WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050019-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 9, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Weekly Contributions 0
Latin America-Wision; CIA
9 lay 1950
D LA finds two developments of particular interest this leek: the
action by the Venezuelan government against Communism (p. /00 and the
anti-US demonstrations in Guatemala (p. 3).
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
GENERAL The Inter-American Conference for Democracy and Freedom, soon
to be held in Ravens, should, on balance, have a beneficial influence
in Latin America (p. 2). Relations between Peru and Brazil may be
strained as the result of a border incident (p. 2).
NORTHERN AREA: The Dominican Republic is planning to divert an increas-
ing proportion of its imports from the US to the sterling area (p. 3).
In Antigua (Leeward Islands) economic life ?3 being seriously disrupted
by the current dock-workers" strike (p, ln Guatemala, anti-US
demonstrations reached a new high on Bey Day (p. 3). The death of
Nicaragua's president will have no significant effect, either at home
or abroad (p, h).
CENTRAL AREA: In Venezuela, the oil strike has caused the goverment
to move against the Communists (p. 1). In Colombia, the break of the
Colombian Workers Federation with the CTAL marks a further decline in
Communist influence in that country (p, 5).
SOUTHERN AREA; Paraguay's prospects for stability are now improved
(p. 6).
DOCUMENT NO.
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Weekly Contributions, D/L,
(CIA Working Paper)
9 May 1950
. GENERAL: Inter-American Conference for Demoorac and Freedom
e r- can ? creme or ',mocraey a.? edom
to be held from 12-14 May in Revere represents an attempt on the
part of democratic groups to arouse the people of the Hemisphere
to ',the dangers of the growth of authoritarian regimes in Latin
America".
The conference -iv. unofficial in character and the first of
its kimi to be held on a hemispheric basis plans to discuss the fol-
lowing topics: the strengthening of democracy in the Americas; the
role of the Western Hemisphere in the maintenance or peace; and the
establishment of a permanent organization for democracy and free-
dom. The sponsors of the conference, and its delegates from the
US and other American republics, are mainly prominent exponente
of democracy in their respective countries. This fact, plus the
declaration of the conference's organizing committee that the
people of the Americas should be on their guard against the twin
dangers of Soviet imperialism and the revival of Fascism, make
Communist infiltration of the meeting unlikely.
The conference will provide a forum for the discussion of
rightist and leftist threats to democracy in this Hemisphere, and
will permit persons of varying shades of democratic opinion to ex-
press their views. Admittedly, certain aspects of US foreign policy
may be criticized. Furthermore, the more undemocratic Latin American
regimes will probably be censured, thus stirring up the ill-feeling
already existing between "democratic" and "dictatorial" governments.
On the other hand, the conference delegates known so far are gener-
ally of good repute and sincerely democratic. If this is true of
the others who may, attend, and if the meeting is not used for inter-
ventionist purposes (particularly by any political exiles present),
it will probably have a beneficial influence on public opinion and
will contribute toward furthering democratic processes in Latin
America,
2,.5.....1EbrdelegaBLEmStrainaletions Between Peru and
8Z
Mtrzil protests the recent violation of its frontier by
Peruvian police, another case like that of Hhya de la Torre may be
added to Peru's international difficulties. The Peruvian police
crossed the Brazilian frontier at Tabatinga to seize an Aprista
plotter and, although Junta President Odria has apologized to the
Brazilian Ambassador, he is unlikely to surrender the Aprista to
Brazil. Brazilian insistence on this point or its presentation of
a formal protest could impair the relations between the two coun-
tries to the detriment of inter-American solidarity.
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3. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Imports to be Diverted From VS to Sterling Area
As an additiona argument1 a campaign to o
tam n a larger share of the profitable US sugar market, Dominican
officials have informed the US Fabassy that they are considering
diverting an increasing proportion of their import trade frma the
US to the sterling area. As a preliminary measure, local sugar in-
terests have already been requested to ardor about $700,000 worth
of machinery from the UK rather than the US.
