NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031200060001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 7, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Situation Reports
China-Vietnam-USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
North Yemen - South Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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Briefs and Comments
South Africa: Raids on SWAPO Bases. . . . . . . . 7
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West Germany - Netherlands: Leopard Tank. .
France: Nonproliferation Policy . . . . . . . . . 11
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Special Analysis
China: Post-Invasion objectives . . . . . . . . . 13
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Vietnam's Foreign Ministry yesterday released a
statement acknowledging China's announced withdrawal of
forces, agreeing in principle to negotiate a "restoration
of normal relations." This suggests the Vietnamese are
considering negotiating larger question than relatively
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simple border issue.
The statement made clear that such negotiations are
conditional upon all Chinese troops being withdrawn "to
the other side of the historic border which both sides
have agreed to respect." China, however, has indicated
that the border itself is one of the issues to be dis-
cussed, and may not be willing to withdraw in all places
to the former border line. Vietnam may use this discrep-
ancy as a pretext for refusing to enter into actual nego-
tiations or justification for continued fighting along
the frontier. The Foreign ministry statement concludes
with a pledge to fight on if the Chinese statement turns
out to be a "trick to cover p their policy of aggression."
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for troops being transferred north.
vilian organizations nationwide to organize into combat
units; Hanoi also publicized a recent send-off ceremony
Hanoi continues to publicize its mobilization order
of Monday. A Nhan Dan editorial yesterday called on ci-
draw Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.
tack on Vietnam's leadership and a demand that it with-
Today's People's Daily carries an editorial hailing
China's "important victory" in the battle with Vietnam
and listing the political gains China has achieved as a
result of the action. Aside from the primary goal of en-
suring a secure border, these gains, according to the
editorial, included deflating the "aggressive arrogance"
of Hanoi, exploding the "myth of invincibility of this
'Asian Cuba,"' and perhaps most importantly, setting
back the Soviet Union's "hegemonistic" plans for China
and Southeast Asia. The incursion also proved that China
is not "weak-nerved" and must be taken at its word in
world affairs. The editorial concludes with a harsh at-
President Brezhnev said yesterday that a Chinese
withdrawal from Vietnam would be a sign that Beijing's
leaders were "sobering up," according to TASS. Brezhnev
again denounced the Chinese invasion and added that only
a complete and unconditional withdrawal of Chinese forces
can restore peace in the area. Brezhnev made his remarks
at a Kremlin meeting with Hungarian party chief Kadar,
who arrived in Moscow Monday for a review of bilateral
relations.
Brezhnev's statement suggests that Moscow believes
that the Chinese are withdrawing, although the Soviet
press continues to report that Chinese forces are engaged
in fierce fighting. Moscow probably welcomes the Chinese
withdrawal because it not only gets the Soviets off the
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damage to Soviet-US relations. The Soviets will nonethe-
less try to portray the withdrawal as another victory for
socialist solidarity, with Moscow getting the lion's share
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//The military situation in the two Yemens remains
unsettled; the immediate cease-fire called for by the
Arab League Foreign Ministers may be difficult to
25X1 Implement.//
//North Yemen has charged privately and publicly
that South Yemeni aircraft attacked North Yemeni posi-
tions in the Qatabah area yesterday. We cannot confirm
these charges. If the North Yemeni accusation is correct,
this would be the first time the South Yemenis have used
aircraft in a ground-attack role inside North Yemen and
would represent an escalation of the conflict.//
//A leader of the South Yemeni - backed National
Democratic Front, which is doing most of the fighting in
the southern part of North Yemen, was quoted by UPI on
Monday as saying that the "armed struggle will continue
until the present North Yemeni regime is overthrown."
We believe that South Yemen could rein in the National
Democratic Front if it chose to do so. The Front relies
on Aden for arms and other materiel support, and the
South Yemeni military apparently has played a vital com-
bat support role in the fighting. We are not yet able to
judge whether South Yemen will make the political deci-
sion to call off the attack on North Yemen. Even if it
25X1 went along with the cease-fire, the regime in Aden might
deem it in its interest to support the Front's continued
occupation of the North Yemeni territory it now controls.//
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South African forces yesterday attacked guerrilla
staging camps of the South-West Africa People's Organiza-
tion--two in Angola and one in Zambia, all within 50
kilometers of the Namibian border. Prime Minister Botha
announced yesterday that South Africa will not agree to
a cease-fire in Namibia unless several provisions in the
UN truce plan are revised. Both the military and diplo-
matic moves appear designed primarily to prevent SWAPO
from establishing substantial bases in Namibia which,
the South Africans fear _might remain under UN monitor-
ing until independence. 25X1
The raids in Zambia, probably at Imusho, and just
north of Onjiva, Angola, apparently consisted only of air-
strikes, while heliborne troops participated in an attack
near Onjiva. The camps probably were primarily forward
staging points for guerrillas infiltrating into Namibia.
The raids probably had only minor military objectives--
the disruption of infiltration plans and retaliation for
recent SWAPO terrorism. Improved Cuban air defenses in
southern Angola may have influenced military planners to
limit the operations.
Botha suggested, in a statement to the South African
Parliament, that his government might accept a cease-fire
if two points in UN Secretary General Waldheim's latest
plan are revised. The plan, according to Botha, must
provide for adequate monitoring of SWAPO forces in Angola
and Zambia, and it must not allow any guerrillas who are
in Namibia at the time of a cease-fire to keep their
arms or to set up bases in Namibia. The South Africans
apparently fear that, without such revisions, thousands
of guerrillas now in Angola and Zambia would move into
Namibia during the initial phase of a truce.
