THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLISH CRISIS FOR EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00228R000100140004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ecret
Intelligence
The Broader Implications
of the Polish Crisis
for Eastern Europe
MASTER FILE COPY
N'rY' i Y~~T ~~ # T
Secret
EUR 82-10040
June 1982
440
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Broader Implications
of the Polish Crisis
for Eastern Europe
Irt/ormation available as of 11 June 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
East European Division, Office of European
Analysis. It was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief East
European Division, EURA
Secret
EUR 82-10040
June/981
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Secret
The Broader Implications
of the Polish Crisis
for Eastern Europe
Key Judgments The seizure of power by the military in Poland, a move without precedent
in the states of the Warsaw Pact, seems destined to endure indefinitely, if
only because there is no visible alternative. But this is not to say that the
? military regime will have an easy time of it. For reasons arising out of Po-
land's long history and because of the special circumstances of the regime's
birth, opposition to it will remain resolute and resilient. The regime has no
program beyond austerity and discipline, policies that will not inspire
popular support, and the economy is unlikely to snap back for years to
come, if ever.
The continuing Polish crisis has reverberated throughout an already
troubled Eastern Europe, but it has evoked little sympathy in the area,
where regimes and publics alike are inclined to view it with suspicion and
contempt inspired in part by old nationalisms. The Polish disease, in fact, is
apolitical infection that is unlikely to replicate elsewhere. Even so, to the
extent that Poland's economic problems reflect the inefficiencies of all East
European systems, certain problems encountered in Poland seem likely to
catch up to at least some of the other regimes as well.
By far the most telling impact of the Polish crisis has been the effect on
Western lenders, who perceive perhaps comparably perilous systemic
economic weakness throughout Eastern Europe. The resulting reduction in
economic intercourse between Eastern Europe and the West comes at a
time when Soviet economic problems are encouraging a curtailment of
Soviet subsidies, forcing the East Europeans to rely more and more on their
own resources. As they scramble to increase investment, improve perform-
ance, and restore credit ratings, the pursuit of national economic advantage
and goods to sell to the West augurs poorly for cooperation within the
region and with the USSR.
Some modest experimentation with altering their inefficient economic
systems is, in fact, taking place, but most states are only tinkering because
of the high domestic political risks attached to real reform. And in the im-
mediate wake of the Polish crisis, there is talk of standing pat. Doing so
could, of course, deepen economic travail, which might in turn contribute
to, or even ignite, festering political problems.
Though the prospects for economic reform are thus not bright in the near
term, the existing movement in Hungary toward a more imaginative,
efficient, and even capitalist-tinged system might accelerate. It has
iii Secret
EUR 82-10040
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achieved a certain momentum and not a few successes, and the events in
Poland demonstrated not only the perils of maintaining the old system but
also the need for something substantially better. If the new approach in
Hungary continues to appear promising, others may seek to emulate it,
including the USSR itself if the post-Brezhnev leadership is not overly
rigid and doctrinaire. In the very long term, as the old command system
and the doctrine that attends it are discredited by events, the appeal of sys-
temic reform could prove irresistible almost everywhere in the Bloc.
With or without systemic economic reform, all the East European states
are potentially volatile. Circumstances, however, vary a great deal. East
Germany, with a regime efficient at repression, and Hungary, where the
leadership manages the economy reasonably well and enjoys a measure of
popular support, are for the time being fairly stable. So too is Bulgaria, re-
mote in both distance and spirit from Poland. Czechoslovakia, where
political life has remained in a deep freeze since 1968, may be less so, in
part because its economy is sagging. But Romania is in bad shape and
seems to be galloping Pell-mell into a period of economic and political
instability; the principal rider, Ceausescu, may find himself unhorsed en
route. In Yugoslavia, where the Soviets were routed by Tito more than 30
years ago, the power of the central authorities has been eroded by
competing regional officials and, partly as a result, dealing with serious
economic problems has proved difficult indeed. Because of neighboring
Albania's near-total economic and political isolation, circumstances there
may hardly be better.
In sum, uncertainty and anxiety prevail in Eastern Europe today and are
likely to grow, perhaps dramatically so, in the months and years immedi-
ately ahead. Despite almost four decades of trying, the Soviets have yet to
find even a patchwork solution to the problems of empire. And, especially
because their current round of political succession may produce disruptive
ripples in Eastern Europe, they almost certainly will not find an answer in
the next five years. On the contrary, as Poland has demonstrated anew,
neither time nor the tide of events seems to be on their side in Eastern
Europe.
Given the existing and probable future nexus of forces operating on
Eastern Europe, the West would seem to enjoy an unusually high ability to
influence events and the policies of the regimes in the area, particularly in
the two most independent states, Romania and Yugoslavia. In fact,
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however, Western leverage is circumscribed by the Soviets' willingness to
use force in extremis, the probable lack of major economic carrots to
complement the West's ability to wield the stick, and the West Europeans'
reluctance to exercise economic leverage for specific political purposes.
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and the emergence of the Warsaw Pact's first military regime may well be
Czechoslovakia, 1968-the ultimate effects of the Solidarity movement
reaching consequences of previous crises in the area-Hungary, 1956, and
long-term credits for the states of the area. Yet, judging from the far-
Europe with little obvious effect other than the drying up of medium- and
The Polish events of 1980-81 have by now reverberated throughout Eastern
forces at work and to suggest directions in which the states there may
will look like five years from now, but it does attempt to describe the major
profound. This assessment does not pretend to predict what Eastern Europe
The first section of this assessment compares the Polish crisis with previous
post-World War II crises in Eastern Europe and suggests that, because of
dissimilarities, the Polish disease is not contagious. The second section
places the crisis within the Poles' longer term political experience, finds the
new Polish military regime compatible with that experience, and concludes
that the military will be in power for a long time. The thud section
attempts to define the ripple effects of the Polish crisis in the context of the
political and economic conditions of each of the other East European states
to discover where these effects may roil already troubled waters. And,
finally, the assessment considers Soviet and Western interests in recent
East European developments and suggests the sorts of challenges both
probably will face.
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Secret
of the Polish Crisis
for Eastern Europe
The Broader Implications
The Recurrent Crises
The emergence of a general in the late months of
1981 as the Polish Communist party's first secretary
and his subsequent imposition of a martial law regime
were unprecedented in a Warsaw Pact state. Such
firsts testify to the seriousness of the crisis that
gripped Poland, but they also represent the culmina-
tion of long-term trends in the postwar development of
Eastern Europe.
