TRENDS IN STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE: UNITED STATES VER- SUS U.S.S.R.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100073-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 73
• Publication Date: August 10, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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August .T 0, Y 9 67 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- -HOUSE H 10371
This is the very basis of our problem-
those who make a career of crime, and
it is here that prosecutors, judges, ju-
ries, and parole boards can and should
act. And it is time our people demand
they do so now.
Mr. Speaker, I will not go into the great
detail on the repeat offender contained
in the 1966 Crime Index. But pel'mit me
to cite a few facts from the summary
on page 1:
55 percent of offenders released to the
street in 1963 were rearrested within two
and one-half years.
57 percent of the offenders released on
parole were rearrested within two and one-
half years.
67 percent of prisoners released early in
1963 after earning "good time" were rear-
rested.
83 percent of those persons acquitted or
dismissed in 1963 were rearrested within 30
months.
72 percent of persons granted probation in
1963 for auto theft repeated in a new crime.
Of the young offenders under 20 released
in 1963, 65 percent repeated.
Mobility study reveals over 60 percent of
the repeaters charged with robbery, burglary,
auto theft, sex offenses and forgery were re-
arrested in two or more states during their
criminal careers.
I say it is time we act, Mr. Speaker. I
challenge those whose only answer to our
crime problem is advocacy of a harsh
firearms law that does little but pile un-
workable and unnecessary restrictions on
the law-abiding citizen, to study the
facts. Why do you ignore the criminal,
when he is the source of our problem,
and'single out the law-abiding citizen for
harsh restrictions?
I say again, Mr. Speaker, if we need
more prisons to hold these hoodlums-to
isolate them from society-then let us
build them. Let us strike hard at the
criminal, not those who own, use or sell
firearms in accordance with our laws and
regulations.
I urge my colleagues to join with me in
seeing that this Congress enact legisla-
tion such as I've authored, and to see
that the rights of the decent citizens are
protected.
(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr.
PRYOR) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous
matter. )
[Mr. MULTER'S remarks will appear
hereafter in the A.ppendix.7
THE VOICE OF AN AMERICAN
(Mr. RARICK (at the request of Mr.
PRYOR) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter. )
Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, I have re-
ceived acopy of the forthright statement
of Mr. Eugene T. Bartkowiak, president
of the National Association of Polish
Americans, Inc.
Each of us Americans is of a minority
origin. What better definition of an
American can there be? Not one people
except in a common loyalty and dedica-
tion to work together under our con-
stitutional system.
Under the unanimous consent I insert
Mr. Bartkowiak's statement here in the
RECORD, followed by his biography from
the Post Eagle, of Clifton, N.J.
STATEMENT OF EUGENE T. BARTKOWIAK, PRES-
IDENT, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF POL-
ISH AMERICANS, INC.
In the White House, the President of the
United States not only brought disgraceful
dishonor to himself and his OfRCe, but de-
graded this entire Nation when, over coast
to coast television our President literally
begged for an end to the wasteful rioting
and civil disol?der which has erupted
throughout this country. The President's
plea was certainly not to the law-abiding
citizens who were hopefully listening for an
intelligent Executive solution, but to the
gangsters such as the young punk named
H. Rap Brown who was a few blocks up the
street from the White House applauding the
murder of a policeman during the recent
riots in Plainfield, New Jersey. This bar-
barian is the national chairman of the so-
called ?'Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee" and finds himself at liberty to
nauseously describe the Plainfield slaying as
"beautiful" and "the most successful I?ebel-
lion to date-one casualty-oue honky cop."
Mere disapproval and reiteration of the
need far law and order will not stop the fire-
brands ar does it serve as a solution to the
problem. Emotional BEGGING is not the
answer either. Our President, our Congress,
all of our leaders in positions of public trust
must face the facts that riot-breeding con-
ditions are made by the people-the slums
are made by the people. How well the Amer-
ican Pole knows that you can be poor, de-
prived, and discriminated against but still
remain morally and physically pure, pre-
venting the creation of a man made slum.
