COMMUNIST CHINA'S GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000200180008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 1, 1968
• Content Type: NIE

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C(TTan I FCf flIsSFM 1 August 1968
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 13-3-68
Communist China's General Purpose
and Air Defense Forces
Submitted by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
1 August 1968
MORI
review(s)
completed.
SECRET N? 382
CONTROLLED DISSEM
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
It. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
It. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr., the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-
mission
Abstaining:
Mr. Wijliam 0. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM ..................................................... 1
CONCLUSIONS ................................................ .... 1
DISCUSSION ....................................................... 3
1. THE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY AND THE CULTURAL
REVOLUTION ................................................ 3
The Peoples Liberation Army's Political and Government Role ........ 3
The Purge of the Peoples Liberation Army ......................... 4
Consequences for the Military Establishment ...................... 6
General ......................................................... 7
Manpower and Conscription ...................................... 7
Military Production ............................................. 8
The Chinese Communist Army .................................... 8
Air Defense and Air Forces ....................................... 9
Naval Forces ..................................................... 10
Capabilities ...................................................... 10
General Trends in Military Policy ..... ............................ 11
The Peoples Liberation Army's Future Political Role ................ 12
A. Army ......................................................... 15
Equipment .................................................... is
Air Support ................................... ................ 19
B. Air Force ..... .............................................. 19
C. Navy ......................................................... 22
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S
GENERAL PURPOSE AND
AIR DEFENSE FORCES
THE PROBLEM
To assess the impact of Communist China's political turmoil on its
military establishment and to estimate the capabilities of the general
purpose and air defense forces.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Communist China's armed forces (known collectively as the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)) have been drawn deeply into the
political turmoil that has afflicted China for the past two and a half
years. The PLA has taken on heavy responsibilities for police and
public security work and has acquired a wide variety of administrative
and control functions in the economy and government.
B. The PLA has also undergone a heavy purge, especially of its
top echelons. Line combat units have so far largely escaped the
purges. The PLA itself has been divided at various levels and buffeted
by the politics of the Cultural Revolution. Thus far the PLA has
taken its cue from the political leaders of the country, but in general
it has emerged as a moderate force loosely aligned with the govern-
ment bureaucracy and others whose primary concern is with order,
stability, and national security.
C. Political factionalism, the general deterioration of social order
in China, and the many extra duties that have been imposed on the
PLA have degraded Chinese military capabilities largely in terms of
readiness, morale, and discipline. But in situations where China's
vital interests were at stake, many of the ill effects of the Cultural
Revolution could probably be fairly quickly overcome. Units, equip-
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ment, and the command structure remain intact, and defensive dis-
positions are largely unimpaired. Thus the PLA could provide a
strong defense of the mainland and would be capable of effective
military operations should the existence of the Communist regimes
in North Vietnam and North Korea be threatened.
D. Conceivably the political, social, and economic situation could
deteriorate to the point where the PLA's combat effectiveness would
suffer severe damage. On the other hand, a consistent trend toward
moderation could enable it to regain full effectiveness within a fairly
short time. On balance, we believe that the situation will not get
so bad that the PLA would be unable to maintain a capability to
function as a fighting force; nevertheless, much of its time and energy
will continue to be diverted by nonmilitary activity and political stress.
For the coming year at least, the power and authority of the PLA are
likely to increase. Peking will be dependent on the PLA as the only
effective instrument of control, and the military will probably play a
significant role in the political reorganization currently in process.
E. Except for the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution,
there have been few developments in China's general purpose and
air defense forces of great significance during the past year. Position-
ing of Chinese forces has changed little and continues to reflect concern
with defense. The Chinese have not given a high priority to equip-
ment programs that would improve China's ability to project its power
over long distances outside its borders. The limitations of China's
economic and technical capacities are such that conventional forces
will remain deficient in modern equipment at least until well into the
1970's.
F. Nevertheless, the modernization program for the air defense
and general purpose forces is moving ahead gradually on a fairly
broad front along the following lines:
1. The Army. Chinese combat units vary considerably in
quality and strength, but their firepower is increasing with the
addition of more medium tanks and artillery. The levels of equip-
ment the Chinese seem to be aiming at cannot be reached through-
out the army much before 1975. No significant increase in the
number of combat units is anticipated, although some increase in
manpower might occur in response to the army's assumption of
widened civil responsibilities.
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2. Air. A growing inventory of Mig-19 fighters, addition of
better radar, and a slow deployment program for surface-to-air
missiles are improving China's air defense. We continue to believe
that the Chinese will produce a new fighter, and we now believe
that the chances are about even that it will be the Mig-21. If
the Chinese do not intend to produce this aircraft, it would be
four or five years before a fighter significantly more advanced
than the Mig-19 could be available. There has been no significant
change in the tactical strike and air support capabilities of the
Chinese Air Force and Naval Air Force.
3. The Navy. Production of R-class submarines and guided-
missile patrol boats continues, but at a slower rate than had been
anticipated. Other types of patrol and torpedo boats are being
turned out in considerable numbers and deployment of a coastal
defense cruise-missile system seems to be picking up pace.
DISCUSSION
1. THE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
The Peoples Liberation Army's Political and Government Role
1. During the past year or two the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has
emerged as the only remaining cohesive force in China with a nationwide system
of command and control. As the authority of the party and the government
bureaucracy declined under the Cultural Revolution, the PLA was drawn into
the maintenance of order and stability. In the process it acquired a wide variety
of administrative and control functions in the economy and the government.
