FINAL DRAFT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002300030002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 19, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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19 August 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
DREW L.LEWIS
'WILLIAM CASEY
PAUL LAXALT
DAVID STOCKMAN
JAMES A. BAKER
MICHAEL. K. DEAVER
EDWIN HARPER
JAMES E. JENKINS
HELENE VON DAMM
VERNE ORR
PETER MCPHERSON
DARRELL TRENT
RICHARD WIRTHLIN
NEAL PEDEN
' yy
FROM: EDWIN MEESE III
COUNSELLOR TO THE COUNSELLOR
SUBJECT: Final Draft of the Presidential Transition Report
Attached is final draft of the Presidential transition
report for your review. It would be appreciated if you
could provide any comments to me ky 1 Se to er 19_2_, so
that we can proceed with the final printing.
You will receive a copy of the printed version as soon as it
is completed.
Thank you.
Attachment
DCI
EXEC
REG
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TRANSITION OF THE PRESIDENT
AND PRESIDENT-ELECT
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Table of Contents
H. HISTORY OF TRANSITION AND APPLICABLE LAW >....>>>..>.>....>.>.>.>. 9
A. Presidential Transition Act .............................................................................................. 10
B. History of Transition Funding ........................................................................................ 10
III. PLANNING FOR THE TRANSITION >...>.......>....>.>....>....>.>.>.>....>.>.>.>....> 13
A. Outgoing Administration .................................................................................................. 13
B. Incoming Administration ................................................................................................. 13
C. Transition Roles .................................................................................................................. 14
1. BASIC INFORMATION COLLECTION ...................................................................... 14
2. MONITORING RESOURCE COMMITMENTS ......................................................... 15
3. POLICY ISSUE ANALYSIS .......................................................................................... 16
IV. ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF OUTGOING ADMINISTRATION. 17
A. The 1976-77 Transition from Ford to Carter ............................................................ 17
B. The 1980-81 Transition from Carter to Reagan ....................................................... 18
C. Personnel Policies for the Outgoing Administration ................................................ 19
ORGANIZATION OF INCOMING TRANSITION .................... .>..... >......
VI. THE REAGAN TRANSITION EXPERIENCE --------- . ....... .......... 23
A. The Role of Transition Teams in the Departments .................................................. 23
1. ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTERISTICS ........................................................... 23
2. INTRODUCTION TO DEPARTMENTS ..................................................................... 24
3. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ............................................................................ 24
4. TIMING, FORMAT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTS ..................................... 25
5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CABINET DESIGNEES AND
TRANSITION TEAM ................................................................................................ 26
6. PLACING TRANSITION STAFF ON AGENCY PAYROLL .................................... 27
7. THE SPECIAL CASE OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS ....... 27
B. National Policy and Budget ............................................................................................ 28
1. POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION ............................................................... 29
2. BUDGET COORDINATION ........................................................................................ 30
C. Personnel .............................................................................................................................. 31
D. External 'Relationships ...................................................................................................... 33
1. CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS ................................................................................ 33
(a) Personnel Referrals .................................................................................................. 33
(b) Positions on Issues .................................................................................................. 34
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(c) Courtesy Calls ......................................................................................................... 34
(d) Confirmations .......................................................................................................... 34
2. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ......................................................................................................... 34
(a) Information Outflow ............................................................................................... 34
(b) Public Response Desk ............................................................................................. 35
(c) Information Flow .................................................................................................... 35
3. OFFICE OF SPECIAL LIAISON .................................................................................. 36
(a) Policy Executives Briefing Program ........................................................................ 36
E. Legal Questions .................................................................................................................. 36
1. APPLICABILITY OF PRIVACY ACT .......................................................................... 37
2. APPLICABILITY OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ................................... 37
3. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ........................................................................................ 38
4. SEPARATION OF POWERS ........................................................................................ 39
5. SUCCESSION ................................................................................................................. 39
6. REMOVAL OF INCUMBENT OFFICIALS ................................................................ 41
F. Financial and Administrative Aspects .......................................................................... 45
1. FUNDING OF TRANSITION OPERATIONS ............................................................ 45
2. PERSONNEL .................................................................................................................. 47
(a) Full-Time Personnel ............................................................................................... 47
(b) Volunteers ................................................................................................................ 47
(c) Dollar-a-Year Personnel ......................................................................................... 48
(d) Detailed Personnel .................................................................................................. 48
(e) Personnel Summary 48
3. OFFICE SPACE ............................................................................................................. 48
4. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT .................................................................................... 49
5. PRINTING ...................................................................................................................... 49
6. MAIL/POSTAGE ........................................................................................................... 49
7. VEHICLE SUPPORT ..................................................................................................... 50
8. TRAVEL .......................................................................................................................... 50
9. USE OF SPACE AND EQUIPMENT IN THE DEPARTMENTS ............................. 51
G. Preparing for White House Operations ....................................................................... 51
1. STAFFING AND ORGANIZATION ........................................................................... 52
2. ACCESS TO SPECIAL FACILITIES FOR THE PRESIDENT-ELECT .................... 53
3. WHITE HOUSE AND EXECUTIVE COMPLEX OFFICE SPACE ........................... 53
4. EQUIPMENT INVENTORY ......................................................................................... 54
5. WHITE HOUSE PERQUISITES ................................................................................... 54
6. NATIONAL SECURITY CLEARANCES .................................................................... 54
7. MILITARY LIAISON .................................................................................................... 55
8. CORRESPONDENCE OFFICE ..................................................................................... 55
H. Support of the President-Elect ....................................................................................... 55
I. Field and Regional Transition Operations .................................................................. 56
VII. DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN PRESIDENT
AND PRESIDENT-ELECT >..................... ...>....>.......>.......>.>.>.>....>.>.......>.. 57
A. Courtesy ................................................................................................................................ ? 57
B. Necessity ............................................................................................................................... 57
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VIII. THE TRANSITION TO FIRST LADY ...>.......>???????>.>..........>
59
A. Chief Usher ..........................................................................................................................
59
B. Curator ..................................................................................................................................
59
C. Staff ................................................................::J ...............................................................
60
D. Press .......................................................................................................................................
60
......................................................
E. Correspondence ..........................................
61
F. Special Projects ...................................................................................................................
61
IX.
X.
REFLECTIONS ON COOPERATION BETWEEN INCOMING
AND OUTGOING ADMINISTRATIONS >...>.>.>.>.>.>.>.>....>.>.>?>>??>????>?>?>?
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE .....>....>.>.>.>....>.>..........>.>.>.....
65
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The concept of a report on the 1980-81 Presidential transition emerged from daily discussions of
practical transition issues among representatives of both the incoming Reagan-Bush Administration
and the outgoing Carter-Mondale Administration. In addressing countless major and minor decisions
to be made, both transition staffs were impressed by the paucity of information describing prior
transitions. Experiences, precedents, policies, and lessons from the past had never before been
recorded and had to be acquired solely through informal personal contacts. They recognized that
future transition efforts could benefit from a record of their experience in managing the orderly
exchange of Presidential authority in 1981, and from the lessons and guidelines that participants of
this transition have derived from months of work and collaboration.
Even before the transition was complete, the two transition Directors, Edwin Meese III for the Reagan
team and Jack Watson, Jr., for the Carter team, agreed to collaborate on a project to leave a written
record of the transition. The following report is the product of the agreement. A joint
Carter-Reagan team met throughout the Spring of 1981 to exchange perceptions, review drafts, and
distill from the mass of potentially recordable activity those precedents and guidelines that have the
most relevance for the future. William Tucker, William Timmons, Jack Nugent, and Barbara Cherry,
represented the Reagan team, with assistance from Ellen Annan, Timothy Ryan, and Frank Lilly.
Harrison Wellford and Matthew Lawlor represented the outgoing Carter Administration on the joint
team. Tucker was named to coordinate the project, and Nye Stevens edited the report. Although the
focus of the report is on the 1980-81 experience, John Marsh, Richard Cheney and Jack Watson were
consulted because of their involvement in prior transitions.
In the past two decades, the United States has had unusual transitions resulting from the assassination
of a President (Kennedy-1963) and the resignation of a President (Nixon-1974). The discussion that
follows is applicable much less to these abnormal occasions than to a transition brought about by the
quadrennial Presidential election. It does not deal with planning for the Inaugural or the ceremonial
events attending it.
The word "transition" is a broad term which evokes a period of time and change. As used in this
report, it means the orderly and peaceful transfer of governmental authority in the most powerful and
complex country in the world. It is a complicated and delicate blending of campaign personnel,
friends of the President-elect, party leaders, transition personnel and members of the incoming and
outgoing Administrations. The transition process is democracy's way of preserving continuity of
government and the nation's ability to respond to domestic and international demands while power is
changing hands.
While this report concentrates on processes of management and organization, it should not be
forgotten that the attitudes of the outgoing President and incoming President-elect are key
determinants of the success of the transition. The tone of their relations and the signals that they give
their appointees and staffs are swiftly perceived throughout the government, and provide a model for
countless transition encounters between incomers and outgoers at all levels. The incumbent still
possesses all of the formal powers of office during the transition. If he insists on an amicable,
cooperative, and constructive transition, his example will be followed nearly everywhere in
Washington.
The President-elect must also understand that despite the enormous attention centered on his words
and actions, he will have no formal, legal authority until January 20. _ Until that time, he and his
supporters must be careful not to undermine the incumbent's ability to operate the government. He
must act in a manner that preserves the machinery and the symbols of authority that he will soon
inherit.
If either the outgoing or the incoming President is insensitive to these imperatives, the potential for
conflict and confusion inherent in any transition may be unleashed with disruptive consequences.'
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CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF TRANSITION AND
APPLICABLE LAW
The Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1933, moved Inauguration Day forward
from March 4 to January 20. Since then, the transition period has lasted from 71 to 79 days. While
this time period has remained stable, the size and complexity of the transition job have grown steadily
with the tremendous growth in Federal power and responsibilities in recent decades. Each new
President in modem times has required a larger and more sophisticated transition organization than
his predecessor.
In 1952, the incoming President Eisenhower commissioned a management consultant group to do a
study of. the government and determine who his key people should be. Personnel selection was the
top priority and three confidants of the President - Lucius Clay, Herbert Brownell, and Sherman
Adams - split responsibility for it. Eisenhower was comfortable with the concept of developing a
strong team and delegating power over both major and minor decisions to its members.
In August 1960, Democratic nominee John Kennedy asked Clark Clifford to coordinate transition
planning during the campaign. Clifford assembled a small planning staff and established liaison with
an independent Brookings Institution transition project which was preparing issue papers for the still
undetermined President-elect. After the election, Clifford continued to play his coordinating role,
particularly with regard to appointments, and Theodore Sorenson established 29 issue groups to
prepare specific policy advice for the President-elect.
While President Johnson did not need a complete transition in 1964, he did use the opportunity of his
election to change Cabinet and other key appointees. President Johnson used outside confidants to
help him pick several new Cabinet officers.
After election day 1968, President-elect Richard M. Nixon established his personal offices and
maintained his senior staff at the Hotel Pierre in New York City. President Johnson assigned the
President-elect generous space in the New Executive Office Building, and gradually operations were
transferred there. President-elect Nixon's transition focused on White House offices, Inaugural
preparation, developing a legislative program and congressional relationships, and Cabinet
appointments. There was, however, no comprehensive and systematic study of the outgoing
Administration's programs, policies, personnel and budgets. The President-elect had served 8 years as
Vice President, and prior to that was a Senator and U.S. Representative. In addition, since many of
his principal assistants and Cabinet appointees had previous Federal experience, the Nixon team did
not feel the need for an in-depth study of the outgoing Administration.
The transition to President-elect Carter in 1976 was characterized by an advance in pre-election
planning and formal organization. Carter took the unprecedented step of establishing a policy
planning group separate from the campaign staff more than three months before the election. In late
July 1976, soon after the Democratic Convention, Carter used $150,000 from his campaign funds to
set up a small staff of 10, headed by Jack Watson, to begin policy, budget and organizational planning
and the building of an inventory of candidates for key posts in the new Administration he hoped to
form. Several major legislative initiatives of his Presidency - such as civil service reform and airline
deregulation - trace back to this pre-election planning group.
The planning group was organized around clusters representing the functional areas and issues
confronting the government, such as national security, budget planning, and government organization
and regulatory reform. These clusters formed the organizational model for the transition team after
the 1976 election.
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A. Presidential Transition Act
A key event in transition history was the passage in 1963 of the Presidential Transition Act (3 U.S.C.
102-Note), which recognized a national interest in the orderly transfer of executive power at the
Inauguration of a new President. This Act fundamentally changed the nature of the transition
operations, shifting the focus from outside government to "in-house" relationships formally bringing
together the new Administration with the old.
The Act authorized the President-elect to incur expenses for the following services and facilities:
1. Suitable office space, supplies and equipment for the President-elect and Vice President-elect
at locations designated by them;
2. Federal compensation of transition office staff at rates not to exceed grade GS-18. Any
Federal employee could be detailed to the transition staff on a reimbursable basis at the
same rate of compensation as his regular employment;
3. ' Payment for the services of experts or consultants, at a rate not to exceed $100 per day;
4. Travel expenses and subsistence allowances;
5. Communication services;
6. Printing and binding, and
7. Postage.
Federal funds, administered and monitored by the General Services Administration, were authorized
by the Act to be used by the incoming Administration from the day following the general election to
the day of the Inauguration.
B. History of Transition Funding
Funding problems provided much of the impetus for passage of the Presidential Transition Act. Until
1964, the costs of the transition were financed by the political parties or from privately raised funds.
The known costs of the Truman-Eisenhower transition in 1952-53 were in excess of $200,000.
In 1960-61, President-elect Kennedy benefitted from the Eisenhower Administration's agreement to
put two incoming staff members on the payroll of each department as of January 3, 1961, with ten
permitted in both State and Defense. Yet this gesture did little to alleviate the Kennedy transition
team's overall financial burden. Many costs of the transition were borne by President Kennedy's
personal funds and his Senate office allowances and payroll. Many new appointees and advisors
absorbed their own expenses, with considerable hardship in many cases. The departments granted
office space to many prospective appointees, but supplementary funds had to be found for the many
individuals required to handle mail, screen appointments, meet the press and generally assist the
President-elect.
Because Kennedy felt it unfair to saddle families or the Democratic National Committee with the total
bill, estimated in excess of $350,000 during his transition, he urged congressional action to defray
expenses for future Presidents-elect. He established the President's Commission on Campaign Costs,
which in 1962 recommended a Federal subsidy to cover certain transition costs. The Presidential
Transition Act of 1963, which established a fund of $900,000 to be shared by incoming and outgoing
administrations, resulted directly from the Commission's recommendations.
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Because there was no change of party or President after the 1964 election, Vice President-elect Hubert
Humphrey drew less than $75,000 from the fund for staff salaries and expenses during his 1964-65
transition.
In 1968, for the first time, Federal funds were used for a change which involved both the Presidency
and political party. Since the law did not specify allocation of these funds among the four individuals
affected, President Johnson decided that $75,000 each would be allowed the incoming and outgoing
Vice President, and the balance would be divided $375,000 each between the President-elect and the
President.
The Republicans essentially combined the costs for President-elect Nixon and Vice President-elect
Agnew and spent additional privately-raised funds of approximately $1 million. Of this amount,
$500,000 was raised at a "Republican Victory Dinner" held in May 1969. The Act did permit the
Nixon. transition, however, to use government employees, office space, and equipment on a
non-reimbursable basis.
In 1976, the 1963 Transition Act was amended (Public Law 94-499, 90 Stat. 2380) in order to address
a number of limitations in the original statute. The amendments provided for:
1. Increasing the maximum amount authorized to be appropriated for each transition from
$900,000 to $3 million. Of this amount, $2 million was reserved for services and facilities to
be provided to the President-elect and Vice President-elect, and $1 million for services and
facilities was to be provided to the outgoing President and Vice President.
2. Modifying the authority to detail government employees to either the incoming or outgoing
Administrations by requiring that such detailees be employed only on a reimbursable basis.
3. Deleting the $100 per diem limitation to be paid for experts and consultants, and providing
for payments of up to the maximum amount applicable to the Executive branch of
government.
In 1976-77, $2 million was appropriated for the incoming Carter Administration and $1 million was
appropriated for the outgoing Ford Administration. Neither team, however, used the full amount
allocated for transition. The Carter transition spent approximately $1.7 million of the $2 million
allotted, and the Ford Administration spent a little less than $700,000 of the $1 million allotted.
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CHAPTER III
PLANNING FOR THE TRANSITION
A. Outgoing Administration
The funds appropriated for the outgoing Administration are used to supply the outgoing President,
Vice President and staffs with the means to wind up the affairs of the outgoing President and Vice
President. They can cover staff salaries, transportation, postage, telephone, telegraph, office supplies,
furniture, printing, and commercial services. These funds are used primarily to assist personal
transitions after departure from the White House, but do not cover moving expenses.
Systematic pre-election transition planning within the incumbent Administration occurs only when the
incumbent President is not a candidate for re-election. In 1952, 1960, and 1968, Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, and Johnson, who were not seeking re-election, organized a transition staff in June or
July. Planning was nearly completed by election day. In all three cases the Bureau of the Budget
career staff was used to coordinate transition preparations in the agencies. Because of the early start,
these activities did not conflict with the budget cycle.
When an incumbent President is seeking another term, transition planning waits until after the
election, regardless of what the polls say. Anyone imprudent enough to raise the issue internally
would be suspected of defeatism if not disloyalty. Some informal clandestine planning is conducted
by career staff at OMB and in the agencies, but this work is not acknowledged by the President's
political officers, even when they know it is going on. As a result, when an incumbent President is
defeated, planning that should ideally take about three months is compressed into several weeks. Even
after the returns are in, members of a defeated Administration will be reluctant to move energetically
into transition planning. There is a tendency for White House staff immediately after the loss to
become absorbed in the reassuring routines of administration, or the challenges of seeking new
employment, and to put off focusing on the details of the transfer of authority.
A defeated incumbent President must resist this attitude and take firm action to show the government
that he intends to exercise his authority until January 20. Failure to do so may lead to a dangerous
breakdown in discipline which can cripple the President's ability to lead if a crisis develops at home
or abroad. At the same time, he must realize the disincentives that exist within his Administration to
focus on transition planning without delay, and use his personal authority and example to overcome
them.
A lame duck President might look at his authority to govern in the transition period as if it were a
large balloon with a slow leak. If he acts with dignity, foresight, and firmness immediately after his
defeat, the leak will initially be small and the President will retain the loyalty and goodwill of most of
his government, and of the Congress. But he must recognize that the balloon is ineluctably shrinking
with each passing week. Therefore, he should try to schedule major decisions during transition in the
first six weeks after the election. By the end of the year, he will have lost the attention of the
permanent government and can accomplish very little.
B. Incoming Administration
There is no disagreement today that the imperative need for continuity of government in a dangerous
and rapidly changing world, overseen by a huge and vastly complicated government, makes it essential
that transition planning and procedures be addressed with foresight and sophistication by those with
positions of responsibility for the new Administration. It is recognized that the process must be
institutionalized to a certain extent, but at the same time it must remain flexible enough to reflect and
adapt to the individuality of each new Administration.
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Although it is now accepted that some planning for taking over the government is expected of
Presidential nominees before the election, it is nevertheless a matter requiring a certain modesty. It
is not harmful for the inevitable pre-election transition planning effort to be acknowledged through
press sources, but it should not be a matter of press priority or continuing news comment since there
can be a backlash if it is perceived to be an overly presumptuous expectation of victory. Too much
publicity may also distract campaign staff, who may fear that others are positioning themselves for
positions of future power while they are still absorbed with winning the election.
This problem was somewhat evident in the Carter campaign of 1976. The small Watson transition
team was intentionally segregated from the campaign staff on the theory that otherwise longer-term
planning would be overwhelmed by short-term crises. The lack of contact between Watson's policy
planning staff and Hamilton Jordan's campaign staff, while keeping the planners from being pulled
into the vortex of the campaign, ultimately led to misunderstandings between the two groups. The
attempts to keep a low profile for the planning group were frustrated by intense press interest and
speculation within the campaign staff about what the Watson group was up to. These tensions
surfaced after the election when attempts were made to integrate the two staffs.
