PROPOSED (Sanitized)ACCOUNTABILITY AND HANDLING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL (JOB #8766)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-00674R000300120010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 99
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 8, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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8o '1417",'
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Inspector General
General Counsel
Legislative Counsel
Comptroller
FROM
SUBJECT
Chief, Regulations Control Branch
Information Systems Analysis Staff
,
Accountability and Handling of
Classified Material (Job #8766)
FOR YOUR CONCURRENCE OR COMENTS:
1. The att
safeguarding of
ached proposal initiated by the Office of Security
implements changes 1: I
dictated by Executive Order 12065, and will replace
the existing
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and that portion of pertaining to the
classified material. (U) v. ii f1,4
forward your concurrence or comments no later than
Since Executive Order 12065 became effective
please considerthis as a priority action to be
attention. Questions may be directed to
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2. Please
29 January 1979.
1 December 1978,
given immediate
Attachments:
25X1 1. Proposed
2. Concurrence
*New Series
cc: AO/DCI
SSA/DDA
C/ISAS
RAB
OS
OL
OC
Sheet
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WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
DERWATiVE.CL BY
DECL X REVW ON 8 January 99
DERIVED FROM A9c5 . 2
C-O-N-F- I -D-E-N-T- I -A-L
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CONGRESSIONAL
FIISEARCH
SERVICE
LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS
RETURN TO:
ISS/RSB25X1
3135309 Hqs..
CONGRESS AND PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTING SECURITY
OR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION:
A Brief Overview
Harold C. Relyea
Specialist in American National Government
Government Division
August 3, 1979
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The Congressional Research Service works exclusively for
the Congress, conducting research, analyzing legislation, and
providing information at the request of Committees, Mem-
bers and their staffs.
The Service makes such research available, without partisan
bias, in many forms including studies, reports, compilations,
digests, and background briefings. Upon request, the CRS
assists Committees in analyzing legislative proposals and
issues, and in assessing the possible effects of these proposals
and their alternatives. The Service's senior specialists and sub-
ject analysts are also available for personal consultations in
their respective fields of expertise.
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ABSTRACT
While Congress does not utilize the same information protection
arrangements such as are found within the executive branch, it has a
functional need to safeguard various types of sensitive materials and
has various options available to it to achieve this end.
The author wished to credit Cheryl J. Scott and Sandra M. Wallace
for the secretarial production of this report.
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CONTENTS
Executive Summary
Part I. Historical Framework 1
Emergence of executive branch policy and practice
Development of executive-congressional relations concerning
committee receipt of controlled information 11
House, Senate and committee rules 15
Part II. Toward a Model 24
The Gravel decision and the Senate Special Committee Report,
1973 24
House Committee on Committees Report, 1974 30
House Ethics Committee Report, 1976 32
Senate Office of Classified National Security Information 33
Committee management considerations 35
Protection practices 35
Member responsibilities 37
Staff responsibilities 40
Enforcement mechanisms and procedures 46
Archival considerations 51
Appendix A. Selected Committee Rules Regarding the Management
of Sensitive Information 53
Appendix B. Selected House and Senate Rules Regarding the
Management of Sensitive Information 77
Appendix C. Selected Provisions of Statutory Law Regarding
Classified Information 80
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CONGRESS AND PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTING SECURITY
OR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION:
A Brief Overview
Executive Summary
Congressional requests for and receipt of executive branch informa-
tion and documents occur in a continuously changing political environ-
ment and against a background of constitutionally separated powers. In
receiving sensitive information -- knowledge, the premature disclosure
of which, if detected, could result in the conveyance of some type of
undesired advantage from the departments or agencies, a congressional
committee may elect to protect such material, regardless of whether or
not it is regulated or under security classification, in order to guard
against assertions that it was disclosed improperly by the panel. With-
out a good faith effort on the part of a committee to safeguard sensi-
tive documents, the executive branch may allege that such records have
been managed irresponsibly by Congress. When information provided by
the departments and agencies is labeled as to its classified or offically
secret status, then any plea of ignorance as to its sensitivity is irradi-
cated and its transmittal to a committee may be predicated upon the under-
standing that it will be protected from disclosure.
As part of the good faith effort to assure the executive branch that
sensitive information will be properly safeguarded, many committees of Con-
gress have adopted special rules and procedures regarding the management of
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such materials. This discussion focuses upon problems confronting com-
mittees attempting to protect sensitive information and documents, often
under classification restrictions, supplied by the departments and agen-
cies. While the matters explored here may have relevance for less specif-
ically denoted security considerations, this narrative is not necessarily
concerned with the management of confidential materials originated within
Congress.
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CONGRESS AND PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTING SECURITY
AND/OR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION:
A Brief Overview
Part I. Historical Framework
Although Congress does not make use of a formal system of secur-
ity classification arrangements such as is found within the executive
branch, it has a functional need, nevertheless, to protect various types
of sensitive information, whether provided by other official entities,
acquired from from private sources, or originated in Congress. Such ma-
terials may be supplied voluntarily with an understanding that no legis-
lative branch disclosure will occur or, as recently happened, 1/ informa-
tion may be transmitted grudgingly to Congress with only a fervent hope
that its confidentiality will be maintained.
In abstract terms, "sensitive information" is temporal in nature --
its importance may lessen with the passage of time. Its character is such
that its premature disclosure, if detected, could result in the conveyance
of an unwanted advantage -- e.g., political, economic, or both -- to others.
1/ A private corporation, having supplied confidential business
information to the Federal Trade Commission, was unsuces-
ful in its efforts to enjoin the anticipated disclosure
of this material to Congress by the agency; see Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. F.T.C., 409 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1976),
affirmed 548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976); for a discussion
of the possible consequences of this decision, see Barbara
J. Smith. Congressional Treatment of Confidential Busi-
ness Information: Proposals to Avert Unwarranted Disclosure.
Indiana Law Journal, v. 52, Summer, 1977: 769-791.
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Or such release might be regarded as'an unwarranted violation of a
fundamental value -- e.g., "invasion of personal privacy" or "contrary
to sound business practice" -- of a given society or political culture.
In more specific terms, existing legal authorities suggest types
or information which appear to warrant protection within the executive
branch and, therefore, might be regarded as "sensitive" within Congress.
These materials, so identified, pertain to or include: national defense
or foreign policy, 2/ national security, 3/ classified information, 4/
diplomatic codes, 5/ intelligence sources and methods, 6/ law enforce-
ment investigatory files, 7/ trade secrets, 8/ commercial or financial
matters, 9/ or personal privacy. JO/ While other such references un-
2/ See 5 U.S.C. 552(6)(1).
3/ See E.O. 12065.
4/ See 18 U.S.C. 798, 50 U.S.C. 783.
5/ See 18 U.S.C. 952.
6/ See 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3), 403g.
7/ See 5 U.S.C. 552(6)(7).
8/ See 18 U.S.C. 1905.
9/ See 5 U.S.C. 552(6)(4), 552(6)(8); a study by the Department of
Justice has identified a multiplicity of laws regarding
executive branch protection of business information held by
the departments and agencies; see U.S. Commission on Federal
Paperwork. Confidentiality and Privacy. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1977, pp. 26-27.
10/ See 5 U.S.C. 552(6)(6), 5 U.S.C. 552a.
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doubtedly could be added to this list, these examples are among the
more obvious concepts conveying a sense of "sensitive" information. 11/
While a variety of ways exist for identifying sensitive information,
at least one type of record is presented to Congress with a clear indi-
cation of its protected status. Classified documents are marked with iden-
tification labels -- "Top Secret," "Secret," and "Confidential" --by ex-
ecutive branch personnel, indicating that their contents met prescribed
standards for the creation of official secrets.
Today, after many years of evolution, various congressional commit-
tees have specific rules for managing classified materials. Others have
developed procedures for safeguarding various types of sensitive data.
The following paragraphs explore some of the matters which confront a
congressional committee attempting to effectively manage classified and
sensitive information and documents furnished to them directly or indi-
rectly by Federal departments or agencies, other committees, other gov-
ernments, or private sources. Congress also has demonstrated its con-
cern about -- or has been criticized regarding -- disclosure of other
types of sensitive information by Members or staff including classified
documents obtained directly from a source outside Congress, confidential
committee studies or hearing materials, and Senate and House closed ses-
sion matters. This overview may be relevant to such disclosures, but
11/ For example, this list overlooks "restricted data," a particu-
lar type of sensitive atomic energy information defined
by the Atomic Energy Act (see 42 U.S.C. 2161-2166).
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concentrates on the problems confronting committees in protecting sen-
sitive information and records in their possession, particularly those
supplied and formally classiEed by Federal entities. Before embarking
upon that discussion, however, the emergence and contemporary context
of executive branch classification policy and practice, together with
related administrative control procedures, are briefly considered; the
implications of committee receipt of regulated records from a depart-
ment or agency are assessed in terms of executive-congressional rela-
tions; and existing congressional rules regarding sensitive or classi-
fied documents are reviewed.
Emergence of executive branch policy and practice
Although members of the United States armed forces were, from the
time of the Revolution, prohibited from communicating with the enemy,
and spying during wartime similarly had been condemned since that era,
no directives regarding the protection of defense information or guard-
ing against foreign intelligence intrusions were issued until after the
Civil War. 12/ The first of these instructions appeared in War Depart-
ment General Orders of 1869. The thrust of these regulations, which
evolved into a document protection system by the turn of the century,
was to provide for the protection of coastal defenses and fortresses
12/ For a detailed history of the evolution of security classification
policy see U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government
Operations. Government Secrecy. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2d
Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. pp. 843-884.
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against unwanted observers. These arrangements were confined to the
Army and the Navy until the eve of World War II. On March 22, 1940,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an order (E.O. 8381) extending
information protection procedures beyond the armed forces institutions
to potentially embrace all information, regardless of its governmental
unit of origin or storage, critically bearing upon the Nation's defense.
And, in 1951, President Harry S. Truman authorized (E.O. 10290) the uti-
lization of information protection arrangements by all agencies of the
Federal Government having a role in "national security" matters. This
scope, with regard to classification use, generally has remained in ef-
fect unto the present time: security classification procedures are em-
ployed by both military and non-military policy entities to protect in-
formation pertaining to "national security," a broadly interpreted re-
ferent generally regarded as including matters beyond more narrowly un-
derstood "national defense" concerns. Indeed, because "national secur-
ity" has never been strictly defined in law and has proven, in practice,
to be a concept of sweeping scope, a preference for more precise langu-
age, to prevent the over-zealous production of offical secrets, has been
expressed officially by one congressional panel having recognized exper-
tise in this policy sphere. 13/
13/ See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations.
Executive Classification of Information -- Security Classi-
fication Problems Involving Exemption (b)(1) of the Freedom
of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., pp. 61-64. (93rd Congress, 1st Session.
House Report No. 93-221)
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Authority to apply security classification to information within
the executive branch generally can be attributed to a handful of cur-
rently operative authorities. 141 Foremost among these references is
the President's standing Executive order ( E.O. 12065) prescribing
classification criteria and procedures. This instrument also provides
an administrative mechanism for the implementation of other informa-
tion security authorities. Both atomic energy data and intelligence
materials may be protected by law apart from the President's classifi-
cation order, but, nevertheless, bear markings and are otherwise main-
14/ Constitutional provisions usually cited by the Chief Executive
in issuing an executive order regarding security classifi-
cation matters include Article II, section 1, vesting
executive power in a President of the United States; Article
II, section 2, naming the President as Commander-in-Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States; and Article II,
section 3, requiring that the President take care that the
laws be faithfully executed (see concurring opinion of
Justice Black in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 718 (197-0 and of Justice Stewart with whom
Justice White concurred, ibid., pp. 727-728.)
Statutes normally cited by the executive branch as
authority for establishing security classification policy
include the Espionage Laws (18 U.S.C. 792 et seq.), the
National Security Act (61 Stat. 496), section 4(b) of the
Internal Security Act (50 U.S.C.- 783(b)), the Atomic Energy
Act (42 U.S.C. 2162(c)), and the Freedom of Information
Act (5 U.S.C. 552). In his concurring opinion in the Penta-
gon Papers Case, (supra, p. 741), Justice Marshall states:
In these cases there is no problem concerning the
President's power to classify information as 'secret'
or 'top secret'. Congress has specifically recog-
nized Presidential authority, which has been formerly
exercised in Executive Order 10501, (1953) to classi-
fy documents and information. See e.g., 18 U.S.C.
798; 50 U.S.C. 783, (and see footnote 3 on p. 743).
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tamed in accordance with procedures provided by that directive. An-
other authority in this policy area is E.O. 10865 of 1960 which estab-
lishes the industrial security classification system used by defense
contractors.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (42 U.S.C. 2161-2166) provides for the
protection of sensitive information, referred to as "restricted data,"
regarding the production of atomic energy.
Under the authority of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403(d)(3) and 403g) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
bears a responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods.
This authority implies an information security arrangement.
And, under the terms of certain regional defense treaties and inter-
national organization affiliations, the United States is required to main-
tain information received from allies in a protected status. Thus, trea-
ties and executive agreements may serve as authority for a classified in-
formation arrangement. 15/
With regard to executive branch discretion for establishing policy
in this area, Congress has not only deferred to Presidential initiative
in certain expressions of classification policy, but has also given re-
cognition to the existence of such policy in statutory pronouncements.
15/ See Herbert Lewis. Safeguarding Classified Information. Defense
Management Journal, v. 9, Oct. 1973: 29-31, 62.
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Nevertheless, the legislative branch maintains it has not relinquished
its initiative to act on these matters or diminished its authority for
ultimately determining policy regarding security classification proce-
dures. 16/
In addition to national security classification markings and pro-
tection procedures, executive branch departments and agencies use a
variety of additional labels and attendant information control prac-
tices which either supplement the arrangements prescribed in the Pre-
sident's classification order or constitute a parallel regulation sys-
tem of administrative safeguards. 17/ There is no clear statutory
authorization for these markings and protection procedures. Arguments
have been offered that the President's classification order, by not di-
rectly prohibiting such supplemental labels, allows their creation and
use. Administrative control markings, so the rationale goes, are a
logical development ot records management discretion granted to the ex-
ecutive branch in the "housekee?ing" statute (5 U.S.C. 301), the
Federal Records Act (44 U.S.C. 3101-3107), or both. These markings,
16/ See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations.
Security Classification Reform. Hearings, 93rd Congress,
2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974,
pp. 289-294.
17/ Samples of these markings are identified in U.S. Congress. House.
Committee on Government Operations. U.S. Government Informa-
tion Policies and Practices -- Security Classification Prob-
lems Involving Subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information
Act (Part 7). Hearings, 92d Congress, 2d session. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, pp. 2929-2938.
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their control systems, and their basis of creation, in many regards,
are of little significance outside of the executive branch. Fairly
definite legal authority must exist to prohibit the disclosure of
information. 18/ Such labels as those discussed here, at best, are
indicators that a record or document, so marked, has been deemed
"sensitive" and precautions against its general circulation may be
warranted.
Three essential considerations underlie contemporary security
classification and information regulation efforts. First, criteria
must be determined which connote what types of information are de-
serving of protection and the reasons for such limitations. Thus,
personally identifiable information might be safeguarded for reasons
of personal privacy in the case of the individual citizen, national
security in the case of an intelligence operative, or law enforce-
ment in the case of an undercover investigator or an informer.
Next, the duration of control must be determined. What is a
reasonable period of time to officially protect information -- for
the life of a particular record or file, for the normal longevity
of a human being, until events either indirectly usurp the substance
or directly reveal the details of a secret? A few years ago, a panel
18/ The denial of information under the Freedom of Information Act
(5 U.S.C. 552) requires the identification of legal authority
justifying such action, including specific statutes apart
from the F.O.I. Act's own exemptions.
