ABM: THE HIGH COST OF LIVING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110053-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: December 7, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

eember 7, 1967 proved FCONC'RESSIONAL/ RECORD - SENATE 8000300110053-5 S 18073
The basic constitutional right of Fed- Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
eral taxpayers to be exempt from taxa- the amendment which I propose would
tion for religious purposes will remain extend the research provisions under
dormant for want of procedure for its section 302(a) of title III of the Mental
enforcement until the Supreme Court Retardation Act of 1963. All this amend-
clarifies its ruling In the Frothingham ment would do is extend the provisions
case or Congress enacts an adequate judi- for one year, 1970, and authorize $18
cial review law. million for these research purposes.
Hope that the Supreme Court would I will only add that this is the mental
shed light on the subject substantially retardation bill which the President
diminished on November 14, 1966, when signed into law yesterday. When the
the Court refused to review the decision bill passed the Senate, this provision I
Horace Mann League against the Board
of Public Works of Maryland case, which
adjudged unconstitutional under the first
amendment State construction grants to
three religiously controlled colleges. Inci-
dentally, these State construction grants
were similar to Federal grants made to
the same colleges under Federal pro-
grams for the assistance of institutions
of higher learning.
For these reasons, it is probable that
the basic right conferred upon Federal
taxpayers by the first amendment will
remain in abeyance and Congress will
continue to appropriate Federal tax
moneys for educational and welfare pur-
poses in constitutional darkness rather
than constitutional light until its Mem-
bers face up to a fundamental national
issue and manifest their respect for the
first amendment by enacting a judicial
review bill for its enforcement.
Senators and Representatives now have
an immediate opportunity to face up to
this fundamental issue and enact an ade-
quate judicial review law without further
delay.
This Is true because on December 1,
1967, the Senate by a unanimous vote of
71 yeas adopted my amendment adding
the provisions of the judicial review bill
to H.R. 7819, the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act Amendments of
1967.
If the conference committee recom-
mends the retention of my amendment
in H.R. 7819 and the Senate and House
adopt such recommendation, Congress
will enact adequate procedures for chal-
lenging on first amendment grounds the
disbursement of Federal tax moneys and
thus manifest a conviction that the first
amendment is to be a living principle of
Government and not a scrap of dead
parchment.
I close with the prayer that all con-
cerned will act accordingly.
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I
send to the dezk an amendment and
ask that it be stated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to read the amendment.
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that further
reading of the amendment be dispensed
with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered, and the
amendment will be printed in the
RECORD. _
The amendment, ordered to be printed
In the RECORD, is as follows:
On page 109, line 21, insert the following
after "amended": "(1) by striking out 'and'
before '$14,000,000'; (2) by inserting ', and
$18,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1970' after 'June 30, 1969'; and (3) ".
am proposing was approved by this body,
but it was omitted in conference. I am
only asking that the Senate reenact
this provision.
Mr. President, the money authorized
by section 302(a) would be appropriated
to conduct research, surveys, and demon-
stration projects related to the educa-
tional needs of the mentally retarded and
other handicapped children. Through
these funds better tools and methods can
be devised for teaching the 5 million
children in America who are now re-
ceiving special educational services and
training, and hopefully we will begin to
reach those children who need but are
not now receiving special education.
Throughout the Mental Retardation
Amendments of 1967, just this week
signed into law, research and teacher
training go hand in hand. Without a pool
of knowledge constantly renewed by re-
search, teacher training would quickly
stagnate, and tomorrow's mentally re-
tarded children would be taught by yes-
terday's procedures and equipment..
The mental retardation amendments
extended the authorization for teacher
training appropriations through 1970,
but the authorization for research appro-
priations through 1970 failed to survive
the conference committee. The former
program is dependent on the latter, so
I am seeking here merely to bring re-
search into line with teacher training.
This extension of research funds will fur-
ther encourage the development of com-
prehensive programs aimed at providing
teachers with the most effective proce-
dures, materials, and curriculums for
educating handicapped children.
I ask that the chairman of the, coin-
mittee accept the amendment.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the man-
ager of the bill accepts the amendment,
and will take It to conference.
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. DOMINICK. Frankly, I did not
hear the amendment-it was so short. I
would like to find out what it Is about
before the Senate acts.
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
the amendment extends the research
Provisions under section 302(a) of title
III of the Mental Retardation Act of
1963. All this amendment would do is
extend the provisions for 1 year, 1970,
and authorize $18 million for research
purposes.
I will only add that this is the mental
retardation bill which the President
signed into law yesterday. When the bill
passed the Senate, the Provision I am
proposing was approved by this body, but
was omitted in conference. I am only
asking that the Senate reenact this pro-
vision.
All I am asking-and this has been
cleared with the chairman today-is that
the Senate reenact the provision, to ex-
tend it for 1 year and authorize research
funds of $18 million.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment of the Senator from Texas.
The amendment was agreed to.
ABM; THE HIGH COST OF LIVING
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, there, is no
single matter that demands closer atten-
tion than the issue of building an anti-
ballistic-missile system designed to pro-
tect our cities and our citizens against
the threat of a Soviet thermonuclear
strike.
The administration has now com-
mitted itself to the establishment of a
limited anti-ballistic-missile system that
would be adequate to protect us against
attack by Red China over the coming
decade, and to protect us as well against
the posibility of an accidental missile
}aunching. But, whichever way we may
lean at the moment, all of us, I am cer-
tain, are asking ourselves whether this
much protection is really enough.
I wish to call to the attention of my
colleagues an exceptionally penetrating
article on this subject that was published
in the October issue of United States
Naval Institute Proceedings, entitled
"ABM: The High Cost of Living." The
article was written by Lt. Douglas M.
Johnston, USN, a veteran of nuclear sub-
marine service.
Lieutenant, Johnston points out that,
while we have been debating the issue,
the Soviet Union has been pushing full
steam ahead in the development of an
ABM system of its own. Not content with
this, they have been "striving for parity
In total deliverable megatonnage and in
numbers of missiles."
Lieutenant Johnston takes issue with
those strategists who hold that nuclear
parity would tend to make peace more
secure. Let me quote what he says on this
point:
Assuming that an offensive nuclear parity
were achieved and that Soviet strategists re-
mained reluctant to institute a surprise first
strike owing to possible overwhelming retali-
atory devastation, the projected condition of
parity would render the strategic balance hy-
persensitive to technological breakthroughs
and surprise tactics. A political aggressive
power such as the Soviet union could readily
de-stabilize the balance by concentrating its
resources on a particularly promising new
technology and achieving unquestionable
supremacy therein. They would, through
this temporary advantage, acquire a position
that would be ripe for political exploitation.
