PAKISTANI-AFGHAN RELATIONS (INTERNAL O/NE WORKING PAPER CIA DISTRIBUTION ONLY)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190032-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: September 19, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L LI G EN C E A G E N C Y
19 September 1961
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 55-61
SUBJECT: Pakistani-Afghan Relations (Internal 0/NE Working Paper -
CIA Distribution Only)
1. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been
troubled over since Pakistan came into existence in 1947. The
crux of the problem is the "Pushtoonistan" issue -- Afghanistan's
demand that some five million Pathans in Pakistan be given a
chance to opt for independence. Within the past month, tension
has reached an all time high. When Pakistan withdrew its con-
sulates and expelled Afghan consulates and trade agencies a
few weeks ago, Afghanistan broke off diplomatic relations.
Transit trade through Pakistan has been halted. Both sides have
moved troops into the border area.
Pakistanis Attitude
29 Pakistani sensitivity to Afghan agitatio'a on the
"Pushtoonistan" issue eased to some extent when President Mirza
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headed the Pakistan Government in 1957-.1958. Afghan and Pakistani
loadora exchanged visits, a US-inspired and supported transit
agreement was signed, and the quarrel seemed to be moving slowly
toward a negotiated settlement. After General Ayub came to
power, however, both sides stiffened their attitudes and Pakistan
reverted to a strong and uncompromising lino aimed at proving
to the Afghans the futility of their "Pushtoonistan" demands,
The Pathan areas wore, more closely integraged into the govern-
mental structure. Military force was used to put down tribal
unrest and to crush Afghan intrusions. Diplomatic approaches
toward Afghanistan were cold and sometimes provocative.
3. Pakistan's attitude is simple. Ayub is convinced that
the Afghans will give up "Pushtoonistan" only if Pakistan makes
continuation of their claim exceedingly costly to them. Fie
is encouraged by his own military training during the British
period (when "'a uhift of gunpowder"-was the standard prescription
for trouble on the frontier,) and by his legalist foreign minister,
who emphasizes the technical weaknesses of the Afghan claim. Ih
addition, Ayub apparently does not like Afghan Prime Minister Daud
personally and probably still hopes that one day the entire Afghan
ruling family will be overturned. On the question of Soviet
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influence in Afghanistan, Ayub's r_tttitude varies: when cooking
US support for Pakistan, he emphasizes the growing Soviet throat
through Afghanistan; when applying unilateral pressure on Kabul,
he ridicules the idea that the Afghans would allow themselves to
come under Soviet domination rather than surrender in their
quarrel with Pakistan.
The Afghan Attitude
Li. Afghan motivations are somewhat more complex than those
of Pakistan. Prime Minister Daud and most of the royal family
are emotionally attached to the "Pushtoonistan" cause. The bulk
of the Afghan people care little about "Pushtoonistan"
as such but many are interested in matters of "face" and honor in
the quarrel with Pakistan. Almost all Afghans know that while
the majority of Pakistan's Pathans are loyal to Pakistan, there
is serious unrest and agitation in parts of the tribal territory
which can be exploited to Afghanistan's advantage. Finally,
the Afghan leadership almost certainly hopes that by continuing
intransigent, it can induce the US to exert pressure on Pakistan
for concessions in order t o keep Afgh3-nistnn from falling
completely under Soviet influence.
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Outlook and Implication
5. The actual situation in the border orea is n%'i; difficult
to predict: tranebordor trade will probably bc: ahstructed if
not actually cut off, for some months at least; both ,,ides will
continue to Increase their activities aimed at turn:i.;r,i; the Pathan
as the Afghan fruit crop, denied its normal markers '-n Pakistan
tribes against each other; tension will build up/ane' India, rots,
and as the 20n,000 Afghan nomads who regularly win'I,)r in Pakistan
are turned back or harrassed at the border.
6. We believe that there is a better than w'2n chance that
fighting will occur in the border area this Fall, The possibility
of something close to an actual war cannot be excluaed. It is more
likely, however, that the violence will be limited in scope,
although regular military, as well as tribal and irregular forces
may be involved. Afte' the present cycle of bitterness and recrimina-
tion has run its course both Pakistan and Af.. nnistan will probably
become somewhat more susceptible to effort;, aimed at reducing
tensions and a kind of modus vivendi may emr-rge again. In the
absence of Pakistani willingness to discuss "Pushtoonistan,",
however, any real progress toward settlement of the conflict is
unlikely.
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7. The long-term consequences of the crisis are less clear,
Afghanistan is already heavily dependent on the USSR. Stoppage
or obstruction of transbordcr trade with Pakistan and continued
unrest on the border will increase this dependence. At the moment,
the Afghan regime is apparently ready oven to see US aid programs
stopped and the US presence greatly reduced rather than modify
its posture toward Palcis tan. However, after the situation has
cooled off a bit, Afghanistan's fundamental awareness of the
throat to its independence inherent in its relationship with the
USSR will almost certainly reassert itself, and we believe that
K ?;WWui will be ea-er to continue fairly substantial relations with
the US as a counterbalance to these it has with the USSR.,
8. The latest phase of the Pakistani-Afghan quarrel may
also have some significance for Pakistan's relations with the US.
President Ayub, who has been following an increasingly independent
(though still pro-Western) foreign policy, during the past year
or so has deliberately refrained from consultation with the US3
in regard to the crisis. He knows the US disapproves of his
policy, but will almost certainly persist in it, except in the
face of very heavy and persistent US pressure. Under the circum-
stances, the road ahead for Pakistani-US relations may also be
less smooth than it has been in the past.
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