NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 7, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Monday 7 August 1978 CG NIDC 78/183
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e c re t
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, 7 August 1978
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I'Tne NID a e is for trio purpose of in orming
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
LEBANON: Renewed Shelling Page 1
CHINA-CAMBODIA-VIETNAM: Sitrep Page 1
AFGHANISTAN: Principal Judgment Page 2
USSR: Renewed Condemnation of Peking Page 4
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LEBANON: Renewed Shelling
//Syrian forces renewed their heavy shelling
of Christian neighborhoods in East Beirut this weekend in re-
taliation for continued Christian shelling and sniping. The
week-old stalemate in southern Lebanon between Lebanese Army
troops and Christian militiamen continues, although negotiations
are still under way and there are some signs of a possible com-
promise.//
//The Syrian artillery shelling of East Beirut
reportedly lasted over six hours Saturday night and was con-
centrated on the Christian districts of Ashrafiyah and Ain-
Rummaneh. It was apparently the heaviest shelling since the
five-day Syrian bombardment of Christian positions in the first
week of July that provoked Israeli threats of intervention. The
Syrians resumed heavy shelling of the Christian districts last
night.//
negotiations continue over the
future of Major Haddad, leader of the Christian militiamen in
the south. The cease-fire Haddad ordered on Friday seems to be
holding. Yesterday, Haddad announced to Israeli radio that he
had reached a "settlement" with the
Lebanese Army- hiif-
to give any details.
F
CHINA-CAMBODIA-VIETNAM: Sitrep
25X1 China used Cambodian Defense Minister Son Sen's visit
to Peking last week to warn Vietnam not to expand its border
war with Cambodia. Peking made the visit--which coincided with
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China's Army Day and which came at a time of sustained lriet-
namese military operations in eastern Cambodia--a major demon-
stration of its "militant solidarity" with Phnom Penh.
The Cambodian Defense Minister departed Peking on
Saturday proclaiming his visit a "complete success." His week-
long stay in China included a meeting with Premier Hua Kuo-feng
and extensive talks with Vice Premiers Teng Hsiao-ping and Chen
Hsi-lien. Son Sen undoubtedly briefed his hosts on the military
situation in eastern Cambodia and probably requested increased
military assistance.
In his speeches in Peking, Son Sen repeatedly attacked
the Vietnamese for their "aggression" against Cambodia. Although
they avoided mentioning Vietnam by name, Chinese leaders re-
sponded by assuring the Cambodians of Peking's unreserved "sup-
port and assistance."
The Chinese, moreover, published their most compre-
hensive and direct propaganda attack on Vietnam during the
course of Son Sen's visit. The article, which appeared in Red
Flag--the Chinese party's leading periodical--accused Vietnam
of willingly acting as Moscow's "forward outpost," of seeking
"regional hegemony" in Southeast Asia, and of pursuing a "war
of aggression" against Cambodia.
Cambodian Foreign Minister Ieng Sary--en route home
from the nonaligned conference--joined Son Sen in Peking last
Monday. The Chinese treated Ieng Sary's visit as a separate
occasion, however, for they apparently did not wish to upstage
Son Sen or otherwise dilute the military overtones of his visit.
AFGHANISTAN: Principal Judgment
//The Daily publishes the principal judgments of
an interagency Intelligence Memorandum entitled "Afghanistan:
Orientation and Policies of the Taraki Government."//
//The government of President Taraki that came to
power in April 1978 is much more closely oriented toward the
USSR than have been previous regimes in Afghanistan. The new
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government will attempt to preserve Afghanistan's basic inde-
pendence from Moscow, but it is not clear that it will be able
to control the growth of Soviet influence in the country.//
//We have no evidence that the USSR was directly
involved i.n the coup that brought the new government to power,
but Moscow has strengthened significantly its historically
strong position in Afghanistan. The Soviets' near-term aim is
to solidify the new government's control of the country and the
expanded Soviet presence in Afghanistan--both steps to ensure
against any backsliding in the bilateral relationship. Over the
longer term the Soviets will seek to guide the new regime in
the implementation of domestic and foreign policies compatible
with those of the USSR.//
//President Taraki's strength derives from his con-
trol of the Marxist-oriented Peoples' Democratic Party and the
support of critically placed leftist Army officers. The new
government, like its predecessors, has no widespread popular
support, however, and government control is very limited in
parts of the country. The new regime faces rebellion from some
Pathan tribes and strong opposition from Islamic conservatives.//
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//The survival of the Taraki government will depend
almost entirely on the military, and its loyalties are uncertain.
