THEMATIC ISSUES FOR THE NFAC RESEARCH PRODUCTION PLAN.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00316R000100070007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 11, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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11 April 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Economic Research
Director of Cartographic and Geographic Research
Director of Imagery Analysis
Director of Political Analysis
Director of Scientific Weapons Research
Director of Strategic Research
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
National Intelligence Officers
Senior Review Panel
I
Chief, Production Planning and Review Group
NFAC Planning, Management, and Evaluation Staff
1. Attached is the package of thematic issues developed by inter-
office working groups over the past several weeks. As stated in D/NFAC's
24 March memo on the Production Planning Cycle, the issues are to serve
as the principal points of reference for the development of individual
research projects for the Plan. _
2. To the extent possible, each research project will be related
to an individual thematic issue. To facilitate this referencing and
make it compatible for computer input, the issues have been divided into
11 categories and further subdivided by letter and then numerical sub-
heading. A simple code can be developed for each project by combining
the general category with the appropriate lettered or, as appropriate,
numerical subheading. Thus, in the case of a paper on the outlook for a
settlement in Rhodesia, the code would be AE1--A for Africa, E for the
paragraph in which the general issue is raised,, and 1 for the more
specific reference to Rhodesia. In most cases the letter of the general
category (A through K) and the lettered subheading should suffice although
a number of the issues are broken down further to a numerical subheading.
I/' Pages 3
L.J~'W il~
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3. In the 24 March memo D/NFAC also stated that he intends that
the Plan be computerized, utilizing the present PPG system. All offices
are familiar with this process and the inputting of the Plan will re-
quire only a few additional steps. I plan to meet with representatives
of the production staffs of all the offices on 15 April to review in
detail what will be required.
Attachment:
As stated
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Cardinal Issue I: External penetration in Africa in the '80s
A. What are the objective of external penetration into the
continent?
1. How do these differ from the more traditional imperialist
of colonialist objectives or the commercial penetration of multi-
national corporations?
2. How are the new and old objectives interrelated?
B. What are the bases for penetration?
1. National interest--power, commerce.
2. Ideology
3. Religion
4. Trends in Soviet, Eastern European, Cuban and Chinese
influence and activity in sub-Saharan Africa. .
5. The roles of Arab states in sub-Saharan Africa. This
would focus on the involvement of Libya, Iraq, Egypt, Morocco,
Saudi Arabia and Algeria.
6. The impact of Islam in general and in specific sub-
Saharan states.
ds in European
objectives, influence and presence in sub-Saharan
8. Trends i
interests and act .
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C. To what degree are African states vulnerable to penetration?
1. Through their military and economic weakness.
2. Through weakness of national regimes and leadership.
3. Research in this area should take into account food and
population problems, energy prospects, mineral and natural resource
production, and socio-cultural change.
4. To what extent does external penetration contribute to
the instability (or, indeed, to the stability) of African
regimes?
a. What is the present and prospective role of the
military as an agent of stabilization or destabilization?
b. Is the military peculiarly vulnerable to external
manipulation?
c. How does African leadership view the military--
as a necessity? as a threat?
d. Does African leadership regard security as more
important than economic development?
e. To what degree will tribal and ethnic rivalries,
succession and intra-African disputes (e.g., the Western
Sahara) contribute to African instability?
5. Is penetration always an unmitigated evil for the African
states? Are the "victims" of penetration exploiting the pene-
trators? Are there vulnerabilities at the core, as well as in
the peripheral states?
6. Does the extent and effect of penetration differ in
periods of economic distress or economic boom in the core or in
the peripheral states?
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Cardinal Issue II: African Regionalism, Internal and Foreign Affairs
D. What will be the role of the African States in the UN, the
arab-Israeli dispute, and the Non-Aligned Movement?
E. What is the outlook for South Africa?
1. How will the Rhodesian settlement proceed?
2. What will be the impact of the Rhodesian settlement and
developments in that country on South African and the region?
3. Zambian political and economic prospects and how will
its relations with the Soviet Union develop?
4. What are the prospects for a Namibian settlement and
how does it relate to the Zimbabwe outcome?
5. What are the prospects for black-white relations in
South Africa?
6. What are the prospects for South Africa's political and
economic relations in the region and with the outside world?
F. What are the propsects for stability in the Horn? How is
the area affected by US-Soviet competition? What difference
has the prospect of greater US military access made in the
region?
G. How is West Africa particularly affected by the problems of
succession in Senegal and Ivory Coast?
H. How will the Western Sahara situation affect West Africa
(particularly Niger, Mali and Mauritania)? What are the
prospects for, and the consequences of, recognition by the
0AU of a Western Saharan (Islamic?) Republic?
I. What are the prospects for continued stability and develop-
ment in Nigeria under an elected government?
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J. Trends toward stability or instability in East Africa
(Kenya - population and food; Tanzania - economic
stability)
K. How do the US, the USSR, and the countries concerned see
the prospect of the "iron ring" (Angola, Zambia, Mozambique)
for the destabilization of southern Africa?
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A. What are the prospects for nuclear proliferation in the
area? (See also Section V C-8)
1. Focus on Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, India
2. What is the capability and potential of these key
states to develop a weapon and/or a delivery system?
3. Actions and policies of supplier states outside region.
B. What will be the impact of the ongoing crises in Iran and
Afghanistan on:
1. Regional and international security.
2. International economic and oil situation.
3. The policy orientation of key states in the region.
4. Prospects for expanded Soviet role in the area.
C. The potential for additional significant setbacks to the US
position in the area.
1. In what states and concerning which issues is the risk
higher.
2. What factors will determine the continuing strength of
the US position?
D. The policies of the major area oil producers.
1. What are their plans re capacity, production, pricing,
and marketing?
2. How and under what conditions might the principal producers
use oil more assertively as a political weapon?
E. How will the major oil producers invest and use their excess
revenues'?
1. What will be the size of these revenues?
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2. To what extent will the cumulation and disposition of
excess revenues be influenced by political factors?
