NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031200200001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
Top Secret
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Chad: New Government Installed. . . . . . . . . 3
Iraq-Syria: Closer ties . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
France: Opposition to Steel Industry
Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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Labor Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Portugal: Budget Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Western Europe: Limited Policy Response to
Oil Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Mauritania: Government Reorganization . . . . . 10
Morocco: New Prime Minister . . . . . . . . . . 11
Yugoslavia: A Warning to Djilas . . . . . . . . 11 25X1
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Special Analysis
Afghanistan: A Regime in Trouble. . . . . . . . 14 25X1
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//Under an agreement signed Zast weekend, Christian
President MaZZoum and Muslim Prime Minister Habre will re-
sign today in favor of a committee composed of six north-
ern Muslims and two southern Christians. The new govern-
ment offers ZittZe hope of solving the regional and re-
ligious rivalries that have plagued Chad since independ-
ence. A follow-up meeting is scheduled next month in
Nigeria to draw up a plan for implementing other provi-
sions of the a reement and to set the
elections.// 25X1
//The Muslim majority in the new government reflects 25X1
the northern military ascendency that emerged in the re-
cent power s ru d Habre.
Gendarme-ri com-
man er amougue probably will take over as political
leader of the south. Southerners, who have run the cen-
tral government since independence, are not likely to
accept a secondary role gracefully, especially if Kamougue
is the southern leader. Strong Muslim countermeasures
could be provoked if communal violence con-
tinues.// F
Friction may also develop among the various Muslim
factions, which have been unified only by their deter-
mination to oust the southern-controlled government. A
major question for the new government will be its rela-
tionship with Libya, which has been the principal mili-
tary backer of some of the Muslim factions. Habre partic-
ularly mistrusts the Libyans and suspects that Muslim
rebel leader Goukouni's recent break with Trip oli i
less than sincere. 25X1
The various armed forces roaming Chad pose a major
threat to stability. The announcement of a phased with-
drawal of the 2,500 French soldiers now in Chad removes
an important stabilizing factor and a major deterrent
against Libyan-backtna mi 1 i f-Arv noi- i tri +v in +-ho "^v 4-1,
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lion of a Syrian-Iraqi federation.//
//Since the rapproachement was launched, the two
governments have avoided dramatic declarations of suc-
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IRAQ-SYRIA: Closer Ties
//The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the continuing
unrest in Iran are likely to add impetus to the reconcilia-
tion between the rival Baathist regimes in Iraq and Syria
under way since last October. There are some indications
that the anniversary on 7 April of the founding of the
pan-Arab Baath Party will be used to announce the forma-
1
Syria and Iraq played a key roie in meaia-
ting the Yemeni dispute, demonstrating to other Arabs
their ability to act effectively in tandem. More impor-
tant, the mediation helped calm a peripheral Arab squab-
ble that threatened to detract from Baghdad's and Damas-
cus' priority goals--organizing a united Arab stance
against the Egypt-Israel treaty and applying sanctions
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toward a mutual defense pact.//
//Military cooperation apparently has not yet reached
the point of a unified command structure but will prob-
ably include contingency planning for coordinating mili-
tary forces on Israel's eastern front. The Egyptian-
Israeli peace accord could also move Damascus and Baghdad
Baath Parties.//
//Major obstacles to effective political
Syria opposes Iraqi proposals for unification
union remain.
of the two
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FRANCE: Opposition to Steel Industry Reorganization
The Communist Party and the Communist-Zed General
Confederation of Labor have called for a march on Paris
today to protest the French Government's determined ef-
forts to streamline the steel industry--a program that
is meeting tough and in some instances violent opposition
from workers who fear it will jeopardize their right to
work in their hometowns. As many as 50 0.00 demonstra-
tors may take place in the march.
Although a genuine and probably irreconcilable con-
flict of interest is involved, the dispute has been ag-
gravated by the failure of government decisionmakers to
establish a dialogue with the workers involved. This
is compounded by the concentration of decisionmaking in
Paris and the absence of strong local organizations that
Paris can depend on to support and defend its policies.
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The publicity surrounding recent violence in Lor-
raine, where most of the layoffs would occur, has forced
the government into negotiations with the unions and led
it to increase its efforts to ease the economic and so-
cial impact of the restructuring. The government, how-
ever, is completely committed to its plan, and further
violent confrontations are likely. 25X1
The steel industry is largely a Communist bastion,
but in Lorraine the Socialist-oriented labor federation
is also strong. The federation, which has refused to
join in today's march, accepts layoffs as part of the
modernization of the steel industry and is willing to
negotiate on that basis. The steel crisis, however, is
turning into a or test of its moderate leadership
and policies.
In recent years it has become increasingly difficult
to hold a demonstration in the capital without provoking
violence. The Communist-led Confederation, however, is
apparently confident that it can control the demonstra-
tors. The Communist Party, for its part, is mobilizing
Paris party militants to infiltrate the demonstration to
help control the demonstrators. 25X1
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President Figueiredo's administration is moving cau-
tiously in its handling of the ongoing strike of metal-
workers in the key industrial state of Sao Paulo. Even
if the dispute is resolved soon, the government possibly
faces further unrest, as workers demand wage increas
to keep up with the spiraling cost of living.
