CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020194-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 194
• Publication Date: August 28, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
[ A
DOCUEET SERV C3 BRANCH
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No Foreign Disscm
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N2 534
28 August 1972
IfReyCIA-RDP85T00875R000800020194-4
Approved For Release 2005/061N?8, fDP85T00875R000800020194-4
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to inwt his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to thr.; President,
the National Security Council, and other senion? government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because Of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart.
merit of primary concern is not feasible, items cr portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publicaticqi may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
I II
I 'Iol I 110,52
',III 11 :.11 .lo
Warning: Sensitive Sources
and Methods Involved
Seevet
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Central Intelligence
CONTENTS
No. 0206/72
28 August 1972
gr
IP
ulletin
LAOS: yang Pao's offensive to recapture the Plaine
des Jarres is encountering its first determined re-
sistance. (Page 1)
VIETNAM: Government troops are regaining more ter-
ritory in Quang Nam Province, but there are signs
the Communists are preparing for heavier fighting.
(Page 3)
AFGHANISTAN: Political situation. (Page 6)
EGYPT-USSR: A review of developments since Presi-
dent Sadat announced the withdrawal of Soviet ad-
visers. (Page 7)
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LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA
0 Wes
III
o Govarmnont-hold location
0 Communist-hold location
A Highpoint
1,1ouam Longr,
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Coptured by irregulars
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Houang
553518 8-72 CIA
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CONFIDENTIAL
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LAOS: yang Pao's offensive to recapture the
Plaine des Jarres is encountering its first deter-
mined Communist resistance.
North Vietnamese forces shelled and attacked
several irregular positions on three sides of the
Plaine on 25-26 August. In the most serious action,
irregulars were forced to abandon two positions near
Phou Houang and are now regrouping about three miles
to the south. Other sharp clashes occurred near
Phou Keng, Phou Then, and Tha Tam Bleung.
Three additional irregular battalionrs have been
airlifted into positions near Phou Keng, north of
the Plaine, to reinforce the three battalions that
have been stalled there since they were deployed
nearly a week ago. The combined force has now be-
gun to move tuwe,rd its objectives on the Plaine's
northern edge.
The government's 15-day-old offensive has made
scant progress despite the fact that the Communists
offered little resistance until two days ago. Sev-
eral days of bad weather hampered tactical air sup-
port and resupply flights, without which the irreg-
ulars had shown little inclination to advance. Only
the task force moving south from Bouam Long toward
Communist supply lines northeast of the Plaine had
advanced appreciably before an improvement in the
weather on Saturday led to a successful assault on
Phou Then, a hill overlooking the Plaine's western
edge. (CONFIDENTIAL)
28 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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2N0J:17),11-
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DEMILITARIZED ZONE:
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er '1;1" !
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'Heavy fighting
MILES 25
SOUTH
VIETNAM
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CAMpODIA
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SECRET N
No FOPEleN
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EVIETNAM: Government troops are continuing to
regain territory in Quang Nam Province, but there
are signs that the Communists are preparing for
heavier fighting.
South Vietnamese forces in Que Son District
capital repulsed a series of counterattacks yester-
day with the help of heavy air strikes. A govern-
ment task force has linked up with advance elements
that captured the town on Friday and has cleared
some of the high ground overlooking Que Son. Sub-
stantial Communist artillery fire is being directed
against the government's field command at Fire Sup-
port Base Baldy, and enemy ground resistance is
stiffening as the South Vietnamese near enemy-held
Fire Support Base Ross.
A major Communist supply and assembly area and
possibly eight tanks have been spotted about ten
miles southwest of Que Son.I
the area is stocked with large amounts of am-
munition and foodstuffs evidently intended to sup-
port a major enemy effort in the coastal region.
The Communists reportedly are making extensive use of
forced labor from the local population to carry out
road repairs and keep supplies moving in this area;
the recent fighting in Que Son Valley has added some
30,000 people to the enemy's labor pool. Another
30,000 persons have fled to government-held areas
near the coast.
In Quang Tri Province, sporadic heavy fighting
occurred near the eastern side of Quang Tri City's
citadel over the weekend as South Vietnamese Marines
pressed their campaign to clear the Communists from
around this prxtion of the fortress. Some 4,400
rounds of artillery and mortar fire were directed
at government positions in and around the city on
Saturday and Sunday, causing only light government2
losses.
28 Aug 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
(continued)
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Fighting elsewhere was generally light, but
there is growing evidence of impending enemy at-
tacks in several areas.
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AFGHANISTAN: The cabinet, despite its weak
performance, may well stay in power until elections
next summer, according to an assessment by the US
Embassy.
Because political leaders in Parliament have
been unable to compromise on a bill that would re-
quire civil servants to speak Pushtu, non-Pushtu
speakers have boycotted sessions. The lower house
has achieved its two-thirds quorum only twice in
almost six mclths and has dealt with no important
economic legislation.
