SABMIS ANSWERS THE RED CHINA THREAT EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. CRAIG HOSMER OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FRIDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1967

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• Publication Date: October 20, 1967
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October 20, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --APPENDIX
ity, exciting programs that some expect
to see on, so-called educational television
may never be offered if we accept the view
of the well-known columnist Howard K.
Smith as it appeared in the Washington
Star on October 1.
Mr. Smith cautioned against expecting
changes of any great magnitude in either
commercial or educational television as
we know it. While I do not share Mr.
Smith's appraisal of the Congress or his
thinking about many other matters, I
thought my colleagues might be inter-
ested in this assessment by a liberal mem-
ber of the fourth estate.
Under unanimous consent I Inclu
the article in full in the RECORD:
DON'T EXPECT Too MUCH FROM PUBLIC
TELEVISION
(By Howard K. Smith)
The House of Representatives has passed
the public television bill. The Senate will
almost certainly do so too, and a source of
government-authorized, tax-supported TV
will come to exist alongside ou`r private, ad-
supported, commercial TV. As television is
thought to affect greatly the mental and
spiritual climate of America, this might be
an important development.
People who understand television but lit-
tle, however, are premature and hyperbolic
in seeing a new age of wonders about to open.
A leading figure. In our nation stopped me
on Capitol Hill the other day and said, "You
commercial TV people had better straighten
yourselves out, or the audience is going to
desert you now that public television will be
available." A leading Washington newspaper
commented that TV was "on the verge of de-
livering to the public those great cultural
and public affairs programs it has all too
frequently failed to deliver in the past."
Criticizing the fare on commercial TV is
without doubt America's chief popular avo-
cation, more practised than watching base-
ball or even than discussing Lyndon John-
son's faults. But for an exercise. Americans
indulge in so much, it is odd how ill thought
out are their assumptions. There is not going
to be any hegira away from commercial to
public TV. There is nothing magic in public
TV that is going to increase the quantity of
genius or imagination in our nation.
All the paraphernalia of commercial TV-
the quest for the highest profits, the ratings,
the fear, of offending-undoubtedly help to
create mediocrity on commercial TV.
By far the most limiting factor on quality,
however, is the } arity of genius, and even
of creative talent. The notion that there are
reams of undiscovered Hamlets or rejected
"Death of a Salesman's" waiting only for an
outlet, is a myth. Good plays or programs
simply do not exist in quantity, and public
TV is not going to change that.
The rarity of high-grade material did not
begin with the television age. Now that we
can watch. decades of Hollywood's output on
the late show night after night on television,
it is clear that there were never really many
good movies. The list of national paperback
book best-sellers (a more reliable guide than
the hardback book best-sellers which a mi-
nuscule number of Americans read) is led
by some books that are several years old,
and they were not outstanding when they
were first published. William Shakespeare is
,
ua
as
far the best contriver of stories the human been married. Those who fail to answer any
race has produced, yet most of his plays were census questions may be fined $100 and sen-
pretty dreary potboilers. tenced to 60 days in jail.
In the realm of documentary TV reporting, The growing complexity of American so-
one needs only watch those produced of edu- ciety might justify seeking information be-
cational television. They are duller and more yond counting noses for the purpose of con-
timid than those on commercial TV-which gressional redistricting-the original pur-
Is quite an indictment. pose of the census. But it obviously must not
Far from being more interesting than com- be used to compel answers to questions that
mercial TV, there Is even a real possibility invade privacy.
that public TV may be less interesting. Con- A bill introduced by Rep. Jackson E. Betts
A 5i'Ir
gress will have ultimate control over its flow [R., 0.] seems to us a sensible way to pro-
of lifeblood-money. Congress is consistently tect personal privacy and also supply the
a good 10 to 20 years behind the times, as government with useful information. His bill
has been demonstrated by its slowness to specifies that mandatory answers be required
enact the minimal legislation needed to avoid of only seven basic questions: Name, age,
explosion in our cities. Congress excels at address, race or color, marital status, rela-
negating, and is downright suspicious of tionship to the head of the household, and
creativity. number of resident visitors. All, other ques-
There is the famous example of the dis- tions would be listed separately and plainly
West Berlin in the 111502:'lo show that ex-
perimentatio...wafoot in our nation, the
exhibition-!eatured a wall of examples of
pret--6r-out art. A junketing group of Con-
gressmen visited Berlin and went to the ex-
liibit and went through the roof, so to speak.
