NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010136-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 136
• Publication Date: December 22, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

N
kpp ?Fdf Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79TOO975AO30900 cret
intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
22 December 1978
Top Secret
DIA review(s) completed.
7vinf, -n')07 22 December 174 25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136
c-,, 9 13
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0309000TOil3 c t
National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
CONTENTS
IRAN: Political Situation .
OPEC: Effect of Oil Price Hike . . . . . . . . . . 4
MAURITANIA: Political Stability . . . . . . . . . . 5
SOMALIA-KENYA: Possible Pact . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ecuad-or
Greece-EC
FEATURE ARTICLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ANGOLA: Current Perspectives
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03090
I
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03090 c ? t
IRAN.: Political Situation
The political situation in Iran appears to be staZe-
mated. Roth AyatoZZah Khomeini and his mass following on 25X1
one side and the Shah and the military on the other are
beginning to show signs of strain. Thus far however,
neither side appears ready to back down.
Khomeini and the opposition have been generally
successful in paralyzing the country through strikes
and work stoppages. Contrary to opposition hopes and as-
sertions, however, large numbers of military personnel
have nQt deserted their units during recent confronta-
The Army thus far has been firm in backing the Shan,
though there have been morale problems and some incidents
among military personnel.
The tactics of relative restraint demonstrated on
both sides could change. Prime Minister Azhari has kept
the military in check in Tehran, but many military of-
ficers seem to be spoiling for a fight with the opposi- 25X1
tion; local commanders in the provinces have already used
excessive force against demonstrators.
I Top Secret
I I 25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900 -
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
 pproved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
OPEC: Effect of Oil Price Hike
//The combined current account surplus of members
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries next
year could fall as low as $3.5 billion, $2 billion below
the level of this year. We estimate that higher oil ex-
port earnings will be more than offset next year by ris-
ing expenditures for imports of goods and services re-
lated to internal development. Without the oil price rise
the combined OPEC current account deficit would have
been an estimated $7 billion in 1979. The four-phased
price increase announced by OPEC will produce an average
10-percent rise in 1979 when compared with the average
price in 1978.// F_ I
Although the details of implementing the price in-
crease are not yet known, we assume that as in the past
some cartel members will deviate from the percentage in-
crease for Saudi benchmark crude when setting 1979 sales
prices. So far, only the United Arab Emirates has
pounced a complete schedule of prices for
prices for its higher quality crudes have
slightly more than for benchmark crude.
//Our early projections indicate that the oil price
increase coupled with a moderate increase in export vol-
ume will raise OPEC oil earnings by $16 billion in 1979.
We assume that demand for OPEC oil will grow 3 percent
over the 1978 level. At the same time, however, OPEC's
import costs will rise by an estimated $16 billion and
net payments for associated services will also -increase
//
.
//The purchasing power of member countries will con-
tinue to erode. OPEC's supplier countries raised the
prices of their exports less than 3 percent during 1978,
but OPEC members were hit hard by the 12-percent decline
in the US dollar.// F777 I
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
1979. The
increased
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0309
MAURITANIA: Political Stability
//The military regime that took power in Mauritania
in July is divided on several issues, especially on how
to end Mauritania's involvement in the conflict over
Western Sahara. The tenure of President Mohamed Saleck
seems tied to progress toward a negotiated settlement,
but such progress is dependent on factors beyond his con-
troZ. The presence of some 9,000 Moroccan military person-
nel in northern Mauritania virtually precludes a uni-
lateral settlement and doubtless adds to militar and
civilian frustration over the conflict.// 25X1
//A French official recently told the US defense
attache in Dakar that tensions within the ruling Military
Committee are rapidly building toward a showdown. The of-
ficial said the majority Arab group in the Committee has
split into two factions. One favors reaching an early ac-
commodation with the Algerian-backed Polisario Front
guerrillas. The other faction recommends a more cautious
approach of continuing to follow the lead of Morocco,
which remains unwilling to consider significant conces-
sions.//
//The six black members of the Committee constitute
a third faction. Although they are said to be not taking
sides in Arab wrangling over the Sahara issue, we believe
they want a peace settlement and ultimately a greater
share of the country's wealth for Mauritanian blacks,
who may now outnumber the politically and economically
dominant Arab portion of the population.//
If no progress toward a settlement occurs in the
next few months, President Saleck's position will become
increasingly vulnerable. His chief rival seems to be In-
terior Minister Major Jiddou Ould Saleck, who wields con-
siderable power behind the scenes. The Interior Minister
is also thought to be suspicious of Morocco's long-term
intentions toward Mauritania and to be a spokesman for 25X1
the faction on the Committee that wishes to end his coun-
try's role in the dispute as soon as possible.
