PAPANDREOU S CYPRUS POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00228R000100040004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence
Papandreou's Cyprus
Policy
Information available as of 24 December 1981
was used in the preparation of this report.
Secret
EUR 82-10015
January 1982
This emorandum was prepared b
25.
25
Office of European Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Iberia-Aegean Branch, EURA
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Papandreou's C rus
Policy
Summary Tensions over Cyprus have increased in recent months-a development
that stems in part from the election of Andreas Papandreou as Greece's
Prime Minister. Papandreou has designated Cyprus a top-priority issue
and has pledged "dynamic" support for the Greek Cypriots. His trip to
Cyprus slated for February will be the first visit by a Greek head of
government since the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus and the
return of democracy in Greece in 1974. It is meant to symbolize to both
domestic and international audiences the importance Papandreou attaches
to the problem
Papandreou, however, is likely to find his options on Cyprus limited. There
are no easy solutions to the problem; there is little room or willingness to
compromise; and the costs of miscalculation are great. In addition,
Greece's own economic and security interests are likely to assume a higher
priority over time.
Cyprus has been a problem for more than two decades. The heart of the
dispute is the conflict between the island's two ethnic communities-the
Greek Cypriots who compose some 78 percent of the island's 600,000
inhabitants and the Turkish Cypriots who compose approximately 18
percent. Cyprus, however, has always been more than an intercommunal
problem. The inability to find a solution is an unending source of tension in
the region and has led Greece and Turkey close to war more than once.
Greek-Turkish antagonism, moreover, weakens the southern flank of
NATO and forces the United States to try to balance the objectives of two
important allies.
Secret
EUR 82-10015
January 1982
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Papandreou's Cyprus
Policy
0
Introduction Andreas Papandreou became Greece's first socialist Prime Minister on a
platform emphasizing change. Among the many changes he offered was a
new Cyprus policy. To underscore the importance he attached to Cyprus,
Papandreou met during his first two weeks in office with President
Kyprianou and nearly all major Greek Cypriot party leaders
In a press conference following Kyprianou's visit, Papandreou announced
Greece's "dynamic" support for the Greek Cypriots. The immediate
manifestation of this support was a promise to double economic aid and be-
gin a new diplomatic offensive. Both before and after the elections,
Papandreou also indicated he intended to open the "dossier" on the
abortive Cyprus coup of 1974, to include Cyprus in Greece's defense shield,
and to link the Cyprus issue to Greece's relations with Turkey, the United
States, and NATO.
The new Prime Minister, however, will find-if he did not know it
before-that the Cyprus issue is a veritable minefield. Opening the Cyprus
file could strain already delicate relations with the United States and
Turkey and, more important, unnecessarily alienate a portion of the Greek
military. Linking the Cyprus question to bilateral relations with the United
States and Turkey could be counterproductive in the long run and weaken
Greece's bargaining position on other bilateral issues of more immediacy to
Athens. Changing the defense posture on Cyprus could cause a dangerous
reaction from Turkey. In short, room for maneuver on the Cyprus issue is
extremely limited, and Papandreou is likely to tread cautiously, playing for
time as he has on other foreign policy issues and weighing his alternatives
carefully to gain maximum benefits.
Background The Cyprus problem has been the bane of successive Greek governments
since the 1950s when Cyprus was a British colony and Greek Cypriots,
with the diplomatic backing of Greece, were fighting for self-determina-
tion-which initially meant enosis (union) with Greece and later independ-
ence. The Turkish Cypriots generally supported the British, but later, with
the encouragement of Turkey, they began to agitate for taksim (partition)
or at minimum a biregional federation. Negotiations among Britain,
Greece, and Turkey led to a compromise, and Cyprus became an indepen-
dent state in 1960.
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The terms of independence, however, were controversial. The Constitution,
drawn up without Cypriot participation, proved unworkable, and the
treaties attached to the basic agreement, which were meant to guarantee
the island's independence, only enhanced the potential for interference by
the treaty signatories. Intercommunal fighting broke out in 1963-64 and
again in 1967. On both occasions a Turkish invasion that could have led to
war between Greece and Turke was narrowly averted by US diplomatic
intervention.