Deployment of a moderately effective ABM
defense system would fall into such a
category.
Lieutenant Johnston goes on to argue
that a Soviet missile defense would
have political implications that far out-
weigh its military implications.
A missile defense-
He says-
would prove to be uniquely suitable as an
agent for bluff, since the bluff could not be
disproved short of major war.
In reply to the argument that the es-
tablishment of an antiballistic missile
defense system In this country would re-
sult in a further escalation of nuclear
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the height of an extreme and vital interna-
tional crisis?
At such a moment, when deterrence is
most needed, there is some evidence that de-
terrence disappears. As is generally recog-
nized, deterrence exists in the minds of the
major policy makers of the nations deterred.-
There is evidence that under conditions of
extreme and growing tension, the major de-
cision makers in every great power become
unable to pay attention to the warnings, the
threats, the deterrents of their potential
enemies.
This was readily illustrated in the summer
of 1914 when the Allies and Central Powers
mobilized their full strength in an attempt to
deter one another from going to war. Each
side subsequently became so obsessed with
its own capabilities that it ultimately ignored
the threat of retaliation.
Since the United States holds a decided ad-
vantage in strategic offensive capability, it
would seem logical that efforts should be
made toward closing the presently "wide
open" defensive door. No enemy vehicle or
weapon of any sort should be permitted to
have a "free ride." An open ICBM defense
could very well prove to be the Achilles' heel
in any future conflict. The United States
must seek to achieve a posture of balance
between its offensive and defensive capabil-
ities-not an offensive balance based. on the
presupposition that a historically deceitful
enemy is going to act in a rational manner,
but a balance that is both real and effective.
Scientific progress in the field of ABM re-
search has reached the point where deploy-
ment would be very feasible. In recent testi-
mony given by Defense Secretary Robert S.
McNamara, before the Bomber Subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee, it
was indicated that there had been a major
breakthrough in missile defense technology
in 1965. New long-range "exo-atmospheric"
interceptor missiles would now render practi-
cable an "area" defense, as opposed to a
"point" defense.
When dealing with feasibility, it becomes
necessary to consider cost. It is not possible
to determine the value of a human life;
but it would seem logical when one is con-
sidering the possible loss of millions of lives
against a 24-billion-dollar appropriation in
a country where the gross national product
exceeds 725 billion dollars, that the cost
would prove to be more than commensurate
with the gain.
Although the United States presently en-
joys a superior capability in the field of
strategic deterrence, there is evidence that
the gap is gradually diminishing. It is
obvious that the Soviet Union should want
to close such a gap, and it would seem that
he optimum strategy to be pursued in such
a case would be for the Soviet government
to persuade the U.S. government to con-
tinue postponing the building of ballistic
missile defenses in return for similar Soviet
restraint. Then it would be free to increase
its offensive arsenal while the U.S. essentially
maintained a status quo. It would appear
that a course of action similar to this is
being pursued by the Soviet Union; with
one catch-there is no evidence of Soviet
restraint in any field. Not only do the Rus-
sians appear to be striving for parity in total
deliverable megatonnage, but also in total
numbers as well. The fact that Soviet mis-
siles carry more powerful warheads than
U.S. ICBMs tends to work towards parity in
itself. In addition, the U.S.S.R. presently has
more than 300 missiles with at least an-
other 300 programmed for completion by
1968 while the United States will have a
total of 1,054 by the end of 1967 with no fur-
ther increase programmed in defense plan-
ning for the next five years.
Some strategists advocate that nuclear
parity would be conducive to promoting
peace. Assuming that the Soviet Union re-
tains its present outward rational com-
posure, there is still much to be considered
in the realm of launching the first strike in
any possible showdown where "core inter-
ests" of either side are involved. Regardless
of the measures of retaliation that would
ensue under a previous condition of parity,
the advantage would definitely lie with
whichever side launched the first strike. Al-
though there exists a column entitled "U.S.
first strike" in an American defense table of
U.S. vs. U.S.S.R. war outcomes, it is a well
established fact that Americans are a tem-
porizing people. This was made apparent
when the United States failed to take action
in light of the pre-Pearl Harbor evidence
provided by decoding Japanese messages and
by the House Committee on Un-American
Activities report concerning Japanese
espionage. The present military posture of
the United States serves to decry such an
observation in the eyes of many people, but
the fact still remains that the United States
is basically a non-aggressive nation. Russia,
on the contrary, is well known for its aggres-
sive policies. Poland, Finland, and Japanese
Manchuria were all victims of Soviet sneak
attacks. Furthermore, Captain ? Nikolai Arta-
manov, a Soviet naval officer, testified before
the House Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities that since February of 1955, Soviet
strategy had been based upon the doctrine
of surprise nuclear attack.
Assuming that an offensive nuclear parity
were achieved and that Soviet strategists re-
mained reluctant to institute a surprise first
strike owing to possible overwhelming retali-
atory devastation, the projected condition of
parity would render the strategic balance hy-
persensitive to technological breakthroughs
and surprise tactics. A politically aggressive
power such as the Soviet Union could readily
de-stabilize the balance by concentrating its
resources on a particularly promising new
technology and achieving unquestionable
supremacy therein. They would, through this
temporary advantage, acquire a position that
would be ripe for political exploitation. De-
ployment of a moderately effective ABM de-
fense system would fall into such a category.
An undertaking of this nature would un-
doubtedly yield a military and political ad-
vantage that would last for a significant
length of time. Evidence presently exists to
the effect that the Soviet Union is in fact
embarked upon such a course. This fact cou-
pled with the rate of progress that the Com-
munist Chinese are making in the nuclear
field render it imperative that the United
States take immediate positive steps toward
deployment of an effective ABM system.
Whereas the United States generally does
not use strategic strength to intimidate other
countries, the Soviet Union has constantly
indulged in widespread use of strategic
threats in support of offensive foreign policy
objectives. These strategic threats have varied
in intensity and degree depending upon the
situation, but have generally been expressed
in terms of "possible, ultimate consequence"
as opposed to "certain and immediate conse-
quence." In pursuing a general policy of bluff,
the Soviet Union has repeatedly invoked an
image of thermonuclear war in pursuit of its
political interests. Since the United States
has gained a definite strategic advantage
through deployment of Polaris submarines
and through elimination of doubts concern-
ing any alleged "missile gap," the Soviet
Union has not been so prone to employ the
strategic threat as a matter of routine. The
quantitative gap existing between U.S. and
Soviet intercontinental strike forces is pres-
ently large enough to alleviate Soviet asser-
tions of strategic superiority based on num-
bers of missiles-at least for the immediate
future. The Soviet Union has, however, re-
cently claimed strategic parity, based not
upon numbers, but upon sufficiency of the
existing force and its qualitative superiority.
