIN. Sure.
Mr. SOURWINE. When he said ours, what was the word he used?
Mr. KARLIN. "Nasch chelovek."
Mr. SOURWINE. Ordinarily, the use of that word by the KGB
means this is a man who has been recruited?
Mr. KARLIN. Not always.
Mr. SOURWINE. Does it mean this is a man who is reliable for us?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. I think in some way. It is my guess if Benediktov
would have a special, let's say, KGB's relation with Galbraith, be
never would speak like that pretty openly. He was not stupid.
Mr. SOURWINE. I was wondering about that.
M.T. KARLIN. No, no.
Mr. SOURWINE. What does the word mean?
Mr. KARLIN. It is what I would try to explain, from my point of
view, of course, because it's very delicate and very specific expression.
Mr. SOURWINE. All right.
Mr. KARLIN. I want to underline that I have to use here my logic
and my experience.
Actually, I guess, Benediktov and Galbraith met, discussed some
important problems-the world problems. They privately discussed
how to prevent war, how to settle peace, how to make life better
for people. I'm sure among your diplomats, as well as the British
and French diplomats, there are very honest and humane people,
pretty well educated people with brilliant ideas, but when they are
coming to discuss all that with the Soviet VIP's, I think involuntarily
they are doing something which gives the Soviets the right to say:
"Our man." Usually these people say that the Soviet system is a
progressive one but with some errors, usually they like to criticize
their own capitalistic system.
They talk with the Soviets as with equally honest partners, without
any idea that during conversation, the opposite side is totally depend-
able on the Communist ideology, as a rule. The Soviets say one, but
calculate different things. I am sorry to say it, but many of your
people are naive, or they simply don't want to accept existence of the
total and the tough ideological struggle.
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Mr. SouRwINE. Who are the "they" you are referring to?
Mr. KARLIN. I'm referring to the western diplomats, like Galbraith.
By the way I met his name in the American newspapers here and
what he is talking about only confirms my theory.
Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that the word "nasch," our man,
means--
Mr. KARLIN. Sympathetic with us.
Mr. SouRwINE. Only someone whom the Spanish would say is
"simpatico."
Mr. KARLIN. It is correct-to the Soviet system, to the Soviet
ideas, to the Soviet way of life.
Mr. SouRwINE. You think "nasch" used in. Russian by a KGB Iran
means the same thing as a Spaniard saying a man is simpatico?
Mr. KARLIN. You ask whether it is similar?
Mr. SouRwINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. No.
Mr. SouRwINE. It means something different than simpatico?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, and I am sure -
Mr. SoURwINE. The Ambassador in this case was a KGB man, was
he not?
Mr. KARLIN. You see, it is a rather special question and a very
complicated question. Sometimes it could even be quarrels between
the Ambassador and the KGB resident.
Mr. SouRwINE. Oh, yes.
Mr. KARLIN. Sometimes they are working friendly together, but
from the official point of view, now the Ambassador is still responsible
for all kinds of Embassy activity abroad.
Mr. SouRwINE. Could an Ambassador himself ever be a KGB
man?
Mr. KARLIN. As the KGB officer-Maybe when he was young and
had started his career.
Mr. SOURwINE. Dobrynin was a KGB man, was he not?
Mr. KARLIN. I would say yes. There is Lenin's formula: "Each
Communist is a KGB man."
Mr. SOURWINE. Dobrynin held a commission in the Secret Police,
did he not?
Mr. KARLIN. But he is now in such a top position that he would not
report himself to the KGB general in Moscow.
He would report to the Central Committee of Communist Party.
Before Stalin's death the KGB abroad was an absolutely independent
body.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think this is still true, when you go into an
embassy that is headed by a man like Dobrynin?
Mr. KARLIN I am sorry?
Mr. SouRwINE. If you go into a Russian Embassy, which is headed
by a man like Dobrynin, say it is headed by Dobrynin, he is the
Ambassador, would you have a separate KGB resident?
Mr. KARLIN. Of COUrse.
Mr. SOURWINE. Who would be above Dobrynin?
Mr. KARLIN. Not the KGB resident of course. Above would be
Central Committee. Panuslikin, the former Soviet Ambassador in the
U.S.A., before he came to America, was the boss of the first chief
directorate of the KGB, a general.
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Mr. SOURWINE. Kuznetzov was KGB man, was he not?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. The point is this: The judge now is the Central
Committee. General Gribanov told me many times when he wanted
to underline it: "I went to the Central Committee and I got permis-
sion to do this." There was General Mironov at that time who was
the chief of the administrative department of the Central Committee
of CPSU and he was responsible for the KGB activity. But of course
the chairman of KGB was above Mironov, you know.
I would say it is rather difficult to know absolutely correct scheme
of this system.
During the Stalin time there everything was clear. Now practically
not so many things changed, but they want to show that still the
Ambassador is the top man.
Mr. SouRwINE. All right, now let me go back a little bit. You speak
pretty good Spanish. You get along in Spain?
Mr. KARLIN. I have been there.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you are fluent. Whether you could write it
well, we do not know.
Mr. KARLIN. No, my Spanish is not fluent. Don't exaggerate my
capacity.
Mr. SouRwINE. Whether you speak Spanish with an accent I am
incapable of judging, but you are voluble in Spanish.
You don't have to stop and think for words.
In my any event, you know what simpatico means.
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, yes, simpatico.
Mr. SOURWINE. Simpatico would mean, I take it, and check me if
you have a different understanding, it means a person who is friendly,
whose general ideas are like one's own.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, or close to one's own.
Mr. SouRwINE. Or close?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. A person who understands one's customs and is
willing to abide by those customs in one's country.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. It embraces a great many other things also?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct.
Mr. SouRwINE. But it does not carry any connotation that the
person is working for you or working for the individual who calls him
simpatico?
Mr. KARLIN. Right.
Mr. SouRwINE. Or under orders or anything of that sort?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. Now when the word "nasch" is used in Russian,
does it mean the same thing we have just been talking about or does
it mean something different?
Mr. KARLIN. I think it means almost the same. But I want to un-
derline that in the Benediktov's words all went, I guess in the sphere
of ideology, in the sphere of ideas, not in the sphere of practical KGB
work for instance. I repeat when he said, "our" it meant that the
American Ambassador was peace lover, that he likes coexistence, and
so on. Nevertheless I think still using that word Benediktov wanted
to say, probably, that is again a psychological matter, that, well, we
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need such people, because they work for us, you know, involuntarily,
on the top ideological level.
Mr. SOURWINE. He was conveying all this by the use of the word
"nasch."
Mr. KARLIN. It is what I think, about it.
Mr. SouRwINE. We have had some testimony before the commit-
tee in the past, some of the years past, involving incidents where the
word "nasch" was used.
To summarize one of these incidents, the person testifying said that
an individual who was not a Russian was within an area, in a com-
pound which was restricted and a sensitive area.