F. The impact of socio-economic change and/or Islamic
fundamentalism.
1. In what states and to what degree are these factors
likely to threaten political stability; domestically and in
the region? (See also Section C C-7)
2. In particular, what will be the impact of:
a - extremist Muslin groups.
b - urbanization, labor migration, and other
demographic changes.
c - food production and shortages.
G. What are the prospects for significant changes in the
Israeli military balance?
1. Eqypt: prospects for programs to reorganize and modernize
its armed forces; domestic arms industry.
3. Syria: implications of political instability and posture
of likely successors; extent of Soviet backing.
4. Iraq: prospects for continued strengthening of capabilities;
strategic aims in filling regional vacuum in Gulf.
H. How will the balance of military power in South Asia evolve over
the next several years?
1. Pakistan/India problem.
2. US vs. USSR--militarization of the Indian Ocean.
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I. Political and security implications of conflicts within the
region.
1. Specifically, which have the potential to involve the
US and/or the USSR?
2. Cases of special interest:
a Iraq/Iran
b -? Morocco/Algeria/Western Sahara
c Yemens/Saudi Arabia
d -- Libya/Egypt
e - Lebanon/Syri
J. What is the potential for changes of regime and/or policy
orientation in the states of the region?
1. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan: states of highest
interest to US.
2. Other moderates: Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan, Arab
Gulf states.
3. Radicals: Syria, Libya, Algeria, Iraq.
1. What are the positions of the principal parties--
Egypt,1I Syria, Palestinians, Jordan?
2. Are these positions changing and in response to what
influences or developments might they change?
L. What are the prospects for changes in Soviet presence and
influence in the area?
1. In the Mediterranean: prospects for securing port
facilities and/or treaties of friendship and cooperation,
especially with Syria, Libya, and Algeria.
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2. In the Gulf: prospects for expanded diplomatic relations
with conservative Arab states and for strengthened role in Iraq
and Iran.
3. On the Arabian Peninsula: the Yemens and Oman.
4. Policies vis-a-vis Pakistan and India.
M. How and in response to what factors will the Cuban role in
the area change in the next few years?
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A. Strategic Importance of the Indian Ocean.
1. Growing importance of the Indian Ocean to Soviet
strategic. planning.
2. Strategic importance of the islands of the Indian
Ocean (e.g., Mauritius, Maldives, Diego Garcia).
3. Vulnerabilities of the "choke points" in the Indian
Ocean Region (e.g., Hormuz, Bab al Mandab, Malacca) to being
closed to US or other Western nations.
B. External Attempts to Influence Events in the Region.
1. The methods by which the Soviet Union is attempting
(including the use of surrogates) to extend its influence in
the Indian Ocean region through military, economic or political
means.
2. Success or failure of Soviet efforts to expand access to
naval, air or other militarily significant facilities in the
Indian Ocean region.
3. Prospects for Soviet-sponsored subversion within the
region, especially in key states of the area.
4. Prospects for Soviet success in attempting to gain
influence in the region by expanded military or economic
assistance.
5. Chinese interest in and efforts to project influence
into the Indian Ocean area; possibility of new arena for Sino-
Soviet dispute.
6. Interests, plans and military capabilities of key 25X1
a.tions
I uin the n zan cean.
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C. Indigenous Activities and Efforts to Meet the Challenge
Posed by Great Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean Region.
1. Reactions of important states in the region (in particu-
lar petroleum producers) to attempts to expand Soviet or Western
influence in the area via direct or indirect means.
2. Local rivalries and disputes in the Indian Ocean area as
they impact on Soviet attempts to gain influence.
3. Prospects for political, economic and social stability
in key states (e.g. Saudi Arabia, India, Indonesia) of the
Indian Ocean region.
4. Efforts of indigenous states to keep the great powers
out of the Indian Ocean region including unilateral or multi-
lateral attempts to improve defense capabilities and efforts
to expand the role of the Non-Aligned nations.
5. Activities of key local powers (e.g., India, Iraq) and
some nearby Third World states (e.g., Libya) to influence events
within the region.
6. Attitudes of key states in region to US-Soviet competition,
including perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the two
superpowers.
7. Significance of ethnic or religious movements toward unity
(e.g., Pan-Arabism, the Islamic Movement) or toward separatism
(e.g., Baluchistan) on the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean
region.
8. Developments leading toward nuclear proliferation in the
Indian Ocean re ion (India, Pakistan, Iraq, South Africa--
I I.
9. Issues and likely developments at the 1981 UN Conference
on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace.
~,,,.J ~ V 2If~
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ANIVINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL IJSF O;4I Y
A. Political implications of economic difficulties.
A major source of future political conflict in Eastern Europe --
with domestic political leaderships and interest groups, and
between governments and populations -- is likely to be resource
constraints. Diminished availability of energy/raw materials
supplies, and its likely negative effect on national growth and
living standards, will create the need for critical choices on
resource allocations and national priorities. Such problems
will affect each of the East European states, the nature of their
relations with the Soviet Union and the outside world.
B. Prospects for and implications of leadership change.
Economic problems and the questions of national adaptation could
contribute to a more fluid leadership situation by making choices
unavoidable and sharpening them, and by creating fissures within
party/government leaderships. Debate over issues such as economic
reform, the appropriate response to political dissent, and more
active engagement in the third world could alter the pattern of
elite stability that has characterized East European leadership
during the 1970s. The pattern of political mobility within leader-
ship groups could also be altered by such pressures. The identi-
fication of individual leaders with political constituencies,
increased factionalism --- situations reminiscent of the ferment
of the 1950s and mid-1960s in some states -- could result. The
probable change of party leaders in some East European countries
in the next five years could contribute to this more dynamic
situation.
