INTRODUCTION - [CONVERGING REQUIREMENTS]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000200090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1978
• Content Type: LIST

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CONFIDENTIAL
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I. Introduction
A. Converging requirements
1. I&W Seminar
1 2.
3. WISP
exercise - Carlucci letter
9 May 1 978
4. HPSCI and OMB
B. Definitions and DCI responsibilities (conceptual framework)
1. Current intelligence
2. Little-W
3. Big-W
4. Crisis management (including relations to I&W)
111 II. Background
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A. History of Warning in Community
1. Watch Committee/NIC
2. Internal CIA staff arrangements
3. Change to Special Assistant/SWS
4. WISP
B. Evolution of community watch centers
1. Development in CIA
2. Elsewhere in Community (including WH)
3. Role in warning
C. Arrangements for crisis management (over time)
1. Task force & situation report
2. Role of NIO
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3. National Task Force experiment
4. Present confusion - need to reflect NITC
D. Major (and perennial) issues
1. Relationship of warning to current intelligence
2. Big-W vs. Little-W
3. DCI's responsibilities vs. those of Secretary of Defense
(in warning and intelligence crisis management only)
4. DCI's responsibilities to field commands
III. Discussion
A. Criteria for a National System
1. Clear lines of responsibility under the DCI
2. Smooth transition from normal operations to crisis
3. Line responsibility for warning, balanced by effective
second-look mechanisms
4. DCI control over mechanisms directly supporting him,
balanced by a recognition of Community equities
(especially in strategic warning)
5. Protection of national intelligence assets supporting
NSC from premature subordination to NCA and war-fighting
B. Necessary elements of such a system:
1. Management
a. Line of command under DCI
b. Community oversight and coordination
c. Internal staffing under DCI
2. Arrangements for warning
a. First-look
b. Second-look
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c. Dissemination
d. Collection tasking
3. Additional arrangements for strategic warning
a. Second-look
b. Dissemination
c. Collection tasking
4. Arrangements for crisis management
a. Policy support
b. Analysis
c. Diseemination
d. Collection tasking
IV. Recommendations (or Options?)
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I BACKGROUND
B - Evolution of community watch centers
1. The historical evolution of the CIA Operations Center had
its roots in a number of diverse factors which in their, own way brought
about its development from a simple, one Directorate support adjunct to
the CIA/DDI current intelligence effort to its present status as an all
Agency, all near real time source, community oriented, alert mechanism.
The first was the so-called "information explosion" brought about by the
improvement of technical collection systems and the concomitant high
speed dissemination of this data to a wider audience of both analytical
senior policy players. A second phenomena, more psychological in nature,
111 was the reluctant realization, based mainly on past errors and consequent
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policy pressure, on the part of intelligence collectors and producers)
intelligence and operational players/ and the highest levels of the
government that we in the field of foreign affairs were living in an
increasingly interdependent world; anNia world which and causes
things to happen 24 hours a day, every day. Thus there began/starting
inthemid-1960sagrowing realization in CIA that much needed to be done
to contend with these phenomena.
By the early 1970s this need had become so manifest that the DCI,
in the spring of 1973, commissioned an in-depth study of the need for
and scope of a full blown CIA Operations Center which hopefully would
evolve into a Community-wide National Intelligence Operations Center.
The result:of this Working Group led by Mr. Richard Lehman, the then
D/OCl/DDI were approved and the CIA Operations Center was born in June
1973.
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2. The experience of the other members of the intelligence community
was not dissimiliar. NSA, given the singular real time nature of its
environment the experienceA learned in the shoot down of the EC-121
A
off the coast of Korea in the spring of 1969, organized its NSOC
in February 1973. However, the NSOC is not only an alert mechanism
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for SIGINT but one which also giws significant requirements and
4
analytical responsibilities around the clock. -Today the NSOC,though
devoted solely to SIGINT/is by a significant margin the largest and most
comprehensive, in scope and authority, of all the 24 hour Centers in
the Community.
The experiences of State and its motives for establishing a 24-hour
Operations Center are not clear. But they too probably felt the Same
kinds of pressure. However, unlike most of the intelligence community
Centers their development seems to have had an internal organizational
eer:47-6r/I'Ll
focus, i.e., the need toKaow*fte tne immediate Office of the Secretary
with the Department's information system and the IR intelligence
function. Since its development in late 1972 State's 24-hour center
has been subordinate to the Department's Executive Secretary and has
comprised two discrete 24-hour parts, the Operations Center and an INR
ri./Y-ff'c,4
portion
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portion sGmewhatA removed,by'substantively integrated.
The Pentagon experience was unique in that its J-2/J-3 separate
orientation continued to drive the way their 24-hour centers evolved.
Both developed separate Centers, one the NMCC under the J-3/JCS and
the-Qther the NMIC under DIA. Until 1976 they were not_colocated, but
with the experiences of recent crises as the unifying element there
111 is today a significant improvement in cooperation in crisis times.
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Further the arrival of the NRT imagery era provided the impetus for
further improvement which was manifest, also in 1976, with the estab-
lishment of the CCF to manage collection systems overall in behalf of
all DOD interests.
3. The role of these various Centers in warning varies from almost
total involvement vis-a-vis SIGINT resources in the case of NSOC to
practically no role in the case of the State Operations Center. This
of course follows the nature of the source each represents-
political reporting can be a
first indication but not nearly to a similar extent as to justify, an
active State role in warning. Both the NMCC and the NMIC are deeply
involved in warning both within their 24-hour center and in conjunction,
through vast communication system, with DOD elements abroad throughout
the world. To a significant degree this is all source though they rely
heavily on NSOC for the SIGINT contribution and through NMIC/CCF for
its NRT imagery element.