Mr. MARLIN. Yes. gwas
Mr. SouRwINE. And that the attention of a KGB general
directed to this fact in the way as one would say what is the foreigner
doing there, and his reply was, "It is all right, he is nasch."
Mr. KARLIN. Sir, can I tell you this?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. You know all depends on which way you use this word.
All depends on particular occasion because in your case it could
mean the KGB man, too, of course. But you know around the table
when there was the Ambassador, his wife, that lady, others and me,
the Soviet dramatist, actually tourist, it would not be possible to
qualify Ambassador's word as the KGB man.
Mr. SouRwINE. Do you think the Ambassador did not know that
you were working for the KGB.
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, no. Even that lady Lubomudrov could only
suspect it. She would not tell the Ambassador: "Well, you know he
is from the KGB." It is no way to tell such thing, you see.
Mr. SouRwINE. We had one other incident that I recall, and I do
not know that it is the only one. We had another incident I recall
when there was a discussion among Soviet intelligence people from
different agencies.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. About a particular American.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. And this was an American who had been for some
years active in the foreign affairs field, not as an official, but as one
who was supposedly an expert and who spoke out on it. And again
the phrase was used, "nasch."
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. And it was explained to us that it was taken to
mean at the time
Mr. KARLIN. KGB?
Mr. SOURWINE. That he was KGB.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, if that was among the KGB people.
Mr. SOURWINE. Not that he was a member of KGB or an officer?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. But that he was controlled by, working for?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. Serving, taking orders?
Mr. KARLIN. If that was a conversation between KGB people, par-
ticularly a businesslike conversation, it is clear what that means, but
in the situation which I had in that time, this word meant a different
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thing, of course it would mean differently, let me say, with regard to
the French case.
Benediktov was not, I repeat, a stupid man. He was well educated
and it was possible to talk to him intellectually.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss this in detail with Benediktov?
Mr. KARLIN. Did I discuss? Oh, no.
Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know what he meant by it. He did not
explain to you what he meant?
Mr. KARLIN. No. He said: "We have a very good relation. We
meet one another very often," that is what he said.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is what you thought he meant.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. You told us earlier about an instance in which this
word was used.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to a French man?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you understood the meaning at that time
somewhat differently?
Mr. KARLIN. Let's look at those things with a perspective.
Mr. SOURWINE. Surely. I am not fighting with you. I just want to
make the record clear about it.
Mr. KARLIN. For example, I am sure that Benediktov reported to
the central committee about Mr. Galbraith, he characterized him.
Of course, one copy of that report went to General Mironov, who
crashed and died recently and this gentleman sent it to General
Gribanov, and the chief of the first chief directorate and if this
American would come to Moscow one day, they know what his
nature is, in which way to "care" for him. Probably they would
organize a nice party for him or even would give him some degree in
Moscow University. They would make him happy, because they know
how to do it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Are you telling us that this gentleman should not
be sent to Moscow on any diplomatic missions?
Mr. KARLIN. I wouldn't do it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Are you telling us that this should not be done?
Mr. KARLIN. I am sorry.
Mr. SOURWINE. You are not warning us against sending this
gentleman to Moscow?
Mr. KARLIN. I am not warning, but I wouldn't advise you to do
it, that's all.
I am talking about that situation, how it could be, how it could
start theoretically. How, for example, the French case started? Still
in Moscow there was an information about the French Ambassador,
about his behavior, his way of thinking and so on.
Mr. SOURwiNE. You are talking now about the French man?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SoURwiNE. You are saying the same French Ambassador we
have discussed before, Dejean?
Mr. KARLIN. That is right.
Mr. SOURWINE. It was with regard to him that you heard the
word "nasch" used.
Mr. KARLIN. I would like to say this: If the Soviet diplomat being,
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lets say, in India, talked to the American Ambassador at a big re-
ception, if he discussed something with him, it's his duty to send a
report to Moscow informing that he had such a conversation.
Mr. SOURWINE. You are assuming all of this?
Mr. KARLIN. Assuming?
Mr. SOURwINE. You do not know it.
Mr. KARLIN. No, it is my presumption.
Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to the Ambassador, the French
Ambassador, Dejean, you do know that you heard him referred to
as "nasch."
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, no.
Mr. SOURWINE. No?
Mr. KARLIN. No.
Mr. SouitwiNE. Nobody ever told you he was "nasch"?
Mr. KARLIN. You see, it was not necessary to say "nasch."
Mr. SouRwINE. Who was it? What was the Frenchman whom you
referred. to as "nasch"?
Mr. KARLIN. Probably it is misunderstanding. I wanted to say
that when the Ambassador in India used this word "nasch", you
know, it could be a rather similar thing probably if some Soviet
official would meet the French Ambassador in Japan for instance or
something like that, and they would talk and then he would report
that the French Ambassador could be "nasch," because he likes girls,
he is a good material and so on.
Mr. SouRwINE. You are not telling us that you ever heard the
word "nasch" used with respect to the French?
Mr. KARLIN. No.
\MIr. SOUR-WINE. Did you ever hear it used with respect to any diplo-
mat other than this man Galbraith?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, I remember something about Jack Raymond
when he came to Moscow. The KGB people told me that he came
here as a friend because I think he published something good before,
it was after Stalin died, in 1956, I guess. He produced some articles
which they read. They are looking which way the foreign correspondent
is writing. One day when lie would come, to Moscow they could try
to use him if he is OK from their point of view.
Mr. SouRwINE. Are you telling its that you heard the word "nasch"
used with respect to Jack Raymond?
Mr. KARLIN. No, I do not want to say "nasch."
Mr. SOURWINE. Don't say it unless it was used.
I am asking you about that particular term.
Mr. KARLIN. Term, yes, they said he came as a friend.
Mr. SouRwINE. No, no, I am asking about the particular word,
"nasch," whether it was used about Jack Raymond.
Mr. KARLIN. No, I cannot say that.
Mr. SOURWINE. What I had asked you was--
Mr. KARLIN. No, no.
Mr. SouRwINE. I had asked you if you ever heard the word "nasch"
used
Mr. KARLIN. NO.
Mr. SOURwINE (continuing). About a foreigner.
Mr. KARLIN. No, sir.
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Mr. SOURWINE. In any occasion in your life a far as you can recall,
except the one instance when
Mr. KARLIN. As far as I remember
Mr. SOURWINE (continuing). When the Ambassador from the Soviet
Union
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE (continuing). Used the word with respect to Mr.
Galbraith?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. In India?
Mr. KARLIN. Right.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is the only time you have ever heard the word
used?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. And your judgment of what it meant is based on
that use of it?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir. That what?
Mr. SOURWINE. That use of it.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. I checked over the record and find that it is not
completely clear on the matter of your superiors.
First you operated under the direction of General Gribanov.
In point of time, it may be that I am confused here, because Grib-
anov was of the first department of the KGB.
