NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031200190001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of I OP Oecrei
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Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Situation Reports
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Briefs and Comments
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Portugal: Communist Leverage. . . . . . . . . . 6
North Yemen: Cabinet Shuffle. . . . . . . . . . 7 25X1
Special Analysis
Central Africa: Impact of Chad's Civil Wary. . . 8
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Kabul is filled with rumors of new or impending dis-
sident activity, but the capital remained calm yesterday
with military units apparently on no special alert. The
situation in Herat remains unclear, but President Taraki's
government is believed to be in control of all major 25X1
military installations in that area. Both Kabul and Mos-
cow, meanwhile, have become more strident in their denun-
ciations of "imperialists" and Afghanistan's neighbors
for allegedly instigating the insurgent activity.
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The Iranians are the targets of the sharpest Afghan
attacks for their alleged role in stirring up dissidents
in the Herat area. On Tuesday, the government declared
the Iranian consul in the city persona non grata. In
Kabul, the government organized anti-Iranian demonstra-
tions in response to earlier demonstrations before the
Afghan Embassy in Tehran.
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Recent speeches by Iranian religious leaders de-
nouncing 25X1
the authorities in Kabul for their "devilish"
treatment of Muslims have particularly incensed the Afghan
A Pakistani Government spokesman issued another
denial yesterday that Afghan insurgents were operating
from Pakistan, as charged by both Kabul and Moscow. The
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Pakistanis probably will be embarrassed by a news confer-
ence held by an Afghan dissident leader in Pakistan;
he thanked the government for its humanitarian assistance
but asked for official Pakistani support for the insur-
gents in their continuing fight to overthrow Taraki.
Soviet Activity
Soviet propaganda continues to hit hard at the theme
of alleged foreign involvement and support for the cur-
rent unrest in Afghanistan. Pravda, for example, yester-
day carried an authoritative A. Petrov piece lashing out
against the foreign supporters of Afghan exiles operating
from states bordering Afghanistan. As was the case in
Pravda's I. Aleksandrov article last Sunday, most of
Petrov's wrath is reserved for the Pakistanis, but Petrov
also says flatly that China is aiding the insurgents and
accuses the US, the UK, West Germany, Iran, Egypt, and
"other reactionary Arab regimes" of spreading false rumors
25X1 and disinformation aimed at encouraging antigovernment
forces inside Afghanistan.
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//Fighting intensified yesterday between dissident
Kurds and besieged government forces in the capital of
Kordestan Province. In the far northwest, leftist Azar-
bayjani autonomists are said to be organizing on a broad
scale.//
Unidentified Kurdish dissidents who initiated armed
action on Monday still control Sanandaj. They hold the
radio-television station, police barracks, and the pro-
vincial government headquarters. Fighting around bar-
racks of the 28th Infantry Division, which is being rein-
forced and supplied by air, has resulted in at least 80 25X1
deaths--some estimates put the figure at 500--with many
more wounded. The government has been unsuccessfully us-
ing tanks, helicopter gunships, and fighter planes to
try to suppress the fighting.
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Radio Tehran has twice carried statements from
Chief of Staff Qarani designed to stem the inflow of
armed irregulars responding to calls for aid broadcast
by the local radio station before the Kurds took it.
Tehran also has repeatedly broadcast calls for calm
from Ayatollahs Khomeini and Taleghani. Government and
religious delegations, including the Defense and Interior
Ministers as well as Taleghani and Ayatollah Beheshti--
both close Khomeini aides--went to Sanandaj yesterday to
discuss Kurdish "problems" and "demands." Similar dele-
gations last month failed to moderate or delay Kurdish
demands for autonomy.
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Ambassador Sullivan on Tuesday after returning from
eastern Azarbayjan, "autonomy committees" are being
organized there in every town and village. The source
25X1 believes they will easily be able "to proclaim autonomy,
The recent upheaval in Kordestan Province, autono-
mist sentiments in Baluchestan and among Turkomen, as
well as hints of restiveness near Bandar Abbas were
prompted in part by the alienation of these groups--all
Suhni Muslims--frrom the Shia majority and the essentially
25X1 Shia revolutibn. Their unrest is likely to intensify,
reinforcing their isolation and posing an increasingly
serious problem for the central government.
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southern agricultural and industrial regions.
stop the government's attacks on their strongholds in
PORTUGAL: Communist Leverage
Portugal's political situation gives the Communist
Party considerable leverage in exploiting the political
turmoil generated by last week's resignation of a senior
Agriculture Ministry official. The Communists want to
Communist activities against the government have so
far been routine. Last week's orderly demonstration in
Lisbon by around 100,000 blue-collar workers capped a
month of lesser protests in other parts of the country.
The workers' complaints, as usual, centered on govern-
ment transfers of collectivized lands to private owners,
the high cost of living, and plans to limit wage increases
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-sponded with strong pro-labor stands in recent efforts
Though the Communists lack sufficient strength to
oust Prime Minister Mota Pinto by themselves, their ag-
gressive labor posture presents a major challenge to the
Socialists and Social Democrats who jointly sponsor
Portugal's second labor confederation--the fledgling
General Workers' Union. The Socialists, in particular,
can ill afford to take a less firm stance without losing
labor's support, and without their tacit su port Mota
Pinto could not survive.
Both the Socialists and Social Democrats have re-
to distance themselves further from the government. if
Mota Pinto does not relent, the Socialists and Social
Democrats would be pressed to back their c with
censure motions.
munists could expect their share of the reward.