The role of the CIA Operations Center in warning is at the
same time extant but unordained. It performs a first look warning
function by the very nature of its access, orientation, organization
and personnel. How this role relates to either the second look warning
.function, either to current analysts or to SWS or later WISP is
unclear largely because the issue has never seriously been examined
in CIA.
The establishment of the White House Situation Room as a 24-hour
consumer center occurred in the early 1960s as a need was manifested by
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs to be kept
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immediately and consistently aware of world developments of all kinds.
The Situation Room was originally formed in close consultation with CIA,
in fact its first head was a DDI/CIA. officer. Since then the leadership
has gone through several changes, CIA, NSA, and State, but always with a
civilian Director. Another constant is the fact that the Watch Officers
at the WHSR are members of the CIA Operations Center detailed there for
two years or more, a factor stemming in large measure from their all-
source experience and current intelligence support focus.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-SubstantAve Support
FROM
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15 May 1978
Chia, Requirements & Evaluation Staff
SUBJECT : Past Arrangements for Crisis Management
1. These are some thoughts in response to para I C of your
4 May outline. This is nothing more than one man's view of the
lessons of the past five years.
2. The CIA analytical task force has usually provided the DCI
with quality analysis, that was relevant to the issues under con-
sideration by the NSC, and in a timely fashion. Occasional lapses in
relevance have occurred when the DCI failed to feed back to his
analytical support the results of policy deliberations. This occurred
because the DCI did not have the time or he was accompanied to
those meetings by someone who had other management responsibilities
that precluded briefing the analytical support chief.
3. The establishment of the NIO as the senior substantive
assistant to the DCI largely eliminated the lapses in relevance of
analytical support to the DCI. The NIO also provided a means of
drawing upon the capability of INR or DIA to produce a piece of
analysis for which they were uniquely qualified. This was seldom
arranged as an additional output by INR or DIA because they usually
functioned at full capacity during a crisis. Their contribution
became possible, however, when they realized that the DCI would
use their analysis in a policy forum and thus they would adjust
their schedule to accomodate the NIO request.
4. The effectiveness of CIA task forces has improved markedly
in recent years, both demonstrated and potential, as a result of
the improvements in the Operations Center. Dedicated space, especially
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arranged for task forces, have brought order, better morale, and
improved timeliness. Improved communications and dedicated
administrative support have improved timeliness and allowed us to have
analysts analyze rather than support other analysts.
5. The National Situation Report idea resulted from the
frustrations of the NSC Staff when they were beset with a con-
tinuous stream of situation reports from CIA, DIA, State, NSA
and spot reports from the DDO. The closing time of the intelligence
was usually different in each report, they were issued at different
times, and not infrequently the predictions and judgments were
different. Brent Scowcroft and Bill Hyland were the leaders of a
movement to establish a single national situation report and the
responsibility fell to the DCI.
6. No one in the intelligence community failed to understand
the White House predicament but the obvious solutions all had draw-
backs. The DCI could not seriously contemplate issuing instructions to
Defense and State ordering them to deny the President the benefit of
their information and analysis. The NSC Staffers could have ordered
some staff procedures at the White House Situation Room to alleviate
the confusion. The decision, as a consensus of the Intelligence
Community, was for the DCI to issue a single National Situation
Report into which all intelligence organizations would put their
information and analysis.
7. An ad hoc DCI committee and some elements of the IC Staff
worked on the problem about a year and a consensus evolved that the
production of a National Situation Report required a National Task
Force. Consideration was given to having each organization provide
selected information and analysis to the CIA task force and making
them responsible for incorporating it into a National Situation Report.
That was ruled out on the basis that the Community's communications
capabilities were inadequate. The decision was to assemble analysts
from INR, DIA, and CIA into a single task force at the call of the
DCI. Before we ever tried this, DIA and CIA decided that neither could
afford the proper number of analysts in a NTF and still retain their home-
based capability. The only test of the NTF concept was on the occasion
of the Korean tree cutting incident. Most of us believed that the concept
failed the test.
8. A major improvement in communications has occurred since
we initially discussed issuing a National Situation Report from CIA
into which we would incorporate other contributions. We have an
improved grey phone trunk system which provides better and wider
services. We have grey phone conferencing service. All operations
centers now can transmit page size copy at five seconds per sheet
versus 45-60 seconds per sheet. We have the "Laserfax" fascimile
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transmission system for photographs and map segments. We have
a first generation conferencing and text editing system in DIA,
CIA, and State. The inescapable conclusion is that it is time
to review the concept of CIA/NFAC issuing a National Situation
Report without having to move analysts all over town.
9. The communications improvements noted in para eight probably
would resolve all but one deficiency we found with the concept of a
National Task Force. However we approached the task force problem,
either having the CIA task force issue the National Situation Report
or by having a National Task Force, we perceived the need for a
crisis collection coordinator. This deficiency has been remedied
by the concept of the NITO in the Collection Tasking Staff. It
would appear that the D/DCl/CT could put a NITO in direct support of
the DCI's principal substantive assistant for the crisis (D/DCl/NI
or NIO) and that NITO could then provide the D/DCl/CT the information
he would need to coordinate the collection tasking.
1 cc: Vincent Heyman
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CONFIDENTIAL
Relationship of Current Intelligence and Warning
The business of intelligence is a seamless web. Cuts in it must
always be to some extent arbitrary and must do some damage to the whole.
So it is in the business of current intelligence (the setting apart of
current intelligence is itself one such cut) which broadly stated is,
"Ensure that all evidence that is collected is brought together and the
results disseminated to those who need to know."