Was this what their appropriations. were
being squandered on? The USIA promptly re-
moved the paintings and substituted a dis-
play of antiseptic American photographs. Is
Congress going to sit still while public TV
falls on its face with experiment--without
sulatfrom congressional pressure I fore-
see a ti id?,proper and dull series of pro-
grams. The didknt controversies which are
the absorbing spirI.t of real life will be
blurred or blunted. ')the- drama is likely to
be horrendously safe. And 1I'"tbere are comics,
they had better be careful abo?t..whom they
Snooping in the Census
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, -October 11, 1967
Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, Chicago's
American for October 7 contained an
editorial regarding the decennial census
,that will be conducted in 1970.
A number of Members of the House of
Representatives, including my distin-
guished neighbor, the gentleman front.
opposition to some of the questions at
have been proposed. He feels, and agree
with him, that they constitu an in-
vasion of privacy.
The editorial discusse the subject
logically, fairly, and to erately, and I
would like to bring it o the attention of
my colleagues, as f ows:
iSNOOPI IN THE CENSUS
Is the Feder census bureau trying to in-
fringe on the, rivacy of American citizens by
asking personal questions? Rep. Edward Der-
winski 1R., Ill.] says it is, and blames Con-
gres for failing to keep the bureau in check;
by now, says Derwniski, it has "gotten com-
pletely out of control."
Derwinski has joined a group of congress-
men opposed to certain questions proposed
for the 1970 census, the first in history to be
conducted by mail. Queries include how
many persons share a single shower, the
number of flush toilets there are in a dwell-
ing
and how many times an individ
l h
would probably give more accurate answers
than someone required to answer under du-
ress. Also, with the state of the art of com-
puter analysis of survey information, the
census bureau could get most or all of the
information it needs from projection of a vol-
untary sample.
Undoubtedly more than enough Americans
would be willing to volunteer information
to the census bureau. They should be allowed
to do so with the feeling that they are con-
tributing to knowledge about the nation,
not because they face a -jail sentence if they
don't answer.
The Log Export Problem
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. AL ULLMAN
OF OREGON
Tuesday, October 3, 1967
I told tb e House that export of raw logs
to Japa was threatening the health of
the tinib r industry in the Pacific North-
west. In the intervening months, the rate
of these exports has accelerated. This
serious tuation has attracted the atten-
tion of many of my colleagues in the
House and Senate, and was one of the
topic discussed during the recent United
Sta s-Japan General Trade Conference
co ducted at the State Department.
problem in depth. The agreement stated
that discussions would include such mat-
ers as the level of exports, the geographi-
cal concentration of log purchases by the
Japanese, diversification of purchases to
include finished lumber, and programs
designed to increase supplies of timber
resources.
Our Secretary of Agriculture, Orville
Freeman, was designated as representa-
tive of the U.S. Government to meet with
the Japanese Minister of Agriculture and
Forestry. Secretary Freeman recently
visited the Pacific Northwest and under-
stands the impact of log exports on the
American timber market. No date has
been set for the first meeting, but the
State Department is hopeful that the
discussions can be undertaken before
Christmas. Industry officials will be in-
vited as observers to these negotiations.
In order to acquaint my colleagues
with recent developments in the Japa-
nese export situation, I am including in
the RECORD a recent article from the
lumber and plywood market report, Ran-
dom Lengths. This knowledgable trade
paper, circulated worldwide by Mr.
Lester E. Anderson, of Eugene, Oreg.,
presents a balanced and reasoned discus-
sion of the many difficult policy decisions
which must be made to resolve the log
export problem.
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CO~NGRESSIONAI; RECOKI~ A~IX
Those who negotiate for the United
States in the upcoming talks with Japan
must recognize the serious ramifications
log exports are having throughout the
entire lumber and timber industry. If
exports continue to grow at their acceler-
ating. rate. and the damage to the domes-
tic timber industry is permitted to con-
tinue, remedies far more stringent than
diplomatic accommodations may be
necessary. Congressional action may
eventually be required if the diplomatic
effort stalls.
I include the comments from Random
Lengths in the RECORD at this point:
In August and early September, while
lumber and plywood prices skyrocketed pri-
marily because of an impending shortage of
raw material, there were huge log decks at
the Washington ports of Olympia, Belling-
ham, and Everett. These logs were earmarked
for export, principally to Japan.
