COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000600020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Communist Aid to the Less Developed
Countries of the Free World, 1976
Secret
Septembor 1977
Copy N2
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 015319
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
Sec. 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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Communist Aid to the Less Developed
Countries of the Free World, 1976
September 1977
Key Judgments
Soviet economic and military aid, by far the largest Communist
program in the Third World, continued to reflect Moscow's internation-
al political interests in 1976, while also enhancing its commercial
position. The Soviet venture into Africa, Moscow's readiness to provide
sophisticated weapons systems on favorable terms to Peru, and
accelerated military and economic aid to Iraq dramatized again
Moscow's use of aid in pursuing its foreign policy objectives in the Third
World. As in most recent years, military sales were the USSR's most
powerful instrument. The value of Soviet military commitments was
almost triple economic pledges.
The Soviet political decision to establish a strong presence in Africa
was supported by large military assistance programs in Angola and
Mozambique; arms and technical assistance (including Cuban techni-
cians) to national liberation movements in southern Africa; and
continued military aid to Uganda and Somalia. Moscow also provided
most of these countries with small amounts of economic aid. Other
significant, politically motivated developments include:
? An expanded Soviet role in Lima's military establishment as a
result of Moscow's first sale to Peru's air force, which made
Moscow Peru's principal arms supplier.
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? Unprecedented military support to Iraq?possibly to guarantee a
Soviet presence in the Near East?that made Iraq Moscow's
largest current Middle Eastern arms client. Iraq also received a
new commitment of economic aid.
? Sharply reduced arms shipments to Syria in the second half of
1976 and failure to sign a new Soviet-Syrian military
agreement for the first year since 1969, because of Soviet
displeasure over Syria's foreign policy.
? A continuing embargo on arms to Egypt, after a cutoff in mid-
1975.
At the same time, the USSR used military and economic programs
to expand commercial interests in the Third World. Hoping to share
more heavily in the new oil wealth and to reduce unprecedented global
hard-currency deficits, Moscow sought cash sales and often exacted
harder terms than before for economic aid as well as military sales. The
large hard-currency earnings and additional assured supplies of certain
strategic raw materials have put Moscow actively into the arms
merchant class.
Moscow parlayed its arms deals into a $2.5 billion business in 1976.
Fast delivery, a willingness to sell sophisticated weapons systems to
almost any LDC, and somewhat smaller price tags than for comparable
Western equipment earned Moscow as much as $1.5 billion in hard
currency or equivalent goods on its 1976 deliveries. These derived
mostly from massive deliveries to Libya, Iraq, and Algeria, all believed
to be cash customers. An estimated 70 percent of all new orders last
year will probably be paid in hard currency or its equivalent.
As in every year since 1970, arms sales kept Moscow's trade with
LDCs out of the red in 1976 as well as providing it with a possible $1.5
billion of hard currency. Such sales, which have accounted for about a
half of Moscow's total exports to LDCs in some recent years, underpin
Soviet trade surpluses with the Third World. Preliminary estimates for
1976 indicate that had it not been for arms exports, the Soviet trade
surplus of $1.2 billion would have been a deficit.
In contrast with arms sales, Soviet economic aid has become a static
program, focused on a handful of recipients. No major new initiatives
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emerged in 1976, and the $900 million aid package contained no
surprises. A few large credits went to Moscow's traditional clients, and
once again the program was commercially slanted. Both the USSR and
Eastern Europe provided most of their aid in the form of trade credits,
which have shorter repayment periods and carry higher interest rates
than traditionally allowed under development agreements. Some
agreements?especially those with Latin American countries?were
associated with formal trade accords and were open ended.
Payments agreements increasingly specified hard-currency settle-
ments, although economic aid still is usually repaid with raw materials
or from the output of projects built under the aid program. Iran, Iraq,
and Syria, for example, probably will provide oil to discharge a pari of
their obligations under new Soviet and East European agreements, and
credits to Morocco and Tunisia appear designed to obtain access to
phosphates.
Economic aid continued to dominate East European and Chinese
programs, although Chinese military assistance peaked in 1976,
following record commitments to Pakistan, Zaire, and Egypt.
At the end of 1976, LDCs had taken delivery of about $30 billion of
the $46 billion in Communist economic aid and military commitments
made them over the past two decades. The delivery figure is heavily
weighted by the military, for which deliveries have been far larger and
more rapid than for economic aid. Nonetheless, large repayments of
principal and interest continue to erode the flows; by the end of 1976
LDCs had repaid about $5.8 billion of their principal debt. Repayments
for economic aid in 1976 are estimated at about half of the $955 million
in total Communist disbursements. In the case of Soviet economic aid, a
net of only about $50 million remained after repayments, and Moscow's
former major clients?Egypt and India?sustained negative flows.
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CONTENTS
Page
Key Judgments
Preface vii
The Military Program 1
A Banner Year 1
Major Clients
2
Technical Services
3
LDC Trainees in Communist Countries
4
Economic Aid
5
The Soviet Program: Continuing Large Agreements With
Traditional Clients
5
Eastern Europe's Expanding Business Interests
6
Personnel: Communist Technicians
7
Technical Training
8
Academic Training
8
APPENDIXES
Page
A. Country Sections
B. Statistical Tables
C. Revised Prices of Military Equipment Exported to LDCs
TABLES
11
51
69
Page
L Communist Military Relations with LDCs
51
2. Communist Military Relations with LDCs, 1955-76
52
3. Communist Military Technicians in LDCs
54
4. Military Personnel From LDCs Departing for Training in
Communist Countries
56
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Page
5. Communist Economic Aid Extended to LDCs, 1976 57
6. Communist Economic Aid to LDCs 59
7. Communist Economic Credits and Grants to LDCs, Extended and
Drawn, 1954-76 60
8. Communist Economic Technicians in LDCs, 1976 62
9. Technical Trainees From LDCs Departing for Training in
Communist Countries 64
10. Academic Students From LDCs Trained in Communist Countries 66
VI
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PREFACE
The term Communist countries refers to the USSR, the People's
Republic of China, and the following countries of Eastern Europe:
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and
Romania. Included in this edition also are data on Cuban, North
Korean, and Yugoslav aid to and personnel present in LDCs.
The term less developed countries of the Free World includes the
following: (1) all countries of Africa except the Republic of South
Africa; (2) all countries of East Asia except Hong Kong and Japan;
(3) Malta, Portugal, and Spain in Europe; (4) all countries in Latin
America except Cuba; and (5) all countries in the Middle East and
South Asia, except Israel. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, which became
Communist countries in 1975, are reported on for prior years for
historical reasons.
The term extension refers to a commitment to provide goods and
services either on deferred payment terms or as grants. Assistance is
considered to have been extended when accords are initialed and
constitute a formal declaration of intent. The term drawings refers to
the delivery of goods or the use of services.
VII
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Communist Aid to the Less Developed
Countries of the Free World, 1976
The Military Program
A Banner Year
Despite the recent cooling of Soviet relations with a number of favored
clients, Communist military supplies to the Third World rose to a near
peacetime record in 1976. Massive arms agreements reported with Iraq, huge
new sales to Iran, and major new deliveries to Iraq and Libya pushed
Communist military activities to heights reached only in 1973-74 when the
USSR replenished client inventories in the Middle East during and after the
October war.
Moscow accounted for about 90 percent of the $2.6 billion of new accords
and of the $2.5 billion in deliveries (see tables 1 and 2). China's $95 million in
agreements was almost 20 percent above any previous year, with four new
African clients (Botswana, Ethiopia, the Central African Empire, and
Rwanda) added to the roster. East European military contracts fell to $80
million, their lowest level since 1970.
Arms deliveries in 1976 surged, as Moscow rushed to fill orders that have
accumulated as a result of heavy commitments that began in 1973. The near
record was somewhat below expectations, however, because of Moscow's
sharply reduced deliveries to Syria in the last six months of 1976.
Problems in Egypt and a faltering relationship with Syria did not alter
Moscow's preoccupation with the Middle East/North Africa. Although this
area still claims the largest share of total Communist arms supplies, the
distribution is changing, and the more radical Arab states have emerged as
major recipients. This shift has advantages to Moscow in that Iraq, Libya, and
Algeria are cash customers, even though they may not serve the same Soviet
interests as Egypt and Syria had before. Moscow also built a military presence
in sub-Saharan Africa by consolidating its position in Angola and giving
increased support to insurgent groups in southern Africa.
The dollar values cited for military goods throughout the paper represent
an update and revision of data previously used for Soviet arms exports and
agreements in 1972-75 (see appendix C). Recent information on Soviet prices
for major items of equipment, and the translation of ruble prices into current
dollars, raised the value of Soviet agreements and deliveries during the four
years by about 45 percent on the average. Two-thirds of the increase was due
to estimates of higher Soviet prices.
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Major Clients
The most significant development in Moscow's military diplomacy with
LDCs in 1976 was the cooling of the Soviet-Syrian relationship. The Soviets
reduced the flow of arms in second half 1976 and failed to sign a new arms
accord for the first year since 1969, showing displeasure over Syria's Lebanon
adventure, its closer ties to Egypt, and its acquiescence to a US role in Middle
25X1 B East peace negotiations. Although the arms shipped in 1976
surpassed 1975 deliveries, second half deliveries fell
Communist relations with other major Arab clients?except Egypt-
25X1 B continued apace. An estimated Soviet agreement in principle with
Iraq had previously been equaled only by a similar agreement with Libya in
1974. The new accord, together with deliveries
2
propelled Baghdad into first lace among current Soviet arms recipients. East
5X1 B European countries sold
worth of arms to Iraq. Aircraft to
support Baghdad's modernization plans bulked most heavily in Soviet-East
European shipments and included MIG-23s, SU-20s, and advanced MIG-21
Ls.
Soviet deliveries to Algeria and Libya also set records. Libyan receipts of
sophisticated land armaments, jet fighters, and bombers exceeded half a
billion dollars, bringing total deliveries under the 1974 agreement to more
25X1 B than Algeria's receipts were part of a
25X1 B or er placed in 1975 for equipment to improve its defense
capabilities in the Western Sahara.
Libya's military establishment can neither absorb nor maintain the vast
quantities of arms that have deluged its inventories over the past two years.
Despite extensive Soviet training of Libyan nationals-1,100 Libyans in the
USSR and many more in Libya?Tripoli still relies heavily on foreign
technicians. In 1976, 850 Communist advisers were in residence to support
25X1 B Libya's Communist-supplied inventory. Tripoli continues to
stockpile arms, possibly for use by other states as well as for its own defense.
In 1976, Moscow also made large sales to Iran, Peru, and India. New Delhi
25X1 B is a customer and Tehran's total purchases are over
mark. The new orders included:
25X1 B ? by Iran for ground forces equipment, Moscow's
second largest agreement in 1976 and its largest ever with Tehran.
25X1 B ? sale to Peru marks the first placement of Soviet
jet fighters in the Western Hemisphere (outside of Cuba). The sale
establishes Moscow as Lima's principal arms supplier.
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25X1B
25X1B
25X1B
25X1B
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25X1B ? Indian order for MIG-21bis jet fighters to compensate
for the slow production of MIG-21s in India under Soviet license.
Meanwhile, deliveries to India maintained the usual levels of recent
years and included MIG-21bis fighters, Osa-II-class guided-missile
boats, and surface-to-air missiles.
Buoyed by its success in establishing a major presence in southern Africa
in 1975, Moscow moved rapidly to sign new agreements with clients in the
region. In contrast to commercially oriented policies elsewhere, favorable
financing terms were undoubtedly offered new clients in sub-Saharan Africa.
The USSR's relationship with Angola was enhanced by a Twenty-Year
Friendship Agreement, as well as commitments to provide 25X1B
military equipment to upgrade Luanda's military establishment. The pledge
was Moscow's largest ever with a sub-Saharan country. Deliveries to Angola?
also a record for the sub-Sahara?reached under 25X1B
commitments made before and after independence and introduced new
weapons systems including jet fighters, modern tanks, and guided antiaircraft
missiles. Moscow also increased shipments of military equipment through
established African governments to support insurgent groups in southern
Africa. Mozambique, which had received Soviet 25X1B
hardware almost immediately after independence in mid-1975, signed a new
agreement in 1976. In a surprise move, Moscow offered Ethiopia large credits
for arms, while assuring Somalia?a rival of Ethiopia?of continuing heavy
support.
Technical Services
In addition to the large new deliveries of military equipment in 1976,
some 21,700 Communist personnel were stationed abroad to assemble and
maintain equipment and train local units in the operation and maintenance of
the new weapons (see table 3). Soviet and East European technicians?
traditionally accounting for about 90 percent of the total?were outnumbered
by almost 12,000 Cubans, all in Africa and the Middle East. Their presence
may also support and fuel local insurgencies against established white
governments. Cubans were most heavily concentrated in Angola, where an
estimated 10,000 were assigned at all levels of the military. An additional 575
were in other former Portuguese colonies and 915 in Somalia, Guinea, and
South Yemen, where the shortage of skills has handicapped the absorption into
inventories of recent large Soviet hardware deliveries. According to rumors,
Libya also has requested a large contingent of Cubans to help alleviate its
military manpower shortage.
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Moscow's use of Cuban troops as an adjunct to its military supply program
first received widespread attention during the Angolan conflict in 1975, when
up to 16,000 Cuban troops were deployed to forces of the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in connection with an airlift of Soviet
military equipment. Cuban personnel trained Angolans in the operation and
maintenance of their new Soviet inventory, and Cuban combat support was
credited with turning the tide in favor of Soviet-supplied forces.
Although the conditions of Cuban military technical assistance are not
known, the USSR has probably shouldered at least part of the financial
burden. This may have involved only transport costs, but it could have
included subsistence and salaries as well. In any case, there were savings to the
LDCs because Cubans come at possibly less than a third of the price of Soviet
or East European technicians. We estimate that salaries for Soviet and East
European personnel run as high as $15,000 to $20,000 a year each, and are
paid for on a current basis. If other allowances and costs are added, this figure
might be doubled. The use of Cubans probably also was calculated to have had
fewer political and social repercussions.
The number of Soviet and East European military advisers in LDCs
increased 10 percent in 1976, while the Chinese presence declined by more
than 30 percent. The largest increases were in Angola, Libya, Uganda, and
Iraq. Soviet military technical programs in Egypt and Syria were sharply
curtailed, as neither renewed service contracts that expired.
LDC Trainees in Communist Countries
Third World personnel departing for training in the USSR also are a
reflection of Moscow's large new arms deals that require more sophisticated
technical training than can be given in less developed countries. Of the 2,500
personnel that went for advanced training at Soviet installations in 1976, about
three-fourths were from Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Peru, Syria, and
Tanzania?all large clients with recent orders or deliveries of modern
weaponry (see table 4). Except for the Afghans, most were trained to operate
and maintain aircraft and air defense systems which their countries had
purchased under recent supply contracts.
We do not have information on financial arrangements for these studies.
flowever, civil air personnel under long-term programs in similar specialties
are charged a minimum of $580 a month for studies in electronics and $1,625
for aircraft mechanics. Rates for military contracts?usually short term?
might be less. Living expenses of about $250 per month and transportation
costs must also be added. By the end of 1976 some 47,000 Third World
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military personnel had trained in Communist countries, more than four-fifths
in the USSR.
Economic Aid
Communist aid pledges were apparently more conservative in 1976 than
in most recent years, although our estimates probably understate such
commitments because values of some agreements are not known. At the end of
1976, the USSR was negotiating agreements with Latin American countries
and Indonesia that could easily provide $550 million in additional credits.
The $1.5 billion actually pledged was half a billion dollars below the
annual average of commitments in the five preceding years (see tables 5, 6,
and 7). While Soviet aid commitments, which accounted for 60 percent of the
total, maintained the 1971-75 average, Eastern Europe's commitments fell
almost 25 percent. Chinese aid dropped even more precipitously.
Peking's $100 million program was less than a fourth of the previous five-
year annual average. Nonetheless, Chinese aid continued as the most
concessionary program. More than half of Peking's aid was given as outright
grants for cost overruns on the Tan-Zam railroad, while commodities and cash
outlays (mostly to African countries), absorbed another fourth.
Communist aid deliveries of more than $950 million recovered somewhat
from the 1975 slump, although Soviet shipments dropped to only about $425
million.
The Soviet Program: Continuing Large Agreements With
Traditional Clients
Arab countries remained the largest recipients of Soviet aid, taking 95
percent of Moscow's new extensions. Large commitments to these countries
confirmed Moscow's policy of selectively providing assistance to countries
with which the USSR hopes to expand or consolidate political, economic, or
commercial ties. Repeating the pattern of 1975, large agreements with three
countries (Syria, Algeria, and Iraq) absorbed the lion's share of new pledges.
