CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 26, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180 1-3 25X1
'fop Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
RETt~AN fifl A~~~6@~~: Y ~_- QpF ~ ~~?~'~i ~. # e - January 2 6 , 19 7 4
Approv~it~~b~1~~~~~00~/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A026006~86~0'F/-3~
v
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
January ,
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
6~dEST EUROPEAN COT~P~UTJIST PARTIES : Relations with
TZoscow will dominate con erence, which opens today
in Brussels. (Page 1)
NETHERLANDS: I
embargo not wh~~ ec ~.ve. age 3~
25X1
(Arab of l 25X1.
WEST GERPZANY - POLAND: Snag in bilateral talks.
(Page 6 )
AITSTRALIA-IRAN: Canberra offers trade agreement in
return for oil. (Page 7)
25X1
25X1
LATIrd AP7ERICA: Andean Common Market members concerned 25X1
over lack of foreign investment in their area. (Page 11)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 14)
Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A026000'~80001-3 25X1
 Approved For Rely
WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES: The underlying
problem of relations with Moscow wa_11 overshadow dis-
cussion of other issues at the conference of West
European communist parties, opening today i.n Brussels.
The Italian Cornmun:i.sts have done most of the
spadework for the meet.ng~, They hope the conference
will produce a coordinated strategy, independent of
the Soviets if necessary, on a broad range of West
European economic, social, and political issues.
The parties have he~Ld a series of preparatory meet-
ings over the last four months to discuss problems
such as communist relations with the EC, emigrant
labor, trade union strategy, and policy toward dis-
sident intellectuals.
The Soviets have kept an eye on all these meet-
ings and are particularly concerned over the Ital-
ians' intention to air fully the question of .Soviet
policy toward dissidents. After the last prepara-
tory session the Italian, French, Swiss, and Span-
ish-parties said they were "hostile" to Moscow`s
suppression of Solzhenitsyn's works, although they
did not agree with the author's criticism of the
Soviet system. Moscow reportedly is working through
the Austrian Communist Party to keep the Solzhenit-
syn issue off the Brussels agenda or, if unable to
prevent discussion of it, to work out a compromise
that would minimize adverse publicity.
One key to the outcome of the conference will
be the role adopted by the French Communist Party.
Although the French acted as a brake on the Italians
during the preparatory stage, they have recently
moved closer to the Italian position on European is-
sues and advocate, for example, the development of
means by which to exert concerted pressure on the
EC. This stand and the party's qualified criticism
of Moscow's handling of the Solzhenitsyn affair do
not, however, reflect serious differences with the
Sovietse The French party is probably aiming for a
middle ground, remaining generally loyal to Moscow
while trying to stay on good terms with its French
Jan 26, 1974
Centrnl Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180p01-3
 25X1
Approved For Rele~
Socialist allies who take a more positive approach
to the EC and sharply criticize Soviet policy to-
ward dissidents.
Differences among the Western parties and in-
direct pressure from Moscow will probably keep the
conference from producing the clear and independent
statement. on European issues desired by the Italians.
It is also unlikely that the conference .will come out
with a declaration affirming the pre-eminence of Moscow
porting Moscow against Peking.
Jan 26, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A0260001>~0001-3
 Approved For R~lease 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A026~00180001-3 25X1
NETHERLANDS: The Arab oil embargo against the
Netherlands does not annear to he wh ~] ]_v PffP C. t-7 iTP _
25X1_
Netherland's oi:1 situation not as severe as
the government had anticipated, and yesterday the
Hague announced that gaso 'ne rationing would be
terminated on February 4. 'Government conservation
measures, slower economic growth, and consumer re-
sistance to higher o:il prices in Western Europe are
curtailing demand. :[n fact, West European spot
prices for petroleum products have been falling in
recent weeks, despitE~ the continued Arab embargo
against the Netherlands and the continued produc-
Jan 26, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A02~000180001-3
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
 25X1
Approved For Rely
WEST GERMANY - POLAND: West German optimism
over the prospects of a quick resolution of bilateral
differences with Poland was dampened this week when
German-Polish credit. talks ended in a stalemate.
The Poles reportedly demanded that Bonn raise
its offer of long-term credits to "compensate the
victims of the concentration camps." The Germans,
however, balked at going higher than their original
offer of about $400 million. Preliminary press re-
ports of the negotiations, while somewhat pessimis-
tic, indicate both sides intend to meet again, but
no date or place was set. The two negotiating teams
are currently consulting with their governments to
map out new strategy.
In earlier talks the Poles expressed a desire
for a credit of approximately $1.2 billion, a pro-
posal that Bonn turned down. Warsaw has considerable
leverage, however, by virtue of the large number of
ethnic Germans within its borders, and Bonn's strong
desire to get Poland to let them.emigrate to the
Federal Republic.
son 26, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
Approved For ~2elease 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A026~000180001-3
 25X1
Approved For Rel
AUSTRALIA-IRAN: Following the lead of several
of the big industrial countries, Canberra has offered
Iran a long-term trade agreement with a view to securing
a source of heavy crude-oil imports, The agreement,
proposed earlier this week by an Australian trade
delegation in Iran, would provide for the exchange of
Australian meat and grain for Iranian oil over a 20-
year period.
Domestic oil production is sufficient to meet the
bulk of Australia's light fuel requirements, but vir-
tually all of its heavy crudes must be imparted. Iran
currently provides less than 5 percent of Australia's
oil imparts.
J`an 2 6 , 19 7 4 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
Approved For Relelase 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
 25X1
Approved For ReleakP ~nnsi~~ins ? cin_Rnp~aTnna~snn~s000180001-3
.LATIN AMERICA: In an effort to attract more
foreign investment, the representatives of the six
Andean Common Market members will meet next month
to review the Andean Investment Code. The Code sets
guidelines restricting the role of capital, particu-
larly in the manufacturing industries. Most member
governments have become increasingly disturbed by
the lack of new foreign investment since the institu-
tion of the Code in December 1970.
Although the Code is not fully in effect in
any country, demand for change is coming from a
number of quarters, most importantly Chile. In
contrast to the di.sr_ouragement given foreign investors
by the Allende regime, the junta is seeking to at-
tract foreign capital. Secondly, businessmen in
Venezuela--which entered the Andean Common Market
last December--would like to revise the Code to avoid
having to buy out foreign investors. Finally,
financial officials of the member countries--Bolivia
in particular--now recognize that the strict rules
about foreign owner:~hip are hindering the inflow of
badly needed foreign capital.
Any changes in the rules will take some time tQ
work out, however. Peru, which has rigid investment
rules of its own, is against any revisions in the
Code and will be difficult to deal with. Even those
who are anxious for change in the investment code
want to be sure that the changes will be carefully
thought out so they will remain viable for a long
time and create renter solidarit within the rou .
,Ian 26, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A026Q00180001-3
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
 Approved For R
Turke Prime Minister - designate nulent
Ecevit has received President Koruturk's "oral ap-
proval" of a cabinet list composed of members of
Ecevit's Republican People's Party and the National
Salvation Party. The defense, foreign, and finance
portfolios went to the left-of-center RPP; the Inte-
rior Ministry was allotted to the NSP, whose leader
b~cames deputy prime minister.
'These items were prepared by CIA without eonsuZtatzon
with the Departments of State and Defense.
Jan 26, 1974
Centrnl Intelligence Bulletin 14
Approved For~Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A02?000180001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
 25X1
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 :CIA-RDP79T00975A026000180001-3