CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: February 10, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

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 No Foreign Dircem
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence bulletin
DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Secret
N2 537
10 r'ebrizary 1972
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~CII'f
The CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by t1le
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his reshousihilities for providing
current intelligence hearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
c'efense of the United States, within the meaning of 'T'itle
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automalic
downgrading and
declassification
Secret
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 Approved For Release 2005/0lf~,-,gfW-IZDP85T00875R000800020033-2
No. 0035/72
10 February 1972
Central Intelligence bulletin
25X6
25X6
WEST GERMANY - FRANCE: Assessment of Brandt-Pompi-
dou meeting. (Page 1)
USSR-BANGLADESH: Mujibur Rahman invited to Moscow.
(Page 3)
COMMUNIST CHINA: Mao's program for higher education
being revised. (Page 5)
PHILIPPINES-CHINA: Manila may intend to broaden
contacts with Peking. (Page 7)
NICARAGUA: Government manipulates election results.
(Page 8)
PANAMA: Government plc.ns major political rally.
Page 9)
SOUTH AFRICA: African leader will demand govern-
ment grant more land. (Page 11)
CHILE-USSR: Army chief under pressure to accept
Soviet credit offers (Page 13)
INDOCHINA: Improvements in enemy roadnet (Page 13)
NEW ZEALAND: New cabinet (Page 14)
ALGERIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Proposal for economic
agreement. (Page .15)
LIBYA: Elections to Arab Confederation assembly
(Page 15)
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S1:?.CRE i
WEST GERMANY - FRANCE: The two-day meeting be-
tween Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou that
begins today will focus on future development of the
European Communities.
Of immediate concern are the differences over
how the EC should rE;sume movement toward monetary
and economic union, which was disrupted by the 1971
monetary crisis. While France attaches priority to
narrowing the margins between EC currencies, Germany
continues to emphasize the need to balance any such
steps with moves trmard coordinated economic pol-
icies.
The meeting will also provide the occasion for
a discussion of preparations for the likely summit
meeting of the present and prospective community
members later this year. The summit will involve a
survey of the future role of the community in Euro-
pean and world affairs generally. EC enlargement,
the prospect of global trade negotiations, the com-
munity's nascent political consultations and the
drive for East-West detente have all made this role
a crucial question.
Brandt and Pompidou nevertheless may find them-
selves in substantial disagreement over Europe's
future political organization. Although German For-
eign Minister Scheel has partially endorsed Pompi-
dou's view that each government should appoint a
"European minister" to represent it in community
affairs, both Scheel and Brandt have also emphasized
the need to develop further existing community in-
stitutions. In interviews earlier this week both en-
dorsed majority voting in the EC Council, a stronger
Commission, and a popularly elected European Parlia-
ment--all of which are anathema to the French.
Given these differences, it seems likely that
the position adopted by Prime Minister Heath--who
will be seeing Pompidou later this month, and Brandt
10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SECRET
in April--will become increasingly important. Al-
though Heath seemed to go far toward endorsing Pom-
pidou's positions in Paris last summer, his recent
statements suggest that his endorsement is by no
means complete. He has, for example, publicly re-?
jected the "European ministers" idea and has sup-
ported strengthening the European Parliament. (CON-
FIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SECRET
USSR-BANGLADESH: Moscow's invitation to Prime
Minister Mujibur Ra man to visit in March is the
latest indication of Soviet interest in close rela-
tions with Bangladesh.
The Soviets are trying to capitalize on their
present favorable position in Bangladesh. Prior to
formal recognition of the new regime, Soviet planes
ferried token relief aid and Soviet officials in
talks with Dacca leaders held out the promise of
assistance, especially in the areas of flood con-
trol, transportation, and communications. A draft
trade agreement was signed on 9 February. The East
Wing branch of the old Soviet-Pakistan friendship
society was resurrected as the "Society of Friend-
ship Between the Peoples of Bangladesh and the So-
viet Union."
After recognition on 25 January, Aeroflot added
Dacca to its Moscow-Djakarta route, and the Soviets
reportedly offered to supply aircraft for Bangla-
desh's national airline.
The Soviets have a strong interest in assist-
ing Bangladesh in reconstruction. They have bris-
tled at Chinese charges that Mujib's government is
a creature of "Indian aggression, supported by so-
cial-imperialism." In addition, Moscow doubtless
hopes that early support for Bangladesh will enable
the USSR to maintain its position as Dacca's pri-
mary "great power" supporter. The Soviets have ad-
mitted misgivings about the bourgeois character of
the Bangladesh leaders, but Moscow wants to ensure
that the US and China--especially the latter--are
prevented from overtaking the USSR's lead in Dacca.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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SECRET
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25X1 C
25X1X4
COMMUNIST CHINA: Elements of Mao Tse-tung's
program for "revolutionizing" China's higher edu-
cation are being selectively revised.