The goal of this sweeping charge is to prepare policymakers to act
promptly and wisely. Closer examination of the intelligence web to
identify those parts of it which contribute most directly to producing
prompt action identifies what can be called indications and warning
functions. Some of these are formal processes directed toward warning
of specific upcoming events. The formal processes range from highly
structured system depending on automatic data processing and computer
facilities such as,the WISP committees are developing under DoD auspices
to warn of war in Europe, down through the regular meetings of groups of
knowledgeable analysts such as the interagency South African nuclear
watch team which periodically assesses the likelihood of a South African
nuclear explosive test. At their lower extremities these formal processes
blend into a host of informal thought processes in thousands of analysts
who see their day to day responsibilities as including watch and ward
for the Nation's interests.
The issues of current intelligence versus warning that arise
perennially in the intelligence community nearly all reflect frustrations
and failures arising from the fundamental conflict between two facts.
On the one hand it is clear that there is no division, only a blending,
of what is called current intelligence and what is called indications
and warning. On the other hand it is also clear that the capacities and
stamina of no single mind is up to the task of covering the whole range
of these responsibilities continuously for any area of the world worth
worrying about. Cuts must be made in the web in order for men to manage
it.
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The history of intelligence community efforts to cope with this
fundamental conflict shows an oscillation between (relatively heavy)
reliance on organs specifically assigned I&W responsibility and (relatively
heavy) reliance on generalists. After a period of reliance on specialists
arguments begin to mount to the effect that this reliance has placed
unrealistic and imprudent reliance on the prescience and ingenuity of
narrowly focused bodies and has blurred and diluted the warning responsi-
bilities of the wider community of knowledgeable analysts. After relying
for a time on generalists to warn of impending vents in some region
arguments will begin to mount to the effect thatwiature, pressures and
conflicting demands of current intelligence are so great that it is
asking too much of one analytic corps to expect it to also meet the
rigorous and time-consuming requirements of systematic and effective
warning; only a group trained and experienced in the specialized tools
and techniques of I&W can do that. And so the pendulum has swung back
and forth.
Out of this history has emerged a fairly coherent set of issues
which must be faced again today.
--How do we invest in the warning function so as to concentrate
in those areas where likelihood and relevance combine?
--How do we capitalize on the capacity of mechanical processors
to handle vast quantities of data and the capacity of knowledge-
able area specialists to capture ineffable signs of change?
--How do we prevent the indication and warning function from
becoming a rout exercise?
? --How do we maintain the sensitivity of the whole body of
intelligence analysts to the warning function?
Warning and Strategic Warning
Another finer cut in the web has been made. Strategic Warning
(Big-W) has been set off by itself within the broader concept of warning
(little-w). There are no inherent differences between W and w in terms
of the techniques and methods required. Distinctions rest primarily on
judgments of priorities (the most serious potential and likely military
threats to US security and interests) and the capacities and limitations
of various national-level mechanisms. The significance of the distinction
is that, as a consequence of various policy and program decisions, the
formal national-level warning mechanisms of the Community are almost
exclusively devoted to W while current Community definitions in effect
limit W to warning of a military attack on the United Stated or its
allies.
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A central issue now is the nature and range of potential threats
and crises that most likely will require national-level warning judg-
ments over the next five to ten years. Is the community consensus of
1974-75 still valid that the principal problem and focus should be W (as
now defined), or should priorities and primary missions be revised to
conform to a new and different perception of the most probable range of
threats and crises in the foreseeable future? In an era of detente
relationships between the US, on the one hand, and the USSR and China,
on the other, a plausible case could be made that although strategic
warning (as now defined) must remain the ultimate requirement, the
principal warning problems on the US agenda in the foreseeable future
probably will not focus on potential military confrontations between the
great powers, but rather on lesser conflicts, tensions, and crises
elsewhere. Some of these "lesser" warning situations, of course, will
involve dangers of escalation to strategic warning situations.
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4WOMORANDUM FOR: Members of the IN Working Group
Attached is contribution as
requested at our last meeting.
It is unclear whether I will have to be in
court Tuesday afternoon. If so, I will reschedule
the meeting for 1400 on Thursday, 11 May, and notify
you soonest.
Attachment
Richard man
AD/NFAC/SS
Date 8 May 1 978
FORM mi USE PREVIOUS
5-75 jul EDITIONS
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Strategic Warning Mlurdng Staff
Washington, D.C. 20301
IU0-0023/SWS 5 May 1978
Big 'W' and Small ''W"
1. There are no inherent differences between strategic
warning and warning in terms of the techniques and methods
required for performing these missions. Distinctions be-
tween these two categories of warning that were made in the
past (for example, in DCID 1/5 in 1975) rested primarily on
judgments of (a) priorities (the most serious potential and
likely military threats to US security and interests), and
(b) the capacities and limitations of specific national-level
warning mechanisms.
2. In the present review of warning and crisis manage-
ment arrangements, the central issue would seem to be a
determination of the nature and range of potential threats
and crises that most likely will require national-level
warning judgments over the next five to ten years. Is the
community consensus of 1974-75 that the principal problem
and focus should be Strategic Warning still valid, or should
this definition of priorities and primary mission be revised
to conform to a new and different perception of the most
probable range of threats and crises in the foreseeable future?
In an era of detente relationships between the US, on the one
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hand, and the USSR and China, on the other, a plausible case
could be made that although strategic warning must remain the
ultimate requirement, the principal warning problems on the US
agenda in the foreseeable future probably will not focus on
potential military confrontations between the great powers but
rather on lesser conflicts, tensions, and crises elsewhere.
Some of these "lesser" warning situations, of course, will
involve dangers of escalation to strategic warning situations.
3. If a determination is made that the present national-
level mission should no longer be confined exclusively to
strategic warning, and that the mission defined by DCID 1/5
does not adequately address the most likely developments of
potential warning significance, the central problems will be
(a) how to define and delimit a broader mission that covers
both small "W" and a wide range of non-military threats, and
(b) what mechanisms and procedures should be established to
perform this expanded mission.