While all of these agreements are expected to yield economic benefits to
Moscow, the three countries also have longstanding political ties with the
USSR, which Moscow is anxious to maintain. Moscow's $860 million in aid to
Arab states was dwarfed by the $1.2 billion extended by OPEC nations. Soviet
aid, mostly designated for continuing development programs, included:
? A $290 million credit to Algeria for an aluminum plant.
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? An estimated $300 million to Syria for continuing oil, irrigation, and
power development.
? At least $150 million in new assistance to Iraq for continuing projects,
complemented by $1 billion of commercial contracts for four major
power and irrigation projects.
? Smaller agreements with Jordan, Tunisia, and South Yemen, which
totaled about $100 million, largely for water and power
development.
Assistance to major clients again emphasized development of heavy
industrial and power facilities, sectors in which Moscow has some advantage.
Over the course of its 23-year aid program the USSR has put about three-
fourths of its total aid into these development activities
Moscow's aid to sub-Saharan Africa generally responded to the needs of
former Portuguese colonies for technical assistance and infrastructure
development. Mozambique received pledges of aid for irrigation, mining,
transportation, port management, the construction industry, and public health.
Agreements with Angola and Guinea-Bissau provided similar assistance.
Eastern Europe's Expanding Business Interests
Eastern Europe's $500 million program, which was spread somewhat
more widely than the USSR's, was largely to support East European efforts to
expand machinery and equipment sales in the Third World. Romania again
set the pace by allocating $200 million in 10-year credits for construction of an
oil refinery in Turkey. Czechoslovakia extended a $100 million credit to Brazil
for equipment purchases. Other East European aid was distributed among 10
countries spread throughout the Third World.
Meanwhile, the USSR and Eastern Europe, anxious to expand their
sources of foreign exchange financing, continued to try to attract funds
directly from oil producers. These efforts were backed by vigorous
competition for commercial contract awards for heavy industrial projects,
particularly in the Gulf Emirates. Romania continued to negotiate for Kuwaiti
financing for 49 percent of a $1 billion petrochemical complex in Romania
and a $100 million cash loan, probably on near-commercial terms. Kuwait
may have agreed to place $30 million in Soviet banks during February
discussions on Kuwaiti participation in domestic Soviet projects and the use of
Soviet contractors in Kuwaiti-financed Third World projects.
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Personnel: Communist Technicians
The Communist technical presence in the Third World soared from less
than 60,000 in 1975 to almost 71,000 in 1976, despite a 25-percent decline in
the number of Chinese personnel in Africa after the completion of the Tan-
Zam railroad (see table 8). The total was swelled by an inflow of 4,700 Cubans,
mostly to Africa, but more significantly by a doubling of the number of East
European technicians. All in all, 26,000 East Europeans worked in LI)Cs,
including some 11,600 working in Libya under commercial contracts.
East European personnel were concentrated in the Middle Eastern and
North African oil and phosphate producing states that can afford to pay cash
or its equivalent. The estimated 21,000 East European personnel working in
these countries resulted in an estimated $200 million flow (at an average salary
rate of $15,000) of hard currency or equivalent goods to Eastern Europe in
1976.
Almost half of the Soviet technicians were concentrated in Algeria, Iran,
Iraq, and Syria where major new construction projects are starting.
Afghanistan and India employed another 2,350. Rekindled Soviet interest in
sub-Saharan Africa brought 250 economic technicians to Angola, Guinea-
Bissau, and Mozambique for an overall increase of 650 in the area. Most of the
new personnel were employed in administration, public health, and training
positions. The USSR is providing 10-year credits for technical services to
Angola, although Moscow usually insists on cash for services not associated
with aid projects.
Moscow continued to provide services at moderate cost. Annual salaries
reported for project personnel ranged between $6,300 for skilled workers and
$11,000 for chief engineers. Salaries for personnel dispatched under short-
term contracts appear to be higher?up to $1,800 a month?and are payable
in cash. Charges do not take account of local costs such as housing, insurance,
or transportation which could double the cost of these services to LDCs.
Although salaries connected with project assistance usually are repaid over 10
to 12 years, costs for contract employees normally are on a current basis.
We cannot estimate Soviet earnings from technical services, because
information on the distribution of personnel between project aid and
commercial contracts is not available. We believe, however, that cash earnings
in 1976 could have run as high as $75 million to $100 million.
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Technical Training
On-site instruction continued to spearhead Soviet project personnel
training in 1976. According to Moscow, its domestic training activity in Third
World countries had yielded 300,000 skilled workers and 150,000 managerial,
administrative, and research personnel for Soviet-built projects by the end of
1976. Major Soviet industrial development contracts now call for construction
of permanent associated training facilities, which guarantee a continuing
supply of skilled personnel for a given project at lower costs than overseas
training. These centers are usually staffed with Soviet instructors for five or six
years, until teaching positions can be filled with Soviet-trained local
professionals.
Most of the 4,250 trainees who went to the USSR in 1976 were from
Middle Eastern and South Asian countries that have major plants scheduled to
begin operations before the required number of specialists can be trained
domestically (see table 9).
Although the USSR does not charge tuition for training, LDCs must pay
about $250 a month per person for room and board, plus a monthly allowance
and all transportation costs. On an annual basis, these charges are more than
double the average cost (about $1,000 per student place) that LDCs pay the
USSR to install local training facilities.
Academic Training
In 1976 the USSR and East European countries expanded their already
substantial academic training effort for nationals of the Third World. The
7,900 new enrollees increased the Third World student population in
Communist countries to a record 36,450 (see table 10). This represents a one-
third increase in LDC student places in USSR academic institutions and a
doubling of East European Third World student capacity in the past three
years. Scholarship awards to Africans accounted for half of the total program,
down from 60 percent in earlier years. The 20-year-old academic program
remained the most concessionary Communist aid effort in 1976. Soviet
scholarships provide all-expense training, including room, board, living
expenses, and transportation. In 1976 the program contributed the equivalent
of $145 million of grant assistance, according to a Soviet cost formula of
$6,500 per student annually. The cost per student in East European countries
ranges from $4,000 to $6,000 annually; many of the students, however, have
traveled under private auspices or have been financed by their home
governments.
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By the end of the year, an estimated 48,500 students had returned from
Soviet and East European training. Their reception has been mixed. In many
countries, Communist diploma holders are isolated by deeply entrenched
Western influences, especially since most LDCs accept Western patterns of
education and professional success as ideals. Nevertheless, most Communist-
trained students, with the exception of doctors, appear to be trained
adequately for the jobs they perform and are moving into responsible
positions, especially in countries with endemic skilled manpower shortages. In
Rwanda, Soviet university graduates provide bureaucrats for the economic
ministries. Even in anti-Communist states such as Bahrain and Oman, Soviet-
trained personnel have reached ministerial-level positions. We believe this
trend will accelerate as broadening development efforts in the Third World
require ever larger numbers of skilled personnel.
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APPENDIX A
Country Sections
AFRICA
SUMMARY
Moscow's heavy military support to the victorious MPLA in Angola,
which captured headlines in 1975, and Soviet help to established governments
and insurgent groups throughout sub-Saharan Africa confirmed Moscow's new
commitment to the region.
Hoping to capitalize on success in Angola and to expand influence in
southern Africa, the Soviets boosted military deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa
in 1976 by more than $50 million over the 1975 record. The USSR shipped
25X1B equipment to Angola alone to replace wartime losses and to
consolidate the new government's position against scattered rebel forces.
In its dealings with traditional client states, Moscow concentrated on
maintaining access to strategic facilities (ports in Somalia and Guinea and
aircraft landing rights in Congo and Mali) and building the momentum of
insurgent group activities in southern Africa. Buoyed by the victory in Angola,
black nationalist forces operating against Rhodesia and Namibia hardened
their stance against near-term peaceful settlement, and threats of open
hostilities over control of the French Territory of Afars and Issas escalated as
the date of French withdrawal drew nearer. Destabilizing effects of the Soviet
arms trade also were evident in heightened tensions between Sudan and Libya
and between Somalia and Ethiopia. Meanwhile, Western-oriented African
governments such as Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Senegal expressed alarm about
the growth of Soviet influence on the continent. Some Western-oriented states,
however, moved to upgrade ties with Communist states.
An influx of Communist personnel into former Portuguese colonies was
spearheaded by 500 East European administrative and service personnel who
replaced fleeing Western experts. Cubans continued to move into southern
Africa in increasing numbers to train guerrillas and local militia personnel and
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in some cases to assist in economic development. China was less active in the
political arena than in the past several years, although it signed its first
economic agreements with two small African nations (Botswana and the
Comoro Islands) and continued to provide training and support to insurgent
groups. Peking maintained its low-key economic programs in Africa and in
1976 made new commitments of about $80 million, all to old recipients.
Moscow's responsiveness to economic and military needs in Arab Africa
was reaffirmed in 1976 by arms deliveries to Algeria and
Libya. For the second consecutive year, i ya? oscow's largest cash
customer?received more Soviet arms than any other Third World client.
Shipments to Algeria stirred fears in the Maghreb of a possible Algerian attack
on Moroccan and Mauritanian troops in western Sahara. The USSR also made
a $290 million commitment to Algiers for an aluminum plant?a record for
that country?which together with $55 million to Tunisia absorbed more than
90 percent of Moscow's 1976 African economic commitments.
Most of the rest of Soviet economic aid went to Mozambique, Angola, and
Guinea-Bissau, where Moscow sought to consolidate its presence. Despite
somewhat greater interest in economic assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, the
$60 million pledge to Somalia in 1975 was Moscow's largest to the area since
1969, and its tropical African aid program still accounts for less than 10
25X1B percent of the global Soviet commitment.
ALGERIA
Soviet-Algerian relations were strengthened in 1976 by Moscow's support
for Algeria's position on western Sahara and by Algerian cooperation in
making the Algiers airport available during the Angola crisis. Nonetheless,
reports indicate that the USSR is demanding cash for Algeria's arms purchases,
as it has recently from other prized customers. Libya is reported to have
transferred several hundred million dollars of cash late in 1975 or early 1976
to Algiers to pay for Soviet arms.
Economic Relations
Although Algeria's commercial and economic ties remained more closely
linked to the West, in April, Algiers accepted a record-size credit from
Moscow, its first major new Soviet assistance since 1971. The $290 million in
10-year, 4-percent credits was allocated for an aluminum plant at M'Sila, on
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which design work had already begun at the end of the year. The 140,000-ton
plant will also include a 600-MW power plant, training facilities, and possibly
a rail line from the port of Bejaia to the construction site. Negotiations began
almost immediately on plans to double the plant's capacity when the first
stage is completed in 1982.
An Algerian-Soviet joint commission, which met in January, also
suggested consideration of Soviet assistance for a heavy machinery and
electrical complex, a dam, a steel mill in western Algeria, and a railroad. Late
in the year Moscow announced that it was studying possible construction of a
number of oil refineries.
Until now, Moscow's most important contribution to Algeria's economic
development has been $300 million in credits for a 2 million-ton steel mill at
Annaba. The 1978 target for capacity operations at the plant may not be met,
because work on a blast furnace and coke batteries fell slightly behind
schedule in 1976.
Although East European countries made no new economic aid
commitments to Algeria in 1976, activities under the $500 million worth of
development assistance pledged Algeria in the past six years accelerated.
? East Germany began surveys for a foundry complex to be built at
Tiaret with $90 million in East German credits.
? East Germany and Czechoslovakia inaugurated construction of a joint
$67 million pump plant at Medea.
? Bulgaria will expand the 115,000 hectares of land already reclaimed by
its contractors with waters from a major dam it is building at Mitidja.
? Hungary completed a technical school in Oran, and Poland agreed to
establish 10 state farms.
? Romania began delivery of petroleum rigs and designed a university
center in Constantine.
China, with the smallest Communist program in Algeria, agreed to
construct a rice-processing plant and several small agricultural projects.
Since the departure of the French in the 1960s, Algeria has relied heavily
on Communist technicians not only for project assistance but also in
administrative and professional roles. In 1976 the number of East European
technicians rose above 4,100, while the number of Soviet technicians remained
at 2,500.
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Military Relations
The USSR moved rapidly to fill contracts under its 25X1B
1975 military commitment. Deliveries included: 25X1B
? Moscow's first aircraft deliveries to Algeria since 1974?jet fighters,
which included the advanced L version export model.
? Algeria's first Osa-II missile attack boat.
? A Polnocny-class medium landing ship.
Deliveries may also have included SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, believed to
25X1B have been part of the deal.
The number of Soviet military technicians in Algeria (now estimated at
650) will rise sharply with the expanding high-technology inventory, and more
Algerians will go to the USSR for training.
Major Military Aid Target
To take advantage of the MPLA victory and Moscow's enhanced image
among radical black African states, the USSR allocated the largest share of its
black African military aid to Angola in 1976. New contracts with Luanda
25X1B surpassed
1975 crisis levels. Moscow replenished stocks depleted during the lighting and
stepped up deliveries of new weapons systems including jet fighters, modern
tanks, and SA-7 missiles under 1975 agreement.
Small Soviet economic aid allocations to Angola were outshone by East
Germany's $10 million donation of relief assistance. Moscow contributed half
a million dollars of medical supplies and equipment and agreed to 10-year
credits for training centers, geological exploration, and agricultural develop-
ment, the total value of which is not expected to exceed $10 million. Bulgaria
and Romania are studying agricultural and industrial projects, for which they
may extend credits.
GHANA
Soviet-Ghanaian relations moved somewhat closer in 1976 with (1) the
first exchange of military attaches in more than a decade, (2) resumption of
several Nkrumah-era Soviet aid projects, and (3) agreement on settling
Ghana's outstanding debt to the USSR.
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Some Improvement in Military Relations
Faced with problems in maintaining the effectiveness of its military and
under pressure to update inventories, Ghana sent an arms-purchasing mission
to Moscow to discuss possible acquisition of tanks, artillery, surface-to-air
missiles, engineering equipment, and training, but no contracts were
concluded. Delegation stopovers in Eastern Europe resulted in a small Czech
arms sale and Bulgarian agreement to provide small arms and
ammunition
Economic Relations
In October, Ghana and the USSR agreed to abandon the bilateral clearing
arrangements established in 1961 in favor of hard-currency payments. The
USSR agreed to resume activity at a concrete panel plant, a gold refinery, and
a reactor for which Soviet equipment was provided before 1966. Moscow may
now agree to reinstate an estimated $60 million in expired credits for new
projects.
China's small, but effective, agricultural program is dominated by the $13
million Afife irrigation project, which is being built under $42 million in
reactivated credits. China also signed a commercial agreement with a private
Ghanaian firm to construct a textile plant.
Hungary, having completed a three-year study of Ghana's bauxite
reserves, is studying participation in aluminum industry development.
Romania agreed to study possible assistance for a brick and tile plant, a
cement factory, road construction, and urban development, possibly under an
old $8 million credit.
GUINEA
Soviet interest continues high in Guinea. Conakry continued to give
Moscow access to its airfields, oil storage, and naval facilities to support the
Soviets' growing military operation in southern Africa, in return for Soviet
military deliveries, which totaled last year.
Cuba maintained the largest foreign military presence in Guinea (over
300, compared with a total of 75 Soviets and East Europeans). Most of the
Cubans worked on military construction, although about 75 were assigned to
the national militia, as presidential bodyguards, and to Guinea's air force.
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Economic
Friction over the price Moscow pays Guinea for bauxite persisted
throughout the year, and after preliminary agreement in August, negotiations
were resumed in December. Moscow removed a major source of dissension,
however, by agreeing to pay the Guinean export tax on Kindia bauxite?
almost $12 million due on past imports. The outstanding total will be repaid
with Soviet equipment, but Guinea may credit future tax payments toward
reducing its debts to the USSR. Some 90 percent of Kindia's annual production
of 2.5 million tons goes to the USSR, half as repayments on a $92 million
construction loan for the Kindia facility. Meanwhile the USSR continues a
small program of technical assistance for agriculture, port development, and
geological surveys.
Although work on Chinese projects was not disrupted, Peking's political
relations with Guinea have not recovered from the falling-out over support of
the Soviet role in Angola. Two fishing trawlers were delivered in July under a
1972 Chinese credit. Technical assistance continued for agriculture, port
development, and a match factory built with Chinese assistance.