In any event, the Communists stand to benefit. As
the only party to vote against the government's investi-
ture, they are least vulnerable to a public backlash
that might accompany the government's fall. If Mota
Pinto stays and makes the concessions to labor, the Com-
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President a i removed severa cabinet o icia s
yesterday because of his dissatisfaction with their per-
formance during the recent border fighting with South
Yemen. Two of the ousted ministers--Foreign Minister
Asnaj and Information Minister Basindwa, both exiled
South Yemenis--were advocates of a hard line toward Aden,
and their removal may also be intended as a gesture to-
ward South Yemen. Salih installed a prominent northern
tribal leader as deputy prime minister, apparently as a
reward to the tribes for their support during the fight-
ing. The removal of some ineffective ministers may
strengthen Salih's position in the near term. The in-
crease 25X1
in the influence of the tribes may, however, prove
damaging in the long run; tribal leaders have tradition-
ally sought to keep the central government weak
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Central Africa: Impact of Chad's Civil War
The civil war in Chad worries neighboring black
African countries, which are also vulnerable to fragmen-
tation along ethnic and religious lines. Nigeria and
the pro-Western governments in Niger, Cameroon, and the
Central African Empire are particularly wary of the
radicalism and the Islamic zeal of Libyan leader Qadhafi,
who is deeply involved in Chad and has ambitions else-
where south of the Sahara.
These states recognize that the old elite--southern-
based, Christianized, and French-oriented--will never
regain its hold in Chad. They realize too that rebel
Muslims will play important roles in any new central
government. As a result of a recent conference in Nigeria
of all Chadian parties, troops from Nigeria are to play
a peacekeeping role in Ndjamena under an agreement that
calls for the creation of a "transitional union govern-
ment" by Chad's warring factions that is to govern until
a new national election can be held.
What Chad's neighbors fear most is the emergence
of a Muslim government strongly influenced by Libya.
They suspect such a regime could consolidate its power
only by repressing the southern Christians, which could
bring border security problems and a destabilizing in-
flux of refugees. In the longer run, Chad could become
a base for Libyan activism elsewhere in the region. Many
political leaders in these countries tend to exaggerate
the Libyan threat, but there is enough evidence of past
Libyan subversion to make their fears credible.
Libyan Ambitions in Central Africa
Libyan support for Chadian Muslim rebels began in
1973, and Libya has occupied a strip of Chadian territory
it claims--the Aozou Strip. Qadhafi may believe a com-
pliant Chad could be a base for undermining his Muslim
enemies to the east--Sudan and Egypt. Even if Qadhafi's
interest in the black African states is secondary, he
--continued
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has devoted considerable attention to some of them with
his encouragement of "pro ressive" forces and disruption
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Niger
President Kountche's five-year-old military govern-
ment has tried to maintain good relations with Libya--
primarily to avoid giving Qadhafi any pretext for meddling
in Niger's affairs. Libya apparently supported a coup
attempt in 1975 against Kountche and refuses to recognize
the validity of Niger's northeastern border. Uranium de-
posits in this area give Niger the fifth largest uranium
reserves in the world.
Although Niger's population is predominantly Muslim,
the country does have potentially serious ethnic divi-
sions. The small Djerma tribe has dominated the govern-
ment since independence, and it was a revolt by members
of the large Hausa group in 1975 that the Libyans appar-
ently sought to exploit. Since then, the Libyans have
tried to force Libyan citizenship on nomadic tribesmen
who roam the desert in the area of the disputed north-
eastern border.
Last year, as the fighting escalated in Chad, Ni-
ger began building up its modest military establishment
acquiring transport planes from the US and armored cars
from France.
Nigeria
Head of State Obasanjo, a non-Muslim from southern
Nigeria, is uneasy about Libya's role in Chad because he
believes Nigeria's large Muslim population--at least 47
percent of its 70 million or more people--may be suscep-
tible to Libyan intrigue under the more fluid political
environment of civilian rule planned for later this year.
The extent of Libyan activity in predominantly Mus-
lim northern Nigeria is difficult to document. It is
clear, however, that Libya has offered large sums to Ni-
gerian Islamic organizations, ostensibly for religious
purposes, and is trying to develop contacts at several
northern universities. Many Nigerians assume that Libya
is providing money to certain northern politicians. Some
--continued
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Nigerians think the Libyans are encouraging "progressive"
Muslims to subvert the conservative Muslim establishment,
with an ultimate objective of a separate Islamic republic
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Since gaining independence in 1960 under the leader-
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try's north, Cameroon has achieved a degree of stability
and economic progress unusual in this part of Africa.
Cameroonians are concerned, however, by what they
see as the threat of subversion from abroad. Already
nervous about the Cuban and Soviet presence to the south
in Equatorial Guinea, Congo, and Angola, they see the
turmoil in Chad as a new reflection of Soviet activity,
with Libya acting as a Soviet surrogate. Their fears are
colored by their experience in putting down a Communist-
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Central African Empire
After the apparently spontaneous disorders in Jan-
uary, Emperor Bokassa is acutely sensitive to events in
Chad and fears they could have repercussions posing even
greater threats to his fragile regime. His decision to
break relations with Libya last month reflects a sus-
picion that Libya was somehow behind the disorders in
January and may be fostering more trouble. Bokassa,
however, may well lack any hard evidence of Libyan in-
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Relations between the two countries have gone from
one extreme to the other since 1976 when Bokassa briefly
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agreements with Libya, agreements that have resulted in
an important source of financial support for Bokassa.
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