In the past three and a half years the
greatest legislative effort in the history of
the United States has been directed at dis-
crimination, disease, not enough jabs, slums,
etc. The Congress has passed the Rent Sup-
plement Act, the Civil Rights Acts, The
Model Cities Act, Medicare and Medicaid,
Head Start, the Job Corps and the Neigh-
borhood Youth Corps, and Manpower De-
velopment and Training. For what? Have
conditions improved? No! Instead, the Con-
gress now has before it The Safe Streets and
Crime Control Act and The Gun Control
Act. The citizens have before them increased
taxes and genuine fear.
What is the answer? The Polish people of
America (and throughout the world) have
managed to survive and progress because
this simple answer has been bred into them.
The strong family structure of the American
Poles has created a code which is relatively
simple for anyone to fallow and would cost
our government very little to publicize and
teach to others. It goes something like this:
Work hard to earn what you have and you
will appreciate and not be wasteful. Do not
expect something for nothing for God helps
those who help themselves. Work in the
spirit of penance, considering it an honor to
employ and develop the gifts received by
God. Build a strong family union between
husband and wife-parents and children. Ask
only the love and grace of Gad and with these
you will be rich enough and desire nothing
more.
$IOGRAPIIY OF EUGENE T. BARTKOWIAK
WASHINGTON, D. C.-Eugene T. Bartkowiak,
president oT The National Association of Pol-
ish Americans, Inc., was born in the City of
Buffalo, State of New York, on May 5, 1929.
A bachelor, he is the youngest of six children
reared by Victoria and the late Lawrence
Bartkowiak. As a proud American youth he
had barely reached manhood when he joined
the Armed Services of the United States; and
like his brothers he served his country well
and was honorably discharged from active
ditty. Following his discharge from the serv-
ice he was not able to resume his formal edu-
cation but continued his studies through a
program of self education and eveniltg
courses at various colleges and universities
in the Buffalo and Washington, D.C. areas.
His business experience includes that of
public relations executive for a subsidiary of
the Eastman Kodak Company of Rochester,
New York, branch manager for a microfilm
corporation, and office management consult-
ant for several national trade asociations.
The inborn pride which Mr. Bartkowiak has
in his Polish ancestry was enhanced in his
youth when his parents proudly taught him
to love the Polish customs and the many
other assets of his heritage. Realizing that
much emphasis is placed on the past history
of Poland in her outstanding political, scien-
tific and cultural achievements, but little
recognition is given today to the present
achievement of the Polish people throtghout
the world, he has founded the National As-
sociation of Polish Americans, Inc. The NAPA
is the only national service organization dedi-
cated to fighting defamation and in obtain-
ing the proper recognition of the Polish peo-
ple of America, as well as in preserving t11e
many benefits of the proud Polish heritage.
~~Pj M
TRENDS IN STRATEGIC MILITARY
BALANCE: UNITED STATES VER-
SUS U.S.S.R.
(Mr. RARICK (at the request of Mr.
PRYOR) was granted permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RECOFiD
anal to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, the Na-
tional Strategy Comlittee of the Amer-
ican Security Council has 1?ecently re-
leased their report "The Changing Stra-
tegic Military Balance" which should be
read and analyzed by every citizen of
our country.
The report can be obtained through
the council's office at 1101 17th Street
NW., Washington, D.C.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
to insert portions of the report following
my remarks and invite particular atten-
tion to the chart entitled "Range of
Estimates From Unclassified Sources."
I. SOVEET UNION VERSUS UNITED .STATES
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
Trends in the strategic military balance
The basic frame of reference for comparing
the strategic strength of the Soviet Union
and the United States is an examination of
their national objectives, both military and
political. It is not our task here to explore
Soviet political objectives in extenso, al-
though it must be kept in mind that these
cannot be separated from the U.S.S.R.'s mili-
tary goals. For ahalf-century, Soviet leaders
have time and again repeated that Com-
munism's ultimate objective is world domi-
nation. But many in the Free World simply
refuse to believe that the Soviet leaders mean
what they say.
In the realm of strategic military weapons,
the United States has, in recent years, dem-
onstrated much the same inclination to dis-
believe or to disount Soviet achievements
and advances. This is particularly so with
respect to the new ballistic missile defenses
oT the Soviet Union and to Soviet boasts of
an orbital bomb capability.