Mr. KARLIN. When?
That all depends on the time.
Mr. SOURWINE. Set us straight.
Take it chronologically. Under whom did you operate, over what
period of time and what positions did they hold? That is what we want
the record to show.
Mr. KARLIN. When I started to work, to cooperate with the KGB,
at that time as far as I know the Chief of the Second Directorate of
KGB was Lt. Gen. Pedovranov. I think, I am not sure, particularly in
that time the Chief of the First Directorate, was Panushkin. After
being Ambassador in the United States, he came to Moscow and
became the Chief of the Exterior Committee of the Central Com-
mittee of the CPUS. This committee approves each travel abroad,
each Soviet official who is going abroad. It is a special, pretty big
office, and he is the chief of it. Pedovranov, that is again as far as I
know, was arrested during the Abakumov affair. Pedovranov and
Shubnikov was arrested, too.
At that time as far as I know from Khokhlov book,. General Griba-
nov was Assistant of the Chief of the First Chief Directorate of the
KGB, the first, that means outside job.
Then he became the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate of the
KGB. Once I used the name of Kravchenko. He disappeared. He was
at a very top position. He was my first boss and I met him in the
Hotel Moscow and then lie disappeared and I do not know where he
is now.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And Colonel Kunavin was during what period of
time?
Mr. KARLIN. I knew Colonel Kunavin particularly from the
Canadian case. It was in 1948, after the Kaul case, I finished this case
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with Egorov, and after that Kunavin came from Riga, he was in
Riga, he was in a top position there, and he was called to Moscow
and he became the assistant of Egorov.
Mr. SOURwINE. He was a colonel?
Mr. KARLIN. No, he came to Moscow as a major and he started
the French case being a lieutenant colonel, and then he became the
colonel. Egorov soon after the Canadian case and some other cases
went to the First Chief Directorate, and he went as far as I know to
Austria, to work in the Soviet Embassy, because I met him, I men-
tioned that yesterday once in Kiev. He told me that he is working
now in the First Chief Directorate.
Mr. SouRwINE. Does that cover all the superiors that you worked
for?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, no.
There was one, an Armenian, Melkumian (Melkumov) Narses
Mikhailovich, but he was called in KGB Nikolai Mikhailovich. He
was a colonel of the KGB and he was one of Gribanov's assistants,
one, because he had many of them, and he was one who was engaged
in the French case. He was born and lived a long time in Suchumi.
It is on the Black Sea, a resort. He was COMSOMOL worker, and
then he was called to the KGB school, and he started his career in
this way.
That was pretty complicated work in London with those teams to
try to find the picture of Gribanov because I knew Gribanov twice
was abroad. Once he was in Vienna during the Youth Festival, and
secondly he was in Brussels during the World Exhibition, and we
went through all pictures of Soviet visitors. There was only one
picture which was close to the Gribanov's image you see. He had
an energetic face with glasses, with, like yours, gray, probably not
exactly, a little bit darker hair.
Now this Melkumov, he told me he was abroad but I do not know
where, and when.
Andreev was found by French, they showed me her pictures. She
worked in France in the Committee of Repatriation, of the Soviet
War prisoners.
Another rather top level man is Barsegov, Colonel Barsegov. He
was the boss of the department which controlled the whole foreign
correspondents. It was an independent body in the KGB, was-I don't
know much about it now-they changed many times their structures.
His job was only to "watch" the foreign correspondents, all of
them, from capitalist countries as well as from socialist ones, all of
them, and I had a relation with him when I "worked" with Americans,
Marguerite Higgins, Jack Raymond and Bill Jordan. Then when I
"worked" with the British correspondent, John Rettie, with him
and with Burchette, of course. Burchette's case was in Barsegov hands.
When I had any relation with the foreign correspondents in any
way, I reported to Barsegov.
Mr. SouRwINE. You had a special relation with Colonel Kunavin
by reason of which he sometimes talked to you?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWINE. About cases he had handled in which you had not
participated?
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Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir, that is absolutely correct, and therefore
I think probably my information is more valuable.
Mr. SounwINE. You spoke of the Benelux case?
Mr. KARLIN. Benelux?
Mr. SouRwINE. Benelux.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the one you have told us about which
involved a man named Nidderland?
Mr. KARLIN. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SOURWINE. Back on the record.
If I understand you correctly, the diplomat you are talking about
now was from one of the Benelux countries?
Mr. KARLIN. That is correct.
Mr. SOURWINE. Belgium, Holland, or Luxembourg?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct.
Mr. SOURWINE. But you are not sure which country?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct, sir.
Mr. SouRwINE. You do not know the name of the diplomat?
Mr. KARLIN. No, I do not know.
Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know about him?
Mr. KARLIN. Once, again it was a private situation, Kunavin told
me that even I think that was particular converstation when he
mentioned about the Gibeau case, when he mentioned that that
picture was taken in Sochi, when Jeannette Gibeau was there with
some KGB man and I think particularly at that time because it was
rather the same story he mentioned that the KGB succeeded to take
pictures when a diplomat from one of the Benelux countries was in a
compromising position with the Russian KGB girl. I cannot say that
they used it against him, I don't know it. Kunavin didn't tell me it.
You just asked me whether II had some information because of my
special relation with Kunavin and I show you what I got from him.
Mr. SOURwINE. Was this man described to you in any way?
Mr. KARLIN. No, sir.
Mr. SouRwINE. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SouRwINE. Back on the record.
So you have no clue to the identity of the Benelux diplomat?
Mr. KARLIN. No, sir, I have. not.
Mr. SOURWINE. His rank was not mentioned. And what year was
this, if you can recall?
Mr. KARLIN. If I am correct it has to be before Gibeau committed
suicide. It means it must have been somewhere in 1962, maybe, some-
where there.
Mr. SOURWINE. It is getting along toward noon. We have just a
few minutes.
Let me ask about two or three individuals. Did you know Yevtu-
shenko?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sure I know him pretty well.
Mr. SOURwINE. He is one of the leading intollectuals"of the U.S.S.R.,
is he not?
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Mr. KARLIN. It depends on qualification and who qualified it.
Mr. SouxwINE. He is a man who is regarded by the West as a symbol
of the new freedom among U.S.S.R. intellectuals?
Mr. KARLIN. It is up to the West to regard him this way.
Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know about Yevtushenko?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, he is a very talented man, but from my point
of view, he is particularly, this man who can voluntarily or involun-
tarily push a real struggle into the wrong way.
What I know about him is rather secret. No one knows this-it is
what I heard from General Gribanov. Once when I met General
Gribanov and we discussed many things, among them was an idea to
make movie, he told me about the special KGB "prophylactic work",
to "predict" something which could happen and to "educate" some
people. He said that KGB tries to help everybody. He mentioned
then Yevtushenko and Vosnesensky, those two very famous people
in the U.S.S.R.
