THE NORTH KOREAN SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00227R000100080006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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The North Korean Succession
Confidential
EA 82-10032
March 1982
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
The North Korean Succession
Information available as of 16 February 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
The author of this report isINortheast
Asia Division, Office of East sian nalysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief Northeast Asia Division, on
I
Confidential
EA 82-10032
March 1982
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Key Judgments President Kim I1-song has ruled North Korea since 1945, and his inevitable
passing will introduce major uncertainty into the Korean scene. To
minimize that uncertainty, he intends for his eldest son, Kim Chong-il, to
succeed him.
Kim Chong-il, at age 40, is exercising increasing control over day-to-day
affairs, especially in domestic political and economic matters. The father-
to-son succession has no precedent in the Communist world, but special
circumstances in North Korea make the succession likely. Indeed, the
image of father and son is being craftily projected in an effort to make the
eventual transfer of power appear both natural and ordained.
The deliberate manner in which the son is being groomed indicates that an
early succession is not anticipated. Kim I1-song, who will be 70 in April,
continues to be very active and retains ultimate authority over the
decisionmaking process. While the Soviets and Chinese have avoided
endorsing the succession scheme, there is no evidence that the succession
issue has adversely affected North Korean foreign policy.
Kim Chong-il's accession to power is by no means assured, however. While
we have not been able to observe any active opposition, other senior North
Korean leaders presumably have ambitions and may view the son as an up-
start. Kim Chong-il's position would be uncertain if Kim 11-song died or
was incapacitated before the son solidified his alliances within the critical
military and security services.
Over the years Kim 11-song, by dint of one-man rule and a pervasive
personality cult, has kept North Korean resources almost totally mobilized
toward the goal of a reunified Korea under P'yongyang's control. A North
Korean regime headed by anyone other than Kim Chong-il probably would
be less reluctant to begin dismantling the elder Kim's cult and his policies.
A prolonged and debilitating succession struggle, in particular, would
seriously dilute P'yongyang's ability to sustain the reunification drive and
the strict, authoritarian controls that have reinforced Kim 11-song's long
reign. This worrisome prospect may explain in large part the great effort
Kim 11-song has undertaken to ensure an orderly transfer of power to his
son.
Confidential
EA 82-10032
March 1982
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Because the son's claim to legitimacy is closely tied to loyalty to his father's
vision, a regime led by Kim Chong-il would be likely to present a large
measure of continuity characterized by:
? Hostility toward South Korea and the United States.
? Strong commitment to reunification on P'yongyang's terms.
? Military strength at the expense of social and economic development.
? Stress on self-reliance (chuche).
We know little about Kim Chong-il's personal traits. In view of his youth
and lack of experience he may be prone to act impulsively when, for
example, he is faced with a shooting incident along the Demilitarized Zone.
Kim Chong-il, in any event, could not automatically wield the absolute
power his father has, and this would reduce his own freedom of action in
forging North Korea's foreign and domestic policy.
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The Son Goes Public
The problems that North Korea's tightly closed soci-
ety present to the intelligence analyst are nowhere
better illustrated than in Kim 11-song's nearly 10-
year, behind-the-scenes campaign to groom his eldest
son as his successor. During that campaign the son,
Kim Chong-il, was never identified at public gather-
ings, the media did not mention his name, and he did
not meet with foreigners.
The regime nonetheless kept the North Korean popu-
lace apprised of the younger Kim's activities by the
use of special honorific expressions. The most promi-
nent codeword for the son was-and still is-the
"party center." Through local indoctrination sessions,
the people were made to understand that these
codewords were, in fact, describing the son's
activities.
Kim 11-song, we judge, saw a number of advantages in
keeping the succession scheme under wraps:
? It provided an opportunity for the son to be tested,
while keeping the elder Kim's options open if the son
failed to measure up.
? It enabled Kim 11-song to avoid lameduck status.
? It shielded North Korea from possibly embarrassing
foreign commentary.