G Transition Roles
Some practices and contraints have become so commonplace that they are likely to apply to any
candidate for the Presidency, while others are matters of choice and style. This section deals with the
former.
The central raison d'etre of any transition organization after an election is to prepare the incoming
President and his principal officers for the new responsibilities which they will assume when officially
sworn into office. From this basic purpose arise three fundamental demands. The incoming
transition team must provide the principals of the new Administration with comprehensive
information on (1) the organization and basic responsibilities of each unit of the Federal
establishment; (2) variable resources within each unit such as budget, legislative authorities and
initiatives, appointments, and grants or contracts; and (3) policy questions that will require or present
opportunities for decision within the next 30, 60 or 100 days after the Inauguration.
1. BASIC INFORMATION COLLECTION
The earliest and most straightforward task is to provide the President-elect and his department and
agency heads with information on the organization, functions, responsibilities and constraints of their
respective offices. Compiling this information is basically a collection and evaluation process, but it
must be done quickly and accurately. The information collected is the data base from which other
activities, such as personnel selection, derive. It must be detailed enough to provide an up-to-date
picture of the current situation in each office, including the talent and tools available to incoming
appointees to accomplish the tasks of the office.
The information collected on the White House, departments and agencies is used to provide a smooth
and speedy transition into office of all appointees of the new Administration. Its ultimate purpose is
to try to reduce the time needed by the new appointees to gain a complete picture of the office which
they will be administering, and to minimize the disruptions that occur whenever top management is
changed. Sweeping changes may, in fact, be desirable, but they should be brought about by
deliberate choice, rather than as a result of initial ignorance or confusion at the top.
Since the background of the designees will not be known at the time the- transition begins collecting
this information, basic as well as more sophisticated data must be compiled on each office. When the
department or agency head is named, the information which has been collected can then be tailored
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to the levels of prior knowledge and sophistication which the new head brings to the office. It is
inevitable, therefore, that considerably more information will be collected than will actually be put to
use.
2. MONITORING RESOURCE COMMITMENTS
A second role which the transition must accomplish is to inform the President-elect and his
department and agency heads on current budgetary, legislative, personnel and other commitments that
are at issue during the transition period. Unlike basic organization, these are matters of policy and
discretion which are at least potentially subject to the influence of the new Administration, though
they are still in the hands of the outgoing team. The transition must be alert to the implications of
actions taken in the final weeks of an Administration. In some cases, it will find that the purpose, or
at least the effect, of the actions is to restrict the options of the new President and his appointees.
The outgoing Administration's budget is a key indicator in this respect. It must be evaluated to
determine where areas of difference between old and new priorities are likely to exist. Budget
information must be compiled in a fashion that will enable the designee to make some initial
determinations on both the desirability and the feasibility of changes in the budget recommendations
that will already be before the Congress when the new Administration takes office.
The transition team must also prepare to deal with pressing, current issues which require discussion
with the outgoing Administration. It is likely, for instance, that the outgoing Administration will have
deferred some tough decisions simply because it will lack the ability to implement them. These issues
may be brought to the President-elect's attention by the outgoing Administration. In other cases, the
staffs responsibility is preemptive, to identify potentially troublesome problems. In both cases, the
transition must gather the information necessary to evaluate the issues and to recommend solutions
that are sensitive to the timing of formal transfer of power. On occasion, this may require a mutual
understanding as to which Administration will deal with the issue.
In the legislative area, the transition has a dual role. The first is to provide, before the Inauguration,
a recognized point of contact with the Congress so that the President-elect and his nominees have an
open channel of communication. The Congress will have enormous interest in the new
Administration's appointees and intentions, and will not hesitate to make lasting judgments on the
basis of how the initial relationships are established and carried out. The second legislative role is to
provide the new Administration with relevant information on forthcoming program expirations and
other legislative business, such as confirmation hearings, which will require early congressional action.
Personnel matters can also be broken down into two basic responsibilities. The first is to organize the
President-elect's pre-Inauguration activities related to identifying and recruiting individuals to fill the
key vacancies in government. The transition then assembles job descriptions, determines the
professional qualifications needed for key appointments, and then identifies and recommends
appropriate people to fill these jobs. The second standard personnel responsibility is to monitor
personnel actions at the "career" level of government to protect against potentially unjustified
conversions from political to permanent jobs during the transition period. The incoming
Administration must be in a position, based on the information it has collected, to detect these moves
early so that abuses can be prevented, or at least minimized.
Just as budget and personnel actions can constrict the new Administration's ability to change the
policy and direction.of government, so may actions taken by the outgoing Administration with regard
to grants, contracts, regulations, legal settlements and other similar discretionary matters. The
transition team collects information regarding grants and contract awards, for example, and analyzes
them to determine if they fit into routine or politically motivated categories. There are legal,
congressional, bureaucratic and publicity channels open to contest or delay some of these actions, but
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they cannot be brought into play unless the transition office has performed its monitoring task well.
(This subject is discussed further in the Recommendations, Section X, Issues No. 9 and No. 12.)
3. POLICY ISSUE ANALYSIS
The third general role of the President-elect's transition office is to inform officers of the new
Administration of national policy issues which will require its attention during the first several months
in office. The incoming team must, during the transition period, collect the necessary background and
other data on all issues which offer opportunities for or will require early action. This information
can then be used to prevent unpleasant surprises, seek congressional help to forestall actions which it
may want to change later, and prepare remedial actions to take after the Inauguration in cases where
there is some urgency.
In addition to these defensive actions, the transition office must also prepare a list of positive actions
which the incoming Administration may want to take during the early weeks of its tenure to put its
own distinctive stamp on the government. This requires synthesizing knowledge gained on current
policies.and programs with the goals and policies of the President-elect into a format of actions that
will blend the old with the new.
The performance of the three roles above, and the activities of the various divisions within the
President-elect's transition office, must be carefully coordinated. departmental transition teams must
work with the personnel office on job descriptions and other personnel matters. The policy office,
blending the information collected by the transition teams and independent advisory groups, must sort
through the issues, bring them to the attention of the senior staff, and coordinate the development of
preliminary policy for the first 30, 60 and 100 days of the new Administration. Congressional Affairs
must relate well to all divisions of the transition office, and there are legal questions and ramifications
involved in transition activities from removal of incumbent appointees to contracting for office space.
While individual tasks and responsibilities can be distinguished, coordination of them is a constant
challenge.
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CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE
OUTGOING TRANSITION
Despite the likelihood that little pre-election transition planning will have been conducted by a
defeated Administration, the post-election challenge for the incumbent team is not as great as it is for
the incoming transition forces. Aside from the obvious transfer of power, this results from the fact
that the incumbent group is already organized, though not specifically for transition tasks, and from
the fact that it includes many individuals, in both the political and senior career ranks, who have had
direct experience in at least one previous transition. Therefore, patterns of precedent and behavior
present less variation than do transition activities among incoming Administration.
Funds from the Transition Act are used by the outgoing President and Vice President only after they
have left office. The outgoing Ford transition in 1977 spent only $687,373 of the $1 million
appropriated. Half of this was for staff salaries, and most of the rest went for transportation, office
equipment, communication facilities and printing. (A detailed accounting is included in Appendix A.)
The outgoing Carter Administration spent $861,526 in Transition Act funds between January 20, 1981
and September 30, 1981. Of this total, $672,659 was allocated to President Carter's account, and
$188,867 was obligated on behalf of Vice President Mondale (Appendix A).
A. The 1976-77 Transition From Ford to Carter
In both 1968 and 1976, the incumbent Administrations hosted a joint reception of both transition
teams in the White House Mess. An informal meeting early in the transition period is a useful
supplement to more formal introduction of the President-elect's transition team, which is often held in
early November.
Richard Cheney and John Marsh hosted a meeting of the incoming and outgoing transition leadership
in November of 1976 in the Roosevelt Room. The meeting was chaired by Marsh. The Carter
director, Jack Watson, outlined the information needs for their reports, explained generally their
transition concepts, requested that the outgoing personnel deal only with authorized transition
individuals and invited questions on the process.
Management of the outgoing Administration's transition team has traditionally been assigned to a
senior White House advisor - either the Chief of Staff or someone just below him - who also has
direct access to the President. In 1976, President Ford and his Chief of Staff, Richard Cheney,
appointed John Marsh as overall transition coordinator.
In the first Cabinet meeting after the 1976 election, President Ford set forth his transition guidelines
to members of his Cabinet. He advised the Cabinet that their first obligation was to carry out the
tasks of government until January 20. As part of the responsibility, and to the maximum extent
possible, members of the Cabinet and their subordinates were to assist the incoming Administration in
every way they could to achieve an orderly transfer of power to President-elect Carter. President
Ford reiterated this statement from time to time, and created a transition team reporting to Marsh.
This included five other White House officials and a designated transition officer in every department
and major independent agency of the Executive Branch.
At the request of the incoming Carter Administration, each of the departments and agencies was
asked to prepare a document on its budget, personnel, programs, policy issues, and future directions.
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These papers set out short-range goals, long-range policy changes under consideration, the status of
necessary legislation and any pressing problems demanding immediate attention by the leadership of
the department or agency. Approximately 22 departments and agencies prepared these transition
documents, including the White House and Office of Management and Budget.
A special problem in transitions is to prevent unauthorized persons from acting without authority and
outside of the transition operation chain of command. They can create controversy, impede
operations, and confuse the bureaucracy, raising questions and doubts about who speaks for the
incoming Administration. In 1976, the Carter transition leadership certified a list of Carter transition
personnel for each department and agency. The Ford Administration Chief of Transition then
instructed the departments and agencies to deal only with authorized Carter personnel on matters
relating to the operation of the organization. Ford transition officers were instructed to report any
breach of procedure through Marsh to the Carter Transition Chief who responded swiftly to prevent
recurrences.
B. The 1980-81 Transition From Carter to Reagan
In 1980, President Carter designated Jack Watson, his Chief of Staff, as Transition Director the day
after the election. Watson was instructed to advise all agency heads that they were to report to the
President on transition matters through Watson. Watson set up a small transition staff led by Al
McDonald (White House and EOP coordinator) and Harrison Wellford (Executive Branch
coordinator). Wellford also acted as liaison to the Vice President on transition issues, particularly the
allocation of the $1 million fund provided by the Transition Act to be divided between the outgoing
President and the Vice President.
In a conference call and memorandum to the Cabinet and head of major agencies on November 7,
Watson asked that transition officers be appointed in each agency and expressed the President's wish
that his appointees be helpful and courteous in their dealings with the Reagan team (Appendix B). This
was followed up on November 10 with a memorandum to clarify these instructions. (Appendix Q.
On November 13, following a precedent set by Marsh in 1976, Watson and Edwin Meese convened a
meeting in the Family Theater of the White House at which Watson introduced the leaders of the
Reagan transition team to the President's transition officers. Watson outlined the transition concept,
explained information requirements, requested that Administration personnel deal only with certified
transition representatives, and responded to questions on the process. As the first official contact
between the outgoing and incoming teams, this meeting alleviated tensions and established a spirit of
cooperation. In a further gesture of cooperation, the two transition teams issued a joint press release
describing the events of the day and announcing the official transition leadership for both teams.
Following the initial meeting, the organization of the Carter transition team was refined. Transition
officers were named in sub-Cabinet agencies not included in the original round. Independent
regulatory commissions, selected for transition by the President-elect, were approached and asked if
they wished to participate in the transition on a voluntary basis. Before long, the outgoing transition
organization was shaped to correspond with the functionally organized management structure of the
incoming department and agency transition teams. Cluster group heads, most of whom were OMB
career employees, were appointed to improve coordination and communication. The fact that the
incoming and outgoing transition teams at the department and agency level were organized
substantially in parallel improved communication and permitted better policing of unauthorized
contacts.
Periodic meetings were conducted by Wellford and Matthew Lawlor for the Executive Branch
transition officers. Bi-weekly status reports were required for all Executive branch transition officers,
but these reports proved to be a poor substitute for the more immediate and confidential
communication link between the Carter Administration group heads and the agency transition officers.
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Each agency and department was asked to prepare a briefing book describing key agency personnel,
major functions, and pending issues. These books were designed to give the President-elect's
transition teams an initial roadmap to agency structure and process, not exhaustive commentaries on
agency life.
Watson asked Stuart Eizenstat, the President's domestic policy advisor, to prepare an inventory of,all
major forthcoming issues and decisions in order to give the President an opportunity to make key
decisions early in the transition period. Eizenstat was also asked to alert the President to decisions
which might require some consultation with the President-elect. Among these pending issues were
negotiations on the American hostages in Iran, a Federal employee salary increase, the status of the
Synthetic Fuels Corporation, and the second phase of draft registration scheduled to commence on
January 5, 1981. The President used this list to help prepare his agenda for his first meeting with the
President-elect on November 20.
In many respects, transition assignments were incorporated into the regular White House division of
responsibility. Thus the Counsel's Office handled legal issues related to transition, with help from
Susan Connor of OMB, and transition press relations remained the responsibility of Press Secretary
Jody Powell. The National Security Council staff consulted with Edwin Meese in preparing a
schedule of security briefings for the President-elect and key staff. Security clearances, Executive
Office of the President (EOP) familiarization papers, and other administrative matters were
coordinated by the White House Staff Director's office.
One of the most important responsibilities of the outgoing transition team is ministering to the needs,
anxieties, and relocation concerns of the President's official family. Literally thousands of requests are
made to say farewell to the President, to have photographs and other momentos signed, and to
organize farewell parties and ceremonies for Presidential appointees. The sensitivity with which these
duties are carried out has a major influence on the morale and teamwork of the outgoing staff during
the transition period. Among the more important tasks are:
a. organizing calls and other expressions of gratitude by President and White House staff to
campaign staff and political officials around the nation;
b. making arrangements for the collection and storage of Presidential papers and issuing
guidelines to Presidental appointees on how they should handle Presidential memoranda in
their files. The President's White House staff director, Al McDonald, developed these
guidelines for the Carter White House after conferring with the Presient's counsel, Lloyd
Cutler;
c. establishing a job referral process to assist outgoing appointees in locating positions in the
private sector. Michael Rowney, McDonald's deputy, arranged briefings by executive search
firms and worked with Arnie Miller, Director of the President's Personnel Office, to set up a
job referral staff;
d. responding to questions about health insurance, pension contribution reimbursement,
eligibility for unemployment insurance, actual departure dates (which varied from individual
to individual and agency to agency), and resignation policy (see Removal of Incumbent
Officials, Sec. VI (e)(6).
C. Personnel Policies for the Outgoing Administration
The outgoing Administration retains formal personnel appointment powers during the transition. This
is such a potentially divisive issue between the two transition teams that the way it was handled in
1980-81 deserves special discussion.
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Every Civil Service position that is filled during the transition period is one less position available to
be filled by the incoming Administration. Every position filled is potentially a point of future
obstruction for the new Administration, and is therefore suspect.
In order to clarify the Administration's hiring policies for senior personnel and to protect the integrity
of the Carter-initiated Senior Executive Service (SES), Jack Watson met soon after the election with
the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to develop hiring guidelines for the
transition period. The resulting guidelines, issued on November 12 by Watson, but endorsed by and
delegated to OPM, are attached. (Appendix D.) In essence, they permitted normal hiring, transfers,
and status conversions to continue, but required much stricter screening and higher approval levels
within the agencies. All SES appointments were to be given special review by the department or
agency heads, and in practice only appointments already in OPM pipeline were considered. Any
conversions of non-career SES personnel to career status had to be reported to the White House.
OPM tightened its own SES appointments procedures by requiring the personal approval of the
Director. The promulgation of Watson's personnel guidelines was followed up with a meeting of all
agency personnel officers. Key Reagan transition officers also attended the meeting.
The practical effectiveness of the interim hiring guidelines has not been established. Initial reports
suggest that the guidelines were largely successful in ensuring that the government continue to
function as normal in meeting its personnel needs, even though OPM approval processes slowed down
markedly. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that some agencies and their transition teams were
confused about application of the policy. Certainly there was variation in interpretation. Some
agencies treated guidelines as an outright freeze, but in other cases members of the Reagan transition
team suspected that an outright hiring binge was going on in anticipation of a post-election freeze.
Several cases of apparent "burrowing" of Carter appointees into secure career positions were also
reported through established channels between the transition teams. They were promptly investigated
and dealt with individually by the outgoing transition team.
The 1980-81 experience was not markedly different from that of past transitions. No hard evidence
exists that any recent outgoing Administration has systematically abused its lame duck hiring powers,
but every incoming team harbors such suspicions and can cite individual cases of abuse. It is a fact,
however, that no outgoing transition team can fully prevent abuse. It has diminished control over
OPM, and its power to control career personnel officers, who are anticipating the arrival of a new set
of masters, is waning in the transition period.
Because this issue has the potential to damage the spirit of cooperation between the transition teams,
future outgoing Administrations might be prudent to consider a temporary hiring freeze, though no
outgoing President has ever imposed one. In any case, a hiring freeze imposed by the new
Administration after it takes office has become standard operating procedure. (This subject is treated
further in the Recommendations section, Issue No. 5.)
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CHAPTER V
ORGANIZATION OF THE INCOMING
TRANSITION
Transitions differ in their styles, priorities and organizational arrangements. The Reagan transition
strategy revolved around five initiatives. These were to:
a. Provide a period of adjustment following the campaign during which the President-elect
would be provided with the knowledge and resources he would need upon assuming office.
b. Wind up the campaign apparatus.
c. Select people to fill key positions in the new Administration.
d. Plan for the first 100 days of the Administration, so that the New Administration could
implement its policies and programs as soon as possible.
e. Establish working relationships with groups outside the Administration which could be
critical to its success.
The transition made a special effort to involve campaign supporters in forming the new
Administration. This gave campaign supporters a unique opportunity to assist in establishing the
direction and policies of the new Administration, as well as the opportunity to position themselves, if
they so desired, to be candidates for key Administration jobs.
The use of campaign supporters was also integral to executing the third leg of the Reagan transition
plan. A personnel selection advisory committee dubbed the "kitchen cabinet" by the media was
formed to advise the President-elect on his top personnel appointments. These long-time Reagan
friends and advisers served to screen, review, and recommend individuals for Cabinet appointments.
The group served the President-elect well in surfacing several candidates who were ultimately
appointed and in sharpening the debate as to which candidates would most effectively serve the
President-elect.
To develop an action plan for the first 100 days of the Administration, Ed Meese and William
Timmons devised an organization which, in effect, separated transition logistics from transition policy
development. Transition logistics were organized around each department and agency, as well as the
White House itself, with a team delegated to each unit. These teams fed information into a separate
policy development operation. By grouping departments and agencies into broad clusters based on
the agencies' functions, overlapping agency issues could be addressed comprehensively. (See
Appendix E for an organization chart.) This "functional" organization also served as a way to
synthesize the variety of viewpoints and alternatives emerging from the teams and advisory groups
while screening out relatively minor issues or problems.
Out of the functionally organized transition clusters came the ideas and policy options for planning
the first 100 days of the Administration. Actual strategy development and planning was then assumed
by the senior transition staff, including those having transition responsibility for the budget, personnel,
and foreign and domestic policy. Information flows and planning for the first 100 days therefore
followed a matrix pattern, with department and agency transition teams serving as the primary contact
for information collecting and analysis. Functionally organized issue cluster heads then worked with
senior staff responsible for budget, personnel, foreign and domestic policy in order to flesh out the
details and provide an overall perspective for the first 100 days.
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Finally, in order to address the last element of the transition plan, special transition offices were
organized to develop relationships with groups who would remain outside the Administration, but
who were critical to its success. A special effort was made to work closely with the press, Congress,
State and local government officials, and other interest groups which supported Reagan's candidacy
and election. Time was also scheduled late in the transition for the President-elect to meet with these
key groups so as to begin establishing personal relationships. This led to pre-Inaugural visits by the
President-elect to Capitol Hill and the Supreme Court. Meetings were also arranged, when the
President-elect was in Washington, with District of Columbia Mayor Barry and influential
Washingtonians.
