WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 22-50 LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: May 31, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

?
Approved F04.1gelease 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-010teA000200050022-1
Weekly Contributions 22-50
LatInmerieiMERETUAE, CIA
31 Way 1950
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
NORTHCRN AREA: In Cuba, the Aut4ntico (government) candidate may min
the election for mayor of Habana by a narrow margin (p.
CENTRAL AREA: In Ecuador, the governmentts expected victory in the
forthcoming congressional elections is not expected to inorease its
stability (p. 2).
SOUTHERN AREA: In Peru, while Odrla is still expected to be elected
constitutional president, the electoral period will be one of danger
to his regime (p. 2).
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation in Colombia 3
The Current Situation in Uruguay 6
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. n
CLASS.
CLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUTH: HR7.11)/274
DATE.( fb V:V/Ii"NER: _
0003/181112r.?
Approved For Release 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050022-1
SECRET
,
Approved For*lease 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-010960600200050022-1
Weekly Contributions, VA, 22-50
(CIA Working Paper)
31 May 1950
1, CUBA: AirgEtgsl:mtilmaisig_esigmfor or of Habana
ny Cuban political observers have predicted that the
president's party, the Autinticos? will lose the 1 June election
for' mayor of Habana to Nicolits Castellanos, who recently resigned
this important political post in order to become the candidate for
the noincidentes" (Gra% Batista, Pujol and the Communiets). Loss
of the election by the administration candidate, the president's
brother Antonio, would be a serious blow to President Prfols pres-
tige, and, despite expected administration victories in a majority
of the other municipal and congressional contests, could reduce the
government's political strength between 1 June 1950 and the 1952,
elections --- even though it would probably not threaten the sta-
bility of the regime.
D/LA believes that, while the election mey be close, the
administration party will win the Habana mayoralty/ thus maintainr
ing the political states-sast.
2, ECUADOR:._ecn:L_CeeFortomite...neel.onalElections
expeoe Plaza's MODN
and Conservative Party candidates will together yin enough votes
in the Lt June congressional elections to assure the continuance of
a pro-government majority in Congress. However, such a victory at
the pale, if it occurs, will maks no appreciable contribution to
the stability of the government, since the revolutionary groups
which currently threaten the present regime continue to base their
hopes on the possibility of staging a successful coup rather than
on coming to povier through constitutional means.
3. PERU: A Month of Decision
IETTECIEM-TEiliesent Peruvian regime will be determined
largely by the events of the period beginning 1 June (when Odria is
scheduled to resign as Junta President to campaign for the constittr?
tional presidency) and ending when the results of the 2 July election
are announced. Mlle Odria's principal opponent, General Montagne,
appears to have a poor chance in the actual balloting, the situation
presents an excellent opportunity to Odrials enemies for subversive
moves to prevent his return to office. Possible danger exists in
two quarters: among members of the present mil4tary junta, some of
whom undoubtedly have designs on the presidencys and the Apristas,
who still represent the largest political group and who maintain at
least acme underground militant organization. For both groups, the
logic of the situation indicates that it is now or possibly never.
While none of the reports of possible revolutionary attempts can be
accepted in Iettete it is obvious that, if Odrials election comes off
as scheduTidThi can assume the presidency with a constitutional
sanction added to the military force that has maintained him in
power to this date. He would than be extremely difficult to dis-
lodge. It is still expected that Odrla will win the election, but
the electoral period will admittedly be one of danger to his regime.
Approved For Release 20111006IMMTZWITP79-01090A0002000022-1
SEORET
Approved For141141ease 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-0109621600200050022-1
Weekly Contributions, p/LA, 22-50 31 MAy 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Mamorandum 32-50
The Current Situation in ColoMbia
(S ..e.The political situation is relatively stable,
aiWRi greater part of the armed forces seem to be loyal
to the government. Economic conditions are generally a
little less favorable but are still good, The Communists
have declined in influence as a result of recent Libor
developments Colonbials relations with other countries
continue to be amicable.