The problem was brought to a head when Greek Cypriot rightists, backed
by the junta in Athens, mounted a coup against President Makarios in
1974, triggering an invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. When the dust settled,
Turkish troops had secured some 37 percent of northern Cyprus for the
Turkish Cypriots, who constituted less than a fifth of the population. An
uneasy truce has existed since then.
The Greek Cypriots have carried their case to international forums, most
notably the United Nations, to get Turkish troops out of Cyprus. They
have pressed for a federal solution based on a strong central government
(which they would expect to dominate) and for guaranteed freedom of
movement (which would give them access to agricultural land in northern
Cyprus and enable many Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes).
Turkish Cypriots declared a separate "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus"
(TFSC) in 1975, which is not internationally recognized, and have pushed
for a biregional state with a decentralized government (which would give
them exclusive control over a portion of the island). Talks between the two
communities aiming at a negotiated settlement have been held intermit-
tently under UN auspices since 1975.'
The Cyprus problem has had a strong impact on Greek domestic politics,
and while certainly not the decisive factor, it has contributed to the rise and
fall of successive Greek governments. In 1958 criticism of government
policy toward Cyprus was responsible in part for the resignation of then
Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, although he returned to office
shortly thereafter. In 1967 the Cyprus issue triggered a dispute between
King Constantine and George Papandreou, the father of Andreas, that
eventually prompted charges and countercharges of plotting against the
government; the political turmoil that resulted led to a military coup and
seven years of dictatorship. Finally, the ill-conceived actions of the Greek
military junta toward Cyprus ultimately led to the junta's own downfall in
1974.
' Intercommunal talks have been held since 1968 after the second outbreak of violence on
the island. The Turkish Cypriots had withdrawn from the government and into isolated
enclaves in 1963 in protest over amendments to the Constitution.
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In the 20 years since Cypriot independence, relations between Greece and
Cyprus have not always been as harmonious as is sometimes assumed.
Greek Cypriots felt betrayed by the Greek Government's willingness to
accept the agreements that led to Cypriot independence and by the
willingness of successive Greek governments to cater to NATO sensitivities
at the expense of more substantial support for Cyprus. Relations reached a
low during the period of the junta (1967-74) when the vehemently anti-
Communist colonels locked horns with the charismatic and independent-
minded Makarios. After the fall of the junta, relations improved markedly,
although there was a limit to what the Greek Government could do in
support of Cyprus and the policies of the two governments continued to dif-
fer in important respects. The new Greek Government found itself weak
militarily, economically, and politically. It faced a potentially more
explosive situation with Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean. Thus,
Athens favored a more conciliatory position on Cyprus than either
Makarios or his successor Kyprianou was prepared to accept
During Kyprianou's visit to Greece shortly after the elections, Papandreou
reiterated his campaign pledge to reopen the 1974 Cyprus dossier, but
since then he has made only scattered references to the dossier. Papan-
dreou almost certainly recognizes that opening the file is a potentially
explosive move. In the first place, it would complicate already delicate
relations with the United States. There is a widespread perception among
Greeks and Greek Cypriots that the United States was somehow responsi-
ble for the anti-Makarios coup and the Turkish invasion that followed.
Greeks believe that the United States gave the Greek junta the green light
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for its coup plans-or, at minimum, failed to give a red light. Likewise,
they believe that US complicity or failure to act was responsible for the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus. They cite the stern and successful warnings
that the United States sent to Turkey in 1964 and 1967 when Ankara was
poised on the verge of a massive offensive on Cyprus
Papandreou probably is aware that reopening the file could intensify anti-
American sentiment in Greece-regardless of what the file shows-and
exacerbate bilateral relations at a time when he is carefully calibrating his
policies toward the West in an effort to exact favorable aid concessions.
Thus, he is likely to move cautiously, although he may try to use the threat
to reopen the file as a lever on the United States.