Since the institutional power and authority of the Presidency is not assumed until Inauguration, the
President-elect had to restrict his comments to general and conceptual plans for his new
Administration. The press office had to walk a fine line between toning down newsworthy items and
trying to maintain the momentum and public support generated by the election victory. In this
respect, the Cabinet selection process helped provide some of the drama needed to keep the
President-elect in the public's eye.
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CHAPTER VI
THE REAGAN TRANSITION EXPERIENCE
The purpose of this section is to describe the experience of President-elect Reagan's transition
organization in addressing the central problems involved in establishing a new Administration. As
emphasized in the previous section, there is nothing definitive in the way the Office of the
President-elect organized itself to address these problems. Its activities do conveniently break down
into nine broad categories that are useful for descriptive purposes, even though they blur distinctions
of the organizational patterns used in this particular transition.
A conscious effort has been made in the material that follows to depersonalize what in the end was a
highly personal and individualistic effort. There is no way to be inclusive or even consistently
accurate in describing individual involvement or contributions in the nine areas of activity covered.
Therefore, to the extent consistent with clarity, activities are described without extensive reference to
the individuals who carried them out Furthermore, since the Federal Government's organizational
structure is nearly as fluid as its leadership, references to specific agencies and units are also
minimized since they may bear little relationship to the organization incoming transitions will
encounter in future years.
A. The Role of Transition Teams in the Departments
1. ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTERISTICS
The Office of Executive Branch Management (OEBM), headed by William Timmons, assumed
responsibility for making an in-depth assessment of the policy, personnel, budgetary and legislative
situations and problems within each of the major units of the Federal Government. Making up a
complete list of all distinct government agencies and other units was a major challenge in itself for the
transition, just as it had been for the Carter forces in 1976. In 1980-81, 13 Cabinet departments and
about 60 agencies, commissions, boards, banks and government corporations were selected for
individual attention by the transition teams.
For organizational purposes, these 73 discrete units of government were divided into five subject or
cluster groupings: Economic Affairs, National Security, Resources and Development, Human
Services, and Legal and Administrative agencies (Appendix F). Each grouping was headed by a
Director. Individual transition teams were assembled to cover each department and agency. Each was
headed by a team leader and ranged in size from 3 to 20 professional staff members depending on the
size and scope of the department or agency. These professionals were in turn divided into four areas
of responsibility: policy and programs, personnel, budget, and legislation. An attached chart shows a
typical team organization (Appendix G). Ultimately, approximately 650 persons, most of them $1 per
year volunteers, had active assignments on the department and agency transition teams. Each team
member was given a copy of a letter from Timmons, dated November 26, setting out certain broad
guidelines (Appendix H).
The transition team members were selected, in part, on the basis of their familiarity with the workings
of the Federal Government. Most had gained knowledge of the substantive areas to which they were
assigned through past service in that part of the government, or through private sector jobs which
kept them current in the field in which their team was working. Many had been involved in policy
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analysis for the Reagan political campaign. Some team members were on congressional staffs, and
had to be assigned, as discussed later, with a sensitivity to potential separation of powers conflicts.
2. INTRODUCTION TO DEPARTMENTS
Once each transition team was organized, it established formal contact with its assigned department or
agency. The Reagan transition teams felt it was important that the first call be made on the
department or agency head. This initial meeting was requested through the counterpart transition
officer in that department or agency of the outgoing Administration, who participated with the
incoming transition team in the meeting. The meetings were not large; on the incoming
Administrati on's side, they were usually limited to the team leader and a deputy.
The first visit was in some cases merely a courtesy call, to ensure the cooperation of the department,
followed by at least one in-depth meeting scheduled soon thereafter. The President-elect may also
choose to meet with certain Cabinet officers of the outgoing Administration to obtain their views on
their departments, as President-elect Carter did in 1976-77.
The first substantive meetings with department officials in 1980-81 dealt with the general concept for
transition, the number of people who would be working in the department or agency, and the
inquiries as to what type of support was available through the department or agency. The incumbent
transition officer was given the incoming team members' names and asked to recognize only those
persons as official transition representatives. (Some campaign workers, it became apparent, had'
erroneously assumed they would continue to work in their campaign areas during the transition.)
Contact with the transition teams by transition personnel from other areas was channeled through the
five group directors. This prevented the transition teams and their departments from becoming
overloaded with unnecessary and potentially conflicting requests for actions and information.
The departmental bureaucracy can be either helpful or harmful to an incoming transition team. They
can supply an enormous amount of information on their respective departments and their programs,
and efforts to gain their confidence and cooperation can have substantial payoffs. The inevitable
tendency of some incoming Administration personnel is to associate the career bureaucracy with the
policies of the past Administration. This attitude of initial suspicion may cause them to benefit less
than they could from the information that the outgoing Administration and the career staff could
supply to them.
3. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
Transition teams were given detailed instructions on information that was to be collected on
department operations to include in the teams' reports. The teams were asked to prepare the reports
based on information they requested from the departments, in contrast to the 1976 pattern where the
departments themselves collected and packaged the information. The full instructions are included in
Appendix I.
The budget members of the teams were asked to collect a listing of each authorized program and
funds available to carry it out, internal operating budgets broken down by major category for FY 1980
and 1981, and a listing of each major contract loan, grant, guarantee or other major purchase, lease or
procurement action that was pending November 1, 1980. Details were requested for each item listed,
including the proposed recipient, the product or service and the time frame, as well as any action that
had been taken after election day on pending application or proposals.
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The policy and program section's responsibility was to list all programs under jurisdiction of the
organization, including citation of authority, assignment of administrative responsibility, and date of
expiration of authorization when applicable.
Also requested was a listing of all regulatory type actions or amendments that the organization
anticipated promulgating between November 1, 1980, and June 30, 1981. However, caution was taken
not to interfere with the regulatory mechanism or with specific enforcement of regulations.
Legislative information included a listing by number, title, sponsor, purpose and status of each bill or
other legislative proposal that the organization either took an official position on, or testified on,
during the 96th Congress.
Complete information was also requested on all litigation in which the organization was involved, all
pending environmental impact statements, reports, and executive orders within the department's
jurisdiction which were contemplated or scheduled to be issued between November 1, 1980, and June
30, 1981.
The personnel part of the transition team sought comprehensive information on both filled and vacant
positions at the Presidential appointment, Schedule "C" and SES levels, including biographical
information. Also covered was anticipated hiring during the transition period, details of consulting
contracts with firms or individuals, histories of employment levels of sub-units in each of the last four
years, retirement and separation rates, and membership on all advisory committees of the department
3. or agency.
It was recognized from the outset that the volume of this information would be formidable. Since
little was known about the knowledge level or the priorities of the new agency heads at the time
information collection began, it would have been impractical to be more discriminating at this stage.
The effort was designed to encompass all the information that appointees might want about the
organizations they were assuming responsibility for, leaving the inevitable selecting and narrowing
down decisions for later.
4. TIIVIING, FORMAT, AND DISTRIBUTION
Before the teams were dispatched to their agencies, they had clear and uniform instructions about how
they were to report their findings. Appendix J sets forth the schedule and general format for the
reports. The initial report was due by Monday, November 24, the interim report on or before
December 8, and the final report by December 22, 1980. Each report was to be placed in a
color-coded, looseleaf notebook, with clear instructions as to its format, distribution and
confidentiality (Appendix I).
Each successive report was to be organized along the same outline, though each would be
progressively refined. The reports contained an introduction that highlighted the most important
decisions and problems. This was followed by sections for each of the functional areas covered by the
transition team: policy and programs, personnel, budget, and legislation. Also included was a section
on miscellaneous items like organization, regulations, and litigation. Each report concluded with the
transition team's recommendations.
The initial November 24 deadline gave most teams only slightly over two weeks for preparation, since
not all the teams were completely operational during the week immediately following the election.
This initial report was envisaged partly as a test run, used to guage the level of information obtainable
from the departments and agencies, and also to provide a measure of the competence of each team.
It was used inside the transition headquarters by other offices, such as policy and personnel, to
determine if the information collection effort was likely to correspond to their needs. Supplementary
instructions were issued to the teams after the first reports had been evaluated (Appendix K).
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Since most of the operational details had been included in the initial report, the interim December 8
report placed additional emphasis on the two key areas of budget and personnel. Headquarters
pressed for making the interim team reports from the departments as complete as possible, in order to
have the interim report ready when the first members of the Cabinet were announced. This was a
particularly difficult schedule for many teams, since it accelerated the schedule for considering and
writing the recommendations section.
The final report was due on December 22. It was this report which was used by the Cabinet
designees since many of them had been selected by this time.
A request was made that each section of the final report not exceed ten pages. Although this was
rarely followed in practice. Four copies (instead of the three originally contemplated) were prepared
and placed in color-coded binders. Distribution was carefully controlled and limited to:
COPY #1 President-elect and Vice President-elect.
COPY #2 The team leader, who would later turn it over to the designated new agency head.
COPY #3 The group director and co-director supervising the transition team.
COPY #4 The Office of Policy Coordination.
Confidentiality was emphasized for several reasons. It contributed to candor. It protected the new.
Administration's options in case it decided not to follow the report's recommendations. In addition,
many of the issues required additional study before the new Administration would be ready to
announce public decisions.
A number of private organizations, not affiliated with the transition, prepared and released their own
studies and recommendations to the new Administration. Frequently their reports were characterized
by the media as transition documents, resulting in considerable confusion.
5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CABINET DESIGNEES AND TRANSITION TEAM
The relationship of the transition teams to the Cabinet-designee was-designed to be two-fold. First,
the team's immediate and central responsibility was to collect material and information for the
designee. Second, in the event that the appointed official needed or desired its help, it was to be
prepared to act as his initial staff during the transition period.
Transition team personnel were not, however, promised any positions in the new Administration as a
direct result of their work during the transition. This was made clear for several reasons, the most
obvious being that the person eventually chosen to head the department-or agency had nothing to do
with the selection of the transition teams. In early November, when transition team members were
selected, no Cabinet or other agency choices had been announced by the President. Each team
member, therefore, was notified in advance that once the final report was finished, his or her principal
task was completed.
Routinely, when the department or agency head was named, he took over the leadership of the transi-
tion team. He was thus able to choose between blending his own initial staff with the team structure,
relying wholly on the established transition team, or releasing the entire team on December 22.
The incoming designee, in most cases, wanted to bring in some people of his or her own. This
required close coordination with the various offices of the transition. In particular, the Personnel
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Office required early consultation because of its overall responsibility for recruiting qualified people to
fill government posts who shared the Administration's political thrust. This coordination also helped
prevent duplicative hiring efforts.
It is important to note that the schedule for the transition team reports was established to coincide
with the naming of Cabinet-designees. The purpose of the interim report was, in part, to have a
semi-final report ready if the Cabinet-designees were named early. The December 22, 1980 date for
the final report was set with two purposes in mind. First, it was by this date that most of the
Cabinet-designees were expected to have been named and to be able to put the reports to immediate
use. The second purpose was to provide a date for release of the transition team members, unless
they were specifically asked to stay on by the Cabinet-designee. This gave individual Cabinet
designees discretion in a potentially delicate matter. In some cases, the teams were dismissed. In
other cases, all or part of the teams were retained to help the designee.
In all cases, however, the transition teams personally briefed Cabinet designees and agency heads
selected before Inauguration. In cases where no Reagan appointee was named prior to January 20,
1981, a small number from each team, sometimes only the team leader, were kept on following the
completion of the reports to monitor the situation.
6. PLACING TRANSITION STAFF ON AGENCY PAYROLL
As a general rule, staff from the incoming transition team is not put on the agency payroll during the
transition period. The $2 million transition budget for the President-elect is supposed to cover all
salary expenses for transition personnel.
There have been a few cases, however, where selected transition staff members have been placed on
agency payrolls before January 20. By making such staff members government officials, the incoming
Administration can have earlier access to personnel and policy information. As government officials,
they are clearly subject to ethics, secrecy and privacy laws. There are risks to the practice, however.
The eventual appointee may not want to keep the staff member so placed. The privileged status of
the designee's staff in an agency might draw them into a policy role prematurely. Conversely, the
official presence of such staff may undermine the authority of the outgoing Administration. Finally,
there is the possibility that the designated head will fail to gain Senate confirmation, leaving his
chosen staff in peculiar limbo. (This subject is discussed further in the Recommendations, Section X,
Issue No. 13.)
7. THE SPECIAL CASE OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
The role of the independent regulatory agencies and commissions during a transition is a potential
source of controversy between the Congress, the President-elect, and the outgoing President. Special
guidelines should be established for the incoming transition that preserve and protect the agencies,
special status.
In 1980, there were 19 independent regulatory commissions (Appendix Q. The outgoing Carter
Administration initially did not include the independent regulatory commissions in its transition
instructions. Transition officers were not designated in those agencies, and they were not required to
make biweekly reports on transition activities through Administration channels. This hands-off policy
derived from the fixed-term, multiple membership status of the commissions, their special relationship
to Congress, and the absence of a direct reporting relationship to the President as part of the
Executive Branch. The incoming Reagan Administration, on the other hand, tended to treat the
independents as similar to Executive Branch units for transition purposes. They felt that both new
budget and regulatory reform initiatives required them to review carefully the activities of the
independents without delay.
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Some of the incumbent officials in the independent commissions disagreed with the Reagan
Transition Group position. For example, when the Reagan transition team first appeared at the
Federal Communications Commission, it was politely told that it had no business being there.
Eventually, an agreement was worked out that allowed the transition team the access it needed to
prepare its report.
Others, while equally concerned about separation of powers principles, opened their doors. The
Consumer Product Safety Commission, for instance, felt threatened by the defeat of many of its
Congressional supporters in the election, especially since its organic legislation was up for renewal
early in 1981. They provided space, secretarial support, and a relatively comprehensive view of the
Commission's operations.
A restrained but cooperative approach prevailed generally in the commissions. In most cases,
members of the transition team were provided with office space and allowed access to documents to
the same extent that a member of the public would be. In other commissions, the transition teams
were required to submit formal requests for briefings, information or access to personnel records to
the heads of the commission, who would then direct the appropriate person in the agency to respond
to the request.
Practically speaking, however, access of the President-elect's team to the independent commissions can
ultimately turn on the perception of relative political influence between the President-elect and the
commission's supporters on the Hill. The outgoing Administration can also play the role of arbitrator,
if asked. For example, after the Carter-Reagan transition leaders had their initial meeting with
transition officers from the Executive agencies, some of the independent regulatory agencies decided.
that they too wanted to be informed about transition planning. Responding to these requests, the
Carter transition team convened a meeting at OMB between representatives of these agencies and the
regulatory policy specialists on the Reagan team. Attendance was voluntary. At this meeting, there
was discussion of such issues as access to information, limits on providing space and services to the
Reagan team, and concern about potential conflicts of interest, as well as a thorough explanation of
conflict of interests guidelines established by the Reagan transition team. The Carter White House
advised the independent commissions to be cooperative and to provide only information to the
Reagan team which would be subject to public disclosure, but stayed out of direct negotiations
between the commissions and the Reagan transition.
Reflecting on the transition experiences of 1976 and 1980, many regulatory agency officials believe
that standards need to be developed to provide guidance for the commissions during transition. Most
questions and policies were handled in an ad hoc manner by the commissions in 1980. Some
independent commission officials feel isolated during the transition. They are not under the
protection of the outgoing President, and congressional sponsors may be equally remote when
Congress is not in session, as is usually the case during transition. Many also feel vulnerable in
dealing with transition teams that include representatives from firms regulated by the agency, even
when the teams are guided by strict conflict of interest standards. Specific areas where standards have
been suggested are: access of transition teams to non-public information, especially information
about pending adjudication or enforcement action; providing services to transition teams; and access
to agency staff with reference to on-going proceedings. (This subject is.discussed further in the
Recommendations, Section X, Issues No. 3 and 4.)
B. National Policy and Budget
The two greatest opportunities for change arising from an election are in the Federal government's
policy direction and its top layer of personnel. These two areas, policy and personnel, therefore
present the major transition planning challenges, and work should prudently begin on them well
before the election if the transition is to be successful.
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In April of 1980, a series of Policy Task Forces were established under the direction of Darrell Trent.
There were 24 such tasks forces, and eventually they included 326 people. The following subject
areas were included in the Reagan pre-election policy structure:
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
AGRICULTURE
ECONOMIC POLICY
EDUCATION
ENERGY
ENVIRONMENT
FOREIGN POLICY
HEALTH POLICY
HOUSING
INFLATION
INNOVATION AND ENTREPENEURSHIP
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY
LAW ENFORCEMENT
NEIGHBORHOODS
REGULATORY REFORM
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SMALL BUSINESS
SOCIAL SECURITY
SPENDING CONTROL
STRATEGIC MINERALS
TAXATION
TRANSPORTATION
URBAN POLICY
VICTIMS OF CRIME
The assignment of the task forces was to identify the key policy issues that needed priority attention
by the new Administration. The groups were encouraged to be as flexible as possible and to exercise
initiative in identifying policy issues and developing optional approaches to them. Each group met
two or three times between August and the election, and their members had additional contact by
telephone and mail. Each task force summarized its findings in a report, due by November 11, 1980.
Many of the task force reports were confused with and in accurately described astransition team
reports by the media.
After the election, the policy staff consolidated to a group of 50-60 professionals and 15-20 support
staff, most of whom were dollar-a-year employees. The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was
organized along lines similar to the transition teams reporting to the Office of Executive Branch
Management with the addition of a separate section for science and technology (Appendix M).
The mission of the OPC was to sort out and analyze the information and recommendations contained
in the pre-election policy task force reports, the reports of the departmental transition teams, the
transition Congressional Advisory Committee, and other outside information and reports. This
material was reviewed with Martin Anderson and Richard Allen, the transition's chief domestic and
foreign policy advisors and developed into briefing papers for formal policy meetings of the Senior
Staff. The product of this effort was policy guidelines and decisions developed by the Senior Staff
and the President-elect for the first 100 days of the Administration. The OPC also prepared policy
briefings and notebooks for the confirmation hearings of the Cabinet nominees.
1. POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION
Policy was also the assignment of another transition organization, the Office of Planning and
Evaluation, under direction of Richard Wirthlin. The three-man Office of Planning and Evaluation
(OPE) was not primarily concerned with either the operational aspects of the transition or specific
policy issues and decisions, but rather with the structure of decision-making and how best to allocate
the President's own time in making policy decisions once he assumed office. This was an outgrowth
of Wirthlin's pre-election responsibility not only for polling, but also for developing the strategy for
allocation of the candidate's campaign time. The OPE developed a series of memos on the
organization of White House activity. It also developed the concept of Cabinet Councils to coordinate
policy planning and decision-making, and explored a realignment of the domestic policy staff that
would advise the President in this revised context (Appendix N). The OPE also advised the Budget
Working Committee on what public reaction might be to specific budget cuts.
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The OPE reviewed the major success and failures of the first 100 days of each Administration since
Roosevelt and developed a strategy for achieving maximum focus on an economic recovery package
by sequencing economic, domestic and foreign policy decisions and announcements. This involved
weighing public attitudes, the legislative schedule of program expirations, budget constraints, and the
expressed wishes of the President-elect as to what he wanted to accomplish during his Administration.
Finally, OPE was also asked to define the possible scope and function of an Office of Planning and
Evaluation in the White House. This resulted in the establishment of the first White House office
with this set of responsibilities. A principal function was to plan Administration relationships with
ouside constituencies, including Congress and other levels of government.
2. BUDGET COORDINATION
The national budget is the concrete embodiment of an Administration's policy goals. The Reagan
transition recognized the budget's importance by establishing an Office of Budget Development
during the campaign under Caspar Weinberger, a former Director of OMB. In early December 1980,
this job. was assumed by David Stockman, whom Reagan had selected as his Director of OMB.
Stockman, as a Congressman, already had an unusually detailed grasp of budget issues when he took
over.