The regime used the Sixth Congress of the Korean
Workers Party-North Korea's ruling Communist
party-to introduce Kim Chong-il officially to the
rest of the world. At the congress, held in October
1980, Kim Chong-il was named fourth-ranking mem-
ber of the party's 19-member Political Bureau. His
name had never before appeared in a public leader-
ship listing. As one of the top five in the party
hierarchy, Kim Chong-il became a member of the
newly instituted "Presidium" or standing committee
of the Political Bureau.
He was also designated a secretary on the party's
Secretariat, ranking behind only his father, who is the
"General Secretary." As the ranking secretary, Kim
Chong-il is now charged with the day-to-day political
Kim Chong-il: Personality Cult Unfolds
The World Revolutionary People highly praise the
dear leader comrade Kim Chong-il, the only succes-
sor to the great leader comrade Kim Il-song, and
express boundless reverence for him....
Dear comrade Kim Chong-il is an outstanding think-
er and theoretician....
We should actively introduce and propagandize the
greatness of the dear leader comrade Kim Chong-il,
his ideas and theories and his precious exploits....
The Korean people hold dear comrade Kim Chong-il
in high esteem as the leader of the revolution and
construction who translates and embodies the lofty
intentions and the chuche idea of President Kim Il-
song.
Excerpts from a broadcast by the North
Korean official news agency on 19 No-
vember 1981 claiming to report foreign
praise of Kim Chong-il.
work of the party. He also was appointed a member of
the party's prestigious Military Committee, ranking
after his father and Defense Minister 0 Chin-u. The
younger Kim is the only official other than his father
to serve on both the Secretariat and the Military
Committee.
The party congress stopped short of formally desig-
nating Kim Chong-il as successor to his father. Even
so, Kim 11-song's decision to "go public" with his son
and, by extension, the succession scheme was not
taken lightly. As long as the son remained behind the
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scenes it was possible for the elder Kim to abandon
the scheme, as in the early 1970s he had abandoned a
similar effort to groom his own younger brother, Kim
Yong-chu.
Heightened Profile
Since the party congress, the buildup of Kim Chong-if
has intensified. Early in 1981, P'yongyang began to
encourage foreigners to offer toasts to Kim Chong-il's
health at diplomatic functions. By late spring, North
Korea began publicizing these greetings as well as
longer stories and commentaries hailing the son's
exploits. In some cases P'yongyang has attributed to
foreigners favorable comments on Kim Chong-il,
when in fact no such comments were made.
In May 1981, North Korea started selectively publi-
cizing Kim Chong-il's activities in the official media,
focusing on his duties in domestic political and eco-
nomic affairs. Kim Chong-il's appearances at about
10 functions in 1981 served to keep him in the
limelight, but the attention paid to him does not begin
to rival that given to his father, whose appearances
were publicized on at least 130 occasions during 1981.
North Korean newspapers now treat Kim Chong-il
more extensively than they do any other leader with
the exception of Kim 11-song. In the party daily:
? Articles on Kim Chong-il appear on page 1 in the
lead position on the upper right-hand side.
? Kim Chong-il's name is printed in boldface type.
? The sizes of the headline and the type font have
increased, although they are still somewhat smaller
than those used for Kim 11-song.
The major duties that Kim Chong-il is now openly
performing closely parallel those attributed to the
"party center" before the party congress. He is
charged with ensuring that party members remain
loyal to Kim II-song, a task that is enshrined in the
slogan "dyeing the whole of society" with Kim II-
song's thoughts. His role as chief interpreter, protec-
tor, and propagandizer of Kim 11-song's thoughts not
only provides the younger Kim with a potent political
weapon against would-be challengers, but also but-
tresses his supporters' claim that he is the logical
choice to carry on his father's achievements.
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and December newspapers.
Heightened emphasis on Kim Chong-il in the party daily Nodong Sinmun is seen in the gradually in-
creasing size of type used in headlines about Chong-il's guidance activities in the June, August,
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Kim Chong-il appears deeply involved in both formu-
lating and supervising the implementation of North
Korea's economic policies and plans. One of his more
publicized contributions is the so-called speed bat-
tle-mobilizing all available manpower and resources
to achieve a specific goal in a relatively short time.