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of experts at the Defense Department, recognizing the technological and
scientific capabilities of the major world powers as well as modern in-
telligence techniques, concluded "that it is unlikely that classified
information will remain secure for periods as long as five years, and
it is more reasonable to assume that it will become known by others in
periods as short as one year through independent discovery, clandestine
disclosure or other means." 19/ The President's current order (E.O.
12065) on security classification prescribes separate control periods
for every document and divorces temporal protection considerations
from the application of sensitivity labels ("Top Secret," "Secret,"
and "Confidential").
Third, having established that certain information has become an
official secret, how is such material to be regulated in terms of its
availability? Two considerations must be addressed regarding this
point: what "need-to-know" justifications are in order to warrant access
to protected materials and what amount or kinds of physical safeguarding
are appropriate?
Because perceptions and judgments on these three concerns may well
differ, the President has issued an Executive order on security classifi-
cation to assure a degree of unity in administration on such matters.
19/ U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering. Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Secrecy. Washington, Department of
Defense, 1970, p. I.
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Congress, of course, is not bound by this Executive order and committees
within the two Chambers may have differing views from those of the execu-
tive branch regarding the creation and maintenance of Government secrets.
Such attitudes have consequences for the transfer of sensitive informa-
tion from the departments and agencies to the Legislature.
Development of executive-congressional relations concerning
committee receipt of controlled information
Congressional requests for and receipt of executive branch records
and documents occur in a continuously changing political environment and
against a background of constitutionally separated powers which are sub-
ject to a degree of interpretation and modification. Oftentimes the pol-
itical elements of a controversy between the Legislature and the Presi-
dent cannot be distinguished from the constitutional aspects, or vice
versa. No where is this blur of arguments more apparent than in matters
of information transfer by the executive to Congress. It may be argued
that the heat and furor of such disputes rises in relationship to the
degree of sensitivity of the records in dispute, reaching an explosive
crescendo with a congressional subpoena duces tecum confronting a Presi-
dental claim of "Executive privilege." Such constitutional tumults are
both classic and rare: they depict the Executive and Congress in their
full power, but they are usually avoided through political accommodations
and compromise.
In receiving sensitive information from the executive branch, a
congressional committee may elect to protect such material, regardless
of whether or not it is regulated or classified, in order to guard
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against assertions that it was disclosed improperly -- leaked--by
the panel. Without a good faith effort on the part of a committee
to safeguard sensitive documents, the executive branch, for a vari-
ety of noble or ignoble reasons, may allege that such records have
been managed irresponsibly and Congress is untrustworthy. When
material is labeled as to its classified or regulated status, then
any plea of ignorance as to its sensitivity is irradicated. Thus,
when certain protected informav:ion was thought to have been leaked
by the House Select Committee on Intelligence, President Ford for-
mally invoked executive privilege on September 12, 1975, refusing
to further supply copies of classified documents to the pane], dis-
allowing any executive branch witness to again testify before the
unit on matters under security safeguard, and demanding the return
of classified items then in the Committee's possession.
As part of the good faith effort to assure the executive branch
that sensitive information will be protected properly, many commit-
tees of Congress have adopted special rules regarding the management
of such materials. Some panels receive sensitive documents under
executive session procedures, avoiding questions about the propriety
of or reasons for executive branch classification or regulation. 20/
20/ When and under what circumstances congressional committees began
using executive sessions is uncertain. According to one
authoritative commentator, secret committee meetings were a
carry-over from the British experience and we are reminded
that public committee proceedings of any kind are a rela-
tively recent phenomenon: "Committees frequently open their
meetings to the public, which results in wide publicity
before their recommendations are presented to the House,
but in general the old practice of Parliament is followed
and committee meetings are not public." Asher C. Hinds.
Approvig.1004eigageeilf&Mkickdik21kb1:4-1515BaKtittOttObvIe2b ffilb_She
United States.. v. IV. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1907, p. 926n.
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Other committee rules appear to accept the condition that if a record
is classified, it must be protected.
Less a matter of good faith and more a precondition to receiving
classified materials, congressional committee staff handling safe-
guarded documents undergo background checks certifying their good
character. This practice has troublesome implications of a separation-
of-powers nature: should investigative agencies of the executive branch
-- such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Defense Investi-
gative Service -- be given a mandate to probe the private lives of con-
gressional staff who may be pursuing oversight, authorization, or
appropriation activities bearing upon these same entities? To avoid this
imbroglio, Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, developed an alternative staff clearance procedure
early in the 94th Congress:
Instead of having the Defense Department investigate and
clear staff members, the committee uses the Civil Service Com-
mission to gather information about them, and the General Ac-
counting Office to evaluate that information. The clearance
is then granted or denied by the committee chairman.
All the reports and papers generated by the field inves-
tigation and the evaluation are turned over to the chairman
and stored in the committee's security safe. 21/
Since this procedure went into effect in August, 1975, only one
agency has questioned its validity and that doubt was eased when the
the White House indicated its full faith in the arrangement. Today
21/ House Government Operations Issues Own Security Clearances,
Staff, v. 1, 95th Congress, Issue 5:1.
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the Committee on Government Operat%ons, the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, and the Commi.ttee on House Administration
utilize this approach to staff security clearances for some segment
of their personnel. (The details of the process and its cost appear
infra.)
One additional consideration night be entertained in this over-
view of congressional committee management of sensitive information
in the context of overall executive-congressional relations. Capitol
Hill leaks of classified information not only can stimulate damaging
charges of irresponsibility having an adverse effect upon public opin-
ion, but may prompt the President to invoke a claim of executive privi-
lege against Congress whenever official secrets are sought. This was
the position taken by President Ford in his September, 1975, cut-off
of classified materials for the House Select Committee on Intelligence.
The Supreme Court also seemed to suggest in United States v. Nixon that
"a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national
security secrets" might constitute a special type of executive privilege
plea which the Court would regard more favorably than other justifications
for the President's injunction. 22! While the Court was addressing "only
the conflict between the President's assertion of a generalized privilege
22/ United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
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of confidentiality against the constitutional need for relevant evidence
in criminal trials" in this opinion, 23/ there is an implication posited
which may go untested without harm to any branch as long as the basic
security expectations of the executive branch are met by congressional
committees.
House, Senate and committee rules
While virtually any congressional committee may find itself in need
of executive branch information under security classification or in some
other type of protected status, about twenty-nine panels of the 95th Con-
gress appear to have had rules directly bearing upon the management of
such material when it was in their possession. A total of forty-one
committees of the same Congress had rules regarding executive sessions,
signifying that sensitive information could be safeguarded under this
procedure. These panels and their relevant rules are identified in
Table I. 24/
23/ See Ibid., p. 712 at note 19.
24/ See Appendix A for the text of these and other relevant committee
rules.
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TABLE I
Principal Committee Rules Regarding Sensitive
Information Management
95th Congress
Committee
Executive
Session
Specific
Management
H. Agriculture
H. Appropriations
H. Armed Services
Full committee
Subcommittees
H. Banking, Finance &
Urban Affairs
H. Budget
H. District of Columbia
H. Education and Labor
H. House Administration
H. Interior and Insular
Affairs
H. International
Relations
Affairs)
H. Interstate and Foreign
Commerce
H. Judiciary
H. Merchant Marine
and Fisheries
H. Post Office and Civil
Service
H. Public Works
and Transportation
Sec.
Sec,
Sec.
Sec.
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
lie
IIIh, IIIk
4(d)
5(a), (b)(1)
Sec. III k
13 Rule 7
IV, XIII Rule XIII
II(f), VII
3, 10, 20
G, J(7)
1(c1)
3, 8(0(7)
Rule 2(c), 5(h)
Rule
Rule
Rule
VII(g)(7)
20
J(7)
Rule 8(f)(7)
(Foreign Rule 4 Rule 19
H.
H.
H.
H.
Rules
Science and Technology
Small Business
Standards of Official
Conduct
Rule 2(e)
Rule lid
Rule II(B), V(A) Rule V(A)
Rule 3(d) Rule 20
Rule II(f), VII Rule VII(g)(7)
(g)(7)
Rule 1(c)
Rule B22, 823
Rule 4(A) Rule 15
Rule 15
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Table I - continued
Committee
Executive
Session
Specific
Management
H. Veterans' Affairs
H. Select Aging
H. Select Assassinations
Rule II(c)
Rule 16
Rule 2.3, 3.3(7)
H. Select Congressional
Operations Rule
H. Ad Hoc Energy Rule
H. Select Ethics Rule
H. Select Intelligence Rule
H. Select Narcotics
Abuse and Control Rule 4(h)
H. Ad Hoc Select Outer
Continental Shelf Rule IIA, IVA
S. Armed Services Rule 4, 9(d), 9(f)
S. Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs
S. Budget
S. Energy and Natural
Resources Rule 10
S. Environment and
Public Works
S. Foreign Relations
S. Governmental Affairs
S. Rules and Adminis-
tration Title 1-2
S. Select Ethics Rule 11
S. Select Indian Affairs
S. Select Intelligence Rule 10.5-10.8
S. Select Nutrition and
Human Needs Rule 2, 3(b), 3(d)
S. Select Small Business Rule 3(3)
Jt. Defense Production Rule 4
Jt. Economic Rule 8, 12
7, 9, 14
3, 8(e)(7)
II(e)
3, 8
Rule 3.3(7), 10,
11.1-11.5
Rule 9
Rule 8(e)(7)
Rule 8, 9, 10
Rule IVA
Rule 9(f)
Rule 2(c), 3(e), 8 Rule 2(3), 3(e)
Rule 1(2)
Rule 10
Rule 3
Rule A2? G9(d) Rule E, F, G9(d)
Rule 5B
Rule 11
Rule 9
Rule 9, 10.5-10.8
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
3(d)
3(e)
4
12, 16, 23
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In addition, the Senate, but not the House of Representatives,
has a general rule requiring that confidential communications made
by the President to the chamber shall be kept secret by its Members
and officers. 25/ The comparable House rule sets procedures for re-
ceiving confidential communications but, unlike the Senate counter-
part, contains no provision requiring that such information shall be
kept secret by Members. .26/
25/ Rule 36, clause 3; appears as Section 36.3 in the Senate Manual
for the 95th Congress; this rule was adopted (Senate Execu-
tive Journal, December 22, 1800, p. 361) in the midst of
controversy surrounding President John Adams' convention
with France and was, therefore, initially designed to
regulate treaties and attendant papers submitted to the
Senate by the Chief Executive; see U.S. Congress. Senate.
The United States Senate, 1787-1801 by Roy Swanstrom.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961, pp. 191-192.
(87th Congress, 1st session'. Senate. Document No. 87-64)
In addition, in 1953, the Senate adopted a reso-
lution requiring a loyalty check to be made on any person
appointed to serve as a Senate employee, thus initiating
a minimal security investigation of every individual work-
ing for a Senator, Senate committee, or Senate officer
(see Senate Journal, 83rd Congress, 1st session, p. 144).
Loyalty checks, their frequency and relationship to
security clearances, are discussed infra.
26/ See Rules of the House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Section
914 (Rule 29); according to annotations on the rule, it was
initially adopted in a somewhat different form in 1792
(Journal of the House of Representatives [Gales and Seaton
ed.], February 17, 1792, p. 510) and secret sessions "con-
tinued to be held at times with considerable frequency
until 1830" but the rule rarely has been used since that time;
see Hinds, op. cit., voL. V, section 7247; also see Clarence
Cannon. Canon's Precedents of the House of Representatives
of the United States. v. VI. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1935, section 434.
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In January, 1820, the Senate agreed that when "acting
on confidential or executive business" the chamber should
be cleared of all persons except the senators themselves,
the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and other necessary
officers. A new rule adopted in May, 1844, provided that
a member of the Senate convicted of disclosing for publi-
cation any written or printed matter designated by the
Senate as confidential would be liable to expulsion. Any
officer guilty of such an offense would be subject to dis-
missal. In 1868 an amendment to the rules specifically en-
joined secrecy upon remarks, votes, and proceedings dealing
with treaties, as well as upon the actual texts and relevant
communications from the President. At the same time the
Senate voted to require that all of its officers be
Another rule of the House which is of interest here is
Section 706(c) (Rule 11, 2, (e), (2)) which, in relevant
part, reads:
. ? 'committee. . .records shall be the property
of the House and all Members of the House shall
have access thereto, except that in the case of
records in the Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct respecting the conduct of any Member, of-
ficer, or employee of the House, no Member of the
House (other than a member of such committee)
shall have access thereto without the specific,
prior approval of the committee.
According to annotations on the rule, this paragraph
"derives from section 202(d) of the Legislative Reorganiza-
zation Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812), was made a part of the
rules on Jan. 3, 1953 (H. Res. 5, 83rd Congress, p. 24),
and was amended on Jan. 4, 1977 (H. Res. 5, 95th Cong.,
p. -) to restrict the access of Members to certain records
of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct."
A later portion of the annotation notes: "While all
Members have access to committee records under this clause,
testimony or evidence taken in executive sessions of a com-
mittee is under the control and subject to the regulation
of the committee and, under Rule XI, cl. 2(k)(7) ?712, (in-
fra, cannot be released without the consent of the committee
T5eaker pro tempore Mills, June 26, 1961, p. 11233). See
also Deschler's Procedure (93d Cong.), ch. 17, 515."
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sworn to secrecy when acting on confidential or executive busi-
ness. A few years later even the lamplighter functioning in
"the loft over the Senate Chamber during executive sessions"
was required to take a similar oath. 27/
In addition to these efforts regarding the Senate chamber, by 1884
at least one committee had inaugurated special precautions for safeguard-
ing privileged treaty materials: the Committee on Foreign Relations requir-
ed that each member of the panel sign a receipt before obtaining a copy of
the proposed agreement with Nicaragua providing for the construction of an
interoceanic canal across its territory. 28/ Later, the panel's members
were denied access to this document and attendant papers except during a
committee meeting; at the conclusion of each session on the treaty, the
materials were locked in the chairman's safe. 29/
Despite the precautions which it took prior to 1929 the
Senate was never wholly successful in keeping matters related
to its executive sessions secret. A systematic, though by
no means exhaustive, survey of the leading newspapers of the
country, checked against official records now available to
the public, has revealed the fact that in literally hundreds
of cases news of such proceedings had been published long be-
fore the injunction of secrecy was removed. To determine the
exact number, even if it were possible, would serve no useful
purpose whatever. 30/
27/ R. Earl McClendon. Violations of Secrecy in Re Senate Execu-
tive Sessions, 1789-1929, American Historical Review,
v. 51, October, 1945: 36.
28/ Ibid., p. 45.
29/ Ibid., p. 46.
30/ Ibid., p. 37.
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While public sources do not immediately reveal any cases when a
Member or staff of the Senate were punished for disclosing protected
committee papers, there are two recorded instances when a Senator was
censured for revealing documents confidentially communicated to that
chamber by the Chief Executive. Having read a letter from French
Foreign Minister Charles Talleyrand to his colleagues in open session,
even though the communique was still under an injunction of secrecy,
Senator Timothy Pickering was censured on January 2, 1811, for vio-
lating the rules of the Senate. Three decades later, Senator Ben-
jamin Tappan was censured on May 10, 1844, and nearly expelled, for
having given a confidential letter fTom President John Tyler, pertain-
ing to the Texas annexation treaty and received in executive session,
to another individual for subsequent publication in the New York
Evening Post. Because Tappan apologized to his colleagues for his
offense, efforts to expel him were withdrawn. However, as a conse-
quence of this case, the Senate adopted an amendment to its executive
session rule (Rule 36.4) providing that, when the secret or confiden-
tial business or proceedings of the Senate are disclosed, an offending
Senator would be liable to expulsion and a Senate officer might suffer
dismissal and punishment for contempt. 31/
31/ See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration.
Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1793-1972
by Richard D. Hupman, comp. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1972, pp. 6-7, 13-15. (92nd Congress, 1st session.
Senate. Document No 92-7.)
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While there have not been any censure actions in the House of Rep-
resentatives with regard to a Member revealing documents confidentially
communicated to that chamber by the President, there was concern evi-
denced a short time ago that a Member of that body might have improperly
purchased classified information from persons not authorized to possess
or otherwise sell such material. 32/ After exploring the matter, the
House Armed Services Committee reported: "In view of the absence of any
evidence Which would support the allegations, we must conclude that there
never were any classified documents, or materials extracted from classi-
fied documents, sold to Congressman [Harold] Runnels." 33/
In response to another matter involving a Member and classified
information, the House Committee on Armed Services, in executive session,
adopted a motion on June 10, 1975, which (1) obligated the chairman "to
direct a formal request to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
requesting guidance from that Committee as to the criteria which should
apply for future access by Members of Congress to testimony received by
the Committee [on Armed Services] in executive session and classified in-
32/ See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Alleged
Purchase of Classified Information by a Member of Congress.
Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1973.
33/ See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Alleged
Purchase of Classified Information by a Member of Congress:
a Report. Committee print, 93rd Congress, 1st session.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Priv:. Off., 1973, p. 10.
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formation provided the Committee and maintained in the Committee files"
and (2) established that, "pending an official response from the Commit-
tee on Standards of Offical Conduct to the Committee request, Congress-
man [Michael] Harrington be denied access to any committee files or
classified information maintained therein because of his previous refus-
al to honor House and Committee Rules regarding material received by the
the Committee [on Armed Services] in executive session." 34/ The chair-
man of the Armed Services Committee placed these matters before the
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in a letter dated June 11,
1975. A response, dated November 12, 1975, indicated that the Committee
on Standards of Official Conduct "feels that to speak to a question in-
volving the internal operation of a co-equal Committee of the House is
a matter beyond its authority under House Rules." 35/ Under the terms
of the Armed Services Committee motion of June 10, this offical response
from the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct theoretically rein-
stated Representative Harrington's access to classified material held
by the House Armed Services Committee. On November 6, 1975, the Commit-
tee on Standards of Official Conduct, by a 7-3 vote, dismissed a formal
complaint against Representative Harrington for disclosing classified
34/ See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Report
to the Full Committee on Access by Member of Congress to
Classified Material. Committee print. 94th Congress, 1st
session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, p. 2.
35/ Ibid., ?p. 3.
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information, arguing that no rules of Congress had been violated be-
cause the session of the Armed Services Committee from which classified
information derived had occurred in violation of House rules. 36/
One other point pertaining to congressional rules and their bear-
ing upon the receipt and maintenance of classified information by the
House or Senate derives from a precedent where the House refused to be
bound by a Senate declaration of secrecy with regard to confidential
communications, raising the possibility that one chamber might reveal
information which the other body regarded as in some way protected. 37/
Part II. Toward a Model
The Gravel decision and the Senate Special Committee Report, 1973
In establishing new procedures regarding the management of classi-
fied information within the legislative branch, guidance may be drawn
from a congressional interpretation of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Gravel v. United States, which still stands. 38/ The Senate
Special Committee to Study Questions Related to Secret and Confidential
Government Documents, in a 1973 report, said of the case:
On the basis of the Gravel decision, it would seem possi-
ble to construct several categories of activities and conduct
in which an individual Member may safely engage when he pos-
36/ New York Times, November 7, 1975.
37/ Hinds, op. cit., vol. V. section 7249.
38/ 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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sesses a classified document. However, before considering pro-
tected and proscribed conduct some analysis of the Gravel deci-
sion is in order.
Article I, section 6, clause 1, of the United States Consti-
tution provides as follows:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by
Law, and Paid out of the treasury of the United States.
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during
their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place.
In writing for the Court majority, Mr. Justice White indica-
ted that the Privilege from Arrest, guaranteed by the Article, ex-
tends only to a privilege from civil arrest (a practice common at
the time the Constitution was adopted), and does not immunize
Members from the operation of the ordinary criminal laws. Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614-615 (1972). Thus, a Member
would be generally bound by the operation of those criminal laws
which regulate conduct with respect to the handling of classified
documents.
The Court's analysis of the scope of protection afforded Mem-
bers by the last clause of Article 1, section 6, clause 1 (Speech
and Debate Clause), however, has important implications for an
individual Member in possession of a classified document. Explain-
ing that the Speech and Debate Clause does not broadly exempt that
which the Privilege from Arrest Clause allows (i.e., that Members
are subject to the operation of the ordinary, law), the Court never-
theless indicated that the former Clause was intended to protect
the integrity of the legislative process and "assure a co-equal
branch of the governmentwide freedom of speech, debate, and delib-
eration without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch."
Id., at 616. Moreover, this protection is broad enough to immu-
nize Members "against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or
threaten the legislative process." Id.
It is important to note that although a Member may be immune
from the operation of the criminal law where his conduct is within
the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity" (Id. at 624), the
fact that a particular act in some way "related 67 the legislative
process is not necessarily a justification for immunity. Protection
under the Speech and Debate Clause is available only where the Mem-
ber's act is "clearly a part of the legislative process -- the due
functioning of the process." United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S?
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515-516 (1972). The test for determining what conduct is within
the protected "sphere of legitimate legislative activity" under the
the Speech and Debate Clause was stated by Justice White as
follows:
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The
heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either
house. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach
other matters, they must be an integral part of the
deliberative and communicative processes by which
Members participate in committee and House proceed-
ings with respect to the consideration and passage
or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect
to other matters which the Constitution places with-
in the jurisdiction of either House. As the Court of
Appeals put it, the courts have extended the privilege
beyond pure speech or debate in either House, but "only
when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such
deliberation." United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d, at 760.
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). 39/
The Gravel decision also determined that the scope of immunity avail-
able to a Member's aide is coextensive with that of the Member. 40/
Thus, any action by a Member's aide which would constitute a protected
legislative act if done by the Member himself is immunized by this in-
terpretation of the scope of the speech and debate clause. 41/ This
39/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Special Committee to Study Questions
Related to Secret and Confidential Government Documents.
Questions Related to Secret and Confidential Documents.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973, pp. 9-10.
(93rd Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report No. 93-466)
40/ Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 616-617 (1972); reaffirmed in
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491
(1975).
41/ In 1973, in Doe v. McMillian, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), the Supreme
Court declared that the scope of immunity under the clause
was applicable to committee employees to the same extent
as that of Members.
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should be borne in mind, the Special Committee stated, when considering
certain types of behavior by a Member with regard to utilizing classi-
fied materials.
In light of these conditions it seems appropriate to sug-
gest several types of conduct which, in the case of an indi-
vidual Member having possession of a classified document,
should be protected under the Speech and Debate Clause. The
following list is not intended to be exhaustive:
1. Any speech or debate on the Senate floor concerning the
classified document.
2. Any speech during a committee meeting, hearing, etc.
3. Any reading from the classified document either on the
Senate floor or in a committee meeting.
4. Any speech concerning the classified document in committee
reports, hearings, or in resolutions.
5. Any placing of a classified document into the public
record.
6. Any conduct at a committee meeting or on the Senate floor
with respect to the classified document and any motive or
purpose behind such conduct.
7. Any communications between a Member and aide during the
term of the aide's employment with respect to the clas-
sified document if related to a committee meeting or other
legislative act of the Member.
As to those types of conduct for which it would seem no
Speech or Debate Clause protection exists, the following,
also not intended to be exhaustive, are illustrative:
1. Any act with respect to a classified document in pre-
paration for a hearing which may be relevant to the
investigation of third-party crime.
2. Any act with respect to a classified document in pre-
paration for a hearing which is itself criminal, e.g.,
gathering defense information (18 U.S.C. Sec. 793).
3. Any act arranging for the private publication of a
classified document.
4. Any act publishing a classified document privately.
5. Any speech or debate concerning the classified document
delivered or conducted outside Congress; i.e., not in
a committee or on the Senate floor.
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6. Any transmittal or communication concerning the classi-
fied document in newsletters or news releases to con-
stituents or in answering constituent mail.
7. Any disclosure of the classified document on radio or
television appearances. 42/
In addition, the Senate Special Committee offered the following
regarding the legal rights of individual Members with respect to doc-
uments or information received from foreign emissaries:
Although it might be useful in some cases, to distin-
guish between information and documents received from for-
eign emissaries which have been classified by the United
States government [see 50 U.S.C. secs. 783 (b) (c) and 18
U.S.C. sec. 7981 and information and documents which are
either unclassified or classified by a foreign government
without a reclassification by the United States, it is per-
haps equally important to note generally that under the
Espionage and Censorship provisions of the Federal criminal
code (18 U.S.C. secs. 792-799) it is a criminal act for any
unauthorized possessor of any document "relating to the na-
tional defense" either 1) willfully to communicate or cause
to be communicated that document to any person not entitled
to receive it, or 2) willfully to retain the document and
fail to deliver it to an officer of the United States en-
titled to receive it [see 18 U.S.C. sec 793 (e)]. Thus, under
this prohibition both the source and the classification of
the document are immaterial and any unauthorized possessor
thereof faces grave risks.
It may be concluded that where an individual member has
received a document or information from a foreign emissary,
and where such document or information may be within the in-
tendment of applicable criminal provisions, there would seem
to be two alternatives under the present law: 1) the member
may use the document or information to the extent that his
immunity from the criminal law under the Speech and Debate
42/ U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee to Study Questions Related
to Secret and Confidental Government Documents. Questions
Related to Secret and ConEidental Documents. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973, pp. 10-11. (93rd Congress,
1st. session. Senate Report No. 93-466)
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Clause allows, or 2) he may comply with sections 4 (c) and
(d) of Executive Order 11652, 37 Fed. Reg. (1972)... 43/
And with regard to declassification procedures, the Senate Special
Committee said:
The question of the method by which an individual member
may declassify a document in his possession seems to yield
two approaches under the present law. First, the member may
effect a kind of "declassification" by utilizing the document
in accordance with his privilege under the Speech and Debate
Clause. A member could, for example, read from the classi-
fied document at a committee meeting as was done in Gravel.
Strictly speaking of course, this protected conduct on the
part of a member does not technically "declassify" the docu-
ment but it does make the document public, effectively de-
feating the classification. However, experience indicated
that such effective declassification may contribute to a
marked reluctance on the part of executive department offi-
cials to tender restricted information in the future.
A second alternative under present law for a member
desiring to declassify a document in his possession is to
submit the document to the appropriate government authority
in accordance with section 1(d) of E.O. 11652.... Section
5 of E.O. 11652, contains the general declassification
and downgrading guidelines.
43/ Ibid., p. 13; in addition, in P.L. 92-403, 1 U.S.C. 112b (1972),
Congress sets limits on congressional access to interna-
tional agreements, other than treaties, where, in the
opinion of the President, public disclosure would be pre-
judicial to the national security of the United States.
In such event, such agreements "shall not be transmitted
to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an
appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only
upon due notice from the President".
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The Senate took no formal action with regard to this report.
House Committee on Committees Report, 1974
Shortly after the Senate Special Committee released its report,
the House Select Committee on Committees offered the following new
clause to Rule X in its 1974 report:
Handling of Classified Information
5. (a) All information and data whether written or oral
received by any committee or Member of the House which is
classified Secret or higher as a national security matter
by the originator shall be deemed to have been received in
executive session, and shall be subject to all the rules
and procedures of the House which restrict the disclosure
of activities conducted and matters presented in executive
session. No such information or data shall be disclosed
to any person other than a Member, except to those House
employees who have been properly cleared and can demon-
strate a need to have such information or data in the
performance of their official duties as such.
(b) Any Member or employee receiving such classi-
fied information or data shall be notified of its classi-
fication and the restrictions on its disclosure. If in
the judgment of the person providing the information or
data there is special sensitivity (or in the case of a
Member receiving the information otherwise than in the
normal course of his committee participation) the Member
or employee may be required to sign an acknowledgement
that he or she understands and will abide by the restric-
tions on disclosure.
(c) Each Member or employee who receives or may
receive classified national security information or data
shall be provided with a security manual governing its
use and protection, together with copies of applicable
statutes on the protection of official secrets and penal-
ties for unauthorized disclosure thereof. Such manual
and the clearance standards and procedures for the House
(which shall meet the same standards of protection as
those applied in the executive branch) shall be prepared
by the special committee on intelligence and concurred
in by the Speaker and the minority leader.
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(d) House employees (whether on committee staffs or
on personal staffs of Members), before they may receive or
be exposed to classified national security information or
data, must be cleared by a process of investigation and
certification which is appropriate to the level of sensi-
tivity involved, following the criteria which apply in
the executive branch.
(e) (1) When a Member receives classified national
security information or data otherwise than in the course
his or her committee activities, and believes it is over-
or under-classified, he or she may request of the special
committee on intelligence that such information or data
(in the House) be declassified, or reclassified at another
level, as appropriate.
(2) When a Member receives classified national
security information or data in the course of his or her
committee activites, and believes it is over- or under-
classified, he or she may request consideration of a
change in classification by the committee. If the com-
mittee by majority vote agrees to the change, it may
request such change of the special committee on intelli-
gence.
(3) The special committee on intelligence, if it
agrees with any change requested under subparagraph (1)
or (2), shall report its agreement with such change to
the Speaker and the minority leader, and if they concur,
the change shall automatically be made. If the decision
of the special committee or the leadership is adverse to
such change, an appeal may be taken to the floor, in
closed door session, at the direction of a majority of
any committee.
(4) Prior to any action by a Member or committee
or the special committee on intelligence with respect
to the reclassification of any information or data under
this subparagraph, such reclassification shall be request-
ed of the originator of the information, or data, with a
response requested within a period of seven legislative
days. Such action shall not be taken prior to the conclu-
sion of such period except in case of an emergency re-
quiring immediate consideration by the House. 44/
44/ U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Committees. Com-
mittee Reform Amendments of 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1974, pp. 97-98. (93rd Congress, 2d session.
House. Report No. 93-316)
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While neither this provision nor a substitute was adopted by the
House, the clause constitutes one of the fullest statements of possible
procedure pertaining to the handling of security and/or intelligence
information by Congress.
House Ethics Committee Report, 1976
Late in the 94th Congress, the House Committee on Standards of Of-
ficial Conduct, in the course of reporting on its investigation into the
unauthorized publication of the final report of the House Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence, offered the following recommendations:
Legislation Dealing With Classification and Declas-
sification of Security Information
This Committee recommends that the Leadership of the
House assign a Committee to promptly initiate research
and study which will lead to establishing a classifica-
tion system. This task should begin immediately.
Disputes about classification and declassification
of national security information will continue to cause
difficulties, conflicts and confrontations, and impede
the flow of vital information among the three Branches
of Government unless there is a vehicle for resolving
these disputes in an orderly manner.
Specific criteria should be established to define
the type of information which can be classified, how
and when it can be declassified, and the selection of
persons authorized to carry out these functions.
Thought also should be given to providing a system
whereby conflicts between the Branches over declassifi-
cation can be resolved to preclude unilateral release
of security information.
House Rules Governing Classified Information
This Committee recommends that the Leadership of the
House direct an appropriate Committee to promptly under-
take the drafting of new House rules applicable to all
Members, Committees and employees of the House, concern-
ing obtaining, retaining and using classified information.
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To insure uniformity in the execution of whatever rules
result, this Committee suggests a small staff of profes-
sionals be recruited and trained as security officers,
to function under the authority of the Speaker or perhaps
the Sergeant-at-Arms. These individuals could be respon-
sible for obtaining and controlling all classified docu-
ments sought by or in the possession of the House, its
Members, Committees and employees.