One weakness most East European regimes share is
an inability to come up with economic strategies that
support growth over the long term; as a result, three
waves of economic crisis have swept over the area in
the postwar period. This weakness is a consequence of
the felt pressure to use economic management sys-
tems that resemble the inefficient Soviet model, of
bad management by economic officials who in many
cases hold their posts by virtue of their political
credentials, and of a reluctance to adjust to changing
economic circumstances because change might imply
leadership malfeasance or-worse-less than total
control. As Poland's economic problems began build-
ing toward another crisis in the second half of the
1970s, the Gierek regime was unable to agree on
ideas, much less programs, for heading it off. It was
hunker down and muddle through.
A reason why promptly addressing economic prob-
lems proves so difficult in Eastern Europe is that
change, to be successful economically, must include a
large dose of austerity and systemic reform. Austerity
is a problem because regimes are usually unwilling to
seek popular cooperation by making concessions in
noneconomic areas or to negotiate its acceptance with
representatives of the people-for example, Solidar-
ity. Yet attempts simply to impose austerity risk
popular unrest. Systemic reform is economically dis-
ruptive and politically destabilizing; it threatens the
party's monopoly on decisionmaking, undermines the
entrenched bureaucracies, and fractures already fac-
tion-ridden Communist parties. The New Courses of
the early 1950s and the New Economic Mechanisms
of the mid-1960s were eventually all abandoned or
put on hold for a time after the Hungarian Revolution
and the Prague Spring because of irresolution or
conservative backlash within the parties. In 1980
factions in the Polish party were arguing only about
the need for change-not over specific reform pro-
grams-and when the crisis broke, the party did not
splinter along major factional faultlines; it simply
collapsed.)
When the first two waves broke over Poland, the party
possessed alternative leaders-the first a purged na-
tionalist (Gomulka), the second awell-regarded party
chief of an industrial province (Gierek). They were
able to step in, depart from the ossified policies of
their predecessors, and for a short while restore the
credibility of the failed party in the public's eye. By
1980, Poland had run out of alternative leaders who
could perform this magic. It turned first to the party
leader responsible for internal security and, when he
failed to prove his commitment to the renewal de-
manded by Solidarity, to the leader of the party's
military wing. There is now no alternative to Jaruzel-
ski's leadershi and it will be some time before one
can emerge.
When Gomulka and Gierek acquired the party first
secretaryship, they had sufficient personal credibility
and support to try new approaches. These did not
include reducing Poland's standard of living nearer to
what the country could afford, but did feature some
In the event, the pervasive Polish bureaucracy was
able to stifle such innovations as factory workers'
councils and democratically elected neighborhood
councils, and deteriorating economic conditions in the
mid-1970s moved Gierek to recentralize. Jaruzelski,
of his forerunners. Although he speaks of reform, he
beyond austerity and worker discipline.
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Previous demands for change in Eastern Europe have
usually been initiated by intellectuals, in and out of
the Communist parties, with only occasional support,
and that delayed, from workers and students. In
Poland in 1980, the workers were the major force for
change, and they were only belatedly supported by the
mass of intellectuals and students. These labor lead-
ers, having been bamboozled twice before and advised
by intellectual dissidents, were not looking for reform-
minded Communists to support; they were determined
themselves to negotiate changes with the regime.
They saw in police provocations and the regime's
unwillingness to make concessions unless forced by
strikes the same old dead hand of the Polish bureauc-
racy. This is why Solidarity became radicalized in its
final months and why all of its major leaders are
unwilling even after five months of martial law to seek
a compromise with Jaruzelski.
In previous East European crises, the military took
little direct political role in the developing stages. In
Hungary in 1956, the armed forces essentially disinte-
grated in the face of Soviet intervention, although
individual officers and men played key roles in the
ensuing resistance. More typically, in Yugoslavia in
1948, Albania in 1961, Romania in 1962-64, and
Poland in 1956 and 1970, the military simply support-
ed the local party leaderships. In the Polish case in
1956, this meant taking up positions that gave the
Soviets pause about intervening to prevent Gomulka's
comeback, and in 1970 it meant firing on demonstra-
tors to keep him in power. Poland in 1981 marks the
first time the military had matters placed in their own
hands.
Previously, when Communist parties in Eastern Eu-
rope appeared to have lost control-or to be opposing
Soviet interests-the Soviets intervened militarily.
Long periods of repression and reestablishment of the
standard instruments of Communist control ensued,
and substantial Soviet economic assistance was pro-
vided to ease the process. Perhaps ironically the East
Europeans ultimately profited in the sense that, for a
variety of reasons-including Khrushchev's recogni-
tion that rigid Stalinism had contributed to Eastern
Europe's difficulties-they no longer felt required
after 1956 to copy slavishly Soviet domestic practices.
And after 1968 they were allowed to borrow in the
West to modernize their industries and agriculture, to
attempt to participate more fully in the international
economy, and to devote more attention and resources
to raising living standards. In allowing the East
European regimes to strike a bargain with disaffected
consumers, the Soviets implicitly recognized that they
would have to turn to the West, not the USSR, for
much of the wherewithal to carry it out. Only in
Poland in 1981 did the USSR call on the local
military to restore control. And now in Poland in 1982
it appears that the Soviets-still unable or unwilling
to come up with adequate amounts of aid, but encour-
aging actions that dried up Western sources-have in
effect decreed a program of grim austerity.
Having developed with a different dynamic than
previous crises in postwar Eastern Europe, the crisis in
Poland has produced quite different consequences:
? Because no major party leaders or factions can
claim popular credit for having participated in the
renewal movement, and because the party was
nonetheless disabled by the strains of the renewal
period, it has become a discredited institution whose
mere existence impedes the "normalization"
process.
? Because the main force for renewal came almost
totally from outside the official political system and
enjoyed broad popular support, it cannot be elimi-
nated by so relatively simple an act as a purge;
continuing opposition to the regime will accordingly
be more resolute and resilient than in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.
? Because the economic problems facing Poland by
1980 were more severe than those previously facing
East European regimes-and because they are be-
ing only partially addressed by the martial law
regime-the economy will not reach previous levels
of output and growth for many years. Tensions
between the regime and the public will, accordingly,
remain relatively high.
? Because the military lacks a credible civilian institu-
tion to turn power back to and will face continuing
popular opposition, it probably will remain in power
for a long time, filling the bureaucracy with its own
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people. Although immersion in governing could
transform the military into a force for systemic
reform, the generals and colonels are more likely to
succumb to the stultifying ways of Polish bureauc-
racies, equally reluctant to relinquish power.
? Because the Jaruzelski regime, despite lipservice to
the need for political and economic reform, has no
program beyond austerity and discipline, and be-
cause it apparently sees little opportunity for reform
until public order and economic activity have been
stabilized, military Communism, at least initially, is
apt to look to traditional military values for its
inspiration. It is thus likely procedurally to empha-
size order and routine, delegation of authority to
competent subordinates, regular inspections and cri-
tiques, and summary punishment for incompetence
and insubordination.
