NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031300110001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 13, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of .... _ _......._.._,.,...__ _ ............. Ton Secret
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
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Briefs and Comments
Syria-Lebanon: Possible Troop Reduction . . . 1
USSR: Reaction to U#, Nuclear Accident . . . . 2
China: Setbacks for Deng's Policies . . . . . 3
Turkey: Killing of US Serviceman . . . . . . . 5
South Africa: Expulsion of US Officials . . . 6
Philippines:. Growing Concern over Inflation . 7
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Saudi Arabia - Egypt: F-5 Purchase .
Chad: No Political Settlement . . . . . . . . 9
Special Analysis
Israel: Moves Affecting West Bank and Gaza . . 10
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SYRIA-LEBANON: Possible Troop Reduction
I Syria is
considering substantially reducing its military role in
Lebanon. The Syrians would be unlikely to reduce their
forces there, however, if they believed doing so would
trigger another civil war.
//The degree of Arab support for Syria's role in
Lebanon will be an important consideration for Syrian
President Assad in reaching a decision. The Arab League
mandate, under which Syria receives $15 million each
month for its forces in Lebanon, was renewed a few weeks
ago for three instead of the usual six months. The re-
duction probably reflects growing Arab dissatisfaction
with the lack of progress toward a political settlement
in Lebanon.//
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USSR: Reaction to US Nuclear Accident
Soviet officials initially had little public comment
on the Three Mile Island nuclear accident. They have,
however, begun emphasizing the safety and importance of
the Soviet nuclear power program in order to avoid public
opposition. The Soviets stress the absolute safety of
their nuclear power reactors and their advantages over
conventional thermal power stations, while charging that
the profit motive of US companies leads to evasion of
safety measures and regulations.
Igor Morokhov, First Deputy Chairman of the State
Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, claims that
Soviet safety standards rule out the possibility of any
accident that would lead to radioactive leaks. The So-
viet designers believe they employ a conservative design
philosophy, but their safety measures are not as rigorous
as those in the US. In addition, Soviet compliance with
recognized safety standards is at best haphazard, although
no serious accident involving the reactor itself has been
reported at a nuclear power station. An accident at a
Soviet nuclear power station would probably have severe
results; none of the Soviet reactors now in operation
has the secondary containment vessel or emergency core-
cooling system included in all US nuclear power stations.
The Soviets are firmly committed to a major nuclear
power program in the European USSR, where 80 percent of
total electric power is consumed and conventional power
plants are in short supply. The program, however, is
proceeding slowly because the Soviets have only a limited
capacity to produce nuclear reactor components and plant
equipment.
The 10 Soviet nuclear power stations in operation
last year provided only 3.5 percent of total power out-
put in contrast with 12.6 percent in the US. The Soviets
are constructing seven new nuclear power stations and en-
larging almost all existing stations. Construction on
17 more stations is to begin in the next five years. By
the year 2000, the Soviet Ministry of Electric Power ex-
pects nuclear energy to meet 20 percent of the total de-
mand for electric power.
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CHINA: Setbacks for Deng's Policies
//Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping has been set back in
his efforts to push several policies important to him.
Although Deng himself called for postponement of a reap-
praisal of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution and
also for the recent crackdown on "democratic" activity,
it seems likely that he has been forced to beat a re-
treat. The current economic "retrenchment," on the other
hand, seems motivated primarily by economic concerns and
does not appear to be an issue being used against Deng.//
Deng's efforts to generate a reevaluation of Mao
and the events of the recent past stopped abruptly late
last month when an attempt to condemn all of Mao's pol-
icies since 1958 gave way to calls in the media to halt
attacks on Mao. Media discussion of some of the more
explosive incidents of the Cultural Revolution met with
propaganda diatribes against "imprudently" reaching con-
clusions about the recent past before the time is "ripe."
Party Chairman Hua Guofeng and other beneficiaries
of the Cultural Revolution undoubtedly are championing
the current official view that these difficult and divi-
sive issues cannot be resolved for many years. They see
Deng's effort to condemn the past as a direct threat to
themselves. Their thwarting of Deng seems largely a de-
fensive move and does not in itself seriously erode his
political power. Deng, who has been stymied on
issues before, is not likely to let them die.
Potentially more damaging to Deng is the crackdown
on "democracy." The excesses of this movement, which is
closely identified with Deng, probably have alarmed many
besides Hua and Cultural Revolution holdovers. Even
Deng was doubtless disturbed by a breakdown in social
order that reportedly has resulted in traffic disrup-
tions, attempts forcibly to enter government buildings,
and behavior that is immoral in Chinese eyes. It is a
severe blow to Deng's prestige, if only because it raises
questions about his judgments, that his efforts to pro-
vide a sense of popular participation in politics and an
avenue to express public grievances have proved disrup-
tive. F7 I
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25X1 //Deng's problems in these areas are relatively re-
cent phenomena and do not appear to be related to the
economic "retrenchment," which began much Parlier_
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probably was largely through Deng's efforts
that economic specialist Chen Yun, who is a prime mover
in the economic readjustment, was restored last year to
the party vice chairmanship he lost during the Cultural
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modernization program fold before it got off the ground.
