CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Saturday 23 September 1978 CG NIDC 78/223
w
i'
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Deot. review Top Secret 25X1 0
(Security Classification)
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, 23 September 1978
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
CONTENTS
ARAB STATES: Steadfastness Summit
LEBANON: Christian Position
USSR: Reaction to Camp David
Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
NAMIBIA: Election Preparations
SENEGAL: Succession Struggle
ECUADOR: Election in the Balance
BRIEFS
Poland-Czechoslovakia
Portugal
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
Page 9
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ARAB STATES: Steadfastness Summit
//Hardline Arab states, Zed by Syria, stepped up
in northern Jordan.//
their efforts yesterday to form a broad Arab consensus opposed
to the Camp David agreements. Libyan Leader Qadhafi and PaZes-
tine Liberation Organization chief Arafat interrupted the hard-
liners' meeting in Damascus to meet with Jordan's King Hussein
//The US Embassy in Damascus reports that the hard-
be trying to avoid the rhetorical tirades that characterized
previous Front summits. They are trying to draft a charter open
to all Arab states that would affirm the need for unity and pro-
vide for joint military and economic measures.//
line leaders at the summit of the Steadfastness Front appear to
//The hardliners clearly hope they can dis-
suade Hussein from accepting the Camp David accords. During
their meeting, Qadhafi probably offered financial inducements
to Hussein to maintain his distance from the Camp David agree-
ment. The relationship between Jordan and Libya has been im-
proving over the past year.//
//There are numerous press reports that
Hussein will loin the Steadfast group as a result of his dis-
cussions with Arafat and Qadhafi,
The King has scheduled a press conference for today.//
//Arafat's presence at the meeting with the
Jordanian King is surprising. Although he and Hussein met in
Cairo in March 1977, they have had only limited contacts since
the Jordanian Army drove Palestinian forces out of the country
in 1970. The Jordanians had flatly refused to permit Arafat to
visit Jordan since then, and Arafat's visit is likely to upset
conservative East Bankers and the Army, which have bitter memo-
ries of the 1970 fighting.
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Lebanese Christian Maronite leaders have indicated a
cautious willingness to consider a renewal--with modifications--
of the mandate for the Syrian--dominated Arab Deterrent Force,
which expires on 27 October. Christian moderates are apparently
gaining ground over militants, who have categoricaZZy opposed
renewal and threatened more fighting if their demands are not
met.
On Tuesday, the Lebanese Front--the umbrella organi.-
zation that includes the Phalange and National Liberal Party--
issued a statement saying that the Front opposed renewal of the
Deterrent Force's mandate but would be willing to discuss cer-
tain government proposals about the Force. This statement came
after a meeting of the Front's leaders, including National Lib-
eral head Camille Shamun and Phalangist chief Pierre Jumayyil.
Shamun and Pierre's son Bashir, the Phalangist militia commander,
are militants who have called for an end to the peacekeeping
force's mandate.
Later that day Pierre Jumayyil, after meeting with
President Sarkis, said renewal of the mandate would seem to be
in the interests of Lebanon and Syria, but added that changes
in its terms were essential.
These remarks represent a significant softening of
Shamun's recent statements and also indicate that Pierre has
taken a more moderate line than Bashir. The elder Jumayyil has
been equivocal about a continuation of the Syrian military
presence but until now has generally sided with Bashir and the
militants.
Discussion of the renewal of the mandate will probably
focus on a compromise formula being drawn up by Sarkis; it calls
for a reduction of Syrian Army positions in Beirut and their
replacement by Lebanese Army and police units.
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The move toward moderation by the Maronite leaders
may reflect only a tactical maneuver while they assess the im-
pact of the Camp David accords on the situation in Lebanon. The
emerging consensus could easily erode as the parties get down
to specific issues--such as the size of the force, the length
of the renewal, and whether Lebanese security forces will re-
place Syrian units in both the Christian and Muslim areas of
Beirut.
In the past, the Syrians have rejected-Christian de-
mands that Lebanese Army troops replace the Syrians only in
Christian East Beirut, arguing that this would. undermine Syria's
image as an impartial peacekeeping force. The Syrians have warned
Sarkis that, if he asks them to withdraw from one area of the 25X1
country, they will pull out altogether. Most Lebanese Muslims
and Palestinians oppose the stationing of units of the predom-
inantly Christian Lebanese Army in Muslim West Beirut.