Although this might prove to be a semi-effec-
tive ploy in nullifying the quantitative ad-
vantage of an opposing force, it is highly
doubtful that it could ever be made the basis
for a claim to strategic superiority.
arms and make peace more precarious,
Lieutenant Johnston points out that
Soviet experts have defended their anti-
missile system on the grounds that such
weapons are purely defensive and that
"the creation of an effective antimissile
defense system by a country which is a
potential target for aggression merely
serves to increase the deterrent effect,
and so help to avert aggression."
Mr. Johnston also believes that an ABM
system would strengthen NATO because
"with a missile defense system of her
own, the United States would be more
willing than ever to come to the defense
of Europe."
Mr. Johnston does not minimize the
cost of an ABM system. But he asks
whether its critics have counted the pos-
sible cost of not having one.
It has been estimated-
He says-
that a massive Soviet ICBM surprise attack
against the United States in 1970 without
ABM protection would result in approxi..
mately 149 million fatalities out of a popu-
lation of 210 million. With an 18- to 24-bil-
lion-dollar ABM system deployed, fatalities
would be reduced to approximately 71 mil-
lion, roughly half of the U.S. industrial ca-
pacity and retaliatory missile force would
survive, and trillions of dollars worth of
property would be saved.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD the complete text
of Lieutenant Johnston's article. I ear-
nestly hope that my colleagues will find
the time to give it the careful reading it
merits.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ABM: THE HIGH CosT or LIVING
(Mankind's most basic, and most frequently
threatened, right-the right to live-is
menaced today as never before. A defensive
system against enemy nuclear missiles will
be enormously expensive and it will not
bar our doors completely; but it will raise
the price of admission.)
(By Lt. Douglas M. Johnston, Jr.,
U.S. Navy)
It is a widely recognized fact that the
United States presently holds the upper hand
in the realm of strategic weapons systems,
both qualitatively and quantitatively. The
U.S. arsenal is programmed to include 1,000
Minutemen ICBMs and 54 Titan II ICBMs by
the end of 1968, In addition, the entire U.S.
Polaris submarine force of 41 submarines
and 656 missiles will soon be operational. Of
these submarine-launched missiles, 208 will
be type A2 missiles and 448 will be the
greater range type AS. This is not to mention
the proposed conversion of the Polaris force
to accommodate the more accurate and more
powerful Poseidon missile in the near future.
Overwhelming as this offensive capability
may seem, the United States at this time has
virtually no defensive protection whatsoever
to contend with a lesser but equally signifi-
cant Soviet capability or to contend with a
probable forthcoming Chinese threat. The
United States must instead rely solely on the
deterrent effect of a seemingly overwhelming
offensive retaliatory capability. Although it
cannot be denied that there is something to
be said for a balance of terror, such a balance
presupposes that all sides concerned will act
in a rational, predictable manner. The fal-
lacy in this argument has been aptly pointed
out by Arthur I. Waskow:
In the real world, frightened by unprece-
dented catastrophe in the offing . men
and nations may not react in any rationally
predictable way. What is likely to happen at
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A more promising approach to achieving a
superior strategic posture would, as previ-
ously mentioned, lie in the development of
an effective missile defense system. A signi-
lficant breakthrough in this area would re-
duce'-the requirement for offensive quanti-
tative superiority. In addition, enemy ICBMs,
that had previously been invulnerable to
pre-launch attack, would become vulnerable
to an ABM defense once they were airborne.
. The military value of a sizeable Soviet
missile defense would probably be far out-
weighed by its associated political value.
This would particularly hold true if the
United States had nothing of a comparable
nature to show for itself. In such a case, it
would undoubtedly prove to be a much easier
task for the Soviet Union to convince the
world that it had developed and deployed a
relatively invulnerable ABM system than it
would be for the United States to refute the
claim of invulnerability on the grounds of
superior offensive weapons employing exotic
penetration aids. A missile defense would
prove to be uniquely suitable as an agent for
bluff, since the bluff could not be disproven
short of a major war. Indeed, it is not incon-
ceivable that dummy ABM Installations
might very well be used in this regard. The
Soviet Union, with its system of rigid inter-
nal secrecy, could readily exploit such a bluff
to the maximum extent possible. Well versed
in the art, the Soviet Union has often suc-
cessfully exploited new weapons in a psy-
chological sphere. The most spectacular ex-
ample of this tactic in recent times took
place in -1957 when the Soviets capitalized
upon their launching of the first- Sputnik to
create false impressions Qf an overwhelming
ICBM capability. This subsequently created
in the minds of the West illusions of a mis-
site gap. In reality, any gap that might have
existed consisted of a Soviet lag in missile
strength. The Soviet Union has con-
sistently exaggerated its military strength
through displaying prototypes of new weap-
ons in conjunction with a corresponding
show of strength so as to create the impres-
sion that the weapons in question were
available in large numbers. The effectiveness
of such bluffs has been all too well illus-
trated in the fact that the alleged missile
gap frightened-the United States into build-
ing an ICBM force which was not only much
greater than that of the Soviet Union, but
also much -greater than that necessary for
deterrence purposes, whether dealing with
Russia, or China, or both simultaneously.
Herein lies the danger of the Soviet tactic
of bluff. It works too well! With a far supe-
rior economy, the United States is able to
respond to such bluffs in an overwhelming
manner, and after a short while, the Soviet
Union finds itself in an even weaker posi-
tion. It might be argued that this pheno-
menon should work against similar U.S, de-
ployment of an ABM system; but it should
be noted that Soviet statements in this area
have been both cautious and subdued in
tone. This restraint, in - all probability, re-
flects a Soviet awareness of the exaggerated
American response which might possibly
ensue. For the Soviet Union to capitalize
upon an ABM capability, it would obviously
be far wiser to effect a large scale deploy-
ment prior to showing its hand fully. Con-
vincing preliminary advertisements in this
instance could result in either a massive
U.S. counter deployment of missile defense
or a massive increase in offensive capability.
In either case, the Russians, with a very
limited ABM capability, would suffer a great-
er disadvantage than would be the case were
it to refrain from bluff until deployment was
fully effected. Once an ABM system were de-
ployed, the element of bluff could be intro-
duced either in the realm- of numbers or
effectiveness. The Soviet Union's ability to
bluff is an advantage that the United States
does not enjoy. Congress and the press pre-
clude such a possibility.
The historically defensive-oriented mili-
tary posture of the Soviet Union renders it
not only improbable but unlikely that the
U.S.S.R. Would for any reason short of gen-
eral disarmament refrain from pursuing an
active program of ballistic missile defense.