Secure depositories should be constructed within the
House complex for the storage of all such records, to
replace the current patchwork system whereby every. Com-
mittee, old or new, has to devise its own ways and means
and whereby individual Members and their staffs frequently
have virtually no secure means of retaining classified
data.
The professional staff of security officers also
could take over the responsibility of screening those
applicants for security clearance in the House, again
to replace the current system whereby Members and/or
Committee Chairmen make the decision.
This professional staff also could be used to conduct
inquiries into leaks of information within the House,
there being no present organization to handle this
function.
This Committee recommends the House consult the Execu-
tive Branch in establishing the proposed rules and sug-
gested professional staff to draw on its knowledge and
expertise in the area of security. 45/
There was no formal House action regarding this recommendation,
Senate Office of Classified National Security Information
The most recent congressional reform effort regarding the man-
agement of sensitive information is now an accomplished fact. In
45/ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.
Report on investigation pursuant to H. Res. 1042 concerning
unauthorized publication of the report of the Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1976, pp. 43-44. (94th Congress, 2d session. House Report
No. 94-1754)
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1977, in anticipation of the abolition of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy and the attendant problem of what to do with the pan-
el's collection of classified atomic energy "restricted data," an
administrative office of the United States Senate was created to
serve as a repository for this protected material. 46/ Given a two-
year mandate, the Office of Classified National Security Information
was granted authority:
(1) upon application of any committee of the Senate, to
perform the administrative functions necessary to classify
and declassify information relating to the national security
considerations of nuclear technology in accordance with guide-
lines developed for restriced data by the responsible execu-
tive agencies;
(2) to provide appropriate facilities for hearings of
committees of the Senate at which restricted data or other
classified information is to be presented or discussed; and
(3) to establish and operate a central repository in
the United States Capitol for the safeguarding of restricted
data and other classified information for which such Office
is responsible.
By provision in the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act of 1978,
the Office has been chartered until the end of 1980. 47/ Operating in
the Capitol office of the defunct Joint Committee, the facility is under
the direction of George F. Murphy, Jr., former executive director of the
Atomic Energy panel, and has a staff of about a half dozen individuals.
46/ Created by S. Res. 252 adopted August 5, 1977.
47/ See 92 Stat. 772, Sec. 105.
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Committee management considerations
The foregoing paragraphs discuss the background to considerations
of congressional committee management of sensitive information: the exe-
cutive branch has developed procedures for the identification of and ad-
ministration of sensitive materials; relevant congressional rules and
statutes exist bearing upon the handling of such records; 48/ a number
of committees of Congress have adopted rules directly or indirectly reg-
ulating sensitive documents; 49/ and efforts at reform in this area also
are apparent. In this narrative, attention is now devoted to the more
finite concerns of congressional committee management of sensitive
information. Particular points to be explored include protection
practices, Member responsibilities, staff responsibilities, en-
forcement mechanisms and procedures, and archival considerations.
Protection practices
Having determined that it must have access to a sensitive document
held by the executive branch, a congressional committee, in order to use
the record in question, may have to pledge to protect its contents from
public disclosure. If no such precondition is set, then the committee
must determine whether or not the information at issue warrants safeguard-
ing and, if so, if this should be accomplished by inspecting the material
48/ See Appendices B and C respectively.
49/ See Appendix A.
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at its executive branch source rather than removing it or accepting a copy
or facsimile and protecting it in committee offices. In the Senate there is
also the alternative of depositing a sensitive document with the Office of
Classified National Security Information.
If such sensitive records are kept in committee offices, the follow-
ing physical safeguards may be pursued in whole or in part:
maintenance of a secure room or storage area
-- with limited means of entry and exit;
-- contained by locked doors;
-- protected against unauthorized entry by alarms;
resistant to fire or entry other than through
doorways; and
free of unauthorized surveillance devices.
-- maintenance of secure files
-- with protective locks;
-- resistant to fire or other than a determined effort
at physical -penetration;
-- protected against unauthorized entry by alarms; and
-- secured to the floor or wall.
-- sensitive document identification
-- name of committee of custody imprinted on document;
sensitivity indicator such as a
-- warning label; and/or a
-- control number.
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These options are available for the physical management of
sensitive information. In addition to these, there are certain
administrative or monitor safeguards which also may be pursued in
whole or in part, including:
-- appointment of a document clerk or security officer to
specifically manage sensitive documents;
-- guards for the secure room or storage area with authority
to check visitor identification and maintain a visitor log;
-- maintenance of a document log for each protected record
indicating each document's committee issued control number
and
-- source of item;
-- receipt date; and/or
-- users of document with date and purpose of inspection;
-- on-site inspection only of committee held sensitive docu-
ments with no allowance for copying or reproduction of same;
-- limitations on staff access to sensitive materials by desig-
nating a small number of authorized users with others having
a need-to-know criterion for access; and
-- periodic clearance of document log, sensitive documents no
longer needed by committee either being returned to Executive
Branch source or being properly destroyed (date and manner of
disposal noted on document log).
Member responsibilities
A foremost consideration with regard to committee management of
sensitive information is that protected records must be entrusted to
Members of Congress serving on the panel in order that they may effec-
tively utilize the information contained in such documents. The public
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release of such safeguarded material contrary to the rules of either
the House or the Senate or the particular committee in question of ei-
ther chamber can result in the punishment of an offending Member by his
or her colleagues. 50/ However, when sensitive papers are not clearly
protected under any rules of the House or Senate, a Member may elect to
publicly disclose such documents even though they are under some type
of safeguard by executive branch standards and their release by a Mem-
ber may prompt conflict between the branches over future congressional
access to such material. Such disclosure could be accomplished without
legal repercussions if it fell within the ambit of the Constitution's
speech and debate clause (Article I, section 6, clause 1). The courts
have construed this immunity narrowly, viewing it as extending to
"speech or debate in either HOUSE" and matters which are "an inte-
gral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which
Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to
the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or
with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the
jurisdiction of either House. 5]/ The Senate Special Committee to Study
Questions Related to Secret and Confidential Government Documents does
50/ As will be discussed later, a Member, depending upon the manner
in which protected information is disclosed, may be subject
to criminal prosecution as well as punishment within his or
her House of Congress.
51/ Gravel v. United States, 406, U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
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not appear to have questioned this interpretation of the speech and
debate clause in its 1973 report. 52/ The Joint Committee on
Congressional Operations, however, was not favorably disposed to this
view. After holding hearings on the legislative role of Congress in
gathering and disclosing information, the panel pointedly noted:
Such an attempt by the Court to tell the Congress what
is its business reflects an unreasonable, if not unknowing,
point of view. It likely reflects, as well, the fact that
no Justice now sitting on the Court has ever held elective,
legislative office. 53/
This divergency of opinion serves to indicate that the applica-
bility of the immunity protection of the speech and debate clause in
situations where it is invoked or said to apply with regard to the re-
lease of safeguarded information -- and here we are referring to records
classified by the executive branch -- by a Member of Congress is somewhat
unclear.
In terms of committee management of sensitive records, Members serv-
ing on the panel should be informed in each case that a document is pro-
tected and' should be apprised of the nature of the relevant authorities
52/ See note 39.
53/ U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Congressional Operations.
The Constitutional Immunity of Members of Congress.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974, p. 2 (93rd
Congress, 2d session. Senate Report No. 93-896); also
see . Constitutional Immunity of Members of Congress.
Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st session. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 2 v.
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conveying this privileged status -- i.e., executive branch order or re-
gulation, congressional chamber and/or committee rule, and statutory
provisions of law. Members, in turn, are responsible for knowing of the
disclosure restrictions placed on information held by a committee on
which they serve. 54/
Staff responsibilities
Continuing on the point discussed above, the leadership of a con-
gressional committee bears a responsibility to identify sensitive in-
formation obtained from the executive branch and to inform both Members
serving on the panel and committee employees as to which records are
protected and the nature of the authorities conveying this privileged
status. There is an additional obligation, as well, to establish and
promulgate general rules or procedures regarding staff responsibilities
in the use or handling of protected materials.
Usually the chairman and ranking minority member of a committee or,
by delegation, the staff director or subcommittee leadership, determine
which employees will have unrestricted access to safeguarded documents
held by the committee and which personnel will have limited or need-to-
know access to such material. While the ideal model would seem to be one
54/ As noted at the outset of this discussion, the focus here is
upon problems confronting committees in protecting sensi-
tive information and documents supplied by and often under
classification restrictions of Federal departments and
agencies and is not necessarily concerned with safeguarding
confidential materials originated within Congress.
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of designating a minimal number of individuals with unrestricted access
privileges, basic management considerations recommend that the staff di-
rector, leader of the minority staff, chief counsel, certain supporting
counsels, chief clerk, and certain supporting clerks of the full commit-
tee have unrestricted access as well as the staff director, counsel,
chief clerk and a supporting clerk of each subcommittee. This arrange-
ment establishes an operational foundation facilitating committee use
of protected executive branch records. In brief, if the occasion sud-
denly arises wherein the committee must make use of safeguarded docu-
ments held by the departments or agencies, there are a minimal number
of staff available to receive and manage such materials for Members
serving on the panel. The determination as to which committee
and subcommittee personnel shall have what type of access to sensitive
papers is conditioned by the rigidity of secrecy desired, the volume
of protected documents handled, and the suitability of staff for re-
ceiving safeguarded records for whatever purpose.
The personal suitability of employees for handling or actually
using sensitive information held by a committee involves at least two
different judgments. The first of these is a determination within the
committee that an individual is trustworthy, i.e., that he or she is
honest, can maintain confidences which may derive from the working
environment, and will otherwise function in conformity with committee
and House or Senate rules as well as the laws of the United States.
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The second judgment usually pertains to official secrets created by
the executive branch. In order to receive this type of material, a
committee employee obtains a security clearance. Under present arrange-
ments, the committee chairman presents the applications of staff mem-
bers deemed to require such a clearance to the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) which conducts the appropriate background investiga-
tion. 55/ When a congressional committee staff member seeks classified
information from a department or agency, the suitability of that indivi-
dual for receiving such sensitive material largely rests upon the back-
ground findings developed by the FBI. 56/ According to the Bureau, the
average cost for a security investigation is approximately $2,200 per ap-
plication but may be considerably higher if extensive field inquiries are
necessary. This cost is borne by each committee for its own staff.
Because security clearances are expensive, the leadership of a com-
mittee with a large staff may wish to carefully identify only a limited
number of personnel who will be authorized to handle executive branch
classified documents.
55/ These are full field investigations which are suitable for
granting the highest level of security clearance.
56/ Suitability alone does not guarantee access to classified
materials; other factors involved in the determination
to provide protected records might be the "need-to-know"
justification for making the documents available or a
determination that sensitive intelligence information
is involved which requires absolute protection (see
50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3)).
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If a committee seeks access to classified materials held only
by the Department of Defense, then applications for staff security
clearance may be submitted directly to it for processing. A back-
ground check is conducted by the Defense Investigative Service and,
on the basis of these findings, a clearance may be issued.
As noted earlier, there was some concern in the House over the
propriety of the FBI investigating congressional staff, for what-
ever purpose, and maintaining dossiers on these personnel. Seeking
an alternative arrangement to the one involving the FBI, Chair-
man Jack Brooks of the House Committee on Government Operations es-
tablished a different security clearance plan in 1975 using the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) and involving the General Account-
ing Office (GAO).
Under the Government Operations Committee procedure,
the chairman requests necessary clearance investigations
(top secret). The requests are channeled through GAO
(a legislative branch agency) to CSC as GAO's agent in
performing national security checks and full-field inves-
tigations on a reimbursable basis.
Upon completion of the national security check, GAO
advises the chairman for interim clearance or employment
purposes.
Upon completion of the full-field investigation, all
reports and papers generated by CSC are sent to the Secur-
ity Office of GAO. That office reviews the file and pro-
vides a written advisory opinion to the chairman as to
the suitability of the individual for clearance. This
opinion is based on criteria established in Executive
Order No. 10450 issued in 1953, and as subsequently
amended.
The opinion -- and the file -- are sent to the chair-
man, who issues or declines clearance for the individual.
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In turn, the staff member is advised of the decision, in
writing, by the chairman. A copy, for reference control
purposes, is forwarded to GAO.
Executive Branch agencies requiring security clear-
ance verification receive it by contacting the Security
Office at GAO. 57/
The average cost for such an investigation, which is charged
to the committee requesting it, is, according to the Security Of-
fice at GAO, approximately $800 per application. This figure in-
creases in direct proportion to the amount of time and field in-
quiry necessary to complete the background check.
In addition to these judgments of the suitability of congres-
sional employees for handling or actually using sensitive informa-
tion held by a committee, the Standing Orders of the Senate have
contained a provision since 1953 requiring that:
. .when any person is appointed as an employee
of any committee of the Senate, of any Senator, or
of any office of the Senate the committee, Senator,
or officer having authority to make such appointment
shall transmit the name of such person to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, together with a request
that such committee, Senator, or officer be informed
as to any derogatory and rebutting information in the
possession of such agency concerning the loyalty and
reliability for security purposes of such person, and
in any case in which such derogatory information is
revealed such committee, Senator, or officer shall
make or cause to be made such further investigation
as shall have been considered necessary to determine
the loyalty and reliability for security purposes
of such person.
57/ House Government Operations Issues Own Security
Clearances, Staff, v. 1, 95th Congress, Issue 5:1.
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Every such committee, Senator, and officer shall
promptly transmit to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion a list of the names of incumbent employees of such
committee, Senator, or officer together with a request
that such committee, Senator, or officer be informed
of any derogatory and rebutting information contained
in the files of such agency concerning the loyalty and
reliability for security purposes of such employee. 58/
The information resulting from this investigation could be utili-
zed by a Senate committee in determining whether or not a prospective
employee is trustworthy. The loyalty check authorized by this provi-
sion is not necessarily considered in security clearances of congress-
ional committee staff to receive classified information from the exec-
utive branch but the loyalty of an individual, in and of itself, is ex-
amined in any security clearance investigation. Accurate information as
to the extent to which loyalty checks, as required by the Standing Or-
ders, are pursued is not available but it would appear that there is not
a high degree of compliance with this provision.
As an additional condition of employment, committee staff may be re-
quired to sign an oath to the effect that they will not reveal sensitive
information held by their panel in a protected status. This is not an
agreement with any governmental entity outside of the legislative branch,
thereby avoiding any breach of the separation of powers doctrine of the
Constitution. Any failure to honor such an oath creates a breach of con-
58/ During the past few Congresses, this provision has appeared as
Section 76 of the Senate Manual.
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tract and can result in immediate punishment including a dismissal from
employment. Both the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Senate Committee on Intelligence use an information secrecy
oath arrangement.
Finally, the leadership of a committee staff bears a responsi-
bility to provide, and the personnel bear a responsibility to acquire,
training regarding the proper handling and use of protected records and
documents. Such an education might focus not only upon factual and pro-
cedural matters, but could include some appreciation, as well, for the
purposes of and criteria for security classification as practiced with-
in the executive branch, the reasons why sensitive information
is safeguarded by the committee, and the consequences for publicly dis-
closing such materials.
Enforcement mechanisms and Eocedures
Efforts at disciplining or punishing a Member of Congress for im-
properly disclosing protected information held by a congressional com-
mittee undoubtedly will be conditioned ,by the circumstances of the re-
lease and the nature of the authority which has been violated. In light
of the broad view of the speech and debate clause expressed by the Joint
Committee on Congressional Operations in its 1974 report on the constitu-
tional immunity of Members, 59/ Lt does not seem likely that a Represen-
59/ See note 53.
