REPORT ON SURVEY TRIP TO LAOS, 30 NOVEMBER - 14 DECEMBER 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A001100120044-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: December 23, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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LOA I ?
2 3 u E 1970
ME OR AN UM
Stl'I3 SEC ' Report on Survey Trip to Laos. 30 November ?
14 December 1970
l ax pose of the Trt
1. My trip was undertaken at the request of the Director of
Central Intelligence for the purpose of conducting an intensive on-
the-ground review of Agency-supported paramilitary operations in
Laos against Pathet Lao and Vietnamese Communist forces. In this
iu vey I directed particular attention to an examination of the concept
of the military operations which we are supporting, the tactics
:n'ploye4 by our forces and the effactivanoas of their execution,
command and control arrangements, and training. The primary
covert action mission of our Vientiane Station is to provide covert
support to the Royal Laotian Government in order to prevent Laos
from falling under Communist domination and to contribute to the
political stability of the Government.
II, Conclusions and Findings
The analysis which follows is based upon full and complete
discussions with both American and indigenous leaders as well as
personal visits to troops and to moot troop locations throughout Laos.
A. SStrate y.
2. The dominant strategic factor in Laos is the enemy line of
c.oxn.naunication (LOC) through the panhandle into Cambodia and
;south Vietnam. Our objectives are to interdict the LOC and at the
Same time to maintain a neutral but free Laos, using indigenous
and air forces, supplemented with U.S. air support.
h~: ns are not permitted to accompany troops into combat, and
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thin introduces the most important limiting factor of this war -- our
inability to influence the outcome of combat action except through prior
persuasion during training as to what tactics they should pursue.
3. In my opinion we should stress mobile infantry tactics by
r'mail unite. The disadvantnge of this is that to be completely effective
rn ob le tactics require a degree of leadership not found in the officers
-%vith whom we rr ust work and a proficiency in training not yet achieved.
'i 1,~-t s ltc fi-ottive+ (if .c x~tib el sad positional warfare with large units
ii even more unattractive, howevor, as it results in casualties which
cannot be adequately replaced from the existing manpower base and
in lose of morale, prestige, "face" and population control when
defensive positional battles are lost - as they usually are to the more
professional NVA regular Army. ?
4. At present Military Regions (MR) I and 3 believe in this
concept and are using it. MR's 2 and 4 are only partially convinced
and use these tactics only against the enemy LOC and fail to realize,
that population control can also be achieved by this method. I put
the arguments for these mobile tactics most forcefully to both
indigenous leaders and to Agency officers. I do not know if I
convinced the Lao but I doubt it. Therefore it will be necessary for
our officers to stress this constantly. The troop leaders must
realize that launch and support bases need not be static but should
move frequently; and that area and population control is much more
readily.won by troops in constant motion within the area rather
than by static defense of a few population centers.
B. Tactics.
5. There is a lack of proficiency among the troops in small
unit tactics. There does not seem to be adequate security on the
march or iniposition. Scouts, flankers, patrols, and listening posts
are often neglected or at best employed haphazardly. As a result
surprises by the enemy are frequent, casualties are needlessly
high and combat intelligence is almost nil. This has the additional
residual effects of lowering morale and making the troops afraid to
move. Instead of troops able to conduct securely rapid and damaging
blows to the enemy, we find troops who are hesitant# slow and subject
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to enemy reactive attacks before objectives are accomplished.
'Dais problem is most difficult of resolution because while Agency
officers have a complete understanding of it. they are limited by
the rules of the game to exhortation and persuasion and even then
only during an uncertain training period.
C. Training.
6. An brought out above training is our most important project.
It is only by training that we can correct lack of tactical proficiency,
failure to perceive correct strategy and mediocre leadership.
7. Agency officers fully understand this but the Lao do not
realize that training is an overriding requirement. Consequently,
upon the advent of battle their first impulse is to cancel training and
throw the trainees into the fray. We must fight this determinedly.
8. Another training failure is the absence of any comprehensive
training program by which units are scheduled into training (and
root and rehabilitation) at fixed and definite intervals. A unit should
ffi ,rt, then rest, then absorb replacements, issue necessary equipment
and train. Then the cycle is repeated. The troops must know this
cycle is assured. When it is not, as at present. then morale goes
down, exhaustion becomes prevalent and desertions increase. All of
these symptoms are evident now among Lao and Meo troops.
Correction will require constant effort with the Lao leadership by
Agency officers.
9. The content of the training program is controlled by us
and to generally satisfactory. We must make sure we emphasize
mobile tactics by small units. For this purpose some of the
instruction at Special Forces Center at Bragg may well be more
appropriate for use in the Lao training courses than the more
conventional lessons taught at Bening.
1), Command and Control.
10. The Lao Army regulars (FAR) and the guerrilla units
seldom work together in coordination for achievement of ? common
objective. While such cooperation would entail a certain amount
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of Gocurity risk. I believe this to be outweighed by the benefits.
'Population control would be enhanced as would the defense of
necessary logistic and training installations. We would gain a
treater persuasive voice in the training and tactics of FAR. At
present if a guerrilla unit is threatened it either flees or is reinforced.
There is never any thought of maneuver by other friendly units so as
to threaten the enemy with encirclement. We should continue to bend
every effort to achieve this type of coordination.
11. Command and control of Agency activity and programs must
be based on current up-to-date written guidance. General policy
should come from the Director and implementing detailed instructions
should then be prepared by Station for Base and for Units. Because
we work daily and over a very wide area with many different indigenous
leaders it is vital that we all sing from the same sheet of music as to
our advice and persuasion.
L. Support.
12. Logistic and commo support including air transport is
outstanding -- quickly responsive to all requirements. It must be so
maintained.
13. Tactical air support is just adequate there is no excess.
Requirements are hard -- there is no "water" to squeeze out. The
battle successes we have we owe in very great measure to close
tactical air support. Without it we will be lost. This cannot be
cinphasized too strongly and decisions must be taken now at the
National Security Council level to replace the tactical air which is
being withdrawn from Southeast Asia under the current Viotnamization
plan. If it in not replaced and present sortie rates decrease in any
significant degree the Laotians will stop fighting at once. with all of
the attendant consequences.
F. Agency Personnel.
14. Our officers are outstanding. They are doing a superb job
in the face of almost insuperable obstacles. Without any command
authority and working with an almost completely unmartial, non-
aggressive. illiterate people owing no real allegiance to a central
Government or nations they have maintained United States objectives
in the area.
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Recommendations:
1. Current up-to-date written guidance be provided the
Station. If this report is approved it could serve as the basis
for the Director's orders to the field on strategy, tactics and
training.
2. Implementing instructions be prepared by Station for
subordinates.
3. Requirements for air support be presented to higher
authority for necessary decision.
C!,*;hmari, V.
Cushman, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USMC
Acting Director
Attachment:
Map
DDCI/RECushman:bjl
(22 Dec. 1970)
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Dr. H. A. Kissinger
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DCI/SAVA
1 - C/FE
1-ER
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