I local
variations are cropping up in applying the Maoist
prescription that secondary school graduates must
undergo a lengthy period of rustication as a pre-
requisite for university admission. The original
formula called for all graduates to spend a minimum
of three years in the countryside prior to univer-
sity entrance. This requirement apparently is be-
ing relaxed in favor of allowing individual local-
ities to set their own standards.
Some areas now require only a year and others
just three months of service in the rural areas to
become eligible for recommendation to a university.
In a sharp reversal of Maoist policies, authorities
in at least one city are recommending certain well-
qualified middle school students for direct entry
into universities without first completing a rural
assignment.
The relaxation of the rural labor requirement
almost certainly is designed to ensure that she
universities, which have been enrolling large num-
bers of politically correct but poorly educated
workers, peasants, and soldiers, are supplied with
at least some better-qualified students. Presumably
the relaxation reflects a growing concern among
moderate elements in the leadership that Mao's rad-
ical prescription for higher education will not
meet China's increasing technological needs.
I a de-
cision already has been taken to alter the Maoist
program and to reorient higher education toward
academic pursuits. Although there has baen no of-
ficial announcement of such a decision, the national
education conference held last summer probably ad-
dressed itselt to this question. In any case, a
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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steadily increasing volume of propaganda has called
for resurrecting academic policies in vogue before
the Cultural Revolution. These include emphasis on
basic theoretical studies, the selective use of
foreign textbooks, and the reintroduction on a lim-
ited basis of the examination system.
On the other hand, the current effort to raise
academic standards at China's universities is un-
likely to alter the basic fact that most secondary
graduates still stand little chance of ever getting
a higher education. Moreover, not all universities
have reopened, and to date those that have reopened
have enrolled only a fraction of the number of pre-
Cultural Revolution students. More importantly,
urban areas are unable to absorb the large numbers
of educated youth who reach working age each year.
Thus, for the near term at least, the majority
of China's educated yL uth can continue to expect to
be sent down for a mandatory stint of labor on the
farm. This is partly explained by an apparent con-
;'ensus in Peking on the notion that the quality of
l..:fe in rural areas will be raised by the infusion
of large 'lumbers--some 10 million during the past
three years--of educated young people. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
10 Feb 72 Central Intelligen,;e Bulletin 6
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SECRE'T'
25X1X4
PHILIPPINES-CHINA: The Philippines may be
preparing to broaden contacts with Communist China. 25X1X4
Benjamin Romualdez, the younger brother of
Mrs. Marcos, apparently is en route to Peking for
a semi-official visit.
The Romualdez trip represents another step in
the slow weakening of the Philippines' traditional
aloofness from the Communist world. Manila an-
nounced last month that it would esta')l.ish its first
diplomatic ties with Communist countries--Yugo-
slavia and Romania. Although early diplomatic re-
lations with Peking are unlikely, Manila recognizes
the need for an eventual detente with Peking in
view of what it sees as a declining US commitment
in the Western Pacific. A trip to China by Mrs.
Marcos would :-early accelerate the move toward
closer cultural and economic ties and would pave
the way for additional steps in the future. (SE-
CF:ET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
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NICARAGUA: The government has suddenly thrown
a blanket of secrecy over the ballot counting in an
effort to juggle the results--not in favor of the
government, but to make the opposition appear
stronger.
In voting for a constituent assembly on 6 Feb-
ruary, the governing Liberal Party was at least a
four-to-one favorite, according to Embassy estimates,
but early returns showed the Liberals running 15 to
1 ahead of the Conservatives. The sting of such a
resounding defeat was too much for Conservative
leader Aguero, who charged that the elections were
fraudulent and threatened to withdraw from partici-
pation in the interim government. In an effort to
forestall this, President Somoza has suspenO.ed pub-
lic disclosure of the count and has, offered to ar-
range for a higher percentage of the vote for the
opposition. Embassy officials believe both sides
can agree on approximately 25 percent for the Con-
servatives.
The number of votes does not matter a:s far as
the composition of the constituent assembly is con-
cerned, since it has already been agreed that the
Conservatives will rece:Lve 40 of the 100 seats re-
gardless of the actual count. What is at stake is
the preservation of a Liberal-Con.servative pact,
which practically guarantees Aguero's credibility
as an opposition leader and Somoza a return to power
following a 30-month interim government. Aguero's
charges of fraud, on the other hand, are credible;
25X6
(CONF IDENTIAL )
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SECRET
PANAMA: The government is planning a major
political rally next month.
Torrijos' political operatives met with labor
leaders last week to organize a massive rally for
1 March. The rally is designed primarily to dem-
onstrate labor's support for the government's new
labor code; which has run into stiff business op-
position. It will also show labor's support for
Torrijos as Panama's next president.
