GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS: THE DEADLOCKED ALLIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00228R000100170005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Greek-Turkish Relations:
The Deadlocked Allies
An Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
y
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the Chief. West Europe Division, EURA, on
I I
This memorandum was prepared b
11of the Office of European Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
Intelligence Council
Directorate of Operations and the National
Secret
EUR 82-10049
May 1982
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Greek-Turkish Relations:
The Deadlocked Allies
Information available as of 1 May 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
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125X
Greek-Turkish Relations:
The Deadlocked Allies
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Summary Although tensions persist between Greece and Turkey, both countries are
trying to keep their differences-rooted in mutual distrust dating back
several centuries-within bounds. For example, Greek Prime Minister
Papandreou, whose rhetoric before and after his accession to power was a
major factor in the growing tension, seems to be aware of Ankara's stand
that extension of the territorial waters around Greek islands in the Aegean
would be a casus belli. And there are signs that the Turks in fact would not
take military action even if Athens announced such an extension. On other
contentious issues as well-Cyprus, NATO-related questions, and other
aspects of the Aegean dispute-both sides continue to posture but are
avoiding highly provocative actions.
Meanwhile, each side wants the United States to prod the other to be more
conciliatory, and the bilateral dealings of each with Washington-the base
negotiations between the United States and Greece, for example-will be
influenced heavily by abiding suspicions between Ankara and Athens.
Moreover, the conflict between the two over Aegean rights is preventing
resolution of important NATO command and control arrangements on the
southeastern flank. As long as the dispute persists, the region will remain a
troublesome link in the Western Alliance.
Greek-Turkish relations could worsen as the Turkish generals begin to
loosen the restraints on Turkish political activity next year. The process of
restoring civilian rule in Turkey could release nationalist, anti-Greek
pressures that the generals have successfully fended off or ignored. This
could lead to an early constitutional crisis pitting the new president,
possibly General Evren who currently heads the ruling military council,
against the new parliament, with Evren counseling moderation and the
parliament clamoring for a more aggressive stand against the Greeks.
Prime Minister Papandreou, for his part, probably will agree to resume
talks with Ankara, at least on an informal basis, but will continue to use
US facilities in Greece as a means of exerting pressure on the United
States for a Western security guarantee against Turkey and for more
military equipment on concessional terms.
iii Secret
EUR 82-10049
May 1982
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Although Papandreou's popularity and support probably will remain high,
rising inflation and unemployment rates, as well as growing dissatisfaction
with the Greek socialist government's inability to implement its costly
social policies quickly, may subject the government to increasing criticism
from leftists as well as from business and conservative groups. This
criticism could cost the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement votes during the
nationwide municipal elections in the fall and could prompt Papandreou to
rely more than he has on the "Turkish threat" to revive his fortunes.
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Greek-Turkish Relations:
The Deadlocked Allies F
Introduction Each of the two Aegean powers remains deeply concerned about what the
other may do, despite a decline in the acrimonious rhetoric that has
characterized Turkish-Greek relations since Papandreou's election last
October. The Turks continue to reject flatly Papandreou's demand that
NATO and the United States provide a security guarantee against
Turkey-a move Ankara thinks is part of a broader Greek strategy aimed
at getting more from the West at Turkey's expense. Suspicions run deep on
the Greek side as well, with Papandreou charging publicly that Turkey's
aggressive intentions are signaled by the deployment of its Aegean Army
opposite Greek islands in the eastern Aegean. If both governments are
willing to limit recriminations-and various sources indicate that they
want to keep the dispute within bounds-Turkish-Greek relations could
return to normal after a lengthy cooling-off period. Mutual fear and
suspicion, however, will keep alive the possibility of verbal escalation
which, in turn, might lead to a dangerous miscalculation.