? Because Jaruzelski has demonstrated on occasion
that he can resist Soviet advice, such as that party
leader Kania be dumped in the summer of 1981, the
longstanding Polish-Soviet working relationship
may develop in ways that may surprise Moscow.
The Soviets will find that they are dealing not with
the remnant of a failed Communist party, but with
an institution and leader that take pride in their
efficiency in imposing martial law and austerity.
The Polish regime, moreover, may believe it is given
leverage by the paucity of Soviet options. There is
thus the potential for a more equal relationship-
and amore fractious one should differences crop up.
Poland's considerable economic dependence on the
USSR has been increased by its diminished ability
to borrow in the West, but-as Romania has dem-
onstrated repeatedly in the past-this does not
translate automatically into more political leverage
for the USSR. If and when it does, this leverage will
be most effective in the negative sense of discourag-
ing Polish actions Moscow does not approve of.~
The Broader Polish Perspective
The martial law regime is a first for a Warsaw Pact
state but hardly a first for Poland. Although the
majority of Poles have no direct recollection of their
country's last experience with a military regime
(1926-39), they are a historically conscious people
whose perceptions and attitudes are broadly condi-
tioned by their past.
The Poles, like most of the peoples of Eastern Europe,
flourished in the Middle Ages, establishing with the
Lithuanians a kingdom that stretched at one point
from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Weakened by a
succession of costly foreign and civil wars, Poland was
partitioned three times by the Russians, Germans,
and Austrians until it ceased to exist in 1795. Modern
Poles may consider Jaruzelski a traitor for having
imposed martial law at Soviet urging, but his claim
that a strong central authority is necessary to preserve
the Polish state will ultimately strike a historically
responsive chord, especially among intellectuals. The
first Warsaw Pact exercise in Poland after martial
law was imposed involved-with the Poles~nly So-
viet and East German troops, and Jaruzelski's first
trips abroad after assuming power were to Moscow
and East Berlin-testimony to the Russo-German
context of much of Poland's history
During their long subjugation by the three empires,
the Poles against considerable odds maintained their
national identity through the institution of the Catho-
lic Church, which explains in part the influence the
Church exercises to this day. Each of the three parts
of Poland, however, developed in politically and eco-
nomically different directions. The resultant regional-
ism is one reason why Poles, whether in the Commu-
nist party or Solidarity, have difficulty making
common cause.
During the long occupations, some Poles served for-
eign masters as soldiers, diplomats, and administra-
tors. Others became flaming Polish nationalists, con-
sidering officials of any nationality-including
Polish~ppressors and mastering the skills of clan-
destine organization and resistance that have been
perpetuated in Solidarity. It was during the pre-
World War I part of the partition that the bitter
division developed among Poles over whether their
nationhood was better served by close alliance with
the backward, but ethnically akin, Russians or with
the value-sharing, but occasionally indifferent, West.
Marshal Pilsudski, who led the coup d'etat in 1926,
embodied a blend of these influences. A product of
Russian Poland where he was several times impris-
oned for revolutionary socialist activities, he escaped
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to Austrian Poland where under Hapsburg protection
he helped raise embryo Polish military units to fight
during World War I for the liberation of Russian
Poland. When Poland regained its statehood in 1918,
he became its first president, presided over the instal-
lation of its first government-socialist-and, in
1920, led the Poles in a successful war against the new
Russian Bolshevik regime to push the border east-
ward. Later on, when Poland's myriad and fractious
political parties proved unable to govern or to stabilize
the chaotic economy, he returned to public life to
install a conservative military regime which, led by
generals and colonels he selected, survived his death
in 1935 and governed Poland until the fourth parti-
tion, between the Germans and the Russians, in 1939.
Had Generals Jaruzelski and Pilsudski been contem-
poraries, they would have been on opposite sides.
Deported to the USSR with his family in 1939,
Jaruzelski came of age while fighting in Polish units
of the Red Army in World War II, participated in the
defeat of Western-oriented and nationalist Poles in
the reestablished postwar Poland, and served his early
career in a Polish Army commanded by a Russian
officer. His career only really took off, however, after
the Polish crisis of 1956 and during the re-Poloniza-
tion of the armed forces. Moving rapidly up the
military and party hierarchies, he was available in the
wings, like Pilsudski, to step in at a moment of
political and economic crisis. One may suspect that
what he is creating will last nearly as long, and
perhaps will also grow more repressive, and that, like
Pilsudski, he will change his political stripes once in
power.
It may be significant that during the interwar period
the natural affinities were between the Church and
agrarians and between the socialists and democrats.
There is reason to doubt, therefore, whether the
Church and Solidarity, the embodiments of divergent
Polish traditions, will ever arrive at the sort of alliance
that might produce lasting political results. The deep-
est antagonisms of the interwar period were between
the military and the socialists and democrats, with the
Church and agrarians closer to the military.
Jaruzelski's avoidance of direct conflict with the
Church and farmers appears to have paid off: the
Church has expressed opposition to popular violence
against the authorities, and the farmers have observed
martial law. But there remains the possibility, how-
ever slight, that the military regime, out of frustration
over food supplies and the Church's continuing moral
support for an independent trade union organization,
might with Soviet encouragement move against the
Church and farmers. If this move occurred while the
campaign against Solidarity was maintained, it might
yet unify all Poles in active opposition to Jaruzelski
and drive Poland over the brink
The Broader Regional Impact
Poland's Solidarity movement has elicited little sup-
port in the other states of Eastern Europe. Jaruzelski's
suppression of it, accordingly, caused few ripples. Nor
is there an inclination to aid the prodigal Poles any
more than Moscow requires, as East European living
standards are already under severe pressure. To have
had a positive impact in Eastern Europe, Solidarity .
would have had to succeed in Poland
Much of this lack of sympathy for the Poles has its
origins in history. Even as the Poles were succumbing
to their more powerful Germanic and Russian neigh-
bors, the Hungarians were successfully striving for
equal status with the Austrians under the Hapsburgs.
In the Balkans, Slavs and Romanians were casting off
centuries of Ottoman rule. And in modern times the
Poles have not been a force for regional amity, having
participated in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia
in 1938 and the military suppression of the Prague
Spring in 1968. Seen in this historical perspective,
Poland's crisis of 1980-81 was viewed by most East
Europeans as a problem the "ethnically inferior" and
"priest-ridden" Poles had created for themselves out
of their own inbred romanticism, stupidity, and indo-
lence. Local, mutually exclusive nationalisms in East-
ern Europe help explain why no wave of revolution
against the Soviet $mpire has occurred, despite com-
parable stimuli in several states. For the same reason,
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among others, the Polish disease is not possible else-
where in Eastern Europe. `
Most other East Europeans are paying dearly for the
Polish regime's repression of Solidarity, which ended
the willingness of Western governments to help Po-
land work its way out of severe financial difficulties.