The deputy prime
minister
has not been attending cab-
inet meetings because he does not want to be asso-
ciated with a "do-nothing" government. The finance
minister has been avoiding government business for
about ten days--probably for the same reason--and
other senior officials are fairly free to make dis-
paraging remarks about the government.
The King. who prefers to operate behind the
scenes, is either unable or unwilling to remedy the
situatiOn. He could dissolve Parliament and call
for early elections, but the embassy notes this
would not be consistent with his "non-style." He
may make some changes in the cabinet, but an en-
tirely new cabinet might be even less effective
than the present one. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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EGYPT-USSR: A review of developments since
Prasident Sadat announced the
withdrawal of Soviet advisers.
Summary
The Soviet withdrawal from Egypt, one month
after President Sadat 's dramatic announcement on
18 July, is proceeding steadily. The bulk of the
13,000 military personnel in Egypt at the time of
Sadat's expulsion order has been withdrawn. Most
Soviet hardware has either been withdrawn or turned
over to the Egyptians. The evacuation may extend
even to the Soviet land-based naval support per-
sonnel at Egyptian ports.
Egyptian-Soviet relations, in the meantime,
are cool, but both countries view it as in their
interests to keep this strain under control. In
Egypt's view, efforts to maintain the friendship
between the two countries will help to ensure a
sustained flow of Soviet military and economic
aid; in the Soviet view, such efforts will limit
the damage to Moscow's prestige and may ease the
adverse impact on its strategic position in the
Middle East. Nevertheless, the nature of the ex-
pulsion militates against any easy resolution of
the current difficult period in the relationship.
The coming period of adjustment is likely to be
painful for both sides, and could well result in
further frictions and recriminations before a new
basis for their relationship is achieved.
The Soviet setback has thus far had no measur-
able impact in the Soviet Union. Moscow's Middle
East policy has been controversial at home, how-
ever, and while Brezhnev's political position ap-
pears strong, this significant reverse, in conjunc-
tion with Moscow's current agricultural difficulties,
could provide ammunition for future criticism of the
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leadership. Sadat also faces domestic problems and
apparently hopes that his action will bring movement
of some sort to the Arab-Israeli impasse. The Soviet
expulsion has been generally popular in Egypt, and
Sadat has bought himself some time against his do-
mestic critics, who have been chafing under the no-
war, no-peace situation. But his move was a gamble
that could, if no serious diplomatic movement re-
sults, leave him more vulnerable zhan before 18 July.
The Withdrawal
The Soviets have withdrawn the TU-16 Badgers
and the remaining aircraft of the naval reconnais-
sance unit which they introduced into Egypt in 1968.
These aircraft were used for reconnaissance, strike
support, anti-submarine warfare, and Elint collec-
tion.
The TU-16 Badger G missile-configured aircraft,
which arrived in Egypt in November 19711 apparently
remain, and may have been given to the Egyptians.
The Egyptians also may Imve taken over some of the
air-to-surface missiles for these planes.
The Soviet withdrawal does not appear to have
affected either military aid shipments or Soviet
economic and training programs in Egypt. Egypt is,
nonetheless, looking elsewhere for military aid,
probably in an effort both to broaden its ties with
the West and to diversify its sources of arms.
Egyptian-Soviet ::elations
The continuing strain in Egyptian-Soviet rela-
tions has begun to surface ds Soviet media have
reacted to criticism of the Soviet Union in the
Egyptian press. The Soviet weekly New Times singled
out Ihsan abd al-Quddus, whose artiEn-s?EriThe Egyp-
tian press have been particularly outspoken, charging
him with anti-Soviet propaganda. Pravda and Izvestia
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have also voiced concerns about Egyptian policy.
Quddus has responded to the Soviet criticism by
questioning the motives behind it. He said Moscow
had no right to forestall any attempt Cairo may
make to regain its occupied territ.lries.
Sadat has long-standing grievances against the
Soviets, which undoubtedly contributed in large
measure to his move against them, and these griev-
ances must still rankle. The no-war, no-peace
situation grates on the Egyptians, and Moscow's
refusal to underwrite a serious military venture,
as well as its reluctance to answer Egypt's en-
treaties for more sophisticated military hardware,
galled Cairo's leaders. Moscow has made
clear its own bitterness toward, and even contempt
for, the Egyptians.
Although recriminations have become more open,
both sides seem anxious to preserve other important
aspects of their relationship. The Egyptians' press
criticism of Moscow has been balanced to some degree
by calls for continuing friendship. Sadat has as-
serted that he merely wants to change, not destroy,
the Soviet alliance, and Egyptian War Minister Sadiq
was prominently displayed presenting medals to de-
parting Soviet advisers on 3 August. A delegation
from Egypt's People's Assembly visited Moscow on 2
August, and the Cairo press reports that a Soviet
Communist Party delegation will travel to Egypt
later this month.