Mr. SouRwINE. Both writers?
Mr. KARLIN. Both writers and very capable writers, they both are
in some relations with the KGB, according to Gribanov.
Well, it is a rather special relation. I do not know whether they
had the same conversation which I had the first time being co-opted,
but I think probably they avoided it. It could be some special contacts
when they must report to the KGB especially after their visits to
Western countries.
They reported, they report and they would report, but in a rather
different way probably without writings, because Gribanov mentioned,
for example, that he telephoned to Demichev who is now the Secre-
tary of the Central Committee and who is responsible for the ideology,
culture, and so on. He is the candidate of the member of the Polit-
buro. At that time lie was Secretary of the Moscow Party Corn-
mittee. General Gribanov called Demichev and asked him to invite
Yevtushenko and to "talk" to him in a friendly way.
Well, at that time probably it was rather risky for Gribanov to
make a direct attempt to send to Yevtushenko some KGB man or
invite him to the KGB flat because at that time probably Yevtushenko
was rather scandalous man.
They wanted to do this job accurately and carefully. For example,
with another man Vosnesensky, Gribanov said this: "My assistant-I
had forgot his name, probably Bikov, one of the assistants of Gribanov,
invited Vosnesensky and "worked with him." But again I would like
to underline that I personally knowing the situation in that time and
even now, and their position, I do not think that they both worked
as I worked for the KGB, because I wasn't known as much as they
were, and I wasn't in such a top position as they were.
I think with them the KGB works, paying attention to their
capricious characters, their names. Maybe they ask them questions,
pretty gently. Still they both have a relation with the KGB, that's
what Gribanov told me.
Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether they were used as you
were?
1\MIr. KARLIN. No, I do not.
Mr. SoURwINE. Or either of them?
Mr. KARLIN. No, I do not know.
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Mr. SouRwINE. Or mainly for propaganda purposes?
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, yes, for propaganda purposes they were used,
but it is the collective work, it is not only KGB work, it is Central
Committee work, better to say the KGB could use them in a "dark
way," to use their information, whom they met, you see, to ask them,
"Well, you met this man. What sort of a man is he, what is his char-
acter?" That is very important and a very big work of the KGB, to
collect all possible information. That is nothing new for you in what
I am telling you.
Mr. SouRwINE. Did you know Solshenytsyn?
Mr. KARLIN. I never met him.
Mr. SouRwINE. Were you acquainted with him? Did you know
him?
Mr. KARLIN. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure you know who he is.
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. What others, what other persons that you have
not testified about did you know who like you were working for the
KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, there are many of them.
Mr. SouRwINE. That is rather a large question. Suppose instead
of asking you to answer that now, I ask you to keep a little list and
jot the names down as you think of them. Jot down the names of
others who like you were co-opted or otherwise put under KGB
orders, and who worked for the KGB.
Mr. KARLIN. You want to know my knowledge about the co-opted
institution?
Mr. SOTRWINE. In a sense, yes. You have already told us part of
what it did. Now contribute what you can about who was in it,
Mr. KARLIN. All right.
Mr. SOURwINE. And how extensive it was. The time has arrived
at 12 o'clock.
Suppose we take a recess.
Can you come back and testify further this afternoon?
Mr. KARLIN. Sure.
(Whereupon, at 12 meridian, the subcommittee was recessed to re-
convene at 2 p.m., the same day.)
Senator THURMOND. The hearing will come to order, the witness
will resume the stand.
Mr. SoiRwlNE. I believe that we had concluded the discussion of
the subject we were in before the recess at noon.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. I wonder if we could start this afternoon and make
a record with respect to what you know about Wilfred Burchette.
There is mention of him at several places in the record, but if you
will just start fresh and tell us who he is, what you know about him,
when you first met him and go on from there.
Mr. KARLIN. OK. I ~N ill do that briefly.
I met him in Germany in 1947 when I went there by the order of
the KGB, to "sell myself," to find the good buyer, particularly among
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156
the British Intelligence Service. At that time I met Burchette and we
went together to the Peenemunde. That is a German place where the
rocket installation was at that time. When we came back he later
telephoned, he sent through another gentleman the message for me
to come and see him and he told me that some special gentleman from
the British Admiralty came to talk to him, to spend with him the
night to understand what the situation has been in Peenemunde
because he was one of the first correspondents who visited it.
And then later Burchette took a position to show his sympathy to
the Soviet side, to the Communist ideas, and he realized, I guess, that
I was rather more than assistant of Mr. Bespalov, who was the Chief
of the Bureau of Information of the Soviet Military Government in
Berlin. Therefore, he wanted to made a good "friendship" with me.
Mr. SouRwINE. Are you saying that you think he recognized you as
KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, probably not exactly, but, you know, he could.
Mr. SOURwINE. You came to know him later as a man who was
himself very experienced in espionage; did you not?
Mr. KARLIN. It is correct.
Mr. SOURWINE. So under the circumstances, it is quite reasonable
that he might have recognized that you were a little more than you
appeared to be.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir; that is what I wanted to say.
Mr. SounwINE. Go ahead.
Mr. KARLIN. And even he invited me once, I remember, to his party
when his father came from Australia, because originally he was an
Austrailian man, and his old father, he was oh, 60, 65 maybe at that
time, or 70, but very active man, who was in conversation with me, I
remember, he openly declared his Communist ideas.
Mr. SouRwINE. The father?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. The father, he said something about his other
sons. I know there were two or three of them, in the family, and some
of them were in the State of Victoria in Australia.
He wanted to create-I guess he did it specifically by the order of
Peter Burchette-to create an atmosphere when it would be easier for
Peter himself one day to say that he is a Communist.
Mr. SOURWINE. By "Peter" you mean Wilfred Peter Burchette?
Mr. KARLIN. It is correct. In everyday life everyone called him
Peter.
Mr. SoiRwINE. Was Peter his first name?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, I suppose so; but I really do not know.
Mr. SouRWINE. Peter Wilfred?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, Peter Wilfred.
Mr. SouRwINE. All right.
Mr. KARLIN. And lie tried any possible way to become closer to me.
Well, he tried to be in a close relation with some of our other officers,
too, not only with me. He tried to visit our place many times and to
come in a particular time when there wasn't any other foreigners.
Mr. SouRWINE. Did he speak Russian?
Mr. KARLIN. No; from my point of view he did not, but I told last
time, in my testimony, that the KGB from the beginning when Peter
Burchette appeared in my horizon, they didn't want me to relate with
him, in other words, to be sold to him, because they had some informa-
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tion about him which wasn't so positive from their point of view.
They told me that probably even he talked Russian, and they told me
that in some situation, in some circumstances, he was in Russia, in
Siberia, that he worked in the Intourist Agency. But that was all
rather strange because, you see, there wasn't any confirmation from
his side, you know, any evidences. They told me something about his
private life, about his wife and so on.