One of the most sensitive transition problems - and the one most likely to lead to misunderstanding
between the incoming and outgoing teams - is preparation of the Federal budget during the
transition period. The outgoing Administration is required by statute to present a valedictory budget
to the Congress in early January. This budget, while largely symbolic, is nevertheless prepared with
all the formality and feverish government-wide numbers-crunching of a normal budget. The
incoming Administration, in order to put its stamp on the congressional deliberations, seeks to
develop a revised budget at the earliest opportunity. This revised budget is real but must wait for
assistance from OMB professionals until the outgoing President's budget is wrapped up - usually
well after Christmas.
The result is intense frustration for the incoming team, which desperately wants to learn all it can
about the programs it will inherit as soon as possible, and a prickly sensitivity by the outgoing team
which, because many important budget decisions have been deferred until after the election, has only
six weeks to complete work requiring four months in normal years. The OMB career staff is caught
in the middle, with the seemingly impossible job of reconciling demands of old and new leaders.
The contention over OMB resources reflects the fact that the budget has become a political lightening
rod for Presidents in the last decade. In the past, when OMB enjoyed a less partisan role, budget
transitions were less contentious. In 1953, President Truman decided to submit only an equivalent
services, status quo budget to Congress, arguing that anything else was "all form and no substance."
President-elect Eisenhower was able to place his designee for budget director in the agency within
days after the election. He sat in on budget review sessions and the outgoing director made every
effort to help him learn his new job as quickly as possible.
In 1976, the Ford Administration held the Carter budgeteers at bay until after the New Year. No
official contact was permitted between the OMB career staff and the Carter team, though there was
some formal contact at the appointed level of the agency.
In 1980, the Reagan. team was given selective access to OMB careerists in early December, limited to
regulatory policy and management areas. Director McIntyre made available a current services budget,
which is a baseline representing what the budget would be without any changes in policy, to
Director-designate Stockman a week before Christmas. Contact with the budget examiners in OMB
was not officially permitted until January 5th by the Carter Administration.
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The reluctance of the outgoing Administration to permit early access to budget professionals is based
on several concerns. First, to meet the mid-December deadline for final budget decisions by the
President, the budget examiners must work very long hours in November and December.
Responding to requests for information from the incoming team may put them off schedule.
Secondly, there is concern about leaks of sensitive policy data to the new team. The outgoing budget
director fears that the incoming team may take political advantage of various options being considered
before the President has had a chance to make his own recommendations on them to Congress.
While these are real concerns, they beg the major question raised by transition budget-making: Is it
necessary for the old Administration to put the new one on hold while it forces the government
through an intensive budget exercise, the results of which may become largely irrelevant soon after its
presentation to Congress? Defenders of the status quo argue that the lame duck budget is a
significant political statement which most Presidents will be reluctant to forego. It is both the last
justification of the old Administration and the first statement of the new opposition. It is sometimes
used as a benchmark, particularly by the media, for measuring the direction and degree of change
attributable to the new President, and is therefore a highly political document. For example, some
budget decisions - e.g. large boosts in foreign aid and energy programs - were designed to allow
Reagan to make the dollar cuts promised in his campaign, but still maintain a critical core to keep the
programs alive.
The cost of the present system of dual budgeting should not be underestimated. Not only is the new
Administration delayed in developing its first year program, but the permanent staff it finally takes
over is exhausted. Several options to improve this system have been suggested:
a. Use the policy officials in OMB and the agencies to prepare a general policy budget or
statement which highlights major priorities of the outgoing Administration but does not
propose detailed budgets for each agency and program in the government.
b. The career staff might routinely prepare a current services budget to assist the outgoing
Administration in this exercise.
c. The new Administration might be permitted to use the career staff to prepare its budget as
soon as the current services budget is completed. This should permit the career staff to start
working for the new Administration by Thanksgiving.
d. The requirement that the outgoing President must present a final budget to Congress might
be waived altogether.
e. Congress could change the date on which the budget is presented in the year following a
Presidential election.
(This subject is discussed further in the Recommendations, Section X, Issue No. 6.)
C Personnel
With the exception of policy and budget, a new President's greatest opportunity to change the
country's direction is through the use of his appointment power. Whom the President appoints to his
Cabinet, to head independent agencies reporting to him, and to the regulatory commissions is of
enormous consequence. The job of preparing for these hundreds of decisions is a major challenge,
requiring attention well before the election. Even then, the 21 months of the transition does not
allow nearly enough time to staff the new Administration fully.
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The Reagan team's Presidential Personnel Group (PPG) was established in August 1980, using
privately-raised funds. The PPG was headed by Pendleton James, and after the elections was
reorganized in roughly parallel form to the OEBM. Separate sections were set up for legal and
administrative agencies, human resources, national security, economic affairs, and resources and
development. In addition, other key sections were political liaison, control and administration, and
the conflict of interest counsel (Appendix 0).
The basic task, which carried over into the post-election transition and then to the White House after
the Inauguration, was to gather information about the critical jobs in a possible new Administration
and to identify persons who would be qualified to fill those jobs. This encompassed a great deal of
computer work, recordkeeping, and clerical activities, as well as more evaluative tasks. The services of
a professional consulting firm were engaged to help with some of these tasks.
The basic sources of names of candidates were the Reagan Senior Staff, the State campaign and
political organizations, Members of Congress, and a Personnel Selection Advisory Committee which
was chaired by William French Smith and later by William Wilson. In addition, there was a large
number of unsolicited resumes.
A file was set up for promising individuals and all correspondence, recommendations, and other
matters pertaining to those individuals went into their respective files. In line with a practice begun
by President-elect Nixon in 1968 with much fanfare, a computer was used to keep track of names and
jobs to be filled. Recorded data included the candidate's name, who recommended him or her, a
summary of the individual's education and background, a political rating, and the position that the
individual was being considered to fill. Eventually, some 30,000 names were put into the computer
bank. No computer is capable, however, of assimilating all of the evaluative information that goes
into the political appointive process.
Under each of the five functional associate directors, a personnel specialist was assigned to assess
candidates for each department and agency. The specialist interviewed candidates according to his
own method and gave a list of those he felt qualified for a particular position to the appropriate
associate director. This list was ranked or unranked at the discretion of the associate director.
The associate director then passed along the candidates' names for legislative clearance (if it involved
a position in the legislative area), for political clearance, for policy clearance and then finally for IRS,
FBI, ethics and disclosure clearance. Names that were cleared through this process were then sent
back to the PPG for ranking and priority ratings, prior to being submitted to the Senior Staff to
accept or reject. If the name was accepted, it went back to personnel for a memorandum of
recommendation to the President.
The conflict of interest, FBI, IRS, ethics and disclosure checks proved to be the most troublesome
steps in the operation and generally took three weeks or more. In most instances these checks had to
be done seriatim causing further delay. The requirements for divestiture and detailed disclosure of
private financial information caused a bottleneck in the procedures, and also discouraged some
well-qualified individuals from seeking or accepting positions with the government. (This subject is
discussed further in the Recommendations, Section X, Issue No. 15.)
The system of staffing high-level positions in government is fundamentally different from that
prevailing in the private sector. Senators, Congressmen, Governors, Senior Staff and others each
claim a certain degree of influence on selection of political personnel, and this aspect of the process is
unlikely to change as long as democratic coalitions control the results of elections.
After the Inauguration, the Presidential Personnel, office was reorganized and moved to the White
House.
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D. External Relationships
External constituency relationships can have a profound effect on the political environment of a
transition. An incoming Administration can have superbly efficient and effective processes in place
for decision-making on policy, personnel, legal and administrative matters, yet be perceived by the
press, the public, and Congress as off to a bad start simply because of inept or inadequate
communications with these key constituencies. The Reagan transition was well aware of the
importance of its external relationships, and organized systematically to keep them informed and
consulted.
1. CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
The transition's Congressional Relations (CR) office was set up on the first day after the election
under the direction of Tom Korologos. While it fell under the Office of Executive Branch
Management (Appendix P), as a practical matter it operated more or less independently because of
the many lines of authority it had to cross.
Its basic mission was to establish an open and constructive relationship between the incoming
Administration and the 97th Congress. It was clearly recognized that the basis and tone for the
President-elect's relations with the Congress that was set during the transition would last far into his
Administration. In addition to the large, easily recognized issues, special attention was given to taking
care of "little things" such as tickets to the Inaugural, positions on minor bills, special notes of thanks.
and so forth.
Great care was taken in the choosing of the Congressional Relations staff, which was divided into
separate offices for the House and Senate. There was an explicit intention to give the initial group
training for possible inclusion in the White House Congressional Relations office after January 20.
Every person chosen for the transition staff had some Hill or lobbying experience. For this reason,
there were few volunteers in the office. For the most part, volunteers were discouraged because they
were difficult to supervise and no time was available for on-the-job training.
Several senior advisors who were not going to go to the White House served as "instructors" for the
newer staff members. Two Members of Congress - Senator Paul Laxalt and Representative Tom
Evans - were used in a similar role. Their function was to be a sounding board for ideas, visits,
meetings and events relating to the Congress.
The efforts of the CR group fell into four broad categories. First, CR handled personnel resumes and
referrals from the Hill. Second, it conveyed information on legislative positions to the Congress
during the lame duck session during November and December. Third, CR arranged courtesy calls to
the Hill by the President-elect. Fourth, CR expedited the confirmation of the Cabinet so that as
many Cabinet officers as possible could be in place after the Inaugural ceremony on January 20.
(a) Personnel Referrals
Thousands of resumes were sent to the transition office from the Hill - many more than had been
anticipated. Most came by mail, but many of the referrals were made by telephone. Every letter that
came from the Hill required a response and referral to the Personnel Group for appropriate handling.
Lack of computer typewriters and form responses hampered efforts to respond for at least the first
two weeks, and the ' office fell behind in responding. Matter, members of the staff gave numerous
talks to Members'of Congress and their staffs at various meetings, emphasizing the great number of
resumes that were coming in and the relatively small number of jobs actually available. This was
designed to help discourage the Members from over-promising assistance.
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(b) Positions on Issues
The Democratic leadership decided to bring the Congress back into session after the election, and the
resulting lame duck session presented unique and difficult problems. Given that the Republicans
would be much stronger in the next Congress, this presented a very sensitive situation to the
Congressional Relations office. Innumerable requests came from the Hill asking for the
President-elect's position on major and minor issues before the Congress. Since there was no Reagan
OMB or Domestic Policy Staff to fall back on, it was difficult to frame official responses. Some large
issues (such as auto imports, a pay raise, defense initiatives, etc.) were handled by the regular 7:00
a.m. Senior Staff meeting, but no Congressional Relations officers attended those meetings and
information usually emerged second hand. Fortunately, this problem became manageable once the
Congress finally adjourned sine-die.
(c) Courtesy Calls
Early in the transition, it was decided that the President-elect should make a series of courtesy calls to
the Hill. In consultation with Senator Laxalt and Representative Evans, these visits were organized
and structured to gain the best exposure for the President-elect, to lay the foundation for his relations
with the leaders, and to establish a "two-way street" concept of Executive and Congressional relations.
In addition, the President-elect hosted several luncheons at Blair House for Members of Congress.
(d) Confirmations
Naturally, the President-elect wanted as many of his Cabinet as possible in place by January 20. The
key to achieving this goal was Senate Majority Leader Baker, who brought the Senate into session for
the 97th Congress on January 5. This gave the incoming Administration 15 days to obtain
confirmation hearings on all of its nominees, submit their names formally and have the President sign
the papers shortly after noon on January 20. It also meant that the permanent Congressional
Relations office had to be in place before the Inauguration to coordinate with Congress from January
5. One individual from the transition team was assigned to each Cabinet officer to assist him in
consultation, courtesy calls and his confirmation hearing. This afforded the new permanent staff the
chance to meet key Members and Chairmen of Congress, and to build a working relationship with the
Cabinet officers. With excellent cooperation from the Senate and its leadership, the Cabinet was
basically in place shortly after the Inauguration.
2. PUBLIC AFFAIRS
The transition's public affairs operation was designed to coordinate information that was disseminated
to the media and the public with information from those sources that was useful to transition
decision-makers. Thus, the Office of Public Affairs, which was headed by Robert M. Garrick,
prepared news briefings, catalogued information, acted as a depository for documents, provided media
relations support, and operated a public response desk (Appendix Q).
(a) Inform ation Outflow
The Reagan transition team felt that the transition should present a coherent and coordinated picture
to the public, and designated a media management team as an official vehicle from which official
releases, positions and policies were to flow. After the campaign, all press functions were eventually
consolidated under the Office of Public Affairs.
The transition had two press operations - one in Washington and one headquartered in a house
leased across the street from President-elect Reagan's home in California. The two offices exchanged
material daily to coordinate the press activity and to ensure a planned and orderly release of the
incoming Administration's positions, policies and appointments.
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Press briefings were held each morning by both Joseph Holmes in California and James Brady in
Washington. They both received their information from the morning Senior Staff meetings or from
Ed Meese. Approximately every third morning, Meese gave the press personal briefings to fill in any
gaps.
Approximately 12 people operated the Washington Press Office on a 24-hours basis. The Western
office staff numbered 6 people. When the President-elect traveled, James Brady and a support staff
of 2-3 people traveled with him to cover press matters.
Any transition must face the problem of too many people involved in the transition speaking to the
media without authorization. The Reagan transition established that only the Transition Director or
the two Press Secretaries were authorized as spokesmen for the transition. In order to curtail
unauthorized release of material or gossip, all personnel in the transition were advised in bulletins not
to comment on substantive matters to the media. Media calls to transition personnel were logged and
reported, sensitive material was held among the Senior Staff until released, and individuals who
released material to the media in an unauthorized manner were disciplined. The Public Affairs Office
did not have a secure room or safe, though bum bags were used to destroy tapes and typewriter
ribbons on sensitive material.
(b) Public Response Desk
An outgrowth of the Answer Desk in the campaign was the creation of a Public Response Desk in the
transition as part of the Office of Public Affairs. The desk was staffed by one paid person and several
volunteers. Its primary responsibility was to provide noncontroversial information on the new'
Administration as a public service to legislators, campaign workers and the general public. No
editorializing was permitted and all answers were drawn from a cleared issues book. The Public
Response Desk maintained five telephone lines and was in operation from 8:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m.
(c) Information Inflow
While the OPA controlled the outflow of information, it was also responsible for monitoring press
coverage of the transition and of national and international developments such as the Iran hostage
situation. An Operations Center worked on a 24-hour schedule to provide daily news summaries for
the President-elect and Senior Staff by 8 a.m. They were then released to other transition personnel.
The news summaries were basically prepared from five national newspapers, three wire services, and
monitoring national news broadcasts. (It should be noted that the monitoring and taping facilities
were not considered an allowable expense by GSA and had to be paid for from private funds.) These
arrangements had to be made a. month prior to the election, particularly for obtaining the three wire
services which required special electrical hook-ups.
The Operations Center also maintained a confidential list of contact numbers so that Senior Staff
could be located at all times. Since the switchboard telephone lines at the transition were not secure,
information was often relayed so that staff members could return calls using lines outside the
transition headquarters.
A research library and central file depository were also established. Sixteen file cabinets of material
from the campaign was boxed and shipped to the transition headquarters. Clipping files of
periodicals and major newspapers assembled during the campaign proved to be a valuable resource
during the transition.
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3. OFFICE OF SPECIAL LIAISON
The Office of Special Liaison (OSL), with Drew Lewis designated as Director, acted as the liaison
between the transition and the Republican National Committee, women's groups, the Inaugural
Committee, the business community, and State and local government organizations. In addition to
this, the OSL developed and coordinated a Policy Executive Briefing Program for Cabinet-designees
and Senior Staff members.
The staff of the OSL consisted of 7 volunteers. The structure was kept informal to maintain as much
flexibility as possible.
Leaders of major outside private organizations were kept informed of transition activities through a
series of information sessions with transition officials and periodic telephone communications.
Outside organization leaders were consulted on both policy and personnel matters.
Liaison was also established with the principal organizations representing governers, mayors, city
managers, and other local government officials. These organizations were kept informed on transition
matters affecting their clientele, and consulted for advice on policy questions.
The transition maintained close contact with the Republican National Committee (RNC) throughout
the entire transition period, a relationship aided by the fact that Lewis was also Deputy Chairman of
the RNC. This liaison was especially important for personnel recruitment. The RNC served as a
clearinghouse for resumes, which were sorted and coded before being sent to the transition personnel
group. The RNC set up a program called Target 80's to help place women in top level government
positions.
(a) Policy Executives Briefing Program
Finally, the Office of Special liaison targetted perhaps the most important "constituency group" of all
- the men and women nominated for the top positions in the Reagan Administration. A "Policy
Executives Briefing" program was established to brief these designees on overall Federal Government
operations and issues. The briefings included information on the structure of the White House and
the Executive Office, and the functions of agencies such as OMB, OPM, and the EEOC. Laws
governing Standards of Conduct, Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Conflict of Interest were also
reviewed.
This program was set up in four phases. The first was a presentation to the Cabinet-designees; the
second for sub-cabinet designees; the third for Assistant Secretaries and the fourth for all Deputy
Assistant Secretaries and lower non-career policy-making positions. However, because of conflicting
demands on time, the program was limited to one day because of Cabinet confirmation hearings.
E. Legal Questions
Legal questions were among the most difficult and pervasive problems confronting the 1980-81
transition: A large number of Federal statutes present potential restrictions to a transition. Many
laws do not consider situations which may arise in a Presidential transition. Since it is unreasonable
to expect that Congress will act to clear up all the statutory ambiguities in the next few years. Future
transitions are also likely to devote a great deal of time and attention to legal questions. Therefore,
this report deals in some depth with questions of legal interpretation addressed by the Reagan
transition, in the hope that recording its experience will be of some usefulness to future transition
planners. As a summary, Appendix R lists, without elaboration, a compendium of legal questions that
the transition addressed.
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All legal questions and problems that arose during the transition were referred to the Office of
General Counsel, headed by M. Peter McPherson, for research and decision. The Counsel's Office
screened transition personnel for conflicts of interest prior to their employment, participated in Senior
Staff meetings, and coordinated the activities of counsel to the teams in the departments and agencies.
The very sensitive issues of succession and removal of incumbent political appointees were
coordinated with the OEBM by the Counsel's office, recognizing the fact that some of these personnel
issues transcended legal questions.
1. APPLICABILITY OF PRIVACY ACT
The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 552 (a), restricts how much and what type of information is
available on all government employees. As a matter of public record, the incoming transition team
has access to information on each employee's title, salary, function, Federal job history, race, sex, and
education. An employee's job history outside the Federal Government and any Federal job
performance evaluation material is not available to the public, and therefore is not available to the
incoming transition team. Since plans for staffing and reorganization often hinge on the relative
strengths and weaknesses of senior career staff, the Reagan transition team asked the career employees
of several agencies to submit resumes on a voluntary basis. This was quite helpful, but proved to be
a poor substitute for more candid and in-depth personnel information obtained through interviews.
('T'his subject is discussed further in the Recommendations, Section X, Issue No. 13.)
2. APPLICABILITY OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The basic concept of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. Section 552, is that all records
in the possession of the Executive branch of the Federal Government must be disclosed pursuant to a
FOIA request unless specifically exempt. The FOIA aims to control executive secrecy by substituting
legislative judgment for administrative discretion as to what may be kept secret. FOIA could be a
tool used by incoming transition teams, but in practice this has been unnecessary, and would no
doubt amount to an overly cumbersome, technical, and time-consuming procedure.
Like other transitions, the Reagan team had no need to use FOIA. In his memorandum of November
10, Jack Watson had directed all Cabinet and agency heads to cooperate with the Reagan transition
teams in accordance with the President's directive that the transition of power be as smooth and
efficient as possible (Appendix Q. That memo authorized turning over "information that will be of
immediate usefulness to the incoming officials," but also directed the responsible officials not to
disclose Fiscal Year 1982 budget information or any other classified or sensitive information. Because
the disclosure of classified information to those without the necessary security clearance constitutes a
felony, transition team members who needed access to sensitive materials had to obtain or
demonstrate security clearances.
Given the quasi-public status of the incoming transition team, an issue arose as to 1) whether
information and material transmitted by the outgoing team to the Reagan team should be made
available to the public, and 2) whether material created solely within the Office of the president elect
is subject to FOIA. In fact, several requests were made by private citizens for transition briefing
material under the FOIA. A corollary issue developed after the Inauguration as to whether Reagan
transition papers were not also subject to FOIA if they were used by the Administration.