-- US interests have been adversely affected, to
a slight degree, by the continued unfavorable climate for
private foreign investment.)
Political
----IS-Political situation is relatively stable, although the bitter
animosity between the Conservative and Liberal parties remains a dis-
equilibrating factor.
The Idbaral position in regard to the approaching inauguration
(7 Aug 50) of president-elect Laureano Oamez has not yet crystalized,
Each of three courses of action non-violent protestation, some kind
of collaboration, rebellion -- has its advocates, At present, the
first alternative seems to be most widely favored. The second, col-
ltboration, has not secured enough backing among Liberals to become a
reasible alternative. In regard to the third alternatives the advocates
of violence have been to some extent discouraged by the failure of an
attempted revolution on 10 March. In addition, this attempt revealed
to the government many of its enemies, and, therefore, increased the
goverumentss control of the situation. Although the guerrilla forces
on the eastern plains have reached sizable proportions (see Eliam)?
thev are not at present a threat to the central government.
The Conservative position and future course of action depend pri-
mer/4 on Laureano amez. It is true that Guillermo Leon Valencia,
who is, after domes, perhaps the most influential Conservative leader,
has withdrawn from Conservative party activity, presumably hoping to
sake political capital at a later date from his disassociaticn with
the present Conservative regime, Otherwise, however, the Conserva-
tives are apparently united in their support of president-elect 06mez,
The Conservatives are expected to maintain the state of siege at
least until the inauguration of awe on 7 August, Furthermore, there
is no immediate prospect that freedom of the press will be restored,
although censorship has been eased in recent months and there has been
taigoviariiitaleee
3.
Approved For Release 2002/06/11: CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050022-1
Approved ForvIk4lease 2002/06/11M1RDP79-01000600200050022-1
Weekly Contributions, D/IA, 22-50 - 2 - 51 May 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 52..50
some speculation that the form of censorship may changed. On the
other hand, despite the suggestion published in Gam' "El Siglou that
the Liberal Party be outlawed and dissolved, it is not believed that
Laureano 06mez seriously contemplates any drastic action against the
opposition party.
greater part of the armed forces seem to be loyal to the gov-
ernment, and are currently engaged in the primary mission of the
Colombian army-- that of maintaining order. In this mission, the
army has been most successful in the north (Magdalena, Bother, and
Antikula). In the southeast, prinoipalky in Huila, Cauca, Valle,
Tolima, and Caldae, there is a limited amount of sporadic violence,
but the army has been able to maintain a fair degree of order, In
the east, however, in Meta, Herta, Arauca, and the outlying districts
of Cundinamarca, arse- action has so far failed to be effective, and ?
armed bands, an estimated 2,000-6,000 men, have apparently increased
in manpower and weapon strength during the past few months. Ons
thousand army troops were reportedly sent to the area in January and
February. In late March a new administrative area was established in
the center of the disturbed region, with an army officer as civil and
military administrator. During April, the air force performed, in
cooperation with army activities, several strafing missions with a
result of 200 unconfirmed rebel casualties. That the government does
not yet have control of the situation is indicated by prepara-
tions for a now offensive.
Economic
The economic situation was generally a little less favorable, but
was still. good. The current secondary coffee crop has been somewhat
damaged by heavy rains, but the 1949-50 coffee year is ex-
pected to produce a virtually normal amount of coffee for export, since
the primary crop was nech larger than usual. Foreign exchange received
from coffee exports thus far this year has been less than anticipated,
since pricei offered abroad for coffee have been less than the minimum
export prices established by the Office of Exchange Control, and exports
have therefore been curtailed. However, the semi-official Coffee Feder-
ation, in limo with its price support policy, has intervened in the
interior market and made purchases at its guaranteed prices with the
result that the numerous coffee growers have suffered Intl:. The
policy of the Office of Exchange Control to maintain the high minimum
export price, in spite of the fact that this policy entails a temporary
reduction in foreign exchange, is undoubtedly based on the well-founded
theory that Colombian coffee prices will rise, to some extent at least,
within the next several months, and that, in the long run, Colombia's
economy eill receive a greater number of dollars.