4. It seems to me that in considering answers to these
problems, greater and more careful attention should be given
to functions and procedures than to "mechanisms." The correct
answer to the question posed in III A. of Mr. Lehman's Working
Paper -- is the provision of warning of all kinds a line re-
sponsibility? -- should, in my view, be a loud and clear "yes."
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The preoccupation with warning mechanisms in the past has con-
fused and blurred the fundamental problems and dilemmas of
effective warning. The notion that the principal, if not
exclusive, responsibility for strategic warning should be
(or has been) vested in a single entity (the Watch Committee
or the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning Staff)
has tended not only to place unrealistic and imprudent re-
liance on the prescience and capacities of these bodies but
also to blur and dilute the warning responsibilities of the
production offices and senior managers of NFIB agencies.
5. Much of the discussion about warning at the national
level and the concern expressed about the adequacy of the ar-
rangements for strategic warning created by DCID 1/5 reflect
misunderstanding and confusion with respect to the intent
and expectations of this directive. It did not envisage that
the Special Assistant and the SWS would be the sole or exclu-
sive authority for strategic warning. On the contrary, the
directive contemplated that strategic warning would be a
shared community responsibility. The SWS was conceived as
serving essentially a staff, research, and supporting func-
tion and as an adjunct and supplement to the DCI, NFIB pro-
duction offices and the NIO system in meeting their strate-
gic warning responsibilities.
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6. This concept that warning is a broadly shared com-
munity responsibility will assume even greater importance if
Small "W" is to be accorded higher priority and national-level
attention in the future. In view of the formidable range of
subjects, areas, and events that will have to be covered,
procedures and functions of warning analysis will have to be
given more thoughtful attention than organizational mechanisms.
No single entity or mechanism would be even remotely capable
of performing this world-wide mission in a systematic and ef-
fective manner. The sheer volume of material and range of
subjects would seem to rule out the option of a separate
organization for warning. Line responsibility would be the
only feasible course.
7. Line responsibility, however, would raise almost as
many thorny problems and potential hazards as a separate or-
ganization. In view of the prevailing structure of, and the
division of labor in, the intelligence community, responsibility
for the provision of warning of all kinds would necessarily
fall primarily on current intelligence analysts. Long experi-
ence has underscored the difficulties and hazards in combining
current and warning functions in the same corps of analysts.
Training, exhortation, and constant attention by senior manage-
ment would have some positive effect in increasing warning
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sensitivity among current intelligence analysts. But the na-
ture, pressures, and conflicting demands of the current mis-
sion are such that it would be asking too much of the analyst
corps to expect them to meet the rigorous and time-consuming
requirements of systematic and effective warning. Some addi-
tional safeguards, insurance, assistance, and support would
be necessary.
8. The safeguard/insurance function should be performed
by a relatively small interagency staff of trained and experi-
enced specialists in warning intelligence. Warning, to some
extent, is a separate and distinct intelligence discipline.
It is not so much that warning skills, techniques, and methods
are unique; it is more a matter of a systematic and disciplined
evaluation and meticulous reconstruction of trends, informa-
tion and events, drawing upon the lessons of past warning fail-
ures and applying these lessons in a self-conscious way to
contemporary problems.
9. This staff of warning specialists would function
primarily as "second-look" analysts, as consultants and ad-
visers to line analysts, and as researchers into specific
warning problems. These specialists would focus on those
areas where experience has shown deficiencies in threat
perception and the warning process. Their functions would
include:
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a. Study of foreign perceptions and misperceptions
of the distribution of power, opportunities for
political or military gains, and calculations of
risk.
b. Examination of contingencies and options as
perceived by foreign actors.
c. Examination of assumptions and preconceptions
underlying threat perceptions contained in
finished intelligence publications.
d. Indentification of perceptions and assessments
that seem to require revision in the light of
recent events or changes in variable conditions.
Are threats being over-estimated or under-
estimated?
e. Examination of possible areas of unexpected
behavior, actions or accidents.
f. Study of discrepant information or events
which may not have received sufficient attention
or analysis -- as a safeguard against the "trap
or preconception," hardening of assumptions, and
"cognitive closure."
g. Preparation of "worst-case" warning assessments
when the community seems to be face with parti-
cularly ambiguous situations and when incoming
6
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reports on foreign intentions are conflicting
and the possibility or risks or surprise ap-
pears to be increasing.
10. The safeguard staff should have closer and more
regular contacts with NFIB production offices than has been
possible under the SWS arrangement. The logic of the present
institutional structures under the DCI, and of the functions
proposed in paragraph 9, suggest that the safeguard staff should
be subordinate to NFAC and, if possible, be located in CIA
Headquarters. NFAC would provide general and specific guid-
ance to the staff, and proposals or initiatives by the staff
would be reviewed and authorized by NFAC. Members of the
staff would provide a warning perspective and leavening by
participating in interagency groups drafting national estimates,
Alert Memoranda, and various intelligence studies.
Director
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DoD
DoD Equities in Warning and Crisis Management
DoD perceives warning (i.e., strategic warning) as a distinct
collection and analysis sub-discipline and as a full-time occupation for
those assigned to it.
- Warning-related activities are largely confined to the Big W
countries--USSR-Warsaw Pact, North Korea and secondarily China.
Crisis management is considered an ad hoc function to be
handled on a case-by-case basis; although the same people become involved,
it is not considered a functional extension of the I&W mission.
- The SWS role, as viewed by DIA, is long-range I&W; it does not
become involved in day-to-day I&W activities (Alert Center function) or
is it expected to participate in crisis management. Although DIA formally
recognizes that SWS is a DCI element, it is very sensitive to suggestions
that the DCI might want to change its status, mission, location, etc.
- DIA provides expanded support to the OSD/JCS hierarchy on all
situations in which the White House/SCC is interested; however, extraordinary
procedures (task forces, etc) are generally not implemented unless a
Big W country is involved or it is perceived that the U.S. military
establishment may be asked to take an active part.
