SOVIET COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR WARFIGHTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002000070019-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 21, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet Command and Control for Warfighting
Good morning. It's a pleasure to be here with you today. As you begin
the last day of your conference on "C3 I for Warfighting," it's appropriate
and important to review Soviet Command and Control for Warfighting because of
its key implications for our national security policy in this decade.
To evaluate Soviet Command and Control for Warfighting we must view it
in the larger context of the traditions and unique perspectives of
Soviet military power. This is important because Soviet strategies and
ev3lopments-seldom "mirror image" our own.
The Soviet liioci has thought deeply about the likely nature of a
modern large-scale war and how to effectively control their forces
in such a conflict.
The nature and history of the Soviet Union's conservative
political system stresses firm centralization of authority and
control. Consequently, the Soviet political leadership places a
heavy premium on centralized command and control of its military
forces--both for political as well as military reasons.
. _The political leadership tasks the Soviet military to seriously
plan for all potential phases of a large-scale war, which they
believe can go through a series of complex phases.
.V/ Soviet military preparations for conflict, therefore, are guided
by a General Staff that has the authority to both shape and
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direct their military forces. As we shall see, this key
institution in the Soviet military hierarchy is both a source of
strength and weakness.
B. The Soviets see their requirements for military forces and
operations within the framework of a competive world that they
,regard as inherently unstable.
1. The Soviet leadership perceives threats to the homeland
potentially arising from a variety of directions.
a.
This includes major theater wars in Europe or China as well
as intercontinental war with the United State.
b.
In addition, the Soviets are concerned with
threats--and opportunities--
-yap
as their
actions in Afghanistan4Iran and the Middle East will
attest.
2. The Soviets deploy and structure their military forces so that
they can take the offensive wherever possible because the
Soviets want any conflict to be fought on the territory of the
enemy, and not on the Soviet homeland.
a. Because the Soviets are uncertain about how and where a
conflict might arise, Soviet forces are postured so as to be
able to mobilize and reposition in as short a time as
possible, and to be able to sustain operations over an
extended period.
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b. Soviet forces are large, complex and diverse. Such forces
are intended to give them the broadest possible array of
military capabilities. They are also co si tent with the
Soviets' sense of historical insecurity. ey reflect the
high level institutional power of the Soviet military.
c. In addition to concerns about possible conflicts with NATO
and China, the Soviets are increasingly concerned with
improving their capability to manage power projection
operations to distant regions of the world.
II. Fundamental to any understanding of Soviet command and control for
warfighting is the type of conflicts the Soviets believe they may have
to fight.
A. The Soviet military planning process assumes that a war could evolve
through numerous stages, each presenting enormous challenges to
planning and decisionmaking. If -a general nuclear war occurs, the
Soviets believe it most likely would result from the expansion of a
major theater conflict, preceded by a political crisis period during
which tensions would rise significantly. The Soviets expect--but do
not count on--such a period of tension giving them the time to raise
the operational status of deployed forces and to mobilize the bulk
of their reserve forces.
B. The Soviets have contingelicy ns for military operations in any
geographic theater. They ,aaec most concerned about the European
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theater, however, so over the next few minutes I'll concentrate on
how they see a major war unfolding against NATO.
1. The Soviets see a conventional conflict with NATO as likely to
follow a crisis period and last an indeterminate length of
time. Soviet scenarios for the conventional phase of a European
conflict typically show the Warsaw Pact containing a NATO attack
and then launching a counter-offensive which penetrates deeply
into Western Europe.
2. They see a theater nuclear phase as likely to flow out of the
conventional conflict because of the inherent risk of
conventional operations. From the Soviet perspective,
escalation to nuclear weapons is highly likely. This is because
they expect NATO to use nuclear weapons to avoid losing a
conventional war with the Warsaw Pact. They do not discount,
however, their using nuclear-weapons to halt a NATO breakthrough
on a key route of advance that they judged could not be
contained by available conventional forces.
3. The Soviets also take into account the possibility that theater
nuclear war might begin with little or no conventional phase.
They have a requirement to be able to preempt in the event they
detect NATO preparing to use nuclear weapons.
4. From the Soviet perspective, escalation to intercontinental
nuclear war would not be necessary if they could achieve their
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theater objectives without it. Keep in mind, however, that they
view theater nuclear war as only an uncertain step away from
intercontinental nuclear war. In the intercontinental phase,
the Soviets would seek to destroy or disable US and allied
nuclear and conventional forces worldwide, and isolate US power
from the theater campaign.
5. The Soviets believe major intercontinental strikes against US
targets, lasting for hours or days, would be followed by the
conclusion of the theater campaign that gave rise to the
conflict, with the Soviets attempting to secure their theater
objectives. Concern that this phase could continue for some
time underlies their preparations for protracted war.
6. The Soviets view intercontinental nuclear forces as having only
a limited role in the concluding phases of a NATO-Warsaw Pact
war. They expect operations in the Eurasian theaters would be
conducted primarily by surviving ground, air, and naval forces
supported by perhaps a small number of strategic nuclear
strikes. In this phase, the Soviets would plan to attempt to
reconstitute conventional and strategic forces, and to the
extent possible focus on securing their theater objectives.
C. As you can appreciate from this brief review of how the Soviets
believe a major war might unfold, their command and control planners
are given extremely stiff operational challenges.
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III. Let's now examine in greater detail the implications of centralized
command and control for the Soviet Union in managing peacetime and
wartime operations.
A. Centralization of authority within the Soviet General Staff permits
it to coordinate the development of weapons and operational
practices with the development of supporting command and control
systems.