Deng no doubt places rational economic planning ahead of
Leading economic specialists like Chen Yun probably
persuaded Deng that goals had to be scaled down lest the
whatever political fallout this might entail for him.
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Despite Deng's recent problems, his opponents are
not prospering. Some aspects of the economic reassess-
ment appear to be indirect efforts to embarrass Chairman
Hua, Deng's other Politburo adversaries continue to main-
tain a low profile, and recent personnel decisions have
favored supporters of Deng.
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TURKEY: Killing of US Serviceman
The killing yesterday of a US Air Force serviceman
in Izmir and the wounding of another follow a series of
less serious anti-American incidents in Turkey in recent
weeks. The attack may force Prime Minister Ecevit's gov-
ernment to institute a more harsh variety of martial law
where it is in force--and also extend it to Izmir--in
order to stop the street violence still plaguing Turkey.
The shootings--the first of foreign servicemen since
the early 1970s--is a clear departure from recent acts
of violence in which leftists and rightists generally
attacked each other or government officials. The kidnap-
ings of four US servicemen in 1971 were an important cat-
alyst of the military "coup by memorandum" of that year.
In yesterday's attack, the assailants fired from a pass-
ing, stolen vehicle. They remain at large. As is cus-
tomary in Turkey, no or anization has claimed responsi-
bility for the action.
Izmir has long been a leftist stronghold, and the
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assailants could be leftists intent upon embarrassing the
government and its relationship with NATO and the US.
The upsurge in anti-American incidents in recent weeks--
particularly in Izmir--may have been part of an annual
commemoration of the deaths of leftists in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. US and NATO facilities are highly visi-
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attacks on these installations and private property of
Americans ensure media coverage of leftist exploits.
Rightist extremist groups would also have a motive
for killing an American. The right has long appealed to
the government to institute a more draconian form of
martial law. The previous martial law period between
1971 and 1973 resulted in near decimation of the extreme
left.
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SOUTH AFRICA: Expulsion of US Officials
The South African expulsion yesterday of three mem-
bers of the US defense attache's office in Pretoria for
alleged espionage reflects a growing anti-US mood in Pre-
toria. We expect the South Africans to continue to lash
out at the US to vent their frustrations over the pres-
sure being put on them to change their social policies.
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This increased resentment of the US involves several
policy elements. First is Prime Minister Botha's belief
that his country was deceived in the development of the
UN Secretary General's recent report on Namibia. This
belief, though it is probably sincere, may provide a con-
venient excuse for further stalling on the Namibian ne-
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ings in the US as necessary evils.
Botha may also be trying to represent the US as an
enemy as part of his attempt to heal the internal rifts
caused by the recent Information Department scandal. He
can justify some of South Africa's more underhanded deal-
South African officials feel increasingly that be-
cause of their successful management of the current oil
crisis and their evasion of the arms embargo, interna-
tional economic sanctions are no longer as dreaded as
before. The South Africans also believe that their
country has a wide and sympathetic audience in the US
whose opinions are not reflected in current US policy.
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PHILIPPINES: Growing Concern over Inflation
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//President Marcos is concerned that the opposition 25X1
may use current economic problems to foment political un-
rest.
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ers to Communists and other dissidents.//
wi increase e susceptibility of urban and rural work-
arcos is apprehensive that rising p
The price increases affect basic goods and services
under government price controls. The Marcos government
raised prices 10 to 30 percent for petroleum products,
rental housing, public transportation, and electricity.
It also lifted price controls on items such as sugar,
milk, and textiles. The increases resulted in part from
the government's policy of passing on to the consumer
the higher cost of imported oil. Pressure from domestic
manufacturers to raise prices on their goods was also a
factor in Marcos' decision.
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//Marcos set the stage for the price hikes last
month when he announced a 20- to 29-percent increase in
minimum wages and cost of living allowances. Only a
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ble for higher wages, however, because of an array of
exemptions and loopholes in the wage law.//
Until now, Manila has been able to keep prices under
control. The inflation rate has been less than 10 per-
cent annually since 1974. Although the government is
forecasting a 10-percent inflation rate in 1979, unoffi-
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Saudi Arabian Defense Minister Prince Sultan has
confirmed Saudi willingness to follow through on its
$525-million commitment to finance Egypt's purchase of
the F-5 jet fighter aircraft from the US. During a meet-
ing Wednesday in Riyadh with a US Assistant Secretary of
Defense, the Prince raised no objections to the arrange-
ment, although he asked the US and Egypt to withhold
publicity surrounding the deal so as not unduly to arouse
the radical Arab states. Sultan also emphasized the
F-5s would be financed over a six-year period. The $108-
million Egyptian order for US support vehicles, which
Saudi Arabia agreed to pay for last year, was not men-
tioned but we assume Riyadh will finance that contract
as well.