It has largely supplanted police and public security units in many areas. It
supervises much of China's transportation network and functions as overseer
in major industrial plants. And it has been assigned new tasks in carrying
out propaganda in schools, factories, and rural communes.
2. The PLA has also become heavily involved in politics. Military control com-
missions were set up in the provinces to take over the party's central functions
when the Cultural Revolution all but dismantled the party apparatus. Subse-
quently, revolutionary committees, the organizations around which Peking is
seeking to build a new power structure, began gradually to replace the military
commissions. In theory, the revolutionary committees are "three-way alliances"
of the "revolutionary masses," the more revolutionary of the old party cadres,
and the PLA. In practice, military officers dominate most of these new organi-
zations. The military's dominance has been especially pronounced in committees
established since the fall of 1967. In the 24 major administrative areas (out of
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a total of 29) where revolutionary committees have been set up, military men
hold both the chairmanship and first vice chairmanship of eleven committees;
they are chairmen of four other committees and first vice chairmen of six. Even
in those committees where military men do not hold chairmanships, the effective-
ness of these new government organs depends primarily upon the local military.
The military is prominent in municipal and county governments as well.
3. The twists and turns of the Cultural Revolution have resulted in ambiguous
and changing directives to the PLA during the various phases of the Revolution.
At times it has been enjoined to "support the left but not any faction." At other
times it has been directed to restore order and to maintain discipline. The PLA's
response to these directives has been mixed. In general, it has tried to maintain
an appearance of neutrality. In some areas, however, it has clearly and openly
supported conservative factions. Moreover, as the PLA has assumed more and
more local authority, it has itself come under attack by radical organizations.
There have been occasions when Peking has dispatched units to crisis areas from
the outside, apparently because Peking felt that these units would be more
dependable in supporting leftist factions against local conservative forces. There
is also good evidence that in some areas field units have taken opposite sides in
factional disputes. There have apparently even been a few clashes between
military units, though they seem to have been on a small scale and did not last long.
4. The PLA has been divided at various levels, subjected to purges, and
buffeted by the politics of the Cultural Revolution. As its power and influence
has grown, it has found itself heavily involved in local politics as well as in top
level disputes. Thus far, the PLA has taken its cue from the political rulers of the
country. In general, it has emerged as a moderate force loosely aligned with
the government bureaucracy and others whose primary concern is with order,
stability, and national security.
The Purge of the Peoples Liberation Army
5. The PLA was, of course, a political army from its inception. Yet, in recent
years it had become increasingly professional, with many of its officers-despite
their party ties-primarily concerned with developing its military capabilities
and discipline. But, once the Cultural Revolution became a fact, it was in-
escapable that it should affect the PLA. As the most powerful and cohesive
element in the force structure, it was a most important target for contending
political factions. Moreover, its senior officers were political figures and by per-
sonal history and belief tied to the various contending civilian leaders. Though
in its early stages the Cultural Revolution was fought out in the party arena,
the growing intensity of the revolution and especially the emergence of public
disorder brought the struggle to the PLA itself. Initially, with the emergence of
Lin Piao as Mao's heir and the specific exemption of the PLA from the Cultural
Revolution declared in August 1966, Mao and Lin acted as if the PLA was, or
could be treated as, in their camp. Gradually, however, the PLA came under
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attack. Madame Mao in particular seems to have tried to exert increasingly
greater control over the PLA and even supported campaigns against its key figures.
6. We believe that divisions over military and related policies were a factor,
though perhaps a secondary one, which led Mao to initiate the Cultural Revolution.
For example, China's economic problems and technological weaknesses have long
provided ample grounds for discord over military priorities and resource alloca-
tion, particularly since such problems had been exacerbated by Mao's disastrous
Great Leap Forward and his handling of Sino-Soviet relations. The war in Viet-
nam also must have provoked debate over the likelihood of war with the US,
the proper strategy to follow if a confrontation occurred, and the advisability of
"joint action" with the USSR against the US in Vietnam. And it seems quite clear
that the longstanding issue of politics versus military professionalism was another
source of friction and trouble.
7. In the earlier stages of the Cultural Revolution some military leaders were
probably purged because of their policy differences with Mao. The later purges
in the PLA, however, were probably more the result of the factional struggles
that developed. Whatever may have been the policy issues or political struggles
involved, the PLA has undergone a heavy purge, especially in its top echelons.
8. About half of the top central military leadership is known or believed to
have been purged. The Military Affairs Committee of the party, the body respon-
sible for military policy, has lost almost half of its standing members and has
undergone a reorganization. In the Ministry of National Defense, three of eight
vice ministers have been removed. The General Staff Department, which is
responsible for coordinating combat operations, has lost two chiefs-of-staff, and
at least five of its ten other principal officers have also fallen. The General
Political Department, the organ through which the party exercises political con-
trol and surveillance in the PLA, has ceased to function at the center. The com-
manders of the armored forces, the railways corps, and apparently the artillery
forces have been purged. The political commissars of the air force, navy, and
the railway corps have fallen. About half of the casualties at the central level
were military professionals and half were political specialists. Insofar as, replace-
ments for the purged figures have been identified, most seem to have been drawn
from the professional wing of the PLA.
9. There has also been a heavy toll at the military region and military
district levels. But the casualties at these levels have been mostly political offi-
cers. As far as is known, field armies, line divisions, and lower combat echelons
have largely escaped the purge, at least to date. Many commanders have sur-
vived intensive attack by militant Red Guard units, and a number have been
formally endorsed by Peking in the past several months. Yet there is good
evidence that the behavior of certain field units has not pleased leaders at the
center.