5 Top Secret
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900L A4 Qr. 0
-
 Top Secret pproved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
lion pact that Somalia and Kenya could sign.
Somalia has been pressing the UK to act as an inter-
mediary in improving Somali relations with Kenya. Somalia
has evidently asked the British to prepare a nonaggres-
Somalis living in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.
litical difficulties in renouncing support for etr 'c
The Somali move may be part of Siad's campaign to
win greater Western political and military support for
Somalia in its rivalry with Ethiopia. Siad has also
called an extraordinary party congress to meet on 20 Jan-
uary apparently to reestablish a parliament and rewrite
the country's constitution in a way that would play down
Somali's irredentist designs on its neighbors. Siad or
any other Somali leader would, however, have extreme po-
Somali eagerness for reconciliation will probably
not be fully reciprocated by Kenya, which has long con-
sidered Somali irredentism the most serious threat to its
national security. President Moi's government is much
more flexible than was former President Kenyatta's, how-
ever, and it might be willing at least to enter into ne-
25X1 gotiations with Somalia.
Moi, meanwhile, has begun to extend government-
sponsored development projects into long-neglected parts
of the country with non-Kikuyu populations. If this pol-
icy is applied to the area inhabited by ethnic Somalis,
local demand for Somalia's protection against alleged
25X1 Kenyan discrimination could decline appreciably.
'fop Secret 6
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900 c t
BRIEFS
//The Ecuadorean Government's replacement on
Wednesday of General Bolivar Jarrin as Minister of Gov-
ernment with Admiral Hugo Garces, a moderate and highly
respected military officer, is a further sign that the
government will hold democratic elections next spring.
Jarrin had been a close collaborator with another gen-
eral, Supreme Council member Duran, in attem ting to
tamper with the election process.// 25X1
//Jarrin's inept handling of the official investi-
gation of the assassination last month of a national po-
litical leader precipitated his downfall. Jarrin's crit-
icism of a private investigation of the suspicious cir-
cumstances surrounding the murder prompted harsh com-
plaints from his military colleagues and a public call
for his dismissal by leading presidential candidate
Jaime Roldos.//
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
 0
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
//Negotiations between the European Community and
Greece that will lead to Greek accession as the 10th
member of the EC were all but completed in Brussels yes-
terday. The success of the talks will boost the popular-
ity of Prime Minister Karamanlis' government, which has
staked much of its prestige on the EC issue.//
//The agreement calls for a five-year transition
period before most Greek agricultural products are
treated equally with those of other EC members, and for
a seven-year transition period before free movement of
Greek workers throughout EC states is permitted. Ini-
tially, the French and Italians had sought an eight-
year transition period for most Greek agricultural pro-
ducts that are competitive with theirs; the West Germans
held out for a equally long period for the free movement
of Greek workers. The Greeks had called for maximum
transition periods of five years in both areas.//
//Negotiations are expected to be completed formally
by next June, and the agreement will then be submitted to
the parliaments of current EC members for ratification.
This process could take as long as 18 months and Greece
may not become a full member until early 1981.//
"Cop Secret 8
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900
FEATURE ARTICLE
ANGOLA: Current Perspectives
//The recent changes in the Angolan Government have
clearly strengthened the hand of President Neto, but
they have also highlighted the dependence of the regime
on his strong hand. Although Neto appears firmly in con-
trol of the party and government, he could be undermined
at almost any time by Angola's serious economic and social
problems, the government's dependence on Cuba to main-
tain internal security, or his uncertain health. If Neto
left office, the manner of his departure would greatly
influence who and what type of regime succeeded him. The
more gradual and predictable the transition, the better
the chances that a mulatto-influenced faction would re-
tain power and govern--at least initially--in much the
same way as Neto. If Neto left office suddenly, the trend
toward a more nationalist, black-dominated, and possibly
more radical state would be accelerated--perhaps dramati-
caZZya //
//Most of the regime's decisions are made by Neto
and a small group of close advisers including party for-
eign affairs spokesman Pascual Luvualu, internal security
director Rodriques Joao Lopez, and Political Bureau mem-
bers Lucio Lara and Jose Eduardo dos Santos. While Neto's
inner circle has long been dominated by mulattoes, those
advocating a stronger role for blacks and for the military
are gaining influence.// F7 _7 25X1
Two longstanding members of the inner circle--for-
mer Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento and former Second
Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rocha--were removed from
their government and party posts earlier this month.
