EASTERN EUROPE: ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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irectorate of on idlential
and Prospects
Eastern Europe:
Economic Problems
An Intelligence Assessment
Confidential
EUR 82-10027
March 1982
Copy 3 3 4
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
and Prospects
Eastern Europe:
Economic Problems
Information available as of 15 January 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared b
Office of European Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief East European Division, EURA,
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for USSR-Eastern Europe.
0
Confidential
EUR 82-10027
March 1982
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Eastern Europe:
Economic Problems
and Prospects
Key Judgments The performance of the East European economies has deteriorated sharply
in recent years. GNP growth has gone from nearly 5 percent per annum in
the first half of the 1970s to virtual stagnation or worse since 1978, and
some of the countries face serious external financing problems. Slower
growth can be attributed in part to stabilization programs designed to rein
in rapidly growing hard currency debt and to unfavorable developments in
Western markets. Eastern Europe's problems, however, are rooted primar-
ily in the chronic distortions and inefficiencies of centralized economic
planning and clumsy management.
The East European regimes are now paying the price for the ambitious and
poorly conceived investment programs that they financed in large part with
hard currency credits and for their failure, for the most part, to reform
their outdated systems of economic management. For a time, sizable
inflows of new Western credits permitted large-scale imports of Western
equipment, grain, and other goods, helping to paper over economic
shortcomings. But poor investment decisions and the rigidities of their
command economies thwarted the translation of Western technology into
improved industrial productivity and competitiveness.
Eastern Europe's transition to slow growth would have been even more
abrupt if Moscow had not continued to increase supplies of energy and raw
materials at concessionary prices and had not granted long-term credits to
help Eastern Europe cope with rising trade imbalances with the USSR.
Over the next few years, economic performance and living standards will at
best stagnate in Eastern Europe, aggravating the danger of political
instability. The region will be hurt by slowing deliveries of Soviet energy
and raw materials, worsening terms of trade with both the USSR and the
West, and reduced availability of Western credit. Investment rates will
continue to fall in response to hard currency shortages and decisions to pay
more attention to consumption. Economic performance will also suffer
from a further slowdown in labor force growth and persistent problems
with productivity. With the possible exception of Hungary, no East
European regime seems likely to implement the reforms needed to correct
basic ills of its planning and management system.
iii Confidential
EUR 82-10027
March 1982
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Key Judgments iii
Economic Performance in Perspective 1
Problems Multiply 1
Recent Trends Show Little Improvement 2
Economic Performance by Country 3
Prospects for Economic Reform 7
2. Eastern Europe: Balance of Payments With Non-Communist 3
Countries
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Eastern Europe:
Economic Problems
and Prospects
Economic Performance in Perspective
Until the late 1970s, several factors combined to give
the East European economies a reasonably good
growth record:
? Rapid expansion of the industrial labor force.
? Ability to maintain a high level of investment in
heavy industry without serious constraints from
competing consumer demands.
? Buoyant growth of Western markets and relatively
stable terms of trade with the West.
? Ever-increasing supplies of Soviet raw materials and
energy provided at attractive prices.
? A guaranteed market for East European manufac-
tured goods within the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CEMA).
Growth rates peaked in the early 1970s as the East
Europeans turned to Western credits to help sustain
levels of investment and support rising consumption.
The East European governments realized that their
economies could benefit from an infusion of Western
technology. Eastern Europe's need for hard currency
credits and goods coincided with Western interest in
promoting political detente through expanded trade.
Western governments eagerly offered credit guaran-
tees to open up new markets for their capital goods
manufacturers and food exporters. The massive surge
in Euromarket liquidity stemming from the recycling
of OPEC funds provided even greater credit sources
for the East Europeans.