Each country must still rely on the other in
the pursuit of its major interests. Cairo needs
continued Soviet military and economic support, and
it will no doubt attempt to preserve these aspects
of its relationship with Moscow. Moscow, on the
other hand, clearly hopes, through rapid execution
of the withdrawal, to limit the political damage
not only in Egypt but also in the other Arab coun-
tries. The danger of another embarrassing expulsion
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of Soviet training personnel by Syria, Yemen (Sana),
or other Arab states must be real enough to compel
Moscow to avoid public controversy and conspicuous
foot-dragging.
Cairo has been the keystone of Soviet policy
in the Middle East for many years; to allow this
setback to lead to a complete rupture or to acknowl-
edge the disintegration of Soviet-Egyptian ties would
have unpredictable consequences for the Soviet posi-
tion in the Middle East and elsewhere in the third
world as well. Finally, Moscow has a sizable eco-
nomic stake in Egypt that it does not wish to risk
with a rash move.
It was presumably with these considerations
in mind that Soviet party chief Brezhnev recently
sent a message to Sadat. Although the Cairo press
initially described the message as paving "the way
for political contacts at the summit level between
Egypt and the USSR," an Egyptian spokesman later
characterized it "as opening no new roads."
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The Soviets will cer-
tainly not be prepared at any time soon to offer
Egypt weapons or aid that they refused before 18
July, and this alone will prevent far-reaching re-
pairs to a-elations between the two countries.
The Longer Term
The longer range impact of the Soviet expulsion,
from both points of view, is more difficult to as-
sess. Official Egyptian statements have offered no
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new ideas regarding the stalemate with Israel. Cairo
seems to expect that its action will somehow serve
to bring movement to the situation, but it does not
appear to have in sharp focus a concept of how this
could be accomplished.
Egypt
has indicated it may launch a new diplomatic offen-
sive prior to the fall session of the UN General As-
sembly.
The Soviet exodus could, in fact, give Egypt
the opportunity to broaden its ties with other na-
tions. Cairo has in recent years cultivated rela-
tions with nations outside the Communist bloc, par-
ticularly in Western Europe, for the purpose of end-
ing its virtually total dependence on the Soviet
Union. This process is now likely to be given added
impetus as Cairo seeks new sources of aid and sup-
port.
Domestically, S-Idat's action has removed one of
the major causes of unhappiness. Criticism of the
Soviet role in Egypt, and consequently of Sadat, had
reached a peak before Sadat's mid-July move. Civil-
ians--students, a group of once-prominent political
and military figures led by former vice-president
Zakariya Muheyddin, and other prominent figures such
as al-Ahram editor Muhammad Haykal--had frequently
expressed their concern over the country's overde-
pendence on Moscow and questioned the Soviet role.
The Egyptian military was also reportedly critical
of Soviet activities in their country.
Sadat now appears to have bought himself a tem-
porary respite from his most pressing domestic crit-
icism, but other difficult issues remain unresolved,
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and these could be on center stage again before lony
Without tangible progress toward resolving the dis-
pute with Israel, new complaints over the no-war,
no-peace situation will soon be heard. A new aca-
demic year begins in September, and Sadat must be
concerned over a renewal of student protests about
the lack of either diplomatic or military action.
These and other pressures will not make life com-
fortable for Sadat in the near future, and he will
be urged to offer new spirals of excitement to con-
tain domestic frustration and dissatisfaction with
his leadership.
After the debacle in Egypt, Moscow is likely
to be even more chary of extensive economic and mil-
itary commitments in the third world. Still, in the
longer term, the Russians will not abandon thei ef-
forts in the Middle East and, indeed, will endeavor
to shore up their positions in other Arab states,
particularly Iraq and Syria. They will probably also
give more attention to such conservative Middle East-
ern states as Iran and Jordan.
The Kremlin's Middle East policy has been con-
troversial for years, probably causing as much dis-
pute among the leadership, and as much public re-
sentment of money spent, as any foreign undertaking.
Brezhnev has avoided the kind cl personal commitment
and leading role vis-a-vis Egypt that he has assumed
with the US and West Germany, and successes in those
areas have strengthened his position. The Egyptian
setback, therefore, does not constitute a major
threat to him. Nevertheless, at a time when the
leadership faces economic problems at home, this is
a costly reverse that will provide ammunition for
critics. If the policies of Brezhnev ard the other
Politburo seniors, Kosygin and Podgorny, backfire
in other areas, the Egyptian fizzle could eventually
weigh heavily against them.
(continued)
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Neither Cairo nor Moscow emerges from the re-
cent developments with its house entirely in order.
Sadat's domestic ponition is difficult at best, and
without some movement on the diplomatic scene his
expulsion of the Soviets, notwithstanding its gen-
eral popularity in Egypt, will not long keep his
domestic critics at bay. With Egypt's military
strength diminished as a result of the Soviet de-
parture, Sadat could then find his position far
less tenable than before 18 July. (SECRET)
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