USSR: Reaction to Camp David
Soviet President Brezhnev in a speech in Baku yester-
day firmly rejected the Camp David agreements, but stopped
short of other inflammatory charges that Soviet media have re-
cently raised against US Middle Eastern policy. In choosing to
emphasize the points he did, however, Brezhnev gave no indica-
tion the USSR feels that either the tone or the substance of
bilateral relations has improved in recent weeks.
The Soviet leader called the Camp David agreements a
"new anti-Arab deal" between Israel and Egypt that has active
US participation, and maintained that such attempts can only
make the situation in the Middle East even more explosive. Al-
though Brezhnev did not specifically mention Geneva, he recited
the standard Soviet argument that there is only one true path
to a final settlement and called for the participation of all
interested parties--including the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion--in any settlement.
Implicitly criticizing Secretary Vance's tour of the
Middle East, Brezhnev referred to attempts to compel other par-
ticipants in the conflict to succumb to the terms of the agree-
ments. Pravda, the Soviet party daily, yesterday went even
further, saying the Secretary was putting "strong pressure" on
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King Hussein. Apparently referring to Jordanian and Saudi state-
ments and to the meeting of the Arab Steadfastness Front in
Damascus, Brezhnev said Vance's mission would not be easy. He
did not, however, raise the charge that the US wants to insert
its own forces into the region as recent Soviet commentary has
alleged.
Brezhnev's comments on bilateral relations conveyed
a sense of continuing chill and placed the blame wholly on the
US. On SALT, Brezhnev asserted that differences are "quite sur-
mountable" and implied that a US lack of good will is all that
has prevented agreement.
The statements on SALT are consistent with. Soviet
public commentary this year, which has balanced a willingness
to conclude an agreement with a somber assessment of US inten-
tions. Brezhnev's statements yesterday are similar to those in
his speeches in April when he expressed skepticism about US
motives. Thus, Brezhnev is now less optimistic in public con-
cerning SALT than he was in an interview last December in
Pravda, when he described the prospects for an agreement as
favorable.
Brezhnev never referred specifically to US-China pol-
icy. The absence of a direct attack on "playing the China card"
suggests the Soviets recognize that further belaboring of this
point in public only serves to underscore Soviet ineffective-
ness.
Brezhnev also assailed US criticism of recent Soviet
trials of dissidents, US newsmen, and International Harvester
official Crawford. He defended Soviet courts for combatting un-
lawful activities, and asserted that the subsequent "loud propa-
ganda campaign" in the US was a "flagrant violation" of the
Helsinki agreements
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NAMIBIA: Election Preparations
South Africa's arrangements for conducting a Namibian
election in late November conform with some of the points in
the Western settlement proposal, although the plan contravenes
the basic Western premise of UN participation in all pha,es of
a transitional program. The arrangements, as well as official
South African commentary, indicate that South Africa is trying
to gain enough public sympathy in the West to counteract black
African pressures for UN sanctions.
The voting in Namibia will be for parties, not in-
dividual candidates. The number of seats in a 50-member con-
stituent assembly that a party may win will be proportional to
its share of the votes cast throughout the territory. This
provision, along with the voter registration that began in
June, conforms in theory with the stipulations in the Western
settlement proposal that all adult Namibians be eligible to
vote and that the election be held for the whole of Namibia
as one political entity.
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The South African Administrator General for Namibia
has announced that he is inviting the UN Secretary General
and the five Western members of the UN Security Council to
send observers "in order to satisfy themselves as to the fair-
ness of the process." The South African arrangements, however,
do not meet the Western stipulations that a UN task force par-
ticipate in a seven-month preparatory period to assure that
all political prisoners are released, all refugees are enabled
to return, all repressive or discriminatory laws are revoked,
and that freedom of speech, assembly, movement, and press are
guaranteed.
Namibian political groups must register by 11 Octo-
ber in order to compete in the election, which is scheduled
for five days beginning 20 November. The official explanation
for the deadline is that time must be provided for printing
the names of duly registered parties on the ballots. The
early deadline could also provide a legal basis for restrict-
ing the activities of the South-West Africa People's Organiza-
tion and other groups that say they intend to boycott the
election.
The South Africans are making extensive efforts to
get out the vote. Some 1,100 polling stations will be set up
to assure that inhabitants in even the most remote areas of
the territory can conveniently cast their ballots.
No doubt the South Africans realize that announce-
ment of an election to be held without a truce with SWAPO
and without a UN-monitored withdrawal of South African troops
will provoke the African group at the UN to demand additional
sanctions against South Africa. Representatives of the front-
line states and Nigeria have already indicated that they will
press for a Security Council resolution next week that adopts 25X1
the Secretary General's recommendations for a Namibian
settlement and at least threatens additional sanctions if the
South Africans obstruct UN participation.