They wanted to prevent my relation with him at that time, but
later they changed their mind. I repeat in the beginning, they don't
want me to relate with him, with the idea to be recruited by him.
But later on when I reported how he behaves, how he talks to me,
situation rather changed. I remember such an episode, one American,
whom I mentioned, Robert Gray, came to our office, and before him
Burchette came, and we have been in the Bespalov private room,
and someone came and said Gray came, his car is there on the street,
and Burchette said immediately: "I don't want him to see me here,
please let's do something." And I remember how I with him went to
another room and we waited there until the American came, talked
to Bespalov and left.
Mr. SoURwINE. What American was that?
Mr. KARLIN. It was Robert Gray. And then I remember how
Burchette told me: "Oh, look, I would like to give you advice. This
rather dangerous man, this American, it is better for you not to see
him." And they were antagonistic between them. It wasn't, you see,
the usual relation between correspondents. It was something special.
Mr. SoURwINE. Did he warn you against Gray?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SoURwINE. On what grounds?
Mr. KARLIN. On the grounds that he was rather suspected by
foreign correspondents, that he is not only a news man, but something
else. He gave me such a hint.
Mr. SoURwINE. Did you ever learn whether there was any truth
in these reports?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, my idea about Bob Gray was that he worked
really in the news department in American military government, but
I think that it was very clear that he had some relation with the
American Secret Service.
I remember, by the way, that Gray reacted probably in the same
way when we talked about Burchette, Gray told me: "Oh, he is
awful, you know, he is a very suspicious man and it is better for you
not to meet him."
Mr. SoURwINE. What was your relationship with Gray, if we may
digress long enough?
Mr. KARLIN. I gave Gray a hint that probably I would be happy
to defect to the U.S.A. and he organized my meeting with another
American who represented at that time, the American authority, to
discuss my possibility to go to the States with some valuable
information.
Mr. SoURwINE. With whom did he arrange that you discuss this?
Mr. KARLIN. Gray?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. KARLIN. He introduced me to a gentleman named Henry.
Mr. SoURwINE. Just the one name?
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Mr. KARLIN. Just the one name.
Mr. SounwINE. Did anything ever come of this beyond the dis-
cussion?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, I met him many times-oh, not many, but
probably three times. And that was close to the realization in some
way. But then the Soviet, the KGB, called me back to Moscow for 2
weeks with the idea to come back. But then I stayed in Moscow and
they didn't send me back.
Mr. SouRwiNE. So nothing came of this?
Mr. KARLIN. Nothing came of it, correct.
Mr. SOURWINE. As far as any pseudo defection?
Mr. KARLIN. Correct.
Then particularly in the German period Burch.ette gave me all neces-
sary hints that he is very close to the Communists, and that he wants
to have a special relation with me.
Mr. SOURWINE. You say the German period. You mean while you
were in Berlin?
Mr. KARLIN. That's correct, sir. That means from May 1947 until
November of 1947.
Mr. SOTRwINE. All right.
Mr. KARLIN. Then when I came back to Moscow, well, in some
years' time, I wouldn't say that I heard much about him, but I heard
that he was in Korea.
Mr. SouRwINE. When you say some years' time, you mean several
years?
Mr. KARLIN. Several years, right. That was the Korean war, and
lie published something, it was republished in the-not in the Soviet
press, but in the, how they call it, "progressive" European press. In
Paris I think there was some publication in' French, someone told me
there was a Burchette article. And then I heard that he went to China,
he stayed there, and then he went to Vietnam. That is all I heard from
some people. I guess it must be emphasized that Burchette was a real
and very good newspaperman, columnist, a talented columnist. In
1956 the telephone in my flat rang and when I took the receiver it was
Burchette's voice. He said he just arrived to Moscow, and that he is
now in the Hotel Savoy which now is titled Berlin. It's only for foreign-
ers. There were at that time the New York Times bureau, the Reuters
Agency and so on.
He asked me to come to see him, and I called to my KGB boss then
it was a Captain Churanov. Well, he told me that I can-I am sorry,
it's a mistake, because Churanov was later. Firstly it was Krasilnikov.
I telephoned him and I said there is a Burchette here in Moscow, what
to do, go to see him or not. Well, a little bit later he told me all right,
go and talk to him and probably you will know what he wants, why
he called, where lie is going, and so on. I went to see him. He was on
his way from Hanoi to Bulgaria, to Sofia. Because he was married, it
was his second marriage, the Bulgarian girl. He wanted to go to Sofia,
then to Warsaw and then to Berlin. That was his idea. Yes, it was the
beginning of 1956, because I remember when he came back he told
me about some unsettled situation in Poland, particularly in Posnan.
And in that time when I visited him and we went to a restaurant,
he openly told me that he is a member of the Australian Communist
Party, but for the benefit of party, he is on the illegal underground
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position, and that-he showed me his document, that was a rather
strange paper which was issued in Hanoi, by the North Vietnam Gov-
ernment-but he told me that he hadn't an Australian passport. He
told me that the Australian authority refused to give him the pass-
port. Then he told me that he was in Korea, and then he was in China.
He worked there as a free lance correspondent but he was supplied, he
was paid by the Chinese Communist Party all that period. Then when
he came to Vietnam he was under the-all his expenses were paid by
the Vietnam Communist Party, by He Chi Minh, and he mentioned
that he was in a very close relation with Chou En Lai, that's the
Chinese, he is now Prime Minister of China, that he was in a very
close relation with He Chi Minh himself. He told me that he visited
him many times, that He gave him a house in Hanoi, and a car, a
secretary, that he was "equipped" very beautifully by the Vietnamese
Communist Party.
And then he said that, he had now a new idea-in that time he told
me-that he wanted to come to Moscow and to stay in Moscow
because now, after the Khrushchev speech, Moscow became the most
important place in the world. And he gave me a hint that he wants to
be in Moscow in the same position as he was in China and in Vietnam.
In other words, to be a free lance correspondent, representing the
American newspaper "National Guardian." It's a small "progressive"
pro-Communist newspaper, which could give him accreditation be-
cause he still formally needed to be accredited. And then he told me
that he could got these papers, he could officially be accredited in
Moscow, but money was a problem, because no one would pay him
money and he asked money from the Soviet Communist Party.
He told me all these directly and he said that it would be nice if I
would be able to find right man to discuss all this.
Then he went to Bulgaria. When I reported all that to the KGB
well, they thought a long time, you see. And when Burchette came
back to Moscow, they ordered me to tell him that practically, with
some hesitation, but still that it is possible for him to come to Moscow
and work here and everything would be all right. They told me some-
thing like that. And I told him something like that. And he went back
to Hanoi, and couple years later I received a telegram from him that
he would arrive such a day, such a plane, and so on.
I called to the KGB boss. I told him that Burchette is coming.