Absent the foregoing conditions, DoD perceives no relative
change of equities vis-a-vis the DCI and is content to have the latter
lead. Given those conditions, DoD will see increased relative importance
of its interests which will be manifested first and foremost in demands
on National collection assets.
- Similarly, under the latter circumstances, DoD/JCS will play a
more active role vis-a-vis the DCI in SCC intelligence-related deliberations
concerning the situation at hand. Where a question-of strategic warning
exists, DoD/JCS will claim equal, if not greater, voice in advising the
President.
- Consequently, DoD (DIA) is not likely to agree to participate
in a DCI warning and crisis management structure in which its predominance
in the strategic warning area is not operationally recognized, nor is it
likely to assign resources to the functions of that structure (Little W)
it considers to be subsidiary interests.
- However, DoD will likely participate in a Community warning
and crisis management structure to which the DCI has coopted DIA as a
principal player and in which improved access to DCI patronage and
resources (particularly collection) is viewed as a benefit.
FIMIV.MT7.111744p
tiNAL USE
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CONFIDENTIAL
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OVERVIEW:
3 May 1978
DCI SUPPORT TO U.S. MILITARY
FIELD CaMANDERS
The DCI's responsibility for providing national intelligence to the
President and the NSC is well established; agreed upon and reflected
in DCI procedures and deployment of resources. This intelligence support
is also selectively available to other senior U.S. officials in Washington.
The degree to which this kind of support is made available either directly
or through their parent organizations to senior U.S. official representatives
abroad, especially U.S. military field commanders is not well established
but clearly should be, especially in areas like Europe/Middle East (USCINCEUT)
and Korea where serious crisis and warning issues are ever present. The
U.S. military field Commanders there constitute another primary customer
for national intelligence and any DCI statement of WV or crisis management
responsibilities or the establishment, of DCI mechanism should reflect
the reality of this responsibility.
The broadening of the DCI's authority in the recent Executive Order,
specifically the creation of the NITC, plus the DCI's responsibility to
.insure proper distribution of information collected and produced makes the
_manifestation of his responsibilities vis-a-vis the "CINCs" even more
necessary than previously. Also the recent studies on the subject of
national/tactical interface indicate the urgent need for these elements
of the Community to work toward the development of more interactive and
111 mutually supportive arrangements.
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PROCEDURAL/ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS:
The nature of any enhanced DCI national intelligence support to
the CINCs has a number of facets requiring attention. One of the major
issues is reporting both the what and the how:
--currently the provision of finished national intelligence to
them is sporadic; some (Gen. Haig) get practically all that is
available concerning these ares: others CINCSAC-CINCPAC and the
U.S. component of Gen. Haig's command receive considerably less.
The presence of a CIA substantive officer assigned to a command
is a major factor in this connection. Some serious effort to
rationalize this situation must be undertaken to protect the DCI
from criticism;
--currently the provisions of collected, unfinished national
intelligence also lack uniformity. Imagery reporting out of NPIC
is wide spread and responsive and goes directly to the commnds:
Sigint support likewise is broad in coverage and goes directly
to the Commands. CIA/DDO Humint field reporting goes both ways:
a very small amount goes to the CINCs on an "EXCLUSIVE FOR" named
recipients basis, but most goes via the DDO/DIA arranged MILDIS
system which is not viewed as satisfactory by the CINCs, mainly
because the distribution is limited to military subjects, as
determined by the individual DDO divisions in Washington.
The other major aspect of the DCI's support to the CINCs is organization,
i.e., the establishment of DCI representatives at the major field commands
and a responsive community wide supportive or coordinating counterpart.
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IW AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT ISSUES:
If we can assume an enhanced recognition of the need to manifest
the DCI's support to the major U.S. military commanders, and given the
improvements in the DCI's procedural and organizational arrangements
discussed earlier, his ability to deal with IW and crisis management
issues at the CINC level should then exist. It would lack only the
conceptual basis of what kinds of "warning" related data is involved
and via which DCI Washington based mechanisms, i.e., the SWS, an enhanced
SWS, a WISP like arrangement or something entirely new. Clearly, and
mainly on political grounds, the DCI must have at least "a dummy in the
window" (hopefully a lively one) if he is to be perceived as the
President's senior intelligence official in all respects, including
warning and crisis management.
Vincent J. dileymar/
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May 5, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lehman
SUBJECT : IW Resources
1. A vast number of resources must be tapped to
fulfill the IW obligation; I recommend that relatively
few be dedicated full-time. CIA needs a system to use
resources already in place.
2. Rather than adding people, the IW responsi-
bility can be better met by:
a. Designating a small IW control group,
b. Defining the I&W responsibility of NFAC
analysts,
c. Improving analyst attitudes, emphasizing
that IW is a basic responsibility of all
analysts,
d. Establishing clear lines of responsibility
and authority, clearly delineating an IW
SYSTEM,
e. Demanding better communication between
elements in the I&W system.
3. Well defined formal relationships should exist
among elements of an Agency IW system and between an
Agency system and other Intelligence Community I&W
components:
a. A small, specially designated IW control
group should exist,
?(Indico, Ops Ctr)?
SENSITIVE INFEU.IGI:NCE SOURCES
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b. An interface with NITC should be
established,
?(NIO, NITO, CIA members of WISP
Review and Advisory Panel (RAP))?
c. Direct and constant communications with
DOD elements should take place,
?(SWS, RAP, Ops Ctr)?
d. Channels should be established for regular
analytical inputs and reviews,
(NFAC analysts)
e. An alert reservoir of crisis managers
should exist.
(NFAC task force leaders)
DISCUSSION
4. The increased attention focused on IW, and in
particular an I&W system, calls for a clearly delineated
unit vested with responsibility for monitoring I&W and
drawing on analytic and mechanical assets to assist the
DCI in fulfilling his charter responsibilities. Warning,
uncontestably, is the prime object of intelligence.