Their dismissals probably reflect both Neto's efforts to
concentrate more power in his office of the presidency
and the growth of black nationalist sentiment in the
only legal party--the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola-Labor Party. It might also signal an attempt
by Neto to keep Soviet and Cuban influence in check;
Nascimento and Rocha had strong ties to both the USSR
and Cuba.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010136-8
 T
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
Since Neto assumed the presidency in 1976, there
have been continuing reports that he was suffering from
heart problems, alcoholism, and other ailments. Neto's
ability to govern, however, has apparently never been im-
paired by such problems. Several persons who recently
observed Neto say that he appeared in good health and
was intellectually sharp, although he did tire easily.
0
Most members of Neto's inner circle--particularly
the mulattoes--want Neto to remain in office as long as
possible because they owe their positions to him and
would lose influence if he stepped down. If his health
problems became debilitating, Neto would be under strong
pressure to name a black successor, presumably from the
inner circle.
//Luvualu, a black, has gained considerable expo-
sure and responsibility over the past year, but the
party may hesitate entrusting the top position to some-
one whose tribal origin differs from that of most of the
leadership. Lopes appears to be on good terms with Neto
and enjoys the support of many blacks in the party and
military. Dos Santos is very bright and some reports say
he is one of the Soviets' prime candidates to succeed
Neto.//
If Neto dies soon of natural causes or were assas-
sinated, a major power struggle would almost certainly
break out. A new black-dominated regime, directed if not
controlled by the military, probably would emerge. The
outcome would be dictated in large part by the extent to
which the military and the art 's rank and file became
factors in the struggle.
//At the party congress last December, the military
was given more than 40 percent of the seats in the Central
Committee and about a third of those in the Political
Bureau. This probably had a politicizing effect on the
military, but information is unavailable on the political
strengths and allegiances of the various military com-
manders or on any factions or alliances that may have
emerged.//
//Neto's sudden departure would place many high-
ranking mulattoes, including Defense Minister Carreira
and Foreign Minister Jorge, in highly vulnerable posi-
tions. Although some mulatto officials would flee the
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0309000 et
country, many probably would be allowed to remain if
they agreed to step into less visible advisory positions.
A few mulattoes--Antonio dos Santos Franca and Henrique
do Carvalho Santos--might even emerge in stronger posi-
tions because of their good ties to the military.//
I I
It is also possible that Neto's death will be fol-
lowed by a period of political chaos and disorder that
would spark a succession of unstable regimes or a quick
assertion of military control. Although Cuba and the
USSR are in strong positions to influence events, there
is no information on how much either country could be-
come involved in a succession struggle or whom they
would support.
If Neto is succeeded by someone from the inner cir-
cle, domestic and foreign policies would be little
changed, at least initially. Efforts to transform Angola
into a Marxist-Leninist state would continue, but with
no greater intensity. Over time, pressures from radicals
in the party and militar mi ht force a shift to a more
nationalistic policy. 25X1
Angola would maintain its close ties with the USSR
and Cuba, but economic needs plus the desire to establish
the political legitimacy of the succession regime would
argue for continued efforts to improve relations with
the West and Zaire. I 25X1
If Neto died suddenly, the black-dominated regime
that would probably come to power might seek stronger
ties with the USSR, Cuba, and other Communist states,
but the West probably would still be given some role,
particularly in economic development. Such a regime also
would be more enthusiastic in its support of the various
southern African liberation groups conducting operations
and training from Angolan bases. 25X1
//Although there are occasional, unconfirmed reports
of plotting against the government in the military, the
party, and the urban slums, Neto so far has kept dissi-
dent activity in check. A coup most likely would be at-
tempted by a black power faction that is gaining support
in the party and possibly within some military circles.
Neto appears to have this group well under control, but
11 Top Secret
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
it could pose a serious threat to the regime if it gained
the support of key people in the military and the inter-
nal security service.//
If the faction took power, most high-ranking mulat-
toes and many nonblack foreign advisers, such as the
Portuguese and possibly even the Soviets, might be asked
to leave the country. Although such a regime probably
would still be dependent on the Cubans to provide security,
it might insist that Cuba remove all nonblack advisers.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010136-8