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CHAD: No Political Settlement
Representatives of Chad's recently installed pro-
visional government adjourned their 10-day meeting in
Nigeria on Wednesday without agreeing on a timetable for
electing a civilian government. Principal sticking
points stem from personal rivalries among the various
Muslim leaders--who seem to agree only on their opposi-
tion to a return to southern political domination--and
efforts by the southerners to carve out a strong position
in the new regime. As a face-saving device, the partic-
ipants agreed to send a factfinding mission to Chad and
to convene again to hear the mission's conclusions. The
inability to come up with a viable political settlement
increases the possibility of renewed fighting and a
de facto partition of Chad along regional and religious
lines.
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ISRAEL: Moves Affecting West Bank and Gaza
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With the approach of negotiations to establish a
self-governing authority for the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
the Israeli Government and unauthorized groups of Is-
raelis are strengthening their positions in both areas.
Israeli authorities have established Jewish regional
councils to control existing West Bank settlements. Po-
litical pressure is building to establish new settlements
on the West Bank and in Gaza. At the same time, Israeli
troops on the West Bank have adopted a tough, new secu-
rity posture and resorted to heavyhanded tactics to sup-
press recent Arab demonstrations. Vigilante actions by
Jewish religious extremists and settlers--to which Is-
raeli officials have reacted equivocaZZ --are further
fueling local Arab resentment.
The Israeli military government last month estab-
lished four Jewish regional councils to control almost
all of Israel's more than 50 settlements on the West
Bank. The military regime reportedly plans to establish
similar arrangements for the half-dozen settlements in
the Gaza Strip.
The councils, which will remain under the control of
the Israeli military indefinitely, appear designed to
ensure that the settlers will be subject only to Israeli
law and administration. The councils apparently will
function much like municipal bodies in Israel proper.
They are authorized to sign contracts, impose local
taxes, distribute government aid, and mans e water, elec-
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Agriculture Minister Arik Sharon, who has long
pushed for more Jewish communities in the occupied
territories, and leading hardliners in the National Re-
ligious Party--Prime Minister Begin's key coalition al-
ly--want quickly to establish new settlements and expand
existing ones in the densely Arab-inhabited "heartland"
of the northern West Bank. They also want to push ahead
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with new settlements in the southern Gaza Strip to estab-
lish a buffer between what will become Egyptian-controlled
Sinai and Gaza's large Palestinian population.
Begin knows that granting the hardliners' demands
would antagonize Egypt and compound Sadat's problems in
the Arab world. Foreign Minister Dayan is pressing that
consideration; in a recent briefing of Israeli Foreign
Ministry officials, he stressed that moderation in a set-
tlements policy is necessary to avoid undermining rela-
tions with Egypt. Financial and manpower constraints
could also restrain new settlement activity.
The radical Gush Emunim organization, which is in
the forefront of the campaign for more Jewish settlements,
may try to lay symbolic cornerstones for 10 new ones on
the West Bank during the current Passover holidays.
Gush leaders hope that the government will not interfere
because of Begin's sympathetic ideological views and to
avoid alienating important Gush supporters in Begin's
Likud bloc and the National Religious Party. Gush lead-
ers probably would then redouble their efforts to gen-
erate pressure within the governing coalition to approve
the settlements.
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The harsh suppression in recent weeks of new anti-
Israeli demonstrations by restive West Bank Arabs also
reflects the government's state of mind. New security
measures included the imposition of temporary curfews in
particularly troublesome areas--one at Hahlul north of
Hebron lasted two weeks--and lengthy closings of all
universities and many high schools. Enforcement of these
measures led to the deaths of two Arabs and the wounding
of several others. The government may be seeking in
part to demonstrate to local Palestinians that the peace
treaty with Egypt and the coming autonomy negotiations
have not weakened Israel's resolve to maintain control.
Even more inflammatory have been recent vigilante
actions by Jewish extremists both in Jerusalem and on
the West Bank. Last month, followers of extremist Rabbi
Meir Kahane ransacked the office of the Supreme Islamic
Council near the Temple Mount in East Jerusalem, a site
sacred to both Jews and Muslims. Kahane has since begun
organizing an armed "guard." Groups of Jewish religious
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students also have attempted to pray on the Temple Mount
in violation of a government prohibition, and have thereby
sparked Arab rallies to preserve the religious status
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On the West Bank, Gush Emunim settlers last month
entered Ram Allah, forced Arabs at gunpoint to clear
roadblocks, and "arrested" one Arab youth. Apparently
encouraged by the lack of a firm official reprimand,
settlers at some of the largest West Bank settlements
have since established self-defense organizations. They
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local Arabs if they judge it necessary.
reportedly intend to use arms in confrontations with
Occupation authorities so far have been unwilling
to clamp down on such vigilante actions. Defense Minis-
ter Weizman and police authorities have issued warnings,
but they have not taken disciplinary actions. They un-
doubtedly want to avoid ugly confrontations with fellow
Israelis, and they may also be influenced by a desire
not to weaken local Jewish defense capacities. This re-
straint, if maintained in the face of continuing Jewish
provocations, could lead to serious Arab counterefforts.
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