4.
Approved For Release 2002 /11 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050022-1
SECRET
Approved FoNelease 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-0109b400200050022-1
ifeek4 Coatributione, D/IA, 22-50 - 3
(CIA MOrking Paper)
Situation laamorendum 32-50
31 Mai 1930
Rising food prices have been wideler pablicized in the Colombian
press. Liberal papers have attributed the rise at least partially to
the political tension which they claim has caused Widespread desertion
of farms However, it is believed that the present cost of living is
.the.common seasonal phenomenon accentuated bye certain amount of crop
damage caused by unneuallyheavy taint.
Subversive
the bommuniste have declined in influence as a result of recent
labor developments. A seemingly united FCC made a strong effort at the
10th CTC congress, held in Bogoti from 1-61 Nay, to maintain OTC's affil-
iation with CUL and MU, but the congress, under Liberal Party influence,
voted 176-141 to break this affiliation and to join ICFTU. This defeat
has tended to isolate the POO in both labor and politics.
US interests have been favorably affected by these developments be
cause CTO's change of affiliation from the Communist-dominated WFTU to
ICFTU reduces Communist ability to disseminate anti-US propaganda in
Colombia and because the isolation of the FCC has not onayweakened its
influence but also has reduced its ability to recruit new members,
collect funds, and avoid prosecution for any illegal activities.
?
International
trarirals relations with other countries continue to be amicable,
although two economic problems have caused a slight strain in relations
with the US. Colombia continues to support the US as against the USSR
in international relations, and has extended diplomatic recognition to
the associated states of Vietnam, Laos, and CaMbodia. Trade agreements
are being negotiated with Italy, 'Western Germany, and Venezuela.
.A dispute arising from the failure of the semi-official an Colomai
bin Merchant Fleet to abide by a Shipping Conference agreement signed
last October has continued for some months, ceasing a slight tension
in US-Colombian relations. New, although the Shipping Conference appar-
ently hopes for total fulfillment of the agreement, the Colombians have ,
offered terms which remove grounds for diplomatic intervention by the US.
The climate for private investment by US citizens in Colombia, how-
ever, has not improved. The departave from the Exchange Control Office
of its anti-US chief has net as yet had a favorable effect. In contra-
ventima of Point IV, the Exchange Control Office has followed a practice
of re-registering employment contracts for foreign technicians for only
brief periods and usually with reduced remittance rights. Although
President Ospina has stated that he has prepared a decree which would
have the effect of protecting foreign investors, no concrete action
favorable to foreign investors has as yet been taken,
'Approved For Release 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050022-1
Approved For Rgipase 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-01090PV200050022-1
SECRET
Weekly Contributions? D/tAl 22-50
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Liemorandum
The CurrebtnE2I211112141112NONE
3/ Nay 1050
(aumpary -e Tho Batlle Somas government remains stable* The
couaryts economic situation has improved considerably in the
last six month period. The armed foreep remain loyal to the
governbent. ComMunists have shown their disruptive capabilities
and a marked imprevement in organicational ability, There is
a trend toward a less intransigent position on foreign policy
questions,.
-- Aside tran the Camnnnist efforts to withhold wool
from US markets, none of the recent developments in Uruguay has
adversely affected US security intereets.)