C. Pressures for change in East European ties with the West.
The pattern of increased East-West political interaction, especially
between East and West Europe, which has attended the pattern of
expanded economic ties (but which is not the result solely of those
ties) could be dealt severe setbacks in future. The strain on East
European economic ties with the West is already apparent. The
initiation of more stringent policies with respect to political dis-
cipline could result in curtailing the network of East European
cultural and intellectual exchanges that has considerably reduced
the region's political isolation in the 1970s. The stagnation/
deterioration of US-Soviet relations could reinforce such trends,
as could a drawing closer by Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union for
economic reasons. Enhanced Soviet political leverage which could
derive from East European economic needs could further reinforce a
"drawing away" from the West by individual East European states.
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D. Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe.
Soviet pressure on Eastern Europe to restrict development of ties
with the West and to participate more fully in CEMA integration
could increase Soviet-Eastern Europe tensions. In any case such
pressures, systematically applied, will introduce new elements
into the politics of the Soviet-East European relationship. In
striking a different balance between East Europe and the West
both Moscow and Eastern. Europe will feel a certain schizophrenia.
Soviet policies and objectives toward individual East European
countries, and toward the region as a whole, particularly with
respect to the institutional expressions of Soviet hegemony -- the
Warsaw Pact and CEMA -- would be useful research topics. The
question is really one of the different pulls in Eastern Europe
between the USSR and the West: How do individual East European
countries perceive contradictory pressures and how will they seek
to deal with them?
E. The character and implications of political dissent.
F. The military reliability of the East European states in a
Warsaw Pact-NATO conflict.
G. Yugoslavia's future (emerging power structure, political stability,
nationalities issues, relations with USSR).
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Cardinal Issue I: Are political, economic, social and technological
developments within the USSR likely to lead significant changes in
established Soviet military and foreign policy objectives and priorities
or in the strategies and tactics by which they are pursued? If so,
what is the likely nature of these changes and what do they imply from
the point of view of US goals and interests?
A. Will the faltering Soviet economy incline the USSR toward
a more assertive or a more forbearing security policy?
1. To what extent does increase in Soviet military power
vis-a-vis the West depend on increases in Soviet military spending?
2. What are the tradeoffs among economic growth, political
stability, and military programs as Soviet policymakers look at
them and as we understand them?
3. How will the defense industrial sector be affected by the
economic slowdown?
4. What can and will the Soviets do to reconcile the increas-
ing complexity of managing the Soviet Union with the desire to
retain central control?
5. How will unequal rates of population growth in the various
republics impinge on political and economic arrangements?
6. To what degree will economic stringencies influence Soviet
toward arms control?
7. What are the prospects for productivity growth in the USSR
under current policies and under conceivable policies?
8. How will the Soviets cope with growing regional imbalances
in raw material sources, increments to the labor force, and the
location of fixed capital?
B. How will the impending, multitiered leadership succession affect
Soviet foreign and military policy-making and policy?
1. Do important generational differences exist regarding
attitudes toward the Soviet system as it has evolved?
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2. Can opposing views be identified with respect to political,
economic, and military policies?
3. What changes are likely in decision-making processes with
the USSR?
C. How will. the rapidly changing ethno-demographic composition of
the Soviet population impact on Soviet foreign and defense policy?
1. How, when, and to what extent will shifting ratios between
Slavs and Muslims in the USSR affect the Soviet military?
2. Will Moscow's fear that Soviet Muslim's might prove sus-
ceptible to Islamic fundamentalism have a significant impact on the
nature or conduct of Soviet foreign policy?
3. How will the apparent increase in Russian national self-
assertiveness within the USSR influence Soviet military and foreign
policy?
D. How will Soviet military and foreign policy be affected by the
dynamics and "imperatives" of "the scientific-technical revolu-
tion?
1. Will current Soviet efforts to improve the process of
introducing new technology be effective?
2. Could the USSR gain a decisive edge in-critical areas of
science in the coming decade?
3. How will the increasing competition between the civilian
sector and the defense sector for R&D resources be resolved?
4. Will the Soviets perceived need for technology transfers
from the West have a restraining effect on their military and
foreign policies?
Cardinal Issue II: Are political, economic, social and technological
developments outside the USSR likely to lead to significant changes
in establishe Sc~ ov et military and foreign policy objectives and
priorities or in the strategies and tactics by which they are pursued?
If so, what is the likely nature of the changes and what do they imply
for US goals and interests?
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E. How will. perceptions of adverse, mid-decade changes in the
East-West military balance impact on Soviet near-term
military and foreign policy choices?
1. How will US (Western) policies regarding exports and
licensing of a range of advanced technology affect Soviet and
East European technical progress?
2. How do the Soviets think the relative advantages in
military technology (East vs. West) will evolve in the 1980s?
3. What are Soviet perceptions of US security policy trends
in the early eighties?
4. What. are Soviet perceptions of the Western/US contribution
to Chinese military capability?
5. Under what circumstances could Soviet economic strains
lead to sharp rather than incremental changes in the distribution
of political. and economic power in the USSR and Eastern Europe?
Cardinal Issue III: The strategic forces: The East/West Power Balance:
How will it evo ve f
F. How does the Soviets assess the current and emergent "cor-
relation of forces" in the world? What forseable circumstances
do they believe could lead to significant shifts?
G. If SALT is ratified, will the Soviets continue nevertheless to
pursue development of counterforce and damage-limiting capa-
bilities of the type the US has perceived as destabilizing?
H. How will the Soviets react to the US deployment of MS/MPS?
1. Will they seek to maximize the number of their MIRVs to
be able to attack all MPS shelters?
2. Will the move away from fixed silos to more mobile systems
to increase survivability?
3. Will they be willing to extend SALT II limitations beyond
1985 when MX is deployed?
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I. How will. the Soviets react in their strategic programs to
planned US and NATO programs for deploying long range
theater nuclear weapons?
1. What will they do in the development of intermediate
range forces?
J. How prepared are Soviet military forces to pursue strategic
objectives with military means? How do they view the conse-
quence of intercontinental nuclear with the US?
K. What are the technological developments in train or expected
that could have impact on the power balance?
