NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010130-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 130
• Publication Date: December 19, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
Top Secret
CG NIDC 78-0294C
19 December
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Copy 613
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
CONTENTS
ARAB STATES - ISRAEL: Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . 4
SOUTH AFRICA: Urban Terrorism. . . . . . . . . . . 7
USSR: Agricultural Research. . . . . . . . . . . . 8
CHILE: Economic Reform Program . . . . . . . . . . 9
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The National Intelligence Daily Cable will not be
published on 24, 25, 31 December or on 1 January.
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West Germany's fast breeder reactor program is now
back on track, but it is ZikeZy to remain a thorny po-
ZiticaZ issue for ChanceZZor Schmidt's government for
some time. The junior coalition partner, the Free Demo-
crats, proved troublesome during the Bundestag debate
last week that ended in a vote narrowly endorsing the
renewal of construction at the Kalkar plant. The Bundes-
tag Zeft unanswered the timing and conditions for resum-
ing construction and avoided a potentially divisive de-
cision on the actual operation of the plant--issues that
are certain to spur renewed public debate on the role of
nuclear energy in West Germany.
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The Bundestag action followed an earlier court
ruling that set aside a legal challenge to the 300-mega-
watt reactor at Kalkar in North Rhine - Westpahalia; the
challenge had held up construction since July. The So-
cial Democratic - Free Democratic coalition turned back
an opposition motion to give full approval to the Kalkar
plant but had to put heavy pressure on six Free Demo-
crats to avoid a defeat of its own qualified measure.
The six were influenced by antinuclear sentiment in the
party's rank and file. Only last-minute resignation
threats by party leaders, including Foreign Minister 25X1
Genscher, persuaded the recalcitrant Free Democrats to
abstain, thus allowing the government measure to pass
by five votes and averting a coalition crisis.
There is widespread support in the Bundestag for
fast breeder technology. The opposition Christian Union
parties, representing nearly half of the Bundestag, are
strongly behind the Kalkar project, while most Social
Democrats, the senior coalition partner, also back the
effort. The government's slim 11-seat majority in the
Bundestag, however, makes it highly susceptible to pres-
sure on such issues from small groups in both coalition
parties when the opposition chooses to challenge along
party lines.
The completion of the plant at. Kalkar, even if con-
struction resumes immediately, may well slip past its
1981 target date. Minister President Rau of North
Rhine - Westphalia could have some difficulty in getting
his divided cabinet to approve a permit for the third
phase of construction, although officials in Bonn be-
lieve the project will get state approval.
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Although the West Germans do not expect their first
commercial fast breeder reactor to be ready until 1990,
they are clearly committed to the development of fast
breeder technology as an integral part of their long-
25X1 term strategy on energy.
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Egyptians are reacting to the missed deadline for
an Egyptian-Israeli treaty by emphasizing the difference
between the US and Israel and trying to portray the US
position as completely in accord with Egypt's. In Israel,
there has been an outpouring of criticism of US negoti-
ating tactics from all sides. Official reaction from
25X1 other Middle East governments has been sparse, but the
general mood among them is one of relief that they, at
least temporariZ do not have to face a signed treaty.
I I
In an interview given over the weekend, Egyptian
President Sadat projected a calm and optimistic attitude
but strongly implied that Egypt would stand firmly behind
its demand for linkage between the two accords and on
the priority of its treaty obligations. Egypt is prepared,
he said, to wait for Israel to change its position. Gov-
ernment officials and the press in Egypt have generally
tried to keep their commentary from further disrupting
the negotiating atmosphere, but there have been direct
criticisms of Israeli Prime Minister Begin reminiscent
of previous Egyptian efforts to sin le out and undermine
25X1 the Israeli leader.
The current impasse in negotiations serves Sadat's
purposes in several ways. It dramatizes Egypt's efforts
on behalf of a comprehensive settlement and highlights
what Egypt hopes will be interpreted by the other Arabs
as a closer alliance between Arab and US interests at the
expense of Israel. We expect that the Egyptians will play
up these themes and that Sadat will not push any new ini-
tiative until he sees some give in Israel's attitude.
cabinet colleagues to show further flexibility.
0
ARAB STATES - ISRAEL: Treaty
cry against the US will make it harder for Begin and his
In Israel, both coalition and opposition leaders
have accused Washington of exerting unfair pressure on
Tel Aviv and conspiring with Egypt. In this charged at-
mosphere, the cabinet's rejection of the latest peace pro-
posals has undoubtedly boosted Begin's stock among Is-
raeli hawks. By the same token, however, the public out-
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The prospect that it would have a tough fight in
obtaining ratification of the treaty probably played a
decisive part in the cabinet's rejection. Indeed, senti-
ment against any treaty that includes a provision for 25X1
the west bank autonomy plan has been growing steadily in
the opposition Labor Party, on which Begin has become de-
l I
pendent for support on peace treaty issues.