The limited scope of the South African incursions
as well as Botha's explanations indicate that the mili-
tary moves were intended to back up further hard bargain-
ing with Waldheim and with the Western sponsors of a
Namibia settlement under UN auspices. The military ac-
tion, however, will complicate Waldheim's already diffi-
cult task of completing cease-fire arrangements that are
acceptable to all parties.
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WEST GERMANY - NETHERLANDS: Leopard Tank
//The Dutch Defense Ministry announced late last
week that it will purchase 445 West German - made
Leopard II tanks, spare parts, and ammunition at a cost
of $1.45 billion. The Netherlands thus becomes the first
country other than West Germany to select the Leopard II
as its main battle tank for the 1980s. Although more
expensive than the US-designed XM-1 main battle tank,
the Leopard will be available to the Dutch at least
three years earlier and will have the advantage of being
compatible with the armor of neighboring West Germany,
which has ordered 1,800 Leopards. The Leopard will re-
place the Dutch Army's British Centurion and French
AMX-13 tanks. When the purchase and replacement cycle
is completed, the Dutch will have effectively improved
their armored capability because of the greater firepower
of the Leopard and their purchase of additional modern
antitank weapons.//
FRANCE: Nonproliferation Policy 25X1
//France has announced that it will seek modification
of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) treaty
"to make it compatible with France's military nuclear
program and its nonproliferation policy." France has had
a long-running battle with Euratom over where national
prerogatives stop and community prerogatives begin. A
recent European Court of Justice decision that inter-
preted Euratom's powers broadly has further disturbed
the French. President Giscard may have decided to take
the initiative now because he is under pressure from the
Gaullists, who see the issue as one of French sovereignty.
Although we do not know the details of the French revi-
sions, other West European countries will very likely
oppose them. West German Chancellor Schmidt had already
indicated his reservations to Giscard at their summit
last month. The French move could also complicate the
renegotiation of the US-Euratom nuclear cooperation agree-
ment.//
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
CHINA: Post-Invasion Objectives
With its withdrawal from Vietnam now under way,
China is turning its attention to drawing maximum poZiti-
cal benefit from its apparent military victory. While
China may not have lured the Vietnamese into the major,
set-piece battle of the magnitude it wanted, Beijing
seems to have forced Hanoi to withdraw at least some of
its troops from Kampuchea and can claim that it has ex-
tracted a promise from Hanoi to negotiate. More impor-
tant, China has demonstrated its willingness to take
forceful steps to do its part to counter what it sees as
"expansionist" collaboration between Moscow and certain 25X1
of its allies and has shown that such moves do not neces-
sarily prompt a strong Soviet reaction.
China in coming weeks probably will attempt to
bring greater international and regional political pres-
sure on Vietnam, citing the "reasonableness" of China's
withdrawal and its call for negotiations. Hanoi has
indicated officially its willingness to negotiate with
Beijing, but only after Chinese troops have withdrawn to
the "historic border" between the two countries. This
position could result in slowing or blocking the initia-
tion of formal talks because Chinese troops may well 25X1
continue to hold some disputed areas. If Hanoi balks
on the negotiations, Beijing undoubtedly will tr to
turn Vietnam's "intransigence" to its advantage.
Internationally, China will point to the absence
of a strong Soviet reaction to its invasion as evidence
that Moscow's allies are not assured assistance in a
crisis. With an eye to the US, China may also use this
example of Soviet inaction to tout its longstanding
position that Soviet "expansionism" must be met head-on
and that this can be done without necessarily bringing
on a larger confrontation. The Chinese undoubtedly
hope their example will encourage the US and other
take a harder line in their dealings with Moscow.
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Regionally, China will seek to take credit for
protecting Southeast Asia from Vietnamese "aggression."
China will attempt to use its "defeat" of Vietnam to
undercut any tendency in the region to make accommodations
with Hanoi. F77 -1
While China's massive military action and the ab-
sence of strong Soviet response may give Hanoi second
thoughts in the future, it remains highly problematical
that there will be any basic change in Hanoi's goals.
While the Chinese have not linked the Vietnamese
presence in Kampuchea to their call for Sino-Vietnamese
negotiations, they clearly will make the most of the
Kampuchean issue. In a brief reference to the Kampuchean
situation in a Peoples' Daily editorial yesterday, China
noted that international pressure for a complete Vietnamese
withdrawal from Kampuchea was mounting. Beijing will un-
doubtedly keep up its iticism of the Vietnamese occupa-
tion.1
China could also attempt to make the situation more
fluid by resuming its campaign to promote a major polit-
ical role in Kampuchea for the exiled Prince Sihanouk.
It would call for a Vietnamese withdrawal, an interna-
tional conference on Kampuchea, and the creation of a
coalition government headed by Sihanouk. This proposi-
tion already has some international support.
//Sihanouk, however, has shown no inclination to
cooperate in any kind of coalition involving Pol Pot,
having suffered at Pol Pot's hands under the last govern-
ment. The Kampuchean resistance under Pol Pot seems to
have taken hold, and the more successful it becomes,
the more difficult it will be to reinsert Sihanouk. Even
so, the Chinese may now believe that Hanoi cannot occupy
Kampuchea indefinitely; the current drawdown of Vietnamese
forces there will further bolster Ch' is confidence in
this regard.//
In sum, China probably feels it has made important
progress toward restoring what Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
described to Ambassador Mansfield last month as the
"equilibrium" in Indochina. Nonetheless, the invasion
leaves China with some important liabilities in pursuing
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its post-invasion objectives. China's massive but shal-
low penetration did not do irreparable damage to Hanoi's
military establishment, and Beijing has now been branded
as "aggressor" along with Hanoi. The Vietnamese, sup-
ported by the Soviets, are certain to claim that they
drove out the Chinese. A war of words, longer and less
gement, is bound to
conclusive than the military e21
ensue.
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