Guinea maintained a low profile in its relations with East European
countries. Trade with these countries continued the precipitous decline that
began in 1974 and was aggravated by Conakry's cancellation of bilateral
clearing agreements with them in 1975. Romania agreed to study gold,
uranium, and iron ore reserves in Guinea. It did not, however, agree to finance
3,300 tractors (valued at $20 million) under an $80 million 1974 credit, nor to
provide assistance for a petroleum refinery that Bucharest considered to be of
doubtful viability.
LIBYA
Libyan President Qadhaf i's December visit to Moscow promoted a
further warming of the Soviet-Libyan relationship. While Moscow views the
Libyan connection as a means of putting pressure on Egypt, it also values
Libya as an important cash customer. Discussion of further Soviet arms
deliveries topped the agenda at the December meeting, and Libya's
continuing requirements for technical assistance and training received priority
treatment. East European contractors, with almost 12,000 personnel in the
country, accelerated development activity in 1976.
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A Major Soviet Arms Client
With arms deliveries in 1976, Moscow worked off 25X1B
25X1 B about half of its 1974 agreement with Libya. Receipts in 1976
included MIG-23 fighters, medium bombers, surface-to-air and SCUD
missile systems, naval craft, and an array of modern ground equipment. In
November, Tripoli joined the elite group of Soviet military clients (Iraq,
Somalia, Algeria, Cuba, and India) to receive the Osa-II-class guided-missile
patrol boat. East European deliveries accounted for an additional 25X1 B
of equipment.
Qadhafi has made the Libyan armed forces the most heavily equipped in
North Africa. Although Libya has already received more arms than its
military can absorb, substantial amounts remain to be delivered under the
1974 agreement. The rapid growth in Libya's arms inventory has not been
matched by an equivalent advance in the number or capability of its
personnel. The undermanned, poorly trained Libyan military remains
ineffective as a combat force and is unable to maintain its modern weaponry.
Libyan purchases have given Moscow a windfall?cash payments at full list
price. Moreover, at least another $15 million accrues to Moscow annually for
the services of its 800 technicians stationed in Libya. About 200 Libyans also
are training in the USSR.
Economic Relations on the Upswing
During President Qadhafi's Moscow trip, the USSR agreed to construct
$1 billion worth of projects in Libya, probably all for cash. These include a
nuclear power station (a project that has been under discussion for several
years), a 600-km gas pipeline from Brega to Misuratah to supply a proposed
1.7 million-ton iron and steel complex, a unified power grid, and three major
training centers; the USSR also agreed to formulate a 25-year natural gas
development plan. The USSR had agreed previously to construct an atomic
research center near Tripoli (on which work had begun by year's end) and had
signed a $22 million contract to install two powerlines between Tripoli and
outlying agricultural areas.
Soviet Technical Presence Will Increase
Present plans call for a sharp increase in the Russian technical presence in
Libya, which previously was limited to about 75 oil advisers and doctors.
Moscow expects to bring in hundreds of personnel to work on the atomic
research center alone. While Qadhafi would prefer Libyan technicians in
strategic sectors of the economy, he believes that he can isolate the Soviets and
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minimize their ideological influence. Qadhaf i's fears of Soviet subversion have
been allayed to some extent by two years of a large Russian military presence.
Eastern Europe: Economic Presence Doubles
East European countries continued to support Moscow's military sales
program in Libya with deliveries Their
major interest, however, was in commercial activities and the supply of
technical personnel. Libya's cash payments for East European equipment and
services make such contracts exceedingly attractive.
Libya has hired large numbers of East European technicians over the past
decade. In 1976 their number rose to about 11,600, the largest work
contingent in any LDC, employed on at least half a billion dollars worth of
development projects. About 5,000 were Poles employed on road construction,
port work, and agricultural development projects. A similar number of
Romanians continued work on housing construction, oil and petrochemical
development, roadbuilding, and animal husbandry. Hungarians made
engineering studies for two railroads, while Czechoslovakia completed a
geological study of coastal areas. Bulgaria worked off $100 million in
outstanding contracts for petroleum exploration and development. East
Germany joined the roster of East Europeans in Libya with an October
contract to construct electric power and transportation projects.
Bulgaria and the USSR may have signed contracts in 1976 to take Libyan
oil in 1977. Existing oil barter agreements have been largely inoperative since
1973, because East European countries have been unwilling to take high-
priced Libyan oil.
MOROCCO
Morocco's concern that Soviet weaponry provided Algeria might be used
against it in Western Sahara clouded the Rabat-Moscow relationship in 1976.
Soviet military shipments were temporarily suspended, but late in the
year talks were reopened on possible delivery of Osa-class patrol boats and
25X1B STYX missiles under a 1975 agreement.
China's neutrality in the Saharan dispute, however, enhanced its
standing. Rabat signed new economic accords with Czechoslovakia and
Poland and received spare parts and munitions from the Czechs.
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Chill in Economic Relations
King Hassan's refusal to negotiate major new economic projects with the
Soviets especially affected the Meskala phosphate project, for which a
preliminary agreement had been drafted in 1975. At the end of the year,
Moscow was still pressing for finalization of the $5 billion, 20-year agreement,
the largest the USSR has ever negotiated with a Third World country. Nor
was a Soviet offer to construct a $235 million power plant at Mohammedia
acted on. Nonetheless, it was agreed that Moscow should continue geological
prospecting, and the annual oil-for-citrus barter agreement, which called for a
40-percent increase in Soviet oil shipments in 1976, was renewed.
Rabat's relations with East European countries reflected the stability of
their trade relationships. Poland, one of Morocco's major phosphate markets
and its largest Communist trading partner, signed a protocol to continue
assistance to the chemical and transportation sectors. Czechoslovakia
provided a line of credit of unknown value in May for complete plants and
possibly technical services. Power, sugar, cement, and textile plants were
mentioned as possibilities for Czech financing. Romania began port
development at Nador under a 1976 agreement, possibly a commercial
accord, and Bucharest and Rabat agreed to joint ventures in copper
development.
An estimated 975 East European personnel were working under contracts
in Morocco during the year. Bulgaria provided 300 doctors, teachers,
veterinarians, and agricultural personnel and Romania 400 technicians for
development work. Chinese technicians began preliminary work on a sports
stadium near Rabat (China's only aid project in Morocco), being built under
a $35 million 1975 credit.
MOZAMBIQUE
Following a decade of Communist political and financial support, the
revolutionary government of Mozambique has continued to rely heavily on
Communist aid since independence in mid-1975. Although the Communists
were slow to provide financial assistance, they sent some 625 nonmilitary
technicians to fill the technical gap left by the departure of Western
specialists. The 250 Chinese and North Koreans worked mainly in agriculture,
100 Cubans surveyed Mozambique's sugar estates, and 275 Soviets and East
Europeans were employed as doctors, teachers, agricultural technicians, and
administrators.
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The USSR provided further guarantees of reconstruction aid under a June
agreement. Contracts for iron ore, coal, and bauxite surveys were signed, and
Moscow agreed to dispatch irrigation experts, harbor pilots, and transporta-
tion and cement experts.
Military
Communist countries increased their commitments of men and material
following Mozambique President Machel's call for help in defending
Mozambique against Rhodesian cross-border operations.
worth of Communist small arms, ammunition, antiaircraft artillery, and
armor, a sizable share consigned to Rhodesian insurgents, was delivered. New
supply agreements were signed with the USSR, but their values are not
known.
The influx of Communist personnel was heavy throughout the year,
allowing Mozambique the services of about 500 military personnel. Most of
these advisers came from Cuba to train the regular army and the militia.
SOMALIA
Soviet military and economic support and a large contingent of Soviet
personnel have given Moscow an important foothold in Somalia and the use of
a naval base, an airfield, and Red Sea port facilities.
New Military Agreements in 1976
25X1B Soviet arms agreement will expand Somalia's naval
25X1 B inventory OL-class patrol boats. The new accord brought Moscow's
total military commitment to Somalia?the largest Soviet arms client in Black
25X1B Africa The USSR repeated the high delivery levels of 1975,
with shipments in 1976.
25X1B
Moscow's heavy supply operation in the past several years and its
continuing heavy technical assistance (at least 1,000), spread through all levels
of the military, have enabled Somalia to develop one of the most formidable
fighting forces in sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the personnel are stationed at
the port of Berbera, where the USSR has a naval missile-handling facility,
repair facilities, and a drydock. (In early 1977, Soviet arms to Ethiopia began
to cause strains in the military relationship.)
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Economic Relations: A Smaller Effort
Confident that the momentum of the military supply program and 1975's
record $60 million commitment for economic development would sustain
economic relations, Moscow was not responsive to Somali requests for
development projects. Its only new aid to Somalia in 1976 was a $4 million gift
of corn.
The most important project under way is the Giuba Dam, which will
generate 5,000 kw of electric power and irrigate 8,300 hectares of land when
completed. The project, however, will never live up to its advance billing as
-Somalia's Aswan Dam,- with only $19 million allocated to it and work
continuing at a snail's pace. The 1,000 Soviet economic technicians in Somalia
provide medical and advisory services, give assistance to the fishing industry,
install oil storage tanks at Somali ports, and furnish support to problem-ridden,
Soviet-built food-processing plants. Soviet personnel are also helping settle
130,000 nomad refugees from drought-stricken areas into fishing villages and
agricultural settlements along the coast. Moscow is providing this assistance
under a $14 million grant portion of the 1975 agreement.
The USSR also contracted to provide $9 million of its 1975 credit for
mineral prospecting, including $4 million for commodities to finance local
costs. East European countries and Cuba were increasingly visible in
supporting Soviet objectives. Bulgaria, Romania, and possibly Hungary signed
agreements for possible project assistance to Somalia. Bulgaria already is
providing assistance for tin mining, and East Germany maintains the largest
East European presence through a police training program. Arab states
pledged $265 million in development assistance to Mogadiscio in 1976, in
hopes of weaning Somalia away from the Soviets.
Meanwhile, China continued the unobtrusive support that has won it
praise from Somali officials. In June, a 360-km section of the Belet Uen-Burao
road, built under a 1971 credit, was opened to traffic. The 970-km road
project will have drawn $67 million from Chinese credits when it is completed
in 1978. In 1976, China also completed a hospital and continued work on a
sports complex under the 1971 credit.
SUDAN
The thaw in Soviet-Sudanese relations of late 1975 was reversed in July
when Libyan-supported dissidents, using Soviet arms, tried to overthrow the
Numayri regime. The abortive coup followed Moscow's gift of MIG jet
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fighters?the first Soviet aircraft to Sudan since the 1971 coup attempt in
which the USSR was also implicated. Sudan is now pushing ahead with plans
to modernize its military establishment with Western arms financed by Saudi
Arabia.
Khartoum demonstrated its concern over future Soviet influence by
refusing to allow some students to go to the the USSR for training. Khartoum
and Moscow did, however, sign a contract in October to continue a Soviet
manganese and iron ore survey under a small 1969 credit that had already
financed other mineral surveys.
China, whose economic assistance program has earned it the highest
marks among Communist donors, accelerated activity under $82 million in
credits extended in the early 1970s. Early in the year, Sudan announced that
Chinese geologists had discovered oil in commercial quantities. The Chinese
also completed a section of the Wad Medani-Gedaref Highway, which was
opened to traffic. In May a textile mill and conference hall in Khartoum were
inaugurated.
TANZANIA
Tanzania continued to shift its dependence for military supplies from
China to the USSR. China scrambled to maintain its waning influence with
deliveries of jet trainers, MIG-19 engines, small arms, and antiaircraft guns.
The USSR supplied SA-3 missiles to Dar es Salaam?the first provided a sub-
Saharan African country. A part of the Chinese and Soviet deliveries were for
insurgent groups operating out of Tanzania. Communist military advisers in
Tanzania also helped train such groups. Although the number of Chinese fell
significantly during the year, the Soviet presence was augmented and
supported by the Cubans.
The USSR's military presence in Tanzania, which accelerated in 1974
with an air defense deal, apparently stimulated interest in economic
cooperation?a marginal effort until now. The USSR signed a July agreement
for a $24 million hydropower project at Kiwira Falls, for which at least $10
million will be drawn from a 1966 Soviet credit.
Wrapping up five years of construction activity on the Tan-Zam railroad,
China handed the system over to the Tan-Zam Railroad Authority in July and
announced that it would absorb $55 million in cost overruns. This brought
Peking's contribution to the project to $475 million. With about a fourth of
Tan-Zam's 20,000-ton-a-day scheduled freight capacity currently being
carried, the railroad is easing transportation bottlenecks in Zambia caused by
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closure of routes through Angola and Rhodesia. China allowed 1,000 railroad
technicians to remain in Tanzania for another two years to assist in operations,
maintenance, and training. Some Chinese that had worked on the railroad
were shifted to iron and coal development work and to building a spur line.
Meanwhile, Zanzibar is phasing out Chinese assistance, until recently its most
active aid program, and turning to non-Communist sources for assistance to
light industry.
OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES
Benin joined the ranks of African recipients of Communist military aid in
1976. Early in the year, the USSR promised Benin delivery of two YAK-40 jet
transports presumably for services rendered the Soviets in the airlift to Angola,
and a second Soviet agreement provided small arms and ammunition at half
the market price. North Korea and Czechoslovakia also supplied small
amounts of infantry weapons and ammunition.
Moscow signed protocols to implement a $5.5 million credit, apparently
extended in 1974, allocating $2 million to geological research. Other projects
under study include establishment of a bus system and fisheries development.
China completed a rice project, which it took over from Taiwan in 1973, and
began work on a sports complex and an experimental farm under a 1972 $44
million credit. Romania signed an economic agreement, but the terms are not
known.
Botswana, in a major policy switch, concluded its first Communist
economic accord in 1976. A team of Chinese technicians, which arrived in
September to assess Botswana's development needs, will be followed by
commitments to specific projects. Credits for agriculture and light industry
probably will be made available.
The Cape Verde Islands signed a general economic and technical
cooperation agreement with the USSR in November, its first with a
Communist country.
The Central African Empire's resumption of diplomatic relations with
China in August was followed by an agreement to reinstate Peking's economic
program, which will initially involve agricultural and medical technical
assistance projects that Taiwan had been operating. Romania, the only
Communist country with ongoing projects, increased its joint participation in
lumber, mining, and cotton ventures by $20 million. The USSR's large
technical service program (with 165 teachers, doctors, and ministry-level
advisers) was criticized for not being expanded.
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Chad signed its second military agreement with the Soviet Union in two
25X1 B years, accord for ground forces equipment. Much of the
equipment was received by the end of the year and included 132-millimeter
(mm) rocket launchers, personnel carriers, mortars, artillery, and ammunition.
The Comoro Islands signed an agreement for economic and technical
cooperation with China in June, making Peking the first Communist country
to establish formal economic ties with the island nation. The visit of a
Comoran trade delegation was followed by a Comoran visit to Peking in
September to arrange for commodity imports to generate local funds for
projects under the agreement.
In Equatorial Guinea, the number of Chinese is expected to increase
when construction begins on a power station and transmission lines that China
agreed in May to build under a $24 million 1971 credit.
Moscow extended its first economic assistance to Guinea-Bissau in
September, a $13 million, 12-year interest-free credit, allocated partly to
bauxite development. The agreement also provides $3 million for commodi-
ties. The USSR had previously given Guinea-Bissau a $500,000 fishing trawler
as a gift.
The Ivory Coast, moving toward greater balance in international
relationships, signed its first Communist economic cooperation agreement
with Romania in June. The general accord calls for cooperation in agriculture,
forestry, mining, and other industries, possibly on a joint venture basis. An
Ivory Coast trade delegation visited several East European countries and the
USSR at midyear.
Kenya has shown receptivity to Chinese offers and is studying a Chinese
proposal to supply under UN Development Program auspices equipment and
technical expertise for textile plants, a rice mill, a brick plant, and a small
hydroelectric plant.
Pro-Western Liberia moved gradually to enhance its African and
nonaligned credentials by upgrading relations with Hungary and Cuba.
Monrovia also planned to open discussions on establishing diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China (PRC) while trying to obtain Taiwan's
guarantee that it would continue its $2 million to $3 million annual funding of
agricultural and veterinary projects. A Romanian joint venture for rubber
processing?Liberia's first Communist project?was completed and similar
joint ventures for a tire plant and agriculture were being planned. A 1974
Soviet proposal to build a port and technical school has not been acted on.