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Israeli leaders may believe that standing up to US
pressure will improve their bargaining position and ease
their problems in gaining ratification by the Knesset
later. In any event, when Begin appears before the Knes-
set today, he is expected to demand that the US revert
to its "true" mediator role and that Egypt modify its
demands. Begin can c nt on strong bipartisan support
for such a position.
Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states are
probably relieved to escape for now a development that
they believe would have split the Arab world, isolated
Egypt, and forced them to choose sides more clearly. In
recognition of these concerns, the Saudis had been urg-
ing Sadat to delay talks. Suspension of the talks also
temporarily relieves the Saudis from demands by Iraq,
Syria, and others that they impose the sanctions against
Egypt voted at the Baghdad Summit if it signs a treaty
with Israel.
Leaders of the Palestine Liberation organization
probably hope that the current impasse will mark the end
of the Camp David accords, which the PLO leaders believe
do not adequately provide for their future control of the
occupied territories. Some influential Palestinians may
also hope that the delay is the first step in Egypt's re-
gaining its former influence in the Arab world--a devel-
opment that would once again offer the PLO an alternative
to its uncomfortably close relationship with Syria.
Syria has not reacted publicly. It will presumably
continue its standard propaganda line that Egyptian-Is-
raeli differences over a peace agreement are artificially
created by-the US, Egypt, and Israel to mask a separate
agreement.
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The frequency of terrorist acts of sabotage has in-
creased noticeably in the Johannesburg area during the
past three weeks. There is no indication that widespread
urban violence is imminent in South Africa, but the 25X1
flurry of low-level incidents indicates a pattern of ur-
ban violence that is gradually increasing despite exten-
sive government security precautions.
Last year, there was a spate of urban bombings
during the Christmas season: a large shopping center in
Johannesburg and several police stations were damaged.
The incidents this year appear to consist more of de-
liberate sabotage than of wanton terrorist attacks that
produce a backlash from both the white and the black
communities. Thus far, the Soweto Community Council
building, a symbol of government authority to many ur-
ban blacks, has been bombed. A depot supplying govern-
ment-owned beer halls for blacks was also set afire, and
a large dynamite factory near Johannesburg was exten-
sively damaged. F_ I
In October, the Minister of Justice warned the
white population to expect increased terrorism, partic-
ularly from the African National Congress, the largest
of the exiled liberation organizations. During November,
the government publicly acknowledged on two'occasions
that trained guerrillas were infiltrating South Africa
from neighboring states. The police have begun a series
of arrests of urban blacks, and they can be expected to
mount lar er security crackdowns if the sabotage con-
tinues.
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USSR: Agricultural Research
The USSR is looking to its Academy of Sciences for
greater assistance in improving the nation's agricuZturaZ
performance. Despite the record-breaking grain harvest of
235 million tons this year, Soviet planners recognize that
a significant increase in technological know-how, improved
management techniques, and more effective agricuZturaZ re-
search are necessary to meet ambitious goaLs established
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Earlier this month, Agriculture Minister Mesyats and
newly elected Party Secretariat member Mikhail Gorbachev--
who has succeeded the late Fedor Kulakov as the party's
chief overseer for agricultural matters--attended a spe-
cial meeting of the Academy held to discuss its role in
agricultural development. The Academy does not now have
an agricultural department among its 16 functional re-
search units. The collaboration of Academy researchers
with specialists in the Agriculture Ministry and other
government bodies concerned with agriculture has generally
been limited and ineffectual because the Academy has been
reluctant to devote as much of its resources to applied
economic and agricultural programs as the party would
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The special meeting of the Academy on agricultural
questions took place only nine days after Gorbachev's
appointment to the Secretariat, suggesting that one of
his first priorities in his new role may be to integrate
the Academy into the nation's agricultural research ef-
forts. As a result of this meeting, the Academy is now
drawing up a draft program that will specify areas re-
quiring greater Academy attention in the development of
Soviet agriculture through 1985.
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CHILE: Economic Reform Program
The Pinochet government's thoroughgoing economic
program has reversed former President AZZende's socialist
revolution and transformed Chile into a market-oriented,
free-trade economy. Chile has restored economic growth,
stopped rampant inflation, and at least temporarily elim-
inated payments problems. Industry and agriculture are
becoming more internationally competitive, the country
is now living within its means, and its overriding de-
pendence on copper exports has been greatly reduced. With
US bankers and businessmen in the vanguard, growing in-
ternational business confidence in the junta's program
has paved the way for new loans and new direct invest-
ment, enabling the junta to relax austerity policies that
have hit hard at the poor. 25X1
The junta's program has touched every aspect of the
economy. Policymakers have slashed government spending
and reduced state involvement in the economy. The junta
has decontrolled prices of industrial products, re-
strained wages, and boosted agricultural production in
part by ending land reform. The government has reestab-
lished Chile's international credit rating and improved
its international payments position. It has also moved
to revitalize the industrial base and to generate new
jobs.
