CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020063-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: March 18, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

~ {F { ` Apprnvgd FbriRelease 2005/06109 CIA-RDP85T00875R00080002D063-9
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No Foreign Disse,,
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence bulletin
Secret
N? 542
18 March 1972
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The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence hearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
dec'assification
Searet
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No. 0067/72
18 March 1972
Central Intelligence bulletin
CHILE: Military leaders may seek Soviet noncombat
equipment. (Page 1)
USSR-GREECE-CYPRUS: Assessment of Soviet policy.
(Page 2)
TUNISIA: Crisis brewing over presidential succes-
sion. (Page 3)
ZAIRE: Government continues efforts to control
Catholic Church. (Page 4)
ISRAEL-LEBANON: New incident could lead to reprisal
(Page
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SECRET
CHILE: The chiefs of the armed services may
try to use proffered Soviet military credits to ac-
quire useful but noncombat equipment.
President Allende recently summoned the three
service commanders to discuss the acquisition of
DIA 25X1 Soviet equipment,
DIA 25X1 F A1.1 gave reasons tor not u i izi g
a reporte -million offer of Soviet military
credit. The navy chief added, :1owever, that a So-
viet hydrographic vessel would be acceptable; the
air force and army commanders said that they could
use telecommunications equipment and vehicles.
DIA The choices were based, on the
commanders' desire to avoid sending . i eans to the
25X1 USSR for training or accepting Soviet advisers.
They have similar objections, he added, to accepting
the Soviet Komar and Osa missile patrol boats that
the Cubans and Soviets are urging on the Chileans.
The subject was raised by Army Chief Prats, the
key military leader, in a discussion with his gen-
erals of the problems facing the armed forces under
a freely elected Marxist government. Although he
said that Chile needs high quality weaponry to main-
tain military preparedness, the army was unable to
take advantage of the Soviet credit. Prats explained
that in addition to the difficulties of incorporating
Soviet equipment, the presence of Soviet tanks in
Chile would increase suspicions among neighboring
governments.
Although Allende wants to weaken Chilean mili-
tary ties with the West, he is concerned, as are
the military chiefs, over the implications of Chil-
ean acceptance of Soviet military aid. If the com-
manders themselves can settle on noncombat equip-
ment to utilize some of the Soviet offer, both the
President and the military might find this an ac-
ceptable way out of this dilemma, at least for the
time being. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
18 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SECRET'
USSR-GREECE-CYPRUS: The USSR has resorted to
a modest level of political and propaganda pressure
against Athens in reaction to Greek demands on Arch-
bishop Makarios but wants to avoid direct involve-
ment.
Soviet press statements, however, reflect Mos-
cow's concern over the viability of an independent
Cyprus. These statements have connected Athens'
pressure on Makarios with the establishment of a
"base" in Greece for the US Sixth Fleet. The So-
viets waited more than two weeks to comment on the
homeporting arrangement and then timed their reac-
tion to coincide with the Greek demarche.
Makarios has not sought either Soviet or local
Communist assistance. Nevertheless, the Soviets
are uncomfortable about these developments and feel
obligated to take up the cudgels for the Archbishop.
Moscow continues to favor an independent and non-
aligned Cyprus. It wants the removal of British
bases on the island and fears the incorporation of
Cyprus into NATO by some form of enosis. The So-
viets will continue to apply cautious pressure on
Greece and, if the situation worsens, will probably
encourage Makarios to take the issue to the Secu-
rity Council where the Soviet UN representative is
serving as president for the month of March. (SE-
CRET)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
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25X6
TUNISIA: A governmental crisis is brewing over
the issue of presidential succession.
and now is disinclined to create the post of vice
president, which he first proposed nearly two years
President Bourguiba has changed his mind again
25X6
A joint meeting of the council of ministers
and the political bureau of the ruling Destourian
Socialist Party, chaired by Bourguiba on 14 March,
adjourned without agreeing on a solution to the
succession issue, which has dominated Tunisian pol-
itics for more than two years. The President's
equivocation has generated serious conflicts in the
ruling circles of both government and party. Bour-
guiba and Prime Minister Hedi Nouira are reported
to be in profound disagreement, and there are per-
sistent rumors that several ministers, including
Nouira himself, have threatened to resign.
Bourguiba probably will be able to secure ac-
ceptance of the succession formula he prefers, but
this may be achieved at the cost of greater divi-
sions and dissatisfaction with his leadership. (SE-
CRET)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SECRET
ZAIRE: The government continues to press its
efforts to gain political control over the Catholic
Church.
The political bureau of the offi,;ial party re-
cently reconfirmed President Mobutu Sese Seko's
tough stance against the Church by issuing a strong
statement calling for chapters of the party youth
wing to be installed in all seminaries by 1 April.
Seminaries failing to comply will be closed and
their bishops will be subject to "legal action."
According to local press reports, chapters have now
been installed in various small seminaries around
the country. The political bureau also upheld the
closure of the Church's major seminary in Kinshasa
and the charges against Cardinal "'alu la, presently
"on consultation" at the Vatican following a clash
with Mobutu earlier this year.
The statement from the political bureau was a
swift response to petitions presented to Mobutu
last week by the Council of Bishops. The petitions
expressed support for Malula and reaffirmed the
Church's refusal to allow party youth chapters in
seminaries. The bishops argued that political or-
ganizations have no business in centers of theolog-
ical study.
The party's pronouncement amounts to a final
rejection of the bishops' position and makes clear
that the isaue is not subject to negotiation. The
government long has suspected the Church, hereto-
fore an independent institution, of being a source
of social agitation and believes that it must be
brought under government direction. Although some
members of the clergy, , particularly the foreign
priests, are likely to continue resisting govern-
ment pressures, any united opposition seems improb-
able. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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ISRAEL-LEBANON: The landmine explosion in
northern Israel on 16 March that killed two Israeli
soldiers and wounded five was the second sach inci-
dent since last month's four-day search-and-destroy
attack on fedayeen bases in southern Lebanon. The
Israelis are investigating to determine if the mine
was planted by infiltrators from Lebanon. If Tel
Aviv decides this is the case, retaliation could
occur. Fedayeen targets in Lebanon were last hit
on 9 March, following rocket attacks on Israeli bor-
der settlements. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Map on reverse)
18 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CsiJ .AN" .r . l~
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