//President Figueiredo wants to end the metalworkers
strike, which is tying up production and represents a de-
fiance of his authority, but thus far has taken a hands-
off position, at least officially.
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25X1 I lany strong move would immedi-
ately lend a highly authoritarian caste of the President
who, only last week at his inauguration, pledged to con-
tinue liberalizing the political system. It would also
strengthen the resolve of workers, increase public sym-
pathy for their cause, and perhaps even bolster the cause
25X1 of more radical labor leaders.
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According to a press report, two of the three unions
yesterday rejected proposals put forward by their repre-
sentatives and employers. Whether or not the metalworkers
strike is ended soon, other workers are preparing to make
demands. Teachers are already off the job in Rio de
Janeiro, and busdrivers staged a wildcat job action in
Sao Paulo earlier this week.
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PORTUGAL: Budget Vote
The Portuguese legislature Last night rejected Prime
Minister Mota Pinto's proposed budget after the center-
right Social Democrats decided to abstain at the Last
minute. The Social Democrats were split badly; many re-
fused to take part in the vote, and five voted with the
government. As expected, the Socialist Party--Portugal's
largest--also abstained, allowing the Communists and in-
dependents to narrowly nutvote the government's Center
Democratic supporters.
Mota Pinto faces several options. He has three
months to draft a new budget that does not include the
objectionable taxation and local government financing
policies now contained in his current proposal. He could
elicit broader party support by reorganizing his cabinet
along less combative lines. Finally, he could either
request a vote of confidence or resign.
President Eanes, who was responsible for bringing
Mota Pinto to power four months ago, probably will en-
courage him to stay on. The parties have little chance
of arriving at a government formula among themselves
and--with the possible exception of the Communists?
agree with the President that an early election would
be damaging to the country. Eanes' only other choice
is to find a replacement for Mota Pinto who would accept
the unpopular task of leading the country until
re ular legislative election in mid-1980.
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WESTERN EUROPE: Limited Policy Response to Oil Shortages
Despite the Iranian production cutback and the
worst winter in three decades, most West European gov-
ernments have avoided taking any conservation measures.
All EC countries as well as non-EC members of the Inter-
national Energy Agency, however, have agreed to 5-per-
cent reductions in consumption and have the necessary
standby powers to move quickly to trim usage if neces-
sary. With winter now over and encouraged by the re-
sumption of limited Iranian exports, several West Euro-
pean governments have begun to allow reserve stock draw-
downs to help supply consumption requirements. Under
these circumstances, a new flareup in Iran or curtail-
ment of production by other OPEC members, partic-
ularly Saudi Arabia, would be extremely disruptive.
Summer stock rebuilding could prove difficult even if
Iranian oil flows steadily and other suppliers maintain
production. F77 I
MAURITANIA: Government Reorganization
Cabinet changes Wednesday in Mauritania favor
moderates who want to reaffirm ties with Morocco. The
changes will temporarily dampen but not eliminate a dis-
ruptive power struggle between the moderates and those
politically sympathetic to Algeria, Libya, and the Po-
lisario Front nationalists of Western Sahara. President
Saleck, a military figure installed as a compromise
leader of the ruling military committee after the coup
last July, has now apparently allied himself with the
pro-Moroccan moderates, some of whom have recently been
engaged in active coup plotting. The government re-
mains committed to disengagement from the Saharan con-
flict, but will now be less inclined to do so outside
the framework of its alliance with Morocco.
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MOROCCO% New Prime Minister
King Hassan's appointment of Maati Bouabid as Prime
Minister yesterday is the latest of several recent moves
by the King that seem designed to project an image of
forceful leadership. He probably hopes Bouabid, who has
ties with organized labor, will help quiet current labor
unrest. Further ministerial changes are expected as
Hassan tries to counter growing popular disgruntlement
with his indecisive handling of the Western Sahara war,
unemployment, and spiraling inflation. In a message to
ter
the Parliament on 8 March, Hassan called for grea
self-sacrifice and the creation of a national council
in support of his Western Sahara policy.
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YUGOSLAVIA: A Warning to Djilas
//Milovan Djilas, perennial critic of the Tito re-
gime, has informed Western newsmen that he was ordered by
the Belgrade police on Wednesday to discontinue his "sub-
versive" activities. The official warning implied that
he could face a jail sentence of at least three years.
This is the first official action against the 68-year-old
Djilas since a party plenum last December hinted at a
crackdown on political dissenters. Looking toward the
post-Tito era, Djilas for more than a year has openly
espoused the creation of an organized opposition. In a
possibly related event in early February, Jovan Barovic--
Djilas' lawyer and a go-between in organizing the opposi-
tion--was killed in an automobile "accident" that is
widely believed to have been engineered by the secret
police.//
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AFGHANISTAN: A Regime in Trouble
vtets could face an awkward dilemma.