In fact, failure of the Soviets to pursue a de-
fensive program of this nature would repre-
sent a disturbance of notable magnitude in
the internal status quo. The traditional Rus-
sian .strategy of attrition and endurance was
successfully employed against Napoleon in
1`812 and Hitler in 1942. Although the Soviets
attribute the effectiveness of this strategy to
the superior will power and discipline of the
Russian people, there can be little doubt
that geography and climate have contributed
to its success in no small. measure. Out of
this background of attrition a1Rl endurance
has evolved a "long-war" doctrine in which
the Soviets envision a possible future nuclear
war as running parallel in many respects to
previous wars, differing only in severity. As
described in Soviet Military Strategy, edited
by Marshal Vasili Danilovich Sokolovtky in
1963, Soviet military leaders conceive of such
a war as consisting of a beginning in which
a devastating nuclear exchange takes place
but in which this exchange neither destroys
the Soviet Union nor ends the war. Subse-
quent to the staggering losses incurred in the
first exchange, it is postulated that the war
would drag out into a long and very messy
affair in which both sides would continue the
fight to the best of their abilities with what-
ever means they might have left at their
disposal. It is at this point that the strategy
of attrition and endurance *ould work on
the Soviet's behalf and ultimately result in
triumph for the Soviet Union.
For advocates of "long-war" doctrine, the
appeal of defensive weapons would obviously
be very great. As the quality of the opposing
offense is degraded, the effectiveness of the
defense becomes more pronounced. It is not
to be denied that missile defense installa-
tions would also suffer a certain degree of
degradation subsequent to the initial ex-
change; but from the standpoint of fewer
numbers of incoming missiles and ensuing
sporadic deliveries, it is probable that the de-
fensive problem would be easier to contend
with as time goes on. It would also hold true
that missile defense personnel would,
through virtue of experience, undoubtedly
improve their techniques by the time a long
war had progressed to its latter stages. It
can be Seen from this reasoning that, with
the Russians holding the view that deter-
rence ultimately rests upon their capacity
and determination to drag out any war into
a long struggle of attrition in which tradi-
tional defensive strategies could be success-
fully employed, there exists no incompatibil-
ity between such a concept and deployment
of a ballistic missile defense system. Al-
though much of what Marshal Sokolovsky
has to say is flavored with typical propa-
ganda, it does indicate that a significant fac-
tion within the Soviet hierarchy believes in
a long-war concept, is basically defensively
oriented, recognizes the political implications
inherent in an effective missile defense sys-
tem, and intends to pursue to completion an
ABM program.
The present downward trend in rate of
growth of the Soviet economy might seem-
ingly indicate a tendency to abstain from
embarking upon something so costly as a
missile defense program, but it is interest-
ing to note that in spite of its semi-waning
economy, the - Soviet Union has never hesi-
tated to pursue sophisticated defense pro-
grams. Extensive space-oriented outlays
serve to illustrate this point.
Although there is always the aspect of
sensationalism to contend with in news
media, there apparently exists substantial
evidence that the Soviet Union has deployed
at least a partial, ABM defense system. The
S18075
following excerpts from the New York Times
serve to verify.
July 24, 1964: The Soviet Union has long
had what is believed to be the world's first
operational site for an antiballistic missile
system near Leningrad. Within the last eight
months, a second site, presumably similar to
the first, has been identified near Moscow.
April 29, 1966: Questioned by newsmen
about reports of Soviet deployment of an
antiballistic missile system around Lenin-
grad and Stalingrad, Pentagon officials said
that they assumed that the Russians were
doing so. There were indications, they said,
that the Russians had previously begun such
development and had then run into prob-
lems and had stoppsd. Now, they said, ac-
cording to Soviet reports, work has been
resumed. - -
July 14, 1966: Still another factor re-
garded as potentially serious is what ap-
pears to be the beginning of an extensive
deployment-in a belt across the Western
Soviet Union-of an antiballistic missile de-
fense system.
Additional verification was - provided in
January of this year when a statement made
by Secretary McNamara to the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the Senate Sub-
committee on Defense Appropriations was
made public:
"Significant changes have occurred during
the last year in our- projections of Soviet
strategic forces . . more positive evidence
of - a deployment of an antiballistic-missile
defense system around Moscow ..know-
ing what we do about past Soviet predilec-
tions for defense systems, we must, for the
time being, plan our forces on the assump-
tion that they will have deployed some sort
of an ABM system around their major cities
by the early 1970s."
It has been made clear that the exist- -
ence of a missle defense system In the So-
viet Union would necessarily prove to be of
grave concern to the United States. Indeed,
it would represent a technological end run
in which the United States stands to for-
feit all that it has achieved in the area of s
strategic superiority.
Emergence of China as the world's fifth
nuclear power has resulted in widespread
concern and has posed new and serious prob-
lems for the United States. Coupled with the
commonly accepted bellicose nature of Com-
munist China, it comprises a threat to world
peace. This threat does not stem from the
size and -capabilities of present Chinese nu-
clear strike forces, but rather from the
political and psychological implications as-
sociated with even a token capability.
Although the present state` of the art in
Chinese nuclear endeavors does not at this
time constitute much of a threat to the
United States, it is only a matter of time
before it will. Secretary McNamara recently
testified before the Joint Congressional Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy to the effect that
the Chinese Communist threat was growing
at a much greater rate than he had originally
expected. That this is true is readily appar-
ent from two statements which he made
within a year and a half of one another. In
May of 1964, he noted that Communist China
was not likely to become a first-class mili-
tary power for "many, many years." This he
held to be true based upon serious agricul-
tural and economic problems and a defi-
ciency of spare parts for airplanes. In an
address to the Ministers of 15 NATO nations
in December of 1965, McNamara urged U.S.
Western European Allies to start worrying.
