NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031400080002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 9, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
Top Secret
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Briefs and Comments
II
Namibia: South Africa Rejects UN Truce Plan. . . 1
France: Challenge Within Governing Coalition .
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Mauritania: Rioting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Special Analysis
Portugal: Poor Prospects for Mota Pinto. . . . . 6
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NAMIBIA: South Africa Rejects UN Truce Plan
South Africa has rejected Western proposals for
strengthening the UN truce plan for Namibia. The South
African Foreign Minister's formal reply to the proposals
that five Western foreign ministers presented in late
March also states that South Africa will reconstitute the
Namibian Constituent Assembly as a national assembly with
legislative functions. Although South Africa remains
willing to implement the UN transitional program if cer-
tain truce arrangements are changed, the overall state-
ment suggests that Prime Minister Botha has decided to
proceed unilaterally toward setting up an "independent"
Namibian government in defiance of the UN. 25X1
According to the South African statement, an accept-
able truce with the South-West Africa People's Organiza-
tion must provide for effective monitoring of SWAPO forces
in neighboring countries and must not allow any guerrillas
inside Namibia to keep their arms or set up bases, even
under stringent UN monitoring. South Africa asserts that
the principal Namibian political groups have rejected the
Western proposals for strengthening monitoring arrange-
ments.
All the principal Namibian groups except SWAPO have
stated some apprehensions concerning the UN truce plan.
Only the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, however, wants
South Africa to reject the UN program. Centrist polit-
ical leaders and spokesmen for the major Namibian church
bodies have declared that going ahead with the UN pro-
gram is a better risk than movie; toward an internal
The Constituent Assembly last week called for a na-
tional assembly to be formed by adding 15 representatives
of the centrist groups to the 50 members of the existing
Assembly, but leaders of the two principal centrist
groups have rejected the arrangement. Prime Minister
Botha may hope that South Africa's rejection of the UN
truce plan will convince the centrist leaders that they
have no feasible alternative but to participate in the
national assembly. Botha no doubt hopes such centrist
participation would lend some international credibility
to the new assembly.
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FRANCE: Challenge within Governing Coalition
Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac may attempt to bring
down the government and force a new election sometime
.after the vote on the European Parliament next month.
The European election is regarded by many in France as a
prelude to the French presidential race in 1981, and the
parties are fighting hard to improve their relative posi-
Lions. The European election campaign may dissipate the
one advantage the governing coalition had over the opposi-
tion in the 1978 French legislative election: its capac-
-ity to stick together and project a credible governing
25X1 mage?
Chirac, who wants to weaken President Giscard prior
to challenging him for the presidency in 1981, has been
working to remain in the public eye and mark his diver-
gencies with the government. By so doing, he apparently
hopes to benefit from
some
of the public discontent
that
would otherwise go to
the
left.
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Giscard and Prime
the European election
Chirac has been saying
than last year's natio
has a chance for a maj
of Giscard's Union for
the 32 percent the pol
Min
has
tha
nal
orit
Fre
ls a
ister Barre keep insisting
no domestic implications,
t it will be more importan
election. Although no par
y, Chirac maintains that f
nch Democracy to gain more
re giving it will amount t
that
but
t
ty
ailure
than
o
public disavowal of th
e Pr
esident.
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Chirac seems likely to stop short of a censure mo-
tion because of the risk of a leftist victory in a new
legislative election and because he might not get enough
support from his deputies. Such calculations may be out-
weighed, however, because Chirac sees his coalition
partner--Giscard's Union for French Democracy--growing
strong at his expense and fears being dragged along in
support of policies of which he does not approve and over
25X1 which he has no real control.
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INDONESIA: Domestic Oil Price Increase
Tndonesians are reacting calmly sq far to a govern-
ment-imposed 40-percent price increase for kerosene that
became effective last Wednesday. President Suharto's de-
cision to approve the increase is an indication of his
confidence in his economic advisers, who also engineered
the 33-percent devaluation of the rupiah last year. Mili-
tary officials had objected to the price increase because
of fears that it would set off public disturbances.
