NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031300160001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
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National Intelligence, Daily
(Cable)
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Top Secret
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Briefs and Comments
Lebanon: New Tension in the South . . . . . . . 1
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Libya-Chad: Renewed Fighting . . . . . . . . . 3
Liberia: Impact of Riots . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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Taiwan: Warnings to Population . . . . . . 5
Brazil: Labor Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Namibia: Political Impasse . . . . . . . . . . 9
Iran: Communist Leader Returns . . . . . . . . 11
Poland: Explosion Near Krakow . . . . . . . . . 12
Special Analysis
Sudan: Threats to the Regime . . . . . . . . . 13
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A 500-man Lebanese Army unit successfully deployed
into the UN-controlled zone in southern Lebanon yester-
day despite intermittent artillery fire from Christian
militiamen. Militia leader Major Haddad--speaking in
the Israeli border town of MetuZZa--responded by declar-
ing the establishment of a "Free Lebanon" in the south.
At the same time, he accused the Beirut government of
being under Syrian control.
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Lebanon and Syria are certain to hold Israel respon-
sible if Haddad indeed sets up an "independent" state.
Lebanese President Sarkis wants to reimpose Lebanese au-
thority over Haddad, and Damascus considers Haddad and
his militiamen to be traitors because of their dependence
on Israel. The Lebanese and Syrian Governments are aware,
however, that any military action against Haddad risks a
sure response in kind from the Israelis. Sarkis will ap-
peal to the US and UN to press Israel to restrain Haddad.
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The Israelis, for their part, may initially attempt
to exploit their close ties with Haddad to bargain with
the US, Lebanon, and the UN for new guarantees against
encroachments on the Christian-controlled area of southern
Lebanon. The Israelis view the deployment of the Leban-
ese detachment yesterday as the first step in a larger
Lebanese effort, supported by the Syrians, to constrict
Haddad's area of operations and eventually to eliminate
Israel remains determined to preserve the security
of Haddad's forces because it regards them as a first
line of defense against Palestinian cross-border terrorist
operations; the Israelis consider the UN forces in south-
ern Lebanon as ineffective for this purpose. The Israeli
public and all political parties support this policy.
Prime Minister Begin and much of the Israeli public, more-
over, identify emotionally with the southern Maronite
Christian community as an oppressed minority. Begin, De-
fense Minister Weizman, and other senior government of- 25X1
ficials will be loath to take any action against Haddad
that could expose the southern Christians to public and
political recriminations.
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LIBYA-CHAD: Renewed Fighting
The Chadian Provisional Government informed US and
other diplomats in Ndjamena Monday that Libyan troops
and Libyan-backed Moslem rebels had begun attacking gov-
ernment-held towns in northern Chad over the weekend.
We cannot confirm the Chadian claims that Libyan troops
struck south from the Aozou strip--a section of Chad that
Libya has occupied since 1973--into the tribal homeland
of Chadian Government leader Goukouni while Libyan-sup-
ported rebels attacked government positions to the east.
Goukouni believes the Libyans intend to occupy all of
northern Chad. F77 I
Renewed fighting would be the first major test for
the provisional government, which has been troubled by
rivalries among the various Muslim leaders and by the ef-
forts of southerners to regain their political dominance.
Libyan involvement could bring together temporarily the
disparate elements in the government, which agree only
on their dislike of the Qadhafi regime. Chad will al-
most certainly call on France to provide military assist-
ance and to delay the scheduled withdrawal of some 2,500
French soldiers in Chad. F_ I 25X1
//Qadhafi might undertake such an offensive to re-
mind Chad that Libyan support is essential for the suc-
cess of any new Chadian government. He also may believe
that new fighting there would help distract the Libyan
military from its defeat in Uganda. Chadian leaders re-
portedly criticized Libya recently for its continued pres-
ence in the Aozou strip and for advocating a major ov-
ernmental role for its Chadian surrogates.//
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LIBERIA: Impact of Riots
Liberia's economy and army were dealt serious blows
by the riots last weekend. The government's ability to
restore food distribution and military discipline will
test its ability to function. A poor performance on both
counts would undermine the government's remaining autho-
rity, leaving it dependent on the support of un o ular
25X1 Guinean troops.