Private bankers, reacting to the cooler East-West
climate and to the poor economic performances of
several states, are not now making medium- or long-
term loans to any East European government. Roma-
nia has been forced into a rescheduling, and only
Bulgaria and Albania-which rejects by law any
foreign credits-seem absolutely safe from having to
do likewise. To the extent that access to Western
credits is restricted and export performance is poor,
The East Europeans' problems are compounded by
the recession in the West. Their share of Western 25
markets has been falling at the very time they need to
maximize hard currency earnings to handle their debt
problems.
The East Europeans are thus economically between a
rock and a hard place, and in some states dissatisfac-
tion with economic conditions is fueling public discon-
tent and ethnonational antagonisms. Popular unrest
has been rising in Romania, the most independent of
the Warsaw Pact states,,and there has been turmoil
for the past year in the Albanian minority region of
Yugoslavia, the first East European state to break
with the USSR over 30 years ago.
imports of Western technologies, spare parts, raw The question thus is not where the Polish political
materials, and consumer goods will have to be cut infection may next break out, but rather where eco-
back. This will lead to still further reductions in nomic hardship-aggravated by the Polish crisis-
domestic economic activity and standards of living.0 may produce comparably dramatic political conse-
A price is being paid also in economic relations within
CEMA. Because the Soviets face worsening economic
conditions themselves and need to focus their aid on
Poland, the other East European countries are having
to accept reductions in Soviet oil deliveries and in
Soviet subsidies. In addition, most East Europeans
have had to compensate for the Poles' failure to
deliver contracted goods and raw material, been
moved to give the Poles some aid, and seen the
coordination of their five-year economic plans disrupt-
ed. To the extent that Soviet subsidization is declin-
ing, additional hard currency has to be spent on
purchases from alternative sources, placing growth
rates and living standards under added pressure.
' The Polish disease embodies five essential qualities:
? A general perception that those in power are too incompetent or
corrupt to exercise sole leadership of the nation.
? The existence of pluralistic groups, including the working class,
which have sufficient political power at a minimum to prevent the
regime from realizing its goals and on occasion to force the
authorities to negotiate.
? A general perception that the Soviet Union will not use its
military power to enforce total control because of countervailing
costs.
? The existence of a national institution outside the regime's control
that can lend dissent moral support and an intellectual dimension.
? Martyrs whose sacrifice for the nation remains to be redeemed.
quences. Because the countries of Eastern Europe are
so diverse, only acountry-by-country review can shed
much light.
East Germany. As a state East Germany has no
particular historical antecedents other than as the
USSR's zone of occupation after World War II,
although it lays claim to some Prussian heroes. Soviet
suppression of the riots of 1953 brought home early in
the postwar period the lesson that Moscow will use
force to prevent any developments in East Germany
that do not coincide with the USSR's interests; the
Soviets maintain adequate military forces in East
Germany to handle any contingency. The East Ger-
man regime, at the same time, is the inheritor of a
long and proud German Communist tradition and has
managed to carry off an economic miracle of sorts,
which has placed East Germany among the more
highly industrialized states-West or East.
Despite these forces working for stability-not to
mention the people's north German characteristics-
the East German state remains a fragile edifice. As
the erection of the Berlin Wall acknowledged in 1961,
Bonn is the metropolis of the East German public,
which is among Eastern Europe's best informed,
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thanks to West German television. The very tangible
attraction of West Germany to the East Germans,
together with their discontent over domestic circum-
stances and the division of their homeland, means that
the East German regime must place a high premium
on its instruments of control and move quickly against
dissent
The major threat, ironically, to the maintenance of
strict internal and external controls comes not from
the West, but from the East. This results from the
dynamic of the triangular relationship between the
two Germanies and the USSR, which requires that
the East German regime pay the bill for Soviet
attempts to draw West Germany away from the
United States. This was most clearly evident in the
early 1970s when West German negotiation of recon-
ciliation treaties with the USSR, Poland, and Czecho-
slovakia became politically palatable in West Ger-
many only after East Germany agreed to open its
borders to a lot more visits by West Germans. The
East Germans had no choice; haughty party leader
Ulbricht, who used to lecture Soviet leaders on his
personal acquaintance with Lenin, found himself re-
tired as a consequence of his resistance. Another
payment occurred when East Berlin signed the CSCE
accords at Soviet behest and hundreds of thousands of
East Germans applied for permission to emigrate.
Even disruptive Soviet activities directed at West
Germany can cause problems in East Germany. The
Soviet-supported West German peace movement, for
example, has engendered a similar movement across
the border that has the regime in East Berlin worried.
The Polish crisis was thus a threat and an opportunity
for the East German regime. The threat was that the
Solidarity spirit might spread, perhaps through Polish
guest workers, among Germans. In the event, ethnic
antagonism between Poles and Germans proved more
than an adequate prophylactic. The opportunity was
to use the threat of contagion as an excuse to curtail
contacts on the personal level with West Germans and
to tighten internal controls.
As for the economic consequences of the Polish crisis,
East Germany has taken a heavier blow than any
other East European state. But because its economy is
in relatively good shape, the effect may not be as
severe as elsewhere. Even so, energy shortages in
particular are causing industrial disruptions, and the
public will feel the pain.
East German leaders apparently plan to head off any
storm by continuing their policy of repression and
improving their peculiar brand of economic manage-
ment. They have shown no willingness in negotiations
with the West Germans to make political or humani-
tarian concessions in return for maintaining the flow
of hard currency loans. Given the size and effective-
ness of East German and Soviet security forces, the
East German strategy may well work-pending addi-
tional developments in the USSR and elsewhere in
Eastern Europe
Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak regime was, along
with the East German, the most vociferous in urging
an early and decisive quashing of Solidarity. Its
position probably reflected the lessons it drew from
the Prague Spring and the Soviet intervention of
1968. The Czechoslovaks may be urging Warsaw to
follow through by thoroughly purging liberal elements
of the regime and clamping down on all forms of
dissent.)
Unlike East German leaders, the Czechoslovak re-
gime saw no opportunities, only threats, stemming
from the Solidarity movement. Dominated by the
conservative wing of the pre-1968 party, the regime
rules a work force with strong social democratic
aspirations that date from the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and a public that probably made democracy
work better than any other people in Eastern Europe
did in the interwar period
Particularly insecure because it is led by an ethnic
minority of Slovaks and because a purged, residual
leadership still exists outside the halls of power, the
Czechoslovak regime has kept its country's political
life in a deep freeze since 1968. Like the Polish
regime, it has been unwilling seriously to attempt
systemic economic reform, though its basic economic
problems may be nearly as severe. Had Solidarity
succeeded in making political and economic reform
stick in Poland, the example might have stimulated
Czechoslovakia's intellectuals and workers to think in
terms of a new thaw.
