NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010054-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: November 2, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Thursday 2 November 1978 CG NIDC 78/256
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 2 November 1978
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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
SYRIA-IRAQ: Bilateral Relations
ALGERIA: Political Maneuvering
ARAB STATES: Summit Strategies
GREECE-TURKEY: Border Incident
TANZANIA-UGANDA: Land Annexation
RHODESIA: Elections Postponed
BRIEF
Japan
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SYRIA-IRAQ: Bilateral Relations
Syria and Iraq are continuing their cautious efforts
to improve bilateral relations, but there are no indications
that a large deployment of Iraqi troops to Syria is imminent.
Several Syrian ministerial delegations have visited
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Iraq since the conclusion of the talks between Syrian President
Assad and Iraqi President Bakr in Baghdad last week. The talks
have focused on economic issues; Syria is interested in trade
and in reopening the Iraqi-Syrian oil pipeline, while the dis-
tribution of water controlled by Syria through the Euphrates
Dam is high on Iraq's list of concerns. Although trade rela-
tions have been resumed, no major progress on the other issues
has been announced, and further talks are to be held in Damascus
later this month.
The Syrian-Iraqi military coordination committee
established by Assad and Bakr has not yet met--at least publicly.
S Air Force Commander Haddad
was doubtful that there would be any meaning-
ful mi i ary cooperation between Syria and Iraq. Haddad said
nothing serious was happening or would happen in this area.//
I I Haddad's comments probably reflect Syrian military
attitudes. While some symbolic military cooperation is likely,
we doubt that the Syrians will allow significant Iraqi forces
to deploy inside Syria because of Assad's deep-seated suspicion
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ALGERIA: Political Maneuvering
//The failure of ailing President Boumediene
to return from Moscow for Algeria's 24th national day celebra-
tion yesterday may encourage maneuvering by competing factions
within the government to promote a successor in case Boumediene
dies or is seriously incapacitated.// The Algerian leader ap-
parently did meet with Soviet party secretary Ponomarev yester-
day, according to Moscow domestic service.
Despite widespread speculation in Algiers,
an interim government was not announced at the national day
celebration; indeed, in line with the Algerian Government's
penchant for secrecy, no official note was taken of Boumediene's
absence. A caretaker administration, however, may already be in
place.
//There are serious differences at the min-
isterial eve o. government underlying this surface unity. One
group, led by Boumediene, favors a socialist economy, close ties
with the USSR, and a hardline stance on the Western Sahara dis-
pute. Another group, centered around Foreign Minister Bouteflika,
favors a less controlled economy and a more pro-Western foreign
policy. There is also popular dissatisfaction with the high cost
of living, inadequate public services, and an inefficient state-
run distribution system.//
//Boumediene's demise or inability to govern
could prompt a move by the group opposed to his policies. A
change of government could take the form of a cabinet shuffle,
or it could become more violent if one of the opposing groups
believed its interests were seriously threatened and thought it
had enough power to force a change.//
In the past, contending forces in the ruling elite
have resorted to behind-the-scenes political maneuvering--
rather than force--to resolve or paper over their differences.
Boumediene has manipulated these differences over the years to
keep potential rivals off balance, and none appears to have
enough support at this point to force a change of government.
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Colonel Abdelghani, an effective administrator with
close ties to fellow Army officers, would not be easily pushed
aside. He is considered loyal to.Boumediene and presumably has
the support of the Army, the dominant branch of the armed
forces. Key Army officers, especially Abdelghani, probably
would exercise dominant influence in picking a permanent suc-
cessor to Boumediene and in controlling a new government.
ARAB STATES: Summit Strategies
The Arab foreign ministers conference in Baghdad ended
yesterday with agreement on "middle-of-the-road" proposals, ac-
cording to Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud. The draft propos-
als will be considered by the Arab summit, scheduled to open to-
day in Baghdad.
Details on the talks are sketchy, but most of the
worcing papers submitted at the conference stressed the. central-
ity of.the Palestinian question to any Middle East settlement,
rejected the Camp David agreements, criticized Egyptian Presi-
dent Sadat's willingness to sign a separate peace with Israel,
urged greater financial support for the confrontation states,
and proposed establishment of an institutional framework to
follow up any summit decisions. It is also possible that the
transfer of the Arab League headquarters from Cairo will be
recommended.
While such a compromise plan falls short of radical
demands, the emphasis on criticism rather than condemnation of
the Egyptian President's actions may enable the Saudis and other
moderates to'subscribe to it. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam
had urged the conference to adopt measures calling for the ex-
pulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and a total diplomatic,
political, and economic boycott of Egypt.