1. What improvements in the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs?
2. How many hard-target capable warheads will they carry?
3. Will Soviet MIRVed SLBMs eventually become accurate
enough to be used against MPS?
4. Will the Soviets make substantial improvements in ASW--
that is, in their open ocean detection and attack capabilities?
5. How long would it take the Soviets to develop an ABM
that could intercept present types of US warheads?
6. How effectively and how soon can the Soviets improve their
low altitude air defenses?
7. What are the prospects for systems employing advanced
technology (e.g., directed energy weapons, non-acoustic ASW
sensors)?
L. How will Soviet perceptions of competing interests in the third
world affect their programs in strategic forces? Do they see
their strategic capabilities forcing a decoupling of the inter-
continental threat from regional confrontations?
M. How do the Soviets perceive the strength of their strategic
forces relative to the US?
1. What do the Soviets see as necessary for deterrence?
2. Do the Soviets seek strategic superiority? What do they
mean by superiority? How much is needed?
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3. What measures do they use to assess relative strengths and
weaknesses?
4. Is this perception likely to cause them to act more aggres-
sive in areas of competing interest with the US? To take greater
risks in a crisis?
5. How will this perception affect their plans for future
force programs?
6. How will it affect their attitudes and approach to arms
control?
N. Do the Soviets see passive defense and recovery capabilities as
a means of achieving strategic advantage over the US?
1. What is the objective of Soviet civil defense programs?
2. How do the Soviets approach the matter of post-attack
recovery? Do they see this as an area in which they could achieve
strategic leverage? What steps have they taken in this area?
0. Are the Soviets planning actively for protracted strategic
nuclear warfare?
Cardinal Issue IV: How will the East West Power Balance evolve in
terms of general purpose forces?
P. How will Soviet developments in armor and antiarmor systems
affect the balance?
1. can the Soviets continue to develop technologies, forces,
and tactics that will preserve the dominance of their huge tank
park against prospective improvements in Western antiarmor
technology?
Q. Will the Warsaw Pact develop air forces capable of establishing
air superiority in Central Europe in a conventional conflict?
(NOTE: The doubtful ability of the Pact to successfully pro-
secute its planned air offensive in Central Europe is regarded
as one of the chief weaknesses in the Pact's current offensive
capabilities.)
1. What new tactics :.and+re?pons-systems Will the Pact develop
for attacks on NATO air bases?
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2. How will Pact tactics for overcoming NATO air defenses
(especiall develop?
3. What level of intensity over time can the Pact maintain
in its air offensive? Sortie rates?
4. What measures will the Pact take to improve pilot and
aircrew proficiency?
5. What will be the effectiveness of Warsaw Pact battlefield
air defenses?
R. What Soviet technology developments or opportunities have the
potential to radically affect the balance?
S. How will developments in the Soviets' general purpose naval
forces affect their maritime capabilities?
-- To interdict Western sea lines of commmunications?
1. To destroy Western surface naval forces, including carrier
strike forces?
T. What is the effect of recent and projected developments in Soviet
command, control, communications, and intelligence on Warsaw
Pact capabilities for theater warfare?
Cardinal Issue V: How will the Soviets perceive their opportunities to
intervene abroad, with or without the use of surrogates?
U. How will Soviet air and naval capabilities develop for project-
ing military forces abroad?
V. Will the Soviets develop and field new tactical combat organiza-
tions for use in Third World adventures?
W. Will the Soviets establish ground force, air, or naval bases in
Third World countries?
X. Will the Soviets increase their use of surrogates as inter-
vention forces?
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Cardinal Issue V[: What will be the impact on Soviet general purpose
forces of era o1 ns in Afghanistan?
Y. Will the Soviets escalate their military commitment in
Afghanistan?
--What impact would escalation have on Soviet
posture against NATO/ China?
Z. What lessons about Soviet general purpose forces can we learn
from Afghanistan?
1. Mobilization and warning
2. Readiness and proficiency of Soviet reserve
3. Equipment readiness and quality
4. Tactics and organization
5. Logistics
6. Use of airmobile forces
7 Leadership and training.
AA.. What lessons about counterinsurgency warfare will the Soviets
learn from Afghanistan?
1. Will they be discouragesd from further such adventures
or not?
Cardinal Issue VII: How much warning of a prospective Warsaw Pact
conventional attack would NATO get?
BB. =GivenSoviet.perceptions of the reliability__of.the East
Europeans, is a surprise attack a realistic Warsaw Pact
option?
CC. What is the status of Warsaw Pact logistic preparations?
DD. How ready are Warsaw Pact air forces to begin a major air
offensive in Central Europe?
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EE. How ready are East European ground forces and Soviet ground
forces in the western USSR.
FF. How ready is the GSFG?
Cardinal Issue VIII: What is Soviet policy for use of nuclear and
chemical weapons in theater warfare?
GG. "Decoupling": Will the Soviets continue to believe that
initiation of nuclear war in Europe would be likely to lead
to intercontinental nuclear exchanges?
1. How will Soviet peripheral strike forces develop?
2. Will the Soviets expand their short-range, low-yield
nuclear systems in Central Europe? Nuclear artillery?
3. If the Soviets concluded that decoupling had occurred,
what effect would it have on their development of conventional
forces?
HH. Do the Soviets plan for offensive use of lethal chemical
weapons, or biological weapons, in nonnuclear warfare
with NATO?
IT. Do the Soviets consider that use of tactical nuclear weapons
at sea could be constrained without spreading to the land
theaters or intercontinental strikes?
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G. GLOBAL ISSUES: POLITICAL
Cardinal Issue I. Why are key international and national institutions
having difficulty coping effectively with the effects of rapidly
accelerating societal change? And what does this imply for US interests?
A. What new patterns of regional and international power
relations are developing and what do these changes mean
to the US?