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The Czechoslovak regime, thus, felt a particular sense
of relief at the imposition of martial law. It is not,
moreover, feeling the subsequent Western credit re-
strictions as severely as most East Europeans are
because it had not borrowed as heavily. That aside,
the country is under economic pressure because it has
one of Eastern Europe's poorest resource bases, its
plant and equipment are antiquated, and it has co-
operated as broadly as any in CEMA specialization
programs that have now been disrupted.
Given the seriousness of Czechoslovakia's economic
problems, economic reform-some timid experimen-
tation has been taking place-may yet get a boost
from Polish events. Because of the weakness and
sterility of the current leadership, however, reform
probably will not go far. To the contrary, the regime
is apt to continue to rely on repression and count on
the public to accommodate to greater privation by
moving more heavily into the second economy, which
it is legitimizing to some extent.
placing the reform on hold at the least sign of major
concern domestically or in Moscow. Asa conse-
quence, the Hungarians today have an economic
system that functions reasonably efficiently because
market forces play a substantial role and a political
environment that, even before the imposition of mar-
tial law in Poland, was among the most relaxed in
Eastern Europe.
In part because he believes it a condition for exercis-
ing arelatively free hand at home, Kadar has seldom
strayed far from Soviet foreign-political or national-
security policies. Any differences have been of timing
and nuance, not of substance. The Hungarians are
now advising Poland's military rulers on how to
proceed-very cautiously-and at the same time are
courting Western governments and banks and acquir-
ing membership in the International Monetary Fund.
Still, the Hungarians have not avoided paying a price
for the imposition of martial law in Poland. The most
serious cost is the restriction of access to Western
credits, without which Budapest could be forced into a
debt rescheduling, a major retrenchment of economic
policies, and a further sharp reduction in economic
growth. Hungary's skillful bankers hope they can still
elude such a fate, and Hungary's politicians-includ-
ing Kadar-have launched a massive public relations
campaign to convince the people that their views are
Hungary. The Kadar regime has insisted throughout
the Polish crisis that the Poles should be left to work
out matters among themselves. This position reflects
Hungarian perceptions that the worst outcome would
be a Warsaw Pact military intervention with Hungar-
ian participation. Had that occurred, a decade of
effort by Hungary to reform its economy systemically
and to join the international economy would have
been severely jeopardized.
The ethnically unique Magyars consider themselves
the sophisticates of Eastern Europe, but they found
themselves the losers in two world wars that left large
numbers of their countrymen living as minorities in
three neighboring East European states. They were
the second of the East European states to attempt to
throw off Soviet domination but, unlike the Yugo-
slavs, they failed and had to pay a high price in blood
and emigration.
The Quisling the Soviets chose to rule Hungary after
1956 proved, albeit after a long period of repression,
to be more a Hungarian than a satrap. Beginning in
the early 1960s, Kadar undertook a gradual reform of
the Hungarian economic and political system, prepar-
ing the public for each step well in advance and
taken into account and that they are the best off
materially in Eastern Europe. Even private money-
making has recently been sanctioned.
As matters now stand, Kadar enjoys substantial do-
mestic respect, and the Hungarian economic system is
considered in some East European states to be a
model worth studying. If Hungary survives its exter-
nal liquidity problems, its example could strengthen
the forces for reform elsewhere and lead to unsettling
political consequences. If Hungary does not, Kadar-
ism might not survive, to the relief of conservative
Communist bureaucrats throughout the area.
Romania. Party leader and President Nicolae
Ceausescu has been as pleased as the Hungarians that
the Poles have avoided a Soviet military intervention.
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intervention had it come to that, Ceausescu no doubt
took pleasure from not having to face down the
Soviets by refusing for a second time to participate in
a Pact invasion of a member state.)
reforming an inefficient economic system. Asa conse-
quence of bad management by senior officials, includ-
ing Ceausescu, dwindling oil reserves, and recession in
the West, Romania today finds itself with industries
that cannot compete, a massive hard currency debt it
cannot pay, and the lowest standard of living in all of
Romania's defiance of the Soviets over the 1968
invasion of Czechoslovakia was but one in a long
series of defiant acts that have earned Romania the
title of the France of the Warsaw Pact. Such behavior
is less characteristic of the Romanian people than it is
of their megalomaniacal leader. The Romanians have,
rather, a reputation in Eastern Europe for unreliabil-
ity and fecklessness; Bucharest switched sides in both
world wars-twice, actually, during World War II.
The Romanians consider themselves an island of
Latin culture in a sea of Slavs. In the process of
establishing statehood, they have developed two mor-
tal enemies: the Russians, whether Tsarist or Soviet,
with whom they have periodically fought over Bessa-
rabia (currently the Moldavian SSR), and the Hun-
garians, who covet Romanian Transylvania. Roma-
nia's shifting alliances have usually reflected the
shifting of these nationalistic antagonisms.
Eastern Europe-save Albania.)
Unlike the Poles, Romanians did not enjoy Soviet
subsidization during their industrialization period nor
can they now call on the Soviets in their time of need.
To the contrary, the Soviets would be delighted to
contribute to Ceausescu's overthrow, hoping his suc-
cessors would not follow a similar anti-Soviet course.
Also unlike the Polish leaders, Ceausescu never re-
laxed aStalinist political system that has kept his
people tightly repressed and the party in a constant
state of purge. And again unlike the Polish Commu-
nists, Ceausescu is free to appeal to the anti-Russian
sentiments of the Romanian people to win passive
acceptance of his rule.
Romania, on balance, seems headed into a period of
economic and political instability. When Romania
was last in comparable circumstances, in the interwar
period, it found its finances under the supervision of
the League of Nations, suffered peasant revolts and
political assassinations, and for a period lived under
martial law. As Ceausescu assesses the Polish crisis
from his domestically weakened position, he should be
as worried about the emergence of a Romanian
The introduction of Communist rule into Romania
did not eliminate the motive forces of foreign med-
dling and resistance to it in Romanian political life.
The great domestic political battles of the late 1940s
and early 1950s were between ethnic Romanian Com-
munists who had spent the war years in Romania and
Communists-many of whom were ethnically
Hungarian, Jewish, or German-who had spent those
years in the USSR. And in the early 1960s, when
under CEMA specialization plans Romania was allot-
ted-in insulting ideological terms-a secondary role
as raw material and agricultural supplier to the rest of
the Bloc, the Romanian party took up battle with
Moscow.)
Economically, Romania might be better off today had
it accepted the role the Soviets assigned it. Instead,
like Warsaw, Bucharest launched a program of rapid
industrialization grounded on its existing industrial
base-in the case of Romania, awell-established
petrochemical industry. Also like the Poles,
Ceausescu has never done anything serious about
Jaruzelski as a Romanian Solidarity.