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sentative or Senator would be challenged by colleagues on the propriety
of disclosing protected records so long as such an action appeared to be
within the ambit of the immunity clause and neither breached a congres-
sional rule safeguarding the material in question nor resulted in a
criminal conviction. As noted earlier, in two instances Senators were
called to question and censured by their colleagues for disclosing in-
formation protected under the rules of the chamber. In this regard, the
importance of having specific rules on this matter and using them, in
both the House and the Senate as well as their committees, becomes ap-
parent.
Depending upon the circumstances of the situation, a disclosure
of properly classified documents by a Member of Congress in an action
outside of the ambit of the immunity clause of Article I of the Consti-
tution could subject a Senator or Representative to criminal prosecu-
tion. 60/ Upon conviction, a Member of the House of Representatives
could suffer the loss of certain privileges as set forth in H. Res.
128 of 1973 as follows:
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Repre-
sentatives that any Member of, Delegate to, or Resident
Commissioner in, the House of Representatives who has been
convicted by a court of record for the commission of a
crime for which a sentence of two or more years' imprisonment
may be imposed should refrain from participation in the busi-
ness of each committee of which he is then a member and should
refrain from voting on any question at a meetings of the
House, or of the Committee of the Whole House, unless or un-
til judicial or executive proceedings result in reinstatement
60/ See Appendix C, particularly 18 U.S.C. 793, 18 U.S.C. 794, and
18 U.S.C. 798.
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of the presumption of his innocence or until he is reelected
to the House after the date of such conviction. This reso-
lution shall not affect any other authority of the House
with respect to the behavior and conduct of its Members. 61/
There is no comparable limitation prescribed for a Senator convicted of
a criminal act.
Questions as to whether or not a Member improperly has handled
protected information must be carefully considered in the House by
its Committee on Standards ol Official Conduct.
In the Senate, the Select Committee on Ethics may exercise this
responsibility under its authority in the Standing Orders "to receive
complaints and investigate allegations of improper conduct which may
reflect upon the Senate, violations of law, and violations of rules
and regulations of the Senate, relating to the conduct of individuals
in the performance of their duties as Members of the Senate, or as of-
ficers or employees of the Senate...." 62/ But only in the instance of
a sworn complaint of such improper conduct, and in the case of unauthor-
ized disclosure of intelligence information in the possession of the Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence, is the Ethics Commmittee compelled to
probe improper releases of protected information by a Senator or Senate
employee. Actions pursuant to a sworn complaint against a Member,
61/ See Congressional Record, v. 119, November 14, 1973: 36943-36944.
62/ During the past few Congresses, this provision has appeared in
Section 79 of the Senate Manual.
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officer, or staff person are conducted under specific and measured proce-
dures. The Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee
System noted its the April 1977, "Second Report" that "the Ethics Com-
mittee does not have explicit authority to investigate unauthorized
disclosures by other [besides the Intelligence Committee] Members
or offices of the Senate." "Nor, for that matter," the report said,
"does any other committee." The panel concluded, saying:
Not only do several Senate committees other than the In-
telligence Committee routinely handle classified and confiden-
tial documents but also individual Senators and employees may
receive such information independently of committees. Further-
more, it may be impossible to identify the source of a disclo-
sure before an investigation is undertaken. For these reasons
the Select Committee believes that responsibility in this area
should be broadened and consolidated in a single committee. 63/
In the absence of clear and applicable Senate-wide rules governing
the protection of sensitive information, it is possible an individual
committee could establish procedures for handling violations of secrecy
conditions by its own members. Nevertheless, no panel has done this
and it is more likely that meaningful disciplining of Members committing
such offenses would come from Senate-wide rules. The principal congres-
sional deficiency in this regard, however, appears to be the lack of Sen-
63/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Temporary Select Committee to Study
the Senate Committee System. Second Report with Recom-
mendations - Operation of the Senate Committee System:
Staffing, Scheduling, Communications, Procedure, and
Special Functions. Committee print, 94th Congress, 2d
session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977, p. 13.
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ate guidelines for the handling of protected materials. Since the adop-
tion of such prescriptions for the whole chamber does not seem to be im-
minent, the void, to some extent, may be filled by individual concerned
committees establishing their own protection practices and policies.
Congressional staff employees are embraced by the immunity clause
of Article I of the Constitution only to the extent they are assisting
a Member in the performance of duties governed by the provision. 64/
If a legislative branch employee was to release protected information
held by a committee on his or her own initiative, then that individual
would be subject to disciplinary action by the chamber served, by the
committee in question, or under the relevant laws of the United States.
Committee personnel found to be improperly disclosing information under
the panel's control could be punished directly by the committee or
brought before either the House Committee on Standards of Official Con-
duct or, in the case of alleged release of Intelligence Committee ma-
terials, the Senate Select Committee on Ethics for investigation and
recommendation of appropriate discipline. The Senate Ethics Commit-
tee considers complaints against employees, even sworn complaints,
"according to procedures it deems appropriate." Punishment in such
cases will depend upon findings and the gravity of the infraction
and may include, but not be limited to, dismissal, suspension,
or the forwarding of findings to the Justice Department for action.
64/ See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); also see
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
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In most cases involving an infraction against a particular committee's
rules (excepting the Senate Intelligence Committee), the chairman
of the panel involved would probably take direct action with regard
to his or her own employees. Where a congressional staff member
outside of a committee has breached information protection conditions
established by that body, the matter is likely to be referred to
the appropriate ethics committee for necessary action.
Archival considerations
At the close of each Congress, committees of the House of Re-
presentatives submit their records to the Clerk of the House in
order that they may be deposited at the National Archives; Senate
committees are under no requirement to so transmit their business
papers but, as a matter of good records management, many panels
regularly submit such materials to the Archives as well. Congres-
sional committees maintain control over access and use of documents
so entrusted to the National Archives and may recall items from
their deposit at any time for whatever reason. As a final consider-
ation in the matter of committee management of sensitive information,
it may be desirable, for reasons of efficient document protection,
to purge files of all safeguarded materials -- returning them to
executive branch sources or destroying them -- before sending retired
files to the Archives, preserving only those items deemed absolutely
essential to the panel for direct future reference.
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A document log will facilitate this process, identifying all sensitive
records, their final disposition, and their historical relevance to the
activities and operations of the committee.
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Appendix A.
Selected Committee Rules Regarding the Management of
Sensitive Information
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Part 1. Defunct Rules
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 94th Congress, Rule 15
15. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Access to classified information supplied to the Committee and
attendance at closed sessions of the Committee or its subcommittees
shall be limited to Members, and to members of the Committee staff
and stenographic reporters who have appropriate security clearance
when the Chairman determines that such access or such attendance is
essential to the functioning of the Committee.
Notice of the receipt of classified documents submitted to the
Committee by the Executive will be sent to Committee Members. Clas-
sified documents will be kept in the Committee safe and will be avail-
able to Members in the Committee office.
The Chairman of the full committee shall establish such other
procedures as in his judgment may be necessary to prevent the unau-
thorized disclosure of any national security information received by
the Committee classified as secret or higher. Such procedures shall,
however, insure access to this information by any Member of the Com-
mittee or any other Member of the Rouse of Representatives who has
requested the opportunity to review such material. Such security pro-
cedures as are established by the Chairman may be modified or waived
in any or all particulars by a majority vote of the full Committee.
House Committee on House Administration, 94th Congress, Rule 15
15. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Access to classified information supplied to the Committee and
attendance at closed sessions of the Committee or its subcommittees
shall be limited to Members, and to members of the Committee staff
and stenographic reporters who have appropriate security clearance
when the Chairman determines that such access or such attendance is
essential to the functioning of the Committee.
Notice of the receipt of classified documents submitted to the
Committee by the Executive will be sent to Committee Members. Clas-
sified documents will be kept in the Committee safe and will be
available to Members in the Committee office.
The Chairman of the full Committee shall establish such other
procedures as in his judgment may be necessary to prevent the unau-
thorized disclosure of any national security information received by
the Committee classified as secret or higher. Such procedures shall,
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however, insure access to this information by any member of the Com-
mittee or any other Member of the the House of Representatives who
has requested the opportunity to review such material. Such security
procedures as are established by the Chairman may be modified or waived
in any or all particulars by a majority vote of the full Committee.
House Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Congress, Special Rules
PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY MATERIAL
1. The chairman, the ranking minority member, the special coun-
sel, and the counsel to the minority shall at all times have access to
and be responsible for all papers and things received from any source
by subpena or otherwise. Other members of the committee shall have
access in accordance with the procedures hereafter set forth.
2. At the commencement of any presentation at which testimony
will be heard or papers and things considered, each committee member
will be furnished with a list of all papers and things that have been
obtained by the committee by subpena or otherwise. No member shall
make the list or any part thereof public unless authorized by a major-
ity vote of the committee, a quorum being present.
3. The special counsel and the counsel to the minority, after
discussion with the chairman and the ranking minority members, shall
initially recommend to the committee the testimony, papers, and things
to be presented to the committee. The determination as to whether
such testimony, papers, and things shall be presented in open or exe-
cutive session shall be made pursuant to the rules of the House.
4. Before the committee is called upon to make any disposition
with respect to the testimony or papers and things presented to it,
the committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine
all testimony, papers, and things that have been obtained by the
inquiry staff. No Member shall make any of that testimony or those
papers or things public unless authorized by a majority vote of the
committee, a quorum being present.
5. All examination of papers and things other than in a presen-
tation shall be made in a secure area designated for that purpose.
Copying, duplicating, or removal is prohibited.
6. Any committee member may bring additional testimony, papers,
or things to the committee's attention.
7. Only testimony, papers, or things that are included in the
record will be reported to the House; all other testimony, papers, or
things will be considered as executive session material.
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RULES FOR IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY STAFF
1. The staff of the impeachment inquiry shall not discuss with
anyone outside the staff either the substance or procedure of their
work or that of the committee.
2. Staff offices on the second floor of the Congressional Annex
shall operate under strict security precautions. One guard shall be
on duty at all times by the elevator to control entry. All persons
entering the floor shall identify themselves. An additional guard
shall be posted at night for surveillance of the secure area where
sensitive documents are kept.
3. Sensitive documents and other things shall be segregated in
a secure storage area. They may be examined only at supervised reading
facilities within the secure area. Copying or duplicating of such
documents and other things is prohibited.
4. Access to classified information supplied to the committee
shall be limited by the special counsel and the counsel to the minority
to those staff members with appropriate security clearance and a need
to know.
5. Testimony taken or papers and things received by the staff
shall not be disclosed or made public by the staff unless authorized
by a majority of the committee.
6. Executive session transcripts and records shall be available
to designated committee staff for inspection in person but may not be
released or disclosed to any other person without the consent of a
majority of the committee.
House Select Committee on Intelligence, 94th Congress, Rule 7
RULE 7. PROTECTION OF PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS
7.1 All material and testimony received or obtained pursuant to
House Resolution 138, 94th Congress, shall be deemed to have been
received by the committee in executive session and shall be given appro-
priate safekeeping.
7.3 The Chairman in consultation with the ranking Minority Member
of the committee shall, with the approval of the committee, establish
such procedures as in his judgment may be necessary to prevent the unau-
thorized disclosure of all material and testimony received or obtained
pursuant to House Resolution 138, 94th Congress. Such procedures shall,
however, insure access to this information by any Member of the commit-
tee under such procedures as may be established by the committee.
7.3 Until such time as the committee has submitted its final
report to the House, classified or other sensitive information in the
committee records and files shall not be made available or disclosed to
other than the committee membership and the committee staff, except as
may be otherwise determined by the committee.
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Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 92nd
congress, Rule 27 and 40
Rule No. 27 - No testimony taken or material presented in execu-
tive session, or any summary or excerpt thereof shall be made available
to other than the committee members and committee staff and no such
material or testimony shall be made public or presented at a public
hearing, either in whole or in part, unless authorized by a majority
of the committee members or as otherwise provided for in these rules.
Rule No. 40 - All information developed by or made known to any
member of the committee staff shall be deemed to be confidential. No
member of the committee staff shall communicate to any person, other
than a member of the committee or another member of the committee staff,
any substantive information with respect to any substantive matter re-
lated to the activities of the committee. All communications with the
press and other persons not on the committee staff in respect to confi-
dential substantive matters shall be by members of the committee only.
Official releases of information to the press on behalf of the commit-
tee shall be made only with the express consent of the Chairman and
vice Chairman.
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities, 94th Congress, Rule 7 and portions of
Rule 9
.RULE 7. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE MATERIAL
7.1 Committee staff offices on the first floor of the Dirksen
Office Building shall operate under strict security precautions. At
least one security guard shall be on duty at all times by the entrance
to control entry. All persons before entering the offices shall iden-
tify themselves. At least one additional security guard shall be
posted at night for surveillance of the secure area where sensitive
documents are kept.
7.2 Sensitive or classified documents and material shall be seg-
regated in a secure storage area. They may be examined only at secure
reading facilities. Copying, duplicating, or removal from the Commit-
tee staff offices of such documents and other material is prohibited
except as is necessary for use in, or preparation for, interveiws or
Committee meetings, including the taking of testimony, and in conformity
with Section 9.2 hereof.
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7.3. Each member of the Committee shall at all times have access
to all papers and other material received from any source. The Staff
Director shall be responsible for the maintenance, under appropriate
security procedures, of a registry which will number and identify all
papers and other materials in the possession of the Committee, and
such registry shall be available to any member of the Committee.
7.4. Access to classified information supplied to the Committee
shall be limited to the Staff Director, the Chief Counsel and the
Counsel to the Minority, and to triose staff members with appropriate
security clearances and a need-to-know.
7.5. No testimony taken including the names of witnesses testifying
or material presented at an Executive Session, or classified papers,
and other material received by the staff or its consultants while in
the employ of the Committee shall be made public, in whole or in part
or by way of summary, or disclosed to any person outside the Committee
unless authorized by a majority vote of the entire Committee, or after
the termination of the Committee, in such manner as may be determined
by the Senate.
7.6. Before the Committee is called upon to make any disposition
with respect to the testimony, papers, or other materials presented
to it, the Committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to
examine all pertinent testimony, papers and other materials that have
been obtained by the Committee staff. No member shall release any such
testimony, papers, or other materials, or any information contained in
such testimony, papers, or other materials, to the public or any person
outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the entire
Committee, or after the termination of the Committee, in such manner as
may be determined by the Senate.
RULE 9. STAFF
9.3 The staff of the Committee shall not discuss either the
substance or procedure of the work of the Committee with anyone other
than a member of the Committee, or other Committee personnel. Upon
termination of employment by the Committee, each member of the staff,
or consultant, shall surrender all classified and other material
relating to the work of the Committee which came into his possession
while in the employ of the Committee.
9.4 The employment of any member of the staff or consultant who
fails to conform to any of these Rules shall be immediately terminated.
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Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 94th Congress
Section 206. Classification of Information - The Joint Committee
may classify information originating within the committee in accordance
with standards used generally by the executive branch for classifying
Restricted Data or defense information.
Section 207. Records - The Joint Committee shall keep a complete
record of all committee actions, including a record of the votes on any
question on which a record vote is demanded. All committee records,
data, charts, and files shall be the property of the Joint Committee
and shall be kept in the offices of the Joint Committee or other places
as the Joint Committee may direct under such security safeguards as
the Joint Committee shall determine in the interest of the common de-
fense and security.
Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, 94th Congress, Rule 21
The information contained in any books, papers, or documents fur-
nished to the committee by any individual, partnership, corporation,
or other legal entity shall, upon the request of the individual, part-
nership, corporation, or entity furnishing the same, be maintained in
strict confidence by the members and staff of the committee, except
that any such information may be released outside of executive session
of the committee if the release thereof is effected in a manner which
will not reveal the identity of such individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, or entity: Provided, that the committee by majority vote may
authorize the disclosure of the identity of any such individual, part-
nership, corporation, or entity in connection with any pending hearing
or as a part of a duly authorized report of the committee if such
release is deemed essential to the performance of the functions of the
committee and is in the public interest.