1. Is the political relationship between the US and its
industrialized allies changing? (See also Section H J-2)
2. Are new power centers that are increasingly autonomous
from the superpowers developing among LDCs? (See also Section H A-1)
3. Are new patterns of cooperation and competition developing
among LDCs and between groups of LDCs and industrialized countries
that are likely to affect US interests? (See also Section H A-2)
4. What are the perceptions of foreign leaders concerning US
global intentions and capabilities and how do these perceptions
affect their foreign policies?
5. What are the implications for Western policies and interests
of the emerging forces of protest, change, and revolution around
the world?
B. To what extent are existing international institutions and
procedures under increasing strains that reduce their adequacy
and create pressures for change?
1. What are the types and significance of the demands LDC
pressure groups are making on the industrial country-dominated
international system? (See also Section H J-1)
2. How are the deterioration of relations between the US
and the Soviet Union and the rising assertiveness of LDCs likely
to affect the ability of international organizations to function?
3. What new threats are likely to be posed to accepted
diplomatic practices and to national governments by international
terrorism?
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4. What impact is the growing number of such transnational
actors as multinational corporations, private lending institutions,
and various special interest organizations having on the inter-
national system? (See also section H S, Y, Z, AA)
C. What are the causes and consequences of political instability
and how do they affect governmental effectiveness in key LDCs?
1. How do national leaders (or governments) attempt to cope
with the conflict between maintaining important traditional values
and institutions, and the pressures from the acculturation process
brought on by the drive toward modernization or westernization?
2. What are the implications of military rule in key LDCs for
their domestic political processes and external relations. (See
also Section I 'F-2, F-3, F-4)
3. To what extent does rising ethnic, cultural, and religious
consciousness within and among LDCs create new strains on or new
rallying points for central governments?
4. What is the relationship between rapid urbanization and the
likelihood of significant political unrest? (See also Section 8
BB-3)
5. How will maldistribution of food in the world, other
resource scarcities, and existing demographic trends contribute
to political instability? (See also Section H I-1, BB-3)
6. How seriously will governmental effectiveness and legitimacy
in the most rapidly growing LDCs be impaired by adverse world economic
especially energy related -- trends? (See also Section H A-2)
7. To what extent are key LDCs subject to disrupting foreign
influences because of ?t:heir strategic significance or because of
the susceptibility of their elites to foreign social, political,
or intellectual values?
8. What is the long-term impact of narcotics trade on the
economics, governing institutions, and social fabric of major
producing countries?
D. What are the causes and implications of the declining govern-
ability of industrialized nations?
1. How serious are the problems of continuity and succession
in developed authoritarian countries for their domestic political
stability?
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2. What are the causes and consequences of the relative
decline of parliaments and political parties as mechanisms
for forging compromise and consent in the industrialized
democracies?
3. Are there basic shifts in the way people in industrialized
countries view central government and in what they demand of it?
If so, what are the implications of such changes?
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H. GLOBAL ISSUES: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
Cardinal Issue I: Political-Economic Adaptation to Energy Constraints
The likelihood of tight energy supplies in the 1980s will necessi-
tate major political/economic adjustments within and among states. In a
slow-growth, energy-constrained, inflation-beset environment, governments
will face a series of closely linked problems that will have to be
addressed in combination. These include:
A. Guaranteeing access to fuel supplies: Consuming countries may
e orced to adopt new political alignments to maintain secure
fuel supplies as oil. resources dwindle. In attempting to
procure supplies, consumers may be subjected to resource
blackmail as producer leverage continues to increase. We need
to speculate about the new global alignments that could occur
in an energy-tight world and assess their implications for
world growth. (See also Section G A-2)
B. Coping with reduced and more expensive supplies: Adjustments
are already underway in some countries to cope with the impact
of energy scarcities on their economies. The ability to
achieve acceptable rates of economic growth and maintain a
high standard of living will largely depend on the adoption of
effective conservation policies. The nations that succeed in
the race to develop energy-efficient and alternative energy
technologies will gain a competitive edge in the world market-
place. In many nations, the adjustment process may occur
rapidly enough, however, to avoid domestic political stress.
We need to track closely the changes in domestic and inter-
national relations that will develop as a result of adaptation
to energy constraints. (See also Section G A C-6)
C. Domestic repercussions: Increasing energy costs and scarcities
may create new domestic political alignments and cause some
countries to undergo profound changes in national political
form and leadership. Growing concern over the impact of
energy shortages on the domestic economy may also cause some
countries to retreat from earlier international commitments on
trade, capital movements, or the entry of foreign workers.
The implications of these changes for the United States will
need to be assessed.
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Cardinal'Issue III: The Increased Use of Non-Military Coercive or
-`- Pius evt Foreign Policy Tools
Over the past decade, nations have made increasing use of non-
military foreign policy tools, usually in situations where some type of
damage inflicting or retaliatory action short of a declaration of war
is desired. Examples of these non-military tools include the Arab use
of the oil embargo, UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia, the boycott
of Olympic games in the Soviet Union, and the freezing of Iranian
financial assets in the United States. The growing use of such actions
raises several issues that need further research.
1..+ ,.~ ~..
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F. Ingredients and efficac of economic warfare: The tools that
conceivably may be used as non-military weapons need to be
identified and their damage-inflicting potential assessed.
These tools include embargoes of raw materials and disruption
of financial flows, among others. This should include an
analysis of how useful or effective the tools can be in
achieving foreign policy goals.
G. Science and technology as a foreign policy tool: The extent
to which lea cing industrial nations can or will increase the
use of their S?T resources as a means of achieving specific
foreign policy objectives should be assessed.
H. Political/dilomatic sanctions: It would be useful to iden-
ti the conditions um-'Cc. er -whi political/diplomatic sanctions,
such as UN condemnation, are likely to be used and the goals
they might achieve (punishment, changes in policy, etc.).