Papandreou has sent out diplomatic feelers that suggest he is softening his
stand against negotiations with Turkey, but provocative incidents in the
Aegean are extending the war of nerves. Ankara, for example, is sending
its warships through disputed waters in the Aegean and sending its military
aircraft into the Athens Flight Information Region without prior notifica-
tion to emphasize that it does not recognize Greek claims. Greece, for its
part, continues to intercept some Turkish military aircraft on NATO
missions, ostensibly because they violate Greek airspace.
Contentious History Greece and Turkey have always been suspicious of each other's intentions.
Four hundred years of Ottoman rule left the Greeks convinced that the
Turks are bent on domination-a suspicion that has not abated in the
century and a half since Greece won its independence from the Ottoman
Empire. The Turks, on the other hand, have viewed the Greeks as a people
whose territorial aspirations vastly exceed their entitlements. After near
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On the procedure to be followed for the delimitation of the continental
shelf by Greece and Turkey.
(1) Both parties agree that negotiations be sincere, detailed, and conduct-
ed in good faith with a mutual consent regarding the delimitation of
the continental shelf
(2) Both parties agree that these negotiations should, due to their nature,
be strictly confidential.
(3) Both parties reserve their respective positions regarding the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf.
(4) Both parties undertake the obligation not to use the details of this
agreement and the proposals that each will make during the negotia-
tions in any circumstances outside the context of the negotiations.
(5) Both parties agree no statements or leaks to the press should be made
referring to the content of the negotiations unless they commonly
agree to do so.
(6) Both parties undertake to abstain from any initiative or act relating
to the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea which might prejudice the
negotiations.
(7) Both parties undertake, as far as their bilateral relations are
concerned, to abstain from any initiative or act which would tend to
discredit the other party.
(8) Both parties have agreed to study state practice and international
rules on this subject with a view to educing certain principles and
practical criteria which could be of use in the delimitation of the
continental shelf between the two countries.
(9) A mixed commission will be set up to this end and will be composed
of national representatives.
(10) Both parties agree to adopt a gradual approach in the course of the
negotiations ahead after consulting each other.
continuous hostilities in the early part of this century, Turkish President
Ataturk and Greek Prime Minister Venizelos reached agreements in the
1920s that ushered in a long period of peaceful relations. The Cyprus crisis
and Aegean disputes of the 1960s and 1970s, however, inaugurated
another phase of deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations-a trend accen-
tuated by the election of Papandreou. Apart from the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus in 1974-which prompted Greece to withdraw from the military
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Cyprus
negotiation.
wing of NATO-the key event was the discovery of exploitable oil and
other mineral deposits in the Aegean in the early 1970s, a development
that eventually led both Greeks and Turks to give the Ae can dispute
precedence over the Cyprus problem.
A UN Security Council resolution in 1976 encouraged the two countries to
solve their disputes through bilateral negotiations. The resolution was
followed shortly in the same year by the Berne Declaration in which
Turkey and Greece pledged to resolve the continental shelf issue through
supports their view on the issue.
The Turks consider the Aegean issue a political problem that must be
resolved bilaterally, but the Greeks prefer to view it as a legal problem and
to appeal to international forums to bolster their position. Believing that
Greece has strong legal justification, the Karamanlis and Rallis govern-
ments instituted legal proceedings against Turkey on the continental shelf
issue in the International Court of Justice in 1976. In addition, they called
for a nonaggression pact. Although the Court dismissed the case in 1978
for lack of jurisdiction, the Greeks continue to insist that international law
Cyprus, long a trouble spot in Turkish-Greek relations, assumed even
greater importance in 1974 following the Turkish invasion, which came in
response to a coup against Cypriot President Makarios inspired by the
Greek junta. The Turkish move exposed Greece's military weakness and
crystallized Greek fears of Turkish territorial designs. Successive Greek
governments have taken the view that Cyprus, as an independent state,
must negotiate its own solutions, but they also have given some material
and moral support to the Greek Cypriot administration. Owing to the large
Turkish military presence since 1974, Ankara has become more active in
the intercommunal talks as well as in the Turkish Cypriot administration.