Joint Committee on Defense Production, 94th Congress, Rule 4
4. No confidential testimony taken on confidential material pre-
sented at an executive hearing of the committee or subcommittee or any
report of the proceedings of such an executive hearing shall be made
public, either in whole or in part by way of summary, unless authorized
by a majority vote of the committee.
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Part II - Operative Committee Rules of 95th Congress
House Committee on Agriculture, Section III
No evidence or testimony taken in executive session may be released
or used in public sessions without the consent of the Committee.
House Committee on Armed Services, Full Committee Rule 7
Any prepared statement to be presented by a witness to the commit-
tee or a subcommittee shall be submitted to the committee at least 48
hours in advance of presentation and shall be distributed to all members
of the committee or subcommittee at least 24 hours in advance of deli-
very. If a prepared statement contains security information bearing a
classification of secret or higher, the statement shall be made available
in the committee room to all members of the committee at least 24 hours
in advance of delivery; however, no such statement shall be removed from
the committee offices. The requirement of this rule may be waived upon
a majority vote of the full committee or any subcommittee, a quorum being
present.
All national security information bearing a classification of secret
or higher which has been received by the committee or a subcommittee of
the Committee on Armed Services shall be deemed to have been received by
the committee in executive session and shall be given appropriate safe-
keeping.
The chairman of the full committee shall, with the approval of the
full committee, establish such procedures as in his judgment may be
necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of any national security
information received by the commitzee classified as secret or higher.
Such procedures shall, however, in3ure access to this information by any
member of the committee or any other Member of the House of Representa-
tives who has requested the opportunity to review such material.
House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee Rule XIII
No evidence or testimony taken in executive session may be released
or used in public sessions without the consent of the committee (subcom-
mittee). (House rule XI, clause 2(k)(7).)
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(c) In the case of subcommittee majority staff, by the Chairman of
the subcommittee;
(d) In the case of the subcommittee minority staff, by the ranking
minority Member of the subcommittee.
No other individual shall be considered authorized persons, unless
so designated by the Committee Chairman.
Designated persons--Each Committee Member is permitted to designate
one member of his or her staff as having the right of access to classi-
fied information in the "confidential" category. Such designated persons
must have the proper security clearance and a "need to know" as determined
by his or her principal. Upon request of a Committee Member in specific
instances, a designated person shall also be permitted access to informa-
tion classified "secret" which has been furnished to the Committee
pursuant to Section 36 (b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
Designation of a staff person shall be by letter from the Committee
Member to the Committee Chairman.
Location--Classified information will be kept in secure safes in
the Committee rooms. All materials bearing the designation "top secret"
must be kept in secured safes located in the main Committee offices,
2170 Rayburn Building. "Top Secret" materials may not be taken from
that location for any purpose.
Materials bearing designations "confidential" or "secret" may be
taken from Committee offices to other Committee offices and hearing
rooms by Members of the Committee and authorized Committee staff in
connection with hearings and briefings of the Committee or its sub-units
for which such information is deemed to be essential. Removal of such
information from the Committee offices shall be only with the permission
of the Chairman of the full Committee, under procedures designed to
insure the safe handling and storage of such information at all times.
Notice--Notice of the receipt of classified documents received by
the Committee from the Executive will be sent promptly to Committee
Members. The notice will contain information on the level of classifi-
cation.
Access--Except as provided for above, access to classified materials
held by the Committee will be in the main Committee offices in a desig-
nated "reading room". The following procedures will be observed:
(a) Authorized or designated persons will be admitted to the
reading room after inquiring of the Chief of Staff or an assigned staff
member. The reading room will be open during regular Committee hours.
(b) Authorized or designated persons will be required to identify
themselves, to identify the documents or information they wish to view,
and to sign the Classified Materials Log, which is kept with the classi-
fied information.
(c) No photocopying or other exact reproduction, oral recording,
or reading by telephone, of such classified information is permitted.
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(c) In the case of subcommittee majority staff, by the Chairman of
the subcommittee;
(d) In the case of the subcommittee minority staff, by the ranking
minority Member of the subcommittee.
No other individual shall be considered authorized persons, unless
so designated by the Committee Chairman.
Designated persons--Each Committee Member is permitted to designate
one member of his or her staff as having the right of access to classi-
fied information in the "confidential" category. Such designated persons
must have the proper security clearance and a "need to know" as determined
by his or her principal. Upon request of a Committee Member in specific
instances, a designated person shall also be permitted access to informa-
tion classified "secret" which has been furnished to the Committee
pursuant to Section 36 (b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
Designation of a staff person shall be by letter from the Committee
Member to the Committee Chairman.
Location--Classified information will be kept in secure safes in
the Committee rooms. All materials bearing the designation "top secret"
must be kept in secured safes located in the main Committee offices,
2170 Rayburn Building. "Top Secret" materials may not be taken from
that location for any purpose.
Materials bearing designations "confidential" or "secret" may be
taken from Committee offices to other Committee offices and hearing
rooms by Members of the Committee and authorized Committee staff in
connection with hearings and briefings of the Committee or its sub-units
for which such information is deemed to be essential. Removal of such
information from the Committee offices shall be only with the permission
of the Chairman of the full Committee, under procedures designed to
insure the safe handling and storage of such information at all times.
Notice--Notice of the receipt of classified documents received by
the Committee from the Executive will be sent promptly to Committee
Members. The notice will contain information on the level of classifi-
cation.
Access--Except as provided for above, access to classified materials
held by the Committee will be in the main Committee offices in a desig-
nated "reading room". The following procedures will be observed:
(a) Authorized or designated persons will be admitted to the
reading room after inquiring of the Chief of Staff or an assigned staff
member. The reading room will be open during regular Committee hours.
(b) Authorized or designated persons will be required to identify
themselves, to identify the documents or information they wish to view,
and to sign the Classified Materials Log, which is kept with the classi-
fied information.
(c) No photocopying or other exact reproduction, oral recording,
or reading by telephone, of such zlassified information is permitted.
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(d) The assigned staff member will be present in the reading
room at the option of the authorized person. Such staff member will
be responsible for maintaining a log which identifies (1) authorized
and designated persons seeking access, (2) the classified information
requested, and (3) the time of arrival and departure of such persons.
The assigned staff member will also assure that the classified materials
are returned to the proper location.
(e) The Classified Material Log will contain a statement acknow-
ledged by the signature of the authorized or designated person that he
or she has read the Committee rules and will abide by them.
Divulgence--Any classified information to which access has been
gained through the Committee on International Relations may not be
divulged to any unauthorized person in any way, shape, form or manner.
Apparent violations of this rule should be reported to the Chairman of
the full Committee at once, and by him to the full Committee as promptly
as possible.
Other regulations--So long as they do not conflict with any of the
rules herein set down, the Chairman of the full Committee may establish
other regulations and procedures as in his judgment may be necessary
to safeguard classified information under the control of the Committee.
Members of the Committee will be given notice of any such regulations
and procedures promptly. They may be modified or waived in any or all
particulars by a majority vote of the full Committee. Furthermore, any
additional regulations and procedures should be incorporated into the
written rules of the Committee at the earliest opportunity.
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Rule V(A)
Records and transcripts of open hearings before the Committee shall
not be available to the public for quotation of any Member until after
such Member has had an opportunity to examine and approve such records.
Closed session transcripts and records shall be available to Members of
the House and Committee staff for inspection in the office of the Commit-
tee, but may not be taken from the Committee offices by anyone.
House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Rule 20
(a) All classified material received by the committee or by a sub-
committee shall be deemed to have been received in executive session and
shall be given appropriate safekeeping.
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(b) The chairman of the committee shall establish such procedures
as in his judgment may be necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclo-
sure of any such classifie0 material. Such procedures shall, however,
insure access to this information at the committee offices by any member
of the committee or any other Member of the House of Representatives who
has requested the opportunity to review such material.
House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Rule VIII(g)(7)
No evidence or testimony taken in executive session may be released
or used in public sessions without the consent of the committee.
House Committee on Small Business, Rule 15
Access to classified information supplied to the committee and
attendance at closed sessions of die committee or its subcommittees
shall be limited to Members, and v:o members of the committee staff and
stenographic reporters who have appropriate security clearance when the
chairman determines that such access or such attendance is essential to
the functioning of the committee.
The procedure to be followed in granting access to those hearings,
records, data, charts, and files of the committee which involve classi-
fied intelligence information or information deemed by a subcommittee to
be sensitive shall be as follows:
(a) Only Members of the House of Representatives may have access
to such information.
(b) Members who desire to read materials that are in the possession
of the committee should notify the clerk of the committee or the subcom-
mittee possessing the materials.
(c) The clerk will maintain an accurate access log which identifies
without revealing the material examined, the staff member involved, and
the time of arrival and departure of all Members having access to the
information.
(d) If the material desired is material which the committee or
subcommittee deems to be sensitive enough to require special handling,
before receiving access to such information, Members of the House will
be required to identify the information they desire to read and sign
an access information sheet acknowledging such access and that the
Member has read these procedures.
(e) Such material shall not be removed from the room.
(0 A staff representative shall insure that the documents used
by the Member are returned to the proper custodian or to original safe-
keeping as appropriate.
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(g) No notes, reproductions or recordings may be made of any por-
tion of such information.
(h) The contents of such information shall not be divulged to any
person in any way, form, shape, or manner and shall not be discussed
with any person who has not received the information in an authorized
manner either under these rules or the laws or rules in effect for of-
ficials and employees of the executive branch.
(0 When not being examined in the manner described herein, such
information will be kept in secure safes in the committee rooms.
(j) These procedures only address access to information the com-
mittee or a subcommittee deems to be sensitive enough to require special
treatment.
(k) If a Member believes the material should not be classified or
considered restricted as to dissemination or use, the Member may ask
the committee or subcommittee to so rule; however, as far as materials
and information in the custody of the Small Business Committee is con-
cerned, the classification of materials as determined by the executive
branch shall prevail unless affirmatively changed by the committee or
the subcommittee involved, after consultation with the appropriate exe-
cutive agencies.
(1) Other materials in the possession of the committee are to be
handled in accordance with the normal practices and traditions of the
committee and its subcommittees.
House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, Rule 15
(a) the Chairman of the Committee shall, with the approval of the
Committee, establish such procedures as in his judgment may be necessary
to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of any information or testimony
received by the Committee or its staff.
(b) Unless otherwise authorized by the Committee, the contents of
a complaint and the fact of its filing shall not be disclosed publicly
by any Member of the Committee or by the staff unless or until the Com-
mittee directs service of a copy of the complaint on the respondent
under Rule 7(a)(1) for the purpose of obtaining a formal response or
directs transmission of a statement of alleged facts and violation under
Rule 9(h) for that purpose.
House Select Committee on Assassinations, Rule 3.3(7), portions of Rule
10, and 11.1-11.5
3.3(7) No evidence or testimony taken in executive session may be
released or used in public sessions without the consent of the Commit-tee.
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10.1 Before the commencement of any presentation at which testi-
mony will be heard or papers and things considered, each Committee Mem-
ber will be furnished with a list of all papers and things that have
been obtained by the Committee by subpoena or otherwise. No Member
shall make the list or any part thereof public unless authorized by a
majority vote of the committee, a quorum being present.
10.2 The chief counsel, after discussion with the chairman and
the ranking minority Member, shall initially recommend to the Committee
the testimony, papers, and things to be presented to the Committee.
The determination as to whether such testimony, papers, and things
shall be presented in open or executive session shall be made pursuant
to the rules of the House and 01 this Committee.
10.3 Before the Committee is called upon to make any disposition
with respect to the testimony or papers and things presented to it, the
Committee Members shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine all
testimony, papers, and things that have been obtained by the inquiry
staff. No Member shall make any of that testimony or those papers or
things public unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee, a
quorum being present.
10.4 All examinations of papers and things other than in a pre-
sentation shall be made in a secure area designated for the purpose.
Copying, duplicating, or removal. of classified or other material deemed
sensitive by the Committee is prohibited except where authorized by a
Member.
10.6 Only testimony, papers, or things that are included in the
record will be reported to the House; all other testimony, papers, or
things will be considered as executive session material.
In addition to rules of conduct for staff contained in other rules
of this Committee and the House, the following rules shall apply:
11.1 Staff offices of the Committee shall operate under strict
security precautions. One guard shall be on duty at all times to con-
trol entry. All persons entering the Committee area shall identify
themselves.
11.2 Classified or other materials the Committee deems sensitive
shall be segregated in a secure storage area. Copying or duplicating
of such documents and other things is prohibited except upon the autho-
rization of a Committee Member.
11.3 Access to classified information supplied to the committee
shall be limited by the Committee and chief counsel to those Committee
staff members with appropriate security clearances and a need to know
and to a designated personal staff member of each Committee Member,
that personal staff member also having the appropriate security clear-
ances and a need to know.
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11.4 Testimony taken or papers and things received by the staff
shall not be disclosed or made public by the staff unless authorized
by a majority of the Committee.
11.5 Executive session transcripts and records shall be available
to designated staff for inspection in person but may not be released or
disclosed to any other person without the consent of a majority of the
Committee.
House Select Committee on Congressional Operations, Rule 9
Testimony received in executive hearings shall not be released
or included in any report without the approval of a majority of the
committee.
House Ad Hoc Committee on Energy, Rule 8(e)(7)
No evidence or testimony taken in executive session may be released
or used in public sessions without the consent of the committee.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Rule 8,9, and 10
RULE 8
The members of the Committee staff shall not discusss either
the substance or procedure of the work of the committee with any
person not a member of the committee or the committee staff for any
purpose or in connection with any proceeding, judicial or otherwise,
either during his tenure as a member of the committee staff or at any
time thereafter except as directed by the committee in accordance with
Section 7 of House Resolution 658 of the 95th Congress and the provi-
sions of these rules, or, in the event of the termination of the
committee, in such a manner as may be determined by the House.
No member of the committee staff shall be employed by the com-
mittee unless and until such a member of the committee staff agrees
in writing, as a condition of employment, not to divulge any classi-
fied information which comes into his possession while he is a member
of the committee staff or any information which comes into his pos-
session by virtue of his position as a member of the committee staff
to any person not a member of the committee or the committee staff,
either during his tenure as a member of the committee staff or
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at any time thereafter except as directed by the committee in
accordance with section 7 of House Resolution 658 of the 95th Con-
gress and the provisions of these rules, or in the event of the
termination of the committee, in such manner as may be determined
by the House.
The committee shall immediately consider disciplinary action
to be taken in case any member of the committee staff fails to con-
form to any of these rules. Such disciplinary actions may include,
but shall not be limited to, immediate dismissal from the committee
staff.
RULE 9
In the case of any information classified under established
security procedures and submitted to the committee by the executive
or legislative branch, the committee's acceptance of such informa-
tion shall constitute a decision by the committee that it shall not
be disclosed unless the committee, by rollcall vote, determines that
it wishes to disclose publicly a part or all of such information
under the procedures set forth in clause 7 of Rule XLVII of the Rules
of the House. For purposes of receiving information from either the
executive or legislative branch, the staff director of the committee,
or the chief counsel in his absence, may accept information on behalf
of the committee.
RULE 10
Committee staff offices shall operate under strict security
precautions. At least one security guard shall be on duty at all
times by the entrance to control entry. Before entering the office
all persons shall identify themselves.
Sensitive or classified documents and material shall be segre-
gated in a secure storage area. They may be examined only at secure
reading facilites. Copying, duplicating, or removal from the commit-
tee offices of such documents an& other materials is prohibited ex-
cept as is necessary for use in, or preparation for, interview or
committee meetings, including the taking of testimony and in confor-
mity with these rules.