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Madagascar's radical socialist government still relies on Western suppliers
for most of its arms, but new Communist economic and military commitments
in 1976 helped move it closer to Communist countries. China reinforced its
position as Madagascar's largest aid donor with a $21 million credit for 30,000
tons of rice and with contracts under its $55 million 1975 commitment for a
sugar refinery, a farm implements plant, a porcelain factory, a model farm,
and improvements to a 150-km road for all-weather travel between
Tananarive and the port of Tamatave. In addition to a Soviet gift of an MI-8
helicoper and agreement for small arms and ammunition,
Moscow movea w provi e personnel and equipment for a merchant marine
school, for the University of Tananarive, and for geological surveys agreed to
under a December 1975 accord. Soviet technical personnel also studied
possible 10-year credits for prefabricated housing, a cement plant, a flour mill,
a hydropower plant and irrigation works, a cotton plantation, and three
university centers. Romania sent technicians to operate Madagascar's only oil
refinery at Tamatave, after its surprise nationalization in June. Romania's bid
for participation in a chemical fertilizer plant at the Tamatave refinery,
however, was not accepted. Madagascar asked Hungary to draw up plans for
bauxite and alumina development.
Mali received sophisticated aircraft for the first time, reflecting Soviet
interest in maintaining access to Mali's military support facilities for its
southern African ventures. Previously MIG-17s had been the most advanced
aircraft in Mali's inventory. Following the visit of Mali's Minister of Defense
to Moscow late in August, the USSR airlifted MIG-21 fighters. Moscow had
already trained Malians to support and operate the planes. Although the USSR
and China have each delivered about the same amount of economic aid ($65
million) over the past 15 years, China has played a more active role in Mali's
economic development, especially in agriculture. In 1976, China agreed to
build a third sugar mill at Sikasso and to expand a recently completed
Chinese-built rice mill at Sevare. Peking is also continuing a $9 million
expansion of the Chinese-built textile mill at Segou and has installed new
equipment for Radio Mali. Moscow's only active project is the gold mine at
Kalana, for which the USSR has provided $17 million in credits.
A Nigerian delegation went to Moscow in December to resume
negotiations on Soviet participation in the Ajaokuta steel mill, which was
opened to international bidding earlier in the year because of the inability of
the two sides to reach agreement. Nigeria awarded Moscow a $137 million
contract to act as general contractor for 800-km of oil pipeline. Moscow
already has solicited Western bids for design work and pumping stations;
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about 700 Soviet personnel will direct Nigerian subcontractors. Poland agreed
to a four-month geological survey, which may draw on a $24 million 1971
credit. In 1976, some 100 Chinese personnel provided technical assistance to
rice projects, to water-well drilling, and for a small industrial training center.
This activity is governed by a 1974 technical assistance agreement, provisions
of which were never announced.
Rwanda accepted its first military aid from China in 1976
worth of small arms?all delivered by yearend. About 300 Chinese were
working in Rwanda on economic aid projects, funded by a 1972 $22 million
credit. They completed most of the $16 million Kigali-Rusomo road and will
finish the remainder early in 1977. Chinese technicians also worked on
developing rice strains and turned over to Rwandan management a rice
project at Kigali, which was completed in 1976. Moscow has concentrated on a
scholarship program, and some of the graduates have gone into Rwanda's
finance, agricultural, and planning ministries. Work has not yet started on the
hospital that Moscow is scheduled to build at Bujumba.
Sao Tome and Principe signed a general agreement on economic and
technical cooperation with the USSR in October, similar to one signed last year
with China. No activity was noted under either agreement.
Senegal, calling on Communist nations for more support to LDC
development programs, concluded new agreements with Poland and Romania
in 1976. Poland agreed to provide $35 million in fisheries assistance over a 10-
year period, $17 million of which will be allocated for trawlers, refrigerator
boats, and port and processing equipment. Romania's agreement was for
cooperation in mining, industry, and rural development projects, but no
credits are known to have been provided. China, still the only active
Communist donor in Senegal, continued work on dams, rice projects, and an
athletic stadium under a 1973 $53 million credit.
Sierra Leone signed its first fisheries agreement with the USSR early in
1976. Moscow will provide research ships and trawlers as well as training. Joint
ventures for fish processing industries may be arranged later. China completed
the Mangeh Bridge, and a stadium at Freetown under a 1971 $40 million
credit, and turned over eight agricultural stations it has established in the
country.
Tunisia at midyear received its first military equipment from a
Communist country under a 1975 Chinese accord for artillery, light
machineguns, rifles, antitank weapons, and possibly two coastal patrol boats.
Earlier in the year, the USSR promised Tunis its first new economic aid in
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almost a decade. The $55 million commitment will be used for dam and
irrigation projects and expansion of the Soviet-built technical institute in
Tunis. Commodity shipments allowed under the credit should facilitate
construction by generating local funds. Czechoslovakia also extended new 10-
year credits totaling $30 million for equipment purchases.
25X1 B Uganda received MIG-21 jet fighters with spare parts from the USSR
in 1976 as replacements or MIGs damaged or destroyed by the Israeli raid on
Entebbe in July. The deliveries probably include the major items in
25X1B Soviet arms deal signed last fall, and presumably brought Ugandan
inventories back to their preraid complement of II MIG-21s,
Upper Volta took over the Kou Valley rice project from China early in
1976. The 250-hectare project, for which Peking assumed responsibility from
the Republic of China in 1973, had been financed under a $48 million credit.
Late in the year, China agreed to build a cement factory and a road under
credits remaining from the 1973 agreement.
Zaire and the USSR signed their first general economic and technical
assistance agreement in December, as Moscow moved to repair the damage to
their relationship created by differences over Angola. Details of the agreement
were not announced. Romania, Zaire's only active East European develop-
ment partner, established a new joint company in 1976 to operate agricultural
projects.
China remained Zaire's largest Communist aid donor. Peking accelerated
work on projects under a $100 million aid package. Preliminary work on a
sports stadium proceeded, and technical assistance continued at several
experimental farms, a sugar plantation and refinery, and a hospital.
Construction of the $3 million People's Palace, being provided as a grant, went
forward. China's influence as a development model remained strong, even
though Zaire's deteriorating economic situation forced the government to
rescind some of the more radical "Chinese-like- nationalization measures
instituted after Mobutu's 1974 trip to China. China became Zaire's principal
Communist arms supplier with tank, artillery, support
equipment, ammunition, and naval vessels, but Communist military supplies
still comprise less than 10 percent of Zaire's total annual arms receipts.
Zambia shared equally with Tanzania in the $55 million of Chinese aid to
cover cost overruns on the Tan-Zam railroad. With railway construction
completed, most of the large contingent of Chinese workers will probably
work on rural development schemes and on the Serenje-Samfua road, being
constructed under a 1974 agreement. Little other Communist activity took
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place in Zambia in 1976. The USSR continued work on diesel power plants
under a 1967 credit. Czechoslovakia completed geological surveys in northern
Zambia and continued copper prospecting around Lusaka. Romanian
development of Zambian mines under a $50 million 1972 agreement was slow,
presumably because of depressed world demand and low prices for metals and
minerals. Romania also formed a small joint venture with a government
company to develop copper. Zambia concluded a single military agreement
with a Communist supplier during the year, a small accord with Moscow for
tanks and armored vehicles. The bulk of the equipment was delivered in 1976.
EAST ASIA
Communist-East Asian contacts expanded in 1976, as both the USSR and
China pursued broader commercial ties with businessmen in the region and
Moscow sought new port facilities to support its fishing fleet.
Tonga and Papua New Guinea were among the island nations that
received Soviet offers to improve port and fishing facilities in return for
services to the Soviet fleet. Western Samoa signed an economic assistance
agreement with China that eventually may provide credits.
Moscow's most dramatic overture was a $300 million offer to Indonesia
for a 600,000-ton alumina plant on Bintan Island. The plant would supply the
Asahan aluminum smelter, being constructed by the Japanese, and still allow
150,000 tons annually for repayment of the Soviet loan. Moscow also offered
to construct two associated power plants at a cost of $120 million.
Malaysia fended off Soviet development offers because of concern over
possible subversion by Soviet technicians. Malaysia's demands for lenient
terms for the $80 million Tembeling dam project at Pahang closed discussions
on the project. Kuala Lumpur also turned down a Soviet offer of an auto
assembly plant. The fate of a Soviet bid on a 240-MW power plant is not
known.
Establishment of Soviet-Philippine diplomatic relations and the signing of
Manila's first trade agreement with Moscow had little effect on their economic
relations in 1976. The trade agreement calls for settlement in convertible
currency and mentions possible Soviet credits to be negotiated separately.
Moscow's offer to construct storage facilities for a new joint fishing venture in
return for fishing rights was ignored, as was its request to construct bunkering
facilities near Manila. Hard bargaining with Romania produced a $5 million
credit for trucks and other vehicles, and China continued oil sales under a
1974 five-year agreement. A Chinese-Philippine committee was formed to
help redress the trade imbalance which in 1975 was more than $20 million in
China's favor.
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Singapore's first joint fishing company with the Soviets (Marissco) started
operations in 1976. The company plans to build processing and storage
facilities at Jurong to accommodate the Soviet fleet's Southeast Asian catch.
The new facilities would make Singapore the largest fish processor in the area.
Singapore announced that it would abolish the service charge on all Chinese
imports and proposed an agreement to put their trade on an official basis for
the first time. Singapore hopes than an increase in Chinese orders will
stimulate Singapore's depressed shipbuilding industry. Singapore also signed
an agreement with Romania for a joint commission to study increased
economic exchanges.
LATIN AMERICA
SUMMARY
Moscow moved to exploit the Latin American arms market with offers in
1976 to Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. While none of these
deals was consummated during the year, the Soviets made further important
inroads into Peru's market to become Lima's principal arms supplier.
25X1B order by the Peruvian air force?Moscow's first sale of aircraft to
Lima?pushed Soviet sales to its only Latin American customer (outside of
25X1B Cuba)
The Communist economic program in Latin America retained its
commercial thrust as a means of cutting recent billion-dollar trade def icits
with the area. Last year, the Soviet-Latin American deficit alone topped $850
million. Communist countries have served notice that failure to redress the
huge imbalances of recent years could force Communist grain and food buyers
into other markets. As a followup, they offered $300 million in trade credits to
Latin American raw materials suppliers in 1976. Some $175 million of new
agreements were signed, despite Latin America's traditional preference for
Western machinery and equipment that has left $1.5 billion of previous
Communist credits unspent. Communist officials hope that credits will be
drawn on as the deficits of major Latin American traders persist with the rest
of the world.
Open-ended trade credits, for which limits and terms have not been set,
were the only kind of Communist credits provided in 1976:
? Peru signed an agreement with the USSR that could result in
commitments to finance up to a third of Peru's $300 million (Amos
hydroelectric project.
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? Mexico signed general economic agreements with all European
Communist states except Hungary and Bulgaria. The agreements
included Polish aid for coal development.
? Bolivia and Peru were offered Polish aid for coal development.
? Chile and Peru were promised aid for their petroleum industries by
Romania.
ARGENTINA
Trade continued to dominate Argentine-Communist relations in 1976 as
Soviet trade went farther into the red with larger purchases of Argentine meat
and grain. East European countries also ran huge deficits with Argentina
because of grain purchases required to offset the effects of the European
drought. As part of a Soviet drive to balance its trade accounts, Moscow
offered assistance to fisheries and coal mining, and submitted a bid to
participate in the $2 billion Parana Medio hydroelectric project. These were
turned down as Argentina's new, more conservative government began to
question the wisdom of expanding the already substantial Soviet involvement
in Argentina's electric power development plans. The government also resisted
Soviet pressure to expand imports through the use of open-ended credits
extended in 1974.
Work progressed, however, at the Salto Grande and Costanera plants
under contracts signed the year before. These together with contracts already
signed for power generators at San Nicolas and Lujan de Cuyo bring the total
value of contracts under the 1974 open-ended credit to $175 million. The go-
slow attitude also affected East European economic relations, with continued
deliveries of Romanian equipment to the state petroleum organization the
only aid activity.
COLOMBIA
Offers of Communist assistance to Colombia approached the $200 million
mark in 1976, following Bogota's announcement that it would welcome
association with the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (CEMA). Until
then Colombia had received less than $25 million in credits from this group of
countries.
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Moscow made the largest offer?assistance for oil development,
transportation, and public health as well as a $140 million equipment credit
for the $400 million Alto Sinu power project. The 10-year credits probably
would be provided under a March 1975 agreement, on which no credit limit
had been placed.
East European activity was spearheaded by a $50 million East German
equipment credit, apparently negotiated late in 1975, and by Polish and
Romanian general economic cooperation agreements. Financial details on the
latter agreements were not announced. The September pact with Warsaw calls
for assistance in building a sulfuric acid plant, sugar mills, and textile plants.
The Romanian agreement, reached after two years of negotiations, calls for
joint oilfield development and coal exploration. Colombia contracted to buy
$21 million worth of buses from Hungary. Czechoslovakia agreed to extend
the period for drawing on a $6 million 1971 credit.
PERU
The Soviets are moving to improve their position in Peru, where they
already have a substantial investment. Despite the shift of the Morales
Bermudez government away from a leftist revolutionary line, Moscow signed
major new military and economic agreements in 1976. Military agreements
25X1B in 1976 gave Peru big-ten rank among Soviet arms
clients and gave Moscow the ranking supplier role in Lima's defense
establishment.
First Air Force Purchase
25X1 B Lima's order for. Soviet supersonic fighter-bombers (SU-22s)?Peru's
largest military agreement with Moscow and its first order for jet aircraft from
the USSR?raises Peru's total arms purchases from the USSR
25X1B all since March 1973. Before 1976 Lima confined its arms purchases
in the Soviet Union to sophisticated land armaments and helicopters for the
army. The navy continued to reject Soviet offers and is reported to have
turned down missile boats and short-haul aircraft.
Lima's aircraft purchases were concluded despite considerable concern
over increasing Soviet involvement in Lima's defense establishment. The
decision was affected by favorable terms and fast delivery schedules. Lima
also may have wished to signal its displeasure with US restrictive arms
measures.
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Yearend reports of possible air defense equipment (radar and mobile
surface-to-air missiles) orders were not confirmed. Unconfirmed rumors also
indicate that Peru purchased T-62 tanks (Moscow's most advanced export
model, previously sold only to Middle Eastern countries and Afghanistan) for
delivery early in 1977.
Economic Relations Accelerated
Clearly designed to close Moscow's large trade deficit with Peru ($85
million in 1976), an economic agreement signed in November provides 10-
year credits at 4- to 5-percent interest for unlimited purchases of Soviet goods.
The first contract under the agreement was for electric generators for the
Olmos hydroelectric project, which eventually could absorb more than $100
million in Soviet financing. Credits also may be drawn for constructing a steel
plant at Nazca and a machinery and equipment plant at Arequipa, both of
which are currently under survey. Meanwhile, Soviet technicians are working
at the Paita fishing complex and the Andean fuel storage project under a $25
million 1970 credit, two-thirds of which has already been used.
Late in 1976, Hungary agreed to provide equipment for some power
plants under the $60 million still outstanding from credits extended in 1972
and 1974. New agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Romania call for faster use of $90 million in old credits.
China agreed to provide irrigation equipment under a 1971 $42 million
credit reinstated late last year. Peking also agreed to import $57 million worth
of metals and fishmeal and to sell $23 million of rice and kerosene. North
Korea signed its first trade agreement with Peru, reportedly valued at $180
million, for the purchase of copper and copper concentrates through 1980.
VENEZUELA
Venezuela and the USSR signed their first economic cooperation
agreement in November. An oil switch deal, signed at the same time, calls for
delivery of Venezuelan crude to Cuba in return for equivalent Soviet supplies
to Caracas' West European customers. If consummated, the deal will reduce
transport cost substantially. At the end of the year, quantities and prices of oil
to be exchanged were still under negotiation.
Venezuela received offers of economic and technical assistance from
several Communist countries during 1976. Romania offered to construct a
railway network, a cement plant, and a soda ash plant and tried to attract
Venezuelan investment for a petrochemical complex in Romania to be
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supplied by Venezuelan crude. In July, a Soviet delegation discussed assistance
for developing heavy oil deposits in the Orinoco region. A Polish technical
team is currently studying possible assistance for reconstructing coal mines in
southern Venezuela.
OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
A Soviet agreement in March 1976 extended 10-year credits bearing
interest up to 5 percent to Bolivia for machinery and equipment. The credits
probably will cover cost overruns at the Soviet-built Potosi tin-processing
plant, for which a 1970 agreement had allocated $7 million. A second tin plant
at Marchamarca, also to be financed from the 1970 credit, now has the go-
ahead signal. Moscow agreed to provide a power plant for a $120 million lead
and silver foundry at Potosi, although the extent of the USSR's involvement is
not clear. Poland began work on a $5 million sheet glass factory agreed to in
1973 and signed new long-term trade and economic cooperation agreements,
with assistance scheduled for the coal and chemical industries and for
transportation. Romania sold locomotives under a $16 million commercial
agreement signed in August, and Czechoslovakia began work on a $2 million
iron alloy foundry under a 1975 agreement.