The extreme market fluctuation of late
summer, ranging from $10-15 on many
items, cannot be blamed directly and solely
on these specific log decks. There had been
a faltering improvement in the consumption
of lumber throughout the Summer; there
had been an unusually long dry spell in the
Northwest which hampered normal logging
operations. But, there also had been an in-
creasing volume of logs sold for export, and
a significant increase over a year ago in the
price these export logs commanded, effec-
tively blocking off many domestic manufac-
turers from access to such logs as were avail-
able. What developed in d&nestic lumber
and plywood markets was a foretaste of a
problem outlined here August 4: The for-
ests of the Northwest, under present prac-
tices, cannot for long meet the lumber and
plywood requirements of an expanding do-
mestic-market and, at the same time, sup-
ply wood fiber for unrestricted export; not,
that is, without economic dislocation which
is most likely to affect the domestic con-
sumer of forest products.
The growing seriousness of the impact of
log exports was recognized recently in a de-
cision to undertake a joint U.S.-Japanese
examination of the use of timber resources
of the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. This
examination was agreed to at the annual
meeting of the cabinet officers of the two
nations. Exports have been a matter of con-
cern among forest products producers for
some time. Finding a solution satisfactory
to all the parties involved is a matter im-
portant to both nations. The U.S. and Japan
need each other's trade. The domestic forest
products industry needs at least equal ac-
cess to raw material grown in this country.
At the moment, there are no clear indi-
cations of the ground the cabinet-level ex-
amination will cover. Certainly it will be
necessary to determine the probable needs
of both this country and Japan. Housing
construction in the United States over the
next decade has been projected at an aver-
age of 2 to 2.5 million units annually; Japan
recently announced a government program
to build 1.2 million units annually over
the next 10 years. While the materials re-
quirements are quite different in each coun-
try, both are major users of structural wood
products. Japan needs the wood fiber; soft-
wood lumber which is imported primarily
from British Columbia and, for domestic
reasons, logs which can be processed in
Japan.
If the Pacific Northwest cannot meet do-
mestic demand, and supply Japanese re-
quirements as well, where is the wood to
come from? The most logical source is Japan
itself. Most of the wood consumed there
comes from Japanese forests. But these are
being out many times faster than can be
sustained by growth. (However, something
like one-fifth of Japan's national forests
are unroaded; would road development per-
mit the managed harvest of more timber?)
Another source of timber has been Russian.
In the past, U.S. exporters have threatened
that Japan would turn to the Russians for
more of their timber needs if they could
not get logs from this country. But, the
Russians say they are exporting only sur-
plus logs and as equipment (much of it sup-
plied by the Japanese) becomes available
for domestic manufacture the volume of
timber available for export is expected to
drop.
Alaska has seemed to many to be a logical
source of both timber and lumber for Japan.
U.S.-Japanese combines now are shipping a
large portion of the lumber and pulp pro-
duced in Alaska to the Far East; recently
logs from private ownerships have been ex-
ported. But federal timber in Alaska is being
held for the development of local industry
and is restricted from export. At this time,
however, the market which would cause this
development is in Alaska and Japan.
Therefore, only about half of the annual
allowable cut of Alaskan forests is being
harvested. The use of the remaining unhar-
vested half of this state's annual timber yield
to develop roads and other facilities is worth
considering. Finally, the Pacific Northwest,
the principal source of Japan's log imports,
might be able to supply a substantial volume
of timber without damage to domestic manu-
facturers. This might be accomplished under
any of several intensive management pro-
grams which have been discussed but never
adopted. One such program, calling for the
investment of $80 million a year for eight
years in development of a thinning program,
has been estimated by the Forest Service to
permit an increase of 500 million board feet
per year in the allowable cut of the national
forests of Oregon and Washington.
In addition, there is private timber which
is, and will continue to be, available for
export. However, the export of large volumes
of private timber might create problems if
public timber is excluded from export. What,
for example, should be the policy toward a
firm which sells its own timber for export,
taking the benefit of the capital gains tax,
and uses this revenue in the preclusive pur-
chase of public stumpage with which to
operate its domestic plants?
It is not going to be easy to find reasonable
and satisfactory solutions to the log export
problem. But, answers must be found with-
out a great deal of diplomatic hemming and
hawing. Through the first six months of this
year, exports from Oregon and Washington
were about 40% greater than In the same pe-
riod of 1966. It is expected that exports for
the full year will climb from just over one
billion board feet last year to between 1.8
and 2 billion feet this year. -
This Is a matter of concern not only to
manufacturers but also to distributors. Con-
sider that the 159 million feet of logs shipped
out Of Oregon and Washington in July alone
(56% more than in July, 1966) would have
provided raw material-at a time when it was
critically needed-for more than a full week's
production of lumber in these same states.