Cardinal Issue IV: Changing Relations Among Oil Producers and Oil
Consumers
Competition for OPEC oil. will loom large in the relations between
oil producers and consumers over the next several years. This will
particularly be the case for Persian Gulf oil as the Soviet Union finds
itself increasingly energy constrained. Tub ]LI)Cs also expect their use
of energy (mainly oil) to grow ftster than energy consumption in the
industrialized nations and are already seeking OPEC assurances about
oil supplies. While the OPEC producers share the West-'s concerns about
avoiding a runaway oil crisis and international upheaval, they may
come to feel that their security requires them to accommodate growing
Soviet and LDC needs for oil.
I. A pragmatic dialogue between the OECD and OPEC: A common
interest in avavoiding an oil crisis and ensuring upheavals
may not be sufficient to accomplish a meaningful exchange.
The other ingredients that will be required for fruitful
OECD-OPEC relations should be examined.
J. Accommodating Soviet needs for oil: The forces that could
cause the key Persian Gulf producers to sell a significant
share of their oil to the Soviet Union and to ensure their
security by "bribing" the USSR with oil should be analyzed.
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Y. Obstacles to institutional modifications to take account of
ties changin lobal economic environment: After a out
years o operation, the major international economic institu-
tions are both showing signs of wear and running out of new
designs to proffer in the interests of a more open global
economy. Some adjustments of operating rules within the IMF,
the IBRD, and the GATT are underway. At each such instance,
the South is increasingly willing to politicize the discussions
and to insist that the new features contain some spur to their
own development, whether appropriate or not. We need to examine
the problems in the progression, since they are likely to
inhibit rapid responses to protectionism the energy crisis,
and global inflation. (See also Section G B-4)
Z. Demands for creation of new institutions: Exploiting concerns
in the developed world that some problems of global scope
require new international treaties, the LDCs will attempt to
enlarge the resource transfers from North to South by demanding
that totally new organizations be created to deal with
problems now handled at least in part by (a) the UN and the
associated agencies or (b) the market. The character-of .the
demands for global "cooperation" in various areas will appeal
to factions in the developed countries as well as the LDCs.
Moreover, increasing bilateralism in resource-contracting may
spur the developed countries to act on the premise that new
international institutions are better than apparent anarchy.
These developments need to be closely tracked because there is
considerable potential for friction among the developed
countries in responding to challenge of this sort. (See also
Section G B-4)
AA. Demands for greater LDC voting power in existing institutions.
There is a go od argument that voting power in existing insti-
tutions should be adjusted over time to reflect changes in
the economic and political power of countries. The IMF/IBRD
group takes this into account in changing country quotas.
The LDC would, however, like to so conform this principal as
to assure that they held the majority of votes in all major
international institutions. There are differences among them
as to what new formulas should be invoked; as a result, there
is considerable prospect for friction between North and South
and within the South in resolving the broader question. In
any event, there is always the possiblity that concessions
will have to be made in voting power to achieve other
developed country objectives. We currently have no reason-
able bats for knowing what impact such changes in power within
international institutions might have for the resolution of
important conflicts. (See also Section G B-4)
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Cardinal Issue IX: Implications of Manpower Balances and Labor Movements
The political, economic, military, and social ramifications of
population dynamics could result in greater social stress and more
government instability. The global population structure will change
markedly over the next ten years. By 1990, another 800 million people
will be added to the global population, mostly in developing countries,
while the impact of several decades of low or negligible population
growth will force major structural changes in the LDCs.
BB. An increase in the labor force in LDCs: By 2000, the labor
force t e s i.s expected to double. What are the
implications of these increases for unemployment and
political stability, in particular LDCs with slow growth or
a limited economic base?
CC. An increase in the international m~rtai(ri:on: More people
are likely two e displaced byany military conflict and
more are likely to be migrating in search of better oppor-
tunities. The extent to which slower growth in the
developed countries will reduce the demand for LDC labor,
removing an historical safety value on population growth
and important source of foreign exchange, should be
investigated along with the political implications of such
a development.
DD. Increased urbanization: High rates of population increase
and the prospect for continued internal migration will make
effective management of large cities difficult and will
present a challenge to the authority of central governments.
The extent to which presence in cities of large numbers of
people with varied cultural and economic backgrounds may
facilitate politization by left-r'^It arouns should be
assessed. (See n1so Section G C-4-S)
EE. Manpower shortages: The implications of low population
growth in many veloped countries on the size, composition,
and skill base of the military and civilian labor forces
need to be assessed.
Cardinal Issue X: I lications of Changing Patterns in Agriculture
- - - an Health
In many countries, political stability will hinge on the govern-
ment's ability to secure food supplies, spur agricultural development,
and maintain humanitarian services such as health care.
ML li~s
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FF. Sporadic food crises are anticipated, especial'y in sub-
SaHaran erica `a T in South and Southeast Asia . We nee to
examine 'the extent to which these will affect the economic
and political stability of LDC governments.
GG. Higher oil costs and slower growth will impinge on the
ability of governments to improve services such as health
care. The impact 'that this will have on the lower socio-
economic groupings and the implications for political unrest
should be assessed.
Cardinal Issue XI: Technolo and Information Transfers: Political,
Commercial,, and trategic Implications
Technology and information have become important "commodities" in
a global context; the acquisition and possession of both are key
determinants in the economic, military, and political development of all
nations. Technology and information transfers between nations--and
barriers to that transfer--could seriously strain relations among OECD
countries and will continue to be major agenda items in North-South
discussions. Similarly transfers along the East-West axis will be a
source of continuing tension between the United States and its military
allies.
HH. Political: The extent to which the LDC's increasing need for
modern technology will result in greater political pressure
being applied to the industrial nations needs to be explored.
II. Commercial: Shifts in technological leadership within OECD,
e.g. automotive and electronic technology, portend not only
new trade leaders but also some changes in the flow of pro-
duction technology to OPEC, Latin America, and the Asian
nations. The results are likely to cause economic as well
as political problems (e.g., France-Brazil space). What
are the implications for the US trade balance?