One or more attempted countercoups are probable, but it is not
clear that any will have organized the degree of military sup-
port necessary for success. The Soviets' expanded presence in
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ill provide the USSR with an
increasea a i y to in ervene militarily on short notice
if it should decide to do so in the future to protect a pro-
Soviet government in Kabul. We believe, however, that the USSR
will seek to avoid sending its own troops to Afghanistan.//
//The domestic policies announced by the new re-
gime, if implemented, would increase substantially the role of
government throughout the society, but they would not turn Af-
ghanistan into a Soviet-style state. Priorities include the re-
distribution of land and water rights, nationalization of in-
dustry, and basic reforms in education and health services.//
//Afghanistan's relations with its anti-Communist
neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, will deteriorate under the Taraki
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government, but in the near term probably not to the point of
armed conflict. The Afghans and Soviets will exercise restraint
with these states to avoid jeopardizing the security of the
Taraki regime; the Iranians and Pakistanis for the time being
will seek continued correct relations in the hope of limiting
the growth of Soviet influence in the area.//
//US-Afghan relations are likely to remain correct
but coo or the foreseeable future. The Afghans will. want to
preserve some tie to Washington as an appearance of balance in
their relations with the USSR, but Soviet influence and the
certainty that US assistance will remain modest compared with
that of the USSR will preclude a closer relationshi
USSR: Renewed Condemnation of Peking
Pravda's castigation of Peking on Friday is one of
a series of recent statements on the "China problem" that sug-
gest the USSR is increasingly preoccupied with the course of
US-Chinese relations. While Moscow is clearly concerned about
a US attempt to "play the China card" against the USA"R, the
Soviets seem more concerned about what they see as Peking's
potential to exploit "antidetente" sympathies within what Mos-
cow perceives as a divided US administration. Other Soviet
commentary suggests, however, that Moscow still sees the op-
portunity to insulate the US-Soviet relationship from poten-
tial manipulation by Peking.
The Pravda article of Friday--the second since early
June signed by I. Aleksandrov, a pseudonym indicating approval
by the top leadership--comes in answer to an article: by Chinese
Defense Minister Hsu Hsiang-Chien published in Peking last week.
Hsu attacked the USSR as China's main enemy while reiterating
the Maoist thesis on the validity of war as an instrument of
national policy even in the nuclear age. Aleksandrov holds up
Hsu's article as proof that the Chinese leaders "have been
gripped in a veritable militarist hysteria."
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I I Aleksandrov further warns that Western attempts to
play "Chinese card" coincide with the Maoist design "to
provoke . . . a military collision" between the US and USSR.
He implied that Washington should not be taken in by Peking.
In an address on Saturday, KGB chief and Politburo
member uriy Andropov continued the campaign against Peking by
charging that the Chinese were supporting the most reactionary,
anti-Soviet forces, including "the Washington hawks." Andropov,
however, included his condemnation of Peking in the context of
a generally positive affirmation of the Soviet policy of detente.
He said that most politicians in the West are aware
that there is no "reasonable alternative to detente." Andropov
thus seemed to imply that the Chinese threat to the US-Soviet
relationship stemmed from Peking's appeals to "Washington
hawks."
1: Yet another voice in recent Soviet commentary on US-
ine e relations has been that of Aleksander Bovin, currently
political observer for Izvestiya. Bovin is known for his some-
what maverick opinions, but he has close ties to members of the
Central Committee and is knowledgeable about high-level discus-
sions on various issues.
" In a domestic broadcast on Friday, Bovin argued that
Sino-US rapprochement" is not really in the offing but is
merely being talked about more. Bovin characterized Chinese
policy as an attempt to frustrate the development of Soviet-US
relations and noted that the US understands that a rapprochement
with China on an anti-Soviet basis "does not accord with the
global interests of the United States."
Bovin said there is a "struggle between two points of
view" in the US, with one group favoring making concessions to
China in order to press the USSR and another group arguing
against making such concessions out of concern they would under-
mine US-Soviet detente. Bovin concludes that neither group has
"gained the upper hand." He thus seemed to be urging the Soviet
leadership not to exaggerate the nature of the Chinese threat
to US-Soviet relations.
I IMoscow's escalation of polemics against Peking at
is time may reflect Soviet concern about the possible manipu-
lation of the "China card" in a broader international context,
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with immediate attention being focused on Chinese Premier Hua
Kuo-feng's coming visit to Iran, Yugoslavia, and Romania later
this month. The Soviets may be seeking to signal in advance
their unhappiness over Hua's trip and thus hopefully limit the
d their hosts
.
room for maneuver by both the Chinese an
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