The position of the Carter Administration on FOIA requests during the transition was that: 1) any
requests directed to the Carter transition team were not subject to FOIA since the transition team
itself was not defined as a Federal agency within the meaning of FOIA; 2) any requests directed at
the White House were also exempt from FOIA since it, too, is not defined as a Federal agency; 3)
requests directed to the Federal agencies for transition material transmitted to the Reagan transition
 team, on the other hand, were subject to FOIA,,,except for those documents specifically exempted by
the Act - national security, personnel records, interagency communications, etc. As a general rule,
therefore, FOIA requests directed to the Federal -agencies were approved when the transition
information would have otherwise been available to the public.
The Position of the Reagan Administration on post-Inaugural FOIA requests for transition materials
was that the information should not be released unless it was actually used by the Administration, and
if the material did not fall under any of the exceptions to FOIA. The Reagan Administration denied,
however,,any requests for transition material which were not used later by the Administration, as
evidenced by it being an official government document, or integrated with government files and
papers. (This subject is discussed further in the Recommendations, Section X, Issue No. 16.)
3. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
While the Personnel Group was in charge of establishing a procedure to apply the conflict of interest,
disclosure, and ethics provisions of the "Ethics in Government Act," the General Counsel actually
assumed responsibility for investigating potential conflicts of interest among transition staff.
It should be noted that the Reagan procedures were not a legal requirement. The Presidential
Transition Act of 1963, as amended, 3 U.S.C. Section 102, Note (1979), provides that transition
personnel (other than those on detail from Federal agencies) are not considered "Federal employees."
They are therefore exempt from the Federal statutory and regulatory constraints that apply to Federal
employees concerning conflicts of interest.
Nevertheless, President-elect Reagan felt that in order to ensure the integrity of the incoming
Administration, it was necessary to establish a central clearance process to protect against actual,
potential or apparent conflicts of interest on the part of all transition personnel, to the maximum
extent possible. In part as a result of advice from the outgoing transition team, Guidelines for
Standards of Conduct (Appendix S) were developed and distributed. In addition, senior transition
personnel and potential transition team members were required to complete a personal data sheet
(Appendix T) which was carefully examined by the General Counsel's office before the individual was
assigned to a transition team.
Basically, the transition adopted the view that a conflict of interest exists whenever an individual
working on behalf of the transition uses his position to further his personal or financial interests or
the interests of his family, business associates, employer or client.
The form solicited information on the individual's connection with any business enterprises, including
those in which he or she had a financial interest of more than $100,000 through ownership of stocks,
bonds or other arrangements, including trusts. The personal data sheet also required disclosure of the
individual's involvement in any administrative action pending before a Federal department or agency.
Several questions concentrated on the potential transition employee's ethical conduct and any possible
record of civil or criminal offenses.
If the General Counsel determined that a potential conflict or an appearance of a conflict existed, the
individual would either be prohibited from serving or would serve in a limited capacity without access
to material or personnel in the area of sensitivity. (This subject is discussed further in the
Recommendations, Section X, Issue No. 3.)
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4. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Attention was required to the propriety of congressional staff members working on the transition,
since the separation of powers doctrine prohibits their working in the Executive branch of the
government.
Employees of the House of Representatives staffs generally fall into four categories:
a. professional staff of committees
b. clerical staff of committees
c. investigative staff of committees
d. clerks to members
House Rule XI clauses 6(a)(3)(B) and (C) provide that professional staff members of committees shall
not engage in any work other than committee business, and shall not be assigned any duties other
than those pertaining to committee business. House Rule XI clause 6(b)(1) limits the service of
clerical staff of committees to "matters related to committee work." The rules do not specifically
address investigative staff, but it is assumed that limitations regarding committee business would also
apply. In response to a transition request, it was concluded by the Committee on Standards of
Official Conduct of the House that "if the employing authority in each case determines that the
service his or her employee would perform as a legislative coordinator is "official or representation" to
the employing authority, such services would not be proscribed" (Appendix U). A similar'
dispensation was received from the Senate. This was, of course, a significant limitation.
Employees from both the Senate and House were used in the transition operation and paid by the
Congress. They worked as legislative coordinators and functioned under the direction and authority
of their supervisor as they do in their ordinary course of work with the Executive branch on legislative
matters. Work on matters unrelated to legislation was undertaken on a voluntary basis over and
above the normal workday devoted to Senate or House business.
Despite the permissibility of using congressional staff members for the transition, both incoming and
outgoing Administrations must be sensitive to the conflicts that might develop. (This issue is
discussed further in the Recommendations, Section X, Issue No. 8.)
5. SUCCESSION
The question of succession arises from the legal need for someone to be empowered to act officially
on behalf of a department or agency until the incoming Administration's nominee is confirmed. A
Reagan team headed by William Tucker worked directly with Harrison Wellford of the Carter
transition team to iron out the plethora of individual succession questions that arose in 1981. A great
deal of time was spent on succession questions, in part because government wide requirements and
constraints were nowhere codified. For these reasons, this section treats succession in unusual detail.
Under the Constitution the appointment power is not the President's alone, but is to be exercised
jointly by the President and the Senate. The President's power to make unconfirmed appointments is
limited constitutionally to situations arising during a recess of the Senate or where Congress has
specifically provided for such appointments.
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The Vacancies Act, 5 U.S.C. (supp. IV) 3345-3349, goes back to the Vacancies Act of 1868. It
provides the manner in which vacancies resulting from the death, resignation, sickness or absence of a
head or of an officer in a bureau of the departments may be filled The Vacancy Act is a general
congressional provision for succession at the top of the executive and military departments (Defense,
Labor, State, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Commerce,
Agriculture, Treasury, Transportation (49 U.S.C. 1652 and Justice, 5 U.S.C. ?508) and the bureaus
within those departments). When a vacancy occurs, the first assistant to the vacant position (who
must have been confirmed by the Senate) is automatically authorized to perform the head officer's
duties until a permanent successor is named (5 U.S.C. 3345-46). The President also has the option of
naming an officer of another department or bureau, whose permanent appointment has already been
confirmed by the Senate, to fill the vacancy (5 U.S.C. 3347). In each of these cases, however, the
temporary officer's authority is limited to thirty days (5 U.S.C. 3348). After this period has elapsed,
the office must remain vacant until a permanent officer is appointed with the advice and consent of
the Senate.
In general, appointments to the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President are made and
confirmed fairly quickly after the incoming President is sworn in. Nevertheless, arrangements must be
made for an acting head of the President-elect's choice during the period between the President's
Inauguration and the swearing-in of each Cabinet member. If a department head is not designated
and confirmed quickly this could present a problem.
In the very sensitive departments such as Defense and State, and in agencies such as the Central
Intelligence Agency, either the head of that department or the deputy is usually requested to remain
in place until the designee of the incoming President is nominated, confirmed, and sworn in.
The outgoing and incoming Administrations worked together closely to identify policy-level
employees in the departments most acceptable to the incoming Administration, in order to maintain
smooth department operations until the incoming leadership was confirmed by the Senate.
The line of succession is provided for in the Vacancy Act and department organic legislation. In
practice, the Reagan team simply communicated to the Carter team the name of a "qualified
individual" to serve as acting head The Carter team then approached the outgoing department head
to obtain his or her agreement and to make all other arrangements. For various reasons, some of the
original choices for acting heads were not acceptable or available and an alternate had to be selected.
For this reason, early attention to succession questions is advisable.
The independent Executive agencies present a different set of problems in that weeks and months can
pass before the incoming Administration has nominated a new head of the agency and the individual
has been confirmed by the Senate. The authority to appoint an acting head of an independent agency
is usually controlled by the organic statute of that particular agency, or by an administrative order of
succession. The organic statute of the agency must therefore be reviewed in order to determine the
method of designating an acting head. If an acting head is not designated by the President, the
individual in the line of succession will become the acting head of the agency by operation of law.
When the incoming Administration is comfortable with an individual in the line of succession, the
resignations of all individuals above that particular person may be accepted by the incoming
Administration. The chosen individual will then become the acting head of the agency by operation
of law. In agencies where there is no one in the line of succession with whom the incoming
Administration is comfortable, it is advisable to obtain an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel at
the Justice Department in regard to the method of designating an outside acting head. In some
agencies it may be necessary to hire consultants to act as a liaison between the Administration and the
particular agency. (A list of independent agencies existing in 1980 is included at Appendix V.)
As a further coordinative step, the two transition groups appointed a continuing OMB official to carry
on after the Inauguration to coordinate the acting heads, who were mostly members of the prior
Administration. This gave the acting heads a mechanism for bringing ad hoc policy and succession
issues to the attention of the White House.
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Several guidelines emerge from the 1980-81 transition's experience in organizing succession and the
naming of acting heads at departments and agencies:
a. All Presidential appointive positions should be identified and cataloged with names and titles
prior to January 1.
b. Between January 1 and January 10, the incoming Administration should obtain resignations
or "offers of resignation" from all incumbent Presidential appointees.
c. The incoming Administration, in consultation with the outgoing Administration, should select
the individual whom it desires as acting head of each department and agency, and between
January 10 and January 20 should prepare the necessary documents to make these
designations effective. Very close communication is needed on this matter between the two
transition organizations, and each should probably designate one person as responsible for
succession questions.
d. Written opinion should be obtained from the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice
.Department on the manner of designating an acting head of a department or agency when
any serious question exists.
e. After January 20, an individual should be designated to coordinate the activity of those who
are acting heads of departments and agencies until the new leadership is installed.
f. In departments or agencies where the Administration is not comfortable with the acting
head, consultants should be brought on as liaison persons.
6. REMOVAL OF INCUMBENT OFFICIALS
While it is generally believed that the only personnel problem facing a new incoming Administration
is to fill the hundreds of vacancies left to it by the outgoing Administration, in fact the process of
"outgoing" is fraught with ambiguity, disorganization, and opportunities for misunderstanding and ill
will. Special care must be taken to balance legal, personal, and political factors in the interests of
both continuity and courtesy. In no other realm is cooperation between the incoming and outgoing
transition officials of more delicacy. In the 1980-81 transition, Michael Farrell coordinated resignation
and removal actions for the incoming team.
Any incoming Administration is accorded the right to remove all persons holding exempt or non-civil
service protected positions in other than independent regulatory agencies. The incoming
Administration usually lacks complete information on all but the most prominent appointive positions
and their incumbents, so its first task is often to gather this information.
Reagan transition team personnel officers assigned to the departments attended several meetings with
the General Counsel's office to prepare for their initial contact with the departments and agencies.
The meetings centered on collecting the information during the transition period needed to make
determinations as to who should be retained, or removed, by an incoming agency head. A personal
interview data sheet was given to each personnel team member (Appendix W). In addition, a
personnel interview memo was prepared and given to each attorney advisor and personnel team
member. -
Several major problems developed from this procedure. The first and most serious problem was the
magnitude of the proposed interview process itself. Most department and . agency transition teams had
only one or sometimes two personnel members assigned to it. With the large number of people to be
interviewed and the Thanksgiving and Christmas holiday interruption, it proved impossible' to
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interview all the exempted individuals before the end of the year. Each interview was a subjective
challenge, and the cooperation of the individual to be interviewed could not be assured. In the end,
the compilation of all contemplated material and evaluations was never adequately completed.
Many officials of the outgoing Administration feel, often with justification, that their qualifications are
not especially partisan, even if they hold positions exempt from civil service. They are proud of the
job they have done and harbor an often unexpressed conviction that the new Administration will want
to keep them on, at least for awhile, in interests of continuity. Cordial relationships with incoming
transition personnel, even if noncommittal, can bolster this hope. The outgoing Administration has a
considerable debt to its loyal officials, and is reluctant to pressure them to resign against their own
inclinations and in the absence of a clear signal from the incoming forces. The incoming
Administration is also often slow to appoint heads for smaller agencies, so the future of their many
exempt employees remains especially uncertain and causes serious morale problems.
In order to allow outgoing appointees more time to deal with this uncertainty, Harrison Wellford
recommended that a 30-day grace period after January 20 be established, during which Carter
appointees could remain on the payroll to advise the incoming transition team. The Reagan team
recommended this policy to the agencies but left implementation of the policy up to the voluntary
judgment of the department or agency head. Political officials at OMB and HHS were in fact granted
a 30-day period by the Director and the Secretary, but no across-the-board grace period was granted
in other departments or agencies. To reduce uncertainty and encourage cooperation between the
incoming and outgoing teams, a President-elect might make a uniform policy on such a 30-day
extension clear by December 1 in future transitions.
Resignation policy and coordination for the outgoing Administration was outlined by Jack Watson in
a memo dated December 10 (Appendix X). Resignations prior to January 20 were considered
voluntary and coordination of resignations was delegated to each department and agency head. There
was little other follow-up on resignations until January 10.
An effort might be made in future transitions to assure that the removal and replacement process
proceeds with a definite plan agreed to by both the incoming and outgoing Administrations.
Exempted individuals should have knowledge of their status soon after the election and should be put
on adequate notice of their probable termination. This places some responsibility on the outgoing
Administration to determine and assist the affected individuals in changing jobs without the uncertain
prospect of keeping their Federal jobs. The placement seminars conducted by the outgoing Carter
Administration for higher ranking Presidential appointees were a constructive initiative, but better
counseling is needed for lower level employees.
The outgoing Administration, in the second week of November, should consider sending to all
affected individuals a request for "offer of resignation." When the "offer of resignation" is submitted,
which should be no later than January 1, it may include information as to extenuating personal or
job-related circumstances that may argue for delay in the individual's separation from Federal service.
Each "offer of resignation" might also indicate whether the individual is willing or desires to serve in
the next Administrati on. This procedure would allow the outgoing Administration to deal personally
with its own appointees, which is likely to be a more comfortable relationship than that with the
incoming Administration. It also permits them to receive letters of acceptance from the President who
appointed them.
The foregoing discussion deals most directly with persons who hold Presidential and clearly exempt
positions under the Civil Service statute. There are also positions at GS 16, 17, and 18 authorized to
be filled by non-career executive assignment under Executive Order 11315 of November 17, 1966
(NEA), and a much larger category of Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel. The SES is a
personnel system covering top level executive and managerial positions in most Federal agencies,
established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. It includes managerial positions previously
classified at GS 16, 17, and 18 and Executive Level IV and V positions not requiring Senate
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confirmation. There are approximately 8,600 SES positions allocated by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) to individual agencies under an overall ceiling established by law.
The SES includes three types of positions: career reserved, non-career and general. By law, no more
than 10% of total SES positions, government wide, may be filled by non-career appointees. The
proportion of non-career appointees may, however, vary from agency to agency (up to a limit of 25%)
within the overall total. A new Administration has considerable freedom in shifting career SES
members among jobs, but cannot do so without consent of the employee until 120 days after the
transition.
Schedules A and B are also categories of positions exempt from civil service, not of a confidential or
policy determining character, for which it is not practical to hold any kind of examination. Schedule
C positions are of a confidential or policy determining character which are exempted from the
competitive service and to which appointments may be made without examination by OPM.
As a practical matter, decisions regarding SES employees and Schedules A, B and C are handled in
the most general way during the transition period. (This is discussed further in the
Recommendations, Section X, Issue No. 13.)
The General Counsel's office gave considerable attention to the possible impact of the Brand court
decision on the transition and removal process. Each personnel team member was given an in-depth
memorandum on the potential implications of the Branti decision, which placed restraints on the
ability of government officials to discharge patronage employees for solely political reasons. Although
Branti did not greatly affect the 1980-81 transition, it may well be of major importance later on.
Appendix Y is a discussion of the Branti decision and some guidance as to its interpretation.
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F. Financial and Administrative Aspects
While the attention of official Washington and the press is on the substantive policy and personnel
decisions of the transition, little progress could be made on those questions unless administrative
functions of the transition were organized and working effectively. The Office of Administration,
headed by Verne Orr, handled space, equipment, supplies, transportation, payroll, communications
and other miscellaneous matters for the transition that allowed its principal officers, and staff to
concentrate on their jobs rather than on administrative details.
1. FUNDING OF TRANSITION OPERATIONS
In 1976, the Carter campaign had tested the applicability of fundraising and expenditure limitations of
the Federal Campaign Financing Act to pre-election transition activities. By informal request, it
asked the Federal Election Commission to permit it to solicit private contributions and to exclude the
expenditure of such funds from its $21.8 million general election limit. In July 1976, the Commission
denied the request on a 3-3 party-line vote and the Carter campaign was forced to finance this
pre-election planning activity, at a cost of approximately $150,000, from its allotted campaign budget.
On August 15, 1980, a group of Reagan supporters filed a formal advisory opinion request with the
FEC (Appendix Z), to permit publicly disclosed and audited individual donations for pre-election
transition planning activities. The contributions, limited to $5,000 per person, were to be placed in a
"Presidential Transition Trust" established independent from the Campaign Committee. The funds.
were to be used to pay expenses incurred in gathering information on critical jobs, identifying
potential nominees, and liaison activities with the General Services Administration (GSA) to plan a
quick post-election establishment of offices and other facilities.
On September 15, 1980, the Commission issued Advisory Opinion 1980-97 (Appendix AA) granting
the Trust permission to raise and spend private funds for pre-election transition efforts, provided: (1)
that all donors were advised that the funds would not be used for the purpose of influencing the
election; and (2) that no coordination or consultation would occur between the Trust and Campaign
Committee personnel in carrying out the functions of the Trust.
The pre-election transition started to function immediately thereafter in the areas of organization,
computer work, recordkeeping, clerical activities and personnel recruitment. With a relationship to
GSA already well established, the Reagan transition team was able to become operational almost
immediately after the election.
The senior group of transition officials who met in Los Angeles the day after the election determined
that the $2 million provided for incoming transition operations was inadequate in view of the nearly
50% inflation since the limit was established. Therefore, the Presidential Transition Foundation, Inc.,
was established to raise and administer private funds to be used for transition purposes, with Drew
Lewis as Chief Operating Officer. The General Counsel's Office at both GSA (letters dated
November 18 and 26, 1980, Appendix BB and CC) and the FEC (verbally) concluded that no legal
prohibition existed to prevent the use of private funds in this effort, as long as they were not
commingled with those administered by GSA. The Justice Department also verbally agreed with this
conclusion. The Foundation's funds were derived from two sources thereafter: (1) post-election
private funds solicited pursuant to the general groundrules established in the FEC opinion for
pre-election transition funds; and (2) surplus primary campaign contributions which exceeded the
outstanding liabilities of the Reagan for President Committee. (This subject is discussed further in the
Recommendations, Section X, Issue No. 2.)
Careful accounting procedures must be instituted for the $2 million of government funds appropriated
for the use of the President-elect and Vice President-elect. The General Services Administration is
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very careful about its statutory obligations to control and account for appropriated funds. The GSA
Central Office Financial Management Division is responsible for providing accounting support for the
transition, as well as administering financial control systems and disbursing all Federal funds. Private
funds must be administered separately.
Federal transition funds cannot be committed or obligated until the Administrator of GSA makes a
determination as to an "apparent" Presidential winner and the President-elect signs a letter requesting
the expenditure of transition funds in his behalf through his designated representative. Transition
funds may be obligated only by those individuals delegated this authority by the President-elect or his
designated transition head. Transition funds are available for obligation from the day following the
election until noon on January 20th.
Financial obligations are entered into the accounting system when obligating documents such as
purchase orders, contracts, travel authorizations and printing requisitions are received by GSA. The
GSA Financial Office has written a procedures manual which includes sample forms and instructions
for all procedures which transition personnel are expected to follow.
Accounting transactions are coded in accordance with the standard object classes and cost elements
used for GSA staff offices. A specific organizational code is assigned to the transition and all
reimbursable expenditures incurred by the transition are charged to that account.
Due to the short period of fund availability, GSA will provide a weekly report which lists obligations
and commitments by object class and cost element. In addition, the standard accounting reports
(cyclical histories, fund balance reports, monthly histories, allotment status reports, and open items
reports) are provided.