Yet, the available evidence indicates that
the Soviet Union has a goal of strategic
sttperiority designed to win a nuclear war
rather than merely deter one. Once in a war-
winning posture, the U.S.S.R. would be ideal-
ly situated to practice nuclear blackmail and
would not even have to fight a nuclear war.
Some strategic analysts assert that this is
the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union, and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE .August 10, 1967
that it depends upon a defense against nu-
c-fear retaliation.
The United States has exchanged its goal
of awar-winning straaeg:ic superiority for a
rstrategy of mutual deterrence. The United
~;tates strat~agy of mutua:i deterrence is said
Co increase "stability" and reduce interna-
!;'..onal tensions. Fence, American officials are
r,triving to convince Soviet; leaders that a race
to build anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems
would be pointless.
iYot only has the Soviet Union already de-
ployed an ABM system, but much evidence
indicates that it is driving hard toward a
goal of overwhelming superiority in the de-
cisive field of nuclear weaLonry.
Ca NTAAST BETWEEN TT.S. AJ4D SOVIET POLITICAL
oBJE[:TIVES
't'he thoughtful words of President John F.
:Kennedy clearly illustrate the contrast be-
tween U. S. and Soviet political objectives.
Regarding U.S, objectives, President Ken-
nedy said:
"Pei: our basic goal remains the same: a
peaceful world community of free and in-
dependent states-iree to choose their own
future and their own system, so long as it
does not threaten the freedom of others."'
Regarding Soviet objectives, President
Kennedy said:
"Where we feel the dif.5culty comes is the
effort by the Soviet Union to communize, in
a sense, the entire world. If the Soviet Union
were merely seeking to protect its own na-
tional interest, to prote963 testimony that we were about to
enter a new era in strategic balance between
the United States and the Soviet Union,
which he called an era of "mutual deter-
rence." At that time, McNamara said, "More
armaments, whether offensive or defensive
connot solve the nuclear war dilemma, We're
approaching an era when it will become in-
creasingly improbable that either side could
destroy a sufficiently large portion of the oth-
er's strategic nuclear force, either by surprise
or otherwise, to preclude a devastating re-
taliatory load, This may result in future
betterment "'" 1967 was the year men-
tioned by McNamara as the most likely be-
ginning of the new era.
Under questioning by Senator Margaret
Chase Smith of Maine, following the above
testimony, McNamara denied that his antici-
pation oP "mutual deterrence" could properly
be equated with nuclear "parity" or "stale-
mate," and said he had repeatedly stated that
it is his intention to "maintain nuclear
superiority in terms of numbers of warheads
versus the Communist bloc."
1967 testimony of Secretary of the Air
Force Harold Brawn, however, indicates that
the United States policy may be to accept
?parity? :
"Militarily the Soviets have a very for-
midable missiles force. They are building
missiles very fast. You see, we have
leveled out our missile forces. We announced
how big our missile force was going to be.
Our plans are that 5 years from now we will
have just as many missiles as we have right
now. They have known that. They have
known that for a couple of years, and they
keep on building.
"Now we can afford to let them build for a
while, if they feel they want to `catch up.'
But there is evidence that if we stop, they
don't necessarily stop. They haven't stopped.
I thick that in our position, we can afford
to let this go on for awhile, without over
responding." 19
Yn the final analysis, the best way to de-
termine actual differences between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. strategic military objectives
is to compare their performances. For this
purpose we will examine hereinafter such
key areas as development of space weapons,
production of nuclear materials, strategic
military budgets, attitude toward research
and development and the changing strategic
military balance.
DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE WEAPONS
The United States policy on space weapons
was first announced in 1961 by 'the then
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gil-
patric:
"An arms race in space will not contribute
to our security. I can think of no greater
stimulus for Soviet thermonuclear arms ef-
fort in space than a U.S, commitment to
such an effort. This we will not do."
This policy was confined in October 1963,
when the United States announced its ad-
herence to the United Nations General As-
sembly resolution banning the "Placing in
orbit around the earth any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weap-
ons of mass destruction, installing such
weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing
such weapons in outer. space in any other
manner." 20
This resolution, however, contains no pro-
vision for inspection and no penalties for
violation.
