CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 98
• Content Type: REPORT

- - - - - - - - Ap
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
ROUTING
TO:
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
2
3
4
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPAR
E REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOM
MENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETUR
N
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
FROM:
NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Top Secret 219
(Security Classification)
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE 0
Wednesday 27 September 1978 CG NIDC 78/226
w
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
&MMINION
State Dept. review
0 AV
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
National Intelli ence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 27 September 1978
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
ISRAEL: Knes
set
Debate on Accords
Page 1
CHINA-VIETNAM: T
alks Deadlocked
Page 2
JAPAN: Supple
men
tal Budget
Page 4
VIETNAM: Pham
Va
n Dong Trip
Page 5
BRIEFS
Page 6
USSR
West Germany
au i Ara-,U-is
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
ISRAEL: Knesset Debate on Accords
Although Prime Minister Begin probably will easily
win Knesset approval for the agreements he negotiated at Camp
David, the margin may not be as large as first expected. There
is uneasiness in almost all parties over the implications of
the accords; much of the concern is focused on the agreement to
dismantle the Sinai settlements. Questions raised during the
Knesset debate will probably stiffen Israel's position during
subsequent West Bank Gaza negotiations.
The decision of the opposition Labor Party to back
Begin makes it virtually certain that the Prime Minister will
win handily in the Knesset. According to the US Embassy in Tel
Aviv, however, restiveness is growing both in the ruling coali-
tion and among opposition parties. Within Begin's Likud bloc,
his own Herut faction is divided; many. members are troubled by
what they see as the Prime Minister's abandonment of deeply
held principles. The La'am faction of Likud is also split, and
its two cabinet ministers have threatened to vote against the
agreements.
The National Religious Party, a key coalition member
with 12 Knesset seats, met yesterday to decide its stance. Ac-
cording to press reports, Minister of Education Zevulun Hammer,
a leader of the party's dominant youth wing, has declared that
he will vote for the agreement and then resign from the govern-
ment. Other leaders of the party appear to be leaning toward
endorsing the accords.
The uneasiness in the Knesset stems from concern
among some Knesset members and other Israelis:
That the agreement to dismantle the Sinai settlements
could be used as a precedent when the negotiating
process turns to the West Bank and Gaza.
That returning all of the Sinai could set a dangerous
precedent for any future negotiations with the Syrians
over the Golan Heights.
That the Sinai agreement violates the long-held Zionist
principle that land, once settled, is never abandoned.
That the provisions in the accords for "full autonomy"
for the West Bank and Gaza contain the basis for a
Palestinian state.
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
Begin appears confident of the Knesset vote but is
disturbed by the members' lack of enthusiasm for the accords.
He is reportedly planning to impose bloc discipline on coali-
tion members in order to get the largest possible vote.
The vice-ministerial negotiations in Hanoi were broken
off yesterday when the Chinese delegate walked out after declar-
ing that Vietnam had "closed the door to negotiations" and that
it was impossible for the talks to go on. The Chinese official
called for adjournment until the Vietnamese show a "sincere
desire to settle the disputes." Hanoi has rejected Peking's
charges and has blamed China for the breakdown.
The talks have been deadlocked from the start and
have served largely as a forum for propaganda by both sides.
China's walkout was probably due in part to a belief that the
continuing unproductive exchange of broadsides is hurting its
image. In addition, the refugee problem that the talks were to
resolve seems to have lost some of its urgency, although it
continues to fester.
The walkout may also be part of Peking's efforts to
set the stage for Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's tour of South-
east Asian nations in November. The Chinese delegate charged
in his final statement that the Vietnamese have been using the
question of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam to create problems between
China and other Southeast Asian nations, and that Vietnam's
tactics serve the needs of Soviet "hegemony" in the region.
Teng is likely to echo both of these themes during his trip.
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
JAPAN: Supplemental Budget
//Prime Minister Fukuda's supplemental spending
plan announced early this month is being billed by Tokyo as
the key to meeting Japan's 7-percent growth target for fiscal
year 1978, which ends next March. The package includes 37 biZ-
Zion in new central government outlays and another $6 billion
in nonbudget items such as concessionary housing loans and sug-
gested local government spending. The stimulus, however., is un-
Zikely to boost growth more than 5.5 percent because of a drop
in exports and a rise in imports.//
//After a strong showing in the January-March
quarter, when the annual growth rate topped 10 percent,
Japan's economic performance has slipped. Overtime activity
in manufacturing has fallen steadily and new construction or-
ders have dropped. Consumer demand, about 50 percent of GNP,
has been growing at a rate of less than 5 percent because of
the slow advance in personal incomes. Export growth, the main-
stay of the good first-quarter record, has halted as a result
of yen appreciation and voluntary export restraints on some
key items. Without supplemental spending, Japanese growth ap-
parently would have been only 4.9 percent for the fiscal year.//
//The main elements of the supplemental package
-- $7 billion in central government outlays for roads,
sewers, and schools.
-- $4.2 billion in low-interest loans for 73,000 housing
units.
-- $1.7 billion in recommended spending by local govern-
ments on parks, schools, sewers, and the like.