GSA will provide an imprest fund cashier on location at the transition headquarters to reimburse
transition employees for personal expenditures incurred in the execution of official business.
The Secret Service, which is separately funded, provides security for the offices of the President-elect,
and their expenses are not charged to the transition account.
The following table details expenditures of public funds by the 1976-77 and 1980-81 transitions.
Private funds were used in 1980-81 in addition to the public funds that are detailed here.
EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC TRANSITION FUNDS BY INCOMING ADMINISTRATIONS
Carter/Mondale
Reagan/Bush
1976-77
1980-81
Salary, wages
$946,248
$1,175,356
Personnel benefits
67,578
88,861
Travel
360,339
145,789
Transportation (moving furniture, equipment
into office & express delivery)
24,945
Telephone, Telegraph
106,460
Office Space,
48,526
Rental, Equipment, Furniture (telephone,
office space, rental, equipment,
furniture included)
45,175
167,624
Commercial services
52,229
8,667
Supplies, misc.
26,724
27,735
Postage
25,035
16,949
Printing
14,456
45,944
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Services rendered by other government
agencies and Blair House
9,355
36,850
Other services (commercial, contract, etc.)
11,190
TOTAL
$1,702,1251
$1,749,9202,4
ADJUSTED TOTAL
$1,778,1533
$1,747,5515
1Source: General Accounting Office, Audit of Ford-Carter Transition Expenditures, December 23, 1977.
2All obligations were incurred during the period November 5, 1980, to January 20, 1981, as required by the
Transition Act. For accounting purposes, however, valid obligations continued to flow into the system for
actual payment for some time after January 20, 1981.
3GSA adjusted the GAO total to include additional expenditures for military aircraft, civilian airline charter and
personnel compensation.
4Private funds were used in addition to the funds appropriated by Congress.
SReflects difference between obligations and actual final billings.
2. PERSONNEL
Many hundreds of individuals must be dealt with in the process of hiring transition headquarters
office staffs and transition team personnel. The amount of pre-election planning that goes into this
effort is a judgment to be made by each Presidential candidate, but the more detailed planning
becomes, the smoother the post-election transition will be.
The GSA Personnel Office will provide briefings on government hiring procedures and prepare
"Personnel Packets" with all the forms and instructions required for transition employees to be
expeditiously placed on government payrolls. The GSA Office of Finance will act as liaison between
the transition and the National Payroll Center in Kansas City.
(a) Full Time Personnel
The transition may pay its employees any salary it desires up to the maximum dictated by Congress
(GS-18-1). Government payroll computers, however, are programmed to handle only the Civil
Service GS salary schedule. Therefore, transition salaries should be determined in accordance with
the GS salary structure.
In the pre-election contingency planning process, a personnel matrix can be created indicating
position and salary. Personnel packets could then be pre-typed by position, with names and social
security numbers added as available after the election. This practice would greatly speed the hiring
process.
Full-time transition employees are eligible for Federal Government life insurance, health, retirement,
and workman's compensation benefits.
(b) Volunteers
Volunteers can make a major no-cost contribution to the productiveness of the transition. There are,
however, a number of considerations which must be addressed when using volunteers. Some never
demonstrate dependability. It is difficult to establish their legitimacy, especially to those outside the
transition. Transition volunteers also have no Federal financial protection or insurance against
on-the-job injuries.
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(c) "Dollar-a-Year" Personnel
In 1980-81, some of these problems were alleviated by hiring "Dollar-a-Year" employees and paying
them out of the Imprest Fund. This gave them status as "transition staff employees," which was
sufficient for access to departments and agencies, and as such they were covered by Workman's
Compensation. They were not eligible, however, for government life insurance, health insurance, or
retirement benefits because of their nominal salaries.
Because of the paperwork involved, and competing requests for time, 1980-81 transition workers
found the requirements to have all volunteers become Dollar-a-year employees cumbersome,
time-consuming, and difficult to explain to volunteers. Some Dollar-a-Year personnel opted not to
receive the dollar, although they completed all the necessary forms.
(d) Detailed Personnel
The transition team may request departments and agencies to "detail" specific individuals to the team
to assist in the transition process. This must be on a reimbursable basis and the detailee's salary,
while he or she is with the transition, must be paid from Federal transition funds.
(e) Personnel Summary
President-elect Reagan's transition in 1980-81 comprised 311 salaried staff employees, and an
additional 331 staff members who drew token salaries of $1. Approximately 917 volunteer staff
personnel, though eligible for the token salary of $1, opted to receive no remuneration from the
Transition Act funds. Salary expenses paid from public funds totalled $1,174,008, which included
$43,204 for eight employees detailed from Federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. (This subject is
discussed further in the Recommendations, Section X, Issue No. 1.)
On a per annum basis, salaries ranged from approximately $10,000 to $49,000. About 190 of the 311
salaried employees were paid at a rate of under $20,000.
3. OFFICE SPACE
On November 5, by agreement between GSA and the Office of the President-elect, office space and
related services were furnished to the incoming transition. In some cases, the cost associated with
these items was not charged to the Transition Act appropriation.
Section 490(j) of Title 40 U.S.C. authorizes GSA to waive otherwise required charges for space and
related services when it determines that charges would be impractical or otherwise not feasible. Under
this authorization, GSA determined that it would be impractical to charge for space or other items
that were already in inventory, and were not acquired specifically for transition purposes. The
Transition Act specifically directs the GSA Administrator to provide space, furniture, and like items
"at such place or places within the United States" as the President-elect or Vice President-elect shall
designate. The costs of other space or services would be charged to the Transition Act appropriation.
A substantially identical arrangement was made during the 1976 transition period.
GSA provided 58,765 square feet of office space at no cost to the Office of the President-elect in an
already-leased building located at 1726 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. The cost to GSA for the
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portion of the building occupied by the Office of the President-elect during the period from
November 5, 1980, to January 20, 1981, amounted to about $177,000. GSA also provided furniture
and equipment used in the building, consisting of 886 chairs, 412 desks, 274 tables, 185 file cabinets
and 254 other miscellaneous office items. Since these items were in GSA's inventory, they were
provided without charge to the Transition Act appropriation.
In addition, GSA furnished, at no cost, about 2,500 square feet of space to the Vice President-elect in
the federally-owned building at 734 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. The Vice President-elect
also used, at no cost, about 1,000 square feet of temporarily vacant office space in the New Executive
Office Building and some space in a Federal building in Houston. California offices were paid for
from private funds.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT
GSA provided several individuals familiar with all GSA procedures and requirements to work with
the transition personnel on a full-time basis throughout the transition period. GSA also provided all
support services and professional personnel necessary to obtain leases and contracts for goods and
services needed by the transition.
Identification badges for transition personnel were issued by GSA's National Capitol Region (NCR) at
the transition headquarters. As demand slackened, this reimbursable service was available at the NCR
offices.
Printing services are available from the Government Printing Office (GPO) on a reimbursable basis.
Government regulations make it, in fact, mandatory that all official transition printing be done
through the GPO. It should be noted that government printing services cannot be used for anything
other than official business of the office of the President-elect. Private funds therefore had to be used
to cover the commercial printing costs of business cards, stationery cost for the wife of the
President-elect.
The Reagan transtion team found that the stipulation to do all printing with the GPO to be
impractical. Much printing work is done on short notice with a one-day deadline, but GPO is not set
up to handle short notice printing requests. It would take a request from the Administrator of GSA to
the Joint Congressional Committee on Printing, to exempt the transition from normal government
printing regulations.
6. MAIL/POSTAGE
The Postal Service assigns a special ZIP code and mail bin for the Office of the President-elect. All
mail and packages were x-rayed before being delivered to transition headquarters. The White House
mailroom can assist on this with its scanning equipment. Special containers are needed to hold the
hundreds of letters and packages which are hand-delivered daily. Franked mail and standard postage
meters are available for official transition use and repaid for out of transition funds. It should be
noted that franked postage envelopes are charged to the transition at regular postage rates, and
destroyed envelopes or those used for infra-office communications cost first class postage.
 7. VEHICLE SUPPORT
Government vehicles were available ~d government bthey were s limited usefulness because
vehicles ould~be
employees were not eligible to ob
leased with transition funds. They often provided more convenient service in that all transition
employees could drive them.
. The
The number of parking spaces available wi
th ads own theombumil~allfcs~oY Thef D Stnctaof Columbia
transition office may have to contract Government may be able to provide a limited number (3 to 5) of "official vehicle only" parking
spaces in front of the transition headquarters building.
8. TRAVEL
The Transition Act permits the payment of travel expenses to staff members at their duty station if it
is different their principal place
the transportation of family members. All official travel by
movement ent of household goods ds or
transition employees or persons invited to travel at transition expense must be in accordance with
Federal travel regulations. lems. GSA travel regulations caused the 1980-81 transition be bdone onPayment in
ntract adcarvance riers for
or
travel is extremely difficult because GSA requires the
travel the
to issue ticketduring
and
justification be furnished for the use another
GSAis simply dnotoprog most
transition is done with very short notice,
government forms being filled out well in advance. A
make travel l arrangements without the necessary g
required byrGSA inregplans change constantly. It is
transition is similar to a campaign in that very
azd to travel and rental car
extremely difficult to comply with the paperwork P
arrangements. In addition, many transition personnel are unfamiliar with government regulations and
tend to travel first and submit claims rgency
situations There are, however, several ways tework owithin the t~ in
emenket travel authonzanons to
The
Assistant Administrator of Budget grams
certain individuals to obtain r travel tickets at their convenience by using a major credit of the trip and must adhere td GSA trator
book individuals still must t submit travealternative would be l vouchers upon completion travel regulations. An additional Travel Requests) to for
espons?b a for
one individual whdowould beto
of blank GTR tickets (Government
maintaining strict controls.
The GSA travel office has the facilities to arrange office transportatidelivery on and obtain knots for availableofficial travel,
if desired. Tickets must be picked up not to exceed allowable
Travel advances may be obtained from for various sties cities with highest now being $75.00
per day for r lodging and meals. GSA applies expenses. GSA has per lies this limit to all transition personnel, including the
President-elect and the Vice President-elect.
or Vice President-melectd theother diemlisesimplY
stay in the same hotel as the is staying. Private funds were therefore used on
insufficient to cover costs at the hotel where the party
occasion to supplement the government per diem rates.
Transition employees, when on government travel orders, are entitled to any government
transportation or lodging discounts which might be available.
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Domestic Policy Staff (DPS)
National Security Council (NSC)
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA)
Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS)
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
Office of Administration (OA)
Military aircraft are available for use by the President-elect on a reimbursable basis. The White House
military liaison office can be contacted for scheduling and assistance.
In 1976-77, the transition account paid for the entire cost of the military aircraft used and collected a
pro rata share from the Secret Service and members of the press who traveled on the aircraft. In a
1977 audit, however, the GAO decided the Transition office had no authority to retain and use such
collections, and they should have been paid directly to the United States Treasury. To avoid a similar
problem in 1980-81, the Reagan transition team negotiated an agreement whereby the Department of
Defense billed each passenger group for its pro rata share on each military flight, thereby debiting the
transition fund only for the transportation expenses of the Transition team members.
9. USE OF SPACE AND EQUIPMENT IN THE DEPARTMENTS
One problem faced during the transition was whether the government should be reimbursed from
public transition funds for the incoming team's use of space, equipment, and services in the
departments and agencies.
It was especially difficult to segregate and allocate expenses to the transition at the department and
agency level. There was also no uniform administrative guidance on the manner in which expenses
should be reimbursed, other than to use the "rule of reason" or "availability basis" formulas.
The absence of specific allocation criteria left the issue primarily in department and agency hands.
Generally the departments and agencies worked matters out in a satisfactory, amicable manner with
the transition teams, though decisions were uneven, inconsistent and arbitrary. Given that the question
is somewhat recondite, since only internal accounting is involved, it may not be worthwhile to focus
on changing this situation in the future through more specific GSA guidelines or alterations in the
Transition Act (This subject is discussed in the Recommendations, Section X, Issue No. 14.)
G.. Preparing for White House Operations
The White House is uniquely different from the departments and agencies for transition purposes, in
that it is completely under the direction and control of the President and his team immediately after
the Inauguration. Virtually no one from the former President's professional staff remains on duty, or
even on call, after January 20. Continuity exists only in administrative services. Therefore, the new
White House staff must be thoroughly organized in advance, and ready to operate at full speed the
moment the official transition period is over.
The Executive Office of the President (EOP), which in 1980 comprised 11 distinct units with their
own budgets and statutory authorization, does bring some continuity to the staff supporting the
President and the White House. In addition to the White House Office and Executive Residence, and
the Office of the Vice President, the 1980 EOP included:
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As an Associate Director of the Transition and head of the Office of White House Planning, James
Baker III coordinated all matters dealing with the transition of the White House and the Executive
Office of the President. Among the first steps was to talk with previous staff directors including
Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, Hamilton Jordan and Jack Watson to get the benefit of their
experience in organizing the White House. On November 15, Baker set up 20 transition teams with
responsibility for preparing management document reports on the White House and the Executive
Office of the President (Appendix DD). The staff assigned to these transition teams provided
management and organizational information, recommendations for job slots which needed to be filled
immediately, and identified both long and short term policy issues. There were also a number of
issues concerning international, domestic, and economic affairs which were identified and which would
probably have to be addressed by the new Administration within the first 100 days (Appendix FF).
1. STAFFING AND ORGANIZATION
The White House transition concentrated first on White House organization and staffing drawing
heavily on in-depth evaluations of the structures developed under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter.
A large number of resumes for White House jobs were collected, and complete recommendation and
information files were created for selected individuals. Any resumes which were not used were
returned to the Presidential Personnel Group. White House support positions were mostly filled after
January 20.
Following interviews and evaluations of most of the incumbent career White House staff, a decision
was made to replace the majority of the career White House staff, in order to give the new
Administration a freer hand than its predecessors had in organizing the White House.
Titles, salaries, and protocol ranking have varied by Administration, and substantial attention was
devoted to these questions for senior professional positions. Protocol order for White House officers
has generally been: Counsellor; Assistant; "Assistant for"; Deputy Assistant; and Special Assistant
(Carter ranked Special Assistants senior to Deputy Assistants). The pay levels of Deputy and Special
Assistants have varied; generally Deputy Assistants have been paid at Level IV or higher and Special
Assistants have been paid at rates anywhere from GS-18 to Level III.
A tabulation of titles for the Carter (1980), Ford (1976), and Nixon (1972) Administrations in relation
to the proposed Reagan Administration title structure was drawn up as follows:
Title
Reagan
Carter
Ford
Nixon
Counsellor to the President
1
0
3
3
Assistant to the President or
Equivalent
2
1
1
4
Assistant to the President for
(specialized area) or Equivalent
10
12
7
5
Deputy Assistant to the President
or Equivalent
17
21
10
13
Special Assistant to the President
or Equivalent
4-9
18
17
15
(for interest
groups)
38-43
52
38
52
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Pay equivalent levels for the Carter Administration and proposed Reagan Administration were as
follows:
EQUIVALENT LEVELS
Ex. Lev.
II
Ex. Lev.
III
Ex. Lev.
IV
Ex. Lev.
V
GS
16-18
Authorized Level
25
25 plus any unused from the
25 authorized for E.L. III 50
Carter
14
10
13
4
21
Proposed Reagan
13
14
10
0
20
Reagan Pool
(2)
(1)
2
2
2. ACCESS TO SPECIAL FACILITIES FOR THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
Traditionally the incoming President has stayed at Blair House when visiting Washington and used
that facility as a base of operation and an office from which he conducts conferences and other
business. Blair House was made available to President-elect Reagan from the time of his election to
the time of his Inauguration.
Camp David is administered through the Office of the President. It usually is not available for use by
the incoming Administration until after the Inauguration, but special circumstances could justify its
use in the future if the outgoing President agrees. A notebook is available at the White House
describing the facility and its services. Each Administration must establish policies for use of the
facility and this is a matter which the transition team may review for the President-elect.
3. WHITE HOUSE AND EXECUTIVE COMPLEX OFFICE SPACE
The task of recommending space and assignments in the White House, and in the Executive Office
Building next door, is a difficult and sensitive one, and the ultimate decision on who is assigned
White House space will undoubtedly be left to the President-elect. To expedite the process, the
transition team should request from the White House Administrative Office copies of floor plans and
room diagrams in the White House. Appropriate recommendations and assignments can thereby be
made in advance of January 20. Some moves may take place on the afternoon of January 20.
The Carter White House provided floor plans of the White House from previous administrations,
which are included at Appendix EE. In addition to the White House, floor plans were also provided
for the Old Executive Office Building, the New Executive Office Building, and the Jackson Place
townhouses.
A facility around the comer from Blair House at 716 Jackson Place, N.W., has been designated for
use by former Presidents. The property meets the requirements for Presidential security and has
bedroom, dining and office facilities located within it. President Ford used 716 Jackson Place on
every visit to Washington after he left office, and used the facility for six weeks as the central
outgoing transition office in 1976-77.
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4. EQUIPMENT INVENTORY
The White House complex, including the Executive Office Buildings, is unique from the standpoint of
property accountability. Office equipment, furniture and furnishings are moved freely from office to
office within the White House, and sometimes between Executive Office Buildings and the White
House. It can be expected that GSA will inventory the furniture and equipment; if not, the incoming
transition team should request an inventory.
5. WHITE HOUSE PERQUISITES
There are a number of White House "perks" for staffers, but four of them will be highly sought after
and preliminary decisions must be made to prevent overuse and confusion. These are White House
mess privileges, access to vehicles, parking, and installation of White House telephones in staff
members' residences.
Other more selective perks are portal-to-portal service, use of Camp David, and use of military
aircraft while on official business.
6. NATIONAL SECURITY CLEARANCES
National security clearances for access to sensitive material and locations can easily prove to be a
bottleneck, and it should be one of the first transition assignments made. The President-elect and his
Senior Staff should determine prior to election day the individuals who will need security clearances
in the transition and the Administration, with a conscious effort to keep the number as small as
practical. Key aides need to be cleared to receive information of a sensitive nature.
Routine clearances for passes to be issued for access to the White House and Executive Office
complex can be obtained fairly quickly, but security clearances for matters relating to national defense
can take four to six weeks. The incoming Administration is also inevitably aware that the incumbent
controls the sensitive background investigations of key incoming staff, and worries about possible
political risk from that fact.
The individual assigned to coordinate security clearances should work closely with the liaison agent of
the FBI stationed in the White House. He is the principal source of contact to expedite clearances for
other members of the transition team. (The Department of Defense can grant its own clearances and
there is an officer in DOD to contact in reference to these matters.)
Persons who currently hold or recently held national security clearances (e.g., staff members of
legislative committees, or individuals who have formerly held security clearances) have a distinct
advantage for early national security assignments because their clearances can be updated very rapidly.
During the Reagan transition, all transition personnel received preliminary FBI name checks based on
their date and place of birth, social security number, and current address.
A deliberate decision by the Transition Director that full background checks would not be done on
any individuals until they become permanent White House staff numbers drastically cut down on the
number of unnecessary full background investigations which the FBI had to conduct.
One week before the Inauguration approximately 200 temporary White House I.D.s (effective January
21) were issued by the Secret Service. Each of the individuals receiving the White House temporary
I.D.s had to be fingerprinted and photographed by the Secret Service before the I.D. could be issued.
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In addition to this, a building access list was given to the Secret Service for those who had not already
received temporary I.D.s prior to January 21.
7. MILITARY LIAISON
Because many of the support elements in the White House are run by the military, extensive
coordination with the White House military office is advisable in the transition period. For instance,
the White House Staff Mess is a Navy installation, and the White House Garage is a joint service
activity with the drivers being active military enlisted personnel. The White House Communications
Agency is a joint service operation that provides telephone, audio-visual, public address, filming and
audio-taping services. During some Administrations, the Naval aide assigned to the White House has
assumed responsibility for oversight of Camp David. Air Force One, HMX 1, and the Medical Unit
are also under military control. Military social aides function as escorts and ushers during White
House functions.
Traditionally, a President has had three mid-level rank military officers (Major/Lieutenant Colonel, or
Lt. Commander/Commander), one from each of the military services, to serve as military aides to the
President. During the second week in January, two briefings on military emergency systems and
chains of command were held for the President-elect and Vice President-elect and top staff members.