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I Jordan is also expected to back the compromise pro-
posals, although it had offered a working paper calling only
for study of the problems presented by the Camp David agreements.
Jordan's press has reported that the ministers held preliminary
discussions on Iraq's proposal to set up a $9 billion aid fund.
d
--and
The money would to to Egypt--if it reneged on Camp Davi
the other confrontation states. The funds would be distributed
by Jordan and the PLO.
GREECE-TURKEY: Border Incident
A Turkish patrol craft collided with and sank a Greek
fishing boat off Alexandroupolis near the Greek-Turkish sea
boundary in Thrace yesterday.
Greek officials say that the fishing vessel was in
Greek territorial waters when the incident took place and that
they will make a "vigorous" protest to the Turkish Government.
/We do not believe that this indicates that
Turkey has abandoned its policy of trying to cool Aegean ten-
sions pending the outcome of negotiations with Greece. Late
last month, for example, the Turks agreed in principle to the
formation of a joint Greek-Turkish committee to investigate a
dispute over the boundary in the region where the confrontation
took place.//
//Still the incident will further heighten
bitterness between the two countries esp ecially if the missing
Greek fisherman is not found.//
TANZANIA-UGANDA: Land Annexation
//Kampala radio announced yesterday that Uganda
had annexed the area between the Tanzanian border and the
Kagera River and said it would administer the territory as a
military zone. Uganda has tong claimed this sparsely populated
area because it regards the river as its natural boundary.
Uganda's troops appear to be in effective control there as a
result of the recent fighting.//
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//There have been numerous reports that President
Amin's initial charge that Tanzania had invaded Uganda and his
later cross-border attacks into Tanzania were designed to cover
up dissidence within the Ugandan Army. Amin may, however, have
intended all along to seize this contested:territory, although
it is more likely that he is grasping an unexpected opportunity
to boost his domestic stature and his Army's morale.//
//The Tanzanians believe their military
position along the border with Uganda is unfavorable but have
begun moving reinforcements, including about 1,000 troops and
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RHODESIA: Elections Postponed
A postponement of Rhodesia's national elections until
next February could provide a needed respite for all the parties
involved in the settlement process to rethink their positions;
it might also move them closer to settlement talks.
The transitional government considers it unwise to
make a formal announcement of a postponement at this time.
Prime Minister Smith is concerned that whites would interpret
this as evidence of the government's shaky hold over much of
the country. Whites might welcome a postponement, however, be-
cause it would mean the continuation of Smith's control of the
government--even if for only a few more months. Smith himself
prefers to hold settlement talks before the elections, while
he can still officially head the Salisbury delegation.
The key indication of white support for Smith will
be the rate of white emigration between now and the end of the
year. The September emigration of almost 1,500 whites was the
highest in the country's history. Large numbers of whites re-
portedly are preparing to leave the country permanently around
the end of the year under the pretext of taking a vacation.
I I The government also may fear that any announcement
would prompt the guerrillas to take public credit for forcing
the postponement and thus encourage them to stiffen their de-
mands in any future negotiations. Once a postponement is an-
nounced, the guerrillas and the frontline presidents could be
faced either with agreeing to settlement talks in the belief
that the transitional government is too weak to resist making
significant concessions, or with delaying any talks in the be-
lief that the transitional government is on the verge of col-
lapse.
I IGiven such a choice, Zambian President Kaunda and
lea er o the Zimbabwe African People's Union Joshua Nkomo
would probably support talks, while Mozambican President Machel
and leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union Robert Mugabe
might initially wish to delay. Tanzanian President Nyerere is
strongly committed to the UK-US settlement plan and would argue
in favor of talks, as would Botswanan President Khama, Angolan
President Neto, and the Nigerian Government. Although Nigeria
is not represented among the frontline presidents, it has ac-
tively associated itself with the search for a negotiated set-
tlement.
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It seems unlikely that Machel and Mugabe could hold
out in the face of such strong support for some form of renewed
negotiations.
Japan
Japan's bilateral trade surplus with the US for the
first nine months of this year stands at $9.5 billion, 50 per-
cent over the 1977 level. Although comparable quarterly figures
are higher this year than last--in large part because of the
depreciation of the dollar--the trend in the second and third
quarters showed a decline in the amount of the surplus.
Tokyo's import promotion program will probably hold
the fourth-quarter bilateral trade surplus at the third-quarter
level, or possibly post another decline. Japan's global current-
account surplus is likely to reach a record $19 billion, even
with emergency import purchases.
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