Sugar shipments, valued at $36 million in 1949,
represent about one-half of the Republic's export trade. In 1949,
the UK purchased 90 percent of Dominican sugar exports, the US 2 1/2
percent. The Dominicans are intensely jealous of the preferred posi-
tion of Cuban sugar in the US market, whereby Cuba sells to the US
one-half or more of its crop at favorable prices and thereby can
afford to dispose of the balance on the world market at depressed
prices. Further, the Dominicans anticipate that the UK, once EGA
financing is terminated, will no longer be able to pay for Dominican
sugar in dollars. Consequently, the Dominicans will seek to avoid
the accumulation of non-convertible sterling balances by favoring
sterling instead of dollar purchases.
The Dominican Republic has been a consistently
good customer of the US. In 1949, 75 percent (over $30 million) of
its imports came from the US, while the US and Puerto Rico bought
only 26 percent ($26 million) of the Republic's exports. D/LA
estimates that the US mill lose a significant portion of this market
unless its current sugar policy vis-A-vis the Dominican Republic is
revised. Further, should the present Dominican trade policy be
altered, the example might be followed by neighboring Haiti, which
also desires a larger share of the US sugar and coffee markets.
14 LEEWARD ISLANDS: Strike Threatens Antigua Economy.
The curreni &ft-marker:31 strike is seriously dis-
rupting the tenuous economic life of Antigua. The sugar industry is
the only significant economic activity of the island. Because of
the strike, there have been no sugar shipments for some weeks and,
with storehouses filled to capacity, cane-cutting operations have
ceased. As a result, there are many unemployed, and the loss of a
significant portion of the sugar crop is threatened. There appears
to have been at least a threat of violence as fifty extra policemen
have been brought over from neighboring St. Kitts. The strike does
not appear to be of Communist origin, but has been accompanied by-
manifestations of political dissatisfaction.
5. GUATEMALA: US Policies Publicly Attacked
thy. Day demonstration in Guatemala City con-
stituted the greatest public expression of anti-US feeling in arly of
3.
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Weekly Contributions, D/LA, 19-50 9 May 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
the American republics in recent years. The usual workers' parade
included placards denouncing "Yankee imperialism" foreign companies,
the Atlantic and Rio pacts, and the atomic bomb, ;idle praising
"peace". The government radio transmitted the viciously anti-US
speech of Manuel Pinto Usage, pro-Communist spokesman for the Guate-
malan labor unions and the international CTAL, Pinto Usage praised
nations "fighting for peace" (including Guatemala) and attacked
those seeking to instigate a third world war, The Marshall Plan,
the Truman Plan (Point 4), the Atlantic Pact the Rio Treaty, and
the Act of Chapultepec were branded as "instruments of imperialist
aggression" and "schemes to aid anti.-democratic governments".
This attack on the US typifies the flood of Communist-
inspired propaganda which has followed the affiliation of Pinto
Usage's FSG (Federacifel Sindical Guatemalta) with the CTAL; and
the acceptance of labor support by Lt. Col. Arbens? leftist presi-
dential candidate. It is true that this anti-US demonstration
represents campaign propaganda of a political faction rather than
an expression of the official administration viewpoint. However,
the presence of President Arivalo and other high officials at the
broadcast and the use of the government radio for this purpose again
illustrates the extent to which the administration is prepared to
tolerate and cooperate with anti-US, pro-Communist agitators.
NICARAGUA: Somoza Chosen President
---r-l-TraTi?Vresi:TheeataRomtln y Reyes will have no sig-
nificant effect, either at home or abroad. Complete political
control remains in the hands of General Anastasio Somoza, who has
been chosen as interim president by the congress, and whose complete
political control makes it virtually certain that he will be elected
president at the "popular election" on 21 Mgy,
70 VENEZUELA: Government Moves Against the Communists
The itaxy j??ta governmexfliae accused the Venezuelan
Communist Party of instigating the petroleum workers' strike which
began 3 May, and which by 6 May had spread throughout most of the
25X1 industry. 1 the government took action
6 May to ena the strike, declaring it illegal, ordering the workers
to returns dissolving 44 syndicates and the Communist federation,
Cada Sindical Unitario de Trabajadores Petroleros (COSUTRAPET),
and seizing their books. 1 union leaders are now
in hiding. In a statement issued 6 May, the government declared it
had evidence that work stoppages had been planned and directed by
the Communist Party, and aided by groups of AcciOn Democritica
adherents.