I
react militarily in Cyprus.
Prime Minister Papandreou has taken more interest in Cyprus than his
predecessors. His visit to the island in February was the first ever by a
Greek prime minister, and he has pledged to champion the Greek Cypriot
cause in international forums. But despite these moves and Papandreou's
postelection promise of "dynamic support" for Nicosia, Cyprus will take a
back seat to more immediate concerns such as a security guarantee against
Turkey and the negotiation of an agreement on the US bases in Greece-a
development the Greek Cypriots ultimately may resent. So far, Papan-
dreou seems determined to avoid actions that might compel the Turks to
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The Turks are suspicious of Greek intentions and insist that they must keep
a large force on the island to protect the Turkish minority until a final set-
tlement is reached. The presence of 27,000 Turkish troops on Cyprus
probably also reflects a Turkish belief that Cyprus would be the first place
where the Greeks would test Turkish resolve in case of a general conflict.
Maintaining a large force minimizes dependence on the Turkish mainland
for reinforcements if trouble comes. Ankara recognizes the overall inferior-
ity of its air and naval forces and, as a result, has been modernizing its
units on the island, thereby fueling Greek suspicions that Turkey is
increasing its strength in Cyprus significantly. Although the Turks have
responded with charges of Greek reinforcements, there are no indications
that force levels have changed significantly on either side.
The Aegean Dispute The Aegean dispute generally takes precedence over Cyprus in the
Turkish-Greek quarrel. The dispute predates Papandreou's ascent to power
and entails four separate but related issues-the continental shelf, territori-
al sea and air limits, control over civil and military air traffic, and NATO
command and control arrangements. To both Turks and Greeks, the
dispute involves major questions of sovereign rights and, ultimately,
national security.
Turkey considers the Aegean-a semienclosed sea-important for its
political, economic, and security interests. Under the Treaty of Lausanne
(1923), Greece and Turkey have been using the Aegean commercially on
an equal footing. In the early 1970s, Turkey began arguing that the same
principle of equity should apply to the continental shelf, airspace, and
NATO command and control arrangements. Greece, on the other hand,
believes that it should resume its pre-1974 responsibilities in the Aegean,
most of which were internationally recognized.
Territorial Limits and Continental Shelf
Ankara advocates the establishment of a boundary line through the
Aegean halfway between the Greek and Turkish mainlands-with the
Greek islands close to Turkey being entitled only to small territorial seas.
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Athens, on the other hand, cites the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf (1958) to claim that the islands have their own continental shelf and
form a political extension of the Greek mainland. Greek territorial waters
currently extend to six miles, but Greece claims a 10-mile airspace around
its Aegean islands. Athens reserves the right under international law to
claim 12 miles of territorial waters and continental shelf around its islands.
If Greece were to accept the Turkish formulation, the equilibrium
established by the Treaty of Lausanne would be disrupted, and Greek
access to and sovereignty over the easternmost islands could be challenged.
The Greeks also argue that history, precedent, and territorial security
mandate that they control most Aegean rights. They believe that the
continental shelf boundary should be roughly the same as the national
boundary-that is, the median line between Greek islands and the Turkish
mainland.
Negotiations on the continental shelf have been irregular and unproduc-
tive. For two years the Greeks parried the Turkish proposals calling for
joint exploration or division of the shelf by a median line between the two
mainlands. In June 1977, the Greeks put forward their own proposal for
delimiting the continental shelf. It consisted of a series of alternating
corridors extending from the two mainlands, with the Greek corridors
encompassing the easternmost Greek islands, and the Turkish corridors
extending between the islands midway into the Aegean.