8. CORRESPONDENCE OFFICE
Because the Correspondence Office is the largest office in the White House, employing 139
individuals during the Carter Administration, and also a valuable political and public relations
resource, the Reagan transition placed high priority on establishing an efficient organization to handle
correspondence in the White House. It is easy to underestimate the amount of mail which the White
House receives. The President-elect received approximately 4,000 letters each week during transition.
It was estimated that the President would receive approximately 40,000 each week after the
Inauguration, but the actual figure jumped to approximately 120,000 (partly as a result of the
assassination attempt in March). During the first few weeks after the Inauguration, the
correspondence unit handled more than 200,000 carry-over letters from the transition and the
Inauguration.
The appointment of a Director, Assistant Director of Issues, Assistant for Staff Liaison, and Comment
Office Supervisor therefore need to be accomplished quickly to ensure a continued smooth
correspondence operation. A reply book of cleared standard responses and pertinent reference
material on the President and his family should be made available to the Correspondence Office.
Standard cards for greetings and special messages should be printed.
H. Support of the President-Elect
Michael Deaver, who had a long-standing personal association with the Reagans, was designated
Deputy Director, President-elect Support. Deaver supervised the travel schedule, logistics, and
personal services staff during the transition, as he had in the campaign. Deaver generally traveled
with the President-elect and supervised the California operations.
The President-elect scheduled two pre-Inauguration visits to Washington, primarily to consult with his
incoming Cabinet and to lay the groundwork for his initial actions as President, particularly with
reference to economic recovery.
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I. Field and Regional Transition Operations
During President-elect Reagan's transition, there were no regional or field operations on a permanent
basis. All regional and field activities were monitored through their headquarters operation in
Washington, D.C. In the several cases where it was necessary to survey an agency headquartered
outside of Washington, transition teams traveled to the agency. The teams spent several weeks at the
agency and then returned to Washington.
While it might be advisable to have regional transition teams, the cost is too great to be borne under
the current funding provisions. One possible method of involving government units outside
Washington is for the outgoing department and agency heads to make special efforts to keep their
respective field units well informed of events in Washington, and to invite their recommendations to
the incoming leadership. The establishment of field advisory committees is another possibility.
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CHAPTER VII.
DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND
PRESIDENT-ELECT
A. Courtesy
Formal meetings between the President and President-elect are limited by tradition to a White House
visit by the President-elect the week before Thanksgiving, and the outgoing President's appearance at
the Inaugural ceremony on January 20. The first meeting may be initiated by either the President or
the President-elect. It is initially a private affair in the Oval Office with no press or staff present.
The Chiefs of Staff may join the meeting later. The President usually gives the President-elect an
advance agenda of topics he intends to discuss, and the President-elect may also submit an agenda.
Prior to the meeting, their staffs should furnish both the President and President-elect a detailed
status report on the transition, and matters which the respective transition teams need raised.
While this meeting is taking place, it is customary for the First Lady to show the wife of the
President-elect the living quarters of the White House. At the conclusion of these meetings, the
Presidential couples may convene in the Oval Office for a brief photo session with the White House
press corps.
B. Necessity
In the modem day of frequent international crises, events may occur during the transition which
require consultation between the President and President-elect. Compared to the domestic arena,
foreign policy-making is relatively reactive and uncontrollable. The time and meter of international
affairs does not fit neatly into the four-year rhythm of the American Presidency. Oftentimes events
develop internationally during a transition which may require consideration of a joint position by the
incoming and outgoing Administration. Therefore arrangements should be made early in the
transition to establish quick, reliable means of communications when they are needed.
This is not to say that contact will result in mutual agreement. Wilson refused Taft's request to
cooperate in protecting American interests during the 1913 revolution in Mexico, and Franklin
Roosevelt refused to get involved in Hoover's efforts to deal with the default of British and French
war debt or the pending banking collapse. In 1952, Truman asked Eisenhower for his support on the
issue of forced repatriation of prisoners in the Korean armistice negotiations. Eisenhower refused to
give his endorsement until after his Inauguration, and further stretched the incumbent
Administration's patience with his secret trip to Korea.
In the Carter-Reagan transition, the outgoing Administration was embroiled in intense negotiations to
free the American hostages in Iran. In order to discourage the Iranians from "holding out" for the
new President, President-elect Reagan cooperated closely with the outgoing Administration. He
issued strong statements to squash any speculation by the Iranians that they would be able to get a
better bargain by waiting until after the Inauguration.
Most Presidential transitions are therefore affected in some way by international developments. The
outgoing Administration, perhaps more sensitive to the issues and the need for a unified position
between the President and President-elect, often attempts to elicit support for its policies by the
incoming team. Conversely, the President-elect is hesitant to be drawn into a policy role before he
has the authority and staff support to establish a position he can sustain for the long term.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE TRANSITION TO FIRST LADY
At the same time that the President is turning the machinery of state over to the President-elect, the
First Lady is handing over her household. She has lived in a national shrine, and her stewardship of
it will be exposed to the scrutinizing eye of the press, a new staff, and the wife of the President-elect
with whom she has had traditionally little contact.
The transition is also a challenging time for the wife of the President-elect. Immediately after the
election, the press and the public focus a spotlight on the woman who will soon become First Lady -
on her personal style, her attire, her domestic taste, and her interest in social causes. She must make
plans and decisions, but until January 20, she and the President-elect are dependent on the
graciousness of the President and the First Lady in many potentially intimate matters.
The wife of the President-elect must receive and assimilate a variety of special briefings during the
transition on such matters as diplomatic protocol, congressional relations, White House procedures,
and personal security.
To make the sweeping transition from wife of the candidate to wife of the President, she needs the
help of a discreet and understanding staff of her own, as well as a constructive relationship with the
staff who have had many years of experience in the day-to-day functioning of the White House
residence.
A. The Chief Usher
The Chief Usher is responsible for the operation of the White House as a domicile and the comfort
and privacy of the First Family and their guests. He is responsible for the maintenance and
preservation of the Executive Mansion and its furnishings. He supervises the staff of chefs, butlers,
maids, housemen, and florists. He organizes White House facilities for Presidential ceremonies and
social functions. In that context, he supervises a calligraphy office for invitations, programs, menus,
and placecards, and maintains a current protocol list for official American guests. (The State
Department provides protocol advice on foreign visitors.)
In preparation for taking over the White House domicile, Mrs. Reagan talked by telephone with
former First Ladies about the quarters, redecoration, interim and permanent staff arrangements, and
entertainment responsibilities. On November 10, she telephoned Rex Scouten, the White House
Chief Usher. Following a meeting with Mrs. Carter and a tour of the White House family rooms and
tea as her guest, Mrs. Reagan met with Mr. Scouten for discussions of household issues and a tour of
the public rooms. While the Carters were at Camp David in December, they turned over the White
House to the Reagans for a more leisurely inspection and private discussion with the Chief Usher and
his staff. Mrs. Reagan, either personally or through Nancy Reynolds, was in touch with the Chief
Usher two or three times each week by telephone throughout the transition. Since the outgoing
Presidential family, by tradition, does not relinquish their quarters until 10:00 am. on January 20, the
Chief Usher is under severe pressure to make precise arrangements for installation of the new
President's furniture in time for their return from the Inauguration.
B. Curator
The Curator of the White House provides the wife of the President-elect with information about the
history and furnishings of the White House. He is able to obtain, on loan, valuable works of art from
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museums and private collections for display at the White House. He is also a board member of three
non-profit organizations with which the First Lady will need familiarity:
1. Committee for the Preservation of the White House. The First Lady is honorary chair of this
Committee, created by Executive Order, that oversees additions to the White House
collections and changes in the decor of public rooms.
2. White House Historical Association. The Association was established to foster understanding
and appreciation of the history of the White House.
3. White House Preservation Fund. The Fund was established to raise $25 million or more to
purchase works of art for the White House.
C. First Lady 's Staff
Perhaps even more than the President's staff, the staff of the First Lady and its organization reflects
highly personal and individualistic needs. Mrs. Reagan took great care in selecting staff both for the
transition and for the permanent East Wing operation.
During the early part of the transition, staff assistance for Mrs. Reagan was consolidated with the
President-elect's at their home in Pacific Palisades, California. Activity gradually built up in
Washington, particularly with reference to the Inaugural events, the move from California, and
selection of a permanent East Wing staff. Nancy Reynolds was in charge of the Washington staff
during the transition, and conferred frequently with Mrs. Carter's staff director.
The staff was composed mostly of volunteers, though seven staff members were budgeted to be paid
from transition funds (see Appendix GG). Besides the personal expenses budget, there was no
operating expense budget which was occasionally a cause for minor confusion. Three rooms at
transition headquarters were set aside for the 7 or 8 staff members there. This space was inadequate,
particularly for the conduct of interviews.
Peter McCoy was appointed permanent chief of staff in mid-December. He took care to select
candidates appropriate for this organization rather than for the different set of assignments held by
the outgoing staff. Special attention was given to scheduling, correspondence, special projects, and
press operation. Approximately 182 persons were interviewed for 17 permanent positions. Mrs.
Reagan herself interviewed the top candidates and made final selections.
D. Press
The press was eager for interviews with Mrs. Reagan and for information about her. While she was
in California, as she was during most of the transition, there was a heavy demand from the press for
information about her from the Washington press corps. The Washington press office scheduled
more than a dozen press interviews with publications and columnists during Mrs. Reagan's two visits
to Washington before Inauguration week. The staff was kept busy responding to questions from the
press. A compilation of personal data was developed since many of the questions were duplicative.
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E. Correspondence
During the 1980-81 transition, the staff recognized the importance to the wife of the President-elect
of an efficient correspondence answering operation. At the outset, mail was arriving at Pacific
Palisades, transition headquarters, campaign headquarters, Blair House, and 716 Jackson Place. When
the Washington transition staff formed a correspondence unit on December 5, mail volume increased
steadily from several hundred letters per week to over 1,000 during several of the heavier weeks.
With the help of volunteers, two typists, and form letters appropriate to the most common messages
(e.g. congratulations, interview requests, prayers, job seekers), correspondence was brought under
control. The transition also allows valuable planning time for deciding on post-Inaugural handling of
the First Lady's mail, special dates of heavy volume such as birthdays, Mother's Day and Christmas,
and size and design of stationery, typewriters, etc.
F. Special Projects
It has become customary that the wife of the President-elect have certain special interests or causes,
even if she has no intention of filling a political or policy role while in the White House. The
transition offers time to consider this aspect of the First Lady's role, and indeed by mid-December
there was an appointed Director of Special Projects for Mrs. Reagan. This permitted the conduct of
useful research on two areas in which Mrs. Reagan had a special interest - the Foster Grandparents
Program, and programs for Drug and Alcohol Abuse.
A special project that can benefit enormously from the attention of the wife of the President-elect in
the transition period is planning for the Inauguration and the dozens of social and ceremonial events
accompanying it.
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CHAPTER IX
REFLECTIONS ON COOPERATION BETWEEN
INCOMING AND OUTGOING ADMINISTRATIONS
The experience of the 1980-81 transition teams emphasizes the need for establishment of a close
working relationship between the incoming and outgoing Administrations very early in the transition
period. The efficient transfer of power requires constant two-way communications at all levels, as
well as a recognized and regularly employed channel of conflict resolution.
On the daily working level during the Carter-Reagan transition, the primary avenues of
communication between the President-elect's transition staff and the departments and agencies were
the decentralized transition teams. These teams both collected information for the President-elect's
staff and provided the departments and agencies with guidance regarding intentions of the transition
leadership.
To handle major issues and work out generic differences which could not be handled at the transition
team level, a higher level of communication between Administrations was established. This link
provided the direct daily contact between the Administrations at the leadership level. President
Carter's and President-elect Reagan's designees met regularly to discuss areas of actual or incipient
differences. Differences included not only policy decisions dealing with major issues, but also daily
operational differences and personnel problems. When an issue arose which could not be handled at
a lower level, it was moved progressively higher until it was satisfactorily resolved.
Even with the best planning and cooperation between the transition teams, many urgent and
unexpected problems will develop which require immediate attention from transition leaders. The
transition period is particularly fertile soil for rumors which may embarrass either team - and
relations between them - if not quickly quashed.
In 1980, William Timmons and Harrison Wellford operated an informal hotline for reporting and
managing daily transition crises. The key to this relationship was the tacit understanding that
information from these contacts would not be used for partisan purposes. Confidentiality was
respected on both sides. As a result, the two recent adversaries were able to cooperate in firefighting
and rumor control to the benefit of both teams.
For example, this process was used to work out differences of opinion over the scope of the transition
team activities in the departments. It was also used to discuss personnel actions as well as contract
and grant awards during the transition. Without this established and tested avenue of
communications, many areas of differences between the two Administrations would have been
difficult to work out and might have flared into counterproductive confrontation.
The governmental resources that formally changed hands on January 20, 1981, were the largest ever
transferred from one political authority to another. The 1980-81 transition apparatus that arranged
the transfer in a hectic 77 days was correspondingly larger than any that had preceded it. This record
has necessarily centered on the often mundane details that occupied hundreds of men and women in
and out of the government. Despite the long hours and difficult tasks, the participants felt privileged
to be witnesses to a uniquely democratic event that is as momentous in its importance as it is sensitive
and difficult to bring to a successful conclusion. President Reagan, on January 20, 1981, was fully
prepared to act with forcefulness and foresight in carrying out his new duties. That he was is a
tribute not only to a meticulously planned and efficiently organized transition operation carried out by
his hundreds of transition personnel, but also to the spirit of constructive assistance that the outgoing
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Carter Administration applied to their equally challenging though quite different set of transition
responsibilities.
With the exception of the disputed election of 1876, the U.S. Government has changed hands for over
200 years without a serious challenge to the power and legitimacy of the new President. We hope and
expect that future transitions will continue to be periods when partisan passions are put aside and
former adversaries work together as citizens in a common endeavor to ensure a calm and responsible
change of power.
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CHAPTER X
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The preceding sections of this report have aimed to provide future transitions with a familiarity of the
principal events, arrangements, and problems involved in the Carter-Reagan transition of 1980-81.
This final section outlines some of the transition issues jointly identified by the Carter-Reagan
working group on the basis of their experience, and makes certain recommendations that the
Executive Branch and Congress may wish to consider in reviewing the Transition Act and related
legislation.
What is the appropriate size of a transition in terms of staffing and other support?
Over the years, the size and scope of Presidential transitions have kept pace with the growth of the
Federal Government. Accordingly, staff size and information exchange reached new summits in the
1980-81 transition. This, in turn, increased the potential for conflicts of interest, security leaks,
internal dissention, unauthorized contacts, and other general operating confusion. The increased size
and scope of the transition effort is therefore not without costs and risks.
One way to mitigate these risks is to amend the Transition Act so as to curtail staff size. A leaner
staff with reduced information requirements might reduce the potential for confusion and
improprieties.
This proposal presumes, however, that effective transitions can necessarily be managed with smaller
staffs. It further presumes that the risks of managing a larger, more sophisticated transition are not in
fact more than offset by the benefits. Finally, the proposal would impose arbitrary, and perhaps
impractical, constraints on the President-elect Staff limitations would be particularly difficult to
specify given the ambiguous status of volunteers, part-timers, advisors, and other non-salaried staff.
There is no denying that risks increase with larger transition staff size. But these risks can be
controlled. Self-imposed conflict of interest guidelines, well-promulgated organization charts,
up-to-date lists of authorized transition team members, strict security clearance procedures, and good
communication with the outgoing transition team are but a few ways to minimize these risks.
No restrictions should be placed on the President-elect's transition staff size The President-elect should
have the flexibility to plan ahead to Inauguration Day, when he assumes power, as he deems fit To
establish an arbitrary staff limit is to ignore the constantly changing size, scope and complexity of the
Federal Government and the transition process itself.
What is the appropriate level of government funding for the transition, and is it appropriate to
supplement Federal funds with funds from private sources?
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The Transition Act of 1963, as amended, now provides $3 million in public funds for the transition.
Of this amount, $2 million is earmarked for the President-elect and $1 million is allocated to the
outgoing President. These amounts were established for the 1976-77 transition, but were not adjusted
by Congress to reflect inflation and the increased complexity of the Executive Branch.
Any question of funding for the transition must necessarily address its essence. The objective of the
transition is to reconcile changed political power with Federal institutional power. However, the
incoming team staff members are not government employees; nor is the incoming team authorized to
speak on behalf of the incumbent government; nor is the transition team subject to all of the
limitations, rules and procedures imposed on the Executive Branch. The transition is therefore a
quasi-public organization.
Recognizing political realities and the need to provide assistance in its own interest, the Federal
government has been willing to underwrite the cost of the transition within the limits of its own
budget. Private sources of funds may also be tapped to supplement public funds given the
quasi-public status of the transition.
There are, of course, greater risks and the potential for embarrassment to the President-elect in using
private funds. If private funds are raised and spent, a system should therefore be established to assure
that legal and ethical standards are adhered to, and that the funds are spent on legitimate transition
purposes.
Federal funds should continue to be appropriated by Congress for the Presidential transition. The
amount of funds should be reviewed in the year prior to the election in the context of inflation,
government size, prior Presidential transition experiences, and new laws affecting the process.
The flexibility to raise and spend private funds in the transition should be continued These funds should
not, however, be commingled with public funds Separate controls and accounting should be maintained
It is further advisable for the President-elect to establish his own limitations on the size of any single
contribution. He may also wish to establish his own internal guidelines on expenditures and provide for
a private audit of those expenditures
Should further limitations be imposed on incoming transition team members to mitigate potential
conflicts of interest?
The President-elect's transition team may include a few persons who potentially stand to gain from
access to proprietary or confidential information. It could be argued that all transition team members
should therefore be subject to Federal ethics and disclosure laws. This proposal could, in turn, be
disputed by citing the following arguments: 1) it is administratively impractical to impose present
Federal ethics and disclosure laws on an operation as necessarily fluid and transient as a Presidential
transition, 2) the potential embarrassment to an incoming Administration from not policing its own
affairs is enough to prevent any serious ethical situations from developing, and 3) ethics law, by
discouraging or impeding the availability of outside expertise, would add greatly to the difficulty of
conducting an effective transition with its strict time requirements.
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RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the President-elect establish his own policies and procedures regarding conflicts
of interest as early as possible in the transition. This will reduce the risk of future embarrassment for
the President-elect and avoid the need to extend the somewhat burdensome Federal ethics laws to the
transition process. While the objectives of the Federal ethics laws clearly have a place in the Presidential
transition, the specific rules and administrative requirements of these laws would run counter to its
character and fluidity.
Is is appropriate to include the independent regulatory commissions in the Presidential transition?
DISCUSSION
There is a perennial debate between Congress and the Executive Branch over whether the
independent regulatory commissions are units of the Executive Branch or arms of the Legislature. In
the past, some Presidents-elect have deferred to Congress and viewed the independents as out of
bounds for an Executive Branch transition. Others, including President-elect Reagan, have dealt with
the independents in much the same manner as regular units of the Executive Branch.
The argument for exclusion makes the point that the independent commissions, being directed by a
plural membership serving fixed terms, are often not immediately affected by the change in
Administrations. The commissions are also quasi-judicial bodies dealing with sensitive adjudications.
In the past, Congress has expressed concern that transition personnel operating outside the formal
restraints of Federal ethics laws may, by design or inadvertance, compromise pending cases.
In contrast, those who believe that the independent commissions are arms of the Executive Branch
believe strongly that they should be included in the transition. This is necessary to prepare the
President-elect to make budget proposals and personnel appointments affecting the commissions. The
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 further requires that the Administration have an understanding of
the informational and regulatory paperwork burdens imposed by the independent commissions. In
order to meet these responsibilities, the incoming Administration should understand the policies,
problems, and membership of the independent commissions.
RECOMMENDATION
The budget, personnel information and regulatory responsibilities of the Executive Branch suggest that
the President-elect should have the opportunity to extend the transition to the independent agencies.