Brazil received the second largest East European credit in 1976, $100
million from Czechoslovakia to finance equipment purchases. Brazil's
relations with Communist countries are confined largely to trade, and failure
to eliminate the large Soviet and East European deficits ($385 million for the
USSR alone in 1976) continues to cause friction. Communist countries tried to
expand machinery and equipment sales on credit, and some East European
countries threatened to reduce their commodity purchases if Brazil did not
increase its imports. Poland was successful in concluding a barter agreement
for the exchange of $3.2 billion of Polish coal for Brazilian iron ore over the
next 10 years. Brazil also agreed to trade iron ore for East German chemicals.
A Hungarian offer of up to $150 million of credits to Jamaica for an
alumina plant had not been acted on at the end of the year. The 10-year
credit, which would make Jamaica the top ranking Communist aid recipient
in the Caribbean, would supply equipment for a plant to be operated jointly
by Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela. The agreement hinges on results of a
feasibility study.
Cuba has been Jamaica's largest and most active Communist aid donor.
In 1976, more than 275 Cubans were working on education, housing, and
medical projects as well as six small dams provided under a technical
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assistance agreement signed early in the year. Most of the Cuban assistance is
grant aid. Jamaica's only other Communist aid is a $9 million 1976 Chinese
allocation under a 1974 agreement for a polyester and cotton textile plant and
a $1 million six-year credit extended in 1976 for 5,000 tons of Chinese rice.
Mexico signed its first economic cooperation agreements with Communist
countries in 1976. Most of the accords are agreements in principle for which
actual credit allocations await further technical studies. An October agreement
with the USSR offered hydroelectric, coal mining, and petroleum equipment,
for which 10-year credits were discussed in 1975. An agreement with Poland
calls for construction of Latin America's largest coal mine. A Mexican-
Romanian accord was for the exchange of petroleum technology and Mexican
construction of an offshore drilling rig to be installed in the Black Sea. In July
Mexico ratified the CEMA agreement it had negotiated in 1975, and in August
a delegation from CEMA arrived to discuss cooperation in fishing,
petrochemicals, telecommunications, and light industry. Subsequent negotia-
tions in October did not produce any agreements.
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
SUMMARY
Moscow faced strong competition in the Middle East from wealthy Arab
states that used their financial power to keep neighboring states out of the
Communist camp. This policy was especially successful in Egypt, which
abrogated its friendship treaty with the USSR in March, and in Jordan, where
a Soviet air defense system was turned down in favor of a more costly US
package financed by Saudi Arabia. Syria, pursuing a more independent policy
than before, ignored Soviet displeasure with its course in Lebanon. Hoping to
keep a foothold in a major Middle Eastern country, Moscow promised Iraq an
unprecedented amount of military equipment, including the newest weapons
systems, and expanded development assistance.
Moscow again used arms to try to manipulate LDC political positions by
cutting arms shipments to Syria sharply after midyear and keeping shipments
to Egypt at only a trickle. Moscow, however, continued to provide economic
assistance and to trade actively with countries that had drawn away from
Soviet influence. Moscow's largest new economic credits in 1976 went to Syria,
and deliveries to Egypt continued.
By the end of 1976, the Middle East, long the favored Soviet client area,
had received Soviet commitments of $5.2 billion of economic aid and $13
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billion of military commitments. Moscow's military 25X1B
agreement with Iraq in 1976 was backed up with economic credits and over
$1 billion in commercial contracts for water and power development.
The Soviet-Iranian relationship was marked in 1976 by Tehran's record
military order from the USSR and expanding commercial ties as well as the
largest contingent of Soviet economic technicians in any LDC. Because of the
long border they share, Iran's large exports of natural gas to the USSR, and
more recently Iran's oil wealth, Tehran has become Moscow's largest customer
for machinery and equipment in the Third World.
The South Asian scene is dominated by Moscow's continuing economic
and military relationship with India. For over a decade Moscow has cultivated
its South Asian neighbors, which rank with Middle Eastern states as major
recipients. New military and economic pacts with India, including an oil
barter deal, helped clear away some differences that have plagued relations
for several years. Meanwhile, China moved to protect its interest in Pakistan
25X1B with new military pledges?its largest annual military deal ever
with a Third World country.
AFGHANISTAN
Despite Afghanistan's recent success on attracting $800 million in new
development financing from OPEC members, the USSR continues as
Afghanistan's most important source of economic and military aid and its
principal trading partner. Moscow's $1.3 billion economic aid program
created Kabul's natural gas and petroleum industry and is responsible for a
large part of Kabul's modern infrastructure.
Sustained Economic Relations
A five-year Soviet-Afghan trade agreement (their first long-term trade
accord) set the tone for Moscow's continuing close relationship with Kabul in
1976. The new accord is designed to increase trade 65 percent by 1980.
Protocols signed during the year will also expand Moscow's already substantial
contribution to Afghanistan's petroleum, gas, power, and agricultural
development, with credits to be drawn mostly from $425 million of aid
extended in 1975 for Afghanistan's Fifth Plan (21 March 1977 to 20 March
1982).
Soviet aicl to Kabul's oil and gas industry topped $200 million with the
signing of a $56 million contract for a gas desulfurization plant at Jeraqduq.
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The Russians will expand their contribution to the industry as the oil deposits
at Angot are developed and construction of a 200,000-ton oil refinery at
Shibarghan gets under way.
The Soviets moved ahead in 1976 with irrigation work along the Amu
River, which eventually will bring 100,000 hectares under cultivation, and
began surveys for a dam and power project at Kelagay. Moscow also initiated
surveys for two chemical plants during the year.
Among other Communist countries, China was most active. Peking
completed a $12 million irrigation project in the Parwan area and made plans
to expand the program. It also continued work on a hospital at Kandahar and a
textile mill at Bagram and signed a protocol to build a paper mill.
Czechoslovakia was awarded contracts for coal mining and for building a
cement plant at Herat, which it will undertake with credits extended in 1973.
Military Relations
The USSR remains Kabul's only major source of military hardware and
services. Although no new agreements were concluded in 1976, Moscow
25X1B delivered tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), AN-26
transports, and an AN-30 from $120 million of orders still outstanding.
EGYPT
Although the Soviets did not resume major arms deliveries to Egypt in
1976 and provided no new economic aid, Moscow continued to fulfill its
commitments under existing economic agreements.
Military Relations
The cutoff of virtually all Soviet arms shipments to Cairo is going into its
third year, with only a small trickle of Soviet arms still coming in. Deliveries in
25X1B 1976, of only consisted mostly of Egyptian equipment being
returned after servicing. Turning to other Communist countries, Egypt took
25X1B delivery of worth of military goods. Peking began delivery
of equipment under an agreement for aircraft and tank engines, spares, and a
production facility for machine tools and motors; North Korea shipped heavy
guns and rocket launchers under a 1976 accord for field guns, rocket
launchers, ammunition vehicles, and spare parts; and Hungary supplied?
25X1B in ground forces equipment. Egypt tried unsuccessfully to obtain
spares from India.
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In winding down its Soviet relationship, Cairo reduced the Soviet military
presence by the end of 1976 to 154 men, down from about 200 in 1975. Ten
Czechs also remained to help maintain the large inventories of Communist
arms.
Economic Relations Continue
An estimated 1,200 Soviet personnel continued to work on projects that
were under construction before the Friendship Treaty was abrogated in
March. The USSR continued to provide fisheries aid, expanded assistance to
agriculture and rural electrification, and proceeded with work on cement
plants and textile mills. Expansion of the steel mill at Hulwan and the Naja
Hammadi aluminum plant?Moscow's largest ongoing projects in Egypt--was
on schedule, boosting steel and rolled iron production in 1976. According to
Soviet claims, electrical output at Aswan also increased, providing more than
half of Egypt's electricity. Soviet assistance also has been responsible for
electrification of more than 2,000 Egyptian villages.
The Debt Issue
The April Soviet-Egyptian trade protocol called for $500 million worth of
Egyptian exports and $320 million worth of imports in 1976, with the $180
million surplus used to service Egypt's economic and military debt with the
USSR. Although for several years the trade protocols have been used for de
facto annual debt settlement, Moscow is now demanding that Cairo sign a
formal 20-year rescheduling agreement, with repayment of 25X1 B
military and economic debt to begin immediately. Egypt has requested a 10-
year moratorium. Stretching into their third year of negotiations, debt
questions remained unresolved as Moscow canceled a delegation visit to Cairo
late in December.
INDIA
Soviet-Indian agreements in 1976 pave the way for closer economic ties
despite Moscow's sagging economic aid program.
The New Initiatives
Following two years of hard bargaining with the USSR, New Delhi won a
major negotiating victory in 1976 with the signing of a four-year agreement
under which 5.5 million tons of Soviet crude oil will be bartered for pig iron,
steel, and other nontraditional Indian exports. The advantage was clearly
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India's, which will save about $100 million worth of foreign exchange
annually, while receiving about 10 percent of its petroleum requirements in
exchange for products that are often difficult to sell on world markets.
Also of importance are several contracts under which the output of Soviet-
built plants in India will be used in Soviet-financed projects in third countries.
One such contract covers equipment purchases from the Soviet-built foundry
at Ranchi for a metallurgical project in Egypt. Other agreements call for
Indian shipments to Soviet projects in Bulgaria, Cuba, and Yugoslavia. The
new agreements will help expand Soviet-Indian nonpetroleum trade to over $1
billion annually by 1980, as envisioned in the five-year agreement signed in
March.
Aid Relations: Net Resource Outflow Continues
Soviet aid deliveries for India's economic development have been small
for over a decade. No new development credits have been extended since
1966, and $475 million remains to be drawn on the $1.6 billion worth of aid
extended between 1955 and 1966. The near doubling of Soviet project aid
disbursements to $40 million in 1976 is still only half the mid-1960s peak and
has done little to stem the growing net outflow of Indian resources to the USSR
in repayment for economic aid. A sharp rise in India's debt service in 1976,
because of an additional $65 million due for Soviet grain shipments under a
1973 agreement, resulted in a reverse flow of almost $100 million. The 1976
trade agreement calls for Indian service payments of $325 million annually by
1980 on its combined economic and military debt to the USSR. India claims
that Soviet proposals for devaluation of the rupee in terms of the ruble would
add $500 million to its repayment burden.
Military Relations
Despite a desire to diversify sources of arms supplies, New Delhi signed
25X1B new contracts with the USSR for MIG-21bis jet
fighters in 1976. India also reportedly obtained Soviet agreement for licensed
production of the MIG-21bis after the current MIG-21M program ends around
the turn of the decade. Soviet military deliveries to India reached almost ?
25X1B in 1976, the highest level since 1971.
Poland fulfilled its outstanding commitments with delivery of
worth of TS-11 jet trainers and one Polnocny-class medium landing ship.
Poland has provided India with $60 million of military hardware since 1971.
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IRAN
The USSR and Iran signed industrial and military accords of greater
values than in any previous year. contract in November pushed
Soviet military sales to Iran Despite the Shah's efforts to
downplay the deal's significance, the new order established the USSR as Iran's
major source of ground forces equipment. Negotiations throughout the year
set the stage for further Soviet-Iranian cooperation in building large new
heavy industrial projects in both countries. Major transport bottlenecks at Gulf
ports and along the Soviet-Iranian border, however, continued to delay Soviet
shipments to aid projects in Iran.
Soviet Economic Relations: Growing Commercial Transactions
Iran has become Moscow's largest LDC customer for machinery and
equipment, largely as an outgrowth of the aid relationship. The aid program,
which began in 1963 with a joint border irrigation and power project, has led
to commitments totaling $800 million and trade that skyrocketed from $30
million in 1963 to $700 million in 1975.
Commercial relations moved into the forefront in 1975 with the signing of
a $3 billion industrial cooperation plan for enterprises in both the USSR and
Iran. Tehran is considering funding a paper plant in the USSR to be paid for
from the plant's output. In 1976, Iran awarded Moscow more than $1 billion
worth of commercial contracts, including purchases of equipment for a heavy
machinery complex at Esfarayan and a foundry forge complex at Kerman (the
largest of its type in the world). The USSR also began work on a second dam
on the Aras River to irrigate 120,000 hectares on each side of the Soviet-
Iranian border and provide each country with 100,000 kilowatts of electricity.
Moscow also plans to expand to 8 million tons annually the steel mill at Isf ahan
built with $500 million of Soviet aid; it also will build a 600-MW thermal
power station at Ahwaz, possibly will build a $500 million aluminum plant,
and is expected to participate in the construction of a second gas pipeline.
Iran will pay for at least part of these transactions with natural gas?with
the annual surplus of about $100 million that it has been running on gas sales
after servicing its economic and military aid debt to the USSR.
East European Relations
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland concluded a series of agreements in 1976
that increased aid allocations to Iranian agriculture, irrigation, and food
processing under existing credits. Bulgaria contracted to build a 100,000-ton
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cold storage facility; Hungary will continue assistance for state farms, and
Poland is to build new sugar mills and other food-processing plants.
East Germany's commitment to supply cold storage plants, railway
equipment and maintenance shops, heavy industrial machinery, and optics
involved new credits of unknown amounts. Romania extended new aid to
cover Iran's purchase of railway cars and agreed to increase the capacity of a
jointly owned soda ash plant and to proceed with new joint ventures in
petrochemicals and cement. A $2.5 billion 20-year contract for the supply of
3.6 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Czechoslovakia is Prague's largest
agreement ever signed with a Third World country. The contract is part of an
Iranian?Soviet?West European triangular gas deal.
East European countries also took other steps to expand their trade with
Iran. A Czech agreement would raise 1977 exchanges to $100 million, 25
percent above the 1976 level. Romania's agreement would result in a tripling
of 1975 trade, to $1 billion a year by 1980. The $780 million of Iranian credits
extended to Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania in 1975 for agricultural
development schemes will begin to pay off over the next few years as these
countries send the produce of these enterprises to Iran. For example, Bulgaria
will deliver $100 million worth of agricultural products annually in the next
five years.
IRAQ
Iraq and the USSR brushed aside political differences following Kosygin's
visit last spring to conclude a military agreement and a series of economic
accords that will expand Moscow's supplier role.
Record Military Transactions
The military deal, matched only by Moscow's 1974 sale to Libya,
underwrites practically all of Iraq's current needs for major weapons systems.
The USSR is determined to maintain a foothold in the Arab world and access
to Persian Gulf naval facilities and undoultedly hopes to check Iraq's recent
attempts to diversify arms suppliers. The deal would place
Iraq first among current recipients of Soviet military hardware, surpassing by
half a billion the 1974 Soviet accord. The agreement is to include large
numbers of MIG-21 and MIG-23 jet aircraft, surface-to-air missile equipment,
radar equipment, T-62 tanks, BTR and BMP armored vehicles, and coastal
artillery (probably 130 mm). Baghdad may also receive its first MIG-25 jet
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aircraft, probably the reconnaissance version. In addition, Iraq signed
contracts for helicopters as well as for vehicles and vehicle spare parts.
Meanwhile, Soviet deliveries to Iraq?mainly under earlier agreements?
reached with aircraft by far the most important
category. At least 86 planes, were received--the 25X1B
largest number Moscow has sent Baghdad in a single year and more than three 25X1B
times the 1975 number. Included were MMIG-23s, EMIG-21s, and . SU- 25X1B
20s. Advanced MIG-21 Fishbed Ls accounted for about half the MIG-21 total.
Iraq also received EMI-8 helicopters, an Osa-II guided-missile patrol boat,
IT-62 medium and some PT-76 light tanks, IE BMP infantry combat 25)(113
vehicles, M BRDM armored scout cars, andMSCUD transporter-erector-
launchers.
Iraq signed new agreements to buy additional arms 25X1B
from East European countries and North Korea. Hungary and Czechoslovakia
25X1B supplied most of the equipment delivered from Eastern
Europe in 1976.
To support Iraq's newly organized jet fighter squadrons, the Soviets and
East Europeans increased their military advisers and technicans by 200 to
1,200, and some 300 Iraqi military personnel went to the USSR, mostly for
pilot and aircraft training.