Each member of the committee shall at all times have access to
all papers and other material received from any source. The staff
director shall be responsible for the maintenance under appropriate
security procedures, of a registry which will number and identify
all classified papers and other classified materials in the posses-
sion of the committee, and such registry shall be available to any
member of the committee.
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Pursuant to clause 7(c)(2) of House Rule XLVIII and to clause
2(e)(2) and clause 2(g)(2) of House Rule XI, Members who are not
members of the committee shall be granted access to such hearings,
records, data, charts and files of the committee and be admitted on
a nonparticipatory basis to hearings of the committee, which involve
classified material, on the basis of the following provisions:
(1) Members who desire to examine materials in the possession
of the committee should notify the clerk of the committee in writing.
(2) Each such request by a member must be considered by the
committee, a quorum being present, at the earliest practicable
opportunity. The committee must determine by record vote whatever
action it deems necessary in light of all the circumstances of each
individual request. The committee shall take into account, in its
deliberations, such considerations as the sensitivity of the informa-
tion sought to the national defense or the confidential conduct of
the foreign relations of the United States, the likelihood of its
being, directly or indirectly disclosed and such other concerns--
constitutional and otherwise--as affect the public interest of the
United States. Such actions as the committee may take include, but
are not limited to: (0 approving the request, in whole or part;
(ii) denying the request; (iii) providing in different form than
requested information or material which is the subject of the request.
(3) In matters touching on such requests, the committee may,
in its discretion, consult the Director of Central Intelligence and
such other officials as it may deem necessary.
(4) In the event that the member making the request in question
does not accede to the determination or any part thereof of the com-
mittee as regards the request, that member should notify the committee
in writing of the grounds for his or her disagreement. The committee
shall subsequently consider the matter and decide, by record vote,
what further action or recommendation, if any, it will take.
Whenever the select committee makes classified material available
to any other committee of the House or Member of the House not a member
of the committee, the clerk of the committee shall be notified. The
clerk shall at that time provide a copy of the applicable portions of
these rules and House Resolution 658 to such members or such committee
and insure that the conditions contained therein under which the clas-
sified materials provided are clearly presented to the recipient. The
clerk of the committee shall also maintain a written record identifying
the particular information transmitted and the committee or Members
of the House receiving such information. The staff director of the
committee is further empowered to provide for such additional measures
as he deems necessary in providing material which the committee has
determined to make available to a Member of the House or a committee
of the House.
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Access to classified information supplied to the committee shall
be limited to those committee staff members with appropriate security
clearances and a need-to-know, as determined by the committee, and
under the committee's direction, the staff director.
No member of the committee or of the committee staff shall disclose,
in whole or in part or by way of summary to any person not a member of
the committee or the committee staff for any purpose or in connection
with any proceeding, judicial or otherwise, any testimony given before
the committee in executive session, or the contents of any papers or
other materials or other information received by the committee except
as authorized by the committee in accordance with section 7 of House
Resolution 658 of the 95th Congress and the provisions of these rules,
or in the event of the termination of the committee, in such a manner
as may be determined by the House.
Before the committee makes any decision regarding a request for
access to any testimony, papers, or other materials in its possession,
the committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine
all pertinent testimony, papers, and other materials that have been
obtained by the committee.
House Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Other Continental Shelf, Rule IV.A
Records and transcripts of open hearings before the Select Commit-
tee shall not be available to the public for quotation of any Member
until after such Member has had an opportunity to examine and approve
such hearing records. Closed session transcripts and records shall be
available to Members of the House and Select Committee staff for inspec-
tion, but may not be released or divulged to any other person without
the consent of the Chairman or a majority of the Select Committee. In
no event shall executive session or mark-up transcripts and records be
taken from the possession of the Select Committee.
Senate Committee on Armed Services, Rule 9(f)
Confidential testimony taken or confidential material presented
in a closed hearing of the committee or subcommittee or any report of
the proceedings of such hearing shall not be made public in whole or
in part or by way of a summary unless authorized by a majority vote of
the committee or subcommittee.
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Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Committee Rule
2(c) and Subcommittee Rule 3(e)
2(c) Confidential testimony--No confidential testimony taken or
confidential material presented at an executive session of the commit-
tee or any report of the proceedings of such executive session shall be
made public either in whole or in part by way of summary, unless specif-
ically authorized by the chairman of the committee and the ranking mi-
nority member of the committee or by a majority vote of the committee,
3(e) Confidential testimony--No confidential testimony taken or
confidential material presented at an executive session of the subcom-
mittee or any report of the proceedings of such executive session shall
be made public, either in whole or in part or by way of summary, unless
specifically authorized by the chairman of the subcommittee and the
ranking minority member of the subcommittee, or by a majority vote of
the subcommittee.
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Rule 10
No confidential testimony taken by or confidential material pre-
sented to the committee or any subcommittee, or any report of the pro-
ceedings of a closed committee or subcommittee hearing or business
meeting, shall be made public, in whole or in part or by way of summary
unless authorized by a majority of the members of the committee at a
business meeting called for the purpose of making such a determination.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Rule E, F, and G9(d)
E. TRANSCRIPTS
1. The Committee on Foreign Relations shall keep verbatim trans-
cripts of all committee and subcommittee meetings and such transcripts
shall remain in the custody of the full committee, unless a majority of
the committee decides otherwise. Publication of transcripts of public
hearings by the committee shall be at the discretion of the chairman,
2. Maintenance and security of classified transcripts:
(a) The chief clerk of the committee shall have responsi-
bility for the maintenance and security of the classified
transcripts.
(b) A record shall be maintained of each use of the
classified transcripts.
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(c) Classified transcripts shall be kept in locked combina-
tion safes in the committee offices except when in active use
by authorized persons. They must never be left unattended and
must be returned to the chief clerk promptly when no longer
needed.
(d) Classified transcripts shall be permitted to leave the
committee offices only in the possession of authorized persons..
Delivery and return shall be made only by authorized persons.
They shall not be permitted to leave the city or the country
unless adequate assurances are made to the chairman for their
security.
(e) Transcripts classified secret or higher shall not be per-
mitted to leave the committee offices.
(0 Extreme care should be exercised to avoid taking notes or
quotes from classified transcripts.
3. Persons authorized to use classified transcripts:
(a) Members and staff of the committee, in the committee rooms,
or, by permission of the chairman, in their offices.
(b) Senators not members of the committee and designated per-
sonal representatives of members of the committee with appropri-
ate security clearances, in the committee's Capitol office, by
permission of the chairman.
4. Declassification of executive transcripts and other executive
records:
Executive transcripts and other executive records of the committee
shall be released to the National Archives and Records Service for un-
classified use in accordance with the policies of that Agency. However,
no such transcripts or other executive records shall be declassified
within a period of 12 years except by majority vote of the committee
and with the permission of surviving members of the committee, at the
time such transcripts or records were made and with the permission of
the executive department, if any, concerned. After 12 years from the
date such transcripts or records were made, they shall be declassified
unless the committee by majority vote shall decide otherwise.
F. REGULATION FOR THE USE OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
(OTHER THAN TRANSCRIPTS)
Receipt and distribution of classified material.
1. All classified material received or originated by the commit-
tee shall be keyed in at the committee's offices in the Dirksen Senate
Office Building, and except for the material classified as "Top Secret"
shall be filed in the Dirksen Senate Building offices for committee
and use and safekeeping.
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2. Each such piece of classified material received or originated
shall be card indexed and serially numbered, and where requiring onward
distribution shall be distributed by means of an attached indexed form
approved by the chairman. If such material is to be distributed outside
the committee offices, it shall, in addition to the attached form, be
accompanied also by an approved signature sheet to show onward receipt.
3. Distribution of classified material among offices shall be by
committee members or authorized staff only. All classified material
sent to members' offices, and that distributed within the working offices
of the committee, shall be returned to Room 4229, Dirksen Senate Office
Building. No classified material is to be removed from the offices of
the members or of the committee without permission of the chairman.
Such classified material will be afforded safe handling and safe storage
at all times.
4. Material classified "Top Secret," after being indexed and num-
bered, shall be sent to the committee's Capitol office for use by the
members and authorized staff in that office only.
5. The chief of staff is authorized to make such staff regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of these regulations.
G. STAFF REGULATIONS
The following concepts will guide the staff in its activities:i
(d) The staff must under no circumstances discuss with anyone the
proceedings of the committee in executive session or conversations
with individual Senators without specific advance permission from
the committee or the Senator concerned.
Senate Select Committee on Ethics, Rule 11
All testimony or action take in executive session shall be kept
secret and shall not be released eor public information without the
approval of a majority of the committee.
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Rule 9
No confidential testimony taken by or confidential material pre-
sented to the committee or any report of the proceedings of a closed
committee hearing or business meeting, shall be made public, in whole
or in part or by way of summary, unless authorized by a majority of the
members of the committee at a business meeting called for the purpose
of making such a determination.
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Rule 9 and 10.5-10.8
RULE 9. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CLASSIFIED
OR SENSITIVE MATERIAL
9.1 Committee staff offices shall operate under strict security
precautions. At least one security guard shall be on duty at all
times by the entrance to control entry. Before entering the office
all persons shall identify themselves.
9.2 Sensitive or classified documents and material shall be
segregated in a secure storage area. They may be examined only at
secure reading facilities. Copying, duplicating, or removal from the
the committee offices of such documents and other materials is pro-
hibited except as necessary for use in or preparation for, interviews
or committee meetings, including the taking of testimony, and in
conformity with section 10.3 hereof.
9.3 Each member of the committee shall at all times have access
to all papers and other material received from any source. The staff
director shall be responsible for the maintenance, under appropriate
security procedures, of a registry which will number and identify all
classified papers and other classified materials in the possession of
the committee.
9.4 Whenever the Select Committee on Intelligence makes classi-
fied material available to any other committee of the Senate or to
any member of the Senate not a member of the committee, the clerk of
the committee shall be notified. The clerk of the committee, shall
maintain a written record identifying the particular information
transmitted and the committee or members of the Senate receiving such
information.
9.5 Access to classified information supplied to the committee
shall be limited to those committee staff members with appropriate
security clearances and a need-to-know* as determined by the committee,
and under the committee's direction, the staff director and minority
staff director.
9.6 No member of the committee or of the committee staff shall
disclose, in whole or in part or Dy way of summary, to any person
not a member of the committee or the committee staff for any purpose
or in connection with any proceeding, judicial or otherwise, any
testimony given before the committee in executive session including
the name of any witness who appeared or was called to appear before
the committee in executive session, or the contents of any papers or
other materials or other information received by the committee except
as authorized by the committee in accordance with section 8 of Senate
Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress and the provisions of these rules,
or in the event of the termination of the committee, in such a manner
as may be determined by the Senate.
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9.7 Before the committee makes any decision regarding the
disposition of any testimony, papers, or other materials presented
to it, the committee members shall have a reasonable opportunity to
examine all pertinent testimony, papers, or other materials that
have been obtained by the members of the committee or the committee
staff.
RULE 10. STAFF
10.5 The members of the committee staff shall not discuss either
the substance or procedure of the work of the committee with any
person not a member of the committee or the committee staff for any
purpose or in connection with any proceeding, judicial, or otherwise,
either during his tenure as a member of the committee staff or at any
time thereafter except as directed by the committee in accordance with
section 8 of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress and the
provision of these rules, or in the event of the termination of the
committee, in such a manner as may be determined by the Senate.
10.6 No member of the committee staff shall be employed by the
committee unless and until such a member of the committee staff agrees
in writing, as a condition of employment to abide by the conditions of
the nondisclosure agreement promulgated by the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence pursuant to section 6 of Senate Resolution 400 of the
94th Congress, 2d Session.
10.7 No member of the committee staff shall be employed by the
committee unless and until such a member of the committee staff agrees
in writing, as a condition of employment, to notify the committee or
in the event of the committee's termination the Senate of any request
for his testimony, either during his tenure as a member of the commit-
tee staff or at any time thereafter with respect to information which
came into his possession by virtue of his position as a member of the
committee staff. Such information shall not be disclosed in response
to such requests except as directed by the committee in accordance
with section 8 of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress and the
provisions of these rules, or in the event of the termination of the
committee, in such manner as may be determined by the Senate.
10.8 The committee shall immediately consider action to be
taken in the case of any member of the committee staff who fails to
conform to any of these rules. Such disciplinary action may include,
but shall not be limited to, immediate dismissal from the committee
staff.
Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Rule 3(d)
No confidential testimony taken or confidential material pre-
sented in an executive hearing of the committee or any report of the
proceedings of such an executive hearing shall be made public, either
in whole or in in part or by way of summary, unless authorized by a
majority of the members of the committee.
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Senate Select Committee on Small 3usiness, Rule 3(e)
No confidential testimony taken or confidential material pre-
sented in a closed hearing of the committee or any report of the
proceedings of such a closed hearing shall be made public, either in
whole or in part or by way of summary, unless authorized by a majority
of the members of the committee.
Joint Committee on Defense Production, Rule 4
No confidential testimony taken or confidential material
presented at an executive hearing of the committee or subcommittee Or
any report of the proceedings of such an executive hearing shall be
made public, either in whole or in part by way of summary, unless
authorized by a majority vote of the committee.
Joint Economic Committee, Rule 12, 16, and 23
RULE 12
Testimony received in executive hearings shall not be released or
included in any report without the approval of a majority of the
committee.
RULE 16
No summary of a committee report, prediction of the Contents of
a report, or statement of conclusions concerning any investigation
shall be made by a member of the committee or of the committee staff
prior to the issuance of a report of the committee.
RULE 23
The information contained in any books, papers, or documents
furnished to the committee by any individual, partnership, corporation,
or other legal entity shall, upon the request of the individual,
partnership, corporation, or entity furnishing the same, be maintained
in strict confidence by the members and staff of the committee, except
that any such information may be released outside of executive session of
the committee if the release therof is effected in a manner which will
not reveal the identity of such individual, partnership, corporation,
or entity: Provided, That the committee by majority vote may authorize
the disclosure of the identity of any such individual, partnership ,
corporation, or entity in connection with any pending hearing or as a
part of a duly authorized report of the committee if such release is
deemed essential to the performance of the functions of the committee
and is in the public interest.
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Appendix B.
Selected House and Senate Rules Regarding
the Management of Sensitive Information
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Rules of the House of Representatives, 95th Congress
Rule XI
Section 712. Investigative hearing procedures
(k)(7) No evidence or testimony taken in executive session may
be released or used in public sessions without the consent of the
committee.
Rule XXIX
Secret Session
Whenever confidential communications are received from the Presi-
dent of the United States, or wherever the Speaker or any Member shall
inform the House that he has communications which he believes ought
to be kept secret for the present, the House shall be cleared of all
persons except the Members and officers thereof, and so continue
during the reading of such communications, the debates and proceedings
thereon, unless otherwise ordered by the House.
Rule XLIII
Code of Official Conduct
There is hereby established by and for the House of Representa-
tives the following code of conduct, to be known as the "Code of
Official Conduct":
2. A Member, officer, or employee of the House of Representa-
tives shall adhere to the spirit and the letter of the Rules of the
House of Representatives and to the rules of duly constituted commit-
tees thereof.
Senate Manual, 95th Congress
Rule XXXVI
Section 36.3. Executive Sessions
3. All confidential communications made by the President of the
United States to the Senate shall be by the Senators and the officers
of the Senate kept secret; and all treaties which may be laid before
the Senate, and all remarks, votes, and proceedings thereon shall
also be kept secret, until the Senate shall by their resolution, take
off the injuction of secrecy, or unless the same shall be considered
in open Executive session.
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Section 36.4.