The loss of this volume of products can be
sustained by our economy. But, not if it
happens repeatedly and over a long period
of time. If this occurs, and there is no evi-
dence that a prompt and reasonable solu-
tion can be found, the demand for the un-
wanted solution-that exports be flatly pro-
hibited-may reach proportions which can--
not be ignored. -
ctober 20, 1967
SABMIS AnewwWs t1ie'Red China Threat
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CRAIG HOSMER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Friday, October 20, 1967
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, of par-
ticular interest to the Congress is the
Navy's seaborne anti-ballistic-missile
interception system, SABMIS. The effec-
tiveness of SABMIS has been explored
in the current-October 16-Washington
Report of the American Security Coun-
cil by Anthony Harrigan, as follows:
SABMIS: FORWARD ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE
(By Anthony Harrigan)
When Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great
naval strategist, wrote two generations ago
of the influence of sea power upon history he
could not in his wildest dreams have imag-
ined that one day the mobility of the surface
ship would make possible the projection of
national defense envisioned in the new
SABMIS concept-the sea-based, anti-ballis-
tic missile intercept system. Yet this concept,
now under consideration as a vital addition
to the nation's nuclear deterrent in the cold
war, offers the United States a forward de-
fense of the continental United States.
The public is familiar with the marriage
of the nuclear-armed missile and the nu-
clear-powered submarine. The nation's fleet
of 41 Polaris submarines, completed this past
summer when the USS Will Rogers was com-
missioned, is widely understood as a key ele-
ment in America's atomic-age strategic
forces. Beyond Polaris, however, lies the SAB-
MIS system, designed to give sea power a new
strategic defense role by providing forward
protection for the United States and its
allies.
The SABMIS concept provides for placing
anti-ballistic missiles aboard surface ships.
If this system were authorized and deployed,
a number of naval vessels-some equipped
with powerful radar and others outfitted as
launch ships-would be assigned stations in
the path of enemy missiles aimed at the
United States from land bases in the com-
munist countries. This sea-based system
would give the U.S. a forward line of ABM
defenses. The ABMs aboard ship in the Pa-
cific or North Atlantic would have the task
of intercepting enemy missiles long before
they entered their terminal phase of flight.
Dr. Paul C. Davis of Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, writing in Orbis, has cited the
possible forms a sea-based, anti-ballistic
missile defense system might take.
"Theoretically," he said, "one could devise
a system based solely on submersible and
airborne or spaceborne components. Since,
however, a sea-based, anti-Chinese system
would be needed, if at all, by 1975, or even
earlier, the present analysis is based upon a
relatively unsophisticated system, one in
which the main elements are mounted on
surface vessels. The launching platform
might be a converted transport or small car-
rier; the missile system might be an adaption
of the Nike Zeus; and detection systems
might be carried by picket ships or converted
destroyers, supplemented by. carrier-based
picket aircraft."
The SABMIS . system under discussion
would have the initial task of serving as a
counter to the potential nuclear threat of-
fered by Communist China. The system is
needed,_ moreover, not simply as a means of.
dealing with a possible attack on the United;
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October20, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD APPENDIX
States but also with the threat of a Chinese
attack on U.S. allies in Asia.
Armed with nuclear weapons, Communist
China within a few years will have a much
greater capacity for international blackmail
than it has at present. Peking can be ex-
pected to threaten Japan, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Thailand and other Asian countries
with nuclear attack unless they break all
defense links with the United States and
move into Peking's orbit. Indeed more than a
year ago, a leading leftist journal in Europe
recommended "socialist counter-escalation"
in the future, and suggested the likelihood of
"graduated reprisals" with rockets against
U.S. air-naval bases on Formosa, Okinawa
and in the Philippines.
Unless the United States. is to withdraw its
forces deep into the Central Pacific, aban-
doning all the Asian countries protected at
such vast expense over so many years, the
credibility of American deterrence of atomic-
armed missiles in the hands of Peking must
be enormously enhanced. The utility of an
anti-Chinese, sea-based ABM thus is enor-
mous.