The Turks countered in 1978 with a proposal that each country retain a
coastal shelf encompassing 15 percent of the seabed and that the remainder
be exploited jointly. The Greeks came back with a variation of their
corridor approach that envisaged smaller Turkish salients but included the
principle of joint exploration of the entire shelf. The two sides still could
not agree, and neither has since offered any new proposals.1
Aegean Airspace
The negotiations over Aegean airspace have been more productive, particu-
larly during the rule of former Prime Minister Demirel's minority govern-
ment and the successor military government in Turkey. The issue came to
the fore during the Cyprus crisis when Turkey issued Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) 714, requiring all aircraft approaching Turkish airspace to
report their positions and flight plans upon reaching the Aegean median
line. The purpose of the NOTAM ostensibly was to enable the Turkish
military radar to distinguish between innocent flights and potential
attackers approaching Anatolia. Greece, which has international sanction
to supervise all civilian flights in the Aegean, flatly refused this instruction
and issued its own NOTAM 1157, declaring the Aegean air routes to
Turkey to be unsafe because of the threat of conflicting control orders. F-
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The deadlock kept the Aegean closed to international commercial traffic
for over six years. It finally came to an end in February 1980, when Turkey
withdrew its claim for control of civilian aircraft. In 1981, Greece greatly
reduced the prohibited military zone it had established over Aegean
airspace.
NATO Reintegration
The Aegean dispute played a significant role in negotiations over Greek
reentry into NATO's military wing. Greece had withdrawn from the
Alliance's military structure after the Cyprus crisis, claiming that Athens
could not be part of an alliance that did not prevent a member state,
Turkey, from invading an independent country, Cyprus. Greece's with-
drawal gave Ankara the opportunity to seek a new military arrangement in
the Aegean that would buttress Turkish claims.
Subsequent negotiations culminated in the so-called Rogers Plan, under
which Greece and Turkey agreed to negotiate Aegean command and
control arrangements after Greek reentry into NATO. Although both
countries have taken substantial steps toward solving airspace issues, no
progress has been made on the command and control issue since Greece's
return to the military wing in 1980.
The Papandreou The Aegean dispute is a central concern of Papandreou's foreign policy. So
Factor far, Papandreou has been accommodating to the Turks in private but
unyielding in public. Papandreou's conciliatory approach during his meet-
ings with the Turkish Ambassador to Athens last fall, for example, quickly
gave way to a belligerent posture against Turkey. This ambiguous
approach may stem in part from his desire to keep Turkey off balance, but
it probably also reflects domestic pressure on Papandreou to stand firm
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Turkish Defense Minister
Bayulken, Greek Deputy
Defense Minister Drossoyian-
nis, and Greek Prime Minister
and Minister of Defense Pa an-
dreou (left to right).II
The Greek Government's pronouncements indicate that Athens has gotten
the message, and Turkey, for its part, probably is not preparing for military
action any time soon. In the eight years since the Turks invaded Cyprus,
Greece's overall capabilities have improved to a point where they are
roughly equal to Turkey's. While Ankara still maintains the largest
standing army among the NATO Allies in Europe, the Greeks have newer
equipment, more intensive training, and better maintenance. Moreover, the
Turkish armed forces have extensive internal security duties that detract
from their ability to perform external missions, and their commitments
near Turkey's volatile eastern borders would increase the difficulty of
launching offensive operations in the Aegean.' Athens probably will
continue its high level of defense spending for the next few years, and
rough Greek-Turkish parity thus will probably continue well into the
1980s.2
Ankara is concerned as well about the militarization of the Greek islands.
The Turks complain that Athens has been placing military equipment and
units on the islands since the 1960s in contravention of international
treaties. Athens is barred permanently from militarizing the Dodecanese
Islands by the 1946 Paris Treaty that ceded them to Greece, while the
Treaty of Lausanne similarly forbids militarization of the Aegean Islands.
Athens maintains, however, that a Greek military presence on the islands
close to Turkey is necessary for defensive purposes to counter the threat
posed by the Turkish Aegean Army.
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Present Territorial Water Limits in the Aegean Sea
Thessaloniki
Volos.