Yugoslavia. Belgrade has declined to take an official
position on Solidarity or the martial law regime in
Poland. Unofficially, opinions run the gamut; in some
parts of Yugoslavia, student pro-Solidarity demon-
strations have been permitted, while in others forbid-
den. Having established an unconventional, independ-
ent Communist state poised between East and West,
Yugoslav Communists in fact have mixed emotions.
On the one hand, they probably regret that Solidarity
was unable to force a more pluralistic system on the
Polish regime, making it more akin to the Yugoslav.
On the other hand, they must be relieved that the
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Soviets did not intervene, which would have made
their balancing act more difficult, and that Solidarity
did not succeed in wresting a major share of political
power from the party.
That the Yugoslavs should speak with many voices on
Poland is hardly surprising. There are few true
Yugoslavs; there are, instead, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs,
Magyars, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Albanians, Mon-
tenegrins, and the Muslim Slavs of Bosnia. Divided
for centuries between the Ottoman and Austro-Hun-
garian Empires, Yugoslavia emerged as a state only at
the end of World War I under control of the Serbs,
the more important of the two Yugoslav nationalities
to reestablish independent states in the 19th century.
The peoples of Yugoslavia have not lived happily with
one another since. Their state was shattered during
World War II, which for them was a civil war as well
as a defense against foreign aggression. The only
multiethnic resistance group was Tito's Communist
partisan army, and it was this group that, with only
marginal assistance from the Red Army, won power
after the war.
Tito's ambitions for the South Slavs in the immediate
postwar period were considerably greater than mere
reestablishment of the former Yugoslav state. Terri-
tory was seized from the Italians in the northwest, a
proxy war was fought to establish influence over
Greece, and the incorporation of Bulgaria and Alba-
nia was attempted through political maneuvering and
negotiation. By 1948, with the West aroused and the
Soviets content to consolidate control over their new
East European client states, Stalin tried first to rein
Tito in. Failing, he attempted to bring Tito down
through severe political, economic, and military pres-
sures. But the Yugoslavs rallied behind Tito, who
turned to the West for aid. The consequences were
containment of Yugoslav expansionism and reduction
of the USSR's European sphere of influence.
For most of the postwar period, Yugoslavia has been
held together by a regime dominated by the partisan
fraternity that assumed the bulk of the key positions
in the restored Yugoslav state. Ethnonational antago-
nisms have bubbled to the surface on three occasions:
among the Albanians in 1968 and 1981-82 and among
the Croats in 1971-72. The Yugoslav Army-largely
commanded by Serbs-was used against the Alban-
ians and is stationed in force in the Albanian region.
The Croats, when threatened with use of the Army, 25
cleaned up their act and pur ed the more radical of
their kin.
Even during times of noncrisis, ethnonational tensions
lie near the surface and tend to be argued in two
different contexts. The first is distribution of econom-
ic authority between Belgrade and the ethnically
diverse republics. As has happened frequently in the
United States, Yugoslavia's "states" adamantly op-
pose federal power over spending, taxes, and trade
controls, but seek advantage in special interest subsi-
dies. In the face of such pressures, Tito in the end 25
came to allow the republics broad autonomy in eco-
nomic development and foreign borrowing. At the
same time, he tried to amend the inequities of history
by mandating investments designed to equalize living
standards in the various parts of Yugoslavia. (The
inequities, not surprisingly, date from the Ottoman
and Hapsburg Empires. Those Yugoslavs who lived
under the Austrians inherited an economic infrastruc-
ture, some social discipline, and work skills. Those 25
who lived under the Ottomans brought little more
than the clothes on their backs.) Greater equality in
practice means taking from the Slovenes and Croats
and giving to the Albanians, Macedonians, Bosnians,
and Montenegrins.
The second context for ethnonational rivalry is the
distribution of political authority between federal and
regional power centers. The Yugoslavs have been
through several cycles of decentralization and recen-
tralization, depending on the perceived problem of the
time. Devolution of power applies even to the Commu-
nist party, which is often admitted to be a "confeder-
al" party, rather than a "unified" Yugoslav institu-
tion.
Yugoslavia is thus trapped between the needs for
broad power sharing and for federal mechanisms
strong enough to preserve the unified state and to
ensure policy consistency. In ethnonational terms, a
strong leadership in Belgrade means domination by
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the Serbs, the most numerous of the Yugoslav minor-
ities. Devolution of power to the republics and autono-
mous regions is in ethnonational terms the most
satisfying solution to the non-Serb majority, but it
allows republic officials to pursue the pleasures and
perils of autarky. As matters have ended up, the
federation has been preserved, even in the wake of
Tito's death, but the republics' successful insistence
on consensual decisionmaking has undermined Bel-
grade's powers. The profligacy of the republics has
brought the larger Yugoslav economy on hard times,
and this problem has recently been aggravated by the
Polish crisis, in that Western lenders have restricted
longer term credits to the Yugoslavs
relevant to current-day Bulgaria. Its people are rela-
tively well fed, the regime has a modest economic
management reform program under way that contains
features of both the East German and Hungarian
models, the country's debt is manageable, and the
party faces no challenge to its control.
Losers in three successive wars-the Second Balkan
and the First and Second World Wars-the Bulgar-
ians have grown stronger and more self-confident in
the three and a half decades of peace and stability
under the protection of their Slavic big brothers in
Russia. Bulgarian nationalism is thus not like the
Polish, which is anti-Soviet at bedrock. Rather it
tends toward romantic expansionism primarily direct-
ed at Yugoslavia's Macedonian Republic, to which
the Bulgarians still lay historical claim. The Polish
crisis worried the Bulgarians only to the extent that
the Soviets appeared to show a lack of resolve. ~~
Tito and his principal lieutenants had the ability to
intervene at key points in the Yugoslavs' ethnona-
tional quarrels to prevent matters from getting out of
hand and to redirect policies to serve greater Yugoslav
interests. These men are now gone, succeeded by
collective party and state leaderships made up of
representatives from each of the Yugoslav peoples.
These leaderships, the chairmanships of which rotate
annually among their members, are proving cumber-
some and progressively less able to make and enforce
decisions.
During the interwar period, when these tensions de-
generated into political assassination and Croatian
and Macedonian terrorism, it was the Serbian-Mon-
tenegrin officer corps that propped up Yugoslavia's
ruler and was strong enough to throw out a Prince
Regent. Since the war, a Communist officer corps-
increasingly more diverse ethnically, but united by
loyalty to Tito and to Yugoslavia-has twice been
called upon to assure the integrity of the state against
internal threats. If such actions come to be required
more frequently, the military may by default .become
the only major force with a "Yugoslav" mission. If the
party leadership in Yugoslavia comes to be viewed as
incompetent, like that in Poland, the military would
be tempted to force a change.