Therefore, all reasonable resources should be tapped to
assure that information is continually measured against
this object.
5. Theoretically, the analytic capability of the
Intelligence Community has always been brought to bear
on this responsibility. Analysts need to understand
more clearly their place in the IW system.
6. Recently, there has been an effort to make
better use of mechanical processors to prevent omission
of relevant material. The Agency should take advantage
of WISP.
7. Both human judgments and mechanical results
should feed into a small, but specifically charged CIA
unit which has a full-time IW responsibility.
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THE WA/ UNIT
8. However dissatisfied the Intelligence Community
has been with the administration of the IW function,
it has always felt the need for personnel exclusively
devoted to that function, be it a 15-man NIC, a 10-man
SWS, or a 3-man Indico. This need remains unchanged
and, in the interest of a designated I&W system, should
continue. The unit should be small, responsible for
securing analytic inputs and merging these with mechani-
cal products, issuing assessments, and interfacing with
other Intelligence Community WA/ elements.
IW RESOURCES
9. Under the auspices of the DOD, WISP committees
are developing (initially for NATO/WP) indicator lists
with individual target weights to provide periodically
computer processed evaluations. This provides a new
tool in the effort to exploit rigorously the increased
amount of raw IW data.
10. An IW system should exploit the broad per-
spectives of the current intelligence analyst. The
analyst must be drawn into an IW system to provide
leavening and insights necessary to interpret in-
dicators and the computer product. The analyst with
specialized detailed knowledge in an area of responsi-
bility (functional or geographical) should have a
specified role in 101.
11. The current NFAC stress on interdisciplinary
analysis could be used to focus further attention on
warning. Increased analyst interaction should provide
opportunity for indicator review and assessment.
12. In essence, the personnel necessary for IW
are in place, and no additional resources are recommended
in this area. A system to exploit existing resources
fully is badly needed.
Regional An lysis Division
OSR
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15 May 1978
II. DISCUSSION
C. Necessary elements of such a (National) system:
1. Management. The DCI's management role must be considered
carefully in light of his authority and limitations under E.O.
12036.
2
a. Line of command under (the) DCI
According to E.O. 12036, the DCI acts as the primary adviser
to the President and the National Security Council on national
foreign intelligence and provides the President and other
officials with national foreign intelligence. Further, he
acts with appropriate consultation as the Community's principal
spokesperson. He thus has implicit authority to exercise Community
oversight during a crisis situation.
b. Community coordination and oversight
It is critical that the DCI's responsibilities for Community
coordination and oversight be effective during warning and crisis
situations. The effort must be across the entire Intelligence
Community to bring together the analysts and the collectors.
c. Internal staffing under the DCI
E.O. 12036 (1-601b) is clear concerning the duties of the
DCI as "the head of the CIA and of such staff elements as may
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be required for discharge of the Director's Intelligence
Community responsibilities." Thus the DCI is free to
establish his own staff elements to carry out his respon-
sibilities both in the CIA and in the Intelligence Community
as a whole. In warning and/or crisis situations the DCI can
use the NFIB, or a DCI committee, or any other element of his
own staff, or a CIA element, to carry out his responsibilities
for coordination and oversight. If a warning and crisis
situation arises from an international terrorist activity,
special Intelligence Community procedures can be initiated,
by either the DCI or any Intelligence Community agency. To
be effective and responsive, any DCI staffing to cover crisis
situations should provide that support which the President and
the other policy players want most from the DCI -- that is,
intelligence on and analysis of the events and collection
activity during the crisis.
The DCI must be capable of exercising Community leadership
during a period of crisis. To do so, he must be able to operate
through one individual, several individuals, or a committee.
The individuals or committee should function in a Community
mode and support the DCI as a Community entity.
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6' a
The following duties should be performed by the individual
or group:
--Keep the DCI fully informed of the events themselves,
the analysis of them, and the collection activities
during the crisis.
--Ensure that Community efforts are focused on key intelli-
gence needs and on intelligence support to US actions
during the crisis.
-- Organize substantive intelligence efforts and collection
tasking in order to ensure that the entire Community is
working together effectively in providing intelligence
support during the crisis.
--Assign tasks and objectives to collection organizations
and systems.
It is less clear as to whether these individuals should
function in noncrisis periods. It is obvious, however, that
they could carry out duties during a crisis only if, by virtue
of normal responsibilities, they possessed the substantive
knowledge and, during noncrisis periods had carefully studied
intelligence capabilities, organizations, and procedures and
had established the necessary relationships and understandings
with Community components.
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Organizationally, there are a number of entities through which
the DCI could exercise leadership during a crisis. Internal leader-
ship and staffing could be provided by NFAC in the form of an NIO,
the Director of the CIA Operations Center, or some other person.
The fact that most of the substantive analysis during the crisis
would be an NFAC product, argues for this arrangement. Further,
the major portion of the DCI's time in a crisis will involve the
details of events, interaction with substantive analytical support,
and the presentation of analytical views.
Alternatively, leadership could be provided by the Collection
Tasking Staff. CTS is responsible for collection guidance tasking,
an important aspect of crisis management and, as a result, should
play a prominent role in crisis operations.
A third possibility would be the chairman of a committee or
intelligence warning and crisis management team under the DDCI.
The DDCI has command authority explicit in his office. That
authority could be strengthened by a specific delegation of
authority by the DCI. An alternative would be to form a national
level committee, composed of the D/DCl/NI, the D/DCl/CT, the
D/INR, and D/DIA under the chairmanship of the DDCI. Another
alternative would be to form the committee as an advisory or
consultative body to the DDCI who would exercise command authority
over the crisis management organization.