SENEGAL: Succession Struggle
Senegalese President Senghor, who may- soon retire
despite his recent denial that his health is failing, moved this
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week against dissidents in the ruling party who hope to bloc
his designated constitutional successor--Prime Minister Diouf--
from taking office.
laced Babacar Ba, Diouf's chief rival
re
h
S
p
or
eng
//
and the strongest alternative claimant, as foreign minister and
is mounting a campaign to embarrass Ba politically. This will
not eliminate opposition to Diouf and could even stimulate
greater restiveness among his antagonists. Senghor's action will
probably reinforce the view that Diouf is a self-effacing crea-
ture of the President without a strong political base of his
own who cannot claim a mandate to lead Senegal.//
ctions in Senghor's party as well as minor opposi-
F
a
leaders are contesting Diouf's auto-
Arm
d t
y
op
tion parties an
matic succession. The military will be the final arbiter if there
is a protracted succession squabble, and Senghor will clearly
resist pressure to revise the constitution to provide for, a new
presidential election once he steps down.
arently remains a party member and is still a
B
pp
ews
A
h
muy vi
e
powerful political figure. We do not Know now t
Ba's dismissal. His civilian supporters are unhappy but have
not organized demonstrations on his behalf.
ECUADOR: Election in the Balance
The announcement Last night by Ecuador's Supreme
Electoral Tribunal of widespread voting irregularities and
fraud in the first round of presidential balloting held last
July could set the stage for canceling the election. The con-
duct of the tribunal--which has been manipulated behind the
scenes by some high-ranking military officers--has prompted
strong reaction from political parties and the media, but the
plotters may still be able to deprive populist candidate Jaime
RoLdos of a near-certain second-round election victory.
The charges were made on behalf of the tribunal by
its newly appointed president, Rafael Arizaga. Arizaga--con-
idered a tool of Supreme Council member General Duran and
s
Government Minister Jarrin, who want to abort the election--
replaced Jose Baquero de la Calle last week following a dis-
agreement over the extent and seriousness of the election
violations.
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lection proceedings--which al-
h
e e
The next move in t
ready have seen the disqualification of four formally announced
candidates--is now up to the government. A group of officers
opposed to the Duran-Jarrin plot is said to want a high-level
military review of the tribunal's findings. Duran aand ndoJarrin,
fearing the judgment of their military peers,
be pressing for an immediate annulment of the election.
is the key to solving the. election
d
a
President Pove
dispute. He has tied his prestige and credibility as president
to a successful and honorable conclusion of the election pro-
cess. We believe that he can still count on the support of a
number of ranking officers. The media and political leaders of
various persuasions also appear ready to rally to his side.
orts indicate that in the past
e
p
Nonetheless, some r
few weeks Poveda has become resigned to canceling the elections,
and forces favoring a continuation of the election process must
th-h our effort to
1 1
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now prevail upon the President to lead an
I)rVII
Poland-Czechoslovakia
Polish and Czechoslovak dissidents
eek
hi
,
s w
Earlier t
held their second secret meeting in northern Czechoslovakia
since early August.
t leader Jacek Kuron gave Western jour-
d
en
(Polish dissi
The two sides
nalists in Warsaw the communique from the meeting.
agreed to set up permanent working groups in order to exchange
information quickly and to ensure cooperation. The dissidents
also discussed convening a "political study seminar about in-
dependent civic activities in Eastern Europe."
hether Polish and Czechoslovak police
IIt is unclear w
deliberately chose not to prevent the meeting from taking place,
or whether they were unaware of when or where it would occur.
Kuron's apartment has since been searched and some of his
papers confiscated.
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The authorities have apparently taken no
.repressive
measures against the participants in the initial mee
ting, but
both regimes probably will now feel compelled to act forcefully
in order to counter the direct challenge of such active and
Portugal
In a speech to the nation last ni
ht
P
t
g
,
or
uguese
President Eanes asked the country's political parties to come
to an agreement so that a stable majority could be established
in parliament. If the parties cannot reach such an agreement,
Eanes suggested the nomination of a prime minister who would
form a government without a formal coalition but with the
participation of party members. Otherwise, Eanes said he would
propose a government to prepare for an election in 1980 or dis-
solve the parliament and call an election as soon as possible.
Eanes is giving the parties time to deliber
t
d
a
e, an
some reports suggest that they will be less rigid than they
were in the negotiations rior to the desi nation of Prime
Minister Nobre da Costa.
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Top Secret
(Security Classification)
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Top Secret
(Security Classification)
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