10. A crisis occurred in the summer of 1967. The PLA came under an espe-
cially violent attack, but suddenly this effort was halted and then repudiated.
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Events surrounding this reversal suggest that a group of PLA leaders resisted
the political attack against them and that Mao and the radicals were made
acutely aware that they had pushed the PLA too far. At any rate, following the
summer of 1967, the harsh line toward the PLA was abandoned and several
ultraradicals identified with it were themselves purged.
Consequences for the The Military Establishment
11. The purge and reorganization of national level military organizations and
the preoccupation of top level political leaders must have seriously interfered
with policy guidance and overall military planning. Certainly the tension and
stress under which the badly depleted leadership operates have not been con-
ducive to thoughtful consideration of complex military problems. Normal staff
and administrative functions almost certainly have been affected also. Despite
events of the summer of 1967, an atmosphere of uncertainty, suspicion, and fear
almost certainly has persisted.
12. Even though the formal military command structure remains intact, morale
and discipline in the PLA must have deteriorated. The military forces inevitably
have been affected by the disruption and divisiveness that the Cultural Revolu-
tion has brought to Chinese society in general. All ranks of the PLA, through
their expanded control and police duties, have had ample opportunity to view
the more vivid manifestations of the struggle going on in their country. There
are reports that troops are weary of incessant political indoctrination and
frustrated by the handicaps under which they are compelled to operate in dealing
with civil disorder. Political attacks against many senior officers and the strains
and antagonisms caused by factionalism within the PLA have only added to
the problem.
13. The many extra duties that have been imposed on the PLA have brought
about a decline in the combat readiness of the PLA. Probably something on
the order of 30 or 40 percent of the PLA's time during the past year or so has
been taken up by activities in someway connected with the Cultural Revolution.
The brunt of these new duties has been borne by the army. The navy and air
force, though involved also, have apparently not had their routine as badly dis-
rupted. The damage done thus far to combat readiness could be fairly quickly
repaired once the PLA was relieved of its extra duties and was permitted to
resume its normal activities. The principal problem is that, given the sorry state
of Peking's administrative and governing apparatus, the central authorities can-
not dispense with the PLA in its new role.
14. There is mounting evidence that a substantial amount of damage has been
done to military production and research. The Cultural Revolution has been
carried into the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission and
into all six of the ministries responsible for military production. Production rates
of many military items cannot be estimated in detail, but there is sufficient evi-
dence to say that nearly all military production has been reduced to some degree.
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The drop of about one-third in the output of Mig-19 jet fighters in 1967 was
almost certainly due to economic dislocations caused by the Cultural Revolution,
and construction of naval craft has slowed down.
II. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING CAPABILITIES
General
15. Except for the disruptions caused by the Cultural Revolution, there have
been few developments in China's general purpose and air defense forces of
any great significance during the past year. The positioning of forces-in-being
has changed little and continues to reflect concern with defense. As a result of
the war in Vietnam, the South China area continues to have some priority in air
defense preparations, and naval forces in that area continue to be strengthened.
There has been no significant strengthening of ground troops along China's
southern border, however. There has been no noticeable Chinese military re-
action to the buildup of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mon-
golia. During the tension in Korea over the Pueblo incident last winter, we
detected no military reaction whatsoever on the part of the Chinese.
16. In the main, the Chinese are not building forces or developing capabilities
on a large scale designed specifically for out-of-country operations. Equipment
programs that would improve China's ability to project its power over long
distances outside its borders seem still not to have a high priority, and much
of the conventional equipment being produced is best suited to air and coastal
defense.
Manpower and Conscription
17. In 1967 Peking imposed a moratorium on conscription and demobilization,
but in early 1968 both were resumed. About the same time, Peking apparently
reduced the terms of service by two years, after having extended them as
recently as 1965. Apparently the terms of service now are two years for the
infantry, three years for other branches of the ground forces, naval forces ashore,
and the air force, and four years for naval forces afloat. We do not know what
motivated this change in policy. One of the purposes may be to subject larger
numbers, including some troublesome underemployed youths, to intensive instruc-
tion and discipline. It may also be intended to make more experienced veterans
available for the militia in order to stiffen the discipline of that force. In two
periods of crisis-during the food shortages which followed the Great Leap For-
ward and in the recent factional fighting-the militia did prove to have been
unruly.
18. We think it unlikely that Peking intends any significant increase in the
number of combat units. It is possible, however, that some increase in man-
power is intended to assist the PLA in performing its many civil duties. The
new conscription policy will place the additional task of training larger numbers
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of raw recruits on the already overburdened PLA. Technical proficiency will
also suffer, but this can be largely offset if, as seems likely, the PLA manages
to maintain an experienced cadre through a policy of selective retention.
Military Production
19. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Chinese are requiring longer
lead times in the development and production of military hardware than would
seem reasonable on the basis of Soviet or Western experience. We also find
that our projections of the quantities of equipment that the Chinese are likely
to produce have frequently been too high. The disruptions of the Cultural
Revolution partly account for Chinese production problems, but more fundamen-
tal factors are China's shortage of highly trained scientific and technical man-
power, its lack of experience in managing complex production processes, and
possiblv the pinch of economic stringency. There are exceptions, of course.
The Chinese Communist Army
20. The Chinese Communist Army (CCA), which numbers about 2.3 million,
includes some 118 combat divisions. Disclosures in Chinese news media re-
specting the activities of military units in the Cultural Revolution and continuing
exploitation of other sources has increased our confidence in this estimate. There
are only a few cases where there is any substantial doubt concerning a division's
existence. Our information is insufficient to determine the strength and equip-
ment levels of many units. But we do know that there is considerable unevenness
in their strength and quality.