About the same time, some East European economists
argued that a revamping of planning and manage-
ment was needed because the Stalinist command
economy model had become outmoded. They pointed
out that with resource supplies tightening, growth
strategy should be based on increasing the productiv-
ity rather than the quantity of inputs. They also
argued that arbitrary prices, state subsidies, political-
ly motivated investment decisions, and full-employ-
ment guarantees would prove increasingly inefficient
and detrimental to rational resource allocation. For
the most part, however, the cautious East European
regimes did little more than tinker with their econom-
ic mechanisms. Only Hungary pursued a major de-
centralization program based on greater use of
mar-
ket-oriented regulators. L_ I
Problems Multiply
The forward momentum of the East European econo-
mies dissipated quickly after the mid-1970s. Hard
currency debt rose much more rapidly than planned
as Western inflation boosted import prices and reces-
sion in the West added to East European problems in
marketing exports. Despite ambitious and costly mod-
ernization programs, the gains in productivity and
competitiveness of East European industry fell far
short of expectations. Poor management decisions
wasted resources on unpromising investments, while
critical sectors such as agriculture were neglected.
Chronic neglect of infrastructure resulted in energy
and transportation bottlenecks that hampered indus-
trial production. Overly bureaucratic management
lacked the flexibility needed to cope with the increas-
ingly complex problems.
Government agricultural policies and increasing price
subsidies for consumers led to growing imbalance
between the supply of and the demand for meat and
other foods. Hard currency problems increased as
greater reliance was put on imports of Western grain.
Most governments pursued policies of low investment
in agriculture and minimum incentives for farmers in
order to provide maximum resources for industrial
development. Despite large-scale imports, consumer
discontent rose, most notably in Poland, as the avail-
ability of goods failed to keep pace with rising
expectations.
Worried about their rising hard currency debt, most
East European countries began to retrench in a bid to
raise exports to the West while cutting purchases of
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Eastern Europe: GNP Growth Rates
Eastern Europe
3.7
4.8
3.1
1.3
1.3
-2.5
Bulgaria
4.7
4.5
1.2
4.1
-0.2
3.0
Czechoslovakia
3.5
3.4
2.5
1.1
1.9
0.5
3.2
3.5
2.2
2.9
2.6
2.6
Hungary
3.1
3.4
2.7
0.2
0.3
1.0
Poland
3.8
6.6
2.5
-1.9
-2.6
-14.0
Romania
4.6
6.2
6.6
4.3
1.0
1.0
Western goods. But in some cases (Poland and Roma-
nia), restraint measures came too late to prevent
serious financial problems or were applied ineptly and
further impeded growth. Poland's deteriorating posi-
tion lent particular urgency to the efforts of the other
countries to bring their external accounts under con-
trol. While Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia
managed to stabilize their debt positions, the cut-
backs-coupled with fundamental economic weak-
nesses-depressed growth throughout Eastern Europe
to postwar lows after 1978.
maintained relatively strong growth. Performance re-
mained dismal in Romania, and Czechoslovakia suf-
fered a further slowdown (see table 1). Living stand-
ards stagnated in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and
declined in Romania. Economic performance in these
countries was far better, however, than in Poland,
where GNP fell by 14 percent (see table 1).
Although financial stringencies forced reductions in
Poland's and Romania's current account deficits,
worsening terms of trade and faster growth in a few
countries pushed Eastern Europe's overall balance of
payments even deeper into the red. The region's debt
grew to over $60 billion by the end of 1981 (see table
2). Hard currency debt has become so large that over
half of earnings from exports to the West must go for
interest and principal repayments. Poland was in-
volved in debt rescheduling negotiations throughout
1981, and Romania reached a tentative agreement
with Western banks to reschedule over $2 billion of
debts falling due in 1982. All the countries will face
serious adjustment problems since banks and other
creditors have been adopting more cautious lending
policies as a result of increasing economic and politi-
cal concern over CEMA creditworthiness
The slowdown in growth would have been even steep-
er except for Moscow's willingness-prompted by the
specter of growing instability in Eastern Europe-to
shoulder some of the adjustment burden. Despite its
own production problems and opportunities to sell in
the West at skyrocketing world market prices, the
USSR continued to supply growing quantities of
energy and raw materials on favorable terms. The
CEMA pricing mechanism caused increases in the
prices of Soviet exports to lag well behind world
trends. Moscow further softened the adjustment proc-
ess by extending sizable long-term credits to cover
Eastern Europe's rapidly mounting trade deficits with
the USSR.