A second and perhaps more compelling reason for Papandreou to play
down the Cyprus file is his relationship with the Greek military. The
military junta badly bungled its attempt to depose Makarios and was
unprepared for the Turkish invasion that followed; hence it was forced to
resign in disgrace. Since then, successive Greek governments have re-
frained from completely purging the armed forces because of the need to
rebuild the country's defense capability and reestablish the bruised confi-
dence and prestige of the military. 2
Papandreou's victory at the polls was a blow to many officers. Military
officers are highly suspicious of Papandreou, and although they are content
for the moment to remain in the barracks, they will watch his policies
closely. They are likely to view any move to reopen the Cyprus file as an at-
tempt to discredit the military. Thus, Papandreou probably will avoid such
action because he does not wish either to evoke a military backlash or to
damage the credibility of the military while the perceived threat from
Turkey is so great.
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Defense Policy Toward Since Papandreou's election, there has been considerable Turkish, Greek,
Cyprus and Cypriot press speculation that a change in Greece's defense policy is
imminent. The speculation gained some currency following the visit of
Cypriot Minister of Interior and Defense Veniamin to Athens early last
November-less than a month after the Greek elections-and Papan-
dreou's comment to the press that Cyprus would be included in Greece's
"defense shield." There is little hard evidence, however, to suggest a
substantial shift in Greek defense policy toward Cyprus, and there are
many compelling arguments against such a move.
Figure 2. Greek Prime Minis-
ter Andreas Papandreou
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Under a treaty signed when Cyprus became independent in 1960, Greece
was permitted to station 950 men on Cyprus, and Turkey was allowed a
force of 650 men. The infiltration of soldiers and weapons from the
mainland, however, became a common practice on both sides in the 1960s
and early 1970s. Greek Cypriots initially welcomed the influx of Greek
troops, but after 1967, as relations between the junta and Makarios
deteriorated, the presence of Greek troops became more of a threat than a
o comfort.
the CNG who led the abortive coup against him in 1974.
b In addition, Greek Army officers controlled the Cypriot National Guard
(CNG), an extra-constitutional force established in 1964 to replace the all
but defunct Cypriot Army. Key posts were filled by officers from the
mainland, and the commander of the CNG (a Greek) reported directly to
Athens, bypassing Cypriot Government channels. Makarios recognized the
threat posed by Greek control of the CNG, and he tried unsuccessfully on
several occasions to reassert Greek Cypriot control. It was Greek officers of
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Mainlanders will continue to play a major role in the CNG, particularly in
its higher ranks, for some time. But an infiltration of Greek soldiers to the
island or an increase in the number of Greeks serving in the CNG, as An-
kara and the Turkish Cypriots are claiming, is unlikely. Such increases
would go against the effort of the last seven years to reduce the Greek pres-
ence and "Cypriotize" the National Guard, and the Greek Cypriots would
be unlikely to countenance them.
Greece has at least two reasons for not wanting to change the balance of
forces on Cyprus. First, any upgrading of Greek Cypriot forces would be
matched, and probably surpassed, by a similar improvement on the
Turkish side. Second, given the distance between Cyprus and Greece,
Athens would have great difficulty defending the island. Both Greek and
Cypriot policymakers realize that Cyprus would be among the first
casualties of a Greek-Turkish conflict. Thus, Greek resources are much
more likely to be used in reinforcing defenses in the Aegean islands and on
the mainland. Papandreou's statement that Cyprus is included in Greece's
"defense shield" means essentially that the Greek Government will view
any Turkish move against Cyprus as aggression against Greece that will be
met not only by a military response on the island but possibly even a
counterattack against the Turkish mainland.
 Nonetheless, tensions on Cyprus have increased since the election of
Papandreor!aLInve been fueled by charges of a military force buildup on
both sides.
that could lead to conflict, therefore, appears to be growing.
of the verbal hostility that encourages distrust and makes politicians and
military personnel on both sides nervous. The potential for a miscalculation
However, rumors of a dramatic and sudden buildup of arms or men appear
to be unfounded. For the present, the greatest danger lies in a continuation
Internationalizing the Papandreou will concentrate his "dynamic" support in the area of public
Cyprus Issue relations and diplomacy. In particular, he has promised to back Greek
Figure 3. Cypriot President
Spyros Kyprianou
Cypriot efforts to "internationalize" the Cyprus issue. This will involve
publicizing the Cyprus issue in international forums, raising the issue in
bilateral talks or through special demarches to selected governments, and
perhaps pushing for some kind of international conference. F
International recognition is the most effective diplomatic weapon the
Greek Cypriots have. The Kyprianou government is the only administra-
tion officially recognized by the international community. This has helped
the Greek Cypriots to keep the Cyprus issue alive and before the public.