21. The modernization of the CCA is making gradual progress. Old equip-
ment is being replaced and units are being supplied with more artillery and
armored equipment. Though we are as yet unable to gauge the program in
detail, the levels of equipment the Chinese seem to be aiming for could not
be reached throughout the CCA much before 1975 at the present rate of
procurement. Even then, the CCA's firepower and mobility would be well
below current Western or Soviet standards, and the Chinese would face serious
deficiencies in conventional combat against modern opposition.
22. The main Chinese battle tank is the T-59 (a copy of the Soviet T-54),
and we estimate normal annual production to be about 400 to 500. We have
no evidence of self-propelled artillery in production or use. There is good evi-
dence that the artillery component of some infantry divisions is being upgraded
with the introduction of additional 85 mm field guns.
F
23. There are indications that the Chinese missile program includes work
on missiles considerably smaller than a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).
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We are not sure what the Chinese have in mind, but we are inclined to doubt
that this activity portends the early deployment of a tactical ballistic missile.'
It is unlikely that the Chinese would deploy such a system without nuclear war-
heads, and we believe that the limited supply of fissionable material will be
committed to the strategic weapons program. Thus, we estimate that it will
he several years before the Chinese could deploy a tactical ballistic missile system.
Air Defense and Air Forces
24. China's air defense system continues to show improvement. The air
surveillance network has been improved and extended into some new areas.
Expansion of SAM facilities is proceeding rather slowly, but the Mig-19 inven-
tory is growing. Deployment of these fighters to operational units in border
and coastal regions of south and east China has improved air defense in these
areas. The air defense system has responded vigorously to isolated intrusions
into Chinese airspace, particularly in south China, and it has had considerable
success against these intrusions. Air defense control and communications fa-
cilities are also improving, but remain a serious deficiency. Despite these im-
provements, China could not cope with a major air attack and will not be able
to do so for at least the next several years.
25. We have been expecting the Chinese to begin turning out Mig-21s for
about two years, but they still have not started production. An airframe plant
and an aircraft engine plant in Chengtu in Szechwan Province have been the
prime candidates for producing Mig-21s. Although the Chinese are clearly con-
cerned with improving their air defense and the Mig-21 would make a significant
contribution to their effort, they may have encountered difficulties. Mig-21
engine technology, for example, is considerably more difficult than that for the
Mig-19. Or production may have been delayed for economic or other reasons.
26. It appears to us the Chinese have two options: to try to produce the Mig-21
or to develop a fighter essentially of their own design. Of the two, producing
the Mig-21 is probably the less difficult and more rapid route. Thus we believe
that there is still an even chance that they will produce the Mig-21. If the
Chinese do not intend to produce this aircraft, it would be at least four or
five years before a fighter significantly more advanced than the Mig-19 could
be available.
27. The question of Chinese intention to produce the TU-16 medium bomber
presents a problem similar to that of the Mig-21. We are quite certain that in
the late 1950's the Soviets were providing the Chinese with the plant and
technical help for producing the TU-16. After the Soviets withdrew their sup-
port in 1960, the Chinese proceeded with construction. We do not know, how-
ever, what aircraft they might produce at the plant or when production might
start. Considering the uses to which a medium bomber could be put, we
'one of the possibilities is that this activity relates to a missile for the G-class submarine.
This possibility will be examined in forthcoming NIE 13-8-68, "Communist China's Strategic
Weapons Program."
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believe there is still about an even chance that the TU-16 will be pro-
duced some time during the next several years. If they are in fact going to
produce the TU-16 and the first unit were to emerge soon, it would be several
years before sufficient aircraft would be available to constitute a significant
adjunct to the general purpose forces. Rather, the Chinese would probably
look to the TU-16 mainly as a carrier for nuclear weapons.
28. There are probably some 15 SAM battalions currently in the field. We
estimate that something on the order of 10 or so new units will be deployed
in 1968, with as many as 35 to 40 additional units by the end of 1970. The
Chinese SAM is a copy of the Soviet SA-2 system, but the Chinese have intro-
duced an improvement to the radar equipment which reduces the system's vul-
nerability to electronic countermeasures. An antireconnaissance mission con-
tinues to govern Chinese SAM deployment, but there probably will be a gradual
transition to a strategic point defense over the next several years.
29. There apparently has been no significant change in the tactical strike
and air support capabilities of the CCAF. It still depends on old IL-28 light
bombers assigned to the air force and navy and a few fighter regiments equipped
with Mig-15/Mig-17s which have been assigned a ground attack role. Though
the purchase of 14 AN-12 transport aircraft from the USSR has helped some,
the Chinese still have an extremely limited airlift and airborne assault capability.
Naval Forces
30. The composition, deployment, and training of Chinese naval forces all
indicate that the primary mission of the Chinese Communist Navy (CCN)
continues to be coastal defense. Naval construction programs and certain
trends in training indicate the Chinese want to increase generally their capa-
bilities and to extend their defensive sea frontier outward. The prospects are
for fairly slow progress to these ends.
31. Construction of R-class submarines continues but slowed down beginning
in 1966, and no additional launching is expected until 1969. The submarine
force is now being equipped with deck-mounted bow sonars. Several types
of coastal patrol craft are being turned out in considerable numbers. The
guided missile patrol boat program is continuing, but at a considerably slower
pace than we anticipated. The Chinese are apparently about to begin more ex-
tensive deployment of a coastal cruise-missile defense with the Samlet or Styx
system. The Samlet is considered the more likely because of its longer range.