The badly demoralized government had seen itself as
a genuinely popular and reformist regime, making slow
but steady progress against Liberia's social and economic
ills. It is having difficulty coping with the aftermath
of the riots and seems to be casting about for scape-
goats at the risk of being distracted from economic
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The riots have damaged Liberia's generally favorable
foreign investment climate and may result in some reduc-
tion of needed capital inflows. The US Embassy reports
that the looters apparently were motivated largely by
personal gain and turned their wrath against rich
Lebanese and Indian merchants and the several prosperous
business enterprises owned by the family of President
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//The government now has 800 reorganized military
and police personnel on patrol in Monrovia, but some
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25X1 entering the city to loot. Guinean soldiers continue to
arrive in Monrovia and may now total 280.
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Guinean MIG-2-L fighters over ew Monrovia
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alert and may mobilize its national militia.//
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TAIWAN: Warnings to Population
Taiwan issued harsh sentences on Monday to an al-
leged infiltrator from the mainland and a prominent Tai-
wanese opposition politician, both convicted o sub-
versive activities.
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Wu Chun-fa, an ex-fortune teller accused of being
an agent for the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, was sentenced
to death for attempting to overthrow the government.
Twelve accomplices received sentences ranging from life
to eight years imprisonment. In a more significant case,
a Taiwanese politician was sentenced to eight years for 25X1
failing to report contacts with Wu and for "propagandiz-
ing for Beijing" by circulating Beijing's calls for the
peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.
//The sentences, which serve as a warning to anyone
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to calls from Beijing for contacts, demonstrate that the
Kuomintang leadership intends to maintain a hard line
against its domestic non-Communist opposition.
Those sentenced are entitled to one appeal, which 25X1
is certain in the case of the Taiwanese politician. The
anti-KMT opposition is likely to protest his conviction
heatedly and may make the case a cause ceZebre.
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A series of strikes are posing a serious political
and economic chaZZenge to the month-old government of
President Figueiredo.
In Sao Paulo, teachers and state and city govern-
ment workers are off the job, demanding wage hikes to
keep up with the rapidly rising cost of living. Teachers
and industrial workers in Rio de Janeiro also are on
strike. Other workers are threatening to follow suit if
their demands are not met. In virtually all cases, the
workers are pushing bread-and-butter issues and are es-
chewing political demands.
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The strikes pose a problem for the military-backed
regime because the salary demands, however justified, are
at odds with the government's top-priority effort to cut
inflation--which even before the latest strikes was ex-
pected to top 50 percent by the end of the year. The
strikes also represent a defiance of authority, since
most are technically illegal, and are a hi hl visible
source of pressure on the administration. 25X1
//The government appears divided over how to proceed.
Last month, Figueiredo initially used security
forces to break up a strike by Sao Paulo metalworkers, 25X1
after mediation efforts failed but then softened his
stance considerably. As the strikes drag on, some of the
military's ultra-conservatives are apt to call for re-
pressive action.// I 25X1
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NAMIBIA: Political Impasse
An aide of the South African Foreign Minister told
a US diplomat on Tuesday that he expected Prime Minister
Botha to delay for a week or so a response to the Latest
Western proposals to firm up the UN truce plan. Botha
apparently is still seeking a consensus among Namibian
political Leaders that wou7,d strengthen his hand in fur-
ther truce negotiations. F I
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The South African - backed, multiethnic Democratic
Turnhalle Alliance presented a resolution in the Namibian
Constituent Assembly yesterday establishing a committee
to finalize proposals for an interim government, to nego-
tiate with other parties on their participation, and to
report back on 30 April. This maneuver--probably made
at Botha's request--suggests that he is trying to broaden
support for a possible interim government while wielding
the threat that it may soon be established to gain fur-
ther modifications in the UN plan. 25X1
One of the major groups outside the Assembly--the
Namibian National Front--is negotiating with the DTA
over the formation of an interim government. However,
the South-West Africa People's Organization Democrats--a
group that is disaffected with SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma-- 25X1
has called for immediate implementation of the UN transi-
tional program. It argues that the UN program is a better
risk than any internal settlement.
The SWAPO Democrats' statement was a setback for
Botha, who apparently had hoped that all Namibian politi-
cal groups except SWAPO would insist that the UN truce
plan be revised to ban any SWAPO bases inside Namibia and
provide for UN monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia.
Botha's recent meetings with Namibian National Front
leaders and the SWAPO Democrats indicated his belief that
the backing of both groups would be important in gainin
international acceptance of an internal settlement.