about the threat posed by Communist
China's nuclear strength. He then offered
some prospects for the future in the area
of Chinese capabilities: operational medium-
range ballistic missiles with nuclear war-
heads as early as 1967; deployment of sev-
eral launchers for medium-range ballistic
missiles by 1968 or 1969, with possibly sev-
eral dozen by 1976; and deployment of
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ICBMs capable of hitting Europe or the or the future direction of Chinese nuclear ex- It is widely recognized that intense politi
United States in 1975. ploitation, but the United states must be pre- cal pressure exists in both the United States
Assuming that the Chinese do develop a pared for any line of development. Deploy- and the Soviet Union to duplicate one an-
nominal force of 50 ICBMs by 1975 that are ment of a missile defense system undoubt- other. It is possibly because of this that many
comparable in size, thrust, and technical edly would constitute the best possible course rAm erica to sp deployment assume Athat BMs Soviet
characteristics to first-generation Soviet of preparation. S. of
ICBMs (ten-megaton yield, 8,000-mile A question which arises out of the issue of necessarily be the same as U.S. reaction to
range), an attack against the United States missile defense is what European reaction similar Soviet deployment. American reaction
could result in 40 million casualties. It has would be to American deployment. The pre- to even an inadequate Soviet missile defense
been estimated that deployment of an ABM vailing opinion is that the reaction would be system could best be summed up in the words
defense centered around our 50 largest cities unfavorable, that Europe would feel left out of President John F. Kennedy, who said they
could reduce the number of casualties to less and defenseless to missile attack. Demands would have "appeared to have surpassed us,"
than ten million. This estimate assumes an inevitably would be forthcoming for similar or General Maxwell Taylor, who said they
80 per cent effectiveness against small num- European defenses. Compliance with such de- would have won a "technological triumph"
bers of incoming missiles and is quite natu- mands would in all probability be cost pro- and provided the United States with a "cold
rally a function of many variables such as hibitive to the United States. Furthermore, war defeat," or Hanson Baldwin, who stated
missile reliability, targeting doctrine, and deployment of such a system in allied noun- that it might result in a "ripple of fear" and
ABM deployment. tries would raise the issue of control of the create subsequent pressure for appeasement.
Although the United States currently has a nuclear warheads: whether such control Although' such reaction is essentially justi-
large and powerful nuclear force around the would be retained by the United States or fiable, there is little reason to believe that a
borders of Communist China, this is not, in relinquished to the ally concerned. This is a similar Soviet reaction would take place if
itself, very comforting, particularly in light significant issue in light of present beliefs the situation were reversed. On the contrary,
of the fact that some top U.S. military strat- that the most stable international condition there is ample reason to believe that the de-
egists believe the present Communist leaders is one in which nuclear proliferation is kept fensively oriented Soviets would think of
to be "fanatics and suicidally aggressive." If to an absolute minimum. Whether or not the ABM deployment as the logical thing to do.
there is any validity to such an analysis, the United States would be willing to provide As the authoritative London Institute for
United States will probably be susceptible to missile defenses for Europe should not make Strategic Studies has pointed out, "a Soviet
some form of nuclear blackmail from China any difference in European reaction. it would phobia about air defense has led to `major
in the not too distant future. An offensive seem apparent that, with a missile defense investments in defensive systems' through-
deterrence could lose all significance when system of her own, the United States would out the postwar period" Indeed, it is inter-
dealing with a fanatically belligerent China, be more willing than ever to come to the de- esting to note the viewpoint expressed by
That the Chinese are determined to continue fense of Europe. An ABM capability would General N. Talensky in which he derides the
their pursuits in the nuclear field was indi- render such a gesture a much lesser sacrifice. West on the grounds that it was only after
cated in an interview in October 1983, be- A similar situation is inevitably going to convincing evidence came into existence con-
tween Vice Premier Chen Yi and a group of develop in Asia when China acquires the cerning successful Soviet efforts in the field
Japanese newspapermen in which Chen Yi capability of attacking the United States. of missile defense, that the West began to
stated that Premier Khrushchev had once Asian allies will begin to question whether voice fears that missile defense would under-
said that the manufacture of atomic weapons the United States will consider the defense mine the existing nuclear balance. He advo-
would cost so much money that China might of Japan or Burma to be worth the risk of cates that anti-missile systems are purely
not have any money left with which to make thermonuclear holocaust. The problem for defensive weapons in every respect and only
trousers. China, Chen Yi concluded, would American foreign policy will be the same for go into action after an at of aggression has
have to manufacture the weapons with or Asia as it will be for Europe: how to main- commenced. He further states that "the crea-
without trousers. The recent Chinese test tarn the morale of allied nations and their tion of an effective antimissile defense sys-
firing of a nuclear armed medium range mis- willingness to oppose Communist expansion. tem by a country which is a potential target
sile and explosion of a thermonuclear device The United States will have to convince her for aggression merely serves to increase the
lends credence to such testimony. allies that all commitments will be honored deterrent effect and so helps to avert aggres-
A critical factor in the nuclear timetable in spite of possible consequences. A signifi- sion." In addition, he points out the in-
of China is the prevailing state of Sino-Soviet cant effort in this direction was made by creased stability inherent in a mutual deter-
relations. It is possible that a cementing of Defense Secretary McNamara in a recent mili- rence based upon both offensive and de-
the Sino-Soviet alliance could result-at the tary posture statement made before the fensive capabilities, where any partial shifts
price of Russian nuclear aid to China. In this House Armed Services Committee: in the qualitative or quantitative bal-
event, the Chinese timetable would be ad- First, in order to preclude any possibility ance of either element tend to be "corre-
vanced quite significantly and Chinese mis- of miscalculation by others, I want to reit- spondingly compensated and equalized." In
siles could become as advanced as Soviet mis- erate that,, althought the United States other words, General Talensky indicates that
siles in a relatively short period of time. This would itself suffer severely in the event of a ABM does not pose a threat to world peace,
being the case, the United States would then general nuclear war, we are fully committed but rather instead serves to deter an aggres-
be. forced to contend with both a sophisti- to the defense of our allies. sor from attempting a first-strike attack. If
cated Chinese and Russian threat. Second, we do not view damage limitation this reflects the general Soviet attitude and
On the other hand, should the-Sino-Soviet as a question of concern only to the United there is no reason to believe that it does not,
relationship continue to deteriorate, a Chi- States. Our offensive forces cover strategic then Soviet reaction to an American ABM
nese long-range, nuclear strike force could enemy capabilities to inflict damage on our program probably would be much milder
prove to pose itself as being of equal menace allies in Europe just as they cover enemy than similar U.S. reaction to the reverse
to both the United States and the Soviet threats to the continental United States. situation. It is possible, but not very prob-
Union. Such a circumstance would obviously Until such a time as either a. "freeze" or a able, that the arms race would "spiral up-
work to the benefit of the United States, general disarmament can be effected in a ward." In light of this, it is not inconceivable
since it would dilute effectively the concen- sincere, gentlemanly manner, the choice of that mutual deployment of missile defense
trations of forces of two potential aggressors. discontinuing the arms race does not appear systems by Russia and the United States
The proximity of these Communist giants to be open to the United States-=only a could result in a new strategic balance
would render each more of a threat to the choice in the method. of conducting it. It is wherein the total number of casualties in-
other than the United States would present generally acknowledged that there are cer- volved on either side in a nuclear exchange
to either. The nuclear capabilities of both tain implicit risks associated with a continu- would be significantly less than that which
would necessarily be designed in part to deter ation of the arms race, and it is on this would be incurred under the existing ar-
one another. If, indeed, Sino-Soviet border account that most objetcons to U.S. deploy- rangement-yet still great enough to accom-
clashes similar to those which occurred in ment of a missile defense system are raised. plish the goal of deterrence. So long as
the early 1960s continue to develop; a situa- The primary objection finds its substance in defense remains less efficient than attack, and
tion such as that described above could very the contention that an ABM program would so long as both super powers are engaged in
conceivably come to pass. constitute a needless waste of vast sums of improving their defenses, they are unlikely
Inasmuch as missiles have come to repre- money and could only result in setting in to change their assessments of one another's
sent a standard status symbol whereby one motion Another "upward spiral" in the arms capabilities or intentions. In this regard,
nation can intimidate another, it is doubtful race; all this at a time when a, Soviet- skeleton deployment could only act to
that the existence of an effective U.S. missile American detente may be developing. The strengthen the present Soviet-American bal-
defense system would deter China from pur- desire to contain the arms competition is ante by minimizing the possibility of a
suing an active missile program. It could, based on a belief that any continuation will general war resulting from either accidental
however, conceivably vector Chinese efforts provide the United States with very little op- or unauthorized firings.