Economic Relations: New Focus on Power and Water Development
A May agreement reportedly will triple Soviet economic assistance in the
next five years, compared with the last five. The agreement, like most recent
Soviet economic accords with LDCs, probably calls for separate negotiation of
credits for individual projects. Firm commitments in 1976 under the
agreement?mostly for power and irrigation projects?are conservatively
estimated at $150 million.
Soviet specialists are also preparing a comprehensive land and water use
program as a guide for development over the next 25 years. The program will
include $1 billion in contracts signed in December for four major irrigation
and power projects?the Haditha and Habbaniyah dams on the Euphrates
River and two canals linking irrigation areas in western and northern Iraq.
Additional projects under negotiation include the $1 billion Hindia and
Fallujah dams. Soviet power and irrigation projects in progress or under
discussion would add 3 million MW of installed power capacity and bring 2.2
million hectares under irrigation.
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Ongoing Activity Accelerates
During 1976 the USSR completed a 200-MW expansion of the Najibiyah
thermal power plant, the 42-km Tharthar irrigation canal, and the Baghdad-
Basrah petroleum products pipeline (although the pipeline was not yet in
operation at yearend).
About 2,900 Soviet technicians were present in Iraq during the year.
Priority attention was given pressurization problems at the Soviet-developed
Rumaila oilfield, where output was running as less than half the 800,000
barrels per day (b/d) rate originally scheduled for the end of 1975. Water
injection equipment ordered in August under the new economic agreement is
intended to raise output substantially by 1978. Work continued at other fields
(Nahr Umar, Ratawi, Luhais, Dujaylah, Half ayah, and Khanaquin) as part of
Moscow's 20-year oil development plan for Iraq. The Soviet-developed
facilities, financed by more than $120 million in credits since 1968, reportedly
account for 30 percent of Iraq's current crude output.
The first meeting of the Iraq-CEMA Joint Commission, established in
1975, ended in November with the establishment of working groups to
recommend suitable projects for multilateral cooperation. Areas under study
include petroleum, agriculture, and light industry. While some observers feel
that the CEMA connection will only provide integrated planning for Iraqi
projects, in fact the administrative framework to disburse multilateral aid
funds has been created through Baghdad's association with CEMA.
Eastern Europe: New Contracts for the Five-Year Plan
Baghdad's apparent willingness to barter oil for industrial equipment and
services makes Iraqi projects particularly attractive to East European countries
faced with rising oil import bills. Romania signed a new economic agreement
in May that identified petroleum development, land reclamation, agriculture,
and inland fisheries as priority targets.
Czechoslovakia will continue to expand the Basrah refinery, which was
completed in 1974 with $27 million of Czech credits. East Germany will
participate in construction of a railroad between Baghdad and the Syrian
border, while Bulgaria will complete food processing and livestock projects in
1977. Hungary has expanded oil exploration under a 1969 credit and agreed to
construct several housing projects.
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Financing arrangements for new projects have not been announced; it is
likely, however, that most East European countries are allowing faster
drawdowns of their $250 million of outstanding credits.
PAKISTAN
Pakistan continued to depend on China for military goods while the USSR
remained the ranking Communist economic aid donor. Chinese arms supplies,
though smaller than Soviet economic aid, provide 75 percent of Islamabad's
weapons imports whereas all Communist countries together provided only 5
percent of Pakistan's economic aid receipts in 1976. Continuing a 10-year
relationship that has made Pakistan by far the largest recipient of Chinese
military aid, Peking agreed in 1976 to provide Islamabad with air force, navy, 25X1 B
and ground forces equipment under agreements This
brings China's total 11-year commitment to two-
25X1 B
thirds of China's military aid to the Third Wor
Despite its heavy support of Pakistan's military establishment, China has
been cautious in providing additional assistance for Islamabad's development
program. Nevertheless, Chinese projects under way maintained their normal
pace in 1976.
Despite concern over Moscow's support for India's expansionist policies on
the subcontinent, Pakistan has accepted $650 million worth of aid from the
Soviets. This includes a $425 million commitment to the Karachi steel mill?
Pakistan's largest industrial undertaking. Construction on the 1.1 million-ton
plant was begun in 1974, and completion is scheduled for 1980. Pushing ahead
with its other aid ventures in Pakistan in 1976, the USSR completed
equipment deliveries to the 330-MW Guddu power plant and continued work
on associated power lines. Despite reports that Pakistan would terminate
Soviet oil exploration contracts, Soviet geologists arrived in December to
extend prospecting into new areas. According to Pakistani officials, two new
Soviet-developed wells are DOW producing 2,000 b/d.
Romania?the only important East European contributor to Pakistan's
development?concluded a new economic agreement in October possibly to
cover an additional expansion of the state-owned Karachi petroleum refinery
already being expanded under a $56 million Romanian credit agreement.
Romania also continued port development at Qasim under a $16 million
contract and agreed to construct a heavy machinery plant at Taxila. East
Germany extended a $10 million equipment credit in 1976.
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SYRIA
Despite Moscow's displeasure with Syrian military operations in Lebanon,
a new economic agreement was signed and sizable military deliveries
continued throughout the first half of 1976. The USSR did not, however, sign a
new arms agreement with Syria?the first year it failed to do so since 1969?
and after midyear arms shipments were drastically reduced.
Arms Flow
Damascus had become Moscow's favored arms customer among Arab
countries following the 1973 Middle East war and was the only major client in
the area to receive advance-model military equipment on credit. Because of
large shipments early in 1976, Syria's arms receipts for the year
25X1B surpassed those in 1975. Deliveries were mostly of sophisticated
25X1B weapons, ordered under the October 1975 accord, with aircraft
comprising three-fourths of the total value. Included were:
?Madvanced MIG-21 Fishbed-L jet fighters, the first deliveries of this
aircraft to a Middle Eastern country.
older MIG-21 variants.
MIG-23 jet fighters.
MI-8 helicopters.
Sy ria also received its second Petya-class destroyer escort, equipment for
SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile battalions, BMP infantry
combat vehicles, and BM-21 122-mm rocket launchers.
In addition to slowing deliveries in the last half of 1976, the USSR signaled
its displeasure with Syria's role in Lebanon by demanding advance cash
payments for overhauling aircraft and tank engines. In reaction to Moscow's
heavy-handed tactics, Damascus accelerated its program to decrease
dependence on Soviet military advisers and technicians, reducing their
number to about 2,000 in 1976 from a 1974-75 peak of 3,000.
Czechoslovakia was the only East European country to deliver arms to
Syria in 1976. It provided MT-55 tanks, contracted in 1975, and a steady
stream of construction equipment ordered in the three previous years.
25X1B
25X1B
25X1B
25X1B
25X1B
Economic Relations in High Gear
As an expression of Moscow's continuing interest in Syria, Kosygin
promised new development assistance during his June visit to Damascus. His
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$300 million pledge was double the largest single previous Soviet economic
commitment and brought Moscow's total 20-year commitment to Syria to
$765 million. Most of the new assistance will be allocated to continuing
projects, especially land reclamation in the Euphrates dam area and the
increasing of oil production at Soviet-aided facilities.
Work on land reclamation was begun in 1976 at Meskene, and three
additional power generators were installed at the Euphrates power station,
increasing the plant's capacity to 500 MW. The Soviets continued to string
power lines from the dam and extensive work on rail lines continued as pa rt of
a major Soviet effort to reconstruct the Syrian rail system.
The centerpiece of the Soviet program has been the $2 billion Euphrates
dam complex, for which Moscow has provided $185 million in credits. With
completion of the first stage in 1977, 800 MW of electric power can be
generated. The dam will eventually add 1 million hectares of irrigated land
and 1,000 MW of power. Other facilities associated with the project include
experimental farms, research stations, a new city at Tabqa, and 15 villages to
house 40,000 agricultural workers. Soviet-built training facilities already have
graduated 12,000 technicians for the power industry.
The USSR together with East European countries has also been
responsible for developing Syria's national oil industry. Syria is now a net
exporter of oil, with 1977 export revenues estimated at about $500 million.
Soviet exploratory work has yielded new reserves of almost 9 billion barrels of
oil. The refinery at Horns, built with $40 million of Czech credits and now
being expanded, satisfies most domestic demand for petroleum products.
Apparently the 1975 reports of possible expulsion of Soviets from the oil
development program were premature. Syrians state that while Soviet
technicians may be less competent than Westerners, they come at one-third
the price.
TURKEY
At the end of the year, Turkey was discussing Communist participation in
$2.2 billion worth of industrial projects.
The USSR: Seeking a Major Contractor Role
Exploiting Turkey's growing uncertainty over future relations with
Western allies, Communist countries moved rapidly to negotiate broad
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economic agreements that assure them a growing role in Ankara's
development plans.
The USSR and Turkey also signed a protocol in December which spelled
out projects to be supported by Moscow under the 1975 agreement which had
propelled Turkey into fourth place among Soviet aid recipients. The new
protocol, signed during the first annual meeting of the Soviet-Turkish joint
economic commission, gave the go-ahead for studies on projects with a
reported total cost of $1.2 billion, for which Moscow had agreed in principle to
furnish $600 million to $700 million. Under the protocol initial engineering
contracts are to be drawn up in first half 1977 for expanding the Iskenderun
steel complex to an annual capacity of 4 million tons from its present 1 million
tons and for increasing aluminum capacity at the Seydisehir complex. Moscow
will also construct two power plants (with a total capacity of 800 MW) and
two heavy electrical equipment plants.
Dramatic Upswing in Relations with Eastern Europe
Ankara expanded relations with Eastern Europe through wide-ranging
economic agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Previous-
ly, East European activity had been confined to light industrial projects and a
power plant for which commercial-type credits had been allocated.
In 1976, Romania extended $200 million in 10-year, 5-percent credits for
the $500 million, 100,000-b/d petroleum refinery to be built north of Ankara.
Additional Romanian credits also are expected for petroleum drilling and
production equipment. We do not have details of the Czech and Hungarian
agreements that may also have provided credits, nor for the 1976 Czech
contract for a 330-MW power plant near Izmir. Ankara reportedly asked
Prague to study industrial projects with a total cost of about $900 million.
These included a $650 million electromechanical complex, steelworks
equipment, and power plants. The Hungarian agreement is more general,
calling for cooperation in metallurgy, power, food, and textiles.
OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES
Bangladesh turned to China for military and economic assistance for the
First time in 1976 as ties with the USSR deteriorated over delays in Soviet spare
parts supplies. Following completion of Soviet military deliveries under a 1972
accord and Moscow's failure to provide additional assistance, Peking
responded to Dacca's request for aid with deliveries of aircraft batteries and
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ammunition. China also agreed to consider further support for the Bangladesh
military. Despite strained relations, the Soviets fulfilled commitments to
ongoing economic projects, including the 100-MW Ghorosal power plant that
was completed during the year. Progress was also made on the electrical
equipment plant at Chittagong, and oil and gas exploration was undertaken.
Negotiations for Chinese aid to agriculture and the textile industry were in
process at the end of the year.
Cyprus received its first aid from Eastern Europe in June?a $5 million
Czech credit for equipment purchases, repayable in eight years at 2.5-percent
interest. In July, Nicosia signed a 10-year economic cooperation pact with
Bulgaria, which may provide financing for imports of Bulgarian equipment
and machinery.
A November Soviet agreement with Greece settled a two-year dispute
over Greek cancellation of the $89 million contract for the Philippi power
project. Under the new agreement, Athens will purchase $69 million worth of
Soviet equipment for two power plants, with some of the equipment taken
from deliveries already made for the Philippi project. Greece also contracted
to buy 500,000 tons of Soviet crude oil for $42 million. Part of the payment
will be in agricultural goods.
Consistent with a policy of accepting aid from all sources for its new
development plan (1976-80), Jordan accepted Soviet assistance for technical
schools, petroleum exploration, and rural electrification. Previously Romania
had been Jordan's only Communist contractor, having expanded the Zarqa
refinery at Amman and built a pipeline to the refinery, presumably under
commercial contracts. Agreements were signed in 1976 for an additional $180
million expansion of the refinery's capacity to 60,000 barrels a day, reportedly
enough to satisfy Jordan's domestic requirements through 1985. Financing was
not announced. Jordan also concluded its first economic cooperation
agreements with Hungary and Poland, and was considering one with
Czechoslovakia. Prague completed hydrological prospecting for a dam on the
Zarqa river, probably as a commercial deal. A Soviet air defense system,
offered as an alternative to a more costly US system, was turned down in favor
of the US package which Saudi Arabia agreed to finance.
Kuwait accepted a limited number of Communist countries' bids for
shares of its market in 1976. Kuwait's reported purchase
of Soviet arms (including self-propelled antiaircraft, artillery systems, and SA-
7 surface-to-air missiles) was not confirmed during the year, but an agreement
in principle for the purchase of missiles was signed early in 1977. Hungary
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and Poland were awarded only small civilian contracts despite active bidding.
At the end of 1976 Kuwait had not yet finalized forintion of a jointly owned
$1 billion petrochemical complex in Romania, stipulated under a 1975
agreement. Nor was Moscow able to obtain sizable time deposits of Kuwaiti
funds in Soviet banks.
Nepal is expected to receive additional economic aid from the USSR
under an agreement signed in November, following feasibility studies on
paper, pharmaceutical, and glucose plants. China agreed in 1976 to proceed
with a $4 million irrigation project at Pokhara and the 65-km Naranghar-
Gurkha road, both financed under a $35 million grant.
North Yemen began to shed its dependence on Soviet arms in 1976, and
Saudi Arabia's drive to push the Russians off the Arabian peninsula was
partially successful in that country. Although San'a took delivery
25X1 B of Soviet military hardware due under a 1975 contract, it
refused Moscow's offer of MIG-21s in order to obtain $139 million in Saudi
financing for arms purchases in the West. San'a also reduced the number of
Soviet advisers to 105. Activity on the Soviet-aided cement plant at Bajil and
in agricultural development, however, maintained its previous pace, and
China provided $27 million worth of new aid for industrial plants and for
continuing a road construction program.
Saudi Arabia was less successful in weaning South Yemen from the
Russians. Possibly to counter Saudi offers and assure continued use of the Aden
naval base, the USSR extended $24 million in new economic assistance for
transportation, fisheries, and agricultural development. It also accelerated
25X1 B military deliveries with shipments of MIG-21s and
MIG-17s along with radar and ground support equipment. The Soviet
contingent at the Aden naval facility remained high.
Although Sri Lanka accepted a Chinese loan of $3 million for budget
support and concluded its traditional concessionary rice-rubber barter
agreement, Peking turned down Sri Lanka's request for large amounts of new
aid. Instead China worked off its outstanding agreements: it began work on
the Gin Ganga flood control project and on a textile mill at Mineriya. These
projects will bring about 200 Chinese technicians into Sri Lanka.
The Soviets, whose aid program has been smaller, began work on the
Samanlawewa hydropower project (under a $57 million 1975 credit) and
expanded a Soviet-built steel mill. Moscow continued petroleum exploration,
despite reports of Colombo's dissatisfaction with the Soviet effort. East
European activity during the year included a Romanian agreement for joint
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ventures in industry, agriculture, and transportation; an East German
agreement to furnish rice and textile mills (probably under a $42 million
credit); a Czech contract for equipment and technical assistance to a
refractory works; and transmittal of plans for a small alumina plant to be built
with a $10 million Hungarian credit extended in 1972.