It should be borne in mind that Peking
does not need an especially sophisticated
missile delivery system, as its primary goal
will be political blackmail and psychological
terrorism-not pinpoint destruction of key
targets. It is this threat that Japan and other
friendly Asian countries must be protected
against in the relatively near future. The
land-based, ABM system on American terri-
tory can be largely concerned with the more
complex danger of Soviet rocket attack, a
problem which does not particularly worry
Japan, Thailand and other friends of the U.S.
at this stage of the cold war. It is possible, of
course, that Japan has the know-how to de-
velop her own ABM defense, but Japanese
defense authorities face a formidable con-
stitutional hurdle in obtaining authority for
the acquisition of defensive nuclear weapons.
Thus the real burden of free world interests
in Asia -will, for many years to come, fall on
the United States. In addition, the U.S. gov-
ernment, which is opposed to the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons-even of a nomi-
nally defensive type-may prefer to increase
the American capability rather than encour-
aging a defense partner to build her own
atomic shield.
A major advantage of a sea-based, anti-
ballistic missile defense for Asia is its mo-
bility. The Asian countries with which the
United States- is concerned embrace a vast
area of this continent. Furthermore, the Chi-
nese nuclear missile threat is likely to shift
from one political theater to another. With
the SABMIS system in operation, the Unit-
ed States could shift its anti-ballistic mis-
sile defense structure as needs dictated. The
balance of these ABM forces could be altered
according to the weight of specific threats
at particular times. Thus SABMIS vessels
could be deployed in a variety of areas and
formations from the Bay of Bengal to the
Sea of Japan. SABMIS ships thus would be
as effective in protecting India or Japan
against Chinese Communist nuclear threats
as the Seventh Fleet has been in guarding
the free Chinese on Formosa from amphibi-
ous invasion. Indeed the security of Formosa
has to be given special consideration when
analyzing the Chinese nuclear-armed missile
threat. This bastion of the legitimate Re-
public of China remains as a special political
target of the powers-that-be in Peking, and
a truly contemporary defense system for the
island must involve an ABM defense.
Yet even on Formosa the construction of
land-based ABM sites would pose a variety
of political problems. Any change in the rela-
tionship between the United States and the
Republic of China, because of an alteration
in the leadership of either nation, could cre-
ate the possibility of a major defense sys-
tem becoming inoperative because of politi-
cal conditions, On the ocean, however, there
is no problem of base agreements or disagree-
ments over hands on the triggering mecha-
nism. In addition, a sea-based ballistic mis-
sile system eliminates the problem. of pro-
viding adequate security against terrorist
attack. ABMs on shipboard would escape the
surveillance the enemy would malntafn if
they were on land in the Far East.
Another tremendously important advan-
tage of a sea-based, anti-missile system is
that it would eliminate the danger of radia-
tion and blast effects in the vicinity of U.S.
cities. An ABM system on American territory
would necessitate significant protection
measures for the civilian population. In a
sea-based, anti-missile system the area of
radiation and blast would be over water.
This means that both the United States and
its allies would be spared the cost of con-
structing shelters.
Existence of the SABMIS system would
give an added measure of protection to civil-
ian populations in the event of a nuclear
attack because the enemy would have to con-
centrate fire at the sea-based, anti-missile
systems. Therefore, civilians would have
more time to insure their own survival.
The forward deployment . assured by
SAMBIS would be in keeping with the long-
time efforts of the United States to offer
prime resistance to cold war enemies on our
advance strategic frontiers from Berlin to
Vietnam. It always is wiser for the United
States to move its power out from the cen-
ter of national life to the rim area where
armed conflict will not directly or immedi-
ately impinge on the lives of our people at
home.
SABMIS is especially attractive from the
fiscal standpoint inasmuch as the concept
does not- include a requirement for a new
and extremely costly type of vessel. The
Polaris missile system is housed in a multi-
million dollar atomic submarine. SABMIS,
however, could be installed aboard existing
vessels of conventional design. The only spe-
cial protective system required would be
augmentation of anti-submarine forces in
the SABMIS operating areas. The United
States is fortunate, however, that Communist
China, though seeking status as an undersea
power (See WR 65-27), still lacks an effective
undersea fleet and could not develop one
rapidly without expenditures currently
beyond its capacity.
Approval of the SABMIS concept is likely
to be difficult, it should be acknowledged, in
view of the extreme reluctance of Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara to authorize
any major new strategic counter-measure.
Despite his announcement of token ABM sys-
tem designed only to face a future Red
Chinese threat, Mr. McNamara remains basi-
cally hostile to the deployment of a full
ABM defensive system, whether on land or
on sea. He apparently places his faith in
negotiation with the Soviets to reduce the
arms race to a walk.