Special care should be taken by the incoming Administration to keep its independent agency transition
teams under tight controL Details of specific adjudications or proprietary commercial data should not be
shared with the incoming team. The incoming team will want to police carefully its own internal conflict
of interest procedures for transition personnel assigned to the independent commissions, given
congressional sensitivity to their unique status and the vulnerability of their quasi-judicial activity to
compromising situations. The outgoing Administration may also play a vital role in advising and
mediating between the commissions and the incoming Administration transition teams
Should a freeze be placed on all Executive Branch hiring and SES appointments during the transition?
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One of the more sensitive issues in a transition is the outgoing Administration's hiring, transfer,
promotion and appointments policies. On one hand, a key objective of the transition is to minimize
disruption of government operations as a new President assumes responsibility. On the other hand,
the incoming transition desires as much flexibility as possible in shaping the next Administration,
especially in personnel matters. The incoming team is thereby extremely sensitive to conversion of
non-career and other political appointees to career SES and other high GS-level positions, as well as
to agency over-hiring as a buffer against later cutbacks in personnel. This sensitivity is further
exacerbated by the diminished ability of a lame duck President to control hiring and other key
personnel matters.
Despite the best efforts of an ougoing Administration to curtail over-hiring and to ensure the merits of
senior appointments, the specter of patronage and partisanship can have a serious effect on the transition
process Undue tension and mistrust can result, which can encroach on other areas of the transition.
In recent years it has become standard operating procedure for an incoming Administration to impose a
hiring freeze immediately after the Inauguration. The freeze is usually a temporary one extending to all
Executive Branch functions not involved in the preservation of human life or with the national security.
It is recommended that such a freeze be initiated by the outgoing Administration to take effect
immediately after Election Day, with the exceptions set out above plus extreme hardship cases. A
similar freeze should be imposed on all promotions or transfers involving conversion of non-career-
Federal employees to permanent positions The cost of the freeze in terms of disruption and loss of
momentum would be reab but it is a relatively small price to pay for removing this constant source of
mistrust.
Should the outgoing President be required to submit his budget proposals to Congress?
A lame duck President is faced with a difficult choice regarding the budget. His proposals will be
immediately amended by the incoming Administration. It is therefore questionable whether the
outgoing Administration should develop a policy budget or one that simply extrapolates the budget at
its "current services" level. A policy budget can be an important legacy, or even a basis for future
opposition. However, by developing a policy budget and tying up OMB's staff through the New
Year, precious time and staff energy is lost to the new Administration in developing its own budget.
The Congressional Budget Act, by pushing budget deadlines up to early spring, has further increased
the costs of this delay.
In order to release the OMB staff and other budget apparatus at a much earlier date, it is recommended
that future outgoing Presidents be required only to submit "current services" levels of spending to
Congress. This budget can serve as a benchmark for the next Administration. If the outgoing President
wishes to recommend new policies or make programmatic changed he can supplement his "current
services" figures with an overview budget message prepared by his policy staf. This message could
further be incorporated into the outgoing President's State of the Union message. The outgoing
President can thereby review his past accomplishments and suggest a roadmap for future opposition
without delaying the preparation of the new Administration's budget.
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Is the transition period too long? Should it be shortened and the Inauguration of the new President
accelerated?
The nearly three-month Presidential interregnum can seem interminable as political power and public
attention shift into the hands of the President-elect immediately after Election Day. Perhaps
institutional power should follow much sooner thereafter and be coincident with the opening of a new
Congress. This would still give the President enough time to nominate his key Cabinet members and
to develop his major policies.
The third month of the transition may, in fact, not only be unnecessary, but disruptive. A "transition
within a transition" may occur as new Cabinet members are designated. At that time, existing
department transition teams are often disbanded and their reports discarded. Sometimes a
Secretary-designate forms his or her own transition team and the process begins all over again.
The "transition within a transition" phenomenon may also be cited, however, to justify a longer
transition period. The art of transitioning has evolved and broached into areas beyond the immediate
policies and functions of the Presidency. It now extends into the Executive Branch departments and
agencies. Enough time should be allotted for Cabinet and agency head designees to begin to identify
major issues for themselves, and to recruit key staff members.
Finally, it should be noted that the 1980-81 experience suggests that new ethics, financial disclosure
and background investigation requirements make it far more difficult and complicated to form a new
Administration. These factors, coupled with relatively low executive salaries and the current lack of
esteem for public service, make it quite difficult and time consuming to attract qualified candidates
into many sub-Cabinet positions.
The status quo should be maintained but only because of the impracticality of amending the
Constitution once again and the bottleneck caused by cumbersome ethics laws low executive pay, and
other disincentives to public service which slow the nomination process True political power shifts on
Election Day. The formal, institutional power of the Presidency should ideally follow as soon as possible
thereafter.
Should members of Congress and other congressional staff be permitted to serve in the Executive
Branch transition?
The principle of separation of powers suggests careful examination of the role of the Legislative
Branch in the Presidential transition. Since transition staff members gain access to Executive Branch
information that might otherwise not be available to Congress, the incoming and outgoing transition
teams may wish to disallow congressional involvement altogether.
Arguing for congressional involvement is the obviously pressing need for expertise. Legislative staff
members, in particular, can be an extremely useful resource for an incoming Administration. They
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are already well versed in agency problems and opportunities to improve Federal programs. Many
congressional staff members also find the Presidential transition to be an excellent vehicle to make a
personal career transition into the Executive Branch. The use of congressional staff might also be a
convenient tool for establishing future working relationships between the President-elect and his party
members in Congress.
To deny a role for congressional staff in the transition is to forego a unique reservoir of program and
institutional expertise. Legislative staff should therefore be permitted to serve in the transition. No staff
member should serve, though, in any capacity giving him or her access to information that would not
otherwise be available to the Legislative Branch.
As a further measure to preserve separation of powers it is recommended that no member of Congress
serve in the transition other than in an advisory capacity.
Should the outgoing Administration impose a regulatory freeze immediately after the election?
The lines of debate for a regulatory freeze are similar to those outlined for a hiring freeze. A major
difference rests, however, with the amount of public review and protocol now required to implement
regulations. Hiring decisions, even at the senior level, are usually confidential. Regulations, in
contrast, follow a formal schedule, requiring promulgation in the Federal Register, hearings,
comments, etc. There is less opportunity for an outgoing Administration to "stack the deck" or
accelerate regulations to which it is sympathetic.
Proponents of a regulatory freeze point out that many "midnight" regulations are needlessly adopted
by the outgoing Administration, many of which are reversed immediately after January 20th. The net
effect is that the Federal government appears erratic and confusion results both among the public and
the bureaucracy.
Although a total regulatory freeze after the election might be disruptive to on-going programs the
confusion and waste resulting from regultory reversals makes some check on midnight regulations highly
desirable It is recommended that future outgoing Administrations require that all regulatory initiatives
be cleared with the responsible department head and explicitly approved by the President.
How should the incoming and outgoing Administrations cooperate in the development of foreign
policy during the transition?
The pace of international affairs does not necessarily beat to the four-year rhythm of the American
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Presidency. In the last 20 years, international crises have frequently boiled over into the transition
period, straining the best efforts of the transition teams to maintain a bipartisan appearance of
national unity. In those circumstances, the President and President-elect are forced to work quietly
together to protect the national interest, as President Carter and President-elect Reagan did
successfully during the Iranian hostage crisis.
Unlike the domestic policy area where outgoing Presidents have traditionally been quick to resent any
efforts by their successors to become involved in on-going policy before January 20, the international
arena is frequently the scene of efforts by the President to draw the President-elect into
policy-making, so as to preserve the consistency and continuity of American policy. This view derives
from the bipartisan tradition of foreign policy.
The President-elect is thereby faced with a dilemma. Political power has been passed to him, but he
lacks institutional authority. The outgoing President, shorn of his political power by the election,
seeks popular legitimacy for his policies by trying to identify the President-elect with them.
The President-elect, for good reason, is reluctant~to assume any responsibility. He does not want to
become implicated in or co-opted by the policies that may have precipitated the crisis at hand. And
he may naturally feel that he lacks the familiarity and seasoned staff to allow him to make foresighted
and responsible judgments.
The need for the government to speak with one voice in a crisis suggests the need for some
cooperation, at least on an informal level. If the outgoing President is sensitive to his successor's
concerns, and does not try to take unfair advantage, and if the President-elect keeps a tight rein on
his transition team, a bipartisan atmosphere can develop which serves the nation well.
In foreign policy, the respective transition offices must make every effort to see that the government
speaks with one voice Contacts with foreign heads of state should be kept to a minimum. Transition
members should not publicly comment on policy issues and should not make publicized visits abroad
The President should keep the President-elect fully informed on a regular basis and keep foreign policy
initiatives to a minimum during this period If a crisis develops both must work together to reassure the
public, with the President clearly in charge. The goal should be to allow the President-elect to remain
one step removed yet fully informed and prepared to lend his legitimacy to bipartisan initiatives when
required in the national interest.
There is little uniformity among the departments and agencies as to who can succeed the appointive
head when he or she resigns. The Vacancy Act defines succession quite clearly for the Cabinet and
certain agencies involved in the national security. Succession for the other agencies is addressed by
either the agency's organic statute, or by an administrative order of succession. In a Presidential
transition, outgoing political appointees are expected to submit their resignations. Since the Senate
needs time to hear testimony and confirm those designated replacements to assume leadership, there
exists a period where acting heads must assume responsibility for the departments and agencies. This
period may extend for only a few days, or it may last for months. Problems arise when 1) agencies
do not have a clear order of succession, and 2) the new Administration wishes that the acting head
execute his official responsibilities (such as a regulatory change, contract award, spending deferral,
etc.).
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It can be argued that the current ad hoc approach to succession is adequate. If there is no clear order
of succession, the outgoing Administration can create one in the last month, or the President-elect can
issue an Executive order naming an acting agency head. Furthermore, official acts are permitted by
an acting agency head, if that individual is authorized to act as the agency head (by the order of
succession), and if that individual has had prior Senate confirmation (presumably for some other
position in an outgoing Administration).
The rationale for changing succession laws is directed primarily at simplifying the process. Extending
the Vacancy Act to all departments and agencies might clarify ambiguous situations and assure that a
line of succession exists for all Executive agencies. When the acting head has no prior Senate
confirmation, such as the case where the second ranking officer of an agency is a career employee,
Congress may wish to grant a grace period, or an exception to confirmation requirements. The acting
head can thereby carry out his official duties.
Congress should review the Vacancy Act with an eye towards extending it to all government departments
and agencies. Congress may also wish to review the conditions and authorities granted to acting agency
heads.
If these issues cannot be resolved legislatively, then it is strongly recommended that future transition
teams should begin discussions on succession at least one full month before Inauguration. A list of
desired acting heads should be initiated by the incoming Administration. The outgoing transition team
should comment on this list (since most will be drawn from ranks of the outgoing Administration) and
assist in making sure that acting heads are in place and available to serve after the Inauguration.
Should a freeze be imposed on grants and other discretionary spending immediately after the election?
Many of the arguments applying to the hiring and regulatory freezes also apply to a spending freeze.
The only major difference is that regulatory and hiring decisions are not repetitive. Most Federal
spending, grants, and awards are small in size and routine in nature. It can thereby be argued that a
spending freeze would severely upset the operation of government.
Close scrutiny of spending is advisable for the same reasons that an outgoing Administration may wish to
impose restrictions on regulations and hiring. It is therefore recommended that all major spending
initiatives be reviewed and approved by one or two agency administrative levels higher than might
otherwise be the case Tighter controls on spending could avoid potential abuse and embarrassment for
an outgoing Administration, and would remove another source of potential friction for the incoming
team.
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Should the "routine use" provision of the Privacy Act be extended to the incoming transition team so
as to allow access to otherwise confidential government employee personnel records?
DISCUSSION
Early background information on key career personnel is extremely useful to an incoming department
and agency head. This information allows the new head to familiarize himself at an early date with
staff experience and capabilities. Once this assessment is made, he or she can better rely on career
staff. All too often career staff experience and expertise goes underutilized in the early stages of an
Administration. Better sub-Cabinet and Schedule C staffing decisions can also result from an early
familiarity with existing career staff capabilities.
Offsetting the benefits of earlier access to confidential personnel information is the potential for abuse.
Incoming transition staff members are not official government employees and are not subject to the
constraints imposed on senior government officials with regard to confidential personnel information.
It is not unreasonable to fear that sensitive personnel information could be used inappropriately for
political purposes.
RECOMMENDATION
It is likely that both the new Administration and the career staff in general will benefit from earlier, but
selective and controlled access to confidential personnel information.
Therefore, the outgoing Administration may wish to allow early access to confidential personnel records
by selected persons; subject to a tight set of conditions, under the "routine use" clause of the Privacy
Act. These conditions might require that incoming Administration members:
1. be publicly designated to a position that will eventually have access to confidential personnel
information;
2. agree to the constraints and rules as if they were government employees with regard to the
personnel information they gain.
If agreement on a satisfactory set of criteria cannot be reached which assures that sensitive personnel
information will remain properly confidential then the "routine use" clause of the Privacy Act should
not be exercised Incoming transition teams may then consider asking key senior career employees to
waive their privacy rights and voluntarily allow access to their files by the incoming transition team
Should the Transition Act be amended to define more explicitly which government expenses should
be allocated to the incoming team?
DISCUSSION
The Transition Act merely states that the incoming transition team should reimburse the government
for any expenses incurred by the Federal Government. Questions arose in the 1980-81 transition as
to what portion of agency costs should be allocated to the incoming transition. Accounting officers in
the agencies wondered whether on-site Reagan transition use of space, secretaries, parking, duplication
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and communications should be reimbursed. Several agencies asked for specific guidelines.
Independent regulatory commissions, particularly those which voluntarily participated in the transition,
stressed the need to be reimbursed for their costs.
While more specific guidelines could be developed, there is a good possibility that they would raise
more questions than they would answer. Practically speaking, there is no substitute for the "rule of
reason." Further guidance might only give the agencies an excuse not to make their own common
sense determinations.
It should also be noted that the government's funds are in effect being spent on itself (i.e. its own
transition). Cost allocation, may have little benefit and possibly amounts in the extreme to a
superfluous accounting exercise.
RECOMMENDATION
Transitions have generally used space, equipment, personnel, etc., at the departments and agencies on a
nonreimbursable basis as evidenced by both the Ford-Carter and Carter-Reagan transitions. It is
recommended that this practice continue and that the Executive Branch departments, agencies and
transition team personnel simply use a "rule of reason" or availability basis formula
More explicit guidelines might be developed by the GSA separately for the independent regulatory
commissions; to encourage their fuller participation in the transition. Such guidelines might call for the
allocation of government costs, where they are "material" (greater than some significant, predetermined
portion of the agencies expenses), incremental (as opposed to fixed or "sunk" costs), and discrete (easily
measurable). But again, above alb, the "rule of reason" should prevail.
What can be done to facilitate the recruitment of qualified people for sub-Cabinet and other
middlelevel positions in the Administration?
DISCUSSION
The burdens of Federal recruitment are quickly becoming such that the personnel side of the
Presidential transition now begins well before the election. Even with this headstart, backlogs later
develop in FBI and IRS background checks, conflict of interest reviews, and confirmations. This can
have a serious effect on the success of a transition.
The ethics laws should therefore be reviewed in the context of the government's need to attract high
caliber people. Many persons are reluctant to serve because of private sector reentry barriers. Others
prefer not to disclose their financial interests publicly, as now required by ethics laws.
Another impediment to recruitment is the "cap" on Federal executive salaries. Relatively poor
executive pay makes government service much less attractive than private sector alternatives. The fact
that the Federal Government does not pay moving expenses to Washington, D.C. further indicates
how Federal compensation policies lag behind the private sector.
The case against making any changes in executive pay and ethics laws for recruitment purposes
centers instead on the need to improve the general public's esteem for Federal service. It can be
argued that this esteem must be rekindled over time, and the government should avoid other "quick
fix" solutions.
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Federal executive compensation and ethics laws are indeed becoming a major impediment to attracting
highcaliber people, especially at the middlelevel of an Administration. Both areas should be reviewed by
Congress Greater esteem for public service will never result from attracting anything less than the
highest caliber people into the Administration. Salaries; moving expenses; and other elements of the
personal compensation package need not be exhorbitant to be competitive. Ethics laws need not involve
unnecessary personal sacrifice in order to be effective.
Should the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) be reviewed as to its applicability to the transition?
The incoming transition team is not subject to FOIA requests since it is not a government agency. If
an FOIA request is directed to a government agency, however, transition communications become
subject to FOIA. The availability of information is therefore wholly dependent on where the FOIA
request is directed, rather than the substance of the communication.
This inconsistency is further illustrated by the possibility that information held by the incoming
transition team, heretofore not subject to FOIA, becomes subject to FOIA if it is used or referred to.
later by the new Administration.
It might be said that the current FOIA interpretations are entirely consistent with the dual
public-private character of the transition. Alternatively, it can be argued that the inconsistency and
confusion surrounding FOIA's applicability to the transition tends to inhibit the free flow and use of
critical policy information that would otherwise be exempt from FOIA.
FOIA should be amended to exempt the transition from its provisions altogether.
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OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS OF A TECHNICAL NATURE
1. A technicality does not permit the incoming transition team's liability coverage to extend to
full-time, but non-salaried transition staff. Many volunteers therefore sign-on as
"Dollar-a-Year" staff. The GSA should design an abbreviated compensation form for such
volunteers. Under the current system, needless paperwork and administrative expense goes into
treating these volunteers as if they were fully salaried.
2. To better accommodate the transfer and momentum of transition operations into the government
itself, accounting books for the incoming transition should remain open for 10 days beyond
Inauguration. Closing the books on Inauguration Day is not only abrupt, but artificial.
Transition operations must in fact be carried on for a short period after the President assumes
office. The Transition Act should be amended to permit this.
3. OPM may wish to review and recommend severence policies for all PAs, Schedule Cs and other
exempt persons affected by the change in Administration. The transition itself, continuing
operating responsibilities, and uncertainty about the new Administration's personnel plans make it
quite difficult to plan ahead. The result for many is an abrupt departure from the Federal
service on or after Inauguration Day. Perhaps policies can be developed where outgoing
Administration employees can receive a twoweek severence.
4. Once a new department or agency head is designated, he or she should be placed on consultant
status by the agency, along with 1-2 confidential assistants (depending on size of the agency).
Sub-Cabinet level appointees should also be placed on consultant status. This would not only
financially assist the designee, but would allow him or her earlier access to information that
he/she would not otherwise be available for review before confirmation. Consultant status would
appropriately constrain the designee to the rules and conditions of Federal employment.
5. As discussed to in Issue No. 15, moving expenses for new members of the Administration are not
reimbursed by the Federal government. Moving expenses are only reimbursed to existing
Federal employees who are transferred to another Federal assignment. This is still another
disincentive to public service that can frustrate the transition. Indeed, even the President's
moving expenses must be paid out of his own personal funds. This should be reviewed and the
laws amended to allow moving expense reimbursement for the President, his Administration and
other Federal executives newly hired into career positions.
6. Per diem rates are not sufficient to cover the expenses of many of the advance personnel
traveling with the President-elect. Transition personnel must either be excepted from existing
regulations, or private funds must be used to supplement GSA reimbursements.
7. During the 1980-81 transition, Blair House required a deposit in the amount of $40,000 for its
use by the President-elect and his family. GSA has no means for paying this deposit. Deposits
were made by the Presidential Transition Foundation, Inc., and later returned by Blair House
after GSA had processed and paid the invoices. This transaction should be consumed without
the need for private funds.
8. It is recommended that GSA specify that the rent and equipment of the transition office is an
item furnished by GSA, so that future transition teams do not consider this in their proposed
budget. Charges for both items were in fact waived for the Carter and Reagan transitions, but
the matter is not defined in the present regulations and cannot be counted on by transition
planners.
9. Very little exists in terms of records or commentary on past Presidential transitions. It is
recommended that each new Administration cooperate with the outgoing team in an effort to
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collect documents for storage in the Presidential archives. It would also be very useful to future
transitions if the two transition teams collaborate later in reporting on the issues and problems
that they encountered.