NORTHERN
SPORADES
G r e'ec e
Evvoia
*ATHENS
Bandirma
Turkey
CYCLADES Naxos
.Iraklion
Crete
Kilometers
0 25 50 75
0 25 50 75
Nautical Miles
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Possible Greek Territorial Water Claims in the Aegean Sea
r e `\ Evvoia
*ATHENS ,
Argos
IrAklion
Crete
Khios
Sea of
Marmara
Turkey
Possible Greek claim (12 nm)
Limit of Turkish territorial water (6 nm)
Kilometers
0 25 50 75
0 25 50 75
Nautical Miles
Skiros
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The disputes over continental shelf, airspace, and sea boundary issues have
been augmented in recent months by renewed controversy over Greece's
status in NATO, particularly the Greek stand on Aegean command and
control arrangements. Papandreou's electoral promise to reevaluate
Greece's position in NATO led him in December to announce to the
NATO ministerial that the plan under which Greece rejoined NATO's
military wing in 1980 was in "partial suspension." In response, the Turks
in January sought a clarification of Greece's status in NATO, noting that
the ambivalence over Aegean command and control placed the southeast-
ern NATO flank in jeopardy. Although the Turkish move could have
sparked another round of verbal exchanges, Greece defused the controver-
sy-at least temporarily-by reaffirming its commitment to the reintegra-
tion plan. The issue could easily flare again, however, because neither side
is yet showing the flexiblity necessary to negotiate concrete command and
control arrangements based on the vague reintegration plan
Implications for The verbal sparring between Ankara and Athens will continue to have
NATO and the detrimental effects on NATO. Papandreou's insistence on NATO recogni-
United States tion for Greece's "special security needs" has already created friction in
Alliance meetings and in Greek relations with key allies. More important,
failure to resolve Aegean command and control problems is hindering
integration of NATO-committed forces and preventing NATO planners
from allocating areas of responsibility or clarifying coordination proce-
dures. Meanwhile, neither the Greeks nor the Turks have much incentive
to resolve the problem because they can exploit it to lobby for more and
better military equipment on advantageous terms.
Such competition diverts Turkish and Greek attention from NATO's
principal threat, the Warsaw Pact. Mutual suspicions about military
strength and preparedness cause a siphoning off of Greek and Turkish
military resources that could be used to monitor Soviet moves and
otherwise strengthen NATO's position. Increased tension in the Aegean,
moreover, gives Moscow more opportunities to play off one NATO country
against the other. Turkey has worried recently that Moscow's criticism of
its military regime represents a Soviet tilt toward Greece in the Aegean
and Cypriot disputes.
The Greek-Turkish rivalry has also complicated the effort to bring Spain
into NATO. Although the Turks have ratified Spanish entry and the
Greeks are likely to, both have raised issues that grow out of their bilateral
dispute. The Greeks worry, for example, that Spanish participation in
Mediterranean defense could hinder efforts to work out an Aegean
command and control structure. The Turks, on the other hand, made clear
that any NATO concessions to Athens would have led them to drag their
heels on Spanish entry.
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Short-term Outlook Until both sides show greater willingness to talk and to compromise,
Greece and Turkey will continue to be weak and troublesome links in the
Western Alliance, and each side will continue to look to the United States
with a mixture of hope and distrust. Papandreou's recent efforts to calm
the atmosphere probably reflect a concern that Greece has diminished in
strategic importance to the United States. The Turks, for their part, view
this country as the only ally able and will* n to offset declining West
European support for the military regime.______________________ 25
In the short term, conflict between the two countries probably will be
limited to the sort of minor incidents that have occurred already. Although
the Turks have told Athens that they would consider Greek extension of
sea boundaries a casus belli, they probably would not in fact respond with
military action because the Turks are well aware of their military and
political limitations. Ankara instead probably would test Greek intentions
and press its claims by sending seismic exploration vessels and small naval
forces into disputed waters.