into IRBM channels since China would be portunity to increase its security. In line with If it were possible to reach some sort of an
forced to face the question of whether or not this thinking, it is felt that ABM batteries do agreement between Russia and the United
the cost of an ICBM program would prove to not help to contain the competition but States involving a freeze on ABM, it would be
be commensurate with the gain. merely represents another dimension in difficult to feel secure under such an arrange-
In the light of the present internal up- which to compete. This prevailing fear of ment. Duplicity has been a historical trade-
fact,
heaval in China, it is difficult to anticipate adding impetus to the arms race can be as- mark k record of previous
can best be described as a tabula-
the future direction of Sino-Soviet relations sailed on several accounts.
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tion of broken promises. It may be argued
that this record was established by the "old
school," that the Soviet regime of today does
not adhere to the same line of deceit. As re-
cently as 1961, evidence of Soviet Machiavel-
lian inclinations exploded on the world scene
in the form of a 57-megaton bomb, in viola-
tion of a moratorium existing between Russia
and the United States to the effect that no
further nuclear testing was to be conducted
in the atmosphere by either side. In the hear-
ings conducted prior to the signing of the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, Secretary
of Defense McNamara pointed out that the
Soviets would honor the treaty only so long
as it served their best interest to do so.
Although this dubious record should not
deter efforts to negotiate with the Soviets in
the area of arms control, it would be prudent
for U.S. negotiators to keep it in mind as they
do undertake such endeavors.
In addition to providing protection against
the present Soviet threat and a future Chi-
nese threat, an ABM {iefense system would
also protect, against any small, unauthorized
or accidental attacks. Some feel that the
probability of an accidental firing is "vir-
tually zero" but the consequences of just
one such firing render it imperative that the
possibility be both considered and provided
for.
Whereas the Soviet Union has iiistorically
pursued a generally defensive military pro-
gram, the United States has consistently
thought more in terms of offense, adhering to
the age-old maxim that the best defense is a
good offense. In line with this, a "short-war"
doctrine has evolved among American strate-
gists with regard to thermonuclear war. This
doctrine visualizes the end result of such a
war as being determined by the outcome of
the initial attacks. Following the initial ex-
changes, the Soviet Union will either be so
completely destroyed that no further or-
ganized military resistance will be possible
or the threat of further destruction will per-
suade surviving Soviet leaders to accept
American terms of peace. Although this con-
cept may be logical in its inception, history
has proven it to be dangerous in its conclu-
sions. The short-war strategies of Germany
failed disastrously in both world wars.
Whether or not the American concept should
be "short war" or "long war" in nature is
irrelevant. What matters is the fact that if
a war of this nature ever did take place,
millions of American lives would be for-
feited-lives that otherwise could have been
saved through pursuit of an ABM program.
.Although present programs yield relatively
invulnerable force structure and an unequiv-
ocal ability to deliver weapons, they also yield
an extremely vulnerable population.
Another of the factors to be considered in
the field of missile defense is the potential
expense involved. Calculations have been
made in this area by Pentagon officials,
based upon estimates of what Soviet capa-
bilities will be during the 1970s. A missile
defense system that could cope with this
projected threat would cost approximately
24 billion dollars over a five-year period and
would cost another billion dollars per year
for manning 6.nd maintenance. "It has been
estimated that a massive Soviet ICBM sur-
prise attack against the United States in
1970 without ABM protection would result
in approximately 149 million fatalities out
of a population of 210 million. With an 18
to 24-billion-dollar ABM system deployed,
fatalities would be reduced to approximately
71 million, roughly half of the U.S. indus-
trial capacity and retaliatory missile force
would survive, and trillions of dollars worth
of property would be saved."
With the present U.S. strategic weapons
budget in excess of 25 billion dollars and
the war in Vietnam resulting in a continual
,drain on the economy, an expensive missile
defense system lends itself to a state of con-
tinual deferment. Unlike offensive missiles,
ABM does not offer a rationale for cutting
back on other weapons systems (such as
bombers or Infantry). For this reason, a rela-
tively cheap skeleton deployment of .ABM
holds even greater appeal at this time. Such
a deployment would be effective against a
primitive Chinese threat and any accidental
or unauthorized firings. In addition, it would
have the capability of being expanded upon
at will to provide effective protection against
the Soviet threat. The cost of deployment of
such a system has been estimated to be 10.6
billion dollars.
Yet another aspect to be considered in pur-
suit of ABM is the defense shelter program
that should supplement it to render it effec-
tive. Without civil defense shelters, it is pos-
tulated that 30 per cent more lives would be
lost. This holds true because incoming mis-
siles could be targeted for undefended areas
and thereby achieve through fallout what
would have otherwise had to be achieved
through blast and heat effects. It has been
estimated that a five-year systems cost for
protection of the entire population would
run approximately five billion dollars. It is
probable that something less than a full
shelter program may be appropriate in a light
"damage-limiting" posture designed against
small unsophisticated attacks. Although it
would not be cost-prohibitive in either case,
Congress has consistently refused to appro-
priate more than token sums for shelter pro-
grams. Since Congress has indicated that it
would support ABM, missile defense enthusi-
asts believe that Congress will be more in-
clined to support a shelter program once
ABM production and deployment is author-
ized, since it would then constitute only a
small addition to a large commitment already
made.
Although shelters may prolong the lives of
survivors, additional thought must be given
to their continued survival. There are many
critical aspects to be considered in this area.
For instance, the destruction of forests by
fire or radiation could lead to catastrophic
flooding of urban areas following heavy rains.