Ill. MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES
Capabilities
32. As indicated above, the Cultural Revolution has degraded Chinese mili-
tary capabilities largely in terms of readiness, morale, and discipline. But units
and equipment are largely intact and defensive dispositions largely unimpaired.
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Thus, in situations where China's vital interests were at stake, many of the ill
effects of the Cultural Revolution could probably be fairly quickly overcome.
The PLA would be capable of providing a strong defense of the mainland should
China come under external threat. We believe it would also be capable of
effective military operations should the existence of the Communist regimes in
North Vietnam and North Korea be threatened.
33. At the same time, local situations have substantially reduced the PLR's
capabilities in particular areas. In Tibet, for example, Peking would have
to put an end to the prolonged factional strife before Chinese forces could
be as formidable as they were in the Sino-Indian crisis of 1962 and 1965. In
Fukien Province, opposite Taiwan, and in Yunnan and Kwangsi Province on
China's Southeast Asian frontier, the PLA has been caught up in serious and
protracted political strife. As matters now stand, before it could undertake
military operations in these areas, Peking would have to move in additional
troops to take over administrative and control duties vacated by combat units
and to ensure that transportation lines were kept open. And the central authori-
ties are probably more reluctant than in the past to consider the use of ground
forces in these areas so long as the political turmoil continues.
34. Whether Chinese military capabilities will improve or further decline
will, of course, depend greatly on the course of the Cultural Revolution. Con-
ceivably the situation could deteriorate to the point where the PLA's combat
effectiveness would suffer severe damage. On the other hand, a consistent trend
toward moderation could enable the PLA to regain full effectiveness within
a fairly short time. The situation is not likely to get so bad that the PLA
would be unable to function as a fighting force, but much of its time and
energy is likely to continue to be diverted by nonmilitary activity and political
stress.
General Trends in Military Policy
35. Despite the political turmoil, the military sector will almost certainly
retain its high priority in the allocation of resources, and strategic missiles and
nuclear weapons will continue to have the strongest claim of all. This will per-
mit a general, but only gradual, improvement in the equipment of the general
purpose and air defense forces. As the process of modernization goes forward,
however, the Chinese will face steeply rising economic costs, and as they at-
tempt to move ahead with original weapons research and development there will
be a further stretching of scarce scientific and technical resources. China's
need for highly trained specialists has been seriously compromised by the two-
year closure of its universities, and the Cultural Revolution has appreciably
weakened the economic underpinnings of Peking's military ambitions. With
economic flexibility thus reduced, decisions over resource allocation may become
increasingly difficult and constitute another source of friction in high councils.
36. Political uncertainties preclude a judgment regarding the decisions on
military policy which will be made. It may be that Mao, though he probably
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has supporters in the military, does not now dare to challenge the military by
trying to make fundamental changes or to inaugurate policies certain to be re-
sisted. It is not even known that he wishes to do so. In any case, dissension
in the top leadership and the regime's dependence on the PLA in running the
country might forestall any major organizational changes or shuffling of priorities
in the near term.
The Peoples Liberation Army's Future Political Role
37. The future of China as well as that of the PLA will depend greatly upon
the relative power position of the PLA and its ability to exert influence on na-
tional policy formulation. For the coming year at least, it seems likely that the
power and authority of the PLA will increase. Peking will be dependent on
the PLA as the only effective instrument of control. And the PLA will probably
play a significant role in the political reorganization currently in process. It
will thus be in a position to expand its power at local levels and probably at
the center as well, should it choose to do so. And it is likely to try to work
for moderation of the Cultural Revolution and the restoration of order in the
country.
38. If the PLA's position should be enhanced, the Maoists might feel com-
pelled to attack it once again. Or a crisis could arise if Mao should try to "revo-
lutionize" the organization and inner workings of the PLA or to introduce radical
innovations in military policy. In this case there would be serious degrada-
tion of the PLA's capabilities. If the central authorities proved unable or un-
willing to restore order, the PLA's political position could become institu-
tionalized to the point that the military would in effect be governing China. In
this event, the PLA would probably be able in time to pull itself together and to
restore its military power.
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ANNEX
SECRET
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STATUS OF FORCES AND TRENDS
1. The Ministry of National Defense (MND), under the policy control of the
Military Affairs Committee of the Party Central Committee, is the senior mili-
tary authority. The chief staff components of the MND are its three general
departments: the General Staff Department, the General Political Department
(now no longer functioning at the center), and the General Rear Services De-
partment. Most combat arms and services, such as the air force, navy, armor,
artillery, and selected supporting organizations, are represented at the MND level
by separate headquarters. However, there is no separate headquarters for the
infantry forces, which are apparently controlled directly by the MND.
2. For administrative purposes, mainland China is divided into 13 military
regions (see map), and these are divided into subordinate districts. These are
territorial rather than operational commands and in most cases conform to pro-
vincial boundaries.
A. Army
3. The main field command organization of the Chinese Communist Army
(CCA), is the army, of which there are some 34. The typical army includes
three infantry divisions and one artillery regiment, and probably numbers about
50,000 at full strength. There is nothing in the CCA analogous to the Soviet
combined arms or tank armies. (See Table 1, page 17.)