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Table 3
Communist Military Technicians in LDCs '
Number of Persons
1975
1976
Total
USSR
and
Eastern
Europe
Cuba
China
North
Korea
Yugo-
slavia
Total
USSR
and
Eastern
Europe
Cuba
China
North
Korea
Yugo-
slavia
Total
10,470
8,220
760
1,205
165
120
21,730
9,080
11,660
825
30
135
Afghanistan
350
350
0
U
0
0
350
350
0
0
0
0
Algeria
650
650
0
0
0
0
650
650
0
0
0
0
Angola
02
02
02
0
0
0
10,480
480
10,0001
0
0
0
Bangladesh
35
35
0
0
0
0
35
35
0
0
o
o
Burundi
10
o
o
10
o
o
10
0
o
10
0
0
cn
Cameroon
20
0
0
20
0
0
50
o
0
50
o
o
(A
m
7)1 ca,
x) A
m
?I5
Central African Empire
Chad
Congo
15
5
80
15
5
35 4
0
0
0
o
45
o
o
o
o
0
35
5
100
35
5
55
0
o
0
0
o
45
0
o
5
0
o
o
n
x
m
?1
Egypt
215
215
0
0
o
0
190
190 6
0
o
05
0
Equatorial Guinea
330
30
200
100
5
0
330
30
200
100
0
Ethiopia
5
5
0
0
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
0
Guinea
440
75
315
50
0
o
430
75
315
40
0
0
Guinea-Bissau
90
65
25
o
o
o
75
50
25
0
0
0
India
300
300
o
o
o
0
300
300
0
0
0
o
Iran
70
70
o
o
o
0
120
120
0
0
0
o
Iraq
1,040
1,035
0
0
0
5
1,355
1,200
150
o
o
5
Libya
345
345
0
0
0
0
845
845
o
o
o
0
Madagascar
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
10
o
o
o
0
Mali
80
35
0
45
0
o
135
65
0
70
0
0
Morocco
10
10
0
o
o
o
10
10
0
0
0
0
Mozambique
85
25
5
60
0
0
495
45
350
100
o
o
Nigeria
45
45
o
o
o
o
50
50
0
o
o
o
North Yemen
120
120
0
0
0
0
115
115
0
0
o
0
Pakistan
40
0
0
40
0
0
40
0
o
40
0
0
Peru
35
35
0
o
o
0
35
30
o
5
o
0
Sierra Leone
30
o
20
10
0
0
20
o
20
o
o
o
'Approved For Release 2001/04/09 : CIA-RDP79600457A000600020001-5
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Somalia
1,050
1,000
50
0
0
0
1,250
1,000
250
0
0
0
South Yemen
410
260
150
0
0
0
695
345
350
0
0
0
Sri Lanka
15
15
0
0
0
0
5
5
0
0
0
0
Sudan
105
80
0
25
0
0
105
80
0
25
0
0
Syria
3,230
3,200
0
0
30
0
2,500
2,500
0
0
0
0
Tanzania
765
55
5
700
5
5
290
80
'
200
5
5
Togo
5
0
0
0
5
0
5
0
0
0
5
0
Uganda
100
100
0
0
0
0
315
315
0
0
0
0
Zaire
145
0
0
20
125
0
60
0
0
40
20
0
Zambia
200
10
0
80
0
110
235
10
0
100
0
125
'Minimum estimates of the number of persons present for a period of one month or more. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.
2 The 215 Soviet?East European technicians and a minimum figure of 10,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola were excluded because Angola was not
an established government in 1975.
Estimates of the number of Cubans present have run as high as 16,000.
Three hundred additional Soviet military technicians were in Congo, associated with arms deliveries to Angola.
5 The number of technicians is not available.
6 By year's end very few Soviet military advisers remained in Egypt.
(.i) Cfa
rn
Ln
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Table 4
Military Personnel From LDCs Departing for Training in Communist Countries '
Number of Persons
1955-76
1976
Total
Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Total
47,340
3,975
2,245
2
Eastern
USSR Europe
39,985 4,465
3,725 250
2,030 200
2 2
China
2,890
0
15
0
Total
3,065
420
60
2
USSR
2,490
420
60
a
Eastern
Europe
475
0
0
China
100
0
0
0
Bangladesh
445
445
0
0
50
50
0
0
Benin
20
20
0
0
20
20
0
0
Burundi
75
75
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cambodia
30
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cameroon
65
0
0
65
0
0
0
0
Chad
65
65
0
0
65
65
0
0
Congo
835
335
85
415
40
0
40
0
Egypt
6,250
5,665
585
0
30
0
30
0
Equatorial Guinea
200
200
0
0
0
0
0
0
Ghana
180
180
0
0
0
0
0
0
Guinea
1,260
840
60
360
0
0
0
0
Guinea-Bissau
100
100
0
0
0
0
0
0
India
2,270
2,185
85
0
140
100
40
0
Indonesia
9,270
7,560
1,710
0
0
0
0
0
Iran
315
315
0
0
35
35
0
0
Iraq
3,590
3,250
340
0
400
300
100
0
Libya
1,125
1,100
25
0
200
200
0
0
Mali
260
200
10
50
0
0
0
0
Morocco
145
75
70
0
0
0
0
0
Mozambique
390
310
30
50
130
100
30
0
Nigeria
530
495
35
0
30
30
0
0
North Yemen
1,100
1,100
0
0
45
45
0
0
Pakistan
415
45
0
370
75
0
0
75
Peru
550
550
0
0
300
300
0
0
Sierra Leone
150
0
0
150
0
0
0
0
Somalia
2,495
2,395
70
30
20
20
0
0
South Yemen
805
785
20
0
50
50
0
0
Sri Lanka
15
10
0
5
5
5
0
0
Sudan
530
310
20
200
0
0
0
0
Syria
4,150
3,525
625
0
320
200
120
0
Tanzania
2,360
1,325
10
1,025
440
440
0
0
Togo
55
0
0
55
25
0
0
25
Uganda
905
705
200
0
130
50
80
0
Zaire
65
0
0
65
0
0
0
0
Zambia
70
35
0
35
0
0
0
0
Other
35
0
35
0
35
0
35
0
' Minimum estimates of the number of persons departing. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.
2 The number of personnel being trained is not available.
56
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Table 5
Communist Economic Aid Extended to LDCs, 1976
Million US$
Eastern Europe
C:zecho- East
Total
USSR
Total
Bulgaria
slovakia Germany Hungary
Poland
Romania
China
Total'
1,479
875
496
NA
135 71
5
35
250
108
Africa
530
376
76
NA
30 11
0
35
NA
78
Algeria
290
290
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Angola
20
10
10
NA
0 10
0
0
0
0
Benin
NA
0
NA
0
0 0
0
0
NA
0
Botswana
NA
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
NA
Central African Empire
Negl.
Negl.
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
NA
Comoro Islands
NA
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
NA
Ethiopia
1
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
1
Guinea-Bissau
13
13
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Madagascar
22
1
Negl.
0
0 Negl.
0
0
0
21
Morocco
NA
0
NA
0
NA 0
0
0
0
0
Mozambique
4
3
1
0
0 1
0
0
0
0
Sao Tome and Principe
NA
NA
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Senegal
35
0
35
0
0 0
0
35
0
0
Somalia
4
4
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Tanzania
28
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
28
Tunisia
85
55
30
0
30 0
0
0
0
0
Zambia
28
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
28
East Asia
5
0
5
0
0 0
0
NA
5
NA
Philippines
5
0
5
0
0 0
0
NA
5
0
Western Samoa
NA
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
NA
Latin America
156
NA
155
0
100 50
5
NA
0
1
Bolivia
NA
NA
NA
0
0 0
0
NA
0
0
Brazil
100
0
100
0
100 0
0
0
0
0
Colombia
50
0
50
0
0 50
0
0
0
0
Jamaica
1
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
1
Mexico
NA
NA
NA
0
0 NA
0
NA
0
0
Peru
NA
NA
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Uruguay
5
0
5
0
0 0
5
0
0
0
Venezuela
NA
NA
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Footnotes at end of table.
57
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Table 5 (Continued)
Communist Economic Aid Extended to LDCs, 1976
Million US$
Eastern Europe
Czecho- East
Total
USSR
Total
Bulgaria
slovakia Germany Hungary
Poland
Romania
China
Middle East and South Asia
789
499
260
0
5
10
NA
0
245
30
Cyprus
5
0
5
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
Greece
NA
0
NA
0
0
0
0
0
NA
0
Iran
45
0
45
0
0
NA
0
0
45
0
Iraq
150
150
NA
0
0
0
0
0
NA
0
Jordan
25
25
NA
0
0
0
NA
0
0
0
Nepal
NA
NA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
North Yemen
27
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
27
Pakistan
10
0
10
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
South Yemen
24
24
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Sri Lanka
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
Syria
300
300
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Turkey
200
0
200
0
0
0
0
0
200
0
' Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
58
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Table 6
Communist Economic Aid to LDCs
Million US$
Extended
Drawn
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total'
22,922
12,105
6,686
4,131
10,706
6,559
2,199
1,949
1954-66
8,046
5,281
1,927
838
3,146
2,246
555
345
1967
480
299
132
50
530
311
117
101
1968
662
379
220
63
504
310
124
70
1969
894
476
401
16
526
353
102
71
1970
1,127
200
196
731
588
385
132
72
1971
2,172
1,126
484
563
795
440
166
189
1972
2,176
654
915
607
827
429
142
257
1973
1,870
709
587
574
899
491
177
231
1974
1,978
807
893
278
1,113
689
186
239
1975
2,037
1,299
435
303
824
484
198
142
1976
1,479
875
496
108
953
422
300
231
'Because of rounding, components may not add to totals skown.
59
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Table 7
Communist Economic Credits and Grants to LDCs, Extended and Drawn, 1954-76
Million US$
Extended
Drawn
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total '
22,922
12,105
6,686
4,131
10,706
6,559
2,199
1,949
Africa
5,428
1,829
1,298
2,301
2,148
863
260
1,025
Algeria
1,333
716
525
92
402
288
64
50
Angola
20
10
10
0
11
Negl
10
0
Benin
49
5
NA
44
3
0
0
3
Botswana
NA
0
0
NA
0
0
0
0
Burundi
20
0
0
20
7
0
0
7
Cameroon
79
8
0
71
7
6
0
1
Central African Empire
7
3
0
4
7
3
0
4
Chad
55
5
0
50
6
3
0
3
. Comoro islands
NA
0
0
NA
0
0
0
0
Congo
67
14
8
45
63
14
5
44
Equatorial Guinea
25
1
0
24
2
1
0
1
Ethiopia
210
104
19
87
54
26
14
14
Gabon
25
0
0
25
Negl
0
0
Negl
Gambia
17
Negl
0
17
Negl
Negl
0
Negl
Ghana
239
93
104
42
68
31
32
6
Guinea
390
203
110
77
287
185
33
69
Guinea-Bissau
31
14
0
17
1
Negl
0
1
Ivory Coast
NA
0
NA
0
0
0
0
0
Kenya
67
49
0
18
7
4
0
3
Madagascar
95
6
Negl
89
26
1
Negl
24
Mali
177
86
23
68
138
66
7
66
Mauritania
103
8
10
85
15
3
0
13
Mauritius
40
5
0
35
2
2
0
Negl
Morocco
185
98
55
32
72
46
26
0
Mozambique
75
3
13
59
5
Negl
0
4
Niger
54
2
0
52
4
2
0
0
Nigeria
50
7
43
0
7
7
0
0
Rwanda
23
1
0
22
10
1
0
10
Sao Tome and Principe
NA
NA
0
NA
0
0
0
0
Senegal
95
8
35
52
13
5
2
7
Sierra Leone
69
28
0
41
12
3
0
9
Somalia
293
154
6
133
164
89
4
71
Sudan
300
65
153
82
95
29
25
42
Tanzania
399
20
20
359
293
4
3
285
Togo
45
0
0
45
3
0
0
3
Tunisia
236
82
114
40
54
20
31
3
Uganda
31
16
0
15
21
15
0
6
Upper Volta
56
6
0
50
6
3
0
4
Zaire
102
0
0
102
9
0
5
4
Zambia
366
9
50
307
273
6
0
267
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Table 7 (Continued)
Communist Economic Credits and Grants to LDCs, Extended and Drawn, 1954-76
Million US$
Extended
Drawn
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
East Asia
912
257
382
273
517
145
189
183
Burma
157
16
33
108
101
16
23
61
Cambodia
134
25
17
92
91
16
6
69
Indonesia
553
214
292
47
314
111
156
47
Laos
32
2
4
26
11
2
4
5
Philippines
36
0
36
0
0
0
0
0
Western Samoa
NA
0
0
NA
0
0
0
0
Europe
45
0
0
45
8
0
0
8
Malta
45
0
0
45
8
0
0
8
Latin America
2,051
663
1,235
153
446
142
283
21
Argentina
513
219
294
0
89
52
36
0
Bolivia
59
28
31
0
17
12
5
0
Brazil
499
79
420
0
160
35
126
0
Chile
442
238
139
65
63
16
33
15
Colombia
77
11
66
0
3
3
Negl
0
Costa Rica
10
10
0
0
1
1
0
0
Ecuador
19
Negl
19
0
9
Negl
9
0
Guyana
46
0
10
36
10
0
6
5
Jamaica
10
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
Mexico
NA
NA
NA
0
0
0
0
0
Peru
282
26
214
42
79
20
57
2
Uruguay
84
52
32
0
15
4
11
0
Venezuela
10
NA
10
0
0
0
0
0
Middle East and South Asia
Afghanistan
14,486
1,379
9,356
1,263
3,771
39
1,359
77
7,588
720
5,407
672
1,468
13
714
36
Bangladesh
473
304
158
11
256
202
43
11
Cyprus
Egypt
5
2,373
0
1,439
5
800
0
134
0
1,488
0
1 ,052
0
355
0
81
Greece
8
8
NA
0
8
8
0
0
India
2,397
1,942
455
01,737

1,467
270
0
Iran
1,391
805
586
0
791
630
162
0
Iraq
1,189
704
440
45
537
363
172
1
Jordan
25
25
0
0
0
0
0
0
Lebanon
9
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
Nepal
207
24
0
183
93
21
0
72
North Yemen
223
104
13
106
150
77
13
60
Pakistan
1,262
652
87
523
470
154
38
278
South Yemen
148
39
52
57
57
22
9
26
Sri Lanka
324
100
62
162
185
30
39
116
Syria
1,621
768
792
61
640
324
284
33
Turkey
1,452
1,179
273
0
457
386
70
0
Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
61
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Table 8
Communist Economic Technicians in LDCs '
1976
Number of Persons
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China'
Cuba
North
Korea
Total
70,850
19,280
26,065
20,415
4,755
335
Africa
49,565
6,670
20,650
17,915
4,105
225
Algeria
6,845
2,500
4,130
200
15
0
Angola
3,525
150
375
0
3,000
0
Benin
85
10
0
75
0
0
Burundi
250
15
5
225
0
5
Cameroon
210
10
0
200
0
0
Central African Empire
190
165
25
0
0
0
Chad
230
160
0
70
0
0
Congo
840
120
120
450
150
0
Ethiopia
620
75
70
450
0
25
Gabon
75
0
10
6.5
0
0
Gambia
50
0
0
50
0
0
Ghana
210
80
10
120
0
0
Guinea
1,210
350
210
400
250
0
Guinea-Bissau
120
10
5
25
80
0
Ivory Coast
10
0
10
0
0
0
Kenya
40
10
25
5
0
0
Liberia
10
0
10
0
0
0
Libya
11,680
75
11,600
5
0
0
Madagascar
175
35
10
80
25
25
Mali
670
285
25
350
0
10
Mauritania
250
40
10
200
0
0
Mauritius
25
5
0
20
0
0
Morocco
1,530
450
975
100
5
0
Mozambique
625
100
175
175
100
75
Niger
95
5
0
90
0
0
Nigeria
415
225
90
100
0
0
Rwanda
310
10
0
300
0
0
Senegal
165
15
0
150
0
0
Sierra Leone
525
10
0
515
0
0
Somalia
3,740
1,000
500
2,200
30
10
Sudan
870
35
35
800
0
0
Tanzania
1,500
100
60
1,050
290
0
Togo
205
5
0
155
0
45
Tunisia
740
125
550
65
0
0
Uganda
185
65
0
100
10
10
Upper Volta
105
15
0
85
0
5
Zaire
685
0
320
350
0
15
Zambia
5,895
150
45
5,700
0
0
Other
4,655
265
1,250
2,990
150
0
East Asia
105
35
30
40
0
0
Burma
65
15
10
40
0
0
Indonesia
15
5
10
0
0
0
Footnotes at end of table.
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Table 8 (Continued)
Communist Economic Technicians in LDCs '
1976
Number of Persons
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Cuba
North
Korea
Malaysia
5
5
0
0
0
0
Philippines
5
0
5
0
0
0
Singapore
5
5
0
0
0
0
Thailand
10
5
5
0
0
0
Europe
410
0
0
400
0
10
Malta
410
0
0
400
0
10
Latin America
1,320
425
325
105
450
15
Argentina
30
5
25
0
0
0
Bolivia
90
50
40
0
0
0
Brazil
80
25
55
0
0
0
Colombia
30
10
20
0
0
0
Costa Rica
10
10
0
0
0
0
Ecuador
15
5
10
0
0
0
Guyana
185
0
45
65
60
15
Jamaica
290
0
10
0
280
0
Panama
60
0
0
0
60
0
Peru
395
245
85
15
50
0
Uruguay
20
10
10
0
0
0
Venezuela
15
0
15
0
0
0
Other
100
65
10
25
0
0
Middle East and South
Asia
19,450
12,150
5,060
1,955
200
85
Afghanistan
1,170
1,000
50
120
0
0
Bangladesh
240
160
70
10
0
0
Cyprus
25
25
0
0
0
0
Egypt
1,755
1,200
530
25
0
0
Greece
80
10
70
0
0
0
India
1,525
1,350
175
0
0
0
Iran
3,790
3,115
675
0
0
0
Iraq
5,300
2,900
2,000
400
0
0
Jordan
75
25
50
0
0
0
Kuwait
500
25
475
0
0
0
Nepal
275
0
25
250
0
0
North Yemen
615
175
15
400
0
25
Pakistan
555
300
45
200 3
0
10
South Yemen
1,000
250
150
400
200
0
Sri Lanka
155
45
10
100
0
0
Syria
1,780
1,030
650
50
0
50
Turkey
470
400
70
0
0
0
Other
140
140
0
0
0
0
'Minimum estimates of the number present for a period of one month or more. Numbers are rounded to
the nearest five.