And at this time a rather funny story happened because instead of
the KGB boss whom I mentioned as the Krasilnikov, there was
another one, Churanov, and probably lie didn't know all about it
before, but in the first time there was a confusion.. He said, well, we
don't need him, and so on. But Burchette was in Moscow practically.
So, situation was not clear. Burchette said, "Well, I would like to go
to see Representative of the Australian Communist Party."
They both were at that time in Moscow because it was particularly
the time of the Soviet Communist Party Congress, and they came as
guests, visitors, you know. After his meeting with them, which I
don't know how it happened, he did it himself, everything was quite
all right and the KGB gave him the good flat and, well, I guess
necessary money. But in that time they asked me to introduce Peter
Burchette to the former KGB man, whom I mentioned before,
Kartsev. After I introduced him, they told me that now this gentleman
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would relate with Burchette and that it wouldn't be necessary for me
to continue my relation with him. Later on, from this Kartsev, I
knew that they, together organized some operations, they called to
London because Burchette was a long-time correspondent of Daily
Express, that's a London newspaper. They called somewhere, some-
body, and they expected that someone would come from London to
Moscow, and they discussed how to meet him and so forth. That is
what I don't know exactly, I heard only some words from Kartsev.
One day he met me and he said everything is well, and there is some
operation underway, then Peter called to London, we are expecting
someone, and so on.
Then only once I met Peter accidentally, near the gas station in
Moscow, and I asked him, whom do you represent, Peter? He said,
being proud, "The Daily Express." That wasn't correct, of course.
But probably there was some relation again, he started to resume his
relation with the Daily Express. I have seen in his car another gentle-
man; he was from Germany, the correspondent of the East German
News Agency, who just visited Peking and who was on the way back
to Berlin.
Well, Burchette came to Moscow with his two kids from his
second wife. Another son from his first wife, and his first wife, herself
as far as I know, are in London.
Once when I went to Japan I met in the ship Ordjonikidze, an
English reporter from Daily Express, Seeman, a very well-known
reporter. He told me that he is coming from Moscow, he passed
through the whole Russia, and now he is going to Japan. He said that
in Moscow he met Burchette. I said. "Well, I knew him in. my past.
How is he?" Seeman said, "Ile is a good reporter, he is a very good
newspaper man, but we are totally different and his position in
Moscow is rather strange." It was his opinion.
It was last time when I heard about Burchette.
Now, I know that Burchette had a close relation with the boss of
the KGB special department which is responsible for the whole
foreign correspondents in Moscow. That's Colonel Barsegov. But I
don't know particular cases which were organized.
Well, I think that is basically the whole story with Burchette.
I mentioned before that dealing with me firstly, when he wanted to
show how valuable person he is, he said about his relation with
Marguerite Higgins, an American correspondent, and he said that he
was in very close intimate relation with her, and then that she, even
wanted to marry him, and then that she married American Air Force
general. He said, "We could use this possibility", but at the same
time he told me that for him to come to America. means to be arrested
here automatically. But later on I heard and I even read in newspapers
that Peter Burchette was in Paris at the peace conference, being with
the Viet Cong or with Vietnam delegation, and I read in the news-
paper that he wanted to be accredited in the United Nations. That is
what I read in the newspaper.
I think it is all what could be said about Burchette.
Mr. SouRwINE. Does that conclude your story?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, I think it does. I don't know whether it is
necessary to mention, perhaps this could be off the record.
Mr. SouRwINE. Off the record.
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(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SouRwINE. Back on the record.
Do you know what Mr. Burchette had done for Mao Tse-tung,
what positions he had held for him, or what tasks he had done?
Mr. KARLIN. I know only general things. He told me that he worked
for the Communist Party of China, he was paid for this, and he was
supported by it, all that was necessary for him was from the Com-
munist Party, and his duty was to be a foreign correspondent, for
example, in the Korean period, and to give information to the Chinese.
Mr. SouRwINE. He did have special privileges as a result of this,
did he not?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
IVIr. SouRwINE. At least claimed that he had had?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. He told me that the whole supply was from the
Communist Party. He told me it because he wanted to deal the
same with the Soviet Communist Party, he wanted it to pay all his
expenses.
Mr. SouRwINE. Did you know what position, if any, he held with
Ho Chi Minh?
Mr. KARLIN. He was a very close man to Ho Chi Minh.
Mr. SouRwINE. According to his own statement?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, to his own statement. He told me that he saw
him many times, and visited his private house, and his friends. I
guess even he described all that because he published four or five
books, one of which was specially about Ho Chi Minh, about the
life in Vietnam and so on. He underlined that lie was in very close
relation with Ho Chi Minh.
Mr. SouRwINE. Now, have you told us all of your part in recruiting
him, I mean by "him" Burchette?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. For employment by the KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. Sure.
Mr. SouRwINE. Was his recruitment with the KGB wholly on the
basis of what you reported, or did it take something else to
Mr. KARLIN. Well, I told you that he met in Moscow the repre-
sentatives of Australian Communist Party. They of course intervened
in his behalf. I am convinced that it happened, because before it
there was an uncertain situation. The KGB decided firstly to take
him, and then there was a hesitation, and he was upset by this and
he said, "I'll go see my people." And after that the situation changed,
you see, and that could be only, I guess, because of his conversation
with Australian representatives.
Mr. SouRwINE. Did anyone ever tell you that the Australian
Communists had intervened in Burchette's behalf with the KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. No, no one told me that in direct way officially. I can
only make my guess, knowing his movements and the position of
KGB.
Mr. SouRwINE. Do you know of your own knowledge whether
the KGB paid Burchette?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, the point is that he asked them to pay. Well, he
asked it even the first time when he carne to Moscow being only on
the way to Sofia. He told me, for example, that he needed $150, to
visit Berlin, and he said maybe someone would be able to give him
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this money. I reported to the KGB and the first reaction was good
and they wanted to give him that money and then they said, well,
there was no money, and lie went to Sofia, to Warsaw, and to Berlin
without it. But he was such a man who from the first moment said,
"I must be paid, I need money." Later when he came back he told
me that usually the foreign correspondents in Moscow have 10,000
rubles, in old money and that he needs particularly this money.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did Burchette tell you he had participated in the
Petrov case?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, he told me that, it's correct.
Mr. SoURwINE. Did he tell you what part he played?
Mr. KARLIN. It was not clear for me. But he gave me a hint, that was
the first time, when we wanted to know his ability, his wide-range
scale as a correspondent and Communist, underground Communist
worker. Then he mentioned that he even had his finger in that case,
and he mentioned that in that case were involved the editor of the
Communist newspaper Chaplin, and one girl.
Mr. SoURwINE. What girl are you talking about?
Mr. KARLIN. One girl from underground.
Mr. SOURwINE. In Australia?
Mr. KARLIN. In Australia, yes. That was an Australian girl.
Mr. SOURwINE. A Communist girl?