4. Despite continuing progress in exploiting all available sources, we are not
able to establish with confidence the actual personnel strength and the amounts
of equipment on hand in the majority of CCA units. Some may be at or near
the levels of the formal TO&E described below; others probably fall short of
what the TO&E calls for, and some may be well below this standard.
5. We estimate that at full strength the standard infantry division would
number about 14,000 officers and men. Its principal combat elements would be
3 infantry regiments, 1 artillery regiment, and 1 tank/assault gun regiment. Its
heavy equipment, all of Soviet origin or design, would include 32 T-59 or T-34
tanks, and 10 SU-76 or SU-100 assault guns. The division would have approxi-
mately 175 mortars (82 mm, 120 mm, and 160 mm) and recoilless rifles (57 mm
and 75 mm) as well as 55-60 guns and howitzers (57 mm, 76 mm, 85 mm, and
122 mm). In addition to the standard infantry division, the Chinese have light
divisions for use in mountainous and other difficult terrain. These type units
are similar to the standard division but do not have the tank/assault gun regi-
ment, are equipped with lighter artillery, and have less organic vehicular trans-
port.
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Army Headquarters ............................................. 34
Combat Support Regiments (Army Subordinate) .................... 19
15 Field Artillery
4 AAA
Combat Divisions .............................................. 118
107 Infantry
3 Airborne b
5 Armored
3 Cavalry
Border/Internal Defense Division ................................. 20
Combat Support Divisions ........................................ 24
15 Field Artillery
3 Antitank
6 AAA
Service Support Divisions ........................................ 11
11 Railway Engineer
Combat Regiments (Independent) ................................ 19
6 Infantry
8 Tank
5 Cavalry
Border/Internal Defense Regiments (Independent) .................. 24
Combat Support Regiments (Independent) ......................... 51
12 Field Artillery
6 Rocket Launcher
26 Engineer
7 Signal
Service Support Regiments (Independent) ......................... 34
33 Motor Transport
1 Railway Engineer
We estimate no substantial change in these figures through 1970.
The three airborne divisions are subordinate to the CCAF, but are, for the
purpose of this paper, included with the CCA.
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6. The Chinese armored division at full strength would number about 8,000
officers and men. Its principal combat elements would be 2 armored regiments,
probably 1 infantry regiment, and probably 1 artillery regiment. The composi-
tion and equipment holdings of these divisions vary somewhat. As additional
armored vehicles become available, a third armored regiment may be added
to armored divisions.
7. The CCA has two types of field artillery divisions. The gun division would
have about 5,400 men at full strength; it usually has 3 regiments equipped with
122 mm guns and 152 mm gun-howitzers. The howitzer division would have
about 6,300 troops; it is normally organized into 3 artillery regiments equipped
with 122 mm and 152 mm howitzers, and possibly a rocket launcher regiment,
equipped. with 132 mm or 140 mm multiple rocket launchers.
8. China has 3 airborne divisions, all subordinate to the Chinese Communist
Air Force (CCAF), but little is known about their training, actual strength,
holdings of equipment, or about Chinese doctrine concerning their employment.
The estimated full strength of the Chinese airborne division is 10,300 officers
and men. Its major subordinate elements include 3 regiments and a heavy
weapons battalion. The division's equipment consists of individual weapons and
light crew-served weapons, the largest of which is believed to be the 120 mm
mortar. In peacetime, control of the 3 airborne divisions appears to rest with
the CCAF, probably for ease of administration and training. In combat, how-
ever, they most likely would be considered as ground force troops, controlled at
theater or field army level because of their mobility potential.
Equipment
9. Our knowledge of actual holdings of small arms is better than for other
types of equipment.
Therefore,
it is a reasonable assumption that all infantry units are equippe with, or have
readily available, their full complement of individual crew-served infantry sup-
port weapons.
10. The amount of heavy equipment, such as artillery, tanks, and vehicles,
either in the hands of the troops or maintained for quick access, is more difficult
to determine. In the case of artillery, we believe that the number of weapons
in the majority of units is at or near the number authorized. The number of
guns in the 76 mm/85 mm gun battalion organic to the artillery regiment of the
standard infantry division may be increasing in conjunction with the replacement
of the 76 mm gun with a copy of the Soviet 85 mm field gun. On the other
hand, we have not yet detected any increase in either the number of artillery
divisions or the number of guns in this type of division. Evidence tending to
confirm the presence of artillery thought to be organic to infantry regiments
and armored divisions is limited.
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11. Some independent armored regiments and some regiments of the armored
division may have fewer tanks than called for in the estimated TO&E. How-
ever, with continued armored vehicle production, tank holdings in these regi-
ments could increase.
12. It has not been possible to determine the number of wheeled vehicles
actually present and organic to CCA units. Although it is possible to estimate
vehicle production, the ratio being consigned to the CCA for exclusive use by
the military is unknown. It is highly probable that most transportation units
respond to both military and civilian organizations. The number of vehicles
assigned to these units may depend to a large degree upon civilian construction
and production requirements of the area, rather than on a formal TO&E. In
any emergency situation, it is expected that many of these vehicles would be
assigned to specific military units.
Air Support
13. The Chinese have no separate tactical air command, and we have no infor-
mation concerning PLA doctrine on the use of aircraft in a close support role.
At present any tactical strike or ground support mission would fall principally
on the 300 or so IL-28s in the CCAF and CCNAF, and a few fighter divisions in
the CCAF which have ground attack as their primary mission. The remainder of
the operational fighter force is assigned to air defense, with ground attack as
a secondary role.