They have elicited a series of resolutions from various international
organizations-especially the United Nations and the nonaligned move-
d ment-reaffirming the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of
o Cyprus; demanding the withdrawal of Turkish troops; deploring attempts
to change the demography of the island through an influx of Turkish
settlers from the maimanu; anu caiitng iur Lola! ucitii11La11LdLI J1I.
Greek Cypriots wanted.
The importance of international forums to the Greek Cypriots has
increased as their control over the island has decreased. Successive
governments in Athens have supported Greek Cypriot efforts to interna-
tionalize the issue, but in varying degrees and often less forcefully than the
Papandreou has already shown his willingness to fulfill his pledge of more
"dynamic" support in the international sphere and through bilateral
diplomatic channels. At NATO's Defense Planning Committee meeting in
December 1981, he raised the Cyprus issue along with the Greek demand
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for a security guarantee against Turkey. He has actively publicized his
view that Cyprus is an issue involving the occupation of one country by an-
other. Dramatizing the Cyprus problem is a policy Papandreou believes he
can pursue with few apparent costs while demonstrating to Greeks and
Greek Cypriots the importance he attaches to the problem.
However, this approach could invite a number of unexpected and unwel-
come repercussions. In the short term, Papandreou's stance is likely to
harden the negotiating position of the Greek Cypriots in the intercom-
munal talks. After nearly a year of backstage maneuvering, representatives
of the two Cypriot communities finally accepted a UN proposal for
discussion in November 1981. Without the firm support of all the parties
involved, this initiative is likely to fail. So far, the Greek Cypriots and the
Athens government -have greeted the UN paper with lukewarm enthusiasm
and appear ready to press for a General Assembly debate if the initiative
does not produce immediate and substantive progress. This would place the
problem effectively back at square one.
Publicizing the issue will add to the tension between Greece and Turkey.
Since 1976, Ankara and Athens have engaged in bilateral negotiations
aimed at solving their outstanding disputes. While Papandreou has said he
wants to extend an olive branch to Turkey and has attempted to reassure
Turkish officials in private, he has been more belligerent in public and has
been unwilling to continue regular high-level negotiations with the Turks
on Aegean issues. To the extent that intentions become unclear, there will
be an increased danger of conflict.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of Papandreou's new diplomatic
offensive is his apparent endorsement of an international conference on
Cyprus. The Soviets were the first to propose such a conference in August
1974. Presumably the conference would focus on the "external" aspects of
a Cyprus settlement-security arrangements and guarantees-while the
two communities would be left alone to solve their differences.
The idea of an international conference has had some appeal among Greek
Cypriot officials for several reasons. By inference, the removal of Turkish
troops would be a prerequisite for negotiations, with demilitarization-
including the removal of the British bases on the southern coast of the is-
land-as the ultimate goal. A conference would also enlarge the number of
key actors; Greek Cypriots have felt that if they cannot limit the arena to
the two communities, they would gain a more favorable hearing in a larger
forum. Finally, any conference would probably include members of the UN
Security Council, the parties involved in the dispute (Greece, Turkey, and
Cyprus), and members of the nonaligned movement. The latter traditional-
ly have favored the Greek Cypriot view.