Mr. KARLIN. Could be, but all that situation was unclear for me,
too complicated to understand and to remember now. Wilfred wanted
to show that it was an underground job and that he was rather in-
volved in it in spite of the fact that he himself wasn't at the time, when
the Petrov case happened in Australia. I'm not sure it was true, it
could be only an evidence of his dealing tendency.
Mr. SoURwINE. You never got it straight?
Mr. KARLIN. He was in Moscow in the position of the seller who
wanted to put his price up. That was why he said it to me because
there was no reason to tell me all this story.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Burchette toll you anything about an
alleged secret mission he had performed
Mr. KARLIN. Oh, yes, with Patliet Lao.
Mr. SOURwINE (continuing). For Ho Chi Minh with the Pathet
Lao?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, he said it, that's correct.
Mr. SOURWINE. Tell its about it.
Mr. KARLIN. He said that by the order of top Vietnamese, maybe
Ho Chi Minh himself, he was sent secretly, illegally, to Pathet Lao
detachment to relate with Pathet Lao. He went on these special
missions to see Pathet Lao leaders twice. I don't know what lie told
the Pathet Lao leaders and why lie went there. He said only that he
did those trips twice.
Mr. SOURWINE. He never gave you any more details?
Mr. KARLIN. No, he didn't.
Mr. SoUnwINE. Have you told its all you know about Burchette's
trip to Poland?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. From Moscow?
Mr. KARLIN. I didn't say, that when he was in Poland, that was
during the first trip from Hanoi to Bulgaria, particularly in Posnan,
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he met there some people and he got some information. When he
came back to Moscow he told me there is a very, very dangerous
situation now in Poland.
Mr. SouRwINE. When was this with respect to the time of the Poland
and Hungarian revolt?
Mr. KARLIN. That was before it, 2 or 3 months before it, because the
Posnan incident was before the Hungarian, one, 2, or 3 months' time.
And he came and he told me, and he knew that I would report it,
that the situation now basically and generally in Poland is very bad,
deteriorated, and .there is some-he worried that there could be some
revolution against the Soviet puppets, against the Communist regime,
and he told me that he talked to some intellectuals and that their
"brains" are not good enough, that they are thinking too free, and
they want to change situation which was at that time. Well, I guess
it was very valuable information, for the KGB as much as for the
Central Committee, for the Kremlin's leaders, for Khrushchev at
that time, I might say. And again Wilfred gave this information to
show that he could be useful in that way, too, not only in the direct
KGB's channels.
Mr. SouRwINE. Was he giving this information to the KGB through
you?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. On his way back to Hanoi and until his second
visit he didn't see any KGB officials. He related with them only
through Inc.
Mr. SouRwINE. Now, was it on the first trip or on the second trip
Burchetto told you about his having formed a close relation in Korea
with certain top generals of the U.S. Air Force?
Mr. KARLIN. He told me that in regards to Marguerite Higgins.
Mr. SouRwINE. That was during the first trip?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes. That was during the first trip when we went
to the restaurant and when he opened his cards.
Mr. SOURWINE. He never named any of the generals?
Mr. KARLIN. No, I never heard any names.
Mr. SouRwINE. You never talked with Kartsev about Burchette
after Burchette was turned over to Kartsev?
Mr. KARLIN. I met him once and he told me that the "work" is
going on, successfully. Of course, he wanted to underline that every-
thing is all right because Burchette wasn't happy when I introduced
him to Kartsev. Well, Kartsev wasn't, let's say, the Burchette type of
man.
Mr. SouRwINE. Off the record.
Senator THURMOND. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Senator Thurmond. Back on the record.
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, that's what I wanted to repeat. Kartsev knew
that I knew that Burchetto wasn't happy with him, and he wanted to
show me that everything is good now, you see. I told you that accord-
ing to Kartsev, Burchette telephoned to London, to Daily Expi;ess,
to some English gentleman who wanted to come to Moscow.
Mr. SouRwINE. You don't know what the important man was that
was coming from London?
Mr. KARLIN. I don't know it. And I wouldn't say he had to be
important, because Kartsev didn't tell me it. He said that some
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British is coming, but I don't know what his position was, that gentle-
man's.
Mr. SOURZVINE. Do you know what Burchette meant when he told
you that if he, Burchette, should go to the United States he would be
arrested immediately?
Mr. KARLIN. I think he wanted to underline his pro-Communist
activity even in Germany, when he wrote the book, it seems to me, his
first book which was, I would say, rather anti-American. I guess when
he went to Korea, he was rather anti-American, too.
Mr. SOURWINE. He has been internationally known for many years
,not only as Communist but as a pro-Communist, hasn't he?
Mr. KARLIN. Right. And as a result--
Mr. SOURWINE. His writings have been pro-Communist, he has been
known as a spokesman for the Communist Party view?
Mr. KARLIN. Almost like that.
Mr. SOURWINE. He has been known and was accepted in Com-
munist areas?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, it's correct.
Mr. SouRwINE. Including the Far East?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes.
Mr. SOURwINE. Including North Vietnam? Including Communist
China?
Mr. KARLIN. Yes, sir. He showed me some articles from the Aus-
tralian newspapers inhere lie was branded as pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese,
and so on.
Mr. SOURWINE. If an American newspaper were to print a story
written by
Mr. KARLIN. Burchette.
Mr. SouRwiNE (continuing). Burchette and carrying his byline, and
to carry with it an editor's note describing him as a famous Australian
correspondent with long experience in the Far East, and nothing more,
how would you describe that, as inaccurate, as naive, or some other
way?
Mr. KARLIN. I read myself in the Herald Tribune such an article
when Burchette was named as a specialist and a good correspondent
who wants now to be accredited in the United Nations in New York.
Mr. SOURWINE. Shouldn't he be described as a Communist corre-
spondent if his stuff is going to be printed in this country?
Mr. KARLIN. From my point of view, yes, of course. There are
evidence which is impossible to ignore, but you know the press in
the United States is rather strange, they choose facts which they like.
Mr. SOURWINE. I have nothing further to ask about Burchette.
Is there anything you can think of that you know about him that
you failed to tell us?
Mr. KARLIN. When I have been in Spain, when I went to Madrid
and walked there, I saw in the window shop a lot of books, and at
the first place I have seen the book written by Burchette. It was the
book about Yuri Gagarin, the first Soviet cosmonaut, which he wrote
in Moscow I heard about it in England. He did it having a contract
with some English publisher, and he used the whole material which
Soviets gave him.
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Mr. SOURWINE. Did he write that himself, or as a matter of fact,
wasn't that a job that was prepared by the KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. Well, I am sure that the KGB helped him because
it was pretty important propagandistic action.
Mr. SOURWINE. All right, We will leave Wilfred Burchette now.
Do you or did you know Jean-Paul Sartre?
Mr. KARLIN. Not Personally.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he is?
Mr. KARLIN. Sure.
Mr. SOURwINE. Do you have any information about his position
vis-a-vis communism or the KGB?