Political
'TEThatile Berres Government ramaias stable, Its strength was
recently proved when it effectively halted the long wool strike after
labor mediators had failed. Current congressional interpellation of
three cabinet ministers is essentially a political maneuver by the
opposition, to embarrass the adminietration and to gather political ammuni-
tion for the forthcoming eampaiGns, Thus, even though this may result
in the resignations of these ninisters, it does not indicate any serious
governnent weakness* Increased tension and political bickering are
expected until the November presidential elections* A serious split in
the President's Colorade parti has reduced its chances in Vie coming
election as two of the three factiont have agreed to run a single eandi-
date in opposition to the presidential faction's candidate, Tho two
principal opposition parties, the Berreristas and the independent Nationa-
lists, will in all probability run separate candidates although factions
in both parties are striviag towards unification, The small independent
parties -- Socialists, Cormuniste, and Catholic "Union deice" -- are
net likely to offer sorioun competition or substantial aid to any of the
major contenders* Mile the final count is likely to be very close,
regardless ofthe outcome, it is probable that US security interests will
not be adversely affected and that the nett Uruguayan Government will be
pro-US in its oriontatiot as is the present one,
Economic
1111.iguay's economic position .has improved considerably during the past
six menthe, largely because of a stronger wool -market(; Record year-end
sales of weelat'provailing high prices, as tell as heavy sales of other
basic exports, aombined with strict. control of imports, produced thefirst
favorable trade balance since the mid of the war, General improvement of
the ebonaMie situation cushioned the shock of a temporary lose of nearly
Approved For Release 200
RETA-RDP79-01090A00020005062-1
SECRET
Approved For'Release 2002/06/11 ;.,CIA-RDP79-010961A.600200050022-1
Weekly Contributions, D/LA, 22-50
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 33.50
31 Hay 1950
eight million dollars in ten weeks oocaaioned by a threwemonth woo/ strike
which paralyzed ohipments to the US at the peak of the wool season. Rapid
recovery of most of the leases and accrual of substantial dollar exchange
rram the sales of the remaining 4Qg of the current clip were assured by
the proept movement of fool stock after the settlement of the strike.
In general, the econamio outlook is favorable. The only serioue
problem facing the Government is the growing inflation for mach little
corTeetive action can be expeoted, during the pro-election period. The
peso, however, shows sips of renaining relatively stable on. the "free"
market, end exports of basic products appear likely to remain at satis-
factory levels despite a drought that will keep the volume under the
unprecedented figures of 1949.
10.244e,
armad forces remain loyal to the government and aro not expected
to become politically active in the pro-election period. Lxoept for the
effects of the recent receipt of aircraft from the US, there have been
no significant changes in the situation of the Uraguayan armed forces.
eeeversive
tecent Communist developments inolude a marked immense in organizae
,tioral activity and reveal their capabilities to disrupt vital industries.
The prolonged strike of Comnunist Wool workers and the shorter sympathy
strikes of truck drivers and Montevideo port workers which paralyzed the
movement of woolto US markets for approximately three months illustrates
the capability of strategically placed Communist workers to withhold a
strategic commodity from US marketa. . The Communist Party Convention, the
UGT Conference, and the CTAL Conference, all held in Montevideo recently,
represent increased activity in the organizing and bolding of conferences.
Best significant political developmett in t.tie Party convention was' the
announcement of the nomination of Regent? Gomez, Secretary General of the
Party e as a presidential candidate. Most significant developments from
the OTAL conference mere the naming of four regional committees of Latin
Anerican labor groups and the reported decision to withhold strategic -
materials from the 'OS in the event of aver against Ruasia. The Cadmu-
nists are expected to remain active during the pro-election period' and
may play an important part in the election by ultimately shifting their
support to one or another of the Major party candidates.
International
-1MW"-appears to have tempered its obdurate position on principles
it previously conaidered necessary for the defense of democracy in other
oountrios. Its recognition of Peep:maga Arias regime, for example, indi-
oates a lee? intransigent attitude on the.reoogaition of governments
established by force, although it still deplores the use of force and
still refuses to recognize the military governments of Venezuela and
Approved For Release 2002/06/11 ?
01090A000200050022-1
7.
? 114S 1:0
Approved Foritglease 209021 1 : CIA-RDP79-010907600200050022-1
toskly Contributions, DAlik, 22-50
(01A Working Paper)
Situation illem:orandina 53-50
31 Nay 1950
Peru. Uruguayan relations with Argentina. and Paraguay have improved conaider-
ably, while friendship with US, Brazil, and Chile remains at a high levei.
There are indications that UN activity may follow US linos more closely than
before, possibly even to the extent of Uruguayan, willingn.ess to recognize its
arehreenemy Franoo if the US did 800
8,
Approved For Release 2002/e1:71=9-01090A000200050022-1