The poor and workers, who have borne the brunt of
the stabilization program, still represent a source of
potential social and economic unrest. The complete aban-
donment of price controls has raised the cost of essen-
tial goods, while tariff reforms and austerity measures
have helped to keep unemployment at a high level. Real
earnings of miners, utility workers, and government em-
ployees, moreover, have not yet regained 1970 levels.
The Pinochet regime is forestalling social unrest by re- 25X1
stricting political liberties, maintaining strict labor
discipline, implementing a public works program, and in-
creasing spending on social services for the poor.
Any of several potential problems--the results of
the US investigation of Orlando Letelier's murder, an
armed conflict with Argentina over the Beagle Channel,
or the Regional Inter-American Labor organizations
planned boycott of Chilean products--could trigger inter-
national payments problems next year. We nonetheless ex-
pect the economic gains and structural improvements of
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year, however, the Chilean junta must take steps to
boost domestic savings and investment from their still
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the economic program to continue. To maintain economic
growth in the 6-percent to 7-percent range beyond next
relatively low levels.
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India's lower house of parliament may soon vote on
a government motion that could send former Prime Minister
Gandhi to jail for the remaining 10 days or so of the
current session and possibly deprive her of the parlia-
mentary seat she won in November. F_ I 25X1
The anticipated vote will climax a heated debate on
Prime Minister Desai's tough motion to punish Gandhi for
alleged contempt of parliament. A parliamentary committee
recently found Gandhi guilty of having obstructed an of-
ficial investigation in 1975 of her son San'ay's car man-
ufacturing project. 25X1
Desai reluctantly bowed to pressure from the anti-
Gandhi hardliners, who apparently dominate his Janata
Party's majority in the lower house. He personally agrees
with more moderate party members who hold that expelling
Gandhi from parliament will simply serve her purposes by
making her a martyr and the focus of nationwide attention.
If Gandhi is expelled, she could seek reelection and
would probably win by an even larger margin.
There is other squabbling within the Janata Party
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because Desai has been unable to achieve a reconciliation
with ambitious former Home Minister Singh, whom Desai
dropped from the Cabinet last June. Singh is planning a
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public demonstration in New Delhi on Saturday to demand
more benefits for the peasants of northern India--the
backbone of Singh's support F77 I
A personal appearance by former Prime Minister Bhutto
before the Pakistani Supreme Court yesterday could mark
the beginning of the final stage of his appeal trial.
Both the prosecution and the defense have completed their
arguments, and Bhutto--sentenced to death for political
murder earlier this year--requested that he be allowed
to make his own concluding remarks before the seven-man
tribunal. He is scheduled to continue his statement to-
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If the Supreme Court upholds the death sentence--
and it is likely to do so--President Zia could bow to
international pressure and spare the former Prime Minis-
ter's life. Clemency would, however, further erode Zia's
support within the military and might give senior offi-
cers--already disenchanted with Zia's performance as
President--enough cause to remove him from power.
A Soviet delegation headed by Mikhail Solomentsev,
Premier of the Russian Republic, traveled to Yugoslavia
yesterday. The Soviets had earlier postponed Solomen-
tsev's trip, originally scheduled for September, after
the visit to Yugoslavia by Chinese party Chairman Hua
25X1 Kuo-feng.
Soviet-Yugoslav relations have been strained over
the past year because of continued policy differences,
in addition to Yugoslavia's developing relationship with
China. The rescheduling of Solomentsev's visit reflects
the USSR's willingness to ut a better face on relations
25X1 with the Yugoslavs.
The visit does not mean, however, that either side
has set aside differences over China. Yugoslav media
commentators last week sternly criticized a recent arti-
cle in the Soviet party Central Committee's journal Kom-
rnunist for its "improper and malicious" statements about
the Yugoslav-Chinese relationship. This polemic could
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chill the atmosphere for Solomentsev in Belgrade and ob-
struct chances for a meeting between Presidents Tito and
Brezhnev, which was also postponed this fall.
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Spain
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The regional government in the Basque area of Spain--
the council set up under provisional autonomy statutes
early this year--last night called for talks with the
Basque terrorist organization ETA. There is little chance
that the terrorists, who have killed. over 30 people in
stepped-up attacks since 1 October, will respond favor-
ably.
The regional government, which is dominated by So-
cialists and Basque Nationalists, also urged political
parties and labor unions in the region to organize peace
demonstrations during the next two months. Such a demon-
stration was carried out peacefully in Bilbao last month;
on its fringes, however, countermarches by ETA sympathi-
zers led to clashes with police. 25X1
The regional government's initiatives may simply re-
flect an effort to improve its image prior to negotiations
with Madrid on a final autonomy statute under the new con-
stitution. If the government is sincere, however, its
initiatives could represent an important step toward iso-
lating ETA and its sympathizers from moderate Basques who
so far have been reluctant to condemn the terrorists out-
right.
In the long term, a polarization of Basque political
forces could help to break the deadlock in relations be-
tween the central government and the moderate Basques.
In the short term, whatever the motives of the regional
government, the proposed rallies could easily lead to con-
frontations and a new cycle of violence in the Basque
region.
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