If birds, which are particularly sensitive to
radiation, are destroyed, insects could multi-
ply at catastrophic rates thereby devastating
the surviving crops and food supply. The pos-
sible results of nuclear devastation are too
numerous to explore thoroughly, but it is im-
portant to consider them in terms of how
they could be mitigated through deployment
of a missile defense system.
Since ABM would require that missiles with
nuclear warheads be maintained in a fully
ready condition, there exists some anxiety
that the American public would be reluctant
to live in close proximity to missile defense
installations. Recently Tempo, the "think
factory" division of General Electric, inter-
viewed 1,400 supposedly well-informed adults
with regard to their reactions to ABM. One in
ten said that they would move away from a
protected city. The majority of these said
they would move out of fear of an accidental
explosion, but many were more concerned
about television reception interference that
would be caused by adjacent radar Installa-
tions. Two thirds of this "well-informed"
group believed that the United States already
had a missile defense system and'that this
system was comparable in reliability to ex-
isting bomber defense. Here again, are signs
of public apathy that could prove dangerous.
Where the "right to live" is involved, Ameri-
cans cannot afford to be complacent. Recent
Defense Department figures might serve to
dispel some of the indifference. Based upon a
20-billion-dollar version of ABM coupled with
a five-billion-dollar shelter program, it was
calculated that the cost per life saved would
be $350.00.
The contention that deployment of an ABM
system would destablize the nuclear balance
and would impart an "upward spiral" to the
arms race is valid only if the nation building
it has displayed a willingness to indulge in
nuclear blackmail. A good indication of a
nation's aggressive intentions is the type of
missile force that it develops. The aggressor
would build a large force of first-strike mis-
siles (missiles not sufficiently protected by
hardened silos to qualify as retaliatory weap-
ons) armed with high-yield warheads (30-100
megatons). The Soviets are presently pursu-
ing such a course and indications exist that
they are deploying a missile defense system
as well. The United States, on the other
hand, possesses a retaliatory missile force
(hardened silos and low-yield war-heads),
and deployment of ABM in this case could
only be construed as a defensive gesture.
Continued pursuit of increasing an already
more-than-adequate offensive capability can
only make starker the balance of terror. Fur-
thermore, how can the United States legiti-
mately convince itself beyond all doubt that
Soviet missile defenses can be penetrated?
Intelligence information is not foolproof, and
a gamble of this nature could prove dis-
astrous. Rather than emphasizing the of-
fensive threat, it would be far better to. mit-
igate the possible effects of war by encour-
aging defensive measures. Only ABM shows
any prospect of neutralizing the offenses and
providing the American public with some
security in this area. A defensive system may
not bar the door completely, but it will cer-
tainly raise the price of admission. If de-
ployed in time, it may even preclude Chi-
nese admission altogether through discour-
aging their efforts in ICBM endeavors. It
would also serve to dispel some of the anxiety
of Western allies with respect to American
willingness to come to their defense in a
nuclear showdown, since there would be less
risk involved in so doing.
The issue of missile defense deployment
has been subjected to such extensive debate
that the form has changed several times dur-
ing the course of the dialogue. The dialogue
itself has just recently entered a new phase
wherein the United States and the Soviet
Union are negotiating in an effort to reach
an understanding with respect to mutual
restraint in the area of ABM deployment.
Since the Soviets have in initial discussions
indicated that they might consider participa-
tion in an ABM moratorium only so long
as such a step is linked to a ceiling an the
production of offensive weapons," an area
in which the United States holds a com-
manding superiority, it seems doubtful that
any short-term agreement on ABM can be
arranged unless it is the prelude to a much
broader program of arms limitation-a pro-
gram which has in the past foundered upon
the rock of inspection and control. The So-
viet Union is unlikely to agree to any ar-
rangement which serves to prolong its posi-
tion of strategic inferiority any longer than
is absolutely necessary. That the issue is
being critically examined is commendable,
but developments in the Soviet Union and
'Communist China render it imperative that
the debate be drawn to a close and a de-
cision be reached as soon as possible. This
becomes all the more imperative when it is
realized that while the U.S. is busily engaged
in negotiations, the Soviet Union is con-
tinuing with its ABM deployment. Also de-
serving of attention is the fact that some
very real intangibles exist with regard to
estimating the lead'times for deployment of
a Chinese ICBM capability.
Unless a satisfactory comprehensive arms
control arrangement can be effected in the
near future, the United States will have to
decide in favor of missile defense deploy-
ment in order to protect the most sacred
right of the American people-the right to
live. Deployment would not constitute a case
of letting nervousness Outrun the danger or
a case of panicky reaction to Soviet deploy-
ment. It would, on its own merits, be in the
best interest of the United States. Not only
could it make the difference between war and
peace from the standpoint of deterrence, but
in its damage-limiting capacity, it could also
make the difference between the end of our
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national existence and our survival as a na-
tion. To over-estimate the enemy could prove
expensive; to underestimate him could prove
fatal.
LIBERALISM AND MODERATION
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, there are
extremist liberals as well as extremist
conservatives. Both believe that only they
have true faith and that those who do
not accept in toto their various view-
points on social problems and foreign
affairs are heretics to be vilified and
shunned, Both fail to understand that in
a civilized society, an essential require-
ment for stability and progress is that
reasonable men of varying viewpoints
must not exaggerate their differences
with those of other viewpoints to the
point where cooperation in seeking com-
mon goals becomes impossible.
Dr. Daniel P. Moynihan, the noted
MIT urban expert, has, until now, been
considered a liberal's liberal. But at the
recent convention of Americans for
Democratic Action, he delivered an ad-
.dress castigating the extremist views of
some of his fellow liberals, appealing for
cooperation between liberals and con-
servatives.
Dr. Moynihan offered three basic prop-
ositions :
1. Liberals must see more clearly that their
essential interest is in the stability of the
social order; and given the present threats
to that stability, they must seek out and
make much more effective alliances with
political conservatives who share their in-
terest and recognize that unyielding rigidity
is just as great a threat to continuity of the
social order as an anarchic desire for change.
2. Liberals must divest themselves of the
notion that the nation-and especially the
cities of the nation-can be run from agen-
cies in Washington.
3. Liberals must somehow overcome the
curious condescension that takes the form
of defending and explaining away anything,
however outrageous, which Negroes, individ-
ually or collectively, might do.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the
full text of Mr. Moynihan's statement as
reprinted by the New Leader of Oc-
tober 9.