This faith, nonetheless, does not remove
the reality of Chinese Communist fanaticism
which places Peking beyond the range of
reasonable discussions on any subject.
As Dr. M. H. Halperin has written, "China's
nuclear capability will pose a threat of mas-
sive destruction to Asian cities in the short
run and to American cities in the long run.".
This threat makes it ever more vital that
additional ways be found to eliminate Red
China's nuclear gains. SABMIS offers opti-
mal detection and interception of Chinese
missiles aimed at Tokyo and Manila as well
as those aimed at U.S. territory. At the same
time, as SABMIS would concentrate on mid-
course interception of Chinese missiles, land-
based ABMs in the United States could con-
centrate on terminal intercept of Soviet in
ter-continental weapons. SABMIS also would
permit more realistic training in remote
ocean areas. Nuclear defense drills on U.S.
territory, after all, necessarily are hedged
around by the most elaborate precautions
which somewhat inhibit the development of
the offensive spirit. Nor, in the case of
A 5173
SABMIS, would there be any problem with
disaffected citizens such as those who have
attempted to halt troop trains carrying sol-
diers to points of embarkation. SABMIS
could perform its mission far from the shores
of America in an environment of maximum
operational freedom. All in all, SABMIS offers
a valuable opportunity to the United States
to redress the strategic balance.
Military Rule in Greece
SPEECH
OF
HON. DONALD M. FRASER
OF MINNESOTA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, October 19, 1967
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, one of the
most perceptive and best-informed
writers on the military regime in Greece
is Maurice Goldbloom. Mr. Goldbloom, a
freelance writer, was labor information
officer for the U.S. economic mission to
Greece in 1950-51. He has since returned
to the country many times and has
numerous sources of information that
give authority to his articles on recent
Greek developments. Following is an
article that appeared in the September
24 New York Times Magazine:
AFTER THE ARRESTS: HOW THE MILITARY RULES
8 MILLION GREEKS
The military junta which seized power in
Greece last April 21 is still nervous, but with
each passing day it is less and less vulnerable.
By now, neither a decision by King Constan-
tine to break with it, nor a decision by the
United States to cut off military aid would
automatically topple it, though either would
undoubltedly weaken it.
The attitude of most Greeks toward the
King's role is summed up in a mot that has
been going the rounds in Athens: "In the
process of seduction, there is a point at which
a girl must decide whether she is going to
remain a virgin. The King has passed that
point with the junta. In his recent ap-
pearances in the United States-in Washing-
ton with the President, in Newport for the
America's Cup races-Constantine has ap-
parently been acting as the regime's envoy.
For its part, the United States, through its
initial acquiescence, has given the junta the
time it needed to dig in.
In other words, the junta, though not
noticeably more popular, does seem to be
more solidly entrenched. The coup was staged
by no more than 200 to 400 officers-out of
some 10,000 in the Greek Army. The ability
of such a small group to seize power without
significant opposition was largely the result
of mistaken identity. Greeks had long been
expecting-and right-wing Greeks had been
hoping for-a coup by a large, nominally
secret, but in fact well-known, organization
dominated by senior officers known as IDEA.
But over the years a small, rival organization
of junior officers, called EENA, had been
growing up almost unnoticed. At the time of
the coup its leadership included only one
general-Stylianos Patakos, now Minister of
the Interior-and he had been made a briga-
dier only three months before. The group's
most important leader was Col. George
Papadopoulos-who happened also to be the
man assigned by IDEA to transmit the orders
for its coup to its followers throughout the
army.
It was EENA that struck, but when Papa-
dopoulos gave the signal its recipients
thought they were obeying IDEA. Because
there was no organized democratic group in
the army, there was no military resistance.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX October 20, f9tr7
Because civilian political groups-Including
the weak and demoralized Communists-
were prepared only for lectoral activity, there
was no popular resistance.
Once in, the junta lost no time in broad-
ening its base of military support. Increas-
ing the officer corps by approximately 10 per
cent lIas enabled it to win the support of
perhaps twice that many officers through
promotions and new appointments. Key of-
ficers on whose loyalty it could not count
were forced to retire. In the army, this
purge for the most part took place immedi-
ately after the coup; in the navy, where the
coup had received almost no support, the
junta moved more slowly. Still, by mid-Au-
gust more than 60 naval officers, mostly of
high rank, were said to have been removed,
and 11 to have been arrested.