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A fourth option would involve some combination of the other
alternatives. The latter option could call for dual leadership
and staffing from NFAC and the CTS. In this arrangement, an NIO,
either for crisis management or for an area, would provide
leadership for substantive analysis and would be responsible for
analytical support of the DCI. The NFAC officer or team would be
responsible for analytical intelligence reporting and for coordina-
tion of that reporting. The CTS officer or team would be the focal
point for collection tasking and would provide Community coordination
of collection, processing, and dissemination activities. In per-
forming these functions, the CTS officer or team would serve as
NFAC's agent for tasking and coordinating Community activities in ,
support of NFAC's substantive role.
This dual management concept would provide the DCI:
--A single point of contact for analytical and collection
support during a crisis.
--Support immediately available and directly responsible to
him.
--A Community entity upon which to rely.
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II-C-2
Arrangements for Warning
1. We proceed from the assumption that the current arrange-
ments for warning have been judged insufficient but that all the
necessary analytical ingredients are in place. They have just not
been properly energized. A separate group, as small as possible,
is needed to serve as a lightning rod to focus the attention of the
NFAC and the intelligence community as a whole on developments that
might adversely affect US security. To provide the necessary lead-
ership we would retain the position of Special Assistant to the
DCI for Strategic Warning, but broaden his responsibilities to
include all warning and change his title correspondingly. He would
report to the DCI through the DDCI.
2. A new high-level Warning Control Group headed by the DDCI
would be created consisting of top officials from State (INR), DIA
and NSA. This group would meet at the call of the DDCI to discuss
matters brought to his attention by the Special Assistant or by
any senior official in the community, in particular the responsible
NIO.
4. A second deputy would also have a staff of approximately
'located in space adjacent to the CIA Operations
Center. This staff would have the responsibility for warning of
any non-military developments throughout the world that have the
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potential of adversely affecting US security interests. The per-
sonnel of this staff, as in the case of the military staff, would
be drawn from the various components of the intelligence community.
(The Department of State (INR) and the Office of Naval Intelligence
currently do not participate in manning the SWS. It would be
imperative that they participate in the new staffs.) The Chief of
Staff A would serve as a defacto warning advisor to the Chief of
Production, DIA. The Chief of Staff B would serve as a defacto
warning advisor to the Director, NFAC.
5. The two staffs would provide the second look to the first
look now taken by the various operations centers around town as
well as by the desk analysts in the various NFIB offices. The
staffs would be expected to prod existing NFIB offices and to challenge
thinking within those offices rather than to do extensive original
reporting. In no case would the line elements' responsibility for
warning be transferred to the new staffs. The two staffs would
function in parallel with the line units in order to provide insur-
ance that proper warning is indeed conveyed. The two staffs would
obviously have to work in close tandem using the most efficient
conferencing techniques at hand.
6. The new staffs would report directly to the Special Assistant
for Warning who in turn would relay concerns to the DDCI and
when feasible to the Warning Control Group.
7. When apprised of a potential problem area by the Special
Assistant for Warning, the DDCI (with or without the participation
of the Steering Group) may, as he sees fit, direct the responsible
NIO or analytic element to prepare an evaluation of the situation.
This procedure, in some cases, could lead to an alert memorandum to
the DCI with the recommendation that he forward it to the President
8. The dissemination of an alert memorandum would also be
directed downward into the community with whatever sanitization re-
quired. At the same time or even prior to completion of the report,
collection tasking would be initiated through whatever procedures
the NITC would have in being by that time.
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10. The above proposal is suggested as one least disruptive to
the intelligence community yet one involving all components in the
warning process without loss of influence or face. At the same time
it establishes a focus on warning problems at the highest level with-
in the community. This type of warning mechanism would have the
potential for earning the respect of the policy-makers and the
cooperation of analytical elements of the community.
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CONFIDENTIAL
15 May 1978
II-C-3 Additional arrangements for strategic warning
1. Arrangements for strategic warning, as well as for other categories
of warning, should be based on a clear understanding that this is a line
responsibility shared by all NFIB production offices. A small interagency
strategic warning staff should function as a backup and supplement to line
responsibility, not as the sole authority for strategic warning. Its mis-
sion should be focused on long-range research and analysis directed toward
providing a greater margin of insurance and safeguard against strategic
surprise.
2. This mechanism should have the right and responsibility to take
the lead in drawing community attention to developments of potential
strategic warning significance. Beyond this alerting function, the stra-
tegic warning mechanism should be authorized, in cooperation with the ap-
propriate NIO, to prepare warning assessments that would serve as catalysts
for broader community examination and judgment. This mechanism should not
be involved in day-to-day I&W activities, which should remain the responsi-
bility of such line elements as DIA's Alert Center, WISP, CIA's Operations
Center, and current intelligence offices. The strategic warning function
should not duplicate the daily, routine process of examining, evaluating,
and reporting force postures, military exercises, normal deployments, etc.
Warning personnel, moreover, should not be directly involved in crisis
management, although they would contribute warning assessments to crisis
task forces.
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11F. 1 DN A
3. The present definition of strategic warning under DCID 1/5 should
be broadened to include (a) political confrontations between the major Com-
munist powers (the USSR, Warsaw Pact, China, and North Korea), and the US
and its allies; and (b) small "W" situations involving a potential for es-
calation into strategic warning situations. The strategic warning group
would work closely with whatever mechanism is established to cover other
categories of small "W" -- a parallel warning staff, responsible NI0s, etc.
4. This distinction between major warning developments that involve
a potential for political or military confrontation between the major
Communist powers and the US, on the one hand, and other developments which
do not carry immediate dangers of such confrontation, on the other, would
meet the DoD's primary interest in warning activities related to Big "W."
The strategic warning group would function in close association with DIA's
Vice Director for Production.