Recent Trends Show Little Improvement
In 1981 Bulgaria and Hungary posted some improve-
ment in their economic growth rates, while the GDR
2
2
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Table 2 Billions of
Current Dollars
Eastern Europe: Balance of Payments
With Non-Communist Countries
Trade
Account
Current
Account
End-Year
Net Debt
Debt Service
Ratio
(percent)
1971
-0.1
0.1
1
45
1975
-0.6
-0.7
3
33
1979
0.7
0.5
4
38
1980 a
1.0
0.9
3
32
1981-
0.6
0.6
2
36
1971
0.0
-0.2
0
9
1975
-0.1
-0.3
1
14
1979
-0.8
-0.9
4
22
1980 a
0.0
-0.4
4
18
1981 a
0.4
-0.2 -
4
22
1971
-0.2
-0.3
1
18
1975
-1.1
-1.2
5
25
1979
-1.5
-1.5
10
54
1980 a
-1.9
-1.9
12
55
1981 a
-1.4
-1.9
13
69
1971
-0.3
-0.3
1
15
1975
-0.7
-1.0
3
19
1979
-0.7
-1.1
8
37
1980 a
0.3
-0.5
8
30
1981 a
0.4
-0.6
8
37
Poland
1971
0.1
0.2
1
20
1975
-2.7
-3.2
8
30
1979
-1.7
-2.9
21
92
1980
-0.7
-2.6
24
101
1981 a
0.1
-1.3
26
148
1971
-0.2
-0.3
1
33
1975
-0.1
-0.3
3
23
1979
-1.2
-1.7
7
22
1980 a
-1.5
-2.4
9
25
1981 a
0.2
-0.8
10
32
Economic Performance by Country
Bulgaria. Bulgaria chalked up impressive growth
rates in the first half of the 1970s as it continued a
fast-paced industrialization program. Starting in
1974, Sofia undertook an import spending spree in the
West that resulted in a rapid increase in its hard
currency debt by 1978. In 1979 Bulgaria embarked on
a program to deal with its balance-of-payments and
debt problems. Sofia was able to improve its trade
position dramatically by boosting exports to develop-
ing countries, and by obtaining crude oil through
barter and soft currency arrangements and reexport-
ing some of it to the West as crude and products.
Bulgaria has not neglected agriculture to the same
extent as some of its neighbors. Although a poor grain
harvest helped push GNP into a small absolute
decline in 1980, near-record grain production last
year paced a strong rebound for the economy as a
whole. Nevertheless, labor scarcity, sluggish labor
productivity, and inefficient central planning dim
prospects for sustained strong performance over the
next several years. Growing Soviet reluctance to
supply Bulgaria's increasing raw material and energy
needs may further impede growth. Aware of these
problems, Sofia has recently stepped up discussion of
its long-planned economic reform, but implementa-
tion in the near future seems unlikely. The plan
targets for 1981-85 confirm the outlook for slower
growth and indicate continued emphasis on heavy
industry, although the consumer sector will reportedly
receive more attention than in the past.
Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak economy has per-
formed poorly not because of irresponsible investment
and import policies, but because of the leadership's
deep-seated reluctance to borrow in the West. The
price paid for Prague's caution is a highly obsolescent,
inefficient industrial base. As a result, productivity is
lagging, manufactured goods are not competitive on
world markets, and transportation and energy bottle-
necks are stifling economic activity. Indeed, the econ-
omy faces an increasingly severe energy crisis as
domestic fuel production slows and Soviet deliveries
stagnate and decline.
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The economic slowdown is being felt increasingly by
consumers who are facing worsening shortages and
higher prices with little prospect of improvement in
the next few years. This poses an especially difficult
problem for Prague, which has tried to win political
acceptance from its population since 1968 by deliver-
ing a relatively high standard of living. These develop-
ments have increased pressures for systemic reform;
yet the "Set of Measures"' implemented in 1980 is
unwieldy, often contradictory, and appears to be
working poorly. Czechoslovakia's unhappy experience
with political and economic liberalization in 1968
makes the leadership extremely cautious with respect
to basic reform.
Although the GDR has avoided so far the balance-of-
payments constraints suffered by the other East Euro-
pean economies, its mounting debt and the growing
reluctance of Western banks to supply new credit-
not to mention reduced availability of Soviet oil-will
probably slow growth in the near future. Neverthe-
less, the East Germans have announced ambitious
production goals for 1981-85 to be achieved via large
gains in productivity.