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Despite its appeal, Greek and Greek Cypriot officials realize an interna-
tional conference is both impractical and unrealistic. The Turkish Govern-
ment would almost certainly oppose such a conference; the United States
would be against Soviet participation; and neither the Greek Government
nor Cypriot officials would be anxious for Soviet involvement in the
problem. Papandreou, therefore, is likely to use the notion of an interna-
tional conference to pressure the West but is not likely to count it among
his serious policy options. How actively he will press for a conference will
depend primarily on the satisfaction he is able to obtain from the West on
other important issues
The Turkish Threat Since 1974, Greece has thought of Turkey rather than its northern Balkan
neighbors as the primary threat to its security. Greece and Turkey have
been at odds over territorial rights in the Aegean since the early 1970s, but
it was Turkey's 1974 military action in Cyprus that created genuine fear
among Greek policymakers. Athens was particularly impressed by the
speed and relative ease with which the Turkish Army was able to secure
the northern portion of the island. Ankara's establishment of an "Aegean
army" along Turkey's Aegean coast increased these fears and led Greece
to militarize further its islands off the Turkish mainland in contravention
of several international treaties. Since then, Greece has embarked on a
costly defense program, which has substantially modernized its military,
and it has begun to develop a domestic defense industry. As a result, Greek
and Turkish military capabilities have become more evenly balanced. The
government currently spends between 5 and 7 percent of its GNP on
defense.)
Greece and Turkey began conducting bilateral discussions over rights in
the Aegean in 1976. The Aegean dispute covers a range of issues, including
airspace, surface, and continental-shelf rights; behind the specific issues
are thorny problems of territorial sovereignty and security. To facilitate the
talks, previous Greek Governments tended to decouple the Cyprus problem
from the issues centered on the Aegean, leaving the Greek Cypriots to
negotiate the status of Cyprus while lending them moral and, to some
degree, diplomatic and economic support. Little progress was made toward
a resolution of differences, but the dialogue helped to reduce tensions in the
Eastern Mediterranean. Papandreou, however, says he wants to link
progress on the Cyprus issue to progress on the Aegean problem. For the
present, he has halted negotiations on the Aegean and thereby introduced
new uncertainties into Greek-Turkish relations.
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Implications for the
United States and
Greeks believe that Turkey holds the key to an effective solution on Cyprus
and that only the United States and NATO can exact concessions from
NATO
Ankara.
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Beyond callitig for a broad security guarantee, however, there are few
options open to Papandreou on the Cyprus issue. He is highly unlikely, for
example, to demand the removal of Turkish troops from Cyprus as a
prerequisite to US base negotiations or to continued Greek participation in
NATO. Over the longer term, in fact, Cyprus is likely to take a back seat,
as it has in the past, to Greece's more vital interests-military aid from the
West and the procurement of more modern military equipment. Ultimate-
ly, the Athens government also is likely to view Cyprus as less important
than the easing of tensions with Turkey on Aegean issues. Finally,
Papandreou, who in the past has accused Turkey of manipulating and
controlling the Turkish Cypriots, will want to avoid the appearance of
negotiating for the Kyprianou government.
Although Cyprus is thus likely to figure less prominently in Papandreou's
foreign policy than this current rhetoric suggests, there are circumstances
in which he could find the issue a convenient tactical tool. If negotiations
with NATO and the United States go poorly, he could threaten to break
off talks with the United States, demand immediate removal of bases,
and/or withdraw from NATO's military wing. As an excuse for such
actions, he could point to western unwillingness or inability to guarantee
borders in the Eastern Mediterranean and to press Turkey for concessions
on Cyprus. This is likely to happen, however, only if Papandreou is unable
to obtain satisfactory concessions on what he believes are his more realistic
demands, particularly in the area of military assistance. In this sense, the
Greek stance on Cyprus would become a kind of barometer of overall
Greek-US and Greek-NATO relations. 25
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Only the United States and its allies can satisfy Papandreou's need for
economic aid, weapons, and some sort of security guarantee against
Turkey. In addition to his own reservations, domestic constraints, mainly
the Greek military and conservative President Karamanlis, prevent him
from turning to the East for substantial assistance. Likewise, he cannot
count on the Arabs, who appreciate his warmth toward the Palestinians but
are unlikely to match the aid he currently receives from the United States
and his EC partners. This dependence gives Papandreou's Western allies
considerable potential leverage on issues such as NATO, the EC, and
bilateral relations with the United States, but it will not translate easily
into influence on the Cyprus problem.
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