Bulgaria. The Zhivkov regime has followed the Soviet
line on Poland with such precision that one can
understand why the Bulgarians are still known in
many quarters as the Prussians of the Balkans. The
fact is that recent Polish developments do not seem
Albania. To the extent that the Hoxha regime has
commented on the Polish crisis at all, its position has
been to condemn all parties to the struggle. A totally
bloody-minded position is in character for the country
that still openly reveres Stalin.
Descendants of the ancient Illyrians forced back into
their mountainous Balkan stronghold by the Slavic
migrations of the seventh century, this people supplied
at least three emperors to Rome, some of the best
fighting units to the Byzantines, innumerable grand
viziers to the Ottomans, and the last King of Egypt.
Dragged kicking and screaming into statehood at
French insistence after World War I, the Albanians
have since been the object of the ambitions of Italy,
Greece, and Yugoslavia.
With their land occupied in part during World War II
by the Italians and then the Germans, the Albanians
joined Tito's partisans in the guerrilla war to expel the
invaders. Finding a third of the Albanian people still
incorporated in Yugoslavia after the war and fearing
Tito's designs on all his neighbors, the Hoxha regime
took the opportunity of the Tito-Stalin split to slip the
Yugoslav leash and place Albania under Soviet pro-
tection. When relations between the Yugoslavs and
2~
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Soviets improved, the Albanians expelled the Soviets
in 1961 and placed themselves under Chinese tute-
lage. And, finally, when the Chinese and the Yugo-
slavs reconciled, the Albanians kicked out the Chinese
in 1978 and retreated into near total isolation
Like other aging autocrats, Hoxha is primarily con-
cerned about the imminence of his demise. To the
extent that he thinks about Poland at all, he probably.
sees in events there reminders of the evil in all
foreigners but especially a vindication of his belief
that the great powers are relentless in their rivalry.
He may particularly worry about the Soviets' prob-
able desire to regain the naval base they had in
Albania in the 1950s. The Polish crisis will probably
only confirm Hoxha in his xenophobia.
only reinforce national peculiarities and add to centri-
fugal pressures. The Soviets' institutions for coordi-
nating the economic and political policies of these
countries are proving no more equal to the task now
than in the recent past.
In contemplating future developments in Eastern
Europe, it will probably be more instructive to look to
each country's history and national traditions for
clues than to Soviet practice. Rivalries between East
European states, and among nationalities within these
states, will probably become more important factors
in their political behavior. The current Hungarian-
Romanian competition for favored treatment by the
West in coping with financial problems may be an
early example. Given the legacy of irredentism and
mutual dislike, such rivalries may not always remain
Implications for the Future
The emergence of Solidarity provided the latest dem-
onstration that Soviet-style totalitarian "socialism"
has not taken hold in Poland. Throughout much of
Eastern Europe, it is but a veneer held in place by the
glue of Soviet economic and military power, the
economic dimension of which is weakening as the
Soviets find themselves discomfited by the increasing
costs of empire.
Soviet willingness to accept a new variant of national
Communism in Poland-military Communism-
combined with Moscow's less generous economic poli-
cy toward Eastern Europe constitutes an additional
impetus for "separate roads to socialism" and for
greater variation among the several national Commu-
nisms of the area. Appearances to the contrary not-
withstanding, as the East Europeans have to rely
increasingly on their own resources to solve economic
and political problems, it will not be the Soviets to
whom they will look for examples and inspiration on
how to improve their performances.
The differing effects of the Polish crisis on the East
European states and their differing reactions to it
testify to the extent to which national peculiarity has
already replaced Communist internationalism as the
primary motive force in the area. The need for the
East Europeans to depend more on themselves will
peaceful in a waning "Pax Sovieticus."
As the countries of Eastern Europe face up to the
problem of reorienting production for export to hard
currency areas and for domestic consumption, other
resource claimants may well come under increased
scrutiny. Reports of a new East German parsimony in
assistance to Third World states, while unconfirmed,
suggest some East European states may be taking
harder looks at this type of spending (which reached a
peak of some $480 million in 1977 and amounted to
about $255 in 1980). Defense outlays for high-cost
modernization, which the Romanians claim they have
been reducing for the last several years, have probably
come under pressure in other states as well despite
Soviet urging for spending increases. This pressure, in
turn, raises questions about the future ability of East
European military forces to fulfill their Warsaw Pact
commitments and about the willingness of East Euro-
pean military leaders to follow Soviet orders after
they have become involved in coping with domestic
economic and political problems for which the Soviets
are believed at least partially responsible.
Inefficient as most of the economies and manage-
ments of Eastern Europe are, there is great potential
for increasing productivity, allocating resources more
efficiently, and adopting appropriate stabilization
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policies-as the Hungarians, and to a lesser extent the
Bulgarians, are proving. In some states, such as
Romania and East Germany, regimes are looking to
the refinement of their command economy systems,
rather than to systemic economic reform, to improve
performance. In others, such as Czechoslovakia and
Bulgaria, modest reform programs have taken root
and are being expanded in such areas as market
measures of success and private enterprise. In still
others, such as Hungary and Yugoslavia where re-
form programs have long been the order of the day,
voices are being heard calling for a halt to the further
implementation of reforms and, in Yugoslavia, even
for a recentralization of decisionmaking and control.
Over the longer term, the movement in Yugoslavia
toward reform is likely to continue (among other
things, too much central power has already been
dispersed), and the movement in Hungary will prob-
ably resume as well: The Hungarian program has had
some success and has achieved a certain momentum,
and the need for something better is as pressing as
ever, perhaps even more so in the light of events in
Poland. It is clear, moreover, that Kadar is sympa-
thetic to innovative ideas and not overly concerned
about purity of doctrine. If, for example, small private
enterprises in trade and manufacturing can perform
better than socialist ones, why so be it. It would be out
of character, however, for Kadar to proceed without
caution vis-a-vis both his own people and the USSR.
Growing popular unrest that seemed related to eco-
nomic reforms or strong Soviet disapproval of the new
way in Hungary would bring the program to at least a
temporary halt.
But barring major domestic disruptions or Soviet
vetoes, Hungarian leaders will probably work to ex-
pand their program once the Polish crisis has subsid-
ed. If so, others will watch with great interest.
Czechoslovakia could become a candidate for some
relaxation of central economic controls and of ideo-
logical constraints. The legacy of the Prague Spring,
until now one that discourages innovation, could in
time (probably after Husak leaves office) work the
other way-that is, memories of previous plans for
economic reform could help to revitalize forward
motion. If nothing else, the Czechoslovaks have been
made aware that they possess the intellectual re-
sources to accomplish considerably more than they
have been allowed to in recent years. It is even
possible that a working Hungarian model of reform
could inspire amost-Brezhnev leadership to look for
new methods to cope with the USSR's growing
economic problems (assuming that such a leadership
does not retreat into rigid orthodoxy).