1. This is not to suggest that this is perfectly done or that
distortions in planning don't result from bureaucratic and
budgetary conflict. Their arms of service are as independent-
minded as are ours. But the potential for the more systematic
management of this function within the Soviet General Staff is
substantial.
2. Since in wartime the General Staff will act as executive agent
of the national leadership, it is in a powerful position to
impose central direction to the development of the overall
command and control system.
B. The Soviets have structured their C3 system with the objectives of
maintaining continuity of command and control and directing their
military forces in all situations.
1. The General Staff, working with the five services, conducts a
regular training program to prepare the C3 system for the
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transition to wartime operations and to handle the complexity of
modern warfare.
2. The General Staff also insures that high priority is given to
the survivability, redundancy, and flexibility of command,
control, and communication facilities and equipment.
a. Command survivability is achieved through the construction
of numerous hardened and concealed fixed command posts which
will probably direct the early phases of a conflict.
b. In addition, there are also fixed alternate command posts as
well as mobile command systems on land, in the air, and at
sea.
c. The strategic military communications system includes
extensive networks of cable and open-wire communication
lines, radio-relay links, radio-communications stations, and
communications satellites. This redundancy of communication
means is intended to improve the prospects of communicating
in a nuclear environment.
3. The Soviets recognize that the automation of the command system
could make their forces more responsive to central direction in
both peacetime and wartime.
a. The Soviets have done research on and written about
automating their command, control, and communications
systems for many years. They treat the control of troops as
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a military science and have a number of military
mathematicians working on control theory.
b. They are introducing automation into their C3 system which
could enable Soviet commanders to increase the effectiveness
of wartime operations as a result of improved battle
management techniques. The Soviet Air Defense Forces and
the Moscow antiballistic missile system employ automation
most extensively.
c. The Soviets are behind the US in automation technology.
However, their ability to systematically apply what they
have, and willingness to quickly field systems incorporating
available technology, compensates considerably for their
technological lag.
IV. While the highly centralized command and control structure I've just
described to you is a source of considerable strength of the Soviet
system, it is simultaneously a major weakness.
A. The concept of centralized planning, in itself, has the potential to
create special problems for Soviet authorities.
1. Its large bureaucracy may be. overwhelmed by the data required to
coordinate the planning for such large and diverse forces at
central staffs. Moreover, innovation and creativity are not
strong characteristics of large organizations in authoritarian
countries. In terms of controlling forces, especially during
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the initial phases of a war it is doubtful that a commander in
the field would be permitted to deviate from operational plans
developed centrally.
2. If, for any reason, Soviet centralized control were cut off, it
is not clear that adequate staffs and information systems exist
at lower levels to minimize serious operational disruption.
B. Because of the concern for centralized control and an awareness of
how quickly it can be lost, the Soviets frequently exercise the
supporting command, control, and communications systems in a variety
of simulated conflict situations.
V. The potential loss of centralized control during wartime could motivate
the Soviets to reintroduce the use of theater-level high commands, in
areas such as the Far East, as was done in World War II.
A. Theater level high commands function as intermediate authorities
between the General Staff and the operating forces in theaters of
military operations.
B. They would exercise direct control over subordinate forces, and may
be better adapted for planning and conducting large and complex
theater operations while still under the overall direction and
control of the General Staff.
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C. If a war did occur, So 'et theater-level commands wo id probably
operate on the periphery the USSR, including E ope, the Far East
and perhaps South Asia. Sub rdinated forces pr ably would include
portions of the Soviet ground orces, air and air defense forces,
naval forces and perhaps even lo g-range bo bers.
1. A combined arms approach to mi itary lanning in peacetime could
facilitate the capability of th S iet Union to achieve a
timely wartime utilization of al its military forces.
2. The Soviet concept of combined rm warfare involves more than
simply the joint use of weapo syste s and forces. It requires
that all required systems a d forces a e brought to bear in a
unified, effective manner at all levels -front, theater and
national--of command.
a. In the Soviet vie , for example, the :support over Europe
is not an end i itself--it is meant to support the advance
of Soviet grow d forces into Europe.
b. Likewise, th battle for naval supremacy in the waters
around Gre land, Iceland and Britain doe not have the sole
objective of simply sinking Western naval \orces. It is
also mea t to protect the Soviet Unions' SS N force, a key
portio of the Soviet strategic nuclear stri forces.
3. The degre of successful integration of these dive se force
componen s would largely determine whether complex, ultiphase
Soviet eater operations could achieve their goals.
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VI. Disruption of their adversaries' command and control structure is as
important to the Soviets as insuring the survivability of their command
and control system. Such operations are key elements in their overall
planning for military operations.
A. The success of counter-C3 operations would be instrumental for the
Soviets in determining how well the war could be prosecuted. These
.operations will include. the use of electronic warfare techniques,
sabotage, and conventional force attacks, as well as direct nuclear
strikes.
1. Such operations could include attacking fixed facilities such as
command centers in NATO Europe, and communication sites which
link US military forces overseas with command centers in the US.
2. Other operations could include disruption of US communications
by attacks against space-based communication and navigation
systems that support US tactical forces and SSBNs.
B. Soviet capability to execute missions of this type has long been
within their grasp and today are fully integrated into their
operational plans.
VII. To sum up, a key element in Soviet assessments of their capabilities to
conduct military operations is the effectiveness and survivability of
their command and control system. In addition, they place great
emphasis on the prospects for disrupting and destroying the command and
control systems of their adversaries.
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