Mr. KARLIN. I don't know anything about the KGB, but he was
very friendly with one of the most known Soviet movie producer,
named Utkevich. I don't know that directly from KGB, but . . .
Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead with whatever you wanted to say.
Mr. KARLIN. It's what could be. You can put this all together,
but not in a direct way. This Utkevich, for many years, it was such a
rumor around him, was and probably is on the very top level collabo-
ration with KGB and Central Committee of the CPUS, on a top,
top level, you see, because France for him is like his second home. He
was very close with Picasso, you know, with all people, artists, with
pro-Communist tendency. It is possible to include Jean-Paul Sartre
in that group. And I want to say this: When Jean-Paul Sartre came
to Moscow, something really exceptional was done by the Soviet
Government. You know his play was shown in Moscow theaters,
and money from the show was paid to him. Now, according to the
existing law, the Soviet hasn't any convention, agreement with the
Western writers, and therefore it is not necessary for them to pay
them money which they can get from publishing books of Western
writers, or to stage their plays, you see. It was done only for Jean-Paul
Sartre and for Louis Aragon. That is two men who are paid in Moscow.
Mr. SoURwINE. Are you saying that when the Soviets or Soviet
publishers pay for the work of a foreigner it indicates that the foreigner
is Communist?
1VIr. KARLIN. Well, I wouldn't say it in a direct way, but they
are doing that each time by the special reason, because still they
don't like to pay. Sometimes it's big money, and of course they are
doing that with special reason, or trying to produce the good impres-
sion, you see, or, yes, well, particularly in those two cases authors are
Communists. It is no question about it.
Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking whether in your opinion the fact of
royalty payments indicates that they are. Communists or whether that
might have some other logical explanation.
Mr. KARLIN. The answer is; there could be two purposes: authors
are Communists or there is some special reason for the Soviet Govern-
ment to do it.
Mr. SOURWINE. We know the Soviet Government does not have to
do it. We know they do not do it in all cases.
Mr. KARLIN. That means that they
Mr. SOURWINE. The question is when they do it, what does it mean?
Mr. KARLIN. It means, that they want to give useful foreign people
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financial hell). Even they sometimes permit them to change Soviet
money for the foreign currency, which is very painful for the Soviet
Union, you know, because they haven't enough currency. But still
they are doing even this, of course its political matter.
Mr. SOURWINE. This might be a good place to close this session.
Senator THURMOND. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Senator THURMOND. This hearing stands in recess subject to the
call of the Chair.
(`hereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the hearing was recessed, subject to the
call of the Chair.)
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(NOTE'.-The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or organization
n this index.)
A
Page
Abakumov--------------------------------------------------------
151
Academy of Science------------------------------------------------
129
Alexey ----------------------------------------------------------
04
Algeria-----------------------------------------------------------
93
Algerian Government--__ ___________________________________ 93,
111
Algerian War-----------------------------------------------------
100
Allied Governments, London________________________________________
113
American Ambassador_______________________________________ 122, 147,
150
American Embassy------------------------------------------------
122
American Secret Service__________________________________ --------------------------------------------
157
Andreev, Major--------------------- 89, 93-95, 99, 100, 108, 111, 112,
152
Aragon, Louis-----------------------------------------------------
165
Aragvi(restaurant)------------------------------------------------
96
Associated Press-- ------------------------------------------------
123
Aurora (restaurant) - ----------------------------------------------
127
Australia-------------------------------------------------------- 156,162
Austria----------------------------------------------- ---------- 152
Avakov----------------------------------------------------------- 99
B
Bagachev, Vladimir------------------------------------------------ 131
Barsegov, Colonel (Borodin)___________________________________ 119, 152, 160
Belgium--- ----------------------------------------------- 90,153
Benediktov--------------------------------------------- 144,145,147,149
Benelux-------------------------------------------------------- 102,153
Berlin______________________________________________ 113-121,158,161,162
Bespalov--------------------------------------------------- 121, 156,
157
Big Four---------------------------------------------------------
111
Black Sea--------------------------------------------------------
152
Bogoslovsky -----------------------------------------------
124
Bolshoi Theater Ballet School_______________________________________
123
Borodin (Barsegov) ------------------------------------------------
119
Botkinskava Hospital______________________________________________
111
Bourne, Eric------------------------------------------------------
119
British Embassy------------------------------------------------- 106,
135
British Intelligence Service_________________________________________
156
British Secret Service______________________________________________
97
Brown -----------------------------------------------------
125
Brown, Miss------------------------------------------------------
138
Brussels----------------------------------------------------------
152
Brynzev----------------------------------------------------------
90
Bulgaria -------------------------------------------- 116, 142, 158, 159,
162
Bucar, Annabel---------------------------------------------------
124
Burchette, Wilfred Peter_________________________ 114-119, 126,152,155--165
C
Canada-------------------------------------------------------- 1.41,143 Canadian Ambassador_____________________________________________ 125
Canadian Embassy______________________________________ 125, 138141, 142
Canadian Secret Service_ __________________________________________ 141
"Captain of the First Rank" (movie) --------------------------------
Central Committee, Communist Party_ _ ------ 146, 147, 151, 154, 155, 163, 165
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Page
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) --- ------------------------------
94,
105
Chaplin----------------------------------------------------------
162
Cheluskensy------------------------------------------------------
125
Cherednichenko, Taissa Savva--- ----------------------------------
93
------------------------------------
Boris
Cherkaschin
98
-- - -----
,
China- ----------------------- ----------------------------- 120,159
Ch
E
L
i
r
ou
n
a
--- --------------------------------------------------
--------------- --------------------------------
Captain---------------------------------------------- 158,159
Churanov
,
Churchill --------------------------------------------------------
100
Circle of Foreigners in Monaco_ ---------------------------- 113,
114
Committee of Repatriation-- --------------------------------------
152
COMSOMOL-----------------------------------------------------
152
Communist China-------------------------------------------------
164
Communist Party, Australia- -------------------------------- 158, 159,
161
Communist Party, China---------------------------------------- --
116
Communist Party Soviet Union------------------------------- 147, 159,
161
China----------------------------------------- ------------------
158
Communist Party of China--------------------------------------- 159,
161
Communist Party of Vietnam---------------------------------------
159
Constitution of the U.S.S.R----------------------------------------
128
Coty, President of France------------------------------------------
93
Crimea
-------------------------------
139
----------------------------
Czechoslovakia-------------------------------------------------- 113,144
1)
Daily Express (newspaper) ----------------------------------- 119, 160, 163
De Gaulle----------------------------------------------------- 93,94, 112
Dejean, Marie Claire------------------------------ --- --- 98-101,122,123
Dejean, Maurice-------------------------- 94-97,103,110-112,123,149,150
De Murville, Couve------------------------------------------------ 94
D emischev-------------------------------------------------------- 154
Department of Water Supply, Mosco