Hungary. Hungary stands apart from the rest of
Eastern Europe in having linked its development
strategy to export promotion. Over more than a
decade, Budapest has proceeded sporadically to jetti-
son those features of central planning most inimical to
the development of internationally competitive indus-
tries. For the next several years, Hungary intends to
subordinate growth to the need to maintain external
East Germany. While growth of the East German
economy has slowed in recent years from the high
rates of the early 1970s, the GDR is still outpacing
most of the other East European economies. Even
though industry suffered losses of raw materials from
Poland and energy shortages forced the closing of
some plants, East Germany maintained GNP growth
in the 2.5- to 3.0-percent range in 1981. At the cost of
a large and rising external debt, East Berlin has
sustained growth through high levels of investment
and supportive policies for consumption. East Ger-
many's performance has been aided materially by its
special relationship with West Germany and by Mos-
cow's tolerance of the GDR's massive trade deficits
with the USSR.
In contrast to Hungary's movement toward market
mechanisms, East Germany is attempting to over-
come the failings of Soviet-style central planning
through administrative decentralization. Berlin has
created decisionmaking bodies at lower levels where
presumably they can gauge economic needs more
effectively. The East German plan is to feed decisions
made by these bodies through an elaborate computer
network in the hope that advanced technology will
weed out inefficiencies.
'The Set of Measures for the Improvement of the System of
Planned Management of the National Economy After 1980, en-
acted in 1980 and implemented on 1 January 1981, is a mild reform
package that grew out of a series of economic "ex e?iments" in the
late 1970s.
balance.
Hungary's movement away from the command econo-
my prototype dates back to the introduction of eco-
nomic reforms known as the New Economic Mecha-
nism in 1968. The essential features of these reforms
included limitations on the scope of central price
determination and investment allocation; replacement
of detailed plan directives with market-oriented regu-
lators; and partial linking of foreign and domestic
prices through more realistic exchange rates. Buda-
pest, of course, retained key "brakes" to slow the
transition to a more marketlike mechanism: absence
of significant interenterprise competition; lack of ef-
fective competition from imports; and continued sub-
sidization of unprofitable firms. The intention, howev-
er, was to remove these brakes over a fairly short
period of time.
After good overall economic performance in 1968-73,
Budapest tightened central control in 1974-78, largely
to shield the economy from external shocks-deterio-
rating terms of trade, sluggish export markets in the
West, the rising cost of borrowed capital, and reduced
growth in supplies of energy and raw materials from
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the USSR. Moreover, Hungary's balance of payments
had suffered from a tendency of enterprises to under-
take excessive investments and inventory accumula-
tion.
Failure to bring the hard currency balance of pay-
ments under control in 1977-78 forced Budapest to
take measures that slowed economic growth. Hunga-
ry's hard currency financial position then strength-
ened in 1979-81. In allocating resources, the top two
priorities have become net exports and personal con-
sumption, the latter dictated by political realities,
with investment now coming in third. Investment
declined absolutely in 1979-80 and is not expected to
grow significantly in the next five years.
Since growth of the capital stock and labor force will
be nearly flat during the 1980s, the economy's per-
formance will depend mainly on its ability to increase
productivity of both capital and labor. At the same
time, Budapest wants to improve the balance of
payments by increasing exports. To attain these goals,
Hungarian policymakers have resumed their program
of basic reform. Domestic prices are being brought
closer to world prices. State subsidies are to be phased
out for most producers, and money-losing firms are to
be liquidated or merged with profitable enterprises.
To increase competition, a significant number of new
firms have been established by breaking up large
enterprises and trusts. Also, state-owned firms may
now spin off privately owned subsidiaries, and Hun-
an important reason for allowing greater private
ownership, investment, and entrepreneurial activities,
which Budapest anticipates will improve the supply of
consumer goods and services while providing 25
outlet for savings. 25
Poland. The causes of the Polish economic tailspin-a
roughly 14-percent decline in GNP in 1981 following
a 4-percent fall in 1979-80-go far beyond labor
unrest and the endemic inefficiencies of centrally
planned economies. While Poland's economic mecha-
nism differs little from that of the other East Europe-
an countries, its planning and management have been
exceptionally poor.