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Nur-ed-Din Kianuri, the First Secretary of the pro-
Soviet Communist Tudeh Party, has returned to Iran after
29 years in exile in Eastern Europe. The Tudeh Party,
which for months has been attempting covertly to infil-
trate the government and workers' organizations, began
to operate openly last month. A government spokesman
said on Monday that the Tudeh is still a banned party,
but no effort has been made to halt its activities. In
general, the party appears very weak compared to the
Marxist Fedayeen and the Islamic Mujahadin, who have
most of the many weapons now in the hands of Iranian
militia groups. Kianuri publicly has been calling for a
united front of all leftist forces.
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POLAND: Explosion Near Krakow
It may have been prompted by the the week-long celebra-
tion of the 109th anniversary of Lenin's birth. A heavy-
handed investigation by the police could cause the inci-
dent to acquire greater significance. The police may be
under pressure to be very diligent because of the govern-
ment's desire to have the security situation well in hand
An explosion yesterday damaged a statue of Lenin,
blew out apartment windows, and reportedly injured five
people in a worker settlement near Krakow. Radio Warsaw
reports that the police have begun a search for those
responsible for the explosion. The incident probably is
an isolated event, and the first instance in many years
of sabotage directed against a political symbol in Poland.
before the Pope makes his visit to Krakow in June.
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SUDAN: Threats to the Regime
//President Numayri's position has weakened percep-
tibly since the beginning of the year. Economic troubles
and Numayri's support for Egyptian President Sadat's peace
initiative have added to public discontent. The arrest
early this month of coup plotters in the Army eliminated
an immediate threat to the regime, but the coup plot in-
dicated that the dissatisfaction has spread to the
military--Numayri's base of support.//
The country's economic problems have worsened in
recent months and could spark serious disorders. Rapid
economic development, fueled by Arab aid that requires
matching Sudanese funds, has strained the country's ex-
ternal financial position and fostered high inflation.
Many key commodities have become scarce or unavailable
because of the shortage of foreign exchange.
//Much of the public appears convinced that the
Numayri government is incapable of arresting the eco-
nomic downturn. Evidence of discontent has been shown
in:
-- Anti-Numayri signs and slogans in Khar-
toum.
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-- A rash of labor stoppages this year, with
more expected.
-- The National Assembly's recent rejection
of a government directive that would
have authorized the firin of striking
public employees.//I I 25X1
//Numayri's support for the Egyptian-Israeli treaty
is particularly unpopular with the conservative, influ-
ential Ansar,Muslim sect, which includes perhaps a fifth
of the population and was involved in coup attempts in
1975 and 1976. Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi returned to
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Sudan in 1977 after three years in exile, reached a rec-
onciliation with Numayri, but left the country again late
last year. Sudanese officials fear that Sadiq's absence
could encourage anti-regime elements hoping to depose
Numayri; Sadiq's departure apparently was intended at
least partly to protest Numayri's failure to advance the
date for elections in the Sudan Socialist Union, the
country's only legal political party. Numayri has re-
sisted moving up the elections, now scheduled for December,
because most of the party's officers--who include some of
Numayri's most loyal supporters--would probably be
beaten. The Ansar leader also demands that Numayri aban-
don his support for Sadat's peace initiative.
//The Sudanese Communist Party--seriously proscribed
and weakened because of its involvement in a coup attempt
in 1971 against Numayri--has regained some of its
strength, especially in the labor movement. It has sup-
ported the recent strikes and in some cases insf-irraf-L-d
government.
//Sudan's black southerners, who waged a civil war
with Khartoum from 1955 to 1972, appear restless over
what they perceive as neglect by the Arab- and northern-
Libya was involved in the 1975 and 1976 coup attempts
and continues to support Ansar dissidents, several hundred
of whom are living in Libya. The Sudanese authorities
are also concerned about reports that Iraq has been
training Sudanese dissidents. We have no evidence that
25X1 the USSR is playing a significant role in Numayri's dif-
ficulties but Namayri is convinced that his removal--and
Sadat's--are major Soviet goals in the Middle East.//
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//Support from the Sudanese armed forces has kept
Numayri in power since 1969. Potential trouble for him
may exist in western Sudan over what residents there
feel is neglect of their needs by the government; 70
percent of the armed forces come from the region. The
involvement of military personnel from western Sudan in
the most recent coup plotting also suggests that the
civilian disenchantment is spreading to the military.
A failure by Numayri to fulfill promises to provide more
modern equipment to the armed forces could also weaken
their loyalty.//
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