CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010034-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE 0
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Saturday 19 August 1978 CG NIDC 78/194
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NAL SECURITY INFORMATION
i Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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State Dept. review Top Secret 0
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NATIO
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturda
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
SYRIA: Assad's Domestic Position
LEBANON: Beirut Situation
ECUADOR: Election Plotting
PAKISTAN: Economic Direction
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SYRIA: Assad's Domestic Position
The two-year-old terrorist campaign against
Syrian President Assad's regime resumed recently after a
three-month Zull.
//The Deputy Interior Minister, who is a senior
security official, was assassinated in Damascus on 10 August.
This murder brings to at least 18 the number of prominent mem-
bers of Assad's minority Alawite sect killed since 1976. Heavy-
handed house-to-house searches in Damascus have been ineffective
'
s population. Security
and have disaffected some of the capital
protection for Alawite officials has been increased amid rumors
of other murders.//
The government seems incapable of ending the violence
or identifying who is behind it. We believe it is probably the
work of extremists within the majority Sunni sect, perhaps
abetted by anti-Assad Alawites or Iraq.
//While the terrorism heightens sectarian
tension in Syria it does not pose a major threat to the regime
as long as Assad can keep his grip on the military. In July,
Assad and his influential brother Rifaat imposed sweeping
changes in the military high command without any apparent dif-
ficulty. At least half of the new division and brigade command-
ers are Alawites.
LEBANON: Beirut Situation
Although the cease-fire has reduced tensions some-
what in Beirut, belief is widespread that more fighting between
Christian militiamen and Syrian troops is inevitable.
Beirut's port facilities, which had been closed
since early July, officially reopened yesterday, but sporadic
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shooting during the day kept them shut down. Bashir Jumayyil,
leader of the Phalangist militia, told US officials on Thurs-
day that although he was initially opposed to the truce, he
will abide by it because the Phalange party leadership has en-
dorsed it.
The political differences between the militias and
Syria have not been resolved, and the leaders of several of
Lebanon's warring factions are convinced that new fighting
is inevitable.
Syrian President Assad, as part of his continuing ef-
forts to build up a coalition of anti-Phalange Lebanese factions,
met with former President Franjiyah yesterday in Syria.
ECUADOR: Election Plotting
Despite repeated assurances by President Poveda
that Ecuador's military government will honor the results of
the country's two-stage presidential election, plotting persists
to deprive populist candidate Jaime RoZdos of a near-certain
second-round victory. Success for Roldos--whose 31 percent of
the.vote Zed all candidates in the initial balloting--appears
to hinge on Poveda's continued domination of the military
hierarchy and upon the President's personal commitment to the
democratization process.
//In a recent series of
statements in Quito and Bogota--where he attended the inaugu-
ration of Columbian President Turbay--Poveda restated "zis deter-
mination to respect the will of the electorate and to resist
any attempts to sidetrack the elections.//
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//A key to future developments should be provided
by the electoral tribunal's review of the first-round returns
from Guayas Province, Roldos' election stronghold. Should the
tribunal claim it has uncovered large-scale irregularities or
vote fraud there--?-some reports say as many as 177,000 votes 25X1
could be invalidated--the stage would appear to be set for
annulling the election. The tribunal could complete its review
of nationwide results by the second week in September.
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PAKISTAN: Economic Direction
/Pakistan's military government has been pre-
occupied with political issues and has made a slow start ad-
dressing economic problems since coming to power one year ago.
Those economic measures that have been undertaken have reflected
the government's conservative,.pro -business bias. Nevertheless,
a good cotton crop and increased remittances from overseas
workers have helped ease the economic problems left by former
Prime Minister Bhutto.//
//The government has prepared a new five-year plan
that focuses on developing the infrastructure, increasing agri-
cultural productivity, and stimulating the private. sector.
Islamabad apparently intends to go ahead with several of the
large capital-intensive projects inherited from the Bhutto re-
gime, even though most are commercially unsound. Some members
of the Pakistani planning bureaucracy, however, as well as the
World Bank--which plays a leading role in the consortium of
Western aid donors to.Pakistan--favor postponement of these
projects and a concentration on agricultural development.//
//The government is not under great pressure to
move rapidly in economic matters. It ended its first year in
power with inflation and balance-of-payments problems fairly
well under control. Real GNP growth averaged about 6 percent
in the first year Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia was in
power, compared with an average of 3.6 percent during the
Bhutto years--December 1971 through July 1977.//
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//Aided by a rebound in agricultural production--
except for w eat, which declined about 10 percent--and the
restoration of normal.supply and distribution channels for con-
sumer goods, the Zia government held inflation to about 10 per-
cent in the fiscal year ending on 30 June 1978.//
//Balance-of-payments problems have been eased
by sharply rising remittances from about 1 million Pakistanis
working overseas, mainly in the Persian Gulf states. Remittances
probably totaled $1 billion in the past fiscal year--enough to
slash the current account deficit by one-third, to lower new
financing requirements, and to increase foreign exchange re-
serves by $240 million to $660 million.//
//Despite the encouraging rebound, the economy re-
mains fragile. An uncertain investment climate persists even
though the business community is happier with the policies of
the present rulers than it was with the socialistic tendencies
of the Bhutto government.//
//Economic performance over the next fiscal year
will depend primarily on the agricultural sector--specifically
on good weather conditions. Another good cotton crop would
stimulate the textile industry and cotton exports, but the
government will have to import about 1.5 million tons of wheat
because of the shortfall last year.//
//External debts will remain a pressing but manage-
able problem. Despite a higher wheat import bill and an expected
slowdown in remittances, the government has ample foreign ex-
change reserves, and this, coupled with anticipated foreign. aid,
should allow it to manage its external accounts.
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