The first half of the 1970s witnessed an almost
indiscriminate expansion of industrial capacity, partly
financed by Western credit. Little thought was given
to how hard currency debts would be repaid as poor
investment decisions sank resources into outmoded
technology and into sectors in which Poland has no
competitive advantage. Furthermore, Warsaw short-
changed the agricultural sector while trying to pacify
the industrial labor force with rising money incomes
and heavy subsidization of consumption. Underinvest-
ment, poor incentives, bureaucratic interference, and
several years of unfavorable weather depressed food
production. With subsidized prices encouraging con-
sumers to demand more high-quality food, Poland had
to import substantial quantities of grain.
garian citizens may form small private companies. Until the late 1970s, the Polish leadership could
Hungary hopes that its domestic austerity and reform
measures will help the economy move toward an
export surplus and that hard currency debt will grow
much more slowly. Bureaucratic resistance to reform,
new external shocks, and consumer pressures may
well frustrate attainment of this goal. Recent cut-
backs in Western bank lending have jeopardized
Hungary's financial health. Nevertheless, Budapest's
impending admission to the International Monetary
Fund can probably provide a reasonably secure safety
net for Hungary's external finances over the medium
term.
whitewash its errors by continuing to borrow heavily
25
25
25
25
in the West. Since 1979 Poland has been maneuvering
desperately to avoid a formal default. Warsaw has cut
imports, even of some critical items, and has pushed
exports, more and more by diverting goods from
domestic use. This effort has caused worsening prob-
lems in industry, agriculture, transportation, and con-
sumer supply, as well as rapidl s eading underutili-
zation of productive capacity. 25
Before the imposition of martial law, Warsaw expect-
ed a continued decline in national income in 1982. A
clear picture of worker productivity since martial law
As a result of the redoubled export effort, Budapest
projects that the standard of living will improve little
during 1981-85, while money incomes will rise. This is
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was declared has yet to emerge, but gains from the
longer workweek are likely to be eroded by shortages
of Western materials and passive resistance. Even
under the best of circumstances, economic activity
will not regain 1978 levels for several years. A long-
term, sustained economic recovery can be achieved
only by resolution of Poland's debt crisis and by a
program of basic reform that the party and a majorit
of the workers and peasants are willing to accept.
Romania. After nearly two decades of strong growth,
Romania's economic performance has been weaken-
ing steadily since 1978, and there is little prospect of a
quick turnaround. Romania's slowdown stems from
accumulated planning errors, mismanagement, and
tightening balance-of-payments constraints. A bloat-
ed bureaucracy has imposed an excessively rigid
system of central planning with inadequate incentives
for workers and managers. Industrial production has
been hampered by energy shortages and cutbacks in
hard currency imports of raw materials and
technology.
The two areas suffering the most severe problems are
agriculture and energy. Investment in agriculture has
long been slighted in favor of heavy industry, and
migration has left an aged and unproductive farm
labor force. Worsening food shortages and sporadic
unrest forced the regime to institute rationing of some
food items in 1981. While Bucharest recently an-
nounced long-promised measures to increase invest-
ment and production incentives for agriculture, output
and consumer supply are unlikely to improve substan-
tially in the short run.1
Romania has experienced continuing shortfalls in --
domestic energy production because its reserves are
being rapidly depleted. This places a growing strain
on the economy, since Romania's industrial plant is a
very inefficient user of energy and Bucharest has
based its export plans largely on the petrochemical
industry. To meet rising domestic demand while
maintaining refined product exports, Romania has
become in recent years a substantial importer of crude
oil. The cost of these imports has contributed to the
serious deterioration in Romania's balance of pay-
ments and pushed Bucharest to current negotiations
on rescheduling its hard currency debt.
Outlook
Eastern Europe's economic slump shows no sign of
abating. The forces depressing growth since the late
1970s have, if anything, grown stronger; continuing
turmoil in Poland compounds these problems. East
European leaders frankly acknowledge the seriousness
of their economic position and warn of stagnation in
living standards-a worrisome prospect because it
could have serious political repercussions. According-
ly, in the face of slow growth projected in 1981-85
plans, most countries have trimmed back investment
rates to free up more resources for consumption and
net exports.