The price hike for kerosene--a basic household fuel--
will sharply increase living costs for Indonesia's poor
and probably trigger further price increases throughout
the economy. Inflation has increased at an annual rate
of 15 to 20 percent since the rupiah was devalued last
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The government raised kerosene prices to reduce its
subsidy of domestic fuels, which without a price increase
would have reached $900 million this year compared to
$34 million only two years ago. The large increase in
the size of the subsidy was due mainly to a sharp rise
in the price for the kerosene and crude oil Indonesia
imports. Last year imports covered 30 percent of its
kerosene requirements. Jakarta hopes the price hike will
help curb the growth of kerosene consumption, which has
been rising 15 percent annually--in part because of low
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Indonesia--which imports crude oil from the Middle
East while exporting its own high quality crude--is cur-
rently facing a tight domestic oil supply situation. In-
donesia's traditional suppliers have cut back their sales,
raising speculation that Indonesia might reduce its oil
exports and divert supplies to the domestic market. The
government probably would opt for export cuts only as a
last resort if it could not obtain sufficient kerosene
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Clashes yesterday in Nouakchott, Mauritania's capi-
tal, between security forces and black students protest-
ing changes in government education policies are the
latest manifestation of the basic racial problem that
has long bedeviled Mauritania. The blacks--French-
speaking ethnic Africans--are angered at recent changes
in the public school system favoring Arabic, the lan-
guage of the politically dominant Moors and the country's
official language. The present strife is not directly
related to other political or security issues, such as
Mauritania's involvement in the war over Western Sahara,
but significant civil unrest could seriously threaten
the month-old regime of Prime Minister Ahmed Bouceif.
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PORTUGAL: Poor Prospects for Mota Pinto
Portugal's fractious political parties, heretofore
inhibited both by popular opinion and by self-interest
from challenging independent Prime Minister Mota Pinto,
are now ready to take him on. As a result, the days of
his nonparty government appear numbered, and an early
election--before the one required by the constitution
next year--has become more likely. The principal loser
from the parties' new assertiveness is likely to be
President Eanes, whose in Zuence as a political arbiter
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A majority of Portuguese legislators has opposed
Mota Pinto ever since Eanes named him Prime Minister
last October. Until recently, however, the parties were
intimidated by public resentment of their incessant
bickering and hence tolerated the Prime Minister's in-
creasing abrasiveness. In addition, the largest party--
Mario Soares' Socialists--hesitated to risk the earl
election that Mota Pinto's ouster might bring on.
In recent weeks, a split among Social Democratic
Party legislators, coupled with the success of the
Socialists' own recent party congress, has made Socialist
leaders hopeful that they could hold their own in an
early election. Moreover, Social Democratic leader Sa
Carneiro is eager for an election because it would allow
him to oust the legislators who defected from his party
this spring and who are trying to put together a new
political grouping.
At this point, Mota Pinto's confirmed opponents--
Communists, Social Democrats, and leftist independents--
slightly outnumber his supporters, and it is increasingly
possible that the Socialists will switch from abstention
to opposition--although they are likely to abstain on the
budget vote next week in order to allow conclusion of a
new agreement with the International Monetary Fund. Thus,
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while the means of his downfall are not clear--whether by
resignation, by confidence vote, or by censure motion--
Mota Pinto's ouster appears inevitable.
The new assertiveness of the parties raises the
prospect of a period of political and economic uncertainty
associated with a weak caretaker government and an early
election. Even more important, the parties' recovery
could challenge the concept of an independent presidency--
that is, the idea that the president operates above the
parties and acts as a counterweight to them.
Since he took office in 1976, Eanes has intervened
several times to check party excesses. His interventions
culminated last year in his dismissal of the government
of Socialist Prime Minister Soares and his naming of Mota
Pinto to head a nonparty administration. His actions
coincided with growing public sentiment against the par-
ties, which the parties have only recently begun to over-
come.
Eanes' recent criticisms of the parties, together
with his continued public support of Mota Pinto, have
deepened the parties' suspicions of the President while
at the same time encouraging their desire for increased
political and institutional leverage over the presidency.
Such leverage would probably weaken Portugal's already
delicate political stability; it would reduce the commit-
ment to the political system by groups--such as the
military and some major business interests--that distrust
the parties and rely on the President-to keep them in
line. It would also tie the presidency more closely to
the uncertainties of party politics.
The new lines of cleavage that have developed during
the controversy appear to have already reduced Eanes'
ability to function as a political arbiter--a role that
has been critical in the resolution of several political
confrontations in the past.
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