It is significant that the government has officially
recognized the responsibility of the Communist Party for current
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Weekly Contributions, D/LA? 19-50 9 May 1950
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lebor unrest, while assigning an accessory role to AD elements.
It has become increasingly evident since last fall, when the
first instances of cooperation between Communist and former AD
ayndioates occurred (D/LA WkIies: 29 Nov 49; 17 and 31 Jan 50)
that the impetus towards "labor unity" came from the Communist
eyndicates? and that cooperation of former AD syndicates was dic-
tated by expediency rather than by choice. Although ].act week's
otrike call was issued jointly by the "red" (Commmnist) and "blue"
(AD) labor leaders, the dominant r8le of the Commanists was illus-
teated by the fact that the first important walkouts occurred in
fields such as Lagunillas where Communist strength was greatest,
while the strike spread more slowly to areas such as Cabimas where
t'iblue" unions are predominant.
The dissolution of these organizations (including both
"red" and "blue" unions) marks the beginning of a much stronger
anti-Comnunist policy, as wall as a continuation of firm anti-AD
measures. D/L A estimates that this step very likely will be fol-
lowed by increasingly vigorous measures against the Communist
Party, and that detention of many Communist leaders is to be ex-
pected. While a repressive anti-Communist policy provides no
permanent solution to the labor problem, it can be expected to
eliminate much of the Communist influence in the petroleum indust;
ehich has been a potential danger to US interests. Unity of the
junta is probably served by the adoption of a tougher policy, which
will satisfy the military supporters of Prez Jimenez.
. COLOMBIA; Gambian Workers" Confederation CTC Breaks With CTAL
0
Mt rea a Is co'n1761171WEE-Waq-
marks a further decline of Communist influence in Colombir. The
break was opposed by the Colombian Communist Party, whIch had been
able to exercise a decisive influence on CIC policy in former years,
but was approved by the congress* which also voted to join ICFTU
(the international anti-Communist labor federation). During the
past year the Liberal Parte has becone increasingly anti-Communist,
ands, under the government's threat to dissolve CIU, its labor wing
in that organization was able to unite sufficiently not only to
break with Communietetainted CTAL but also to displace Communist
Party memberu on CTU Is board of directors. While the Conservative
0overnment will probably continue to favor the Conservative-and-
Church-sponsored UTC (Union of Colombian Workers) over cr, there
is now a possibility that CIC will not be dissolved.
US interests have been favorably affected by these develop-
ments because 1). CTC's change of affiliatien from CTAL( and therefore
from the Communist-dominated WFTU) to ICFTU reduces Communist ability
to disseminate anti-US propaganda in Colombia and 2) the demonstrated
decline in strength of the local Communist Party will weaken its in?
fluence and its ability to recruit members.,
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Weekly Contributions, DilAs 19-50 9 May 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
9. MUM: Prospects fox" StIONIAMEigg4IMMI
RF:5irc:75.F-ZFrib a paei3Var-e007JAw, In Paraguay have lm-
proved recently.. Military plotting, always a threat in Paraguay,
has subsided recently', and the army appears to be supporting the
government. The government has been able to thwart two known con-
, spiracies. Provisional President Chaves hasthe'support of the
Democratic sector of the Colorado Party, which now is in full con-
trol of that party. The Democratic Colorados were unanimous in
their nomination of Chaves for president in the elections scheduled
for 16 thAy. The current period of stability will continue as long
as Chaves maintains the support of both these groups.
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