JJ. Strategiic: Many advanced civil technologies have military
aplications and are commercially available to both
Community and LDC nations. We should examine the serious
control problems and the implications for relative military
balances of these transfers, In addition, the increasing
regulation of commercial and media information flow by
foreign governments poses intelligence as well as political
and economic problems for the United States, which need to
be explored.
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.r ['~!? ~iW LY:C ~, 14 ? ii9 Nd '.F .L
I. Global Issues: Political Military
Cardinal Issue I: Nuclear Proliferation
A. Evolution and spread of sensitive technology and materials:
1. Spread of dual purpose technology to the LDCs.
2. Increasing ability of LDCs to develop indigenous tech-
nological capabilities in such sensitive fields as reprocessing
and uranium enrichment.
3. Diversification of sources of nuclear technology, material,
and equipment, including the entry of LDCs into the supplier ranks.
4. Development of deliverable weapons, including thermo-
nuclear weapons, and of delivery systems.
5. Prospects for nuclear sharing among LDCs, including the
'7~bslim world".
6. Development of necessary military and industrial infra-
structure in LDCs for nuclear weapons deployment.
B. Political factors and implications:
1. Impact of nuclear commerce controls and other nonpro-
liferation initiatives on North-South and intra-OECD relations,
and on the overall nonproliferation regime.
2. Impact of changing international political/military
environment on nonproliferation regime and motivations of
potential proliferators.
3. Potential impact of further proliferation on regional
politics, relations among the nuclear weapons states, and the
overall nonproliferation regime.
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4. Ability of certain nations -- particularly those able
to use the oil weapon -- to blackmail suppliers into transfering
sensitive technology.
C. Strengths and weaknesses of the nonproliferation regime:
1. Potential for the illicit acquisition of nuclear
technology and materials by LDCs.
2. Prospects for acquisition of nuclear weapons or fissile
material by subnational groups.
3. Impact of US nonproliferation efforts (both unilateral
and multilateral) on:
a. Behavior of potential proliferators.
b. Behavior of suppliers.
c. US nuclear relations with other nations.
4. Impact of the NPT and IAWA in preventing proliferation;
prospects for defections from these regimes.
5. Outlook for new or more effective supplier efforts --
either individually or cooperatively -- to prevent proliferation.
Cardinal Issues II: The Manufacture and Transfer of Conventional Weapons
D. The intentions and. capabilities of major and emerging arms
exporters:
1. Causes and implications of trends in export policies
and practices; factors (including shifts in market forces)
that could cause marked discontinuities.
2. Capabilities of existing and projected industrial plant
and technological base; extent and nature of R&D efforts.
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3. Impact of technology transfer and repatriation of expert
personnel; impact of technological advance:
Extent to which technological sophistication of
of weaponry available in the world market is
rising.
-- Likelihood that rising costs and increasing
difficulties of maintenance will result in
increased demand for less sophisticated
weaponry, enable more arms manufactures to
enter the market, and drive some poorer arms
purchasers out of the markets.
4. Economic motives and constraints affecting arms exports.
5. Political motives and constraints (both domestic and
foreign policy-related) affecting arms exports -- e.g., influence,
prestige, and diplomatic linkages.
6. Prospects for--and political, economic, and military
implications of--increased regional collaboration in the defense
industry field (e.g., in NATO or in ASEAN).
E. Factors affecting the demand for arms in the NATO Alliance
area and Key Third World regions:
1. Perceptions of Warsaw Pact threat.
2. Interaction between cooperative and competitative efforts.
3. Impact of standardization, interoperability, ration-
alization.
4. Prospects for an orderly marketing method and export
restraint.
5. Political and. security motives.
6. Economic motives.
7. Terms of trade and the availability of new sources of
financing.
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F. Impact and Dimension of Arms Transfer
1. Implications of retransfers and arms brokering (official
and private, open and covert).
2. Extent and implications of arms transfers to subnational
groups.
3. Domestic impact (political and economic) of the transfer
of sophisticated weaponry on the acquiring state; absorptive
capacity; availability of foreign operators and technicians.
4. The impact of arms transfers on regional stability and
military balances.
5. Impact of military sales and assistance on the foreign
policy orientation and. behavior of the recipient states.
6. The prospects for restraint or denial; implications of
growth in ranks of alternative suppliers.
Cardinal Issue III: Arms Control and Disarmament
G. The dynamics of the arms control process: general incentives
and disincentives; parochial motives and inhibitions of
significant and aspiring military powers; perspectives and
behavior of the militarily weak.
H. Impact of change in the international environment on East-
West arms control negotiations, including SALT, MBFR, ASAT,
CTB, and CW.
I. Political, economic and military implication of growth and
modernization of existing strategic and conventional forces.
J. Political, economic, and technical implications of need to
monitor and verify compliance with specific existing or
projected arms control agreements.
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K. Spread of unconventional weapons capabilities, including
BW and CW, to governments or nongovernmental groups not
now possessing them.
1. Who might use them and where.
2. Implications for efforts to control such weapons.
L. Influence of new developments in weapons technology on arms
control (and vice versa):
1. Weapons employing exotic technologies (e.g., lasers or
particle beams): incentives for controlling such weapons, and
problems in verifying controls.
2. New weapons considered excessively injurious or indis-
criminate in their effects; pressures for restricting their use.
M. Significance of adherence or nonadherence of key countries
to international agreements (e.g., Chinese and French
attitudes toward a CTB agreement).
N. Responses of nonaligned countries to a changed international
environment and to setbacks or lack of progress in East-West
arms control negotiations.
1. Extent of pressure for greater multilateral involvement
in the negotiation of CW and CTB agreements.
2. Proposals for further alteration of multilateral dis-
armament machinery.
3. Nonaligned responses to Soviet arms control initiatives.
0. Regional arms control: proposals for, and prospects for
agreement on:
1. Confidence-building measures (especially in Europe).
2. Zones of peace (especially Indian Ocean and Southeast
Asia).
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3. Nuclear-weapons-free zones (including Latin America,
Africa, Middle East, and Nordic countries).