14. The Chinese have an extremely limited airborne assault capability. The
principal limitation on the employment of Chinese airborne forces is the small
size of the Chinese air transport fleet which consists largely of light transports
and only a few medium transports. We have no evidence of preparations for
production of a medium or heavy transport aircraft; however, the Chinese have
recently indicated their desire to improve their airlift capability by purchasing 10
AN-12/Cubs from the Soviet Union. These medium transports are the only rear
extraction aircraft in the Chinese inventory and their total force now numbers 14.
The total lift capacity of the entire Chinese military transport force is about 12,600
lightly equipped troops. Total cargo capacity is about three million pounds.
Civil aircraft could augment this capacity by about 50 percent. Depending on
aircraft availability and various operational considerations, only a portion of this
capacity could be utilized at a particular time.
B. Air Force
15. The CCAF and Naval Air Force (CCNAF), number approximately 270,000
men and are equipped with some 4,000 aircraft. The largest active operational
unit in the CCAF is the Air Division, with each division consisting of 2 to 3 regi-
ments. (See Table 2 for estimated numbers of military aircraft in operational
units.)
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1 JULY 1970
Fighter
Mig-15/Mig-17 Fagot/Fresco
1,760
290
2,050
1,850
Mig-19/Farmer
555
130
685 "
970
Mig-21/Fishbed
25
0
25
d
Bomber
TU-2/Bat
100
5
105
75
IL-28/Beagle
172
128
300
275
TU-4/Bull
13
0
13
12
TU-16/Badger
2
0
2
d
Transport
Medium
26
0
26
36
Lights
415
50
465
525
Reconnaissance
BE-6/Madge
0
5
5
3
Helicopter
MI-4/Hound
200
20
220
420
Approximately 10-20 percent of the Mig-17s possess a limited all-weather intercept capability.
" Less than 10 percent possess limited all-weather capability. This figure includes some 100
aircraft that are associated with test and training facilities.
In the absence of production of a follow-on aircraft, Mig-19 production probably would
be extended and production rates kept at a higher rate than indicated in this table.
d In our view, the uncertainties respecting Chinese intentions and capabilities for producing
Mig-21s and TU-16s are such that any projection is unwarranted at this time.
'Approximately 300 of these aircraft are AN-2s.
16. The present strength of the jet light bomber force is approximately 300.
The number of sorties flown per month by the average IL-28 pilot is probably
adequate to maintain minimum proficiency. Moreover, the fact that many pilots
have been flying these same aircraft for up to 10 years would probably provide
the bomber force with sufficient experience to conduct daytime medium or low
altitude bombing missions. With only limited training done at night, it seems
likely that the night and radar bombing capabilities of most crews would be
very marginal.
17. The strength of both fighter and bomber units has been relatively stable
during the past two years, though we have increased our estimates for some
units owing to reassessment of the evidence and, of course, because of continuing
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Mig-19 production. Bomber attrition appears to have leveled off, and as new
Mig-19s have been introduced into jet fighter units, some older aircraft have been
phased out. IL-28 regiments currently have about 20 aircraft per unit and
fighter regiments about 25 aircraft.
18. Probably less than 20 percent of the fighter force has airborne inter-
cept equipment; however, the large majority of these are Mig-17s. The Soviets
may have provided the Chinese with a limited number of AA-2 type missiles
when they delivered the Mig-21s, and the Chinese may be producing some of
these missiles themselves. They have the technical capability, though no produc-
tion facilities have been identified.
19. The CCAF exercises its administrative and operational control through 10
air districts and a limited number of air elements assigned directly to Head-
quarters CCAF. Although there is no "Air Defense Command" in the US or
Soviet sense, a staff element of CCAF Headquarters coordinates and controls
all air defense operations, including those involving AC&W, antiaircraft artillery
(AAA), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and fighters supplied from the CCAF and
CCNAF. There are no known "commands" responsible for CCAF or CCNAF
tactical, bomber, or transport operations.
20. The air defense command directs an extensive air surveillance and con-
trol network comprised of over 700 radar stations with about 1,250 radars.
Since 1963 withdrawals of older radars have about equaled replacements, and
the total number of radars in the network has not changed appreciably. The
replacement radars have included sophisticated models of native Chinese de-
sign. Qualitative improvement of China's air defense radar network probably
will continue to enjoy high priority.
21. There is a heavy concentration of radars in coastal areas, particularly
in South China. The coastal radar net provides seaward early warning (EW)
coverage to an estimated range of 200 nautical miles (n.m.) and ground control
intercept (GCI) coverage to 175 n.m., for targets of medium bomber size.
The heavy deployment of radars in coastal areas has improved performance
against low level targets, but tracking of aircraft at altitudes lower than 2,000
feet above the terrain probably is still erratic and undependable. At present,
GCI coverage is fairly complete throughout the eastern and central interior sec-
tions of China. All major population and industrial areas and almost all sig-
nificant military targets are covered. Future developments will probably in-
clude expansion of the EW net on China's borders with the USSR, Mongolia,
and India. GCI coverage will probably be reinforced in the interior of China
and be extended to the border areas.
22. The air defense weapons system includes about 20 air and about 6 army
AAA divisions and at least 7 army AAA divisions which are more lightly gunned.
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Some of these units are deployed in point defense of important targets. These
AAA divisions are operationally subordinate to the CCAF District Headquarters
in the area in which they are located.
23. In addition to their conventional AAA, the Chinese have a limited SAM
capability. We estimate that there are about 15 SAM battalions currently in
the field. There are probably up to 7 battalion sets in research and development
support or training status. About 10 or so new units are expected during 1968,
with perhaps as many as 35 to 40 additional units by the end of 1970.