Arrests, indeed, have been the junta's
most conspicuous activity. The cases of for-
mer Premier George Papandreou of the Cen-
ter Union, his son, Andreas Papandreou, and
Mikis Theodorakis, composer of the score for
"Zorba the Greek," have attracted world-
wide attention, but there are thousands
more, and the arrests show no signs of abat-
ing.
The original wave of arrests was based
largely on an army list of suspects prepared
nearly 20 years ago; the conspirators had
been afraid to ask for more recent lists or
fear of tipping their hand. Thus, many of
those arrested in the first'sweep were people
who, whatever they might have been in the
turbulent nineteen-forties, had long since
ceased to be politically active.
Later arrests-which by now certainly out-
number those of the first wave-have been
more selective. They affect all sections of
the political spectrum, including parliamen-
tary deputies, former Government ministers
and several of the country's leading journal-
ists. They also include a man who criticized
the King in a telephone conversation with
his sister, a bus driver who objected to let-
ting a soldier ride free and numerous persons
accused of such offenses as having five or
more guests in their home or possessing a
mimeograph and not registering it with the
police.
Of those arrested at the time of the coup,
more than 6,000 were sent to a hastily opened
concentration camp on the island of Yiaros,
(Some 1,500, most of whom had been arrested
because of their official positions rather than
for their politics, were soon released, though
many remained under house arrest.) The
Government has now announced the opening
of a second major concentration camp on the
island of Leros, to which prisoners are being
transferred from Yiaros. This should be an
improvement.
Yiaros is a completely waterless and bar-
ren island, swept by high winds. Before the
coup it had an old and unused prison, with
cells for a few hundred persons. When the
detainees were dumped on the island, the
prison was used to house some of the women.
The other prisoners were housed in tents, 25
to a tent, grouped in three camps.
Some weeks later, at a time when the Gov-
ernment claimed to have released about a
third of the prisoners originally there, it an-
nounced plans to construct reservoirs on the
island which would make it possible for each
prisoner to receive 15 liters (a little less than
4 gallons) of water a day. Clearly, the water
supply during the first several weeks must
have been barely enough for drinking, let
alone sanitation.
Later, other ameliorations were promised..
These included an improvement in the diet,
which was said to have consisted mainly of
beans, and the opening of a canteen at which
prisoners could purchase additional food and
other small necessities, Some of these im-
provements may have taken place. It at least
appears reasonably certain that the canteen
was opened-since underground channels re-
ported a few weeks later that it had been
closed again.
There are inevitable gaps and time lags in
information on conditions in the various
places of detention, since Yiaros and most
of the others have been barred to journalists
and foreigners. A representative of the Inter-
national Red Cross has, to be sure, been per-
mitted to visit them. But in accordance with
the normal practice of that organization, his
report was submitted only to the Greek Gov-
ernment, which never made it public.
The Government did, however, release a
letter in which the Red Cross representatives
asked on humanitarian grounds that the 250
women confined in the old prison on Yiaros
be transferred elsewhere, to accommodations
more appropriate to their sex. (The circum-
stances of this release were such that one is
impelled to wonder if the Government really
desired to give it wide publicity. In the Greek
Government press office, official releases are
normally laid out on tables, arranged in the
order of the numbers which they bear. They
are available in Greek, English and French.
This release had no number, it was not with
the others, and it was available only in
Greek.) I have seen no report indicating that
such a transfer has in fact taken place, al-
though the women may be among those now
being moved to Leros.
If conditions on Yiaros have improved in
some elementary physical respects, it appears
that they have recently become worse in
other ways. Some 250 of the "most danger-
ous" prisoners are said to have been segre-
gated from the others, and to be confined to
their quarters 20 hours a day. During the
four hours in which they are allowed out, the
other prisoners are confined, in order to pre-
vent any contact between the two groups.
And the three camps on the island are kept
isolated from one another.
These changes probably result from the
regime's disappointment at the failure of the
prisoners to break down under its pressure. A
condition for release is that the detainee sign
a pledge to refrain from "antinational and
anti-Governmental activity." Few politically
significant prisoners have been willing to
sign, regarding it as dishonorable.
Interior Minister Patakos complained to
me: "Some of them are getting more hard-
ened instead oi' reforming. They have or-
ganized by tents; a leader for each tent, and
a group leader for each 8 or 10 tents. They
have a president for each of the camps, and
a general commander for the whole island.