4. Any Senator or officer of the Senate who shall disclose
the secret or confidential business or proceedings of the Senate
shall be liable, if a Senator, to suffer expulsion from the body;
and if an officer, to dismissal from the service of the Senate,
and to punishment for contempt.
Section 36.5
5. Whenever, by the request of the Senate or any Committee
thereof, any documents or papers shall be communicated to the
Senate by the President or the head of any department relating to
any matter pending in the Senate, the proceedings in regard to
which are secret or confidential under the rules, said documents
and papers shall be considered as confidential, and shall not,he
disclosed without leave of the Senate.
Section 76. Standing Orders of the Senate
Loyalty Checks on Senate Employees
Resolved, That hereafter when any person is appointed as an
employee of any committee of the Senate, of any Senator, or of any
office of the Senate the committee, Senator, or officer having
authority to make such appointment shall transmit the name of such
person to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, together with a re-
quest that such committee, Senator, or officer be informed as to
any derogatory and rebutting information in the possession of such
agency concerning the loyalty and reliability for security purposes
of such person, and in any case in which such person, and in any
case in which such derogatory information is revealed such committee,
Senator, or officer shall make or cause to be made such further
investigation as shall have been considered necessary to determine
the loyalty and reliability for security purposes of such person.
Every such committee, Senator, and officer shall promptly
transmit to the Federal Bureau of Investigation a list of the
names of the incumbent employees of such committee, Senator,
or officer together with a request that such committee, Senator,
or officer be informed of any derogatory and rebutting infor-
mation contained in the files of such agency concerning the
loyalty and reliability for security purposes of such employee.
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Appeldix C.
Selected Provisions of Statutory Law
Regarding Classified Information
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Title 18, U.S. Code
?793. Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information
(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting
the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the infor-
mation is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the
advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or
otherwise concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy
yard, naval station, submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery,
torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory,
mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building,
office, research laboratory or station or other place connected with
the national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of construc-
tion by the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft,
arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time
of war are being made, prepared, repaired, stored, or are the subject
of research or development, under any contract or agreement with the
United States, or any department or agency thereof, or with any per-
son on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place so desig-
nated by the President by proclamation in time of war or in case of
national emergency in which anything for the use of the Army, Navy,
or Air Force is being prepared or constructed or stored, information
as to which prohibited place the President has determined would be
prejudicial to the national defense; or
(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or
reason to beieve, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to
copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document,
writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or
(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or
agrees or attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from any
source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch,
photograph, 'photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, mode, instru-
ment, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national
defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives
or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain it, that it
has been or will be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any
person contrary to the provisions of this chapter; or
(d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control
over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, sig-
nal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan,
map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national
defense, or information relating to the national defense which in-
formation the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation,
willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communi-
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delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or trans-
mitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not
entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to
deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled
to receive it; or
(e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or
control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch,
photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, in-
strument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or
information relating to the national defense, or information relat-
ing to the national defense which information the possessor has
reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States
or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates,
delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause
to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person
not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails
to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States en-
titled to receive it; or
(0 Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession
or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch,
photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model,
instrument, appliance, note, or information, relating to the national
defense, (1) through gross negligence permits the same to be removed
from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation
of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, or
(2) having knowledge that the same has been illegally removed from
its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of
its trust, or lost, or stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails
to make prompt report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruc-
tion to his superior officer --
shall be fined not more than 810,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both.
(g) If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the
foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of
the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment
provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 736; Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024,
title I, ?18, 64 Stat. 1003.)
?794. Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign
government.
(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to
be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of
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a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts
to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or
to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign
country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States,
or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or
citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writ-
ing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic nega-
tive, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or
information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by
death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
(b) Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall
be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or com-
municates, or attempts to elicit any information with respect to the
movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of
the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United
States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans
or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect
to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or in-
tended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other
information relating to the public defense, which might be useful
to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for
any term of years or for life.
(c) If two or more of such persons conspire to violate this
section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy
shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which
is the object of such conspiracy. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62
Stat. 737; Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1261, title II, ? 201, 68 Stat. 1219.)
?798. Disclosure of classified information.
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes,
transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person,
or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or
interest of the United States for the benefit of any foreign gov-
ernment to the detriment of the United States any classified
information --
(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code,
cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign
government; or
(2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or
repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or
planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for
cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or
(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of
the United States or any foreign government; or
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(4) obtained by the process of communication intelligence from
the communications of any foreign government, knowing the same to
have been obtained by such processes --
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both.
(b) As used in subsection (a) of this section --
The term "classified information" means information which, at the
time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national secu-
rity, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency
for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution;
The terms "code," "cipher," and "cryptographic system" include
in their meanings, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of
of secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method
used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, signifi-
cance, or meanings of communications;
The term "foreign government" includes in its meaning any person
or persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction,
party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a
foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person
or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country,
whether or not such government is recognized by the United States;
The term "communication intelligence" means all procedures and
methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining
of information from such communications by other than the intended
recipients;
The term "unauthorized person" means any person who, or agency
which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set
forth in subsection (a) of this section, by the President, or by the
head of a department or agency of the United States Government which
is expressly designated by the President to engage in communication
intelligence activities for the United States.
(c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the furnishing, upon
lawful demand, of information to any regularly constituted committee
of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States of
America, or joint committee thereof. (Added Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655,
? 24 (a), 65 Stat. 719.)
? 799. Violation of regulations of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
Whoever willfully shall violate, attempt to violate, or conspire
to violate any regulation or order promulgated by the Administrator
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for the protec-
tion or security of any laboratory, station, base or other facility,
or part thereof, or any aircraft, missile, spacecraft, or similar
vehicle, or part thereof, or other property or equipment in the cus-
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in the custody of the Administration, or any real or personal pro-
perty or equipment in the custody of any contractor under any con-
tract with the Administration or any subcontractor of any such
contractor, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both. (Added Pub. L. 85-568, title III,
? 304 (c) (1), July 29, 1958, 72 Stat. 434.)
? 952. Diplomatic codes and correspondence.
Whoever, by virtue of his employment by the United States,
obtains from another or has or has had custody of or access to, any
official diplomatic code or any matter prepared in any such code,
or which purports to have been prepared in any such code, and without
authorization or competent authority, willfully publishes or furnishes
to another any such code or matter, or any matter which was obtained
while in the process of transmission between any foreign government
and its diplomatic mission in the United States, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 743.)
? 957. Possession of property in aid of foreign government.
Whoever, in aid of any foreign government, knowingly and will-
fully possesses or controls any property or papers used or designed
or intended for use in violating any penal statute, or any or the
rights or obligations of the United States under any treaty or the
law of nations, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
745.)
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Title 42, U.S. Code
Subchapter XVI. -- Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
? 2256. Classification of information.
The Joint Committee may classify information originating within
the committee in accordance with standards used generally by the
executive branch for classifying Restricted Data or defense infor-
mation (Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, ? 206, as addeded Aug. 30, 1954,
ch. 1073, ? 1, 64 Stat. 957)..
Subchapter XVII. -- Enforcement of Chapter
2271. General provisions.
(a) To protect against the udlawful dissemination of Restricted
Data and to safeguard facilities, equipment, materials, and other
property of the Commission, the President shall have authority to
utilize the services of any Government agency to the extent he may
deem necessary or desirable.
(b) The Federal Bureau of investigation of the Department of
Justice shall investigate all alleged or suspected criminal violations
of this chapter.
(c) No action shall be brought against any individual or person
for any violation under this chapter unless and until the Attorney
General of the United States has advised the Commission with respect
to such action and no such action shall be commenced except by the
Attorney General of the United States: Provided, however, That no
action shall be brought under section 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, or 2276
of this title except by the express direction of the Attorney General:
And provided further, That nothing in this subsection shall be con-
strued as applying to administrative action taken by the Commission.
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, ? 221 as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, i 1,
68 Stat. 958, and amended Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. 91-161, S 5, 83 Stat.
445.)
2272. Violation of specific sections.
Whoever willfully violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to
violate, any provision of sections 2077, 2122, or 2131 of this title,
or whoever unlawfully interferes, attempts to interfere, or conspires
to interfere with any recapture or entry under section 2138 of this
title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or
both, except that whoever commits such an offense with intent to in-
jure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any
foreign nation shall, upon convict:Lon thereof, be punished by impris-
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onment for life, or by imprisonment for any term of years or a fine
of not more than $20,000 or both. (Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, ? 222, as
added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, ? 1, 68 Stat. 958, and amended Dec. 24,
1969, Pub. L. 91-161, ?? 2, 3(a), 83 Stat. 444.)
? 2273. Violation of sections generally.
Whoever willfully violates, attempts to violate, or conspires
to violate, any provision of this chapter for which no criminal
penalty is specifically provided or or any regulation or order pre-
scribed or issued under section 2095 or 2201 (b), (i), or (o) of
this title shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine
or not more than $5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two
years, or both, except that whoever commits such an offense with
intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an ad-
vantage to any foreign nation, shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punished by a fine of not more than $20,000 or by imprisonment for
not more than twenty years, or both. (Aug. 1,1946, ch. 724,
? 223, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, ? 1, 68 Stat. 958, and
amended Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L. 90-190, ? 12, 81 Stat. 578; Dec. 24,
1969, Pub. L. 91-161, ? 6, 83 Stat. 445.)
?2274. Communication of Restricted Data.
Whoever, lawfully or unlawfully, having possession of, access
to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing,
sketch, photograph, plan, model, instrument, appliance, note, or
information involving or incorporating Restricted Data --
(a) communicates, transmits, or discloses the same to
any individual or person, or attempts or conspires to do any
of the foregoing, with intent to injure the United States or
with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation,
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment
for life, or by imprisonment for any term of years or a fine
of not more than $20,000, or both;
(b) communicates, transmits, or discloses the same to
any individual or person, or attempts or conspires to do any
of the foregoing, with reason to believe such data will be
utilized to injure the United States or to secure an advan-
tage to any foreign nation, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment
for not more than ten years, or both.
(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, ? 224, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073,
? 1, 68 Stat. 958, and amended Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. 91-161,
? 3(b), 83 Stat. 444.)
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52275. Receipt of Restricted Late.
Whoever, with intent to injure the United States or with intent
to secure an advantage to any foreign nation, acquires, or attempt
or conspires to acquire any document, writing, sketch, photograph,
plan, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information involving
or incorporating Restricted Data, shall upon conviction thereof, be
punished by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for any term
of years or a fine of not more than $20,000 or both. (Aug. 1, 1946,
ch. 724, 5 225, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 5 1, 68 Stat. 959,
and amended Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. 91-161, 5 3(b), 83 Stat. 444.)
5 2276. Tampering with Restricted Data.
Whoever, with intent to injure the United States or with intent
to secure an advantafe to any foreign nation, removes, conceals,
tampers with, alters, mutilates, or destroys any document, writing,
sketch, photograph, plan, model, instrument, appliance, or note in-
volving or incorporating Restricted Data and used by any individual
or person in connection with the production of special nuclear material,
or research or development relating to atomic energy, conducted by the
United States, or financed in whole or in part by Federal funds, or
conducted with the aid of special nuclear material, shall be punished
by imprisonment for lite, or by imprisonment for any term of years or
a fine of not more than $20,000 or both. (Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, 5
226, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 5 1, 68 Stat. 959, and amended
Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. 91-161, 5 3(b), 83 Stat. 444.)
5 2277. Disclosure of Restricted Data.
Whoever, being or having been an employee or member of the Com-
mission, a member of the Armed Forces, an employee of any agency of
the United States, or being or aaving be a contractor of the Commis-
sion or of an agency of the United States, or being or having been
an employee of a contractor of the Commission or of an agency of the
United States, or being or haviag been a licensee of the Commission,
or being or having been an employee of a licencee of the Commission,
knowingly communicates, or whoever conspires to communicate or to
receive, any Restricted Data, knowing or having reason to believe
that such data is Restricted Data, to any person not authorized to
receive Restricted Data pursuant to the provisions of this chapter
or under rule or regulation of the Commission issued pursuant thereto,
knowing or having reason to believe such person is not so authorized
to receive Restricted Data shall, upon conviction thereof, be punish-
able by a fine of not more than $2,500. (Aug. 1, 1946. ch. 724, 5
227, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 5 1, 68 Stat. 959.)
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2278. Statute of limitations.
Except for a capital offense, no individual or person shall be
prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense prescribed or de-
fined in sections 2274 to 2276 of this title unless the indictment
is found or the information is instituted within ten years next
after such offense shall have been committed. (Aug. 1, 1946, ch.
724, ? 228, as added Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, ? 1, 68 Stat. 959.)
Title 50, U.S. Code
783. Offenses.
(b) Communication of classified information by Government
officer or employee.
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United
States or of any department or agency thereof, or of any corporation
the stock of which is owned in the whole or in major part by the
United States or any department cr agency thereof, to communicate in
any department or agency thereof, to communicate in any manner or by
any means, to any other person whom such officer of employee knows
or has reason to believe to be an agent or representative of any
foreign government or an officer or member of any Communist organi-
zation as defined in paragraph (5) of section 782 of this title, any
information of a kind which shall have been classified by the Presi-
dent (or by the head of any such department, agency, or corporation
with the approval of the President) as affecting the security of the
United States, knowing or having reason to know that such information
has been so classified, unless such officer of employee shall have
been specifically authorized by the President, or by the head of the
department, agency, or corporation by which this officer or employee
is employed, to make such disclosure of such information.
(c) Receipt of, or attempt to receive, by foreign agent or member of
Communist organization, classified information.
It shall be unlawful for any agent or representative of any for-
eign government, or any officer or member of any Communist organization
as defined in paragraph (5) of section 782 of this title, knowingly to
title, knowingly to obtain or receive, or attempt to obtain or receive,
directly or indirectly, from any officer or employee of the United
States or of any department or agency thereof or of any corporation
the stock of which is owned in whole or in major party by the United
States or any department or agency thereof, any information of a kind
which shall have been classified by the President (or by the head of
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any such department, agency, or corporation with the approval of the
President) as affecting the security of the United States, unless
special authorization for such communication shall first have been
obtained from the head of tne department, agency, or corporation
having custody of or control over such information.
(d) Penalties for violation.
Any person who violates any provision of this section shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000,
or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or by both such fine and
such imprisonment, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to
hold any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
(e) Limitation period.
Any person may be prosecuted, tried, and punished for any viola-
tion of this section at any time within ten years after the commission
of such offense, notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute
of limitations: Provided. That if at the time of the commission of the
offense such person is an officer or employee of the United States or
of any department or agency thereof, or of any corporation the stock
of which is owned in whole or in major part by the United States or any
department or agency thereof, such person may be prosecuted, tried, and
punished for any violation of this section at any time within ten years
after such person has ceased to be employed as such officer or employee.
? 797. Security regulations and orders; penalty for violation.
(a) Whoever willfully shall violate any such regulation or order
as, pursuant to lawful authority, snail be or has been promulgated or
approved by the Secretary of Defense, or by any military commander des-
ignated by the Secretary of Defense, or by the Director of the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, for the protection or or security
of military or naval aircraft, airports, airport facilities, vessels,
harbors, ports, piers, water-front facilities, bases, forts, posts,
laboratories, stations, vehicles, equipment, explosives, or other prop-
erty or places subject to the jurisdiction, administration, or in the
custody of the Department of Defense, any Department or agency of
which said Department consists, CT any officer or employee of said
Department or agency, or of the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics or any officer or employee thereof, relating to fire hazards,
fire protection, lighting, machinery, guard service, disrepair, disuse
or other unsatisfactory conditions thereon, or the ingress thereto or
egress or removal of persons therefrom, or otherwise providing for
safeguarding the same against destruction, loss, or injury by accident
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