Although the chances for war between Greece and Turkey during the next
year are slim, the proliferation of incidents-which have been given greater
visibility by both Athens and Ankara in their propaganda war-has
somewhat increased the chances that a dangerous situation could develop.
Both governments, however, believe that a war would be disastrous and
appear careful not to carry their provocations to excess. If the highly
charged atmosphere were to lead to fighting in the Aegean, both sides
would quickly attempt to limit its scope and to end the confrontation
quickly.
Roots of Compromise
Some hopeful signs can be found in Greek-Turkish relations. Recent
contacts between Greek and Turkish foreign ministry officials suggest, for
example, that Papandreou may be willing to authorize a renewed dialogue
with the Turks in early summer. But Papandreou's electoral pledge not to
negotiate with Ankara means that any overtures would constitute an
about-face. His preliminary moves suggest that he will forgo official
meetings in favor of informal talks-perhaps held at the same time as the
US-Greek base negotiations.
Both sides see it in their interest to avoid war, but neither side would yield
beyond a certain point. The Greeks, for example, would not accede to
Turkish pressure to demilitarize the islands in the absence of an overall set-
tlement. By the same token, the Turks would not leave unchallenged a
Greek declaration of a 12-mile territorial sea, which would effectively turn
the Aegean into a Greek lake.
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Kenan EvrenO
Any compromise would have to involve Greek acceptance of a significant
Turkish role in the Aegean. Turkey, for its part, would have to settle for
substantially less than the equal rights it seeks. And Greece would have to
moderate its proposal that the Athens flight control area coincide with the
national boundary and agree to some joint exploration of the continental
shelf. The Turks would have to make some concessions on Aegean military
command and control as well as commercial rights. Above all, Ankara
would have to acquiesce in some formula, however vague, that Greece
could interpret as a Western security guarantee for Greece's border with
Turkey.
The Longer Term The moderation that the Turkish generals have shown so far may be tested
by domestic pressure in a year or so. A referendum is planned later in 1982
on a new constitution, and resumption of limited political activity probably
will be permitted in early 1983. At some point in this process, the generals
probably will come under increasing pressure, primarily from the new
generation of politicians, to exercise less restraint in responding to Greek
provocations. Once civilian rule is fully restored-perhaps in late 1983 or
early 1984-the new politicians, anxious to build their reputations, could
press for a harder line in dealings with the Greeks-a development that
would increase the chances of armed conflict.
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General EVren, who probably will be elected president in a new civilian
government, is likely to be the principal force for moderation-a modera-
tion that stems in part from his recognition that Turkish air and naval
forces are inferior to Greece's. But his stance could pit him against a new
civilian parliament likely to favor a tough stand against Papandreou. It is
conceivable that such circumstances might even lead to a constitutional
crisis between the executive and legislative branches of government,
subjecting the new constitution to premature legal interpretations or tests
of consistency and flexibililty.
Papandreou for his part will be increasingly occupied with domestic
concerns during the next year, which is-likely to see a further deterioration
in the Greek economy. Although Papandreou's popularity and support
probably will remain high, rising inflation and unemployment rates, as well
as growing dissatisfaction with PASOK's inability to implement its costly
social policies as quickly as expected, may subject the government to
increasing criticism from leftists as well as business and conservative
groups. This criticism could translate into a loss of support for PASOK
during the nationwide municipal elections in the fall and could prompt
Papandreou to rely more on the "Turkish threat" to revive his fortunes.
0
A more aggressive posture by Ankara could thus play directly into the
Greek Prime Minister's hands. Although Papandreou probably will agree
to informal talks between Athens and Ankara later this year, he is likely to
cite a more nationalistic Turkish stance as further evidence of Turkey's
designs on Greek territory. Turkish saber rattling could nudge Papandreou
closer to the United States, but he would still keep up the pressure for a se-
curity guarantee against Turkey and use US facilities in Greece as
leverage.
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