The insurgencies faced by President Taraki's govern-
ment since his leftist faction seized power almost a year
ago have now grown into serious threats to the survival
of the Soviet-backed regime. The USSR is clearly con-
cerned, and if conditions worsen in Afghanistan, the So-
The most damaging recent development has been the
spread of fighting to the previously quiet north and
west. The causes of the revolt that broke out in Herat
last week and smaller outbreaks elsewhere are still un-
clear, but Islamic opposition to the "godless" govern-
ment may have been the most important factor. In his
first months in office, Taraki appeared to be dealing
successfully with the religious communities by avoiding
policies offensive to them. When criticism of the gov-
ernment became more open last fall--perhaps encouraged
by events in Iran and by exiled religious leaders in
Pakistan--Taraki cracked down. The arrests in January
and February of a number of clerics, apparently exacer-
bated the situation.
Even if the armed forces succeed in suppressing the
current rebellions, insurgencies inspired by the Islamic
opposition will almost certainly recur, placing further
strains on the loyalty of the Muslim soldiers. Rebel-
lion in the tribal areas along the Pakistani border broke
out almost as soon as Taraki came to power. The tribes
cannot campaign effectively outside their home areas but
are holding their own in the mountains. Probably more
than half of the Army's combat units are now in tribal
areas, and morale is declining because of casualties,
and the dim prospects for victory.
I I
So far--despite the defection of a large part of
the Army garrison in Herat and reports of daily deser-
tions in the tribal areas--the bulk of the military re-
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--continued
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dismissals have prevented any successful move against
Taraki by disgruntled officers. At the same time, how-
ever, the purges clearly reveal the continuing decline
in the number of officers the government is willing to
trust and, along with the similar removal of suspected
opponents in the bureaucracy, have forced the government
to rely more and more on inexperienced party members.
The few capable senior officials--for example Foreign
Minister Amin--seem to have more to do than they can
handle.
//The economic situation is deteriorating. Poor
weather has sharply reduced agricultural production,
foodgrain import requirements have increased, and Kabul
is shopping in world markets for early delivery of at
least 400,000 tons of wheat. The government estimates
that the shortfall in wheat production this year will be
between 700,000 to 800,000 tons. Foreign exchange re-
serves are sufficient to pay for wheat imports, but Kabul
still faces problems in arranging for delivery. The
Afghans have asked Pakistan to expedite wheat shipments
through the port of Karachi, but Islamabad has not yet 25X1
responded.//
//Afghanistan's relations with its non-Communist
neighbors are becoming more difficult. Although the
Pakistani Government is not now giving support to tribal
dissidents, it is reportedly making little effort to
limit the activities of Afghan exiles in Pakistan and
may decide at some point to provide material aid. The
new Iranian Government apparently is continuing the
Shah's non-interventionist policy, but anti-Afghan state-
ments by Iranian leaders and verbal attacks on Iran from
Afghanistan have increased tensions. The increasingly
Islamic character of the insurgency in Af hanistan could
lead to a change in Iranian policy.//
Soviet money, arms, and advisers have been an im-
portant factor in keeping the Taraki government afloat,
and the implicit threat of a Soviet reaction has been a
major deterrent against Iranian and Pakistani meddling
in Afghanistan. As his troubles increase, Taraki will
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need even greater Soviet assistance, and it is even
possible that at some point only open Soviet military
25X1 intervention could save him.
of men and materiel to the various combat zones.
problems if the situation worsens, and Soviet military
personnel might be dispatched to facilitate the moves
The Soviet military advisory mission in Afghanistan
has more than doubled since the coup last April. It now
numbers between 600 and 1,000, but there is still consid-
erable room for further expansion. The Afghans, for
example, probably will be unable to handle their logistics
Moscow will face a dilemma if--despite expanded
assistance--the situation deteriorates to the point
where only massive Soviet military intervention could
save the Afghan Marxists. This could happen if the
Islamic insurgency spreads to other urban areas of
Afghanistan and if the military withdraws its support
from Taraki. Moscow's decision to publish two author-
itative warnings in less than a week about outside inter-
ference in Afghanistan is indicative of Soviet concern
about a possible replay in Afghanistan of recent devel-
opments in Iran. This is also reflected in the current
Soviet propaganda effort to portray the current govern-
ment as respectful of Islam and mindful of the teachings
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The Soviets would be most reluctant to introduce
large numbers of ground forces into Afghanistan to keep
in power an Afghan Government that had lost the support
of virtually all segments of the population. Not only
would the Soviets find themselves in an awkward morass
in Afghanistan, but their actions could seriously damage
their relations with India, Iran, and--to a lesser
degree--Pakistan. As a more likely option, the Soviets
probably could seek to re-establish ties with those mem-
bers of the Afghan opposition with whom Moscow has dealt
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