RECOMMENDED CIA POSITION ON RECOMMENDATIONS 6.A. AND B. OF THE NSAM 156 COMMITTEE REPORT OF 11 JULY 1966 (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A002000050028-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: August 10, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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SUBJECT Recommended CIA Position on Recommendations
6.a. and b. of the NSAM 156 Committee Report
1. This memorandum recommends to you in paragraph 2 a CIA position
with regard to Recommendations 6.a. and 6.b. of the NSAM 156 Committee
Report of 11 July 1966. Recommendations 6.a. and 6.b. of this report
asks USIB to review:
a. The matter of lifting codeword controls over references
to a US operational satellite reconnaissance program in order to
permit explaining at the SECRET or TOP SECRET level to Government
personnel concerned with non-military satellite earth sensing
programs the reasons for certain limitations on the areas in which
they should concern themselves.
b. The matter of either selective removal of certain photo-
graphy from codeword control for classified use by selected NASA
and other cleared personnel or, alternatively, the clearance of
an increased number of personnel for codeword materials.
2. We recommend that CIA take the position that henceforth the
existence of US satellite reconnaissance programs be removed from the
.TALENT-KEYHOLE compartment and be classified TOP SECRET or. SECRET, the
choice to be made in the light of security and practical handling
considerations. However, information and photography derived from US
satellite reconnaissance programs should remain within the TALENT-
KEYHOLE compartment.
a. The purpose of security control over the existence of
satellite reconnaissance programs is no longer to prevent adverse
Soviet reaction, as was the case in the U-2 case in May 1960.
The purpose now is to prevent speculation and pressure for more
detailed information about these programs by uncleared govern-
mental and contractor officials who have built fairly good
surmises about satellite reconnaissance from numerous unauthorized
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published references in the press and elsewhere. TOP SECRET or
SECRET classification of the existence of satellite reconnaissance
programs will put this matter in the proper light: that such
programs are going on; that they are valuable to national security;
and that they are not to be discussed publicly or with uncleared
personnel.
b. Pressures for more information about these programs and the
need to maintain continued security over the fact of these programs
will increase in the future. Release to the public of NASA GEMINI
photography, continuing references in the press to satellite
reconnaissance, general knowledge of Soviet satellite reconnaissance
programs at the SECRET classification, and increasing numbers of
organizations and individuals becoming involved in all phases of
satellite reconnaissance all argue for acknowledgment of US satellite
reconnaissance on a broader basis than the TALENT-KEYHOLE compart-
ment permits. Acknowledgment at the TOP SECRET or SECRET level
will reduce pressure on the TALENT-KEYHOLE classification which
needs to be preserved to protect the information gained from these
programs.
c. There is documentary precedent for this position in the
TALENT Sanitization Manual (COMOR-D-7/44 - Jan 1966), approved by
COMOR and the USIB Security Committee and noted by USIB, which
concedes that the existence of a satellite reconnaissance capability
is less sensitive than its performance.
4. Certain primarily administ'a'4tive problems attend acceptance of
the recommended CIA position:
a. Not all persons cleared for TOP SECRET or SECRET have a
need-to-know in regard to satellite reconnaissance. A double
screening and controlled dissemination will. be required to prevent
inadvertent disclosures.
b. Wider knowledge of the programs will not stem further
questions about the degree of success achieved or the technology
of the systems used. These details will need to be kept in the
TALENT-KEYHOLE compartment and an understanding of that need may
have to be part of the need-to-know clearance.
c. If the TOP SECRET classification is selected for the
existence of these programs, administrative and security document
handling problems will increase. Accounting procedures for TOP
SECRET documents, particularly in the military, are more compli- 25X1A
cated than those for documents in the TALENT-KEYHOLE 0 system.
This will raise pressures for further decontrol to the SECRET level.
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5. On balance, we believe the advantages of decontrol of the
existence of satellite to TOP SECRET or SECRET outweigh the problems
noted above. An evident capability can be acknowledged within proper
controls, and uninformed speculation and questioning and pressure
on the information gained can be reduced, at least within the Government.
25X1A
Chi
DDI/Collection Guidance Staff
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