24. The antireconnaissance mission continues to govern current Chinese SAM
deployment. We believe, however, that as available SAM units increase, China
will make a gradual transition to a strategic point defense intended to provide
thin protection for its advanced weapons facilities, expected strategic missile de-
ployment, and vital military industrial targets. We feel certain, though, that
a substantial percentage of the SAM force will continue to be kept relatively
mobile in an effort to interdict and deter aerial reconnaissance and the intrusions
of other aircraft. SAM battalions utilized in this role will also be able to supple-
ment strategic air defense requirements should the need arise.
C. Navy
25. The Chinese Communist Navy (CCN) now includes 35 submarines, 4
destroyers, 8 destroyer escorts, 50 to 60 hydrofoil motor torpedo boats, and 10
to 14 guided missile patrol boats. Personnel strength is estimated at about
142,000, including 17,000 in the naval air force. The estimated inventory of
naval units through mid-1970 is given in Table 3, page 23.
26. Over the past year or so, the most significant change in the Chinese naval
force was the addition of over 75 smaller combatants composed almost equally
of hydrofoil torpedo boats and fast patrol craft. These units provided a sub-
stantial augmentation of the coastal defense forces. One Kiangnan-class de-
stroyer escort, one R-class submarine, and a small number of guided missile
boats were also added.
27. Administrative and operational control over the naval forces is exercised
through the Commander in Chief of the Navy. Orders from the Minister of
National Defense are passed to the Commander in Chief of the CCN via the
General Staff for information and coordination. CCN Headquarters is located
in Peking. The CCN is comprised of three major fleets: North Sea Fleet with
headquarters in Tsingtao, East Sea Fleet with headquarters in Shanghai, and
South Sea Fleet with headquarters in Chan-Chiang (Fort Bayard).
28. The South Sea Fleet was strengthened in 1967 by the addition of two
Kiangnan-class destroyers escorts and several squadrons of the Hu-chwan hydro-
foil torpedo boats (PTH), continuing the trend begun in 1965. Compared with
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SECRET
TABLE 3
NAVAL COMBATANTS AND SUPPORT SHIPS
Principal combatants
Destroyer (DD)
4
4
Destroyer escort (DE)
8
9-10
Ballistic missile submarine (SSB)
1
1
Submarine (SS)
34 ?
38 b
Patrol boats
Patrol escort (PF)
16
16
Submarine chaser (PC)
23-24
26-28
Fast patrol boat (PTF)
130-150
180-200
Motor torpedo boat (PT)
150-170
140-160
Hydrofoil motor torpedo boat (PTH)
50-60
100-120
Motor gunboat (PGM)
90-110.
120-140
Guided-missile patrol boat (PTG/PTFG)
10-14
15-25
Minesweepers
Fleet (MSF)
20
28-34
Coastal (MSC & MSM)
35-45
40-50
Auxiliary (MSA)
20-30
30-40
Amphibious ships
Tank landing ship (LST)
20(8)
20
Medium landing ship (LSM)
13(11)
13
Landing ship infantry (LSIL)
16
16
Utility landing craft (LCU)
10
10
Landing craft mechanized (LCM/LCT)
220-240
240-260
Auxiliaries
Miscellaneous auxiliary (AG)
Light cargo ship (AKL)
35
10-20
35-40
15-25
Net laying ship (AN)
6
6
Oiler (AO/AOL)
15-25
20-30
Landing craft repair ship (ARL)
1
1
Small submarine tender (ASL)
1
1-2
Possible submarine rescue ship (ASR)
1
2-3
Ocean tug (ATA)
13-15
15-18
Service craft 330-360 350-380
Note: numbers in parentheses are additional units in merchant service.
" Including 21 W-class, 3 M/V-class, 4 S-1-class, and 6 R-class of which only 5
have been observed in operation.
" The additions are expected to be R-class units.
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the North and East Sea Fleets, the South Sea Fleet is still weak in patrol escorts,
however, and does not have a submarine force. Shipbuilding and shore installa-
tions in South China have also been significantly expanded and modernized,
most noteworthy being the construction of a drydock at Yulin on Hainan Island.
29. Most of the modern and sophisticated naval equipment continues to be
assigned to the North Sea Fleet, where the more advanced training and test
activity is carried out. All R-class submarines, the G-class submarine, and
most of the guided-missile boats are assigned to this fleet.
30. The CCN's troop lift capability with amphibious ships and landing craft
is about 2 plus infantry divisions (33,000 troops) or 1 infantry and 1 artillery
division (20,300 troops), but amphibious training appears to receive little
emphasis. In port-to-port operations, ships of the merchant marine fleet could
deliver about 4 infantry divisions (up to 49,000 troops). In addition, in opera-
tions where the use of smaller ships and craft is feasible, the Chinese could
employ literally thousands of junks for transporting troops and light equipment.
The amphibious force is aging and replacement will soon be required if the
present capability is to be maintained. Construction of landing craft (LCM)
is taking place as much for civilian use as in possible naval use.
31. The CCNAF is predominantly an air defense force. It includes both
fighter and jet light bomber regiments. All naval operational fighters are assigned
to air defense. Although administratively controlled by CCNAF headquarters
at Peking through the fleet headquarters, in their air defense role fighter units
are operationally controlled by the CCAF. The bomber regiments are used for
patrol and bombing activities in coastal areas and are controlled by the fleet
headquarters. A few of the IL-28 regiments have a limited torpedo attack
capability.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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