East European economic performance will continue to
sag:
? In all of the countries except Romania, the rate of
increase in the labor force will decline in 1981-85.
? Modernization of industrial plant will lag since
competing consumer demands and balance-of-pay-
ments constraints are prompting governments to cut
investment to the bone. The inefficiency of Eastern
Europe's capital stock becomes increasingly burden-
some as supplies of cheap energy and raw materials
wane.
? Productivity growth shows no sign of picking up in
the 1980s; stagnating per capita consumption levels
will tend to depress labor effort, while sluggish
investment and reduced imports of Western ma-
chinery will leave the capital-labor ratio little
changed and will hobble technical progress.
Tightening external constraints will limit the inflow of
resources from the USSR and the West that have
helped Eastern Europe offset internal shortcomings:
? Reductions in 1982 concessionary Soviet oil deliv-
eries to Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Hungary
threaten to bring their economic growth to a halt.
While billed as a one-year cutback, Moscow's action
probably heralds a permanent reduction in oil and
raw material deliveries. At a minimum, Soviet
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domestic shortfalls will prevent the USSR from
increasing exports of materials and energy at past
rates. Eastern Europe cannot afford to offset inad-
equate Soviet supplies through purchases on the
world market.
? East European terms of trade with both the USSR
and the West are likely to worsen as CEMA pricing
adjusts to 1979-80 world energy price increases
while prices of Western capital goods continue to
rise.
? The chillier East-West political climate as well as
Poland's and Romania's financial problems is deter-
ring Western lenders from increasing their exposure
to Eastern Europe. Since new lending will at best be
little greater than debt service obligations, hard
currency import capacity will be tied tightly to
export performance.
? Slow growth in the West and possibly heightened
protectionism will frustrate Eastern Europe's plans
to raise appreciably the volume of exports to hard
currency countries; the USSR, in turn, will prob-
ably demand more imports of East European goods
otherwise salable in the West.
The crisis in Poland further darkens the economic
prospects for the rest of Eastern Europe. Although the
evidence is unclear, the USSR may be diverting to
Poland deliveries of raw materials originally intended
for other East European countries. Moscow is pressing
the other Warsaw Pact allies into giving aid, especial-
ly scarce consumer goods, to the Poles. Poland's
failure to meet its CEMA trade commitments-
particularly coal for the GDR-further complicates
the fulfillment of East European plans.
Prospects for Economic Reform
The distortions and inflexibility of centralized plan-
ning compound the internal and external troubles
besetting the East European economies. Although
some East European leaders recognize the inefficiency
of their economic systems, any inclination toward
reform will probably be limited for the foreseeable
future. The danger of incurring the wrath of reform
opponents, particularly in Moscow, is considerable.
Furthermore, in return for uncertain long-run bene-
fits, reform promises painful short-run costs for the
domestic population-higher consumer prices, unem-
ployment, less egalitarian income distribution. In
addition, reforms that give more play to market forces
would meet with resistance from the politically en-
trenched bureaucracy, who would lose some of their
power and control over economic decisionmaking.
Politically, the emphasis in most of Eastern Europe at
this point in the Polish crisis is on tightening central
controls, not on relaxing them.
The crisis in Poland has intensified the dilemma East
European governments face in addressing their basic
economic ills while trying to provide a steady rise in
per capita consumption. Although discontent in the
other East European countries is far from being as
high as it was in Poland, all East European regimes
know they must pay attention to consumer needs in
order to avoid the Polish experience. Their 1981-85
plans were delayed and revised as governments sought
to maintain consumption levels and to balance exter-
nal accounts in a period of economic stagnation.
Whereas most East European regimes imposed steep
consumer price increases in 1979, the Polish crisis
seemingly deterred new rounds of price adjustments
in 1980-81. Governments began to increase food
subsidies again and appeared prepared to hold the line
on prices in general.
Eastern Europe hopes that luck and ad hoc adjust-
ments will see it through the coming lean years.
Continued domestic shortages and hard currency
import stringencies probably is prodding the East
European planners to hike consumer prices in 1982,
but comprehensive reform packages seem out of the
question for the next few years. Only Hungary appar-
ently remains intent on giving a greater role to mar
forces.
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