The concept is patterned after the Chollima, or
winged-horse, campaign-a labor-intensive produc-
tion campaign Kim 11-song instituted in the late
1950s. The two techniques have been coupled in a
single slogan-the "spirit of Chollima spurred on by
the speed campaign." This slogan elevates the son's
contribution in directing the national economy to the
same level as that of his father.
Perhaps Kim Chong-il's most celebrated innovation is
the "three-revolution team" movement, a nationwide
campaign initiated in 1973. Such teams, made up of
technicians, students, and representatives from the
party, are sent to factories and farms to check on the
performance of local party and administrative leaders.
The teams are credited with eradicating all sorts of
bureaucratic evils and outmoded concepts. In practi-
cal terms, the movement provides the younger Kim
with a separate and powerful institutional arm to
purge or demote veteran functionaries and replace
them with handpicked representatives.
A Long Apprenticeship
North Korea, through its official press, clearly is
attempting to portray Kim Chong-il's activities in a
manner that evokes the image of his father's activities
over the past years. Kim Chong-il, for example, is now
shown making periodic inspection trips in the prov-
inces, accompanied by other senior North Korean
leaders. He also is shown inspecting the progress on
construction projects in P'yongyang. The younger
Kim is credited with the decade-long campaign to
modernize and beautify the capital city-the results
of which have impressed even the harshest foreign
critics of the North Korean regime.
The activities that the son has not engaged in are just
as important, however, in gauging the overall pace of
the succession:
? He has yet to make a publicized speech or publish
an article under his own name.
A youthful Kim Chong-il looks on respectfully as his fat her visits a
"three revolution" exhibit, probably in the early 1970s. Photos
such as this one are appearing in current North Korean publica-
tions with increasing frequency as part of the effort to link the
younger Kim historically with the achievements of his fat her.I 2X1
? He has not presided over a major national event.
? He has not met with foreign leaders.
? He has not traveled abroad in his capacity as a high-
ranking official.
This pattern of activity suggests that the elder Kim is
still moving at a deliberate pace on the succession
scheme. In any event, the succession issue dominates
North Korean domestic policy concerns. At every
major domestic function the party sponsors, the publi-
cized proceedings are focused almost exclusively on
the campaign to ensure that party functionaries ac-
cept Kim Chong-il's instructions without fail.
The one development that obviously could cause the
succession scenario to quicken would be a sudden
deterioration in Kim 11-song's health. The elder Kim,
who will be 70 in April, is overweight, a heavy
smoker, and probably has high blood pressure. He has
a large growth on the back of his neck, which is not
life threatening but is too complex to remove for
purely cosmetic reasons. In the past year or so North
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Confidential
Korea has permitted this growth, which is visible at
the hairline from the left side, to appear in official
photographs, a reminder of the elder Kim's mortality.
This new candor reinforces the need for addressing
the succession issue.
Kim 11-song nonetheless shows no sign of slowing
down any time soon. He has remained extremely
active since the party congress and has no hesitancy
about meeting in long sessions with foreign visitors. In
April, Kim 11-song will be receiving numerous foreign
leaders who have been urged to attend gala celebra-
tions marking his 70th birthday. Preparations for this
demanding schedule would not be proceeding if Kim
11-song's health were questionable.
Foreign Reactions
Thus far, China and the USSR, P'yongyang's treaty
allies, have avoided public commentary on Kim
Chong-il. Among "fraternal" Communist countries,
the issue of succession has long been viewed as an
internal matter. North Korea, in developing its ration-
ale for a planned succession, has not endeared itself to
Beijing or Moscow, however. In thinly veiled terms,
P'yongyang has argued that its method will help avoid
the chaos that followed the deaths of Stalin and Mao.
China, for reasons of political expediency, would
probably be more inclined than the Soviet Union to
tolerate a family succession. Beijing, wants to keep
P'yongyang firmly in its camp and over the years has
been willing to overlook Kim 11-song's cult. Beijing
will find it difficult to accede to North Korean
pressure for explicit endorsement of the succession,
however, because of domestic Chinese political sensi-
tivities. China's present top leaders used criticism of
the personality cult of Mao Zedong and his successor
Hua Guofeng to remove the latter from the party
chairmanship in 1981.