THE POLITICS OF STABILITY
(By Daniel P. Moynihan)
President Johnson is said, to be fond of
relating the experience of an out-of-work
school teacher who applied for a position in
a small town on the Texas plains at the very
depths of the depression. After a series of
questions, one puckered old rancher on the
school board looked at the applicant and
asked, "Do you teach that the world is round
or flat?" Finding no clues in the faces of the
according to their personal taste and condi- successful administrations in the nation; a
tion. The apocalyptic view has many support- city in which the social and economic posi-
era, of course, most notably those of the new- tion of the Negro was generally agreed to be
ly emergent Left who foresee a period of far and away the best in the nation. Who are
Right-wing oppression and excess, followed we, then, to be pointing fingers?
by the triumph of a new ideology-a convic- The question is addressed as much to the
tion that will seem absurd to anyone who has future as to the past, for the probabilities are
ever visited East Berlin. The more sanguine that the present situation will persist for
view commends itself to those who would like some ti
B
me.
y this I mean that President
to believe it true. This includes, almost with- Johnson will almost certainly be re-elected in
out exception, any liberal who has shared 1968 and that, with some modifications, the
considerably in the "rewards" of American national government will remain in the
life, and who can look forward to continued hands of the same kinds of liberals who have
sharing on, if anything, more favorable terms, been much in evidence for the last seven
The alternatives, then, are to agree with years. The war in Asia is likely to go on many
Andrew Kopkind that this past summer the years, too, although possibly in different
war abroad and the revolution at home con- forms. Most importantly, the violence in our
trived to "murder liberalism in its official cities, tensions between racial and ethnic
robes" (with few mourners), or to conclude groups, is just as likely to continue and if
that although we are in a lot of trouble, we anything get worse (as indeed the war could
can think and work (and pray) our way out get worse). But our responses will have to be
of it. It is worth stressing that no one whose sufficiently different from those of the iem-
views we have learned to trust over the years mediate past to suggest that we are aware
would offer us a happier option than the of some of our apparent shortcomings.
latter, which means that if we do not think What, as someone once said, is to be done?
well enough, or work hard enough, or if our I offer three propositions.
prayers are not answered, we can bring this 1. Liberals must see more clearly that their
republic to ruin, essential interest is in the stability of the
Certainly things have not turned out as we social order; and given the present threats to
had every reason to think they would. Walter that stability, they must seek out and make
Lippmann, with merciless clarity, has argued much more effective alliances with political
that the unexampled mandate of the 1964 conservatives who share their interest and
election was "to be quiet and uninvolved recognize that unyielding rigidity is just as
abroad and to repair, reform and reconstruct great a threat to continuity of the social
at home." Fate took another direction, and order as an anarchic desire for change,
has exacted a double price: not only troubles For too long we have been prisoners of
abroad, but disasters at home because of-or the rhetoric that Republicans do not know
seemingly because of-the troubles abroad. or care about the social problems of the
Tom Wicker has stated the matter plainly, as nation. This is not only a falsehood, but as
is his failing. "The war," he wrote at the end any New York Democrat can testify, it is
of last August, "has blunted and all but de- seen by the electorate to be a falsehood. In
stroyed the hopeful beginnings of the Great New York City two years ago, Mayor Lindsay
Society. It has produced the gravest Ameri- was elected because he was the most liberal
can political disunity in a century, and it has of the three candidates. Last year, Governor
aggravated the profound discontent with Rockefeller was re-elected for precisely the
America of the postwar generations." same reason. The hooting at the callous in-
The violence abroad and the violence at difference of Republicans toward human
home-regardless of political persuasion, all needs recently reached considerable levels in
agree that these are the problems, and they the rumpus over the rat bill. I don't doubt
are somehow interconnected, and that in they deserved what they got in that uproar.
combination they have the potential for po- The argument can nonetheless be made that
larizing, then fracturing, American society. we would have more to show for it all if
But the situation is especially embarrassing somewhere along the line the Democrats had
for American liberals, because it is largely taken at face value the statement of Con-
they who have been in office and presided gressman Melvin R. Laird (R.-Wie.) that he
over the onset both of the war in Vietnam was in favor of "massive" Federal aid to city
and the violence in American cities. Neither governments, but not through the tech-
may be our fault, yet in a world not over- niques of proliferating grant-in-aid pro-
much given to nice distinctions in such mat- grams which he and many like him thought
ters, they most surely must be judged our to be an ineffective form of administration,
doing. Interestingly, in the area of foreign affairs
The Vietnam war was thought up and is the idea that Republican Congressmen and
being manged by the men John F. Kennedy Senators are supporters of a moderate course
brought to Washington to conduct American is more readily accepted. It is time the idea
foreign and defense policy. They are persons became familiar in domestic matters. It is
of immutable conviction on almost all mat- pleasant to hear the New Left declare that
ters we would consider central to liberal the white liberal is the true enemy because
belief, as well as men of personal honor and he keeps the present system going by limit-
the highest intellectual attainment. Other ing its excesses, yet the truth is that the
liberals also helped to persuade the American informed conser
ati
d
v
ves
eserve the greatest
public that it was entirely right to be setting credit for performing this function--the
out on the course which has led us to the Robert Tafts of the nation-and at the pres-
present point of bein
waist d
i
g
eep
n the big ent juncture they are needed.
other board members, the teacher swallowed muddy. It is this knowledge, this complicity 2. Liberals must divest themselves of the
hard and allowed he could teach it either if you will, that requires many of us to prac- notion that the nation-and especially the
way. tice restraint where others may exercise all cities of the nation-can be run from agen-
That is the position of just about anyone their powers of invective and contempt. The ties in Washington.
who would assay the state of the American plain fact is that if these men got us into Potomac fever became a liberal disease
republic at this moment from that middling the current predicament, who are we to say under the New Deal and it has turned out
vantage point known generally as liberalism. we would have done better? not only to be catching but congenital, hav-
'i'wo views, are possible: On the one hand, This is more the case with respect to the ing somehow worked into the gene structure
it may be argued that the nation is entering violence at home. The summer of 1967 came itself. The syndrome derives from one Cor-
a period of political instability from which in the aftermath of one of the most extraor- rect fact that is irrelevant, and two theories
it will not emerge intact; on the other, that dinary periods of liberal legislation, liberal that are wrong.
we have entered a troubled time and will not electoral victories, and the liberal dominance It is certainly a fact that strolling across
only survive, but will emerge from it wiser of the media of public opinion that we have Lafayette Park to endorse or to veto a public
and having demonstrated anew the deep ever experienced. The period was, moreover, works program is much more agreeable than
sources of stability in American life. accompanied by the greatest economic ex- having to go through the misery of persuad-
I cannot imagine what would constitute pansion in human history. And to top it all, tog 50 state Legislatures. But this has to do
irrefutable evidence for either stand, and I some of the worst violence occurred in De- with the personal comfort of middle-aged
assume that persons adopt one or the other troit, a city with one of the most liberal and liberals, not with the quality of government
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110053-5