They have collected 250,000 drachmas [a little
more than $8,000] among themselves, for
what purpose I do not know, but I am sure
it is not a good one."
As one of the "Communist" leaders of the
hardened prisoners, Patakos mentioned Di-
mitrios Stratis. When I remarked that the 78-
year-old Stratis, a veteran trade-union leader
and left-wing parliamentary deputy whom I
know well, was not a Communist, Patakos re-
plied: "He calls himself a Socialist, but he is
a Communist. In Greece, we have right peo-
ple and wrong people. All those who are
against the country are Communists. Stratis
is a Communist in his heart and his works.
They are all liars."
Yiaros and the courts-martial which hand
out sentences of five years for writing slogans
on walls and eight years for lese-mafestd
are not the Government's only instruments
of intimidation. Some Greeks beyond the
borders have had their citizenship revoked-
most notably, the actress Melina Mercouri,
who seems to have come out ahead on the
exchange.
Many persons regarded as potential trouble-
makers have been taken to police stations
and badly beaten, as a warning, without being
formally arrested; this treatment has been
most often used on students and other young
people. The security police have visited
private employers with lists of "unreliable"
individuals who are to be discharged. Many
people have had their telephones removed
because of their political, views; all have been
discouraged from talking politics on the
phone or writing about it to friends by the
knowledge that phones are likely to be
tapped and letters opened.
But the junta has not relied on terror
alone to consolidate its position. Rather, it
has systematically endeavored to entrench
itself in every aspect of Greek life. On the
national level, despite the existence of a
nominally civilian Government, an army of-
ficer plays a key role in every ministry-in
some cases as minister, in others as secre-
tary general, in still others as a political
commissar without official title.
The tenure of civil servants has been
abolished; many have been removed for their
ideas, and all have been ordered to pledge
their loyalty to the regime on pain of dis-
missal. The purge has not been confined to
such poltically sensitive departments as the
police, where 118 high-ranking officials and
police doctors were dismissed in mid-August.
(Others had been ousted previously, indi-
vidually or in smaller batches.) It has even
affected the director of the Byzantine Mus-
eum, an internationally known scholar.
Locally, the regime has destroyed the sys-
tem of nonpolitical nomarchs or district
administrators, whose establishment Amer-
ican advisers once regarded as one of their
major achievements. More than half the
nomarchs have been removed; most of their
replacements are army officers. While assert-
ing its belief in the decentralization of au-
thority, the Government has removed large
numbers of elected mayors and local coun-
cils and replaced them with appointees
chosen in Athens,
Nor has it confined itself to the govern-
mental sphere. It has seized control of the
Orthodox Church. It has dissolved hundreds
of private organizations and removed the
officers of numerous others, including bar as-
sociations, agricultural cooperatives and the
Jewish community.
The United States, Embassy in Athens
clearly does not like the regime, though most
Greeks regard it as responsible for the coup-
an opinion the junta assiduously encourages.
(A skeptical friend remarked to me, after
seeing one of the coup leaders in action,
"Now I believe what you say about the Ameri-
cans not being behind the coup; they'd never
have chosen these people!") But the Embassy
also regards the present Government as a
lesser evil than a revolt against it, and has
therefore placed its hope in persuading the
junta to practice self-denial and restore de-
mocracy voluntarily. Its influence is limited,
since the junta now feels certain that the
United States will continue military aid
whatever happens. (Some weeks after the
coup, the U.S. did out off certain items, esti-
mated by the Defense Department at 10 per
cent of the total.)
Nevertheless, the Embassy and State De-
partment see great cause for optimism in
the appointment of a committee of jurists
to draw up a revised Constitution by the end
of the year for submission to a plebiscite.
This is supposed to lead to a speedy and
orderly restoration of constitutional govern-
ment.
This assessment appears to contain a large
measure of wishful thinking. The group
named to draw up the new Constitution in-
cluded a few persons of some distinction,
several conservative nonentities and a few
with rather unpleasant reputations. But the
members were not consulted before their ap-
pointments were announced, and some of the
best-known have refused to serve.
The Government's influence on the de-
liberations of the committee is not likely to
be cast on the side of democratic institutions.
While Premier Constantine V. Kollias has said
the new Constitution will be only slightly
changed from the present one, journalists
close to the junta have called for much more
drastic alterations. Among the suggestions
offered are a ban on political activity by any-
one who has ever cooperated with the ex-
treme left, a requirement that all candidates
have loyalty certificates from the security
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