Including laborers in some countries.
Excluding Chinese personnel working on the Karakoram highway project in Pakistan. These may
number as many as 20,000.
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Table 9
Technical Trainees From LDCs Departing for Training in Communist Countries '
Number of Persons
1956-76
1976
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
41,895
26,850
14,155
890
5,320
4,255
1,010
55
Africa
9,060
4,600
4,250
210
1,000
625
330
45
Algeria
2,960
1,085
1,875
0
350
200
150
0
Benin
785
465
320
0
0
0
0
0
Burundi
25
0
5
20
0
0
0
0
Cameroon
30
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
Central African Empire
120
85
35
0
0
0
0
0
Congo
130
75
50
5
55
0
50
5
Ethiopia
205
65
100
40
40
0
0
40
(;hana
785
440
345
0
0
0
0
0
Guinea
1,545
1,155
390
0
350
300
50
0
Kenya
125
10
115
0
0
0
0
0
Liberia
5
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
Libya
25
0
25
0
0
0
0
0
Mali
615
400
175
40
0
0
0
0
Mauritania
25
25
0
0
25
25
0
0
Mauritius
5
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
Morocco
175
120
55
0
0
0
0
0
Mozambique
35
0
35
0
25
0
25
0
Nigeria
105
30
75
0
0
0
0
0
Somalia
370
285
85
0
150
100
50
0
Sudan
110
15
95
0
0
0
0
0
Tanzania
380
60
240
80
0
0
0
0
Tunisia
345
130
215
0
0
0
0
0
Uganda
60
55
5
0
0
0
0
0
Upper Volta
60
60
0
0
0
0
0, ,
0
Zambia
35
5
5
25
0
0
0
0
East Asia
1,115
360
345
410
20
5
15
0
Burma
245
50
140
55
20
5
15
0
Cambodia z
385
10
20
355
0
0
0
0
Indonesia
485
300
185
0
0
0
0
0
Footnotes at end of table.
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Table 9 (Continued)
Technical Trainees From LDCs Departing for Training in Communist Countries '
Number of Persons
1956-76
1976
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Europe
35
0
35
0
35
0
35
0
Malta
35
0
35
0
35
0
35
0
Latin America
465
265
190
10
70
5
55
10
Argentina
20
15
5
0
0
0
0
0
Bolivia
5
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
Brazil
15
5
10
0
0
0
0
0
Chile
55
20
35
0
0
0
0
0
Colombia
35
15
20
0
0
0
0
0
Ecuador
25
20
5
0
5
0
5
0
Guyana
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
Mexico
130
85
45
0
35
5
30
0
Peru
165
100
65
0
15
0
15
0
Middle East and South Asia
31,220
21,625
9,335
260
4,195
3,620
575
0
Afghanistan
1,725
1,270
455
0
150
100
50
0
Bangladesh
990
790
200
0
100
50
50
0
Cyprus
100
50
50
0
0
0
0
0
Egypt
8,900
5,160
3,740
0
250
200
50
0
India
5,350
3,820
1,530
0
350
250
100
0
Iran
4,610
3,875
735
0
2,050
2,000
50
0
Iraq
2,640
1,925
705
10
350
300
50
0
Nepal
105
55
10
40
0
0
0
0
North Yemen
890
445
235
210
10
10
0
0
Pakistan
870
775
95
0
325
300
25
0
South Yemen
450
405
45
0
35
35
0
0
Sri Lanka
190
145
45
0
0
0
0
0
Syria
2,590
1,245
1,345
0
450
250
200
0
Turkey
1,785
1,640
145
0
100
100
0
0
Other
25
25
0
0
25
25
0
0
Minimum estimates of the number of persons departing. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.
2 Records through the end of 1974; Cambodia formed a Communist government in 1975.
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Table 10
Academic Students From LDCs Trained in Communist Countries '
Number of Persons
Departure to Communist Countries
1956-76
1976
Being
Trained as of
December 1976
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
86,180
49,875
35,130
1,175
7,965
4,500
3,405
60
36,450
22,025
14,190
235
Africa
40,70523,800
16,065
840
4,250
2,505
1,730
15
18,395
11,470
6,800
125
Algeria
3,970
1,965
1,990
15
375
200
173
0
1,560
1,200
360
0
Angola
590
245
345
0
145
50
95
0
445
100
345
0
Benin
340
215
115
10
40
30
10
0
135
120
15
0
Botswana
150
90
60
0
5
5
0
0
25
25
0
0
Burundi
370
335
35
0
50
40
10
0
160
125
35
0
Cameroon
1,060
660
400
0
60
45
15
0
255
190
65
0
Cape Verde Islands
10
5
5
0
10
5
5
0
10
5
5
0
Central African Empire
880
500
200
180
110
65
45
0
505
305
200
0
Chad
380
360
20
0
120
115
5
0
370
350
20
0
Comoro Islands
40
25
0
15
5
5
0
0
10
10
0
0
Congo
1,670
1,190
465
15
215
150
65
0
1,345
880
465
0
Equatorial Guinea
295
165
130
0
15
15
0
0
85
85
0
0
Ethiopia
1,830
1,075
740
15
545
400
140
5
1,255
800
440
15
Gabon
620
0
610
10
440
0
440
0
620
0
610
10
Gambia
130
130
0
0
20
20
0
0
50
50
0
0
Ghana
2,285
1,200
1,055
30
115
50
65
0
430
165
265
0
Guinea
2,015
950
1,020
45
240
150
90
0
815
510
290
15
Guinea-Bissau
145
65
80
0
15
5
10
0
55
25
30
0
Ivory Coast
230
175
55
0
35
25
10
0
140
130
10
0
Kenya
2,025
1,210
805
10
75
60
15
0
345
185
160
0
Lesotho
175
100
70
5
15
10
5
0
70
35
35
0
Liberia
135
65
70
0
35
20
15
0
120
50
70
0
Libya
20
5
15
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
5
0
Madagascar
510
360
145
5
85
60
25
0
450
300
145
5
Malawi
30
15
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Mali
1,470
1,040
430
0
75
50
25
0
515
300
215
0
Mauritania
385
355
30
0
65
60
5
0
240
215
25
0
Mauritius
270
220
50
0
20
15
5
0
210
160
50
0
Morocco
920
470
450
0
55
20
35
0
300
150
150
0
Mozambique
215
125
90
0
50
25
25
0
110
55
55
0
Niger
395
340
55
0
40
30
10
0
180
155
25
0
Nigeria
3,070
1,950
1,105
15
180
100
80
0
1,175
840
335
0
Reunion
55
55
0
0
5
5
0
0
35
35
0
0
Rhodesia
365
140
225
0
10
5
5
0
125
75
50
0
Rwanda
355
340
15
0
15
15
0
0
245
245
0
0
Footnotes at end of table.
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Table 10 (Continued)
Academic Students from LDCs Trained in Communist Countries '
Number of Persons
Departure to Communist Countries
Being Trained as of
1956-76
1976
December 1976
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Senegal
525
435
90
0
50
45
5
0
275
230
25
20
Sierra Leone
895
730
165
0
55
40
15
0
535
490
45
0
Somalia
2,425
1,820
565
40
125
100
25
0
605
500
105
0
Sudan
3,345
1,365
1,950
30
150
50
100
0
1,740
700
1,020
20
Tanzania
1,640
935
545
160
100
65
25
10
570
295
235
40
Togo
410
320
90
0
55
50
5
0
185
143
40
0
Tunisia
860
160
700
0
70
20
50
0
400
150
250
0
Uganda
755
540
185
30
20
20
0
0
235
200
35
0
Upper Volta
310
275
35
0
75
70
5
0
285
270
15
0
Zaire
1,335
710
615
10
105
50
55
0
465
100
365
0
Zambia
695
265
230
200
50
40
10
0
325
175
150
0
Other
105
105
0
0
105
105
0
0
380
340
40
0
East Asia 2
3,160
1,620
1,405
135
15
15
0
0
300
200
100
0
Burma
535
250
265
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cambodia 2
220
60
150
10
0
0
0
0
90
30
60
0
Indonesia
1,935
1,030
825
80
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Laos 2
420
255
145
20
0
0
0
0
190
150
40
0
Philippines
5
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
South Vietnam'
20
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Thailand
10
5
0
5
0
0
0
0
5
5
0
0
Other
15
15
0
0
15
15
0
0
15
15
0
0
Latin America
8,605
5,285
3,305
15
890
475
410
5
4,200
2,560
1,625
15
Argentina
400
210
190
0
10
5
5
0
125
90
35
0
Bolivia
750
415
335
0
25
10
15
0
220
150
70
0
Brazil
480
265
215
0
20
5
15
0
125
90
35
0
Chile
690
510
180
0
0
0
0
0
200
150
50
0
Colombia
895
495
400
0
160
80
80
0
805
405
400
0
Costa Rica
460
310
150
0
85
50
35
0
400
250
150
0
Dominican Republic
365
220
145
0
60
45
15
0
240
165
75
0
Ecuador
1,140
675
465
0
180
75
105
0
700
235
465
0
El Salvador
240
135
105
0
30
5
25
0
95
20
75
0
French West Indies
90
60
30
0
15
10
5
0
75
50
25
0
Guatemala
90
70
20
0
5
5
0
0
25
25
0
0
Guyana
245
115
130
0
25
5
20
0
40
10
30
0
Haiti
120
60
60
0
10
5
5
0
40
25
15
0
Honduras
255
185
70
0
25
15
10
0
85
65
20
0
Footnotes at end of table.
67
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Table 10 (Continued)
Academic Students from LDCs Trained in Communist Countries '
Number of Persons
Departure to Communist Countries
195646
1976
Being Trained as of
December 1976
Total
Eastern
USSR Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Jamaica
10
10
0
0
10
10
0
0
10
10
0
0
Mexico
570
335
225
10
55
25
30
0
100
45
45
10
Nicaragua
280
195
85
0
5
0
5
0
145
115
30
0
Panama
385
265
120
0
40
25
15
0
160
130
30
0
Paraguay
20
10
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Peru
705
500
205
0
90
70
20
0
550
500
50
0
Uruguay
65
35
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Venezuela
350
210
135
5
40
30
5
5
60
30
25
5
Middle East and South
Asia
33,710
19,170
14,355
185
2,810
1,505
1,265
40
13,555
7,795
5,665
95
Afghanistan
2,515
1,625
885
5
180
130
50
0
950
600
350
0
Bahrain
185
185
0
0
20
20
0
0
120
120
0
0
Bangladesh
1,305
950
350
5
200
140
55
5
1,285
940
340
5
Cyprus
1,545
685
860
0
220
125
95
0
920
340
580
0
Egypt
2,950
1,225
1,725
0
100
25
75
0
705
230
475
0
Greece
130
5
120
5
20
0
20
0
100
0
100
0
India
1,825
1,070
750
5
105
60
45
0
465
380
85
0
Iran
250
65
170
15
15
5
10
0
195
20
160
15
Iraq
4,525
2,555
1,945
25
75
50
25
0
630
350
275
5
Israel
75
75
0
0
0
0
0
0
Jordan
2,245
1,150
1,095
0
125
100
25
0
1,300
800
500
0
Kuwait
110
70
40
0
15
10
5
0
110
70
40
0
Lebanon
1,260
775
485
0
0
0
0
0
465
410
55
0
Nepal
710
575
50
85
70
60
0
10
370
360
0
10
North Yemen
2,060
1,300
760
0
170
130
15
25
750
600
90
60
Oman
15
15
0
0
5
5
0
0
15
15
0
0
Pakistan
290
205
85
0
15
10
5
0
190
110
80
0
South Yemen
1,120
515
605
0
60
50
10
0
420
250
170
0
Sri Lanka
665
390
245
30
20
15
5
0
125
100
25
0
Syria
9,255
5,505
3,740
10
950
550
400
0
3,420
2,100
1,320
0
Trucial States
150
130
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Turkey
80
80
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Other
445
20
425
0
445
20
425
0
1,020
0
1,020
0
Numbers are rounded to the nearest five. Most of the estimates are based on scholarship awards.
Data for Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam are through 1974 because they formed Communist governments in 1975.
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APPENDIX C
Revised Prices of Military Equipment Exported to LDCs
A 1976 review of Soviet prices for military equipment sold to LDCs has
enabled us to update and reassess the value of Soviet arms exported to LDCs in
1972-75. Prior to the update, Soviet equipment prices were based largely on
pre-1970 sources and, in the case of new items for which Soviet price
information was not available, on the cost of producing comparable
equipment in the United States. Ruble prices had been expressed in 1971
dollars. An examination of Soviet export data tended to confirm that prices of
recent exports were understated while the value of grant aid (including the
amount of discount allowed from list prices) was probably overstated.
In addition to our usual annual review and updating of previous editions
of the Communist aid review, we revised the values of Soviet military exports
in the current edition by (a) using new Soviet trade prices where available, and
(b) converting values of all arms transfers into current dollars, based on the
exchange rate for the ruble in the year when the transaction took place.
New prices charged to several large Soviet arms customers for major items
of equipment were applied for deliveries of these items to all clients since
1971. These items made up almost half of deliveries in the four-year period
and accounted for about two-thirds of the 45-percent increase in total value.
The rest of the upward revision results from the application of current
exchange rates to old prices.
In applying the new prices to deliveries, we continued to (a) use uniform
equipment prices for all customers, (b) make a blanket allowance for initial
spare parts and ammunition, and (c) include an allowance for follow-on spares
and ammunition only when they were reported.
Agreements, as opposed to deliveries, were also revalued on a country-by-
country basis to reflect the higher prices. Where information on the kind and
amount of equipment ordered was not available, we adjusted contract values
on the basis of actual equipment deliveries received under the orders.
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To test the validity of our findings, we again compared the dollar value of
arms exports, exclusive of estimated grants, with Soviet export data. In making
the comparison we revised grant aid estimates, for which, because of the lack
of new contract information on terms, we had previously used terms from old
agreements. Such terms often included discounts of a third to a half off list
price, which we believe are no longer applicable. For purposes of comparison
with current Soviet trade data (which exclude grants), grant aid was allowed
only in cases where we had specific information that a discount was provided.
Although, as noted in the 1975 edition, published Soviet statistics do not
explicitly identify military deliveries to LDCs, an unidentified residual in
official Soviet export data is believed to consist mainly of military goods. The
residuals are the difference between published Soviet statistics on total exports
to all LDCs and the sum of the value of exports to the individual LDCs. The
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unexplained differences (noted since 1954) have been roughly comparable
with estimated military deliveries, which are assumed to constitute the bulk of
the difference. While the residuals diverged sharply after 1967 from our
unrevised delivery estimates, the revised dollar estimates of arms ex sorts since
e a ove ta
estimate va ues o Soviet nongrant arms se iveries used in earlier
publications, our revised estimates for deliveries after 1971, and a comparison
of both sets of values with Soviet trade residuals. Because Soviet trade data
exclude all grant aid, our delivery estimates are net of military goods shipped
free of charge; where discounts from list price apply, we have used the
discounted price.
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Analyst:
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CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION STATINTL
Job No. 425-1021-77
SERIES NUMBER Sanitized versior
3f ER 77-10296
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
SECRET
DISTRIBUTION TO RC
NONE
DATE OF DOCUMENT
September 1977
NUMBER OF COPIES
90
NUMBER IN RC
COPY
RECIPIENT
DATE
NO.(E)
STATINTL
SENT
RETURNED
1-90
" c'd from P&PD
7 Oct 77
1
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7 Oct 77
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, CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
SERIES NUMBER Sanitized version
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CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
SECRET
DISTRIBUTION TO RC
NONE
DATE OF DOCUMENT
June
976
NUMBER OF COPIES
80 I' 01/) ,AA--,,-1.4.- (---,--1?_ s
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12 Jul 76
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