//Other elements in the announcement that will
affect growth are an increase in aid to industries hard hit
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
by yen appreciation, loans to depressed industries and voca-
tional retraining programs for displaced workers, and a reduc-
tion in consumer utility rates resulting from the drop in yen
oil costs.//
//Tokyo publicly asserts that the stimulation
package.wi make possible the 7-percent growth pledged at the
Bonn summit. Privately, however, most Japanese officials are
less optimistic, forecasting GNP growth slightly in excess of
6 percent. On the foreign side, Tokyo now is officially fore-
casting a $13 billion current account surplus for this fiscal
year, down from $14 billion in fiscal 1977.//
//We believe Japanese GNP growth will be only
about 5. percent this fiscal year. Without a major tax cut,
consumer demand will grow by less than 4.5 percent. Surplus
capacity and the downturn in exports are likely to hold
private investment growth to 5.5 percent, and even with the
government loan program, housing construction probably will
be up by only 5 percent. As Tokyo recognizes that growth will
not reach the 1978 target, the government is likely to opt for
a second supplemental budget.
VIETNAM: Pham Van Dong Trip
Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong stressed Hanoi's
desire to be a good neighbor and downplayed the extent of the
USSR's influence over Vietnam during his recent visits to Thai-
land, the Philippines, and Indonesia, members of the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations. Dong's hosts treated him cor-
diaZZy but were careful not to endorse Vietnam's side in its
disputes with China and Cambodia.
a joint statement was signed in each
capital. In addition to calling for closer economic relations,
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
each of the statements asserted that Vietnam would not "directly
or indirectly" support subversion in the host country. The
Vietnamese pledge received favorable--if somewhat skeptical--
press attention in the three countries; China's unwillingness
to make a similar statement was also noted.
During the trip, Dong repeatedly stressed the inde-
pendence of Vietnam's foreign policy. There are reports suggest-
ing that some ASEAN officials are suspicious that Hanoi's newly
favorable attitude toward them, as well as Dong's trip itself,
may have been inspired in part by Moscow.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko broke no new ground
in his speech yesterday at the UN General Assembly. He em-
phasized Soviet efforts in the disarmament field, drawing par-
ticular attention to the USSR's recent call for an interna-
tional convention on security guarantees for non-nuclear
states.
On East-West issues, Gromyko asserted that a parity
in arms existed and that the USSR "is not going to change
this balance in its favor." He went on to criticize alleged
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
US and Western intransigence at the comprehensive test ban
negotiations, the Indian Ocean talks, and the talks on Mutual
and Balanced Force Reductions.
Gromyko reserved his harshest comments for the Camp 25X1
David agreements. He condemned the accords as "an anti-Arab
step" and charged that "the campaign of artificial and affected
optimism can mislead no one."
West Germany
//West Germany, like several other developed coun-
tries,ha_s announced plans to writeoff the official debts of
about 30 of the world's poorest nations.//
//Bangladesh, Sudan, Tanzania, and Afghanistan
will be the major beneficiaries of the debt cancellation, which
amounts to approximately $2.2 billion. The combined debt-service
reduction to the debtor nations will be about $40 million a year,
or.3 percent of their total.//
//The writeoffs will have a minimal economic effect
on West Germany but should enhance its reputation for responsive-
ness to the needs of less developed countries. These countries
have been pressing for debt moratoria, most recently at a minis-
terial conference in Geneva in March of UN Conference on Trade
and Development.//
//Thus far the UK, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Switzerland have agreed to some form of official
debt writeoff. France, Austria, and Denmark are now consider-
ing comparable measures. West Germany's writeoff should hasten
this movement because it is one of the larger aid donors. 25X1
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
Saudi Arabia continues to delay approval of a joint
venture with Shell Oil Company that has become a test case for
Western cooperation in the country's industrial diversification
plans.
The project would be the largest of six petrochemical
plants to be built by foreign partners. The plants would use
natural gas that is now being flared and would form the core
of the major industrial complexes the Saudis envisage.
Negotiations with Shell are more advanced thar. with
the other potential foreign partners but remain stalled over
Saudi failure to meet Shell's two basic conditions--assl;.rance
of long-term crude oil supplies and confirmation of cost. assump-
tions that will determine profit margins.
The Saudi official most closely involved has apparently
lobbied strenuously to get the decisionmaking process moving
and may ask Crown Prince Fahd to intervene. The government is
already spending heavily on infrastructure that will not. be
used effectively until the joint ventures begin producing.
The USSR is seeking Western help to develop a large
gas deposit discovered near Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea. There
may be more than one trillion cubic meters of ultimately re-
coverable gas reserves in the field; Moscow asserts that. it
will be the largest producing gas field in the USSR. by 1.990.
The USSR will be unable to tap the new field without
Western equipment and technology. Astrakhan gas is said to be
among the "dirtiest" in the world because it contains about 25
percent hydrogen sulfide and 25 percent carbon dioxide. Although
high-quality and expensive corrosion resistant equipment will
be needed to transport and process the gas, developing the field
is economically sound because of its large size and proximity
to gas-consuming regions.
Moscow is soliciting bids from Western and Japanese
firms for a $100 million desulfurization plant. For the first
60 to 70 development wells, the USSR also needs an additional
$50 million to $100 million in Western equipment for drL11
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
pipe, casing, tubing, completion units, field processing facili-
ties, and gathering lines. Plans call for 500 development wells
by 1983 or 1984. Moscow is shopping for long-term credits and
consid
Bring a compensation agreement to finance these purchases.
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30800010098-2
0 Top Secret
(Security Classification) 0
0
10
10
I
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
Top Secret 0
(Security Classification)
'Aar 4 Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010098-2 AW AO