The government is also apparently resurrecting
the Ncw Panama Movement, an official government
party designed to replace the traditional oligarchy-
dominated parties that have been proscribed since
the 1968 coup. The New Panama Movement was first
adcrertised in 1969, but never got off the ground.
More recently, however, a leadership cadre has been
formed, and the movement is providing funds for the
planned labor rally. The government party is still
only a shell, but it may soon take on real life in
preparation for the election in August of a legis-
lature, which will in turn elect the new president.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
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SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
1lntornolionol Trrritory)
WAIVI`i fAY.
P., f At'
OlocnNnnl^_in
MASERU
LUURENQO
MARQUES
,..) ' Outbdn
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SEGRI:','.['
SOUTH AFRICA: The Government may be heading
for another showdown with the Transkei.
Kaiser Matanzima, the chief minister of the
Transkei--South Africa's largest, oldest, and at
one time most cooperative bantustan (African re-
serve)--is meeting with Prime Minister Vorster this
week and reportedly plans to demand additional land,
including a seaport. The Transkei leader has threat-
ened to denounce apartheid as a fraud and to pursue
a policy of multiracialism if the government refuses
to grant his demands. Although requests for more
land are not new, Matanzima may have been encouraged
to be more aggressive now by the success that the
Zulu and the Ovambo have apparently had in extract-
ing concessions from Pretoria.
This action could pose a dilemma for the gov-
ernment. Right-wingers would view concessions to
the Transkei as a display of weakness. On the
other hand, granting these demands would open the
floodgates of demands from other bantustan leaders.
Moreover, denunciation of separate development by
one of its oldest supporters .ould make the govern-
ment look bad just when recent UN Security Council
actions have focused international attention once
again on South Africa. The Transkei has put the
government on the spot on other occasions, however,
and the two have always reached an accommodation.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
10 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
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New Communist Road Construction
THUA Ti?1IEN
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S1?C.RE'i.
NOTES
CHILE-USSR: Army commander in chief Prats
claims that he is under constant pressure from the
Allende governmena-. to accept "many attractive offers"
of credit for the purchase of Soviet military equip-
ment. 25X1X
he may no be a e to continue postponing acceptance
of these offers or of an official invitation to visit
the USSR. Top generals have opposed acquisition of
Soviet equipment, but this attitude may change fol-
lowing recent shifts in many top army assignments.
Perhaps more important, army representatives in the
Chilean military delegation that recently visited
Cuba reportedly were favorably impressed by the Soviet
military equipment demonstrated by the Cuban armed
forces. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
INDOCHINA: The North Vietnamese are rapidly
improving tieir logistical roadnet into northern
South Vietnam. Photography of late January showed
the early stages of construction of an extension of
Route 102, apparently heading fcr cache sues just
north and west of Fire Support Base Fuller near
Route 9. The other two. roads that cross the DMZ
are in the final stages of construction, but some
segments north of Khe Sanh are inactive. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
(continued)
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SI?C.k]?,'U
NEW ZEALAND: Prime Minister Marshall's cabinet,
announced 9 February, includes several new faces
but strengthens the impression that it will bring
no significant policy changes. Former prime minis-
ter Holyoake retains the foreign affairs portfolio,
the able Robert Muldoon remains minister of finance,
while former defense minister David Thomsun takes
on the labor portfolio. Thomson's appointment was
without the blessing of organized labor and may
signal a hard line toward labor unrest during 1972,
The new and younger faces presumably are intended
to give the government a revitalized appearance in
preparation for national elections later this year,
which are expected to be close. Marshall has also
created two new portfolios for environment and so-
cial welfare in a clear effort to disarm the oppo-
sition Labor Party's criticism that the government
has neglected these areas. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOR-
EIGN DISSEM)
(continued)
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ALGERIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Prague promised to
conclude "as early as possible" a new economic
agreement with, Algiers during the recent session
of the joint c:o'.imittee for economic, technical,
and scientific cooperation. Under the proposed
pact Czechoslovakia would provide a $50-million
long-term loan for complete plants and equipment.
With this new aid Czechoslovakia would play a more
active role in Algeria's economic development.
Previously, Prague had extended $15 million in
credit but only one third has been used. (CONFI-
DENTIAL)
LIBYA: The first elections to the National
Assembly-of the Confederation of Arab Republics
(CAR) will be held in Libya on 27 February, accord-
ing to an announcement by the official. Libyan news
agency. Libya will be represented by 20 members,
whose candidature must be submitted on 15 February,
although details have not yet been published con-
cerning the qualifications of candidates or how
they will be selected. It is in keeping with Qa-
dhafi's fervent support of CAR, however, that Libya
will hold elections for the CAR assembly, even be-
fore it has elected a Libyan National Assembly.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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