The appeal of systemic economic reform could in time
prove to be compelling almost everywhere in the Bloc.
The risks of adopting more or less radical new
measures are enormous, but any innovative system
that promises economic growth and also permits the
ideologists to maintain (or pretend) that the tenets of
Marxism-Leninism have not been violated will attract
all manner of advocates, including those Soviet and
East European politicians who will seek to ride to
power on the basis of persuasive new programs.
Indeed, progressive abandonment of the discredited
command system in favor of a more flexible, realistic,
and market-oriented approach might seem the only
way to cure widespread economic malaise, restore
relevance to official doctrine, and undercut rising
popular discontent.
Still, all this is quite long term. And, for the period
immediately ahead, there are no panaceas. On the
contrary, whatever the approach to avoiding aPolish-
like economic disaster, in the near term tensions are
likely to increase within the various East European
regimes, between the regimes and their publics, and
among nationalities and ethnic groups within those
publics. The potential will thus grow for leaders to fall
and publics to become aroused.
As domestic tensions increase apace with deteriorat-
ing living standards, the Communist parties of the
region, aware of the Polish precedent, will be forced to
look to the efficiency of their internal security forces
and the reliability of their military establishments.
Already the security forces are the regime's major
prop in Romania, where severe popular disgruntle-
ment with Ceausescu's cult of personality and the
parlous state of the economy is growing. And in
Yugoslavia the military is crucial to the survival of
the federation, not only in general terms but also
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specifically in suppressing the restive Albanians in
Kosovo province. Disaffection in Romania could get
out of hand and force the party to unseat the
Ceausescu dynasty, a move with uncertain conse-
quences. Ethnic antagonisms, republic politics, and
popular discontent could all erupt in Yugoslavia,
where there is little restraining fear of direct Soviet
intervention. Even short of civil war, the central
government and party officials in Belgrade could one
day find themselves bereft of all authority over the
constituent republics. There is some chance, however,
that in the event of severe unrest military figures
might seize power in Bucharest to forestall a Soviet
invasion and in Belgrade to forestall national collapse.
As the East European leaders contend with their own
problems, they will have to cope also with the suspi-
cions and anxieties of a Soviet leadership whose
military dominance remains intact even as its eco-
nomic power declines. The East Europeans are likely
to receive mixed signals from Moscow. Soviet leaders
will be torn between recognition that national solu-
tions to the problems of the East European economies
are required, fear that one or another of their allies
will seek successfully to increase their freedom of
maneuver, and concern that the ability of one state to
maneuver will inspire others to do the same and that
the thrust of such a process will diminish Soviet
control. The need to placate Soviet suspicions will add
one more series of obstacles to the course that the
East European leaders must traverse.
The uncertainty that prevails in Eastern Europe,
already serious enough, will soon, increase substantial-
ly. It is not by chance that most crises in Eastern
Europe have occurred in the wake of a succession in
the USSR. Another succession appears in process,
even as Brezhnev lives. Leaving Jaruzelski aside,
party first secretaries in Eastern Europe have been in
power for a long time-an average of over 22 years.
This means that even the feisty Ceausescu has estab-
lished arelationship with Brezhnev. Long personal
relationships have given these leaders a confidence in
the accuracy of their judgments about Soviet policies
and levels of tolerance.
With Suslov dead, Kirilenko in apparent decline, and
Brezhnev apart-time leader, the East Europeans will
anticipate that a new principal Soviet leader will
emerge. And while the East Europeans make it a
practice to cultivate Soviet leaders other than those at
the very top, they will be concerned about the possibil-
ity of major changes in the direction of Soviet policies
and wonder what adjustments in their own policies the
new Soviet leader may demand.
The succession factor becomes even more unsettling
when one considers that the leaders of Eastern Eu-
rope, while none appears to be on his deathbed, are
nonetheless getting along in years-their average age
is 67. Jaruzelski is the youngest at 58. Kadar at 69 25
and Hoxha at 73 are believed to have health prob-
lems. It is conceivable, therefore, that one or more
East European states could be going through succes-
sion processes at the very time the Soviets are,
processes that will be all the more difficult because it
has been so long since any of these countries other
than Poland and Yugoslavia have been through such
an experience.
In sum, then, Eastern Europe is likely to be an area of
growing instability for the next several years and will
present new challenges and opportunities to both the
Soviets and the West. The curtailment of East Euro-
pean economic relations with the West has ostensibly
played into the Soviet hand; Warsaw has accused the
West of supporting ill-chosen Polish economic pro-
grams so that it might increase its political leverage,
and Jaruzelski has called for closer political and
economic ties with the USSR. Unquestionably those
East European states that have been viewed most
favorably by the West are those that are being hurt
most in the wake of Polish martial law, a circum-
stance East European leaders like Romania's
Ceausescu find hard to comprehend in political
terms.
The fact remains, however, that whatever sympathy
exists in Eastern Europe to turn back toward greater
economic reliance on the USSR-even to buy more
favored Soviet economic treatment with greater politi-
cal conformity to Soviet policies-is no real answer
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when Soviet economic problems make the USSR an
unlikely source of greater largess, particularly of the
right kinds. This leaves the East Europeans with the
options of greater domestic austerity, which most are
pursuing despite the risk of increasing popular discon-
tent; systemic economic and political reform, which
most prefer not to pursue because it risks disturbing
established power relationships; and revived economic
ties with the West, which most are pursuing despite
the reluctance of creditors and the existence for
Poland and East Germany of political conditions they
insist they will not meet
The West, therefore, is not without leverage over East
European events, though Western leverage in most
Warsaw Pact states must always be recognized as
tenuous in the face of the Soviets' demonstrated
willingness to use force in extremis. The West Euro-
peans' disinclination to use their economic ties with
Eastern Europe for more than influencing trends
further reduces the West's leverage over specific
events. The West's experience in Eastern Europe has
been, rather, that it can encourage a regime to move
in desired directions if that regime is so disposed, but
that it can neither determine the outcome nor force a
regime to take steps judged to be destabilizing politi-
cally. Western leverage would be greater if at this
juncture it had major economic carrots to offer in
addition to an ability to wield the stick and if Western
lenders did not believe they are overexposed in the
area as a whole. Recognizing these limitations, West-
ern leverage remains substantial in Romania and
Yugoslavia, among the most independent and least
stable of the East European states, where the Soviets
no doubt still hope someday to recover lost ground and
reverse the established trends that have been eroding
Soviet t.egemony.
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Secret
Approved For Release 2007/02113 :CIA-RDP83B00228R000100140004-9