China's desire to skirt the succession issue came to the
fore during the visit of Premier Zhao Ziyang in
December 1981. Not only did Zhao fail to acknowl-
edge Kim Chong-il, but the North Korean hosts
themselves refrained from making any mention of the
son in connection with Zhao's five-day stay in North
Korea. The omission was made all the more striking
by a publicized appearance by the son at a separate
event in P'yongyang during Zhao's visit.
The Soviets, for their part, are extremely distrustful
of Kim 11-song and have been unwilling to endorse
Kim's cult. They have not forgotten Kim's ingratitude
for past assistance and his penchant for taking high-
risk actions that jeopardize Soviet strategic interests.
Moscow probably does not cherish the prospect of
trying to cope with the younger Kim, who could be as
irascible and unpredictable as his father.
Kim Chong-il's Assets
Historically, Communist states have had great diffi-
culty arranging an orderly transfer of power. More-
over, Kim 11-song's father-son succession scheme has
no precedent in the Communist world. Thus, by most
standards, Kim Chong-il would seem to have more
going against him than for him.
There are, however, some special conditions at work
in North Korea that improve the son's chances. First,
of course, is Kim It-song's great personal power.
Many of his senior lieutenants may be unenthusiastic
about the younger Kim, but they are undoubtedly
loyal to Kim 11-song-he has systematically eliminat-
ed his opponents over the years. Thus, resistance, if
any, is likely to remain passive as long as the senior
Kim is around.
There are no obvious challengers to Kim Chong-il.
The older Kim's personal involvement in virtually
every aspect of North Korea's development has cre-
ated an enormous gap between Kim 11-song and his
immediate subordinates. Only party veteran Kim Il
has anything approaching an independent stature, and
his health is poor.
Finally, North Korea is probably more of a closed
society than any other country in the world. A
generation has matured under virtually exclusive in-
doctrination in Kim 11-song's thought. To the people,
Kim 11-song is both a political leader and a father
figure. North Korean propaganda has sought to cap-
italize on and magnify this personal appeal in order to
establish the legitimacy of the son's claim. Indeed, the
image of the father and the son is being craftily
projected in an effort to make the eventual transfer of
power appear both natural and foreordained.
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The Murky Background
of Kim Chong-il
Despite his heightened publicity, reliable information
on Kim Chong-il's personal history remains meager.
He was born on 16 February 1942, a date that
P'yongyangfinally cormed on his 40th birthday.
There is still uncertainty concerning where he was
born.
Most accounts suggest that Kim Il-song took refuge
in the Soviet Union after Japanese forces moved
against Korean Communist guerrillas in Manchuria
in the late 1930s. North Korean hagiographers, how-
ever, put guerrilla leader Kim in the Korea-Manchu-
ria border area. The issue has implications for the
younger Kim. As successor, it is important that his
birthplace be established on Korean soil or in terri-
tory under the operational control of Kim II-song's
partisan forces.
Kim Chong-il's early family life is also obscure. His
mother, Kim Chong-suk, died in 1949 at the age of
32. Since the mid-1970s, a campaign has been under
way to depict her as a fervent follower of Kim II-song
and a staunch revolutionary in her own right. This
program is also meant to lend support to Kim Chong-
il's cause.
Kim II-song remarried in the early 1950s. His second
wife, Kim Song-ae, is a member of the party Central
Committee and leader of the women's league. During
her infrequent public appearances, she is identified as
Kim Il-song's wife. Kim Il-song reportedly has a son
and daughter by this second marriage, but neither
has been mentioned by name in the press.I
Kim Chong-il reportedly studied briefly in Eastern
Europe and ultimately graduated from Kim II-song
University in P'yongyang. He apparently did not serve
in the armed forces but moved directly into an
important post in the central party apparatus. Kim
Chong-il reportedly has a wife and children, but they
have never been mentioned in the North Korean
media.
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