5. The strategic warning group would report either to a Special
Assistant to the DCI, the Director of NFAC, or the DDCI. Community re-
sponsibility could be symbolized by and centered in a high-level interagency
warning committee which would oversee the group's operations and advise the
senior warning authority. This committee would not have regular weekly
meetings but would convene at the direction of the senior warning authority
to examine specific developments and oversee the community's response -- in
the form of an Alert Memorandum or a Strategic Warning Notice.
6. Other options for handling the strategic warning function might
include:
A. Dropping the distinction between Big W and Small W and vesting
the entire warning mission in an expanded SWS, which could either operate
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as a single warning mechanism or be subdivided into two units -- one for
Big W and the second for all other categories.
B. Appointing a national intelligence officer for warning who
would supervise the separate warning mechanism, provide guidance and over-
sight for the I&W functions and responsibilities of line production offices,
and advise the DCI, DDCI, the Director of NFAC, and the NIOs on all matters
pertaining to warning.
C. Continuing the present arrangement under DCID 1/5, but with
a broader Big W mission for the Special Assistant and SWS as described in
paragraph 3, and with the NIOs responsible for other small "W" coverage.
Dissemination
7. Alert Memoranda or Strategic Warning Notices would be issued to
the DCI and passed, at his discretion, to the President and the NSC. Other
reports and studies prepared by the warning staff would continue to be
disseminated to the Washington policy and intelligence communities and to
the major U & S Commands.
Collection Tasking
8. The strategic warning function should not have a separate tasking
system but should form an integral part of the total warning tasking system.
The warning group would maintain constant contact with the NITO for warning;
any collection requirements not satisfied through line production offices
and Alert Centers would be presented to the NITO for warning.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantke Support
FROM
15 May 1978
(met, Requirements 4 Evaluation Staff
SUBJECT : Support to the DCI in Crisis Management
1. The following thoughts are offered in response to para II C 4
of your 4 May outline.
25X1
2. The arrangements for crisis management should be derived from
the DCI responsibilities in crisis management. The President and the
NSC expect the DCI to provide warning of radical changes in the flow of
events inherent in the crisis of the moment, analysis of intentions
and implications of the actions of the foreign actors in the crisis,
and sometimes he is asked for analysis of the likely implications of
alternative causes of action considered by the USG. The DCI traditionally
has provided these services and we usually label it "policy support" as a
shorthand expression to describe the complicated interaction of the DCI
and the NSC principals in deciding and executing policy in a crisis.
3. To provide this policy support, the DCI must be concerned that
a variety of intelligence collection activities be continued, initiated,
or discontinued. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what is
happening or is likely to happen. The DCI must be concerned about the
priorities to be accorded intelligence information processing and dissem-
ination activities. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what
is happening or is likely to happen. The NSC policy maker has little or
no interest in the details of the collection or processing activity but
has an insatiable appetite for the relevant facts collected and the
analysis of those facts. The output, or the cutting edge, of policy
support is facts and analysis.
4. Our arrangements for crisis management should be designed to:
? increase the responsiveness of analysis to meet the
needs of the policy makers,
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o increase the responsiveness of collection resources to
meet the requirements of the intelligence analysts,
the policy maker, and the military commanders,
O reduce the number of people the DCI must see,
O increase the availability of people and data the DCI
may want to consult,
O increase the time available to the DCI for contemplation
and consultation on crisis matters.
5. The responsiveness of analysis can be improved in a crisis by
concentrating the CIA analytical resources into a task force operated
by the NFAC. This task force could be augmented by analysts from INR
and DIA in the unlikely event that State and Defense needs for direct
intelligence support do not overwhelm INR and DIA. In any event, the
analytical output of the CIA/NFAC task force can benefit by drawing
upon some of the paper produced by INR and DIA as we have done many
times in past crises.
6. The relevance of the CIA/NFAC analysis to policy interests will
be, to some measure, dependent upon our knowledge of what is under
discussion in the USG policy arena. There must be a bridge between the
policy arena and the intelligence support the DCI is expected to provide.
This communication bridge can be provided by providing a special substantive
assistant to the DCI for the duration of the crisis. This person must
possess detailed knowledge of the area and events so that he can back up
the DCI in SCC or NSC meetings. This person must be attuned to policy
nuances and understand the analytical effort behind the DCI in order to
provide guidance to the CIA analytical task force and to INR and DIA as
appropriate. This role could be filled by the D/DCl/NI, by the appropriate
NIO, or by a combination of their efforts.
7. The responsiveness of collection resources will in large
measure improve by the reflexive actions of the collection program
managers in response to the crisis situation. Frequently, however, the
crisis will result in a conflict of priorities for the use of a single
collection system between analysts and policy makers involved in
the crisis and those whose responsibilities are untouched by the crisis.
In the case of such conflict, and also to maintain the level of
responsiveness, it would be helpful for the D/DCl/CT to place a NITO in
direct support of the DCI's special substantive assistant. This would
ensure that there will be someone who has direct knowledge of the
analytic support needed by the DCI who can keep the D/DCl/CT informed of
the priorities from that support.
8. The DDCI could assume a more direct management role and
reduce the demands upon the DCI in the crisis. In particular, the NFAC
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less the analytical task force could report to the DDCI and the Directorate
of Operations less the headquarters resources devoted to support of the
DCI and the task force could report to the DDCI.
9. The main point one ends up with is that the thrust of the DCI's
responsibilities are analytical in nature and that all procedures must be
designed to support him in that role. The major portion of the DCI's time
in a crisis will be spent absorbing the details of events, interacting with
his analytical support, presenting his analysis in policy arenas, and
participating in policy debates. The next heaviest demand will stem from
covert action or paramilitary planning and activities should they be
involved. Other than having periodic briefings or reports on the overall
status of collection systems, one would not expect the DCI to spend much
time on collection matters.
1 cc: Vincent He an
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