~~ The New York Times, Western Edition,
February 11, 1963, p. 12.
10 Senate Hearings, January 25, 26, 27, 30,
31 and February 1 and 2, 1967, p. 876.
2U Report of the Committee on Foreign Re-
]ations, United Statea Senate on Executive
M, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Exec. Report
No. 3) Government Printing Office, 1963.
Although-the Soviet Union has announced
its compliance with the U,N. resolution, its
official publication, Izvestiya, noted that
while the U,N. had banned the orbiting of
rockets that constitute weapons of mass ex-
termination, it by no means bamxed "the
manufacture of such missiles."
On July 4, 1965, Communist Party Chief
Leonid Brezhnev declared that the Soviet's
possess "orbital rockets." ~'
Brezhnev's claim was supported by the
display of a three-stage missile in the Bol-
shevik Revolution Day parade on November
7, 1965. On November 8, 1965, both TASS
and ]zvestiya described it as an orbital mis-
sile. This weapon has since been code named
SCRAG.
Subsequently, the Department of State axx-
nounced that it had asked Moscow whether,
in the light of the Soviet display of an or-
bital rocket in the Revolution Day parade,
the Kremlin still planned to abide by its
pledges not to put such weapons into orbit?'
The Soviet answer was that the agreement
did not bar development of such weapons.
While waiting for an official answer from
the Kremlin, the Department saw fit to keep
our country on record (as reported by UPI)
"The State Department reiterated the U.S.
position that although either the United
States or Russia could put such a weapon
into orbit, there would be no military sense
in doing so."
The Soviet attitude should have been Ixo
surprise to anyone. After an examination of
the long history of broken Soviet treaties and
agreements, a Senate Internal Security Sub-
committee reported that:
"It keeps no international agreements at all
unless doing so is clearly advantageous to the
Soviet Vnion." ~?
On March 12, 1964, at hearings before the
House Appropriations Subcommittee, Dr.
Harold Brown, then Director of Defense Re-
search and Engineering, now Secretary of the
Air Force, was asked how much money was
being spent on studies of orbital bombard-
ment vehicles. This is his official answer:
"My recollection is that we have no more
than three or four people working in one of
the contract organizations studying this
question. We are not doing any hardware
work. So that I would be surprised if more
than a couple of hundred thousand dollars
in fiscal 1964 is being spent on this, and cer-
tainly no more than that Ss planned for 1965.
"There are two reasons: First, it is not a
very good idea. .Second, there is now
a U. N. resolution which we subscribe to and
the Soviets have subscribed to, not to put
bombs in orbit. This does not prevent people
from doing the development on it, but appar-
ently neither t)ze Russians nor we believe it
is a very important strategic weapon. .. .
(Emphasis added.)
Late in 1966, President Johnson announced
that the United States, the Soviet Union and
more than 100 nations on the United Nations
Political Committee had agreed upon the
language of a formal treaty outlawing nu-
clear weapons fn space. It has now been
passed by the U.S. Senate. Again, no provision
for inspection was included in the treaty.
The only known effective ways to assure
the world that none of the nuclear-rocket
powers are orbiting nuclear weapons are to
inspect space rockets before launch, or to
rendezvous with the orbiting rockets and
open them to inspection in space (?go up
there with a screwdriver," as one AEC au-
thority put it).
~~ Izvestiya, July 4, 1965, p. 2.
=~ United Press International dispatch
dated Washington, November 19, 'L965.
2' Soviet Political Agreements and Results,
Internal Security Subcommittee, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Third Revision,
Volume Y, U.S. Government Printing Office,
1964, Foreword, p. VIII.
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CONGRESSI:ONAL RECORD -HOUSE ,4ugust 10, 1967
General Earle G. Wheeler's statement on
the Treaty on Outer Space includes the fol-
lowing comment on verification:
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain con-
cerned about the assured verification capa-
bility with regard to 'weapons in orbit.' The
deployment of prohibited orbital vehicles
could have. serious implications, especially
if it enabled an enemy to achieve effective
surprise attack against our command and
control facilities and milirary forces. Weapons
in orbit could become a matter of grave con-
sequence, particularly when utilized in con-
junction with other str