4. Control of theater nuclear forces in Europe (West
European objectives, Soviet positions, possible forums for
negotiation).
P. Issues, problems and alignments at the Second UN Special
Session on Disarmament.
Cardinal Issue IV: Projection of Force
Q. Policies, doctrines, capabilities, and intentions of the
leading military powers and industrialized countries with
respect to military intervention:
1. The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies.
2. The Peoples Republic of China.
3. OECD countries.
R. Military capabilities of--and countervailing political and
economic constraints affecting--key LDCs with respect to:
1. Resisting or impeding intervention by extraregional
powers.
2. Intervening militarily in either a neighboring or
distant state.
S. Factors likely to affect the future availability of necessary
base access arrangements and overflight or transit clearances
to:
1. The US and its allies.
2. The USSR and its allies.
3. Other potential intervenors.
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T. Prospects for--and implications of--further military inter-
vention by third countries acting in collaboration with
(or as surrogates for) the USSR or other major powers:
1. Factors likely to promote or inhibit such cooperation
and to define its limits.
2. Factors likely to influence foreign reactions to such
cooperation.
3. Implications of such cooperation for US crisis manage-
ment efforts.
U. Political, economic, and military implications of greater
outside power involvement in local conflicts.
Cardinal Issue V: Alliances and Other Cooperative Security Arrangements
V. Role of alliances and other security groupings in planning
and negotiating arms control.
W. Likelihood for increase defense cooperation within existing
regional organizations (e.g., ASEAN, ECOQAS, Andean Pact)
-- How changes in the international environment are
affecting prospects for such cooperation.
-- Relation between military and nonmilitary cooperation.
X. Prospects for emergence of new regional security arrangements
(e.g., in the Persian Gulf).
Y. Role of alliances (especially NATO and ANZUS) in meeting
security threats outside of the main alliance area.
Z. Relation between regional security organizations and outside
powers.
AA. Effects of alliance formation on regional stability.
Cardinal Issue VI: Military Involvement in Politics
BB. External factors likely to influence the political orientation
and role of military personnel:
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1. Impact of foreign training and assignments.
2. Impact of foreign military assistance programs.
3. Impact of foreign military presence.
CC. Prospects for the establishment or continuation of direct
or indirect military rule in key developing countries world-
wide. (See also Section G E-2)
DD. Implications of direct or indirect military rule for local
and regional political stability.
EE. Implications of direct or indirect military rule for other
key global and regional problems and issues, including:
1. Nuclear proliferation.
2. Human rights.
3. Conventional arms transfers.
4. Arms control.
5. Alliances and security cooperation arrangements.
Cardinal Issue VII: Outer Space Issues
FF. Implications of new space technologies and applications
(including the Space Shuttle):
1. Implications of competition and cooperation for relations
among industrialized countries.
2. Implications for North-South tensions.
3. Implications for East-West relations.
4. Implications for the economic development and political
stability of LDCs.
GG. Efforts to broaden international controls over the uses of
outer space:
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1. Factors shaping national positions on such controls
(e.g., considerations of national sovereignty, security concerns,
fear of foreign exploitation of natural resources).
2. Nature of controls currently being--or likely to be--
considered.
3. Implications of these controls for current or projected
national space programs:
- Implications for NTM and other space-based
intelligence collection activities.
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The topics set forth below reflect the consensus of the East
Asian Sub-Group as to the thematic, larger-dimensioned issues that
should guide intelligence research on East Asia. Soviet policies
and actions in the East Asian region were not separately addressed
since they appear to be functions of overall Soviet policies and
problems addressed in the Soviet Sub-Group. Similarly_ is
addressed primarily in terms of its East Asian dimension since that
country's immensely important role in world economic and political
issues is covered by the Global Issues: Political/Economic Sub-Group.
All four issues focus on the analysis of political, economic, and
social change in East Asia. The first two issues center on evolution-
ary and multivariable processes of change involving inadequately under-
stood factors whose consequences for US policy are analytically diffi-
cult to forecast. The second two issues center on changes in two areas
of East Asia where the prospects for abrupt change pose serious problems
for U.S. policy in the Area.
Cardinal Issue I: The Chinese Modernization Effort
A. How permanent are the new economic, political, and social
institutions being developed by the PRC as it continues
to work out its plans for economic modernization?
B. How are Chinese capabilities for acquiring and absorbing
foreign technology changing and how will these factors
shape PRC foreign policy toward the U.S., the U.S.S.R.,
C. How are Chinese perceptions of their military moderniza-
tion requirements changing? Will they continue to seek an
improved deterrence posture or will they attempt to acquire
a better capability for projecting military force outside
their borders? What effects will changes in these percep-
tions have on internal resource allocation decisions and
on PRC relations with the other Asian states as well as
the great powers?
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Cardinal Issue III: The Two Koreas
G. What effects will the leadership succession process now under-
way in both Koreas have on tensions between the two states?
H. What role are domestic economic problems -- inflation in the
South and a diminished capability for drawing on foreign re-
sources in the North -- playing in the succession process and
how do these problems affect North and South Korean decisions
on reunification policies?
I. What effects will these factors have on the balance of military
forces on the Peninsula and how wi elationships of both
Koreas to the major Asian powers the USSR, China,
and the US evolve?
Cardinal Issue IV: Indochina and Southeast Asia
J. How cohesive is the Vietnamese leadership and what are its
capabilities for sustaining the present course in Kampuchea
in the face of increasingly serious resource allocation
problems?
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K. What is the likelihood of a resurgence of the Vietnamese
refugee problem and what are its implications for the
policies of the US and other governments in the area?
L. Is there any prospect for the establishment of viable
governments in Kampuchea and Laos other than in the frame-
work of a Vietnamese-led "Indochina Federation"?
M.. Will the ASEAN countries continue to react to these problems
on an